Lords Sitting of 12 May 1936

Preamble
The House met at a quarter past four of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
MORTLAKE CREMATORIUM BILL. [H.L.]
Read 3a, and passed, and sent to the Commons.
SOUTH EAST CORNWALL WATER BOARD BILL.
Read 3a, with the Amendments, and passed, and returned to the Commons.
MERSEY DOCKS AND HARBOUR BOARD BILL.
Read 3a, with the Amendments, and passed, and returned to the Commons.

HIS MAJESTY THE LATE KING OF EGYPT: MESSAGE FROM THE KING.
THE EARL OF CROMER: My Lords, I have to convey to the House the following Message from the King:
"I thank you for your loyal and dutiful Address. I join most sincerely in your expression of deep regret at the melancholy tidings of the death of my illustrious friend His Majesty the King of Egypt, and I shall without fail communicate to King Farouk your message of profound sympathy with His Majesty, Her Majesty Queen Nazli and the Royal Family and with the Government and People of Egypt in the loss which they have sustained."

MILITARY MANŒUVRES: MESSAGE FROM THE KING.
THE EARL OF CROMER: My Lords, I have to convey to the House a further Message from the King:
"I have received your Address praying that I will make an Order in Council under the Military Manœuvres Acts, 1897 and 1911, a draft of which
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was presented to your Lordships' House on the 11th day of February last. I will comply with your advice."

ROAD TRAFFIC (DRIVING LICENCES) BILL.
Brought from the Commons; read 1a, and to be printed.
SHOPS (SUNDAY TRADING RESTRICTION) BILL.
Brought from the Commons; read 1a, and to be printed.
MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDER (STOCKTON-ON-TEES) BILL.
Brought from the Commons; read 1a; to be printed, and referred to the Examiners.
GREAT WESTERN RAILWAY (EALING AND SHEPHERD'S BUSH RAILWAY EXTENSION) BILL.
Brought from the Commons; read 1a, and referred to the Examiners.
LONDON AND NORTH EASTERN RAILWAY (LONDON TRANSPORT) BILL.
Brought from the Commons; read 1a, and referred to the Examiners.
SOUTHERN RAILWAY BILL.
Brought from the Commons; read 1a, and referred to the Examiners.
COINAGE OFFENCES BILL. [H.L.]
Returned from the Commons, agreed to.
MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDER (BRIDPORT JOINT HOSPITAL DISTRICT) BILL.
Returned from the Commons, with the Amendments agreed to.
VOLUNTARY HOSPITALS (PAYING PATIENTS) BILL. [H.L.]
Returned from the Commons, agreed to.
GLASGOW CORPORATION ORDER CONFIRMATION BILL. [H.L.]
Read 3a (according to Order), and passed, and sent to the Commons.
LONDON AND NORTH EASTERN RAILWAY ORDER CONFIRMATION BILL. [H.L.]
Read 3a (according to Order), and passed, and sent to the Commons.
EAST LOTHIAN COUNTY COUNCIL ORDER CONFIRMATION BILL.
Read 3a (according to Order), and passed.

POST OFFICE (SITES) BILL. [H.L.]
Reported from the Select Committee, with an Amendment, and re-committed to a Committee of the Whole House.
House in Committee (according to Order): The Amendment proposed by the Select Committee made.

SUGAR INDUSTRY (REORGANISATION) BILL.
Order of the Day for the House to be put into Committee read.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Earl De La Warr.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly:
[The EARL OF ON SLOW in the Chair.]
Clause 1 agreed to.
Clause 2:
Staff, expenses, and procedure, of Commission.
(6) The Commission may hold such inquiries as they consider necessary or desirable for the discharge of their functions under this Act; and if the Minister is satisfied that for the purposes of an inquiry into any definite matter it is necessary so to do, he may by order, specifying the matter to be inquired into, direct that in respect of any meeting of the Commission at which not less than three of the
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commissioners are present for the purpose of inquiring into that matter, the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act, 1921 (other than paragraph (a) of Section two thereof), shall apply to the Commission as if they were a tribunal established in manner provided by that Act and as if that Act had been applied to them in the manner thereby provided.
LORD ROCHE LORD ROCHE moved, in subsection (1), to leave out all words after the second "necessary" and insert "to appoint a special tribunal he shall have the power of a Secretary of State under the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act, 1921." The noble and learned Lord said: I beg to move the Amendment standing in my name. I desire to make it clear to your Lordships that this Amendment does not affect the substance or the business of the Bill. It is an Amendment to a machinery clause. On the substance of the Bill I desire to express no view. I live in an agricultural county where some beet sugar is grown and it certainly employs people. My only complaint is that that interesting bird the partridge does not like sugar beet as much as he likes the crops which preceded it.
With regard to this clause, if your Lordships would turn to subsection (6), on page 3, you will find that provision is made for certain inquiries, and, over the page, you will see an allusion to the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act, 1921. That is an Act under which an inquiry is at this moment proceeding. It is an Act which gives to a Tribunal very wide and extensive powers; in effect it makes the President of the Tribunal equivalent in power to a High Court Judge in this country or a Court of Session Judge in Scotland. It gives him the widest power of administering the oath, of compelling evidence, the production of bankers books and everything of that sort. It gives him everything except the power of committal for contempt of court. That is done, and may be done, on the Resolution of both Houses of Parliament in a matter of urgent public importance, and upon an Order of the Secretary of State. This subsection enables the Minister to do those things without any vote of either House of Parliament, leaving out the words "in a matter of urgent public importance." What is perhaps more important, if your Lordships will turn over the page to the

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words "other than paragraph (a) of Section two thereof," you will see words which look innocent but which amount to this. Under the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act itself the inquiry must be held in public unless it is detrimental that any part of it should be heard in public; then there may be closed doors. This Bill omits altogether the provision about inquiries in public, therefore they may be held in private. The inquiry may be held without any vote of either House of Parliament, and it may be held for any purpose as the Minister thinks fit.
I submit that that is not right. If the Minister wishes to hold an important inquiry then he can ask for no more than that, and that is what this Amendment gives him. He would then be put in the same position as the Secretary of State under the original Act. That is what this Amendment does. If, on the other hand, the Minister wants merely some machinery for other and less import inquiries, then he ought to seek it in some other way than this. There are precedents, I believe, by which, under Local Government Acts, inquiries may be held under some other Acts. I cannot help thinking that those who framed this Bill, quite inadvertently no doubt, have taken much greater powers than are needed, and have assumed for the Minister inquisitorial powers which they neither intended nor desired. If that is the true state of the facts, and they would like a better machinery, it can be provided quite simply in the words of the Bill itself for conducting the ordinary inquiries at the Department. If they were to say that they desired that that should be done, and that they would bring this matter up on Report with provisions to that effect, then, speaking for myself, I should be quite satisfied, but if it is desired to take and persist in these wide powers of holding secret inquiries then I object. I beg to move the Amendment standing in my name.
Amendment moved—
Page 3, line 43, leave out from ("necessary") to the end of the subsection and insert ("to appoint a special tribunal he shall have the power of a Secretary of State under the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act, 1921)."—(Lord Roche.)
THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION (EARL DE LA WARE): My Lords, it is quite true,
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as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Roche, said, that this is only a matter of machinery, but I think all of us will agree with him that it is a most important piece of machinery. In working out this new technique of endeavouring to control certain sections of industry it is important, while taking powers that are necessary and adequate for making any schemes we may set up effective, that we nevertheless do not take powers that are unnecessarily severe. I take it that the two points that are really in the noble and learned Lord's mind are these. The first is that it is wrong to entrust the Sugar Commission with powers that are really equivalent to the powers of a High Court Judge; that that is a step so serious that it should not be taken except by direction of Parliament in each particular case. The second point is that under the machinery he proposes all proceedings should be held in public unless the public interest should dictate otherwise.
LORD ROCHE: Under the proceedings ordered by the Act.
EARL DE LA WARR: Yes; whereas in the procedure that is proposed here that provision is omitted. Taking the first point, the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act does not confer all the powers of a High Court Judge. It confers only such powers as compelling the attendance of witnesses, the production of documents and the administration of oaths or affirmations. The power of enforcing obedience is not given. That, under the Act, can only be given by reporting a defaulter to the High Court, and it is then for the High Court itself to determine whether, and if so how, he is to be punished. The application of this Act is, I think, not a new one. It has been applied repeatedly before. It has been applied, for example, to inquiries held by the Coal Mines (Reorganisation) Commission, by Section 12 of the Coal Mines Act, 1930; to inquiries under the Public Works Facilities Act, 1930; to inquiries by the Agricultural Marketing (Reorganisation) Commission under the Agricultural Marketing Act, 1931—your Lordships will notice that all these are of comparatively recent dates—to inquiries held under the Wheat Act of 1932; and to inquiries held by the Sea Fish Commission under the Sea Fishing Industry Act, 1933. Your Lordships will agree

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that there are very considerable precedents for this.
I hope your Lordships will forgive me if I deal with this matter at some length, but I think it is important. The real answer to both Lord Roche's points lies in the nature of the functions entrusted to the Commission under the Bill. The Commission is charged with the duties of
"keeping under review the growing of sugar beet and the manufacture, refining, marketing and consumption of sugar in the United Kingdom, and of advising and assisting the Minister and the Treasury in such matters relating to the sugar industry as he or they may require of them ".
They have a great number of specific duties conferred upon them by the Bill, such as the determination of the terms and conditions of purchase of sugar beet, the annual approval of arrangements for the production and marketing of sugar, and the approval of sugar refining agreements.
With regard to Lord Roche's point about the privacy of the procedure, the section to which the noble and learned Lord refers deals with matters of public interest in relation to which it may or may not be desirable for proceedings to be made public. In this case the bulk of the inquiries for gathering information by the Commission will not be dealing with matters of exclusive public interest. The Commission will be taking evidence from private companies, companies that might very well be most unwilling to give information unless the proceedings are held in camera. For these reasons I would ask the noble and learned Lord not to press the point. I can assure him that the Government throughout have had his considerations very much in mind. It is their view that if we are to make this machinery effective and carry out these inquiries with full justice to private interests it is necessary to maintain the present form of the inquiries.
LORD MAUGHAM: My noble friend who has been supporting the clause by a reference to certain previous Acts cannot be completely aware, I think, of the contents of those Acts. One to which he referred was the Wheat Act of 1932. It so happens that I have that Act in my hand. It is not accurate to say that the clause to which this Amendment is moved is in pari materia with what was contained in the Wheat Act. What was done there was something different and, I
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think your Lordships will see, something much less objectionable than that which is proposed now. By Clause 12 (1) of the Wheat Act, the Minister was permitted to make, regulations for, amongst other things, applying the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act, 1921, which is an Act giving all sorts of powers to Tribunals, to the Committee to be appointed under Section 2 (3) of the Wheat Act as if the Committee were a Tribunal established in manner provided by that Act. So far so good, but then the Act provided something which is very germane to the present question.
By Section 18 it was provided that:
"All orders, regulations and by-laws made under this Act shall be laid before Parliament as soon as may be after they are made, and if either House, within the next subsequent twenty-eight days…resolves that the Order, regulation or by-law be annulled, it shall forthwith be void."
If the Government will insert something of that sort in the present Bill the objections to it—I do not know what view my noble and learned friend Lord Roche will take—would, so far as I am concerned, be removed. The objection which I can see is that, without the authority of Parliament and without any information to the public, in what I think may be not unfairly described as a hole-and-corner way, a tribunal may be set up with powers not quite so extensive indeed as those of the High Court but still very extensive—with powers, for instance, to administer oaths and summon witnesses to their great inconvenience, and in fact to compel answers to questions and thus to interfere with the liberty of the subject, a thing which in my judgment ought not to be sanctioned by this House unless some knowledge is given to the members of the Legislature before they come into force. If Section 18 of the Wheat Act, 1932, or some reasonable modification of it, were incorporated in the present Bill I think the objection would largely be met.
LORD ROCHE: In response to the invitation extended to me may I say that if the noble Earl will put into the Bill on Report the same provision as there is in the Wheat Act I should be abundantly content, but I am bound to tell him that it is entirely different from this clause. It applies all the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act except that it makes the

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Commission the Tribunal. That I conceive is a fair offer, because it is appealing to his own precedent and asking him to adopt it.
LORD HASTINGS: I think the noble and learned Lord is entitled to the gratitude of the House for drawing attention to this matter. I am bound to say, however, that if the noble and learned Lord, Lord Roche, had the same not altogether satisfactory experience which has fallen to many of us of what happens on Report, he would not be quite so willing to withdraw the Amendment now. The noble and learned Lord has put before the Committee in a most lucid manner exactly what is intended to be done by the clause which is under discussion. It would be quite out of place for me even to endeavour to elaborate what has fallen from the noble and learned Lord, but I should like to say a word or two if I may upon the answer given by the noble Earl. The noble Earl's answer to my mind did not in any way meet the point which had been raised by Lord Roche. It was the kind of formal answer which one would expect to get from an overweening bureaucracy which was reaching out for as much power as it could possibly get. My lack of sympathy for that kind of answer has been voiced more than once in this House, and I voice it again now.
The attempt which is made in this Bill is to give to the Minister power which at the present moment is only vested in a Secretary of State. The safeguard by which a Secretary of State, as has been pointed out by Lord Roche, must move Parliament before he can obtain the authority which he desires, is sought to be shortheaded by this Bill. The noble Earl gives as a reason for that proposal a certain number of precedents. I am painfully aware that those precedents which he gave are correct, but two wrongs never make a right, and the fact that Parliament has in error permitted this kind of thing to slip through in the past is surely all the more reason why your Lordships should prevent it from again slipping through in the future. From the point of view of the beet sugar industry, is it not wise to keep a sense of proportion? This is, after all, nothing more nor less than a trade inquiry. Is it necessary to set up all this machinery for holding what is nothing but a trade inquiry? I hope that
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your Lordships are not going to have anything of the kind. There are quite enough Jacks-in-office at present for us not to want any more, and that is the intention of this Bill. Now that it has been exposed by the noble and learned Lord I cannot see how any noble Lord in this House can wish to support it, and I hope that the noble and learned Lord will take his Amendment to a Division.
EARL DE LA WARR: The noble Lord spoke of a sense of proportion. I hope that the framers of this Bill have shown a great deal more sense of proportion than has the noble Lord. If it is really to be suggested that Parliament is going to give these enormous Exchequer subsidies to different sections of our industries and then take no adequate powers whatever to see that those subsidies are to be rightly and properly administered, then, if the noble Lord attempts to persuade Parliament not to ask for adequate powers, I think he will find that he has taken on a very heavy responsibility and the effect may well be to the great disadvantage of those industries which he is expressing his desire to help. If I might deal with the point which is now before your Lordships, the proposal of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Roche, which is that we should consider bringing this Bill into conformity with, for instance, the Wheat Act between now and Report, I most willingly give him that undertaking.
LORD ROCHE: Might I just understand what the undertaking is? I did not quite catch what the noble Earl said.
EARL DE LA WARR: I speak with some diffidence here, because I am speaking as a layman to a lawyer on a question of law, but I should like to say that I will most certainly ask my noble friend to give this whole matter his consideration with a view to incorporating what I think was his proposal—that we should incorporate the words from Section 18 of the Wheat Act, which virtually make the order an affirmative order. Do I misunderstand the noble and learned Lord?
LORD ROCHE: Section 18 of the Wheat Act, as I read it, enables the Minister to do what the Secretary of State can do but also enables him to

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make his Committee or Commissioners a Tribunal. Otherwise he has to comply with the Act. That is what the Wheat Act does. They could not make rules which did not comply with the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act, 1921, and if they did, the rules in my humble opinion would be ultra vires. If the noble Lord wants the inquiries, he does not require this sledge hammer. I submit that the proper course is to make milder provisions—for instance, that the Commission should have power to summon witnesses—and put them into the Bill itself.
EARL DE LA WARR: I cannot go further than to give the noble and learned Lord the undertaking to go into this question between now and Report. It is a complicated legal matter and it would be most unwise for any of us to try to draft a new clause on our feet. In saying that, however, may I assure the noble and learned Lord that it is a genuine undertaking.
LORD HASTINGS: If the noble and learned Lord makes it quite clear to the House, that he is going to reserve to himself the full right to put down this same Amendment again, then I think perhaps it would be courteous to give an opportunity to the Ministry of Agriculture to redraft that proposal, if they feel disposed to make any change at all. On that condition, although I am in no way entitled to advise or anything of that kind, I would personally refrain from pressing the noble and learned Lord to go to a Division.
LORD ROCHE: I am extremely obliged because, to be quite frank, I did not know what my proper course or my rights were. I should be very glad—while making it perfectly plain that I reserve my rights in that regard—to leave the matter as suggested.
EARL DE LA WARR: A perfectly normal course would be for His Majesty's Government to consider the matter and enter into discussions with the noble and learned Lord, if he would be willing, and then they would be perfectly free to take what action they thought fit.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 2 agreed to.
Clauses 3 and I agreed to.
Clause 5:
Functions of Corporation as to purchase of home-grown beet.
5.—(1) Subject to the provisions of this section it shall be the duty of the Corporation to enter into contracts for the purchase by the Corporation of home-grown beet upon such terms and conditions as may be determined by an agreement made, after consultation with the Commission, between the Corporation and a Sugar Beet Marketing Board, or, where there is no such board, any body which in the opinion of the Commission is substantially representative of: the growers of home-grown beet or, where there is no such agreement, upon such terms and conditions as may be determined by an order made by the Commission:
Provided that, with a view to securing that the quantity of sugar manufactured by the Corporation in Great Britain from home-grown beet received by it in every year will be, as nearly as may be, the standard quantity, the Commission shall for every year determine the acreage of land in respect of the produce of which such contracts as aforesaid may be entered into by the Corporation for delivery in that year, and the Corporation shall not enter into such contracts in respect of beet grown for delivery in that year on more than that acreage.
(2) With a view to securing that the acreage in respect of which such contracts as aforesaid may be entered into by the Corporation for delivery in any year is not exceeded, provision for the determination from time to time of the quantity of home-grown beet that may be acquired from any person by the Corporation shall be made with the approval of the Commission; and such provision as aforesaid shall be made either by a scheme under the Agricultural Marketing Acts, 1931 to 1933, limiting the quantity of home-grown beet that may be sold by any person to the Corporation, or by arrange-merits made by the Corporation limiting the quantity of home-grown beet that may be purchased by the Corporation from any person.
LORD PHILLIMORE LORD PHILLIMORE moved to leave out the proviso in subsection (1). The noble Lord said: Mine is also an attempt to knock another shackle off the fetters that are going to surround the liberties of the subject. I wish I thought I could do it with the same authority as the legal profession properly can. It might be convenient if I dealt with all my Amendments relating to Clause 5. The first seeks to do away with the restriction on acreage and therefore the restriction on output, and the whole of the case for not putting this limitation on production was far more ably and convincingly put by the noble Lord, Lord Hastings, than I could hope

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to put it, during the debate on the Second Reading.
What is the position? We are told that there shall be a fixed subsidy; no more than that shall be spent. I gather there may even be economies. I am not asking for a penny more of public money to be spent on the beet sugar industry; therefore I take it that the question of Privilege, amongst other things, does not arise. In any case I am really anxious that no more money should be spent on the beet sugar industry. All I am asking for is that there should not be a permanent limitation of production and a restriction on cropping against the farmer. In other words, I want to see both the total restriction of acreage, which it is proposed should be enforced through the Sugar Commission, and the basic acreage per farm done away with. To my mind, to take that second point first, it is an absurdity that there should be attached to an individual grower what amounts to a monopoly; as the noble Earl in charge of the Bill was very quick to point out on Second Reading, the same kind of monopoly that the brewer may have on his licensed public-house. The brewers go on for ever. Farmers and farms are constantly changing, and it does not in the least follow that because a farmer may have a good title to sow fifty acres of sugar beet in the year 1936, when possibly his family is at its prime of capacity, he will have the same capacity to sow fifty acres in 1946, but so far as you can see from the Bill, having once established a right to a given acreage he will always, subject to the Sugar Commission, retain that right for ever.
Here, again, may I cite the Wheat Act? As your Lordships are aware there is a definite limit to the amount of money that goes out in subsidies on the growing of wheat, and if farmers like to grow more wheat than last year they know well that they will receive a lower price per quarter for it and yet they have so decided, and the history of wheat growing since the Wheat Act is that the acreage of wheat has very much gone up. It has fluctuated considerably from year to year, and with it the price per quarter has fluctuated by a narrow margin—a few shillings per quarter. I submit that exactly the same thing would happen in the case of sugar beet. Whereas the proposed subsidy will result to the
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farmers this year in a price of 4s. 9d. per cwt, it may well, if the Amendment be accepted, result in a price of 4s. 8d. or 4s. 7d. or 4s. 6d. in succeeding years, but that is not going to kill the sugar-beet industry. It is not going to prevent a man, who finds that it is the best way of resting his land, from growing sugar beet, merely because he will get a smaller price per cwt. for his sugar beet.
As I have said, Lord Hastings has already developed on Second Reading lines the arguments against restriction, but there was one point which I believe was not mentioned. Under the structure of the Bill it is highly improbable, and indeed almost impossible, that additional sugar factories should be set up. If there are not additional sugar factories the transport from distant places to existing sugar factories will decide to a large extent how much sugar beet is grown, and it is highly unlikely that there will be any large increase in the acreage put down to sugar beet. I do not think, therefore, there is anything to be frightened of in that respect. One other point. In the long run the Sugar Commission, which has already nineteen separate functions, will have to decide every single year, successively, what will be the acreage allowed for sugar beet growing in this country. Further, I think I am right in saying that the Sugar Beet Commission will have to decide the basic acreage per farmer. Is it right that we should place in the hands of the Board such a very onerous, difficult and technical duty, for no apparent gain that I can find whatsoever.
What I have said so far refers to my first Amendment to Clause 5. As to the second Amendment—to insert a new proviso—that deals only with the small holder, or the man at any rate who is prepared to grow less than one acre of sugar beet on his farm. I speak with a great deal of feeling about small holders. They are a body whom I think we all on both sides of the House are most anxious to encourage. They are a body which the Government themselves take steps to encourage, and which the county councils have also encouraged to a large extent. There are a considerable number of beet growers who are already small holders, but when I was speaking on the Second Reading—I am not sure that the noble

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Earl quite appreciated this—I was referring then more to such persons who want to become small holders and growers of sugar beet. You are inviting people in hundreds to go on the land as small holders. When they have got there you tell them: You must not grow hops, you must not grow potatoes, or you will have to pay a fine of £5 per acre, and now you must not grow sugar beet. Very soon they will not be allowed to grow geraniums.
How are you going to encourage small holders if you restrict them in that way? Is it not wise to use our soil to the best advantage? Is it not necessary that we should get our men, who are competent but unemployed, at work on the land, where they can produce wealth? Surely, the arguments for striking out the small holder from this opportunity are not worth while. On the other hand, the concession which I am asking the Government to give me on this Amendment is so triflingly small, as compared with the additional acreage, that it cannot affect the whole structure of the Bill. If you take a thousand small holders with one acre each it would not have much effect on the sugar beet industry, and for that reason I do not think the Government should resist the Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Clause 5, page 6, leave out lines 29 to 38.—(Lord Phillimore.)
LORD HASTINGS: My Lords, I find myself in great difficulty in dealing with this important series of Amendments put down by Lord Phillimore. The Committee will remember, perhaps, that on the Second Reading I ventured to develop strong arguments against the whole principle of the limitation of production, but that I felt myself compelled, by reason of the structure of the Bill, to admit the necessity of such limitation, although I was in principle very strongly opposed to it, and I ventured to put it to the House that the structure of the Bill was wrong. I am glad to see that, speaking with much greater authority, Lord Bledisloe drew attention to the alternative, the alternative being to have no subsidy and to eliminate the Excise. I know that that is not a practical proposition to suggest now, on the Committee stage of the Bill, but it is enough to remind your Lordships and the country
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that the effective subsidy in this first year—and that is confirmed by the noble Earl—will be no more than 4s. 9d. per cwt., and the Excise 4s. 7d. It does seem, therefore, unfortunate, to put it no more strongly, that a Bill creating machinery of the magnitude which is set up by this Bill should form an Act of Parliament for the sake of 2d. I saw Lord Rhayader smile. He would not admit that the difference is only 2d. If time and place were appropriate I should be prepared to argue it with him, but not now. I have found myself, as I have said, in the great difficulty of having to swallow principle or vote against the Second Reading of the Bill, which I am very un-desirous of doing, and perhaps now, though trying to avoid a Second Beading speech, I might give one or two reasons why the Amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Phillimore, are in fact incontrovertible and yet are most difficult of acceptance.
The Bill as drawn provides for a limitation of subsidy, and simultaneously a limitation of tonnage upon which that subsidy shall be paid, and it is of course perfectly clear that if the tonnage were to increase and the subsidy did not increase, each ton would receive a smaller subsidy than is proposed in the Bill. As my noble friend pointed out, that is the same principle as is applied to the Wheat Act, but the restriction of production which is applied in this Bill and not in the Wheat Act has not in fact militated against the success of the Wheat Act. My noble friend went on to say that, in so far as his later Amendments are concerned, the withdrawal of limitation from growers of less than one acre would be likely to affect the scheme to-as small an extent as has been the case in the Wheat Act. It is a fact that sugar beet growing is a highly developed industry in certain parts of the Fens which have become more and more settled by small holding communities, and it is, I think, quite certain that if no limitation were imposed upon the growing of sugar beet by those communities, the tonnage produced would be vastly larger than is anticipated by my noble friend, and that consequently the value of the subsidy to previous growers would be watered down to a figure which would make sugar beet growing no longer a practical proposition.

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That brings us up against a very big social question. Small holders have now in many of the lighter Fen areas only two alternative crops. One is potatoes and the other is sugar beet. We have to bear in mind that potatoes are now grown upon restricted acreage and that the small holder has not the alternative of going back to potato growing, be is faced with sugar beet as practically the only crop which he can profitably grow. Now if you limit production in the way that the Bill does limit it, and absolutely forbid, as you do, the small holder to develop sugar beet cultivation, you instantly put a complete stop to the increase of small holdings. That is where the big social question comes in. The case that I am making is perfectly well known to the Ministry of Agriculture, because I know of at least one county small holding committee which has, and quite properly, already given facts and figures to the Ministry of Agriculture in connection with this Bill. But you will not be able to have it both ways. You either have to insist upon the Bill as it stands, and with it limit the expansion of small holdings, or you have to admit unlimited production for holders of under one acre of land and admit of the expansion of small holdings.
I have felt when considering this matter that it is really not the business of a Back Bencher to outline and lay down a policy for the Government. If the Government realise that the policy embodied in this Bill must militate against any big scheme of land settlement which they chance to have in mind, and decide that the policy of the Bill is the one they are going to stick to, then it is the Government's responsibility and not ours. At the moment I think all that I can possibly do is to take the Bill as it stands, apply it to the interests of the sugar beet growers as they are, and come to the inevitable conclusion that it is impossible to allow of the inclusion of the unlimited small holder, if I may use that term, because the detriment to the existing grower would be too great. It goes very much against the grain to have to come to that conclusion, and it is an argument, I think, stronger than any other that could be adduced, that really the structure of the Bill is wrong. It ought to have been approached from a different angle. But, things being what
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they are, it would be extraordinarily difficult to insist upon the inclusion of these Amendments in the Bill without really destroying the industry for those who now live by it, and therefore I am bound, I repeat, most reluctantly to come to the conclusion that the Amendments, though drawn with the best intentions, are not altogether practicable.
I would like very much if I could to leave some loophole in the Bill for the expansion of the sugar beet and the sugar industry which I think will be necessary when the whole relation of agriculture to defence comes into perspective, and I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Rhayader himself, whose courteous appreciation of my poor efforts is always very much greater than those efforts could possibly deserve, might perhaps be inclined to view with less antagonism—I will not put it any stronger than that—an attempt to provide for the foodstuffs of the people, as I feel that a Bill of this character really ought to provide. But I will not attempt to commit the noble Lord to any opinions of any kind. I apologise for having held the Committee so long on this subject, but there is some excuse, for really it is at the bottom of the Bill. This question of the limitation of production is the most important point in the whole Bill. I said on the Second Reading that I regard it as a cardinal sin to limit production while there still remains a market, and I do so regard it, but the Government compel me, much against my will, to take the narrow view and to protect the interests of the sugar beet grower, when I know that the broad view is the right one, and that the small holder is the man who ought to be first considered. I shall be most interested to hear what the noble Earl has to say about this particular point, and I would like to reserve judgment as to what we finally do upon the basis of his speech. If that speech gives me the opportunity of forming a different view while this debate proceeds, I shall be only too delighted to be able to do so.
VISCOUNT BLEDISLOE: I feel bound, coming from the West of England as I do, and particularly in view of the apparent mental tangle in which my noble friend finds himself, hailing from the East of England, to say that if the noble Lord, Lord Phillimore, goes into the Lobby on this Amendment I for my part,

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not only as representing myself, but a very large number of fellow sugar producers in the West of England, will most certainly support him. Of course, as the noble Lord, Lord Hastings, has pointed out, we in this House are in considerable difficulties in dealing with the important matter of principle as to whether this subsidy is really necessary, at any rate under existing conditions. If only Excise could be dealt with on an equitable basis it would be a different matter. I may say quite frankly that we in the West of England have for at least ten years been looking forward to the prospects of a factory being established within our area. We grow beet quite successfully, at any rate on our lighter or not too heavy soils—beating in mind that our beet is of a very high quality and that we have learnt by experience how best to grow it—and we do feel that the time has arrived when we are entitled to have a factory established, particularly when the Government make it part of their business to safeguard the production of sugar in this country. We feel we are entitled to have a factory, or at least not to have to pay such heavy transport charges as we shall have to pay if this Bill becomes law for the transport of our sugar beets to a distant factory in some other part of England.
I feel very strongly that it is a little bit unfair to us who farm to the best of our power, and achieve good cultivation, incidentally, by the adoption of this crop on our farms in the West of England, that this proviso will in fact have the effect of limiting the beet factories already in existence and thereby place us under a very severe handicap which we would not have to face if private enterprise were given the free play which it enjoyed in less socialistic days. This handicap possibly, and I think probably, would have been overcome in the early future as the result of individual enterprise. I for my part shall support the noble Lord if he thinks it worth while to go into the Lobby.
EARL DE LA WARR: This Amendment strikes at the root principle of the Bill, but before dealing with the specific points in the Amendment I would like to make it quite clear that we are not discussing the question of restriction of production. We are discussing the question of the limitation of Government
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assistance, and if those who are responsible for the beet sugar industry care to say to-morrow that in their view it is such an economic industry that they can carry on without Government assistance, and that the extra tonnage will not cost the taxpayer any money, there would be no question whatever of limiting their acreage. The noble Lord, Lord Hastings, has really replied to the demand for this Amendment, and said exactly what I would have said. I do not think it would be proper for me on the Committee stage, in dealing with a specific Amendment, to discuss the whole question of whether the Bill ought to have been fundamentally redrafted. I consider there are extraordinarily good reasons why that should not be done, but I shall not weary your Lordships with these reasons at this moment. The noble Lord, Lord Phillimore, has said that he does not want an increased subsidy, but how are you going to get that increased acreage without increasing the subsidy or doing, as the noble Lord, Lord Hastings, has said—namely, so radically decreasing the per capita subsidy that it becomes virtually valueless?
LORD PHILLIMORE: As in the Wheat Act.
EARL DE LA WARR: Why, the noble Lord asks, do you not do as in the Wheat Act? The Wheat Act was a very much simpler proposition. The Wheat Act dealt simply with the question of subsidy, but here you are dealing with a commodity assisted in two ways—by subsidy and by duty preference. That is why this Amendment is really dealing with a point of privilege, because for every extra ton of beet that is grown, even though no additional subsidy is paid, there is to be an increased duty preference, and to that extent it is going to result in a heavy loss to the Exchequer. I have worked it out rather hurriedly, and I shall not answer for the figure to a penny, but if the noble Lord will assume that ten tons of beet are grown to the acre, I think he will find that in duty preference alone an extra acre of sugar beet will cost the Exchequer something like £7. Therefore you are up against this point: unless you are going to increase the assistance you must maintain the limitation of acreage and quantity grown.

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The noble Lord who moved this Amendment referred to the following Amendment in the same speech, and therefore, if noble Lords will permit me, I shall deal with the next Amendment also. His point—and it is a point that it is extraordinarily difficult not to sympathise with—is that here we are, we want to see small holdings increased in this country: beet sugar is essentially a small holder's crop, and therefore it is most desirable that the small holder growing less than one acre should be excepted from the limitation. But if the small holder growing an acre or less thereby comes into cultivation, that means that somebody else has got to go out of cultivation unless you cut at the whole principle of the Bill. I suggested to the noble Lord on the Second Reading that by far the best way of dealing with this question would be to leave it to the Sugar Commission. We all recognise that it is desirable that small holders should be admitted to the production of sugar beet as far as possible, but there is a very clear principle at stake. Having admitted that it is desirable that something should be done, we have got to decide whether we are going to deal with it from Whitehall or Parliament, or set up a responsible body within the structure of self-government in the industry, and say: "It is for you to settle these matters of detail." I think this is the main question of principle which divides this side of the House from the other. Whereas they would try to reconstruct industry according to set formulas laid down in Whitehall, we say we are going to provide the machinery of self-government whereby the industry will be able to solve these problems for itself. That is really the principle which is at stake in the second Amendment. For that reason I suggest to your Lordships that you should not pass the Amendment and I hope the noble Lord will not move it.
LORD PHILLIMORE: There are really, of course, two Amendments. The first one deals with the general question of restriction, and the second one with the very small holders, the people for whom I only ask leave to grow half an acre of sugar beet a year. I am disappointed to find that, at any rate in the second case, the noble Earl can do nothing better than refer me to the Sugar Commission, whose hands will be already tied. I know they will not be tied in so many
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words, but they will be tied by the whole structure of this Bill, which, as the noble Lord, Lord Hastings, has pointed out, leaves a good deal to be desired. I am not sure that it is any use dividing the Committee on this question, but I do beg everybody on this side of the House, at any rate, to consider whether there are going to be any crops left which anybody engaged in agriculture will be allowed to grow.
On Question, Amendment negatived.
Clause 5 agreed to.
Clauses 6 to 20 agreed to.
Clause 21:
Provisions as to the making, approval, and revocation, of licensing schemes.
(3) For the purposes of paragraph (e) of subsection (1) of this section and for the purposes of the last foregoing subsection the necessary majorities of registered refiners are—

(a) the registered refiners who, in the opinion of the Minister, are capable of producing more than one-half of the quantity of refined sugar that all the registered refiners are capable of producing;

(b) more than one-half of the number of registered refiners.

LORD PHILLIMORE LORD PHILLIMORE moved, in paragraph (a) of subsection (3), to substitute "two-thirds" for "one-half". The noble Lord said: This is a totally different subject. I do not know whether I am right in supposing that this is the first Bill which has passed or which may pass your Lordships' House that says, in so many words, that it intends its provisos to work notwithstanding any rule of law relating to agreement in restraint of trade. I must say that to see those words used in a Bill of this nature gave me rather a shock, and when I went on to find that it was proposed in certain circumstances to force on the whole of the sugar refining industry an agreement by which their freedom of trade would be restricted, and that the only proviso for their safeguard demanded a bare majority of votes of the members of the registered sugar refiners, then I really did think that the noble Earl was on his way to that dictatorship which we are all expecting him to assume. Surely, if you are going to cramp an industry within so narrow a framework as that, it is right that you should have at any rate a substantial majority of the trade to agree

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with you before they submit to it. One small disgruntled sugar refiner may turn the scale against half the wiser heads of the trade, and the whole of this enormous industry may be confined within the limits proposed for it in this Bill. I am not going to make a long speech. The subject has been before your Lordships in other cases, but I submit that it is only reasonable to say that at least three-quarters of the licensed sugar refiners should vote in favour of these proposals before they are sanctioned on either basis.
Amendment moved—
Clause 21, page 23, line 35, leave out ("one-half") and insert ("two-thirds").—(Lord Phillimore.)
EARL DE LA WARR: As I gathered, the effect of this Amendment would be to require a two-thirds majority of the registered refiners instead of a 50 per cent. approval. No doubt the object of the noble Lord, Lord Phillimore, is to bring this Bill into conformity with the Marketing Acts, which lay down the need for a two-thirds majority before a marketing scheme can come into effective operation. But I do not think that the noble Lord, on further examination, would be prepared to contend that a refiners' licensing scheme is completely analogous to a marketing scheme. Actually, the licensing scheme will be prepared not by an interested body of producers but by an independent body, the Sugar Commission, and, further, the safeguards provided for interested parties are very much greater in the case of procedure for the approval of a licensing scheme than they are under the Marketing Acts.
There is, I think, another point, and one of some importance, and it is this. Those who will be called upon to vote for these schemes will be business firms of very considerable standing, and it can be presumed that they will understand what they are voting for; whereas it is necessary to be particularly careful in the case of farmers, who are very numerous and spread all about the country and have some difficulty in really keeping in touch with what is happening. In such a state of affairs as that there is a great obligation on us to ensure that a scheme is not carried just by a bare majority consisting possibly of considerable numbers who do not really understand the scheme. But there is no danger of that
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in regard to the provisions of this Bill. There is a further proposal contained in the noble Lord's Amendment, and that is that there should be the same two-thirds majority required for the revocation of the scheme. That, I think the noble Lord would agree, would take it completely out of touch and contact with the Marketing Acts where 50 per cent. is sufficient for a revocation. Therefore, whilst on the one hand increasing the protection to registered refiners, the noble Lord, on the other hand, is proposing to decrease that protection. I would point out to the noble Lord that under this scheme—I do not lay too much stress on this—it is not sufficient for outside bodies to discuss the matter and settle it. The whole of this scheme in fact has been very carefully discussed with interested parties who will be most affected by it. I would, therefore, ask your Lordships not to agree to the Amendment of the noble, Lord.
On Question, Amendment negatived.
Clause 21 agreed to.
Clauses 22 to 24 agreed to.
Clause 25:
Penalties for false statements.
25.—(1) If for the purpose of obtaining any payment by way of assistance, supplementary payment, apportionment of supplementary payment, or allowance, either for himself or for any other person any person makes any untrue statement or untrue representation, he shall he guilty of an offence under this Act and shall, in respect of each offence, be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding fifty pounds or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months or to both such fine and imprisonment, unless he proves that he did not know, and could not with reasonable diligence have ascertained, that the statement or representation was untrue.
LORD MAUGHAM LORD MAUGHAM moved, in sub-section (1), after the second "person," to insert "knowingly or recklessly." The noble and learned Lord said: I hope not to occupy your Lordships very long in explaining the reasons for what I regard as a somewhat important Amendment. Clause 25 of this Bill provides for what appears to me to be a new crime. There are to be a number of statements made by farmers who require payment and allowances of various kinds, and the clause provides that if the farmer makes an untrue statement, which to a lawyer means a statement that is not accurate, whether

923
he has made this statement innocently or otherwise, he is to be guilty of an offence and to be liable to a fine or imprisonment not exceeding three months, or both, unless he proves—the onus being thrown on him—that he did not know—then come very remarkable words:
"and could not with reasonable diligence have ascertained, that the statement or representation was untrue."
That is a wide departure from the practice of the Legislature with regard to statements, returns, and other documents which have to be signed by various citizens.
It amounts to this, that if, by lack of some inquiry or by lack of being able to understand the forms which are sent out by officials, a man has made a statement which turns out to be not true, he is liable to fine and imprisonment. It is not the course which the Legislature has generally adopted. I hope your Lordships are accustomed to use reasonable diligence in making Income Tax returns. You get a form which is known as Form 12. It lies on the tables of many of us. It is a document I think of some 16 pages or thereabouts, including in the middle a lot of small-print statements of instruction or assistance for the purpose of filling up the form. I do not know if your Lordships have ever been able to read to the end of that form, but if you have you will find on the last page, and at the bottom of the last page, a little paragraph beginning with the word "Penalty," and if you read it you will see that this is the way in which the Legislature has dealt with the matter for a hundred years. You will find that if the Income Tax payer or a person who desires any abatement makes a misstatement, he is liable on conviction by a court of summary jurisdiction to a term of imprisonment not exceeding six months with hard labour. But the condition of his being so liable is that he has knowingly made a false statement or a false representation. That is the form which has almost uniformly been adopted by the Legislature in cases of this kind.
If you are going to accuse a man of having committed a crime it is for the Crown in the normal way to prove the case. It is in my submission ridiculous, and if there is any precedent it is following an unsound precedent, to impose on him the obligation of showing that he did not know, and that he could not
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with reasonable diligence have ascertained, the untruth of the statement. Reasonable diligence is a thing which, if used, will enable a man to discover everything. I do not know how the Courts are going to deal with an unfortunate man who has not been able to understand a form sent out by some Commissioners or other people engaged in working this measure, when he comes forward and says that he really could not read to the end of that particular form or that he did not understand it or that he made some statement or other by pure error—because errors are excluded by this clause. I would add that if your Lordships engage, happily or unhappily, in the cultivation of sugar beet you will all be-asked to sign forms which have been made out by bailiffs or people of that kind, and you will be probably quite unable to take the time necessary to satisfy yourselves—even with "reasonable diligence," to use the words in the Bill-that the statements made on your behalf are true. Everybody knows that you have to rely on servants, officials, employees in matters of this sort, and this Bill will make you liable, I am afraid, to a fine not exceeding £50 for each offence and imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months if you rely on the inaccurate information of some third party.
Every Amendment so far has referred to the Wheat Act. The Wheat Act is a very good example of how this ought to be done. As late as the year 1932 the Legislature in dealing with penalties dealt with them in this way. Section 16 (1) provides that if any person "with intent to deceive "—you see in the present Bill that the words "intent to deceive" come out—and (mark what follows) "knowingly makes any false statement"—"knowingly" has been taken out—or "withholds any material information for the purpose of obtaining for himself or any other person any such certificate, receipt or other document or any payment," then is he liable to fine or imprisonment or both. That, I venture to think, is the proper way in which a clause of this kind should be drafted. To refer to another matter, with which many of your Lordships may be concerned—namely, the issuing of a prospectus for the purpose of a company inviting subscriptions—the matter is there made perfectly clear. Section 227 of the Act of

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1918 provides that a director or any other person is liable with regard to his statement in the prospectus or other document or account if he wilfully makes a statement false in any material particular knowing it to be false. That again is a good example of the way in which the Legislature ought to deal with false statements which are of the nature of the false statements considered in Clause 25.
When I ask myself why the British farmer should be singled out for the creation of an offence—and I venture to think a new offence—I really am at a loss to find an answer. I do not know that farmers are a class particularly liable to make false statements, nor do I know that the growing of sugar beet is particularly demoralising to the character. I should have thought that if anybody was a person who could fairly claim the sympathy of this House it was the farmer who is engaged in endeavouring to make a difficult living under very arduous circumstances, beset with all sorts of restrictions, and constantly bombarded with forms which he has great difficulty in filling up. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 27, line 10, after the second ("person") insert ("knowingly or recklessly").—(Lord Maugham.)
LORD ATKIN: I should like to say a word or two on this Amendment, because I have come here specially with reference to it, having no great knowledge of—I do not say interest in—sugar beet. This is a matter which far transcends in importance any question about sugar or sugar beet production, because it is, I venture to say, a very serious invasion of a thoroughly well known principle of the Criminal Law which has existed as long as the English Criminal Law—that is, that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove that the alleged offender committed the crime. This is not the first time that it has become an offence to obtain money from the Government or from any other person by making a false statement. It is one of the commonest offences known to the law, obtaining money by false pretences, and in all cases it is for the prosecution to prove that the man made the false pretence knowing that it was false and with intent to deceive. Now why should any difference be made, and why should the onus of proof
926
be thrown in these particular cases upon the person who makes the report?
I can quite conceive that it is very convenient for persons who have to pay money to be able to hold in terrorem over those who make these statements that unless their statement is absolutely correct they will go to prison. That is what it really comes to, because for the first time—I think it is for the first time, though the noble Earl may be able to show some precedents in some of the similar Acts; if so, they are very bad precedents—the onus is upon the defendant to show not only that he did not know the statement was untrue, but also that he could not with due diligence have discovered that it was untrue. I venture to say that that is a most improper burden to put upon anybody accused of a criminal offence. Have any of your Lordships come across pig-headed farmers who believe in what they say without there being due grounds for their belief? As long as they honestly believe in what they say they are not going to make inquiries into whether it is true. They go by their thoroughly well formed but no doubt wrong opinions and are justified in doing so. The essence of crime consists in honesty or dishonesty, and this provision will expose a man to fine and imprisonment although he is really as honest as the day. It concerns, moreover, a class of people who have quite enough difficulty in filling up forms already and might quite easily make a mistake. This is a very serious and important principle, and I hope the Government will sec their way to accept the Amendment.
EARL DE LA WARR: We are discussing, as those noble Lords who are supporting this Amendment have said, a very important principle, and a principle which, I say very clearly and very strongly, His Majesty's Government would be just as anxious, and are just as anxious, to defend as anybody else in your Lordships' House. This principle is that the onus of proving the guilt of a person charged with an offence should rest with the prosecution. But I think that your Lordships would fully admit another principle, and that is that it is necessary to sec that, where offences are created by a Statute, the language employed is not such as to add to the proper burden of the prosecution such extra weight as may render that Statute in

927
effective. This Amendment is, in the view of His Majesty's Government, a drafting Amendment, because we consider that the point is dealt with in the wording of the proposed clause. The noble Lord, Lord Hastings, has complained considerably that one who is not connected with the Ministry of Agriculture should be answering in your Lordships' House on behalf of agriculture, but I can assure him that I would far rather discuss agricultural questions with him, after ten years during which I had never been near the Ministry of Agriculture, than I would discuss legal questions with a Lord of Appeal. If asked what is worse than one Lord of Appeal, I should say three Lords of Appeal.
As I am advised, however, under the clause as presented to the House the prosecution will have to prove, first, that the defendant made a statement that was untrue. But they will have to do more than that. If your Lordships will turn to the wording of the clause, you will see that they will also have to prove that he did so for the purpose of obtaining a payment either for himself or for some other person. This, of course, involves proving that the untrue statement or representation was made on purpose—that is, knowingly. Not only so, but the wording also makes it necessary to prove the actual purpose for which the statement or representation was made. The full onus of proof will therefore be on the prosecution under the clause as drawn, notwithstanding that the word "knowingly" does not occur in it. I see noble and learned Lords who are much more fitted to discuss matters of law than myself shaking their heads, and I can therefore only say that that is the view of His Majesty's Government and their legal advisers. But if noble Lords are not satisfied with that, I am perfectly prepared to undertake to discuss these matters with my colleagues and with noble and learned Lords in order to see whether before the next stage we cannot arrive at some agreement on this difficult point. I can assure noble and learned Lords that on the principles we are in complete agreement, and that nothing is further from the desire of His Majesty's Government than "knowingly" to destroy this great
928
principle that it is for the prosecution to prove that a man is guilty.
LORD MAUGHAM: If I may tell the Minister of Agriculture where he is quite wrong, it is that he has not observed the last three lines of this subsection. A person is held to have made an untrue statement and to be liable to a fine unless he proves that he could not with reasonable diligence have ascertained that the statement was untrue. That differentiates this clause entirely from all the clauses to which I have shortly referred the Committee and a great many more, and it is for that reason that the clause should be altered—unless His Majesty's Government are creating a new crime.
EARL DE LA WARR: If I might answer that specific point: the contention which I have had made to me is that the process is, as I have said, firstly, that the man should be proved to be guilty; secondly, that he should be proved to have made the statement on purpose; and then in the last three lines of the clause he is given the further concession that, even if those two points are proved, he has the right to come back and endeavour to make his point that he did it not knowing. But I bow to noble and learned Lords, and willingly undertake on behalf of His Majesty's Government to discuss this point before the next stage.
LORD HASTINGS: I trust that the noble and learned Lords who have been good enough to take the interest that they have taken in the protection of the farmer against what I have previously described as an overweening bureaucracy, will not give way. After all, common justice should not be made the subject of discussion between the Ministry and even the most distinguished Law Lords outside this House. When the Ministry in their Bill have desired that a certain phraseology should persist, it is on the floor of this House that that phraseology should be either accepted or rejected. There is another and a purely technical reason why this Amendment should be insisted upon, and that is that we shall, many of us, for various reasons require a Report stage, and there will be no Report stage if no Amendment is now pressed upon the Committee. That is not an argument, naturally, which would weigh with your Lordships in comparison with the infinitely weightier ones which have been advanced, but at the

929
same time, the practice of politics being what it is, we cannot entirely afford to ignore it. I hope very much that, only in the interests of justice, the noble and learned Lord who has just spoken to this Amendment will proceed to a Division.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My noble friend who has just sat down is quite right: unless some Amendment is put in at this stage there will be no Report stage. That means that this matter, in which your Lordships are practically at one with the noble and learned Lord in thinking that something will have to be done, will be left over to the Third Reading. Those of us who have sat in this House for a long time know how difficult it is to amend a Bill properly on Third Reading. By the Rules of the House Notice must be given of an Amendment on Third Reading; it cannot be moved in the course of the debate in any form whatever, because that would be contrary to the Rules, and you are therefore very much hampered in arriving at a reasonable solution. I hope that in the circumstances the Government will consent to put this Amendment into the Bill; then there will be a Report stage and they will be in a position to adjust it as they think best. That is much the best plan.
EARL DE LA WARR: After that appeal, I do not see how I can do otherwise than accept the proposal, but I would say this. I have on behalf of His Majesty's Government given two definite assurances The first is that we are in complete agreement on principle. There is no question of bargaining, because we are in agreement on principle. Secondly, I have given a definite undertaking to discuss this matter, and when I say discuss it I mean a bona fide discussion, with a real desire to arrive at agreement. Therefore I venture once more to appeal to your Lordships to allow this Amendment to go. I would not think of dividing the Committee. If I may take your Lordships into the confidence of the Government I would say that this Bill is already very much overdue. At the moment a very great deal of business is being carried on, and contracts are being made on trust. I have not put this to your Lordships before, because I did not think it would be a proper suggestion to make, but now that a question of time has arisen I would point out that this would mean another
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day, and intervening days, and returning the Bill to the House of Commons, and further time wasted. There is no question of dividing the Committee, but still I appeal to the Committee to accept my suggestion.
VISCOUNT BLEDISLOE: May I venture to endorse the appeal of the noble Marquess? I have stood in exactly the same position as the noble Earl stands in to-day. You have a most distinguished legal authority in this House pointing out that a particular clause is contrary to the principles oil British law, and it is perfectly clear that if the words which Lord Maugham proposes are inserted they will not only do justice but be in accord with the principles of British Law. There is only one other point which I wish to make. A statement may be untrue, that is, inaccurate, and at the same time infer no guilty intention on the part of the person who makes it. That being so, I venture to support the appeal of the noble Marquess, and I hope that the Government will accept the Amendment.
EARL DE LA WARR: It is quite obvious what the Committee desires, and therefore I will accept it.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD MAUGHAM: My second Amendment is consequential.
Amendment moved—
Page 27, line 16, leave out from ("imprisonment") to end of the subsection.—(Lord Maugham.)
EARL DE LA WARR: I must make it quite clear in regard to this Amendment and the previous one that the Government are not accepting the Amendments, but merely agreeing to their insertion.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 25, as amended, agreed to.
Remaining clauses agreed to.
Schedules agreed to.

MEASUREMENT OF GAS.
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (THE EARL OF ONSLOW)THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (THE EARL OF ONSLOW) moved to resolve, That is is desirable that a Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament be appointed to consider whether it is expedient, and if so in what circumstances and subject to what conditions, to authorise the measurement of gas supplied

931
by gas undertakers to consumers by means of meters so designed as to register in therms instead of in cubic feet.
The noble Earl said: My Lords, a rather complicated situation has arisen in regard to the question of the measuring of gas supplied by gas undertakers to consumers. At the present moment the meters used register in cubic feet the amount of gas consumed. Last session the South Metropolitan Gas Company promoted a Bill to enable meters to be designed so as to register in terms of therms instead of in cubic feet. After a considerable amount of discussion the Bill was dropped last year, but it was re-introduced in the present Session. I understand that the Government saw a very considerable objection to the proposal put forward by the company, and gave their views, not by Counsel, before the Select Committee of the House of Lords presided over by Lord Cozens-Hardy. In spite of the Opposition of the Board of Trade and of the London County Council, who I think were represented by Counsel, the Committee decided, after a long and patient hearing, in favour of the proposals submitted in the Bill. As I understand it the Board of Trade still maintain their objection to a proposal of this kind being introduced in a Private Bill, but they have intimated to me that they are prepared to allow the whole question to be considered, with a view to its being the subject of public legislation, provided that the case put forward by the company can be proved.
The House of Lords is naturally and rightly very careful when it is proposed by the Government, or anyone else, to override a decision of a Select Committee of this House who have very patiently and carefully heard a case and decided thereon. But of course it is obvious that Parliament can at any stage of a Bill take any action it considers right, and it is open to any Member of Parliament, including, of course, the responsible Minister, to persuade the House of the correctness of his point of view. A suggestion has been put forward, which I think this Motion embodies, and which it seems to me is one which, from the point of view of all parties concerned, would tend to a satisfactory solution. It is proposed that a Joint Select Committee should be set up and the terms of reference are those which appear in my Motion on the Paper.
There is only one other point to which I would refer. Of course the company might be placed at a certain disadvantage if the Committee find in favour of their proposal and then time is not available for public legislation during the Session. They would gain their case, but in practice they would lose, because if the Bill were dropped they would have to wait for public legislation to be undertaken. Therefore, I understand that the Government would be willing to withdraw their opposition to this Bill, if the promoters agree to drop it should the Government be able to introduce and pass a Public Bill this Session. If there should not be time for such a Bill it is agreed, and I think it would be fair, that the Bill which will be before this House tomorrow should be allowed to go forward, and subsequently it will embody such decisions as may be arrived at by the Select Committee should a Public Bill not be produced this Session. By this means, if the company are able to persuade Parliament of the desirability of their case, they will not lose should a Public Bill not be introduced this Session. In these circumstances I understand that the Government offer no objection to the Bill being read a third time to-morrow.
Moved to resolve, That it is desirable that a Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament be appointed to consider whether it is expedient, and if so in what circumstances and subject to what conditions, to authorise the measurement of gas supplied by gas undertakers to consumers by means of meters so designed as to register in therms instead of in cubic feet.—(The Earl of Onslow.)
THE MARQUESS OF DUFFERIN AND AVA: My Lords, I do not want to keep you from a much more important discussion, but I feel that this is a matter of some importance. I would like to remind you of the history of this Motion. What happened was that I and four other noble Lords sat for two days listening to the ablest Counsel of the Parliamentary Bar discussing this matter. We came to certain very definite conclusions. We were unanimous, and there was no question in my view that our decision was a perfectly right one. Then we were informed that the Board of Trade intended to oppose this Bill on Third Beading. I was quite content with that situation, because I had no doubt that if the Board of Trade

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did oppose our conclusions on the Third Reading your Lordships would pay no attention to that. Yesterday I received a letter telling me that the Board of Trade had decided not to oppose the Bill on Third Reading, but that a compromise, so-called, had been arrived at. Why was it arrived at? Well, it was arrived at partly because the Board of Trade did not want to have to oppose a Bill which had been passed by your Lordships' Committee, and partly, so far as I can make out, because the threat was employed that if this compromise was not arrived at the Whips would be put on in another place, and the Bill would be thrown out by the well-regimented squadrons over there.
I make this protest because I feel that it is a gross bit of blackmail, and I regard it as a gross denial of your Lordships' rights. I also regard it as reducing the whole system of Committees in this House to a farce. If a Government Department takes it into its head to make a threat of that kind and to say: "Very well, do it if you like, but you will lose the whole Bill, because we will put the Whips on in another place," then where are you going to stop? Why should you ever have a Committee at all? I say this quite frankly, because I feel a sense of grievance, and a man with a sense of grievance perhaps never speaks too clearly. We sat two days on a Gas Committee—not a very amusing entertainment—very little "wine, woman and song" about that. We did it with the aid of the best Counsel with one object only, to help your Lordships, and we did it to the best of our ability. If, at the end of all that, simply because a Government Department takes it into its head that this matter is of importance, all our efforts are to be wasted and the whole costly farce is to be gone through again, I say to your Lordships that you are likely to find it extremely difficult to ask at any rate the younger members of your Lordships' House to have any part in your Committees again, because if we are only going to be rubber stamps we would rather be absent. With that protest, I sit down.
LOUD TEMPLEMORE: My Lords, my noble friend who has spoken with his usual eloquence, did not give me notice that he was going to raise this subject to-day, or I should have been prepared with a defence of the Department which I have the honour to represent in your
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Lordships' House. I can assure him that I personally was quite unaware that any threat had been made to defeat the Bill by the nefarious process of putting the Whips on in another place. If he will take it from me, I will convey what he has said to the Department, and I hope he will take it that I have said sufficient on this subject for the moment. I really rose to say that, as the Lord Chairman has stated, the difficulties raised with regard to this Bill have been carefully reconsidered and, on behalf of the Board of Trade, I welcome this proposal for the appointment of a Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament
"to consider whether it is expedient, and if so in what circumstances and subject to what conditions, to authorise the measurement of gas supplied by gas undertakers to consumers by means of meters so designed as to register in therms instead of in cubic feet."
Of course, the Government raise no objection to the Third Reading of this Bill to-morrow.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I think I must say one word with reference to the speech of the noble Marques. I have no acquaintance with the circumstances to which he refers, but I am bound to say I have the greatest sympathy with him in his protest. What appears to have happened is that, whereas your Lordships' House had sent a Bill to a Private Bill Committee and that Committee had arrived at certain conclusions, the emissaries of a Government Department came and said: "Unless this decision is reversed we shall use the mechanical majority of the Government in order to overbear you." In other words, the action of your Lordships' House, either by its Committee or as the House itself, is to be overthrown by the orders of the representative of a Government Department. That, of course, is an intolerable position. I speak with the greater emphasis because this is not the first time it has occurred. On the last occasion on which it occurred the matter did come under my own notice, and I said what I think any of your Lordships would have said under the circumstances. I said that nothing would induce me to give way for a single second in deference to a mere direction from a Government Department. One of the Houses of Parliament to be overridden merely because the President of the Board of Trade or

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his emissary thought that we ought to give way, and said: "If you do not give way the House of Commons"—probably a weary House of Commons—"under the orders of its Whips will override you"—that is an impossible position, and I sympathise very much with the noble Marquess in the protest that he has made.
On Question, Motion agreed to.
Ordered, That a Message be sent to the Commons to acquaint them therewith, and to desire their concurrence.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.
Order of the Day read for resuming the debate on the Motion of Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, moved on Thursday last, That an humble Address be presented to His Majesty for Papers relating to any preparations for proposals to the League of Nations for a thorough revision of the system of collective security in view of recent experiences.
LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE: My Lords, before the noble Viscount, Lord Cecil, resumes this debate may I perhaps ask the Government, as it is now rather late and a great many noble Lords have come down specially for this debate, whether it will be possible for them again to continue the debate on another day, perhaps on Thursday; and may I plead that on that Thursday the day will be kept clear of sugar, cotton and gas?
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AIR (VISCOUNT SWINTON): My Lords, that is a very reasonable request, and we propose to meet your Lordships' convenience by continuing the debate on Thursday. I can promise that cotton shall be cleared out of the way on that day, and that we will take the Cotton Spinning Industry Bill next Tuesday. I fancy that gas has exhausted itself. I cannot give an absolute undertaking about sugar, but we will keep the day as clear as we possibly can.
EARL PEEL: Why has cotton always to give way to gas and to sugar?
VISCOUNT SWINTON: Because it is so important that it ought to have a day to itself, which it would not have had on Thursday.
LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE: Sugar is by far the most important. I should be glad of an assurance about sugar.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: My Lords, possibly my noble friend will, before the end of this evening, be able to give a more direct assurance to my noble friend Lord Ponsonby. At any rate I think I had perhaps better employ the time which still remains to us this evening in making the observations that I desire to make to your Lordships on this subject, which I think, with my noble friend, is certainly one of the most important subjects which this House could possibly have to consider. We began the debate the other day and four speeches were delivered. Except the speech of my noble friend Lord Snell, I think all proceeded on this broad thesis, that collective security had failed and that it must be abandoned. That it has failed in the case of Abyssinia is so far unhappily true; that is to say, it has not succeeded; but I personally am altogether unconvinced that it would be right to abandon this great effort, the greatest effort that has ever been made in the history of civilisation to substitute for war some more reasonable method of settling international differences.
The three speeches which were made against collective security disagreed considerably amongst themselves. There was my noble friend Lord Ponsonby, who maintained the thesis that he has continually maintained on the subject; he was in favour of the total abolition of anything that savoured of the use of force by international bodies, because he was against the use of force altogether in international matters. I hope I am not misstating him, but he regarded the use of force as useless and pernicious. My noble friend Lord Lothian, whose absence to-day we all deplore, particularly for the reason that has caused it, took a less drastic view. He wanted indeed to abolish Article 16, that is true, but as I understand both from what he said in this House and what he has said in his letters to The Times, he does propose to maintain the use of force to this extent that he proposes to have what he calls "regional security," but which used to be called more clearly, "a defensive alliance," with France, confined—though I am not quite sure on that point—to her western borders. The view of my noble friend Lord Rennell, whom I am glad to see here and with whom I disagree very little, if at all, was not the abolition of collec

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tive security, but, if I am not misinterpreting him, he thought—and there is a good deal to be said for that view—that the obligation to exert force ought to be confined to European disputes.
I should be the last to deny that a very grave international disaster has occurred. It is unnecessary to emphasise it now, because, however much we may disagree as to what ought to have been done, we are all agreed, without exception, as to the very grave events which have taken place. Nobody put it more strongly than my noble friend Lord Ponsonby, and I need not repeat it. We all profoundly sympathise with the Emperor of Ethiopia. We all regret the events which have driven him from his Throne, at any rate temporarily, and we all deeply deplore the action and the policy of the Italian Government. But I venture to hope we shall not, nevertheless, exaggerate the general result that has been produced on the policy of collective action. My noble friend Lord Ponsonby did not deal much with the general case. I think he regards it as so clear that the conception of sanctions is wrong, that it is not necessary to argue very much about what has happened, because it is quite in accordance with what he expected and therefore he thinks it is unnecessary to dwell on the failure that has taken place. My noble friend Lord Lothian took a totally different view. His view was that force was right. He rejected altogether the conception of my noble friend Lord Ponsonby. He said force was essential, but he thought it had been shown conclusively, by what had occurred not only in Abyssinia but elsewhere, that the conception of collective action in order to repress aggression—in order, that is, to make peace sure—was a hopeless conception and must be abandoned.
He based himself in the first place on his recollection: of conversations which he said took place during the Peace Conference between Mr. Lloyd George and, I suppose, myself and General Smuts. I do not want in his absence to make any criticism of him. Therefore, I shall merely say it is a rather inconvenient plan to base any considerable argument on private conversations which took place nearly twenty years ago. Though I do happen by chance to remember the incident to which he referred, I cannot say that I agree with the colour that he
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gave to the discussion. As I remember, after the matter had been before the Commission of the Conference for some little time—I do not remember how long—I received, and I suppose General Smuts received, a message suggesting that the whole conception of a League of Nations as we understood it was wrong, and that the proper plan would be merely to have some general affirmation of the principles of peace, and leave it at that. Indeed, in my recollection, the kind of suggestion that was made was that we should revert to the Holy Alliance—the true Holy Alliance—to the proposals made by Alexander I after the Napoleonic Wars, which, as your Lordships will remember, were simply an affirmation that it was desirable that international relations should be conducted on the principles of Christian morality. A very large number of countries signed that declaration. I believe we did not, but almost all the other countries did, and of course it never produced the very slightest effect of any sort or kind. I think my view, as far as I remember it, was very clear. If we were merely to do that kind of thing, it really was not worth while putting provisions of that description into the Treaty, and it was on those grounds that we represented to Mr. Lloyd George that that would not be a desirable course.
I do not remember any conversation with him. It may have taken place—my memory is not so trustworthy as to enable me to say confidently that no such conversation took place; but I am sure there was no insistence on this view. The reason, of course, is quite obvious. The proposals we went to Paris to submit to the Conference had formed the subject of most elaborate consideration in this country. They began with a paper which was submitted to the Foreign Secretary and, I think, circulated to the Cabinet as early as the autumn of 1916. That paper was considered. A very important Committee was appointed to discuss it and investigate it, presided over by the late Lord Phillimore and on it sat three very eminent civil servants, members of the Foreign Office, and two or three—I forget now which—gentlemen who had made it their business to study International Law and international history. They reported as far as this provision. Article 16, which was then part of the

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proposals submitted to them, was concerned, as far as I remember, without dissension in favour of it. It then went to the Cabinet and was considered by them. It went to the War Cabinet, the large War Cabinet on which the Dominions sat. It was considered by them and approved by them. General Smuts was much attracted by the suggestion, and he brought out a very brilliant pamphlet in which he elaborated the proposals and added certain proposals of his own. That pamphlet earned the enthusiastic approval of Mr. Lloyd George. I am sure he will remember, because he was very much struck by it, as indeed everyone was. It was again considered by the Cabinet. There was, I remember, a Cabinet Committee on the subject, and so on, and it was part of the instructions to the delegates who attended the Conference to accept the suggestion which we understood was going to be made by the President of the United States.
Therefore it is not at all likely that Mr. Lloyd George, having considered this matter with great care as Prime Minister of the Cabinet for two years, should suddenly, in obedience to suggestions which may have been made to him by my noble friend, his secretary, or someone else, throw the whole thing over and have an entirely different plan. He may have said, "I hope you will consider this alternative plan." I do not think he did more than that. I am sorry to trouble your Lordships' with these recollections, but since the matter has been raised it-is right to mention how it stands. I may add this in one sentence, that since that time the question of the Covenant of the League of Nations has repeatedly been under the consideration of successive British Governments. They have consistently supported it, and used the most emphatic language in connection with it. It has, of course, also been supported and endorsed by very numerous international statements, among them the statements made during the Conference of Locarno, and very often during the discussions at Geneva, so that I think, if we are to consider merely the question of authority, which I certainly should not have pressed at all, that against the rather casual suggestions made, if they were made, by Mr. Lloyd George, there is a very much larger weight of authority on the other side.
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My noble friend went on to refer to one or two other cases besides the Abyssinian case. There was the case of the Far East, and there was the case of the Disarmament Conference. May I just say a word or two about each of them? As far as the Far East is concerned my noble friend said that the ordinary threats—I have the phrase here if it is necessary to use it—were used with regard to Japan. I happened to be the representative of the British Government during the earlier part of that discussion. No threats were used to Japan at all. On the contrary, there were two or three meetings of the Council, and at most of them the conclusions were accepted by Japan. At only one of them, I think, was the Japanese representative unable to assent. That was because there was some question of a time limit to which he felt he could not agree. But, broadly speaking, during all that period, the case was this: Here has been an unfortunate clash of arms in Manchuria; no doubt it can be put right in the ordinary way in which such clashes have been put right before. We relied on Japan and her opponents—China, of course—to collaborate in putting the thing right. The discussions proceeded during two meetings of the Council at Geneva, and a very long meeting, which lasted four or five weeks, at Paris. Conciliation, mediation, and every phase of the kind you may like to use was carried to its most extreme point, but no question of threat of any sort or kind arose.
At the end, with the assent of Japan and the collaboration of Japan, it was agreed to appoint a Commission of Inquiry to see what could be done. Your Lordships will remember that my noble friend Lord Lytton, with four colleagues drawn one from each of the principal Powers, went to the place, and, with the collaboration and assistance of a Japanese representative, investigated the whole thing, examined a great number of witnesses and so on, and did everything they could think of by way of conciliation and discussion. Finally, they made a Report of an extremely valuable kind in which certain proposals were made. I ought to add that nothing resulted. When the conclusions of the Lytton Commission were adopted by the Assembly of the League of Nations, Japan announced her withdrawal from the League. All

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that I would say is that so far from that being an argument against the use of sanctions, it seems to me a very conclusive instance—no single instance can be absolutely conclusive but a very powerful argument—to show that mere discussion, mere conciliation, unless it is backed somehow or in some way with some form of force, of coercion, will not be sufficient to stop aggression of that description. That seems to me to be the only conclusion you can draw from the history of the Far Eastern case.
It is perfectly true that I thought—I am sorry to be so egotistic; it does not matter a straw what I thought—but many people in this country thought it would have been desirable, with the assistance of the United States—it could not have been attained without—to have tried some form of coercion. I need not go into all that, because in point of fact that was not done, and the conclusion, therefore, that I draw is that the conception, if my noble friend will forgive me, that you can do a great deal by sitting round a table and discussing is really not in accordance with the fact when you have to deal with a determined aggression. No amount of discussion round a table stopped Japan, and no amount of discussion round a table would have stopped Mussolini.
The next instance that my noble friend gave was disarmament. I do not really know why he thought the failure of the Disarmament Conference had anything to do with Article 16 or Article 10. Disarmament at least was not a part of the League machinery. The Conference no doubt was called at the instance of the League, but it was an ordinary International Conference and nothing else, and it discussed, unfortunately unsuccessfully, these very difficult topics of international disarmament. It failed, not, I think, as my noble friend said, because there was some difficulty about granting to Germany complete equality, but broadly—and this was the real difficulty which ran through the whole Conference and which I think British Governments have never adequately faced—because, in order to obtain international reduction and limitation of armaments, you must satisfy those countries which are at present highly armed that they will be safe in reducing their armaments, and the only way of doing that is to assure them that the international guarantee that is offered to them
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is a real, serious, effective guarantee. I believe that was the real reason of the failure of the Disarmament Conference.
I know that my noble friend Lord Ponsonby hates these Disarmament Conferences and thinks they are entirely mistaken. I have never been able quite to follow what his reason for that opinion is. In his view, I suppose, it is really touching the accursed thing armaments. It assumes that some kind of armaments may be necessary, and that you are going to try to reduce them. That is not the view he thinks ought to be, adopted. But if the Disarmament Conference has any bearing on the present controversy it is that there, again, unless you are prepared to offer to the nations at this minute some real guarantee by collective security, you cannot make any serious advance in the direction of international peace. I do not want to dwell on these things, but it is important that we should know where we are and what the difficulty is that we have come up against before we attempt to apply a remedy.
I do not want to dwell upon the cases—perhaps they have been dwelt on too much—in which the action of the League was completely successful, but do not let us forget them. There were more, but I merely mention three which were very clear. There was the Serbian invasion of Albania, which was stopped by League action and stopped because it became known that the League, it necessary, would take coercive action. The result—I know the danger of saying these things, but it is essential to say them—was a great slump of the Serbian credit, and I have not the slightest doubt that that was one of the main causes of the complete settlement of that affair with absolute agreement by both parties. No further disturbance has ever taken place between those two countries.
There was the Bulgarian case, where Greece appeared to be about to invade Bulgaria. In the same way intervention by the League ended the matter. It was certainly true, and I believe it was known to both parties, that the Powers were considering what coercive action should be applied if peace was not made. Peace was made. Finally, there was the case of Corfu, where Italy, with a very real and genuine grievance against Greece, attempted to seize Corfu and did indeed occupy Corfu for a short time. In con

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sequence of the action of the League after rather heated debates the attempt by Italy to seize Corfu was abandoned. I am myself absolutely confident that but for the League and the possibility of coercive action by the League Corfu would be to-day an Italian island. All these things must be considered. It is quite true that they were all cases where the League was able to exert overwhelming force. In the case of Italy, for reasons I need not go into, she was quite unready to take military action at that time and the other cases were of small Powers which could be dealt with effectively. But these cases show that it is not true to say that force, sanctions, coercion are not useful in preserving peace.
We hear a great deal about the present failure, and it has been a failure. The force was not adequate to stop aggression. But I do not myself admit that no advance has been made. I think it was a great thing that we should have got fifty nations to agree on a common resolution and on common action and that, in spite of great damage—they must have lost a lot of money—they have not weakened in their economic action but have, in point of fact, maintained it. I think that is so far encouraging. I do not think it shows that coercion is impossible. It shows that you have got to be very clear as to what you want and very clear in recommending it to your colleagues in the League. My own belief is that if we had been clear and had recommended much more strong action it would have been equally accepted. But may I interpose this observation? The conception was that you should have small sanctions gradually increasing if they were ineffective until you got so great a pressure on Italy that it would be impossible for her to go on. It began very well. For two months, September and October, the proceedings were initiated with great smoothness and with great success. I may mention—I do not think it will be denied by anybody—that the position of this country never stood higher than during those months. It was universally looked up to by every country in Europe. The smaller countries said: "We have got leaders in this matter, we trust them, we are going to follow them, we are going to run risks"—because there were risks, and not merely economic risks, for no small
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country likes to offend a great country like Italy.
They did it, and then came that terribly disastrous mistake, as I think, the Hoare-Laval Agreement. Its immediate effect was crushing. It discouraged every single one of the small countries. They said: "After all, England is not in earnest. We always feared there might be some difficulty of that kind." America, which had shown signs of being ready to co-operate to some extent in the efforts we were making, withdrew instantly and has never advanced. Italy, which had been extremely anxious, according to such information as reaches me, up till then, said: "They will never touch us, evidently. We can go on to do anything we like. We can proceed to the extreme and use every weapon however horrible that science gives us, and force these people to submit as soon as possible." That, as I read it, is what happened and I think it was a most unhappy disaster.
But is it not rather unreasonable to expect unbroken success in the immense experiment we are engaged in? What is it we are trying to do? It is to substitute for war some better system of settling international disputes. It is a tremendous job, reversing the history of many centuries, taking from countries the right to go to war in their own causes, and substituting for it the acceptance of an international authority. I think it would be absolutely incredible that an operation of that kind should meet with no set-back in the course of its establishment. I cannot admit that it has had more than a set-back. If I am not wearying your Lordships I should just like to refer to the alternative suggestion by the two noble Lords, and I hope they will let me assure them that I speak with no want of respect. On the contrary I think they have put their case admirably. What do they say? My noble friend Lord Ponsonby says, in effect, sweep away the whole Covenant of the League of Nations.

LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE:
Article 16.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: I thought rather more, but my noble friend says not. He said, if I understood him—I am sorry if I misunderstood—that the Articles to which he attached importance were Articles 3 and 4. I am not dealing

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how with questions of Mandates and things of that kind, but what he thought was that for peace making the thing to do was to bring the nations together to talk round a table. That experiment was tried in the Far East and in Ethiopia, because the British Government did everything they could to induce Italy and Abyssinia to meet and talk the matter over at a round table, with the advantage that it was a table at which all other countries would be represented. Italy refused. It was because of that refusal, and because she insisted on making war without leaving an interval in which the matter could be considered, that the whole trouble arose. My noble friend the Marquess of Lothian said he was in favour of delay because delay meant an opportunity for discussion as to what were the real grievances between the two countries. With all deference to my noble friend Lord Ponsonby, and with a great deal of sympathy for the underlying ideas he represents, I cannot believe that in the present condition of the world it is really a possible policy to say that we will have no force at all, that we will disband our Army and abolish our Fleet, and that we will rely entirely on talking at a round table. I cannot think that that is right.
I refer for a moment only to his other thesis; that one of the things you should discuss round the table is the reconsideration of all the treaties which bind all the nations together, believing—quite inaccurately, if I may venture to say so—that the grievance of the Italians in this matter was some old musty treaty. Nothing of the kind. The treaties they have broken have all been made within the last twenty years, and I cannot believe that a general throwing into the melting-pot of the whole of the arrangements by which Europe at present exists, the whole of the arrangements by which the boundaries of the various States are framed, and a general rediscussion of them every two or three years, would do anything towards the maintenance of peace. The Covenant goes quite far enough when it says that, when any one objects to a particular arrangement and thinks it is no longer right, that matter should be considered in very much the way which my noble friend suggests.
My noble friend Lord Lothian does not go quite so far. He proposes in regard
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to the League, as I have said, the abolition of force, and in effect, as I think he would find when he tried to propose it to any international body, the abolition of the League of Nations altogether, and the substitution for it of a defensive alliance with France and the reinstatement—as he said, not in this House, but in another public statement—of the balance of power by increasing the power of Germany so that she would be more on a level with France. That is returning to 1913; it is nothing else. I cannot for a moment believe that that policy is going to succeed. Why should it? It did not succeed in 1913; and according to him, the difficulty which then faced Sir Edward Grey (as he then was) was that he could not get the discussion going to nip the difficulty in the bud—as my noble friend very properly said—and to go straight down to the dispute between Austria and Serbia. The thing which happened then would happen again; I can see nothing to prevent it. We should have the same dispute, and one country joining in after another because they could not afford to let the balance of power—use that phrase as much as you like—be disturbed, until we had the necessity, under which we felt ourselves then, to intervene also. I cannot feel that that situation really holds out the slightest hope of any permanent peace.
Your Lordships will say: "Well, it is easy enough to criticise what other people have proposed; have you any suggestions to make?" My Lords, I have, and I must make them, as briefly as I can. In the first place, I hope my noble friends will not misunderstand me if I say that the two most important things in the conduct of foreign affairs are courage and tenacity. Vacillation, timidity—those are the things which produce war and produce disaster. We have started on this great experiment; I ask your Lordships to say that, because it has not succeeded in one case, that is not sufficient reason for abandoning it. Of course I am delighted to see that apparently they are going to continue sanctions for the time being, but I do not wish to go too much into the details of the present case. I ask your Lordships to support the League, broadly. I agree with my noble friend Lord Ponsonby in saying that there were signs, at any rate up to last summer, that though the Government were nominally in favour

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of the League, they were not so wholeheartedly, and that they entered on this very dangerous and difficult enterprise without counting the cost sufficiently, without having done all that was in their power during their ten years of office to increase the authority and prestige of the League. When it came to be tested in this great way, they did not make it clear, as they ought to have made it clear, that they were going to rely on the League and enforce the system of the League. As my noble friend very properly said, if they had made that clear at Stresa there would have been far more chance of a successful issue from this difficulty.
All I say, therefore, is: Let us proceed with this effort, the only effort that has ever had any prospect of success, that I can see, in the maintenance of peace. There are one or two other things we must do. I am not going to elaborate them now, but we must consider whether the means in the Covenant as it now stands, not only for stopping war when it has broken out but also for preventing the outbreak of war, are sufficient. I will go farther. I am attracted by the suggestion of my noble friend Lord Rennell that it may be right and proper to make more precise and more definite the exact cases in which we, and not we only but all the Members of the League, agree to intervene. I will not go into the details of that suggestion, because I am sure my noble friend will agree with me that this is a matter for great caution and great delicacy and that to say too much would only do more harm than good. Finally, we must press again, for this is the only positive security we can ever get, for some measure of international reduction and limitation of armaments
That is the policy which I venture to recommend to your Lordships. It is, I say quite clearly and plainly, a policy not of whittling away the League, but of strengthening it and making it more effective; least of all is it a policy of abandoning the League. To my mind, when you come to examine these proposals made here or elsewhere, you will find that in effect nothing can be done, or has even been suggested, except something in the nature of collective security under some such system as the League. The machinery of it has not worked badly. You must either have that system or go back to the old system of 1913.
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I do not believe there is any alternative. I do not believe—I say so with regret—that any provisions merely for talking round a table are of any use. We have seen the Kellogg-Briand Pact, stating the most admirable principles that could be stated. It is most valuable as a statement of principle, but as a practical peace-keeping measure it has had, I am sorry to say, little if any effect.
To my mind that is the case which your Lordships and the people of this country have to decide: either we go back to 1913 or we go forward with this great experiment. I do not know whether the experiment will ultimately succeed or not; no one can tell that. All I can say is that I have not read or heard of any suggestion which seems to me to have a better promise of success. I cannot doubt that if we return to 1913 the same results that took place then will take place again, and the consequences will be even more terrible than they were then. I cannot abandon my hope that possibly, if we show great courage and resolution, if we are prepared to run risks—yes, to run risks—and give a real lead to the world in this great enterprise, it may succeed. I certainly am not prepared, because of one failure, which is not yet complete, to abandon all hope of it, and timidly, as it seems to me—not to my noble friend, because he has always taken a different view—to fly from the difficulty that has met us and abandon the fairest hope of this sort that has ever been accorded to mankind.
LORD MOTTISTONE LORD MOTTISTONE, who had given notice of a Question to ask His Majesty's Government whether they will undertake that in future the representatives of this country shall be chosen from professional diplomatists or other persons specially qualified by expert knowledge of the law and custom of foreign nations, said: My Lords, everyone has listened to my noble friend Lord Cecil with sympathy, but he has not made any concrete proposal, except to go on as we have been going, and the way we have been going in recent years has been disastrous to the League of Nations. I venture to make a definite proposal to your Lordships, to which I hope your Lordships will agree, for I can build up a case in a few moments which shows that some such reform is really needed if we are not going

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to drift into war, as we have so nearly done in the past few months. The Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper gives you the purpose which I have in mind in bringing this matter before you. If I may use the language with which I am most familiar, and regard the League of Nations as a ship, I should say, and I think the noble Viscount will agree, that the ship has struck a rock and is nearly sinking.
LORD STRABOLGI: Badly navigated.
LORD MOTTISTONE: Why is the ship nearly sinking? Is it because it is badly constructed? There is a great deal in that. I agree with Lord Lothian and Lord Ponsonby that if you regard it as an armed merchantman you had better scrap the arms and navigate the ship without them. The reason why the ship is nearly sinking is that the ship is manned almost exclusively by landsmen—men who have no knowledge of the affairs that they are trying to conduct. It really is not a false parallel, because the League of Nations has often been referred to by supporters, of which I am one, as a High Court of Nations. What do you want to compose a High Court? You want men, with judicial minds; men who want to weigh the evidence before they act; men who will not act as your Lordships will remember was the case in the trial of the Knave of Hearts in Alice in Wonderland, which I have recently been reading, and which reminded me exactly of recent proceedings of the League, or of those who compose it. Your Lordships will remember that someone said: "Consider your verdict," but they had not heard the evidence. "No, no!" said the Queen, "sentence first, verdict afterwards." So it has been in the last few months.
I will try to show that the personnel of the League is so ill-equipped for its job, and so lacking in judicial sense, that it has taken wrong decisions again and again. It is ill-suited to consider the problems which lie ahead. Let us think of the first case—the imposition of partial sanctions. When that was first proposed I was at pains to ask those whom I thought would know about it—some members of the House who had made a special study of blockade: and the difficulties inherent in it—and I did not find one single man who did not tell me that this proposal was bound to fail. I consulted
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also people on the Continent, and they all told me the same thing. I suppose that if men with judicial minds had been on the League of Nations they never could have imposed sanctions, because they must have known that they were bound to fail, as they have failed. That is why I venture to bring this question before this House, not because it was my idea, but because I was compelled to come to that conclusion from the opinions of those who were best able to judge.
Take the very vital cases now of the Red Cross and gas. These raise an important question. Are we going to pro scribe Italy for ever as a nation which has done so wicked a thing? There are two sides to that question. The one is that Italy set out to destroy the Abyssinian forces with the use of gas; that that was their intention, and they carried it out with great skill; that is how they won the war. On the other hand the Italian case as stated, and as I under stand it, is that it formed no part of their campaign to employ gas, and they did not employ it until, in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, it was the only way in which to stop the atrocities committed by their enemies. When disasters occurred to the Italians it was found that not only were dreadful tortures committed on living people, both combatants and non-combatants, but also that the armed forces opposed to the Italians were using in almost every case soft-nosed bullets. All of us who have been at different wars will know that it is a more cruel thing to employ soft-nosed bullets than it is to employ gas. I have a soft-nosed bullet in my pocket which I picked out from my gun case before I came here, and it reminded me of the kind of wound that these bullets make in the animals that we shoot. There may be a very little hole in front, but I have frequently seen on the other side a hole as big as both palms. That is more cruel than gas, and if the Italian statement be proved gas was only used as a reprisal. When some of the worst things done by the enemy were given up the Italians stopped using gas, the use of which made in fact very little difference, if the statement is true.
I suppose Lord Cecil would say without doubt, because he has said so in this House, that there is no doubt at all that the Italians did employ mustard gas deliberately, and had it in mind at the start, and that that is the way in which

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they won the war. The Italian case is the exact opposite—namely, that gas was only used by way of reprisal, and I hope it be true; as I am told, that they are more anxious than any nation to join with others in putting an end to poison gas. Which statement is true?
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: My noble friend does not deny that they imported, I do not know how many, tons of mustard gas through the Suez Canal. What did they want it for?
LORD MOTTISTONE: I was explaining, when the noble Viscount was having his interesting discussion with Lord Rennell, that they only used it for reprisals after the Abyssinians committed those awful atrocities—cutting off both hands of hundreds of people, combatants and non-combatants, white and black impartially, and employing soft-nosed bullets, It is wicked to leave it to a few excited people with no legal training and no knowledge of great affairs, who perhaps have flown over in a hurry from the capital of their country in order to make impassioned speeches and then fly back again the same evening. You want a cool impartial judgment by people accustomed to weigh evidence. That has not been the case, and it causes bitter anger on the part of impartial people, Italians and Germans, with whom we are now having disputes, because they say their case never gets a hearing. Why does it not get a hearing? Because the ship is being run by landsmen with no experience.
Take another case, that of Germany and the Rhineland. Here indeed is a most extraordinary case. The French case was that the Germans had broken the Treaty which they had signed, and therefore they could undoubtedly be condemned. The German case was that the treaty was non-existent because the offensive and defensive alliance with Soviet Russia rendered it null and void, and they were compelled in the interests of their own safety to take the action that they did. Who was right and who was wrong in this matter? Surely some High Court should consider it. It is an affair of fact which could be ascertained. But in this case the excitable gentlemen I referred to, who attend the League of Nations on our behalf, did a still more extraordinary thing. First of all they said: "Germany is at fault; she is
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rightly to be condemned." Then in the next breath they said: "We refer the question of whether she is right or wrong to an impartial legal tribunal." Well, could folly further go? And when you add to that, that at this same moment the excitable gentlemen turned round to Italy, whom they had condemned as being unfit for the society of decent men, and said, "Will you kindly help us to police the Rhineland?" could folly further go? I make no apology for dwelling upon these facts, unpleasant though they be, bringing the League of Nations into disrepute, because I think they ought to be faced, and if a remedy can be found that remedy should be applied.
We come finally to the question of the future. Shall sanctions be continued? Is it really wise to remit that question to a body of persons with no claim to the judicial mind? On the one hand it is said—the noble Viscount, Lord Cecil, said—that we ought to go on with them because they very nearly succeeded. On the contrary, they never had the remotest chance of success, as then applied. All who understood the facts of the case knew that they could not succeed, and said so. If that was so then, when Italy was faced with a million well-armed men with modern rifles, and a very real risk of disaster from the big force opposed to them, how could sanctions succeed now, when the task of Italy is made so infinitely easier by the collapse of practically all resistance? That is the case as it presents itself to me. But of course it is conceivable that some fact that nobody here knows may make it possible to get some advantage from the continuance of sanctions. Then let trained legal minds, if you can get them, but above all, men of judicial temper, consider that question before you commit yourselves to the rather extraordinary proceeding which, I gather from the noble Lord, Lord Rennell, is probably not within the four corners of the Covenant itself, and certainly may have disastrous results for the future prospects of peace in Europe and the world, without the remotest chance of its having any effect at all upon the future issue, except to anger Italy and to make her less reasonable.
That that has been the effect so far nobody disputes. Why should it not be the same again? Then what is going to happen to the Abyssinians themselves if

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you continue sanctions and so weaken Italy that she cannot continue the work of restoring order in Abyssinia? "Ah," you say, "you must not mind about that. We are going to end war for ever; we are going to show that aggression does not pay." But we ought to think rather less of our own souls, and rather more of the souls and bodies of the people who are going to be affected; and I do not think anybody in this House will deny that if by any chance we so cripple Italy that she cannot continue to do anything at all in Abyssinia, the chaos that would ensue, the murders, the rapine, the looting would be one of the most horrible things in the history of mankind. Short of the amusing suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi—namely, that the only way would be to give a Mandate to Germany and let her expand there-short of that, which would hardly commend itself to your Lordships, there is no choice in Abyssinia now but between Italy and chaos. You must face that, and not go mouthing platitudes about collective security. You must face the world as it is.
I hope I have not detained your Lordships too long, but I do feel strongly on this matter. The: present people who have represented us at Geneva, with the best intentions, and those also who have represented most of the other nations—I understand that twenty-two nations have Foreign Secretaries there—being so ill-equipped for the job, have kept on making a bad shot, and I plead that in future the Government should send men such as I describe. It is difficult to define them, but we know the kind of man. To name two in this House, a man like Lord Ullswater or a man like Lord Hardinge—different in many ways but certainly-possessed of the judicial temper and having wide knowledge. Let us send them; they have no reason to get excited, far from it. I name two, but in your Lordships' House there are many men of that kind. The more often you can find a man really trained in the law of this and other countries, Roman Law and our own law, the better. Let us get people with the judicial mind. The place for the Foreign Secretary of Great Britain is in the Foreign Office in London, and nowhere else, and our representative should be a man who has nothing to do but to bend a judicial mind to these problems on which hang peace and war and
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very likely the future destinies of mankind.
LORD SEMPILL: My Lords, I have listened, as we all have, with the closest attention to all that has been said last week and to-day in your Lordships' House regarding the League of Nations. Much has been stated in support of that institution, but your Lordships will surely agree that the case is weak. It rests partly upon half-articulate hopes and, for the rest, upon self-deception. Of substantial achievement in world affairs there is unfortunately no hint. I submit that your Lordships should at least give a lead in bringing the policy of His Majesty's Government back to the realities of Europe. The time for chasing shadows is past. It is emphatically not our duty to reform the world. It is, on the other hand, our duty to solve in a just and strong way our own problems of country and Empire. Indeed many, in view of our own pressing necessities, are convinced that it might have been better had the League of Nations never existed. The foreign policy pursued by our successive Governments in the last fifteen years whilst that policy has been overshadowed by the League has tragically lacked fine ideas, great initiative and decisive action. It has kept us at peace, but it is not a peace with honour. I could add my reflections as to how that peace might be described, but I forbear.
Were we not unfortunately heavily committed in an international sense I would most strongly urge that your Lordships press on His Majesty's Government the desirability of leaving the League forthwith. As heavy commitments presumably make this impossible, there are two practical courses open for us to follow. Either we may try to persuade all other nations to secede from the League, a course which the smaller will probably not like to follow, even though they do not pay their due subscriptions, or we must arrange that Germany, France, Italy and Russia should join with us forthwith in council and conference to secure the peace of Europe that has been endangered by the futilities of the past incompetent years.
I do not want to suggest to your Lordships that the League has done no useful work whatever. The various Committees that have been set up to deal with matters such as drugs and the white

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slave traffic have no doubt done valuable work, but the League has completely failed in its main purpose. War threatens almost everywhere, and the rule of law is openly and defiantly flouted. I beg therefore to make the tangible and practical suggestion that the five great Powers that sway the fate of Europe should meet without delay and measure their differences and their respective objects and policies, lest perhaps our whole civilisation flounders in one awful storm whilst the League of Nations is scanning the horizon for a cloud.
I am very conscious of the privilege which falls to me to-day of addressing your Lordships for the first time. I had hoped to make my maiden speech on the subject of aviation, so important from every angle, while that was being debated. Lord Ponsonby did at least touch on this subject last week, when he stated that the Lord Bishop of Durham had all the qualities that would enable him to become an Air Marshal. I wonder if the suggestion came after a discussion with the noble Viscount who controls the destinies of the Royal Air Force with such distinction?
EARL PEEL: My Lords, I beg to move that this debate be now adjourned.
Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.
THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (VISCOUNT MONSELL): My Lords. I understand that it is the wish of the House that this debate should be continued on Thursday and that it should be the first Order of the day. That will be done.
LORD STRABOLGI: Is it intended to sit late on Thursday, might I ask the noble Viscount, or is it hoped to get through all the business to enable us to rise for dinner?
VISCOUNT MONSELL: I think it might be necessary to sit a little later on Thursday, but that will be left to the will of the House at the time.
House adjourned at a quarter past seven o'clock.