DEFENCE SERVICES.

HL Deb 17 March 1936 vol 100 cc9-54

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AIR (VISCOUNT SWINTON) rose to move to resolve, That this House approves the defence proposals of His Majesty's Government which are outlined in Command Paper No. 5107 (Statement relating to Defence). The noble Viscount said: My Lords, there is absent from our debate, to-day, one whom we and the country can ill afford to spare. It seems only a few weeks ago that we were all looking forward with confident expectation to Earl Beatty contributing to these debates on defence all that his long experience and his vigorous advocacy would have made so valuable. Deliberately careless of his own health when there was any claim of duty, or the paying of respect—as deliberately careless there as he had been thoughtless of life in any hour of danger—he has passed over. Those who knew him best, and served with him in action, or worked with him in administration, have paid their tributes to the leader they were proud to follow and to the man they loved—tributes with which all of us, whether we knew him well or little, would wish to be associated. When such a man passes surely something more than his memory lives to invigorate and inspire all of us in our work.

I now beg to move to resolve, That this House approves the defence proposals of His Majesty's Government, which are outlined in Command Paper No. 5107 (Statement relating to Defence). Let me hasten to assure your Lordships that the fact that I am moving this Resolution and not my noble friend Lord Monsell, in whose name it originally stood, does not indicate any split in the Cabinet, nor even—what I understand is the latest cliché of noble Lords opposite—any divergent dualism in our policy. The only reason why the First Lord is unable to be here to move this Resolution is that he is fully occupied with the Naval Conference, where I am sure everybody in all quarters of the House wishes him well. If he is able to keep the fleet of that Conference in being, to steer it through all the storms and shoals which it encounters—the storms from without as well as internal difficulties—and to pilot it safe to port, I think he will have achieved no mean feat of international seamanship.

The White Paper is a comprehensive exposition, not only of the immediate programmes which the Defence Services are to put in hand, but also of our general defence policy. A short time ago I had the opportunity to explain to your Lordships the broad lines of the policy which the Government propose to adopt for what I may call the co-ordination of defence. I think that those proposals were received with general assent in the House, with one exception, and I do not therefore propose to devote any time to that side of the matter to-day. I do not think I need devote very much time to justifying to your Lordships the case for very considerable expenditure and expansion in the Defence Services of the Crown, in spite of the rather long Amendment which I see on the Paper following my much shorter Motion. Surely, from whatever standpoint one looks at this—whether you consider our own vital interests, our own wide Imperial connections—defence is necessary. If you consider our hopes, our firm hopes, based on collective security, those hopes have no foundation at all unless the forces which make for peace are going to be strong enough to keep the peace of the world.

And as we are strong upholders of that policy, we cannot be behindhand in our capacity to play our part. It is no good simply to have the will to peace, the will to collective security: the means must be there at the back. If the term "collective security" means anything, surely it means that the collective forces for peace are going to be sufficiently strong to prevent war arising. The effective deterrent—that is what matters more than anything else in the world. It is, I think, an illusory view that we could pursue a policy of isolation, because our interests stretch over all the world and our Empire is world-wide, and because the sea is no longer an effective barrier, unless it be a very wide one; but even if you should conceive the right policy of this country to be one of isolation, I believe such a policy would not only be illusory, it would also be the most expensive. And certainly that policy would need at least as great a programme and plan of defence as that which we are now putting forward.

" Disarmament "figures in the Amendment of the noble Lord. Can any one who has followed the protracted negotiations of the Disarmament Conference believe that there is the faintest chance of getting disarmament unless this country is as strong as other countries, and unless the world knows that this country is able to build on the necessary scale? We will strive to get disarmament—always we will strive for that as long as there is the least chance; but with all that experience behind us, I say with most profound conviction that unless this policy were carried forward, unless this policy were endorsed by Parliament, the chances of effective disarmament would vanish entirely. Therefore on all grounds I submit that the need for a considerable elaboration of our defences is proved up to the hilt. I am much more concerned to consider whether the plans which we are now-presenting are wisely framed and are adequate for their purpose. As I explained to your Lordships in the last debate, the plans we now put forward are the considered plans framed by the Cabinet after the most exhaustive inquiry by a strong Cabinet Committee, an inquiry not merely into the needs of each Defence Service separately but into the proper basis of the combined policy of all the Services, and into all the world-political considerations which must govern our decisions. They are therefore put forward as a fully considered and comprehensive plan.

If our programme and our planning are to be adequate and rightly directed, I submit that in the case of each of the three Services we must be satisfied that three requirements are met. I would put first the provision of an effective force in each Service. What, objectively considered, is the size, the character and the quality of the force with which each Service should be provided? Secondly, I put the provision of adequate reserves for each Service, both in men and in material. Thirdly, civil industry should be, as part of our plan, fully able to turn over to war production on a large scale whenever occasion should require, and to turn over to such production rapidly and effectively. I put those three propositions as each of them necessary, as fundamental, and as inter-dependent. I shall show later that a considerable output will actually be required from the civilian industry of this country to reinforce the ordinary sources of munitions supply, and by civilian industry I mean those factories which are not ordinarily occupied with the making of munitions. I shall hope to show that the plans now submitted to your Lordships fulfil adequately all those three conditions.

The plans are comprehensive. We have considered in the first place the present need of the Services both in relation to general policy and in relation to each other. We are taking steps to provide for the constant review of the programmes which we have set out, both individually and collectively, in the light of developments, political, strategic, and technical. We are also under these schemes creating the means of industrial expansion and adaptation necessary to meet emergency requirements or war needs, to create what I think I may conveniently call the "war potential" in industry. While I regard the preparation of that war potential as at least as important as any other part of the programme, and as inseparable from these specific programmes, I ought to say a few words before I come to that on the programmes of each of the three Services.

To take first the Navy. The plans there cannot be final at the present time. They cannot be finally produced until we know, not only the results of the present Naval Conference—and I do not wish to exaggerate these—but, what is more important, until we know what action the other great naval Powers will take in the future following upon the conclusion of this Conference. Meanwhile, certain definite proposals are put forward. There will be a steady building of cruisers and destroyers. In cruisers, the aim is to increase the number to seventy. The destroyer programme is that which, on careful consideration, the Admiralty think is most suitable both in numbers and in types for their varied duties. Provision is made for the continued modernisation of existing battle ships, and provision is also made for the laying down early in 1937—the earliest moment at which it is possible—of two new capital ships. May I say just one word or two upon what I believe is vulgarly known as the bomb versus battleship controversy? No one is keener than the staffs of the two Services to resolve by effective experiments, or by as effective experiments as you can have, a true solution of this matter, A number of experiments have taken place; more experiments are planned to take place in the future. It seems to me that the less you are in touch, and the less responsibility you have, the more confident can you be. A limited knowledge, of a problem always makes it very easy to dogmatise as to its solution! No one supposes that a capital ship is, or is likely to be, immune to attack from the air; but that is not the problem.

The problem is this: How can you guarantee the destruction of a capital ship? So long as other countries have and build capital ships, can we take the risk of not having similar ships which can meet them on equal terms in action unless, and until, we can guarantee that we can destroy or immobilise the capital ships of a hostile Power by other means? It seems to me that unless you can give with real certainty such a guarantee, to deny yourselves capital ships while other nations are building them would be a risk, a hazard, which it would be very doubtful wisdom to take. It is not only in this matter that the closest co-operation between the Navy and the Royal Air Force is necessary. The Air Forces serving with and co-operating with the Navy will have to be strengthened, but that will have to be done in the most effective way. New developments are taking place to-day in aircraft design and performance which present a wholly different picture to that which would have been presented a year ago. We have now, and will have coming shortly into production, machines which in range, speed, and power far exceed anything that we had in the past. That immediately presents a wholly new picture when you come to consider the function of aircraft co-operating with the Fleet. It means that shore-based aircraft in the narrow seas can do a very great deal which a year or two ago it was supposed no such aircraft could do. It would indeed be very foolish to make any plans which did not pay full regard to this great new development.

But we have to remember that the ships of the British Navy have not only to operate in and guard the narrow seas, but wide tracts of ocean as well. The form which the expansion and the co-operation should take must be conditioned by wise appreciation of aircraft development and of combined naval and air strategy. I must add this—that co-operation which both Services are only too anxious to give is really not helped by persons trying to fan the flames of old controversies long since resolved. I believe that the spirit in all three Services to-day is, as I said in a recent debate, a genuine spirit to give and to get the best that each can contribute.

In the Army there is a very moderate increase proposed in size, but a great increase in efficiency. Mechanisation is carried forward. New tank battalions and new tanks: the anti-tank gun and the antitank rifle, which have now been conclusively proved, will be brought into use. The new Bren machine gun will be introduced, and the Field Artillery will be thoroughly modernised. In addition to the re-equipment there will, of course, be the creation of those very necessary war reserves; and not only, I am glad to say, better equipment in arms and munitions, but better equipment in housing, which is hardly less important. Some of the barracks really are a disgrace. I am not sure that I think all the Air Force places are quite up to the standard which any local authority would require if it were a case of building a house. We have got some places that hang over from the War, but I think we are better off than the Army. We have not got barracks which are a hundred years old and which seem to have had few, if any, amenities introduced into them during that time. Therefore the housing conditions will be taken in hand.

May I add this? Everyone knows what a valuable training the Air Force is to a man who enters it as a mechanic. Everybody knows that when you pass into the Air Force and become a skilled aircraftman, this is about as fine a training for engineering in future life that a man can have. But I want to say this on behalf of the Army. I do not think it is equally realised how valuable the training centres and the training courses in the Army are, and that they manage to pass even in time of slump a very large number of these trained men into employment. That will be steadily proceeded with. And it should be remembered by anyone who is thinking of joining the Army, that he not only joins a great Service but that he is training probably for after employment and will have a very considerable chance of obtaining that employment.

I turn now to the Air Force. The expansion which I announced in July is going steadily forward. A very large increase will be made in addition to that. There will be an increase in first-line strength and an increase in war reserves. For obvious reasons we have never given the figures of reserves. If we could have complete publicity among all the countries of the world it would be a great advantage. We would welcome it. We cannot give information which other people do not give. Such figures as have been given, for example, figures of first-line establishment, obviously lead to misunderstanding. I saw it stated somewhere, for instance, that to add some hundreds to first-line establishment merely meant the ordering of a few hundred machines. Of course it means nothing of the sort. While I have no intention of giving—and I am sure I should not be pressed to give—any particulars about reserves, I may say this as some indication, that in the next three years we aim at taking delivery of more machines than have been delivered to the Air Force in the seventeen years following the War.

There is no subject, I think everyone in this House who knows air questions will undoubtedly agree, in which comparison is so difficult and so misleading unless you can be quite sure you are comparing like with like. Nowhere does quality in men or machines count for more—the machine of high performance, the pilot, and, even more, the formation which is highly trained and has had full experience. Let me give an example as regards machines. I said, speaking in another place when I was introducing the new programme, that one of the things we were aiming at was to get any new improvement into production as soon as possible after it had been proved. Indeed we took some risks in ordering on a large scale machines of types which we could not feel certain, were going to be completely proved, but we felt it was so important to get these new improvements into production as quickly as possible that it was right to take the risk of piling up orders behind the production of the first machine. We know enough now, as these machines are coming forward, to say, I think with confidence, that these risks were well taken, and that the results will more than justify them. But these new types of machine, in range and speed and performance, present so entirely different a picture from those of a year ago that any comparison which took a force of the old machines and compared it with the force of the new machines would be a perfectly worthless comparison.

I may say that in this we are not merely the judge in our own cause. Perhaps the best tribute to the success of the designers of these machines is that I hardly know a country in the world which is not extremely anxious to possess itself of some of them even if it has to wait a considerable time before we are served first. What we have conceived to be our duty in this matter is, objectively, to create the most effective force for our purpose—effective in defence and effective as a deterrent against attack. Concurrently with this, experiments and research go on all the time in matters of air defence. Your Lordships would not expect me to detail in any way either the nature or the extent of these experiments. Their value must lie in their secrecy. I would only say that some of the greatest scientists in this country are working wholeheartedly with the Services and with the Department of Scientific Research as a team in complete partnership, and that there is no scamping in money or material for any experiment which those men, working together, think can even possibly afford a valuable chance of solution of defence problems.

I spoke of reserves. There are, of course, reserves in material, in machines—I am coming in a moment to our plans for industrial expansions—but there are also the reserves in men. In the Air Force those have come in the past through the men who had the short-service Commission, as we call it, and have then passed out of the Service into the Reserve. I thought ignorantly before I was acquainted with the facts that a short-service Commission, the taking of an officer for live or six years, was rather a blind-alley occupation. I found by experience that it is nothing of the sort; that to take a man at eighteen or nineteen, give him his five years of training, and then to pass him into civil life is, as a matter of fact, much the best thing that you can do. Even in the slump, as my noble friend Lord Londonderry would bear out, for it was in a time when he was responsible, over 80 per cent. of these short-service officers were finding regular civil employment as they passed out of the Service. It is, therefore, a valuable career.

There is also the direct entry into the Reserves. We are going to take steps to make that entry easier, and to get the initial training at times more convenient to the man in civil life. We are expanding our auxiliary squadrons. The Army is trying to get the numbers for the Territorial Force. May I on behalf of both Services make in this House an appeal which I have made before, and ask your Lordships' help, which can be great in this matter? It will make a tremendous difference if employers will give that fortnight of holiday during which a man goes either to the Air Force reserve or the auxiliary squadron or the Territorial battalion or battery. It is a pretty hard thing to ask a boy, who before he went into business was probably accustomed to rather longer vacations, who now has a fortnight, that is all, in the year, to give up that fortnight or even a week of that fortnight to do his training. If, on the other hand, it became the general practice that employers should give a fortnight's leave, as some are doing, to the man for his time in camp with the Air Force or the Army, that would be a tremendous incentive and a help to filling the numbers which are needed.

I pass to the final proposition which I put, the third test which we have got to apply in seeing whether these plans are adequate, the test of whether we are taking steps to make our civilian industry ready so that it can turn over to be a great producer in war. There is no doubt about our potential resources. There is no doubt about our staying power. What is important is that we should be sure that those resources can come into play in time. If that can be done it will be the greatest deterrent and the greatest keeper of peace. In normal times the plan would be this. You would have the Service Departments placing their ordinary orders with what I may call the professional firms, with the Government arsenals and establishments and with the regular munitions firms. At the same time it would be our duty to see that plans existed by which ordinary civilian industry could come in to play its part in war—plans not merely existing on paper, but plans supported with arrangements that plant should be available where required and supported with a sufficiency of what I may call educative orders. But the present requirements of our programme exceed the capacity of the normal munitions industry to fulfil. We therefore propose to employ a number of selected firms, who would turn over to munitions production in war, to build new additional factories and workshops, to build them as agents for the Government, to equip them and produce in them those things which we want for our present programme and which are in excess of the capacity of the ordinary munitions industry to produce. In that way we shall reinforce the munitions industry to supply our present needs and we shall indeed be making a very effective preparation against the possible emergency of war.

I have said that these additional factories will be built and managed on Government account. No one can do that work so efficiently as the great firms which have practical production knowledge. Indeed they were the very people who, in the Ministry of Munitions in the late War, had to do all that job and create and manage new factories. We shall call upon them to do that in addition to their ordinary civil work. But I am sure there is one thing which we do want to avoid in any planning even now—that is anything like the "time and line" procedure which crept in during the War under which the more you spent the larger your remuneration. If a man spent £1,000,000 he got a percentage on what he spent. Another man who spent £800,000 on the same work got the same remuneration or in some cases actually a smaller remuneration than the man who spent £1,000,000. I do not say that was universal, but I think all your Lordships will remember cases where that occurred. We want to avoid all that. We propose, therefore, wherever possible, that the remuneration shall be related to efficiency so that where a firm as manager of these works makes a marked economy to the advantage of the State and the taxpayer, that economy may redound somewhat to the advantage of the firm as well as to our advantage.

In order that I may show that this is not a theoretical exposition let me give a practical example of how we are already working. I take an example from the Service for which I am responsible. The programme in aircraft which is now envisaged is considerably more in output than the regular aircraft industry can accomplish. I have already seen two great firms, the Austin Motor Company and Messrs. Rootes, who control, as your Lordships are probably aware, great undertakings like the Humber, the Hill-man and the Commer companies and I think the Sunbeam company. I asked them to establish two great factories on Government account, two great factories for the making of aircraft. They did not particularly want to do it. As a business proposition it was not attractive. They did not want to go into the business, nor does one want them to do so as an ordinary undertaking. But they said at once: "We will gladly do this thing. We do not want to enter the aircraft-making industry, but we realise that this is a planned scheme for national emergency and we will readily put our experience and our knowledge at your disposal." They will therefore erect these factories. They are already in touch; they have had allocated to them the two types of aircraft that they will produce; they are already at work on the planning of how their factories shall be built and laid out, and are in contact with the aircraft firms whose machines they will make.

Let me emphasise that this will be done, not by turning people off their ordinary civil work, but by creating, side by side with that work, great new factories, which are brought in as soon as they are ready for this emergency and which will be ready at any moment, should the emergency of war come, to produce on a large scale. I heard the suggestion made: What happens when that work is finished? When that work is finished, those factories remain the property of the Government. They have the plant and the equipment in them; you can turn the key in the door, keep the plant on a care-and-maintenance basis, and you have there a great factory ready to spring into immediate activity should the need for it ever arise again. I submit that that is a really practical way of dealing with that proposition; and the work is already being undertaken.

LORD STRABOLGI

If the noble Lord would excuse me, might I ask whether any arrangement is made to keep the workpeople in being?

VISCOUNT SWINTON

We had better wait and see about that. Obviously you are going, by creating this new demand for work, to create a new demand for labour; but as I see it—it is an important point—the great advantage of having what I might call your shadow factory established in connection with, and close by, some great undertaking which is itself in civil life a great employer of labour, means that there is a much better chance of the workmen getting re-employment if and when your extra production of munitions comes to an end.

LORD STRABOLGI

Thank you.

VISCOUNT SWINTON

I have spoken, my Lords, of the establishment of these new plants. There is, of course, an enormous amount of subcontracting going on in the aircraft industry and no doubt among firms which make for the Army as well. It would be quite a wrong conception to suppose that a firm which turns out aeroplanes is a self-contained unit turning out everything from start to finish. A great aircraft firm has a very-large number of sub-contracts for parts, bits and pieces with firms all over the country, and nobody knows as well as a skilled and experienced firm where best to place its own sub-contracts.

I want also to say that, in working out these plans for reinforcing the ordinary munitions industry, there is no overlapping and no cutting across what I might call the Committee of Imperial Defence plan of war supply. The orders for the programmes of the Services must be placed, and are being placed, by the Service Departments. They place them in the first instance with the ordinary munitions firms with whom they are in the habit of contracting. As I explained, we are placing orders and getting work done by firms like Austins. The Service Department, therefore, places a contract or gets work done on commission by a non-munition firm; but in all that each of the Service Departments will act strictly in accordance with the Committee of Imperial Defence plan of war allocation. Beyond that, beyond the actual placing of orders, the creation of the war potential is a matter for the Supply Organisation of the Committee of Imperial Defence.

In war I take it as axiomatic that you will have two Ministries: you will have a Ministry of men and a Ministry of things; a Ministry of Man Power or National Service, dealing probably with all man power, and a Ministry of Munitions or a Ministry of Supply; and I assume that the recruiting and supply departments of the Services would merge in those two Ministries in time of war. But in peace the Service Departments rightly discharge their own supply responsibilities and place their own orders, but working all the time in strict accord with the broad plan of war allocation which the Committee of Imperial Defence organisation lays down. For example, in my dealings with non-munition firms I deal only with those firms which, under what I may call the war plan, I know have been allotted to aircraft production of one kind or another.

My Lords, I have dwelt on that industrial side, I am afraid, at some length, but I thought it was important that your Lordships should see exactly not only how this plan is intended to work but how it is actually being carried out in practice. I wanted to give your Lordships this assurance because I am sure, if I had not given and proved it, I should have been very promptly asked: "If you are placing your orders and the War Office are placing their orders with a number of different firms outside the ordinary armament field, how are you taking steps to see that you are not cutting across the proper war organisation?" I think I have shown your Lordships that enough work has been done to allocate the firms, and that everything which is being done, and being properly done, by the Services to meet their own requirements is being done strictly in accordance with the broad lines of the war production plan and the war allocations. I therefore think I can claim that, on the third test, and that is the most important, perhaps—the test of the organisation in peace of normal civil industry so that it can stand the strain of war and turn quickly to take up the stress of war—our plans are advancing, and that the action which is being taken is strictly in accordance with this plan. I submit that both in framing and carrying out the immediate programmes which the Services have had set to them; in the creation of what I have called the war potential; that power to turn over the civil industry to war needs; and in using that war potential to reinforce and supply our present needs, the proposals that we make are thorough, comprehensive and well-conceived. They are certainly no panic measures, but they are certainly no more than our plain duty. I beg to move.

Moved to resolve, That this House approves the defence proposals of His Majesty's Government which are outlined in Command Paper No. 5107 (Statement relating to Defence). —(Viscount Swinton.)

LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE

had given Notice of an Amendment, to leave out all words after "That" and insert "as the safety of this country and the peace of the world cannot be secured by reliance on armaments but only by the pursuit of a policy of international understanding, general disarmament and economic co-operation so as to remove the causes of war, this House cannot agree to the proposals for rearmament now adopted by His Majesty's Government; such a policy can be no guarantee of security, but by drawing this country into the disastrous international competition in armaments is calculated to inflame public opinion and increase the danger of war; and in depleting our national resources by a heavy expenditure for destruction, the urgent need for social and domestic reconstruction by which alone the well-being of the nation can be secured must be seriously and adversely affected."

The noble Lord said: My Lords, may I at the outset associate myself on behalf of my noble friends around me with the eloquent tribute which the noble Viscount, who has just resumed his seat, paid to the late Lord Beatty. His was a vigorous personality and he inspired confidence in all with whom he was associated. His record stands high, and his fine career will be handed down to the admiration of future generations.

I quite understand why the noble Viscount, Lord Monsell, was unable to move this Motion, to-day, but I am sure your Lordships are all in agreement in feeling that he was very adequately represented by the noble Viscount who has just spoken. The noble Viscount, Lord Swinton, whose skill at presenting a difficult technical case is very well known to me in my former existence in another place, has put before your Lordships, with a wealth of detail, the whole process by which His Majesty's Government desire to bring forward a rearmament, or rather an expansion of armaments. In spite of the noble Viscount's eloquent exposition of the case, I must confess that his speech filled me with the deepest possible gloom. It was so terribly reminiscent of the debates, many of which I took part in, in the years before 1914. As usual, with a wealth of detail, with technical arguments, the underlying principle behind this White Paper is described in debate, and we shall have representatives of one Service after another claiming that more attention should be paid to this branch or that branch, and disputes will arise as to the cost of this and the cost of that and we shall lose sight of what all this is for. I do not intend to analyse the exact figure of expansion or the exact proportion of expenditure to be allocated to each of the Fighting Services, nor shall I attempt to differentiate the relative importance to be apportioned to personnel and engines of war. I am not competent to do so, and I have a misgiving that owing to recent inventions, and the darkness of the abyss into which it is contemplated we may have to plunge, no one is competent to judge which particular device will be most destructive and therefore the most effective.

I am grateful to the noble Viscount that, seeing my name on the Paper above the Amendment which I am now moving, he did not switch off your Lordships' attention by any reference to my individual views, and what is sometimes referred to as my policy, because that is not the question before the House to-day. I saw only last week that it was referred to while I was not here, in a debate on the League of Nations, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of London was good enough to say I was consistent, but he added: "although the Lord knows where the world would be if we followed him." Without referring to any higher power, I can tell him that the world would not be in such a parlous condition as it is to-day. My humble views are not, however, in question to-day. I am only concerned with the underlying and governing principle which induces the Government at this period of the world's history to spend a vast amount of the country's resources in order to plunge us into war preparations on an extravagant scale, trusting that by describing imminent dangers it can induce the people to support it in adopting the age-old method of force outbidding force, and so bringing the conflict of these forces undoubtedly nearer.

What is the reason for it? I notice that the noble Viscount skated over the question of collective security very skilfully. I should like to get a collection of the utterances of His Majesty's present Government on the question of collective security. Is this brought forward to implement the Government's policy of collective security, and to enforce more effectively that policy? My Lords, I am going just to make one or two quotations, not of years past but of recent date, with a view of illustrating the Government's faith in collective security. The Prime Minister, a week or two ago, referring to former utterances of his, said:

" Though the organisation of a completely effective collective system is impracticable…."

The Chancellor of the Exchequer put it more explicitly. On the 10th of this month, he said:

" Quite apart from the fact that some of the most powerful and heavily armed countries of the world are not Members of the League at all, the countries who are Members of the League are by no means so strong, or so united in determination as to what they would do in given circumstances, that we can say that collective security has yet reached that point when our national safety is no longer a matter which we need consider."

I subscribe to that description of collective security as undertaken by His Majesty's Government recently.

I have said in this House on several occasions that without an all-inclusive League, and without complete unanimity and co-operation, and a sincere desire to carry out the full obligations laid down by the framers of the Covenant, you cannot have collective security, and to attempt it is dangerous. Now the Government know that you cannot get completely collective action, but they have never awakened to the fact that it is dangerous to attempt it if you cannot. Anyhow, I think they will admit, and I think the noble Viscount will admit, that the failure of collective action recently—and a complete failure it has been—was not lack of armaments on our side. By adding armaments you would not have got any better collective security. It is not armaments that are wanted for collective security, it is unanimous co-operation, the faith of nations in one another, and their desire to maintain peace by being all resolutely determined to oppose any aggressor. That is what is wanted, not armaments. On the contrary, the parading of our Fleet in the Mediterranean has nothing to do with collective security. To my mind that was a very injudicious move and at one moment seemed to be having only the effect of singling us out as the one enemy of the Power against whom sanctions were being imposed. I do not want to go back on all that argument; because of present events and past history it all seems so remote that we do not discuss it. But I want to emphasise the fact that this expansion of armaments has no sort of connection with the implementing of the policy of collective security. Armaments are not wanted for that.

It is almost impossible in a debate on defence not to refer to the present situation. I should be reluctant to say anything that would endanger in any way, humble though my voice may be, the very delicate and difficult negotiations which are now proceeding. But again it is the Chancellor of the Exchequer who, in a most unfortunate phrase, as I think, when this subject was being discussed in another place, said:

" I think we are surely all agreed that the situation has not been relieved by anything that has happened in the last few days, and that there is no reason to suppose we ought to change our view that we should get on with these proposals as fast as ever we possibly can."

Now what connection is there between what is going on now in the League Council and armaments? I hope none. Do the Government pretend for a moment that if we were possessed of far greater armaments than we have at present it would ease the situation at St. James's Palace? On the contrary, it might make the whole situation very much darker.

I do not know how many people are going to sleep more peacefully in their beds because of the appointment of Sir Thomas Inskip as Minister for the Coordination of Defence, but I personally feel relieved that some of the other competitors have not been chosen. I would say notably the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and, to paraphrase the Bishop of London, I would say, the Lord alone knows where we should be led by him. I only desire in this very difficult situation to comment on the fact that British opinion and the British Press have shown the most exemplary moderation. It is our habit. A day or two ago, in a tremendous jam of traffic caused by a car which the driver had foolishly tried to turn in the middle of the road, I noticed a policeman. He did not shout at the man, he did not take his name and number, he did not blame him, he did not arrest him, but he went quietly and firmly up to him and simply said: "And what are you trying to do?" That is essentially British, and that is really the best method of diplomacy.

EARL STANHOPE

Were you driving the car?

LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE

No, I never obstruct any traffic. And I believe that His Majesty's Government would not contemplate for one single moment plunging this country into a conflict which ultimately is based on the academic interpretation of clauses of treaties. The ultimate aim of a treaty, more especially of this particular Treaty, is peace—peace between nations; and that ultimate aim must override the minor considerations of the legal implications of certain clauses. Many clauses in treaties are observed by nations according to the dictates of expediency at the moment they are called into question, and several clauses of treaties have been entirely disregarded by all nations for the very same reason. The main purpose of the Treaty is the only thing which should be kept in view. The lawyers and the international jurists should be put in a room apart to have it out among themselves, but they should have no influence on the main principles of policy which are being followed by the Ministers themselves. The methods of Herr Hitler may have been clumsy, may have been brutal, may have been coarse, but who has taught him these methods? When Germany adopted the orthodox diplomatic method the Powers paid no attention to her at all. We have taught Herr Hitler this method.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

Not we.

LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE

The Powers—I am not blaming this country especially. And unfortunate as it may be, it ought not to stand in the way of the Governments who are aware and must be aware throughout the world that the desire of their people is peace. They want to live in amity with one another, and they do not want these particular quarrels to interfere with the world's happiness. Anything that can be said in these days to encourage His Majesty's Government to take a sane view, not to lose their sense of proportion in this turmoil but to keep this country from any entanglement in an issue of this kind, will, I am sure, be welcomed by them. But the expansion of our armaments would do no good in a crucial position of this sort, and will be of no avail in any of those controversies that are likely to arise in the future. We may turn this corner as we have turned other corners. I am sure that the two Ministers—the noble Viscount the Leader of this House, Lord Halifax, and Mr. Eden—have the very best and most fervent wishes of the country that they will succeed. But it is not turning corners in diplomacy that really in the long run will pay. It is not turning the dangerous corners, however skilfully they may be turned, which is what matters. It is the adoption of a different road on which these dangerous corners do not exist.

So, my Lords, we come back to what the noble Viscount himself declared, that this is a matter of defence. If your Lordships will allow me, I should like to say a few words on that threadbare, time-worn theme. There have never been any armaments manufactured by any country which have not been declared to be for defence. It is a very old story. It is always for defence that armaments are needed. I was frightened that the noble Viscount might use the argument, trotted out sometimes, which is just beyond the limit of what is acceptable, and that is the argument that when other nations rearm it is a danger to peace, but when we rearm the whole world knows that it is the way to secure peace. I have heard that in this House, and I am very glad it was not repeated to-day, because, as we know, other nations cannot adopt that point of view. This is a policy quite deliberately undertaken because other nations are rearming. The White Paper gives nation after nation and tells us exactly, in the figures available, what the rearmament of the world has been within the last few years. Therefore we come forward and say we cannot be left behind; we have got to come in too; we have got to encourage this competition; we have got to make the world safe by rearming to the teeth; we must have adequate armaments.

What are "adequate armaments "? Is there a single expert that can tell us what are "adequate armaments" to-day? They do not know at all, they are all working in the dark, they have not an idea. Is tremendous preparedness in armaments really security? Nobody would dispute that in 1914 Germany-was equipped, as magnificiently equipped as any Army has ever been, to face what proved to be practically the whole world. Of what avail was it to her? None whatever. At the end of the War France, with the backing of the Allied and Associated Powers and all the money, ingenuity, and invention of the world behind her, won the War. And what then? Ever since she has been crying out for security. No, my Lords. Security never will be won by armaments. Pile them up as much as you like, but you will never get the security of this country or any other country by that means. It is an old device to blame somebody else as being responsible. We blame Italy, we blame Japan, we blame Germany, and then we say the world is in a turmoil and we must join in too.

I do not think it really should require very great wisdom to abandon a policy of this sort. We are in fear of a conflagration and so the Government, in a state of panic—because it is that, it has been accepted as that—stoke up the smouldering embers and add fuel to the flames by way of stopping the conflagration. The people of this country and the people of all countries are far in advance of their Governments in this matter. If they could be articulate, if they could be listened to, I think we should see the Governments of the world taking a different course. As it is, the public mind and public attention are to be distracted by war preparations. Industry is to be organised on these lines. The noble Viscount very clearly described to us exactly what was to be done. The country is to be militarised and even, according to the noble Viscount, each man's holiday is to be devoted to military, air, or naval exercises. Air centres, barracks, and munition centres are to be multiplied, and meanwhile the urgent need of the Social Services of housing and education will have to be neglected for want of money. We shall always be told, when propositions of that sort come forward, that there is not enough money to devote to them. The enemy has not yet been chosen, but, with the tremendous devices of publicity now at the Government's disposal, there will be no difficulty about inflaming public opinion against a criminal nation, whichever it may be, when the moment comes. Propaganda is just as necessary as munitions, but the Government know all about that.

I have felt depressed at the statement that has been made and at the White Paper that has been published, to find, so soon after the great tragedy, people actually contemplating the possibility of another one which will be ten times worse. It may not be an extravagant idea to suggest that we may be entering on one of those periodic cycles of which instances could be quoted in the past history of Europe, when such civilisation as had previously been gained was lost in the turmoil and conflict which continually distracted the minds of men from noble aims and high achievement, when the business of war became man's chief concern, when education was sacrificed and decadent generations arose careless of the great heritage left to them by the toil and genius of their predecessors—a time when conquerors and tyrants overran vast territories dominated by a civilisation which seemed lasting to those who created it, and this not once and not for a year or two, but for generations and for centuries, time after time.

The mechanical ingenuity on which we pride ourselves, and the enslavement of new scientific knowledge for base purposes, will hasten for us such a plunge into barbarism deeper, more cruel, and more rapid in its poison to the mind and soul than any of those terrible lapses which history records. I hope this is a gloomy prophecy, but there were those before 1914 who made the same prophecies and who were laughed at, derided, or disregarded. I believe that this country, above all others, would seem to have the opportunity of staving off this evil day, not by going down the wrong road of war preparation, but by leading the nations in another direction to strengthen the methods of conciliation and of peace and concord between the peoples. At a critical juncture of this kind we find that His Majesty's Government have made the wrong choice. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Leave out all the words after (" That ") and insert (" as the safety of this country and the peace of the world cannot be secured by reliance on armaments but only by the pursuit of a policy of international understanding, general disarmament and economic co-operation so as to remove the causes of war, this House cannot agree to the proposals for rearmament now adopted by His Majesty's Government; such a policy can be no guarantee of security, but by drawing this country into the disastrous international competition in armaments is calculated, to inflame public opinion and increase the danger of war; and in depleting our national resources by a heavy expenditure for destruction, the urgent need for social and domestic reconstruction by which alone the well-being of the nation can be secured must be seriously and adversely affected)."—(Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede.)

THE MARQUESS OF CREWE

My Lords, before I touch on the; subjects raised in the two important speches to which we have listened, I should like to join in what both noble Lords said in expressing our deep regret for the loss of Lord Beatty. All his qualities have been appreciated and praised by many writers and speakers, but there is one point in which there has possibly been some excess. Lord Beatty has been sometimes spoken of as though he were a sort of Murat of the seas, thinking only of the charge and the attack. Those who knew Lord Beatty personally, as I am glad to think I did, know that, in addition to all those qualities of dash and courage, he was besides a very thoughtful and sensible man, and those who served with him at the Admiralty during the period when he was First Lord would, I am sure, bear that statement out in full.

The noble Lord who has just sat down touched for the first time on the existing political situation, not I think exactly on its bearing on the Motion made by the noble Viscount the Secretary of State for Air, but rather by way of illustration of the futility of the proposals made by His Majesty's Government. On the situation I will only say this. It is generally recognised, and recognised as much by the noble Lord as by everybody else, that in sending troops into the demilitarised zone Herr Hitler committed a breach of public law. I think he has himself stated that the number of troops sent to the Rhineland was really symbolic. Well, I must say I think 30,000 troops, which is the lowest estimate which has been made, seems to me to be pushing symbolism rather far. It represents an army equal to the entire military force of an important country like Sweden. But be that as it may, it was also said, and I think truly said, that the sequel to Herr Hitler's action was the offer of an olive branch. To use a happy phrase of Cardinal Newman, that was of the nature of an olive branch shot from a catapult; and the missile caught the Locarno Powers full in the eye. But I agree, and I hope it may be the case, that when they have recovered their ordinary eyesight they will examine the olive branch very carefully to the utmost and see if it may not in fact prove to be a fruitful plant, and I trust that the negotiations which are going on may lead in due course to such a careful examination.

I come now to the Resolution moved from the Government Bench. I am not by any means one of those who consider that the Government have shown a kind of torpor in delaying so long in making these particular proposals. I think that the fact they have not moved before—and I know that in some quarters they have been blamed for not moving before; it was quite evident from the debate in another place—is due in the first place to the circumstance that there was a more or less tacit understanding that for a ten-year period there was no risk of a European war. I confess that I have never greatly appreciated the custom of naming terms of years within which no danger is to be feared. Such statements are apt to convey the implication that at the end of the period there is serious danger of war, and I think it would have been far better not to have mentioned any such period of years.

But in addition to that every Government that has existed since the War ended has encountered serious pressure to reduce taxation, and that pressure has proved in some cases almost irresistible. A certain reduction of Income Tax and the restoration of all the cuts that had to be made after the crisis of 1931 might have been impossible if steady attention had been paid to keeping all the forces of the country in a position supposed to be adequate for a possible outbreak of war. Then there was a third inducement not to spend money on armaments, and that was the attitude taken up by the United States towards the settlement of the Debt due from us and, still more, from other countries in Europe. Your Lordships will all remember that the one charge brought against European countries by the American Government was that they were squandering money in continuing and even in increasing their expenditure on armaments, and it was asked: "Well, if they can do that why can't they pay their Debts?" That, I think, must have been a further reason actuating successive Governments in trying to keep expenditure on armaments as low as possible; and besides it is a fact that a hope was being expressed, a sadly baseless hope I fear it has proved to be, that a general disarmament would be undertaken by most of the heavily armed countries.

The noble Lord who has just spoken was eloquent on the word "defence," and I am afraid that we all have to agree with him up to this point, that it is very difficult if not impossible to draw a distinction between defensive and offensive armaments. I think he was correct in saying that there never has been a case in any country where armaments have been regarded as anything but defensive. The great fortifications which France has erected on her Eastern frontier are obviously regarded by the French as defensive armaments, but we may be equally sure that a number of Germans would look upon them as giving potentialities for a possible offensive against Germany. To go further, I have no doubt that hundreds and thousands of Italians at this moment honestly believe that their invasion of Abyssinia represents a necessary protection of their territory and commerce. Therefore always when we use the word "defence" we use it in the sense in which I think it is understood by everybody concerned.

Before I say a word about the White Paper I must say, without by any means agreeing in all the charges which the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, brought against His Majesty's Government, that I do think that in their general policy and in their action as displayed at Geneva they have given to many people, who do not regard these matters in a factious, spirit or merely in a spirit of pure opposition to the Government, an impression that they have not explained to the world what their real attitude has been during the past years towards the question of disarmament. They have not, some of us venture to think, drawn a real distinction between what is necessary for collective security and what is necessary for national security. I should be inclined to think that the quite legitimate boast which His Majesty's Government have made, that we have disarmed to a greater extent than any of the powerful European countries, may lead our friends on the Continent of Europe to think that in reducing our armaments, and perhaps also in not keeping up our forces to the requisite level, we have been more obviously and more fully-actuated by those four considerations which I mentioned just now—economy and the others—than by a serious wish to impress upon other countries the need for joint disarmament. And it is quite clear that if there is to be disarmament it must be joint disarmament. Probably the noble Lord who has just spoken does not think so. He would believe that we might go on reducing our forces without much reference to what other countries are doing, but I do not think that proposition would be accepted by all those who sit on the same Benches as the noble Lord.

I come now to the few points in the White Paper about which I wish to speak. The White Paper in paragraph 5 implies that we are the only Great Power that is obliged to keep large forces owing to its world-wide interests. That surely is not quite accurate. France has vast colonial possessions in many parts of the world, and the French military situation has been thereby very greatly complicated in precisely the same way that ours has been by the fact of our having to keep a large force in India. A point to which I wish to draw attention is with regard to the new Minister. I do not know whether the right honourable gentleman the Attorney-General ought to be congratulated or condoled with on his appointment, but I am quite sure we all wish him well, and I personally have not a word of criticism to offer against his appointment. I hope for his own sake that even if he possesses it he will not show that he possesses any familiarity with either the literature or the science of any foreign country. In that case he might have to remember that, because the late noble Viscount, Lord Haldane, was a student of German philosophy, when it came to war with Germany his intelligent fellow countrymen—or, at any rate, a great many of them—seemed to think that his vast services to the Army and to the country, which cannot be overrated, were entirely obliterated by the fact that he had often visited Germany.

I quite see the very difficult dilemma in which the Government found themselves between the creation of a Minister of Defence governing all the Services, a Minister who was evidently not desired by the country or by Parliament, and on the other hand the creation of a Minister who might be almost a puppet and who would have no real power even of carrying out the blessed word "coordination." I wonder whether in setting forth the relations of the Minister with the three Chiefs of Staff the Government have not fallen into the danger of adopting the second alternative. It is stated in the White Paper, and was, I think, emphasised in one of the speeches in another place, that in the ordinary course the Minister would not attend the meeting of the Chiefs of Staff. Obviously, what in any ease would happen would be that the Chiefs of Staff would meet informally and discuss things without the presence of the Minister. But I should have thought that, if he did not always attend the formal meetings attended by the secretary or secretaries, of which minutes are kept, he would find it very difficult to keep himself in the position which the Minister ought to hold in relation to the three Services.

I think there is a certain analogy—of course, no analogies in politics or in anything else are absolutely complete—between the position of this Minister and that of the Secretary of State for India in relation to his Council. His Council are all experts; he is seldom or never an expert himself, and he depends upon them for a great deal of knowledge, advice and information; but he always presides when they meet. If it happened to him that they held formal meetings and reached conclusions in his absence, he would find himself in a greatly weakened position for exercising the supreme power which has to belong in the last resort to the head of a Department. The co-ordinating Minister of Defence has, of course, to submit his conclusions to the Prime Minister and to the Cabinet, but if he is not able to do so on his own authority I am afraid—though I have no doubt that the late Attorney-General is the last man likely to do this—that he will slide into a position of comparative impotence.

I listened with great interest to what the noble Viscount said on the matter of munitions and supply. I am not at all sure that these paragraphs are not in fact the most important part of the whole Paper. Nobody, I am sure, has forgotten or can possibly forget, the remarkable services which, in this respect, Mr. Lloyd George performed in the early stages of the War. I happen to know something about that first-hand, and I think it is hardly possible to overstate those services. But nobody wants the country to be put into a position in which some deus ex machina has to do that again, and I hope, without attempting to criticise the Services, that the provisions for supply may prevent any possibility of such a thing happening again, and prevent it without producing the impression, either here or in other countries, that we are a country perpetually engaged in preparations for war. That would be an equally serious misfortune in the opposite direction.

The noble Viscount's Resolution invites us to approve the White Paper, but I find difficulty in doing that for two reasons. In the first place there is an implication that such approval means in fact approval of the Government policy in relation to defence and kindred subjects, an approval which some of us would not be able to give. But a reason further than that which actuates me is that, when I am invited to approve something, I like to know what it actually is that I am approving. In reading the White Paper, admirably drawn up as it is, and making every allowance for the fact that neither figures of expense nor precise modes of action can be laid down in a Paper of this kind, yet I feel that there is an atmosphere of vagueness and uncertainty about the whole matter which makes it impossible for me to give it the unreserved approval which a vote for the Government would mean. I cannot help thinking, particularly as a great many of the details will, I imagine, never come before your Lordships' real consideration, because they are largely financial in character, that those who give a vote for the Government—when and if a vote is taken—will be understood to have approved a considerable number of the details in the Paper. Therefore I do not find myself in the position of being able to support His Majesty's Government on this occasion.

But I am equally unable to support the Amendment moved by the noble Lord opposite. He said a great many things in the course of his speech with which I agree, and some with which I profoundly disagree. But I observe in the terms of his Amendment that he makes no allusion to the League of Nations or to collective security. He only speaks of international understanding, which is a thing which people have been striving to get for hundreds of years. The general conclusions reached in the noble Lord's Amendment are not such as most of us who sit here can agree with. I have no doubt that both he and other noble Lords forming the Opposition in this House are quite firmly convinced that if only a Socialist Government had been in power during these last few years things would have been very different; there would have been far greater advances towards disarmament, and foreign countries would have taken a much more agreeable view of us and of the world in general than they take at present. I cannot agree with the noble Lord.

I cannot help feeling that, if such a Government had been in office, great consternation would have existed in many parts of the world. I think that consternation would have been felt in certain events by entirely different people, because taking the evidence from what has fallen from various speakers who hold the same, or similar, views to the noble Lord, we should either have been engaged in bombarding Genoa and Leghorn; or, on the other hand, troopships would be hastening home bringing soldiers in thousands from the Mediterranean or India with a view to their being disbanded. In those circumstances, I cannot help feeling that the existence of such a Government would not have brought peace to Europe and the world but possibly a sword. I have explained why I cannot bring myself either to vote with the Government or with the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby. I am sure, however, that all of your Lordships will agree that the debate, which I understand is to be continued on Thursday, will be a very valuable one and I am very glad to have been able to take part in it.

THE MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY

My Lords, I ask your indulgence to allow me to make a few observations on the debate to which we have listened this afternoon, and I would say at the outset with what regret I have heard the remarks made in the closing part of his speech by the noble Marquess, who has just sat down. I had hoped that he would have found himself able, and his friends also, to vote for the Resolution, and give that support to the Government which I think they are entitled to have in the very arduous duty which lies before them. I would like, if I may, to congratulate the noble Viscount, who has moved this Resolution in a very eloquent and very comprehensive manner. He has gone into many details of which we were not altogether aware, and I feel that all those of us who are anxious to support the White Paper, and do everything we can to see it brought into successful effect, will agree that he has made a useful contribution.

It seems to me that there is one great difficulty with which the Government are faced, and I have no doubt they will overcome that difficulty; it is that of trying to carry out a scheme of this description, which is certainly of a very comprehensive character, under institutions which we call democratic institutions. There are other countries in the world in which orders can be given, and orders have to be carried out, in a far smaller space of time than we can carry out those orders in this country; but I am sure that with the elasticity of our institutions we need have no doubt whatever that the whole nation will rise to the support of the Government and help them to carry out the policy which has been put before us in the White Paper. As I have said, I have no fault to find with the White Paper. I agree, perhaps, in a measure with the noble Marquess, that we have no specific figures and other details which might have induced the noble Marquess to vote for the Resolution; but I think he must recognise, as the great majority of your Lordships must recognise, that to give an accurate figure would have been a very difficult thing to do, and it is much better, rather than give a speculative figure, to leave that item of the White Paper in the condition in which it is at the present moment.

This White Paper, it is very obvious, has been a very difficult document to draw up, and I certainly think we owe a deep debt of gratitude to members of the Cabinet who have formed themselves into a committee to produce this document. It is naturally the earnest endeavour of the Government, as I know it is of a great majority of your Lordships, that we should establish a position in this country of security as far as armaments are concerned, and it is idle to pretend that there is any school of thought of any great dimensions in this country which believes that by divesting ourselves of all armaments we are making a greater contribution to world peace, than if we place ourselves in that position of security which we believe is necessary to meet the situation in which we find ourselves at the present moment. The plans which are now in being carry out two objects. They maintain our security, and by that I mean they give us authority for making our voice heard in the Council of Nations, because, unfortunately, the measure of our strength goes a great way in these international discussions in which we engage, and it also makes a contribution to collective security. I will venture to make some observations about collective security in a few moments. The policy which is in being now, and which is so different from the policy pursued at no very distant date, has been due to several circumstances. Some people might perhaps say that the fact of the public becoming aware of the rearmament of Germany might have been the turning point, but I would not go so far as that. In fact I would say that it was only a point which had an influence on public opinion. I think gradually public opinion became aware that the whole world was arming, and that the world was beginning more and more to rely upon armaments, by reason of the fear which existed in their minds.

As to collective security, I am not certain that that is not perhaps rather an unfortunate phrase. To my mind collective security is not a term by which a country can think it can reduce its own measure of security, by reason of its being supplemented by another country, because collective security connotes an atmosphere in which individual security is achieved. I think your Lordships will agree with me that that is really the essence of the League of Nations. That is really the reason why we support the League of Nations. I also think that, believing in that theory, we should do what we can to reconstruct the League of Nations. I would not trespass at the moment upon your Lordships' indulgence in order to consider that question of the reconstitution of the League, but I think we all agree that it is our desire to see the League of Nations comprise all the nations of the world. If every nation subscribed to a reconstituted League of Nations the power of the League would be of such an overwhelming character that collective security would be achieved.

The position in this country for the carrying out of the measure which the noble Viscount has in view is not a very easy one. The Government have to have due regard to every shade of political opinion, and those shades of opinion vary from complete disarmament to the state of a nation fully armed. I think that the White Paper steers the middle course, and that is why I am glad to support it. The noble Marquess referred to the ten-year plan, and as a phrase and indication such a plan has been followed. But the noble Marquess knows, I think, as well as I do that those are never concrete figures. The difficulty of all Ministers is as far as they can to give to their advisers and those with whom they work a concrete idea. The only concrete idea which could be put into any sort of phraseology was that a major war should not be contemplated for the period of ten years. I think that was a very proper attitude to take up; but the period became longer than the ten years that was first contemplated. All this time our defences were being kept in being, but not at that level of strength which the country thinks should have been maintained during that period.

Speaking as an old Minister of Defence I think your Lordships will recognise that our position was never a very easy one. A Minister of Defence was criticised on all sides. The character of a Minister of Defence was also attacked on the assumption that, as he was a Minister of Defence, he must be a war-minded man, and that his main object was to make war on everybody. During that time it was the duty of the Ministers of Defence to keep the defensive forces in being as best they could, and I think I can say, speaking for my colleagues also, that we succeeded. I know that the noble Viscount has cause to feel gratified that the basis on which he is now working was a very good one. The credit for that is not due to me but to those able advisers who are now supporting him in the great work which he is doing. There was also the question of finance, which your Lordships will remember very well. After the advent of the present Government in 1931 its attention was concentrated on finance owing to the state in which the country then found itself, and that was no time to ask even for deficiencies to be made up or for the strengthening of the Defence Services. When we are criticised on different sides therefore for delay, I think there is a very full answer to the charge.

I am sure I may be allowed to express my good wishes to Sir Thomas Inskip. All the assistance that your Lordships can give him in his arduous duties will, I know, be given. I am glad to feel that we have in the late Attorney-General a man fully competent to deal with the great work of co-ordination of the three Services, which is now in being and increasing in efficiency every day, and I am sure that he will add to that improvement. He will also give his assistance to the Chiefs of Staff who have done so much to bring about that co-ordination. The noble Viscount in his speech spoke of the problems of supply. Whilst it is obvious that the machines of the Air Force, the ships of the Navy and the requirements of the Army are of the highest importance, still the question of supply, in my opinion, transcends all others. We know quite well that if we are called upon—and I most sincerely hope that that call will never be made—we shall find that the wheels of industry have been so adjusted by the arrangements which are made now that we shall be able to switch over from our peace-time duties, peace time developments and commercial activities to the state in which we found ourselves, by the efforts of successive Ministers, before the end of the War.

The noble Lord who has moved an Amendment has widened the scope of the discussion, and in view of the latitude which is allowed in your Lordships' House I do not feel that he has infringed any of the rules of order, because rules of order in this House in connection with debate hardly seem to exist. The noble Lord and I have crossed swords before, and I am sorry to find from the speech which he has made this evening that I do not find myself in any greater agreement with him than I have on other occasions. The noble Lord seems to me to have jumped several stages of evolution. He has advanced to a time when the peaceful conditions shall have been brought into existence by the processes which he has in his mind, but he has given us no indication of the stages which we should pass through, nor has he indicated any remedy for the conditions in which we find ourselves to-day. The pathway to peace is a very arduous one, and I doubt if it is short. There is no magician's wand by which the noble Lord could achieve his purpose, and we have to try to reach the fruition of our hopes by pursuing those methods which we believe will eventually lead to success. I feel that, paradoxically as the noble Lord has put it—and he said that no one had ventured to make the claim, but with great audacity I venture to make it—by strengthening ourselves and at the same time giving our contribution to collective security we are following the right course at the present moment.

As the noble Lord has widened the debate, I should like to say a few words about what I believe to be the great problem with which we are faced at the present time. Many reasons are adduced for the dangerous state in which the world finds itself at the present moment. In my judgment the demand for security is the only point at this moment to study and settle. I believe that from the success of that study will flow an understanding of the economic problems to which the noble Lord attaches so much importance, and the question that arises therefrom of the distribution of the world's raw materials. But the matter on which our attention is directed at this moment and to which the noble Marquess has alluded in his speech—though I wish he had been able to say more about it because there is no one more competent to deal with these questions or give your Lordships advice and information on these very important points—the whole problem to which I feel we are making a contribution by increasing our forces is the security of France. If we can induce France to realise that she is secure I believe we shall have taken a great step in the direction which the noble Lord has advocated. I shall not venture on this occasion to go through the history of the last few years, although it is pregnant with interest and has a tremendous bearing on what we are doing at the present moment; but I feel that the main point on which we should concentrate our efforts is the establishment of that security for France on which I believe the whole peace of Europe at the present moment depends. That is why I feel that in these negotiations which are in being at the present moment there is the germ of the success of the policy which we have in mind.

I should be the last to say anything at this moment that could exacerbate the feelings of either of those countries who are the main actors in the great drama which is being enacted before our eyes, but I do think that in this country we are inclined to judge other countries by the systems under which we fortunately exist here, and do not realise the great difficulties in which other countries find themselves We have seen Germany passing through different stages over a period of years and achieving nothing in the direction of peace or security in the way in which we want her to achieve it. Upon Germany's internal management of affairs I shall pass no criticism. It is no concern of mine. But we know quite well that after defeat, after approach to revolution, after passing through a period of chaos—in fact, after passing through periods which we in this country have never passed through in the memory of any one of us, or of our grandfathers before us—we find the country concentrated and united under the command of one man. I have visited Germany myself recently, but if I had any doubts in the matter I should have been convinced by the demonstration which took place at Frankfort last night in which the one cry of those assembled people—and in these demonstrations the people are free, there is no coercion, no organising as to what they are to do—was to enable Herr Hitler to obtain an accommodation with France.

France has passed through a very difficult time. Sometimes we may have had occasion to feel she was intransigent and uncompromising, but for centuries past the one point in France's creed has been her own security. In these last few years France has had every reason to feel that her security is in danger, and I feel that the central point on which we should concentrate is that of ensuring the security of France. I am quite sure that in strengthening ourselves as one of the partners of the League of Nations in the quest for collective security, we are helping forward the object that we have in view of giving France the confidence to feel that the means are there to help her to achieve her object.

THE EARL OF MIDLETON

My Lords, I do not propose to intervene for any long period, but there are a few words I should like to say, especially with regard to the statement of the noble Viscount who spoke on behalf of the Government. This has been a very strange debate. The speech of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, was not unexpected, but when a man finds it necessary to put his sentiments into 130 words for your Lordships to vote upon, that certainly does not look like the cast-iron objection which we might have expected from that quarter, or even a complete vindication of his own opinions. I would certainly like to have heard from the noble Lord what has been achieved in the last ten years by the extraordinary measures of disarmament which have been taken by this country. I do not think there was a word in his speech about the lead which this country carried, as I think, to a dangerous extent and which has met with practically no response in any quarter in Europe.

Then came the speech of the noble Marquess who speaks for the Liberal Party. I confess that, although he spoke with his wonted moderation with regard to the proposals of the Government, I hardly think there was anybody on this side of the House who was not astonished at his conclusion that, because he differs from them on details, he would find himself unable to support them in the Lobby. I have a very grave doubt as to whether it is fully appreciated that in the last few years we have lost something besides merely the force which we expected to have. There has been an extraordinary want of appreciation of the dangers into which we were falling. I do not wish in the least to indict the Government for not being able to do, after the Great War, what the Duke of Wellington as Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and subsequently as Prime Minister, was unable to do after the Napoleonic Wars when our Forces fell into a most dangerous condition of inefficiency, and the horrors of the Crimean War were largely the result. I feel that we have fallen into an almost equally dangerous position now. The effectives in the Army were reduced in the period from 1914 to 1934 by 70,000 men. We all know the pressure there has been with regard to expenditure, but if it were the right time I would venture to prove that the Government have gone, not merely to the extreme limit of safety in regard to reducing both expenditure and efficiency, but beyond it.

Then there is what the noble Viscount said with regard to the Minister of Defence. I wish to make most serious representations to your Lordships on that subject. He told us, as I understood, that it was intended that the Minister of Defence should co-ordinate policy and also, in case of war, co-ordinate man power and munitions.

VISCOUNT SWINTON

I am sorry I did not make myself clear. I said that when you came to war you would obviously have to have two Ministries, one a Ministry of Man Power, the other a Ministry of Munitions.

THE EARL OF MIDLETON

I am quite sure that we mean the same thing. What I want to point out is that you are not going to run the Army, the Navy or, with all respect, for I know much less of that Service, the Air Force, unless you have a man who has the power and the status of a Secretary of State and who is able to use that power for the furtherance of the particular Service. I will take one instance, if your Lordships will pardon this one digression into figures. The cost of the Army has been reduced, I think, by £15,000,000 in the last seven years, but, in addition, out of the reduced sum voted for the Army, I find that no less a sum than £3,750,000 had been returned to the Exchequer. The Army is short to a degree which we cannot help under the present conditions of recruiting, but what of the Anti-Aircraft Force in London? I wonder how many of your Lordships have read the letter to which The Times gave leader type a few days ago. I had intended to refer to this from my own knowledge, but I came to the conclusion that it might not be patriotic to do so. As, however, it has now appeared in The Times in leader type I think I have a right to mention it. It is pointed out in that letter that the Anti-Aircraft Forces are in the hands of Territorial organisations, and that these Territorial organisations are, neither in strength nor in practice, equal to serving the guns.

I cannot help asking the Government why, when they have been returning every year on an average between £500,000 and £600,000 to the Exchequer, the very simple plan which has now been adopted of giving a bonus to the Territorials has not been adopted before, and why this vital point in our defence has been allowed to continue in such a condition when money was being sent back to the Exchequer. An inefficiency has been allowed for which there is really no reason whatever in our finances or in our organisation. What is the reason? I find that one reason—and there are a number of other reasons—is this. With regard to the War Office, of which only I am speaking at this moment, the Government have not regarded the organisation of the Army during this period of disarmament as being of such first-rate importance as to give what has been most necessary to that Force.

I have not a word to say against the individuals of high character and of great ability who have filled the post of Secretary of State, but in the last ten years there have been seven Secretaries of State for War. Does anybody believe that any business in this country could proceed satisfactorily if the head of it was changed seven times in ten years? My complaint against the Government is not that they have made great reductions but that the whole organisation of defence has been treated as a secondary matter. However eminent the man you may put into the position of Secretary of State for War, if he is to be changed "before his eye is in," that really must end in disaster. I think we have committed a terrible error from that point of view, and I do ask that we may have before this debate closes an assurance from the Government that the appointment of a Minister of Defence, desirable as it is from so many points of view, is not going to be allowed to interfere with the status and also with the authority of the heads of the three Services, the Army, Navy and Air Force.

There is one further point I might be allowed to put arising from my own experience. I have served under three chiefs at the War Office, and I was myself Secretary of State. I assure your Lordships that a great deal of the work of the Secretary of State consists in his having to umpire, as it were, between the divergent views of military men, and he alone can supply the stimulus which will induce the Government to take necessary action. I am quite sure that the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack, who gave great attention to the War Office when he was there, will bear me out in that. It would be perfectly futile, it would be wrong to the last degree, if it was supposed that the Minister of Defence is a post that somebody may occupy on the way to some further promotion.

With regard to our present position I can only say that I personally have felt, knowing what the result of the last War was, that we ought by every means in our power to take every avenue that is open by which we may obtain peace among the nations who are disposed to fall out with each other in Europe at this moment. But I did not hear a single word from the noble Lord opposite—and I doubt if we shall hear or can hear anything in this debate—which can lead us to suppose that a gesture is equal to the power of being able to give some effective support to our peace opinions. If we are to take part in agreements with foreign nations, we must in the last resort consider the weight that we can put into the common stock. From that point of view I cannot help feeling that the Government, even though a little late, have taken a wise course, and your Lordships will, I am sure, give them your support.

EARL HOWE

My Lords, other noble Lords who have spoken in this debate have paid tribute to the great seaman who was buried in St. Paul's yesterday. Perhaps I, as one who was privileged, I am glad to think, to serve under him both before the War and during the War, may be allowed to add my very humble tribute to his memory. The Navy has suffered a terrible loss during the last few months. The two foremost seamen of our age have been taken from us. The two men who at this very moment, at this crisis in our country's affairs, could have intervened with the greatest possible authority and would have been listened to by all, have both passed over. I am sure that the whole Navy feels a sense of personal regret and will ever remember and honour the memory of those two very great men.

The noble Viscount who introduced this debate said that he hoped that the White Paper would be judged as being wisely framed and adequate in purpose. I referred to those two great seamen whose loss we mourn to-day because many years ago Lord Jellicoe gave it as his opinion that the barest minimum in cruiser strength on which the British Fleet could rely was the minimum of 70 cruisers. We all of us remember that by the London Naval Treaty negotiated by the Socialist Government of the day this irreducible number was cut down from 70 to 50. I am glad to think that at long last the White Paper puts back the number to 70. It never should have been altered. But if one turns to the White Paper one sees from paragraph 26 that while 60 of those cruisers will be under age 10 will be over age. The facts with regard to our cruisers are well known. They have been referred to in your Lordships' House before. Some of them are of War-time construction and their replacement is long overdue. I am glad to think they are to be replaced.

At the same time I hope we shall not forget the lesson of the War. One of the first things that we learnt at the outset of the War was that there is great use for ships over age, and I earnestly hope that His Majesty's Government in the crisis of our country's affairs will consider the retention for a further period of ships that are out of date. They may not be capable of performing great service with the Battle Fleet, and they may not be capable of engaging the modem cruisers which are being commissioned in foreign navies at present, but there is no doubt that in certain circumstances they would be extraordinarily useful for convoy duty and patrol duty. Therefore I hope that the cruisers which we are about to replace will not necessarily be scrapped or put up for sale.

The noble Viscount who introduced the debate this afternoon and invited support for the White Paper gave what I thought was a curious reason for supporting the construction of capital ships. The reason he gave was that you cannot annihilate enemy capital ships unless you have them. I suppose that is one way of looking at it, but there is to my mind a far better way of justifying the Government's proposal. There are six or eight capital ships under construction for foreign navies, and that reason was advanced—I think with great wisdom—in another place by the Financial Secretary to the Admiralty when introducing the Navy Estimates yesterday. I hope we shall not lose sight of the fact that we must have in these days capital ships not only because the Admiralty thinks that their construction is necessary but because they are considered necessary by foreign countries.

I turn from that to the destroyer position. On page 8 of the White Paper, paragraph 23 says:

"…it will be necessary not only to proceed with new construction at a more rapid rate than in recent years, but also to make good existing deficiencies in ammunition and stores of all kinds."

Then, on the next page, paragraph 27 says:

" A steady replacement programme for destroyers and submarines is contemplated…."

One of the troubles in the last few years has been that when the Navy Estimates are introduced by the First Lord of the Admiralty the Votes passed in the House of Commons are very often only token Votes and the actual construction of the ships does not commence until the following year. Ships were voted by Parliament in the Navy Estimates for 1935 but construction did not in fact begin until 1936. It seems to me that a good deal might be done to accelerate construction if we could obviate that year's delay.

The destroyer position appears to me, and appears I think to most people who have studied the actual position, to be one of infinite seriousness. I believe I am right in saying that when the Grand Fleet went to sea in the Great War it was almost invariably accompanied by over one hundred destroyers. I have tried to ascertain from the Return of Fleets published in December last year the actual number of destroyers we have at present and it would seem that we have only about 157. We have some seventy-two post-War destroyers, but we have no fewer than eight-five destroyers of War-time or pre-War construction. That is a dangerous position. Destroyers wear out more quickly than almost any other ships. I remember the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd, coming to your Lordships' House and saying that there were certain destroyers in Malta Harbour which could not go to sea. I do not know whether the statement was correct or not, but it was not contradicted with very much assurance at the time. The United States at the present time have about 200 destroyers and Japan has over 100, and we have a little over 150 of all sorts. One of the things we did learn during the Great War was that you cannot work a Fleet without its necessary complement of destroyers, and I must confess I should be much more satisfied if His Majesty's Government were able to assure us that they would press ahead with destroyer construction to a far greater extent than is adumbrated in the White Paper.

There is another point in the White Paper which I find rather disturbing. Here I am afraid the noble Viscount who opened the debate this afternoon may not agree with me. The point has reference to the Fleet Air Arm. There-are certain proposals in the White Paper for increasing the strength of the Fleet Air Arm. I believe that when those proposals are carried into effect there will be 200 or 240 aeroplanes to go to sea with the Fleet. Every time the American Fleet goes to sea it takes with it between 500 and 600 aeroplanes. The Japanese Fleet, I believe, takes between 400 and 500 machines with it. When we have worked up to the strength contemplated by the White Paper I believe we shall have only from 200 to 240 machines. I do not bind myself to the exact figures, but they are approximately correct. Two aircraft carriers alone in the American Fleet take over 90 machines each. I do not contemplate war with the United States or Japan or any other country, but how can a Fleet equipped with only 200 to 240 machines meet a Fleet with exactly twice the number of machines? Aeroplanes, it seems to me, are in a way merely a device for extending the range of a big gun when they are dropping bombs, but they can of course be used in other ways, for torpedo work, for observation and the rest of it, and at sea their use may be at times absolutely devastating. It seems to me that His Majesty's Government should press ahead with far more resolution than is contemplated in the White Paper with the provision for the Fleet Air Arm.

I do not want to revive, as the noble Lord said who introduced the debate to us this afternoon, the controversies of the past, but I feel, as I shall always feel, that so long as the present system of dual control in the Fleet Air Arm continues, we shall have there a situation which cannot last in war and which holds in itself the seeds of danger. There are several points about the Fleet Air Arm, and indeed about the White Paper, which I find disturbing. There seems to be nothing in the White Paper that I can find—and here I hope that the noble Viscount who introduced this debate will have something to say when he comes to reply—about the aerial defence of shipping. In the air we seem to contemplate, of course, defending the British Isles, providing for our Air Force overseas, and also for a Fleet Air Arm, but there seems to me nothing to provide for the aerial defence of shipping. I do not know whether that is an Admiralty preserve or an Air Force preserve, but it is vital to us.

The White Paper talks on page 8 about

"the overwhelming importance of the Navy in preserving our sea communications and thus ensuring to this country the supplies of seaborne food and raw materials on which its existence depends"—

and so on. Exactly, my Lords, but all those ocean routes bringing us all those vital necessities concentrate on certain focal points, which are very well known and are all within the range of hostile aircraft. How are those focal points to be defended? In case of war, no doubt, convoys will be employed, as they were in the last War, but supposing a convoy is attacked by hostile aircraft, what arrangements are going to be made to defend it? Are they to be made by the Navy or by the Air Force? I hope that, when the Government come to reply, they will be able to deal with this point, which I regard as one of infinite seriousness.

I need hardly say that, in common with the large majority of your Lordships' House, I shall do everything I can to support the policy of the Government as outlined in the White Paper. I feel that it is a policy which will help collective security—though I must confess that I do not know what collective security is, and I must confess that to me it sounds rather like distributive danger. But whichever it may be, I am certain that this strengthening of our forces is entirely necessary and that, even if belated, it is better late than never. I hope that the few points that I have mentioned, and with which I should have liked to deal at greater length if it had not been for the lateness of the hour, may receive the attention of His Majesty's Government.

THE EARL OF CAVAN

My Lords, the late Lord Beatty, my noble friend on my right (Viscount Trenchard) and I were the first triumvirate of the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee, and I am sure that my noble friend on my right will agree with me when I say how greatly we deplore the loss of Lord Beatty's counsels at this juncture of our affairs. During my term as Chief of Staff it was my unenviable task to have to reduce the Army Estimates by £2,000,000 a year for the first three years and by £1,500,000 in the fourth year. I need not say, therefore, how heartily I welcome the White Paper and also the appointment of Sir Thomas Inskip. I hope and believe that, owing to the co-ordinating influence of the Imperial Defence College, he will find in practice that he has very little to co-ordinate, so excellent now is the spirit, referred to by the noble Viscount the Secretary of State for Air, of co-operation between the three Services. I am quite sure that they all feel that each is absolutely indispensable to the other and to the nation's safety.

I am very glad to note the increase in the Vote for scientific research, because I cannot subscribe to the doctrine that there is no defence against air attacks. That may be true at this moment, but I am quite convinced that, given sufficient money, the great brains that can enable me to turn a knob and listen to Moscow and Berlin will in due course evolve something which may render an area of the ether impassable, or so highly dangerous that it cannot be entered. Thirty years ago it would have been thought fantastic that one could listen to any part of Europe without wires. Why, thirty years hence or even less, should my dream not come true? Secondly, in turning to home protection on land, I want to speak of purely passive defence. I have no desire to attack anybody, and indeed the whole of this debate is on defence. It is, in my view, little use moving your factories or arsenals from east to west of England. It is only 230 miles, as the aeroplane flies, from Woolwich to Carmarthen. The speed of up-to-date bombers, as I understand from the Press, is 250 miles an hour. I want, of course, to avoid congestion of arsenals and important factories in any one particular spot; dispersion is the first rule of defence against aeroplanes, but it seems to me that we must get away from the doctrine I see preached in some parts of the Press that everything will have to be moved over to the other side of the country.

My next point is that there are two very old-fashioned but good means of defence: the first is camouflage and the second is digging. It makes me positively ill to see at most of the old naval ports of this country and most of the great ports of the Empire, as the first thing which catches my eye, the large, round, silver turrets ranged in line, all bearing that commodity which is absolutely essential to us—oil. I cannot imagine a greater "jolly" for a hostile airman in the air than to buzz along those lines dropping bombs or shooting his machine-gun at them. To my mind it is absolutely essential that they should be effectively camouflaged or dug in. By camouflage I do not mean a coating of various-coloured paints. In the Great War, Royal Academicians were called in to assist, and they made some perfectly admirable forms of camouflage. We should call them in again, and also, now, the great film industry, who could, I believe, disguise the whole of the oil tanks into something that would deceive any airman.

With regard to defence in the great cities, I have had the privilege, owing to the courtesy of the French General Staff, of visiting some portion of the French Eastern defences, and I was enormously impressed there by the arrangements for defence in respect of gas, supply of water, and sanitation. Those are three things that must not be lost sight of. It always seems to me that, when the London Transport Board want to change from lifts to escalators, they put up enormous erections in Knightsbridge, Piccadilly or Leicester Square. Nobody minds; they are there for two years, and large acreages of vacancy are made, at a cost which, I presume, the London Passenger Transport Board can afford. If it is ever thought desirable to make underground refuges, surely it would not be beyond the powers of the Government to form some sort of definite refuge in all the big cities, to which women and children could be allowed to go. I hope that, if that is done, some study may be made of the system in France which I have mentioned.

One word before I finish about recruiting. The only really disquieting thing to me in the whole of the White Paper is the shortage of fit men. There is apparently no shortage of gallant young-boys and men who offer themselves for enlistment, but, as I read the reports, I see that roughly 50 per cent. are rejected. That is a national reproach. It is my sincere belief that this can be remedied, not by lowering the standards of acceptance, but by paying much more attention to the physical well-being of our youth—more food and more open-air games. I have for the last seven years worked as an officer of the National Playing Fields Association. We are now just beginning to work side by side with the Central Council of Recreative Physical Training. We are to work in the same office, and our joint object is the welfare and fitness of youth. We have had wonderful assistance from the Carnegie Trustees and the public, and we go through all the various methods of balls and banquets to try to extract cheques from the rich. We are delighted to go on doing the work, but we cannot do it alone, and I really feel that if measures were taken now seriously to try to improve the physical welfare of the youth of this country, your recruiting problems would very shortly be solved. Lastly, may I send one more shiver down the spines of my noble friends on my right? It is my earnest belief that if you put your Army back into full dress you would get at least another 30 per cent. of recruits, and in that way your most serious problem, which is to find men for the expansion, may come very nearly to solution.

THE EARL OF LUCAN

My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend Lord Lloyd, I beg to move that the debate be now adjourned.

Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to, and debate adjourned till Thursday next.

House adjourned at twenty-eight minutes before eight o'clock.