§ THE EARL OF MANSFIELD had given Notice that he would move to resolve, That in the opinion of this House His Majesty's Government should not propose, support, approve, or agree to, any alterations in the Articles of the Covenant of the League of Nations which do not provide for the removal, in letter and spirit, of the coercive clauses in the Covenant.
§ The noble Earl said: My Lords, before I come to the subject matter of the Resolution which stands in my name, I feel that an explanation is due to your Lordships for its presence there to-day. It is the result of a concatenation of unfortunate circumstances. When a number of us began to grow anxious at the lack of any Government pronouncement on the future policy of this country towards the Covenant of the League, those of 209 us who formed a not unimportant political organisation, known as the Imperial Policy Group, and numbering some three score members in this House and another place, debated whether this question should not be raised, and I was deputed to put down a Motion on the subject. This I did, but unfortunately I was travelling about the country. I looked carefully at the Order Paper to see if anything on the subject appeared, but found nothing. It happened, however, that the Order Paper available was some three days' old, owing to my having been moving about and not getting any Parliamentary Papers for three or four days.
§ The next misfortune was that the letter which the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, addressed to me was addressed to a house which was unoccupied save for the presence of a caretaker, and his communication followed me about the country. Your Lordships will naturally inquire why, at the end of this time, when I became aware of Lord Ponsonby's letter at the end of last week, I did not remove my Resolution. The reasons were twofold. I was on the horns of a very unpleasant dilemma. Either I had to do something which was, in spirit at least, contrary to the etiquette of your Lordships' House to some extent, and which was undoubtedly, though entirely unintentionally, discourteous to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, or else I had to lot down a large number of people who were depending upon me. It was a difficult decision to take, and, being possibly rather a fanatic on the subject of loyalty to one's immediate political associates, I chose to be loyal to them and to risk this seeming discourtesy to the unwritten laws of this House and to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby. This I regret very much having had to do. Your Lordships may blame me for it, but I assure you that I am willing to take the blame. It was a matter of conscience, and I felt it was my duty to do as I did. No discourtesy was intended to your Lordships' House or to any individual member of it.
§ Now turn to the subject of the Resolution. I understand that the noble Viscount, Lord Halifax, said on Monday that there would not be a Government reply to-day. I respectfully suggest that, without any question of the merits of any case that I may put forward, that would be rather a mistake. I do not think that 210 it is really fair to your Lordships' House, to the members of another place, or to the country, that we should have a really important pronouncement on a first-class question of national and international policy made to us at the very end of a Session, when there is totally inadequate opportunity to discuss it within Parliament or without, and I do hope therefore that, even if there is not an amplification, we may have some small indication to-day of the Government's attitude before we leave.
§ To deal as briefly as possible with our contentions, those of us who desire to see the coercive clauses removed from the Covenant of the League are convinced that the Covenant in its present form is more an incitement to war than an inducement to peace. If it had not been for the existence of the League of Nations it is probable that Abyssinia would not have lost its independence, simply because it would have been possible, and I think probable, that this country would have gone early in the operations and quietly have informed Italy that any further aggression in Abyssinia would have meant that Italy had to cope not only with Abyssinia but with the resources of Great Britain and the British Empire. But such unilateral action was of course, and still is, impossible under our League obligations. Collective security has proved itself unfortunately—or fortunately, as some people may think—a complete failure. We had the sad spectacle of fifty-three nations at Geneva paying lip-service to it, but only one, namely, our own, doing anything whatever to implement its pledges. No one has ever attempted to deny the statement of Sir Samuel Hoare that no country save this one had moved a ship, a man, or an aeroplane, and in these circumstances I cannot see that there is any expectation that in new, and possibly greater, dangers that may face this country in the future, there is any reason to suppose that those countries will show themselves any more regardful of their obligations than they have done in the past.
§ And not merely were we left to bear the brunt of expenditure and risk, but none of those other countries which declared themselves so passionately opposed to aggression even made the slightest promise that, should hostilities 211 break out between Italy and ourselves, we should receive from it any form of substantial assistance. We had no definite promise, say, from any of the Scandinavian, Balkan or South American countries that in the event of war breaking out they would provide a division, a brigade, even a battalion, or say £500,000 or £100,000 for the prosecution of that campaign. That is to say that the coercive clauses come to this, that fifty-three nations shall pass a resolution saying that Great Britain shall act as policeman. I suggest that that state of affairs is not satisfactory either from the point of view of this country or from the point of view of the world. That, I think, is pretty generally recognised, and I think that, even in Government circles, there is a very decided difference of attitude towards the Covenant of the League of Nations from that which was held a very few months ago.
§ There are now three bodies of opinion in regard to the Covenant. There are those who say that, after all, it does not work too badly in small matters, and therefore it would be advisable to adopt the policy of laissez faire. But then there are others, who are much more dangerous, who take the line that the Covenant should be reformed on a definitely much more coercive basis—apparently coercion almost automatic—and should apply force to make any country guilty of aggression sec the error of its ways immediately. I do not think that those worthy persons who would thus reform the Covenant have ever properly envisaged the difficulties of such a performance. Many of them at least now think that some form of regional pact would be better than some form of collective security covering the whole of the civilised world. That, I think, is open to doubt, because I submit that the existence of a regional pact whereby a number of nations are pledged at once to attack any country which is guilty of aggression, so far from restraining a country which wishes to undertake aggression, is only too likely to make that aggression more violent, more wholesale, and more cruel than would otherwise be the case.
§ It is useless to blind ourselves to the fact that at the present time the potential danger in Western Europe is regarded as Germany. We cannot view without acute anxiety the warlike preparations which that country is making, but can it be 212 reasonably supposed that, if Germany or any other country which is preparing an aggression wishes that aggression to be successful, it would wait to give notice of what it is going to do? I think it is far more likely, and indeed practically certain, that it would strike at once; and if it knew that several surrounding countries were likely to take up arms against it immediately, its first task would be to ensure that there was such chaos and destruction and confusion in the main cities of those countries within bombing distance that it would be quite impossible for them to carry on a successful counterattack to repel or check the aggression.
§ There is one other system which is suggested by certain people, notably by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that is, the creation of a powerful International Army, I presume mostly of an aerial character, to enforce the will of the League of Nations. I would respectfully suggest to your Lordships that this, too, is not likely to prove a great success. In the first place, in dealing with a large country, or even a country considerably smaller than Germany, such a force, to be of any practical value, would have to be a quarter of a million or, better still, half a million strong to begin with. Where will such a force have its headquarters? If the various units are to be spread about in their own or other people's countries, then it is going to be a matter, not of days, but of weeks getting them together. If they are going to be in one place, say in Switzerland, it is quite obvious that it is going to be a very long time before they can reach the scene of hostilities, if that scene of hostilities should perchance be in the Balkans.
§ Furthermore, although Switzerland has been hitherto the centre of all international transactions, I am pretty certain that the Swiss would not view with any favour the establishment of a large force within their boundaries, which would certainly be the object of attack by any country which wished to commit aggression, simply because it is perfectly plain that any country which wished to commit an act of aggression and knew that it would be likely to be attacked immediately by the aerial forces under the control of the League of Nations, would make its first step the bombing out of existence of the barracks and aerodromes at 213 which that International Force was camped. In these circumstances I do not think that such an idea is going to be of very much practical value. What is the alternative? I suggest to your Lordships that the alternative is to recognise fully and frankly that in the present state of the world in general and of Europe in particular neither collective security nor regional pacts are going to work, and therefore we should endeavour to place the League of Nations on the basis of being a body used for conciliatory purposes rather than for coercion.
§ That is from the European point of view. Now, as to the national or, as some may believe, the more narrow point of view. As I observed a few moments ago, it is quite obvious that all the nations of Europe are agreed that whenever there is what one may colloquially term "dirty work" to be done, it is Great Britain that should be allowed to do it while everyone else pauses. I do not suggest that that is a situation which we should accept at all. We should make it quite clear in the future that as it is obvious we are not going to get the co-operation in international matters which we have been promised on paper, we consider it far better to stick more strictly to our own business and consider the interests of our own people at home and throughout our Empire.
§ This policy, the policy of the Imperial Policy Group, is not a policy of isolation. We are not isolationists, although that charge has sometimes been levelled against us simply because we recognise that, however much strategy may have been altered as the result of developments in the air, one fact remains unchanged, namely, that we cannot allow a hostile or potentially hostile nation to occupy the Low Countries and the Channel ports. With that I think most people will be in agreement. Some say that is no use because, even if that territory were not occupied, it would be quite possible, as during the last War, for London and the South Coast to be bombed. Certainly it would be possible, but it would be much more difficult, for the raiders going and coming would suffer many more casualties. Their appearance would be much more easy to discover, and their task rendered much more difficult. That is why I and my friends consider that we ought, if not to 214 guarantee the Low Countries and the Channel ports, at least to make it clear that we are not prepared to allow any hostile or potentially hostile country to have control of them. That in its turn brings the corollary that we should not be in a position whereby we could be dragged at the heels of any country, most especially France, if that country's unfortunate liaison with Soviet Russia should bring about a Russo-German War which would involve France and possibly mean the invasion of French territory by German Armies who, endeavouring to evade the famous Maginot line, might try to outflank that line at one end or the other.
§ We should make it perfectly clear that while we would not be a party to French aggression on Germany any more than to German aggression on France, we are equally not prepared to allow an army to come down through the Low Countries and establish bases within striking distance of our South and South-East Coasts. To do that we must have a drastic change in our international obligations. I do not think—I say this with great respect—that His Majesty's Government are aware of the success which is attending purely isolationist propaganda. It is succeeding to a degree which would have been considered impossible, say, a year ago. A very significant fact has been brought to the notice of our Group very recently. That is that in various parts of the country, but especially in the Midland areas, we are having the unprecedented condition that potential recruits for the Army are coming to the recruiting stations and asking first, before they are willing to make the attestation: "Does my joining the Army mean that if a war breaks out in Central Europe the League of Nations can order me to go and fight there?" Recruiting officers have done their best to explain the situation, but unfortunately they have not been able to dispel the natural and correct impression that, under certain conditions, a decision taken at Geneva would send our troops to Central Europe. The prospective recruit replies: "Thank you, I will not enlist to-day."
§ That is a new phenomenon. In some ways it is not an unhealthy sign. It means that the people of this country are taking an ever-increasing interest in foreign affairs, and that is all to the 215 good at the present time. But it is also a sign that no Government which is going to involve this country in hostilities on the Continent of Europe or elsewhere, unless these hostilities are directly concerned with the preservation of the integrity of Great Britain or of the British Empire, is going to last very long. I do not think that the Government realise the strength of this feeling, and I am sure that it would be a very good thing if we could have some pronouncement to-day before the greater pronouncement is made next week, as to what their intentions are, because, otherwise, we may be faced with a situation we have had to face too often in the last five or six years—that is to say, the Government coming to both Houses and presenting them with a fait accompli at home or abroad, and making it a question of confidence, so that some action which has been taken, or some decision made, which may never have been discussed at all or at least discussed most inadequately here or in another place, is then put to Parliament in such a manner that the only way to overcome it would be to throw out the Government.
§ For this reason more time should be given than a couple of days at the very end of the Session for both Houses to consider whatever the Government's proposals are for the reform of the League of Nations, if they have any—and I hope they are going to take the lead, because British prestige in the last eighteen months, and particularly in the last few months, has suffered terribly throughout the whole world as the result of our vacillations of policy. It does not matter so much having a bad policy so long as you have a policy of some kind, and unfortunately our policy has been one which could be not inaccurately described as one policy on Monday and a completely reversed policy on Thursday. That does not lead to international stability or international good will. I hope, therefore, that your Lordships will be willing to give a lead to the Government by accepting the Resolution which I respectfully lay before you this afternoon, and I hope most emphatically that some small indication of the Government's attitude may be given to your Lordships this afternoon. I beg to move.
§ Moved to resolve, That in the opinion of this House, His Majesty's Government 216 should not propose, support, approve, or agree to, any alterations in the Articles of the Covenant of the League of Nations which do not provide for the removal, in letter and spirit, of the coercive clauses in the Covenant.—(The. Earl of Mansfield.)
§ THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (THE MARQUESS OF ZETLAND)My Lords, it may be for your Lordships' convenience if I interpose for a moment at this stage. I am sure your Lordships will have heard with satisfaction the explanation which the noble Earl gave at the beginning of his remarks of the apparent discourtesy to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, in placing this Motion down upon the Paper for a day earlier than that already chosen by Lord Ponsonby for a similar Motion. You will have heard that explanation with satisfaction, even if your satisfaction may possibly have been a little bit modified by the fact that the noble Earl went on to explain that, even after the circumstances which had led to his apparent discourtesy to Lord Ponsonby had passed, he still decided to proceed with the course which he had originally adopted.
I am bound to express some regret at his decision, in the first place because my noble friend the Leader of the House, who was most anxious to hear what the noble Earl had to say on what is admittedly a question of the highest importance, is unable, owing to other duties, to be present in your Lordships' House this afternoon. It so happens that at the present moment discussions are taking place between the representatives of His Majesty's Government and the representatives of the Governments of France and of Belgium in which my noble friend is taking a part, and he asked me, therefore, to express to your Lordships his regret that he is unable to be present here this afternoon. I have to remind your Lordships of the statement he made in reply to a private notice question by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, on Monday last. My noble friend explained that the Government were proposing to reply to this and other Motions on Wednesday next, and that they were not prepared to make their reply this afternoon.
I am unable in any way to depart from that statement which those of your Lordships who were present at the time will agree met with the general approval of 217 the House, and in those circumstances I am going to venture to ask the noble Earl whether he would not be prepared to withdraw his Motion to-day and to move it again formally on Wednesday next when other Motions standing in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, and I think also the noble Lord, Lord Allen of Hurtwood, dealing with the same question, will come before your Lordships. That is the statement that I have to make on behalf of my noble friend the Leader of the House, and I venture to hope that in the circumstances that proposal will commend itself to your Lordships and to the noble Earl himself.
THE EARL OF MANSFIELDMy Lords, I certainly do not wish in any way to inconvenience either your Lordships' House or the Government, and I am, therefore, quite willing to agree with the suggestion of the noble Marquess; but before formally withdrawing this Resolution I think I ought to repeat that no matter what consultations may be going on with foreign countries I do not think that it is satisfactory for Parliament to be given about two days merely to consider these matters. I think we ought to have had a definite indication given of the line of policy. I would not, of course, ask for details. However, the Government either are unable or unwilling to do that, and with that I fear we must abide content. Therefore, in order to meet their convenience but, I must say, with some dissatisfaction, I beg leave to withdraw the Resolution.
§ Motion, by leave, withdrawn.