Lords Sitting of 11 February 1936

Preamble
The House met at a quarter past four of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (VISCOUNT HALIFAX)THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (VISCOUNT HALIFAX) rose to move, That Standing Order No. XXXII be amended by leaving out the words "and the doors shall remain locked until the numbers are declared" in paragraph 7. The noble Viscount said: My Lords, I have to move the Amendment that stands on the Paper in my name. The reason for it is, I am advised, that in fact the original Standing Order made in 1365 enacts that all the doors of the House shall remain shut until the numbers in a Division have been declared. That Order, I am also advised, has in fact been honoured more in the breach than in the observance; if it were to be honoured in the observance, it would impose considerable inconvenience upon the conduct of our Divisions. The change that I propose to your Lordships is therefore one which would bring Standing Orders into harmony with what had in fact been the actual practice observed. In those circumstances I bog leave to move.
Moved, That Standing Order No. XXXII be amended by leaving out the words ("and the doors shall remain locked until the numbers are declared") in paragraph 7.—(Viscount Halifax.)
On Question, Motion agreed to. The said Standing Order amended accordingly, and to be printed as amended.

POST OFFICE (SITES) BILL [H.L.]
THE EARL OF MUNSTER: My Lords, I beg leave to introduce a Bill to enable the Postmaster-General to acquire lands in London for the purpose of the Post Office and for the purpose of executing certain street work in the Metropolitan Borough of St. Pancras; and to acquire lands in Manchester and Hereford for the purpose of the Post Office; and for purposes connected with the matters aforesaid. I move that the Bill be read a first time.
Moved, that the Bill be now read 1a.—(The Earl of Munster.)
On Question, Bill read 1a, to be printed, and referred to the Examiners.

VOLUNTARY HOSPITALS (PAYING PATIENTS) BILL [H.L.]
Amendments reported (according to Order).

UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE (TEMPORARY PROVISIONS) (EX TENSION) BILL.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
VISCOUNT GAGE: My Lords, the object of this Bill is to extend up to March 31 next the operation of a measure passed in this House in May last, the object of which was to make a temporary readjustment due to the postponement of the second appointed day. As I explained to your Lordships when that Bill was introduced, it was decided to transfer to the responsibility of the Board not only the unemployed who were in insurable occupations, but also the able-bodied unemployed who were not in insurable occupations. Owing to the postponement of the second appointed day, the transfer of this second category has never actually taken place. In consequence, had the Bill not been passed, full financial responsibility for the maintenance of this category of unemployed would have been thrown on the local authorities.
As these local authorities were led to believe that after March 31 last year they would be relieved of a considerable proportion of their liability for this class of unemployed, the Bill was introduced to put them into the same position as they would have been in had the second appointed day not been postponed. In order to arrive at an appropriate sum a formula was employed, and by the working of this formula the local authorities have actually received £425,000 from the Treasury more than they have paid out. Therefore, as might be expected, local authorities are showing little objection to the scheme. I should explain, however, that the operation of this part of the scheme is not yet complete, and that the balance may have to be used in this coming period up to

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March 31. As this Bill has been certified as a Money Bill, and as it passed through another place without a Division, I think this explanation will probably be sufficient. I accordingly move that it be now read a second time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a. (Viscount Gage.)
On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

ASSYRIANS IN IRAQ.
THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY had the following Notice on the Paper:—To call attention to the position of the Assyrians in Iraq and to ask His Majesty's Government whether they are now able to give definite information as to the prospects of the settlement of the Assyrians in Syria and as to the contribution which His Majesty's Government are prepared to make towards the cost; and to move for Papers.
The most reverend Primate said: My Lords, this is not the first occasion on which I have brought before your Lordships' House the position of that ancient nation and Church called Assyrians or Nestorians, or reminded your Lordships of their long history, partly noble and partly tragic, or of their unhappy fortunes in the Kingdom of Iraq. I do not propose to make any rehearsal of past events, but rather to look forward with hope to a more satisfactory future. Yet at the outset it is well that we should remind ourselves of the measure of special responsibility which rests upon the Government of the United Kingdom for the welfare of these people. That responsibility has, I think, a twofold basis. First of all, in the years of the Great War they were our allies in a limited but not unimportant field. They were invited, not indeed by ourselves but by Russia, to join forces against the Turks. They responded to that invitation, and showed amply their hereditary qualities as a warlike tribe.
Then, in 1917, came the collapse of Russia's place in the War, and the Assyrians were left to the tender mercies of the Turks. Our authorities asked them to continue as an allied force. The Assyrians were given, not, I quite admit, official, but sufficient assurance to induce the Assyrians to trust that the British Government would make their future its
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Certainly, they suffered severely at the hands of the Turks. They were driven from their homes, they were without lands or resources. Thousands of their numbers had been killed, and our Government took them under their protection. They established a temporary settlement for some 25,000 of them, where they were maintained at 'the cost of this country—a considerable cost—for two years. The best of them were organised as levies in Iraq under our control. Then began efforts to secure for them a more permanent settlement. These efforts, it must be admitted, were not satisfactory in their results. There were constant difficulties between the Assyrians and the Arabs and Kurds. I quite admit that there were also difficulties created by them on the side of the Iraq Government and our own, but at least they were there because they had been our allies in the War, and from the first their levies had been a fine force at our disposal.
Secondly, they came under our protection by virtue of our Mandate in Iraq, by which we were bound to protect the interests of minorities. Later, for reasons which it is not necessary to discuss, we saw fit to recommend to the League of Nations that the Iraq Government was sufficiently strong and trustworthy to be admitted as a Member of the League, and to be itself entrusted with its Mandate. Assurances as to the trustworthiness of the Iraq Government were made in 1931 by our representative, Sir Francis Humphreys, to the Permanent Mandates Commission, and I think these assurances are worth repeating. What is certain is that these assurances directly influenced the decision of the League to transfer the Mandate to the Kingdom of Iraq. It was stated that His Majesty's Government fully realised its responsibility in recommending that Iraq should be admitted to the League, which was in its view the only legal way of terminating the Mandate. Should Iraq prove herself unworthy of that confidence which had been placed in her the moral responsibility must rest with His Majesty's Government.
Not unnaturally the Assyrians, who had specially relied upon our protection, were gravely alarmed. Alas! it was soon proved that they had good reasons for their alarm. In August, 1933, there broke out those deplorable massacres at Simel and at Mosul. I do not propose to

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discuss, indeed it would be a most futile proceeding, the degrees of provocation on either side. It is enough to remind ourselves that the massacres were in themselves admittedly brutal and indefensible, and they left behind them ineffaceable memories which made the continuance of the Assyrian people in Iraq quite impossible. Certainly our own action in surrendering our Mandate and in advising the League that the Iraq Government was competent to hold it leaves us some measure of very real responsibility for the present plight of these people. This twofold responsibility made it plainly most inconsistent, at least with honour, for this country to leave the Assyrians to their fate or to contend that we had no greater responsibility for them than any other Member of the League. The first course would have been indeed a betrayal, and the second would have aroused the indignation of the not inconsiderable public opinion in this country which is deeply concerned with the lot of the Assyrians.
With this special responsibility in our minds, which I measure not in legal terms but in terms of honour, let me call your Lordships' attention to the present position. After the massacres, as I have said, it was plain that the Assyrians could not stay in Iraq, nor did the Iraq Government desire them to remain. The League of Nations, feeling rightly its very great responsibility in the matter, appointed a Committee of the Council and that Committee at once set about to discover opportunities of resettlement elsewhere. They were actively assisted by the British Government, and here I should like to acknowledge most cordially the personal interest shown in the matter by Sir John Simon. Various possibilities were explored. First, you may remember, Brazil was thought of, but there local opposition was encountered. Then the Government of our own Colony of British Guiana offered to receive them, but an expert committee reported that the land proposed would be unsuitable in climate and general condition for the Assyrian people.
Then it became known that the French Government were willing to receive a large settlement in their mandated territories of Syria and the Levant. Already a small settlement of the Assyrians were there who had crossed
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the border before and after the massacres, and had remained with the consent of the French authorities. This was in the region of Upper and Middle Khabur. At first it was thought that settlement might be extended here. Drafts of Assyrians from the large camps of the refugees at Mosul to the number of 1,100 were sent across, and I believe I am right in saying that by the middle of September last year a total of 6,000 Assyrians were to be settled in the Upper Khabur. But further investigation showed that there was a far more promising region for a larger settlement further from the frontier and more capable of development. It was the area called the area of the Ghab, on the left bank of the Middle Orontes. There was land there available on high ground at the foot of mountains, suitable to the mountainous character of the Assyrian tribes. It was plain that this land could by irrigation be made good for the growth of fruit and vegetables, for cereals, for cotton, for rice and for live stock. It was clear that the French authorities would welcome the development of their land by a large settlement of hardy and industrious people, and the conditions were favourable to the Assyrians, their character and their habits. That scheme was adopted and recommended by the League of Nations.
Meanwhile, the Chairman of the Committee of the Council of the League, M. Lopez Olivan, last summer visited Iraq, held consultations with the chiefs of the Assyrian tribes, and found that the great majority were eager to leave as soon as possible—probably about 24,000. True, the chiefs representing some 8,000 hesitated until they knew more about the conditions of settlement, but the Levies and the large number of Assyrian employees on the railways and on other undertakings were ready to leave on any conditions. And here I would venture to ask the noble Earl, who I think will reply for the Government, if he can give any later information as to the numbers of the Assyrians who are now known to be ready and willing to be re-settled in the Ghab area.
Now we come to the question of cost, bound to be considerable to re-settle some 20,000 or 30,000 people. I believe that the cost has been estimated in pounds, provisionally and of course only approximately, at £1,140,000. I think that was

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on the basis of about 21,000 Assyrians. How is this large sum to be met? At once there were grave difficulties, and here I must give my cordial testimony to the keen personal interest of Sir Samuel Hoare. I do not hesitate to say that his coming upon the scene in many ways quickened and stimulated the activity both of the League Council and of His Majesty's Government. He set himself at once to try to reduce the claim of the French Government for the cost of settlement and development, and to increase the contributions of Iraq and of the United Kingdom. He had some success, not much, with the French, more with the Iraqi and United Kingdom Governments.
Last summer the Council of the League asked the United Kingdom to make some large independent contribution, apart from its share of any contribution which the League itself might decide to make. Hitherto the attitude of His Majesty's Government appears to have been that they were unwilling to accept any sort of liability beyond that which was shared by other Members of the League. Indeed, when I brought this matter before your Lordships in November, 1933, the noble and learned Viscount now upon the Woolsack, who then replied for the Government, said:
"I cannot give an assurance—because I do sot think it would be fulfilled—that we shall individually, apart altogether from the League of Nations … accept a separate and independent liability outside our liability as a Member of the League."
I am very thankful that His Majesty's Government have seen fit to take a more generous attitude, and the United Kingdom has now promised, I understand, on certain conditions—namely, that the Iraqi Government will give a similar amount and the League will find the balance—to contribute a sum up to £250,000. I desire very cordially to acknowledge the action of the Government in making this large independent contribution. The result is that the Iraqi Government have been persuaded to double their first proposal and to contribute a like sum. Thus towards the sum of £1,140,000 the French have promised for development work, so I am informed, about £380,000, His Majesty's Government have promised £250,000, the Iraqi Government have promised £250,000, and the League has promised approximately £80,000. This may seem a comparatively
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small sum, but it is larger, I think, than was expected.
And so you see a balance still remains of about £180,000—£960,000 is promised out of £1,140,000. I should be very grateful if the noble Earl would confirm or correct these figures, and if he could give any information as to how this balance of £180,000 is to be obtained. Am I right in saying that, while it is hoped that of this £180,000 about £130,000 might be raised by credits and loans, partly on the basis of eventual reimbursement by the Assyrians for the purchase of their land, £50,000 is left which the League desires to obtain from private sources? Certainly in the autumn it was strongly pressed upon me that the Council of the League considered that without some such sum contributed from private sources it would be impossible to transfer all the Assyrians who were ready to be transferred, and that therefore, if any were left behind, there would be great bitterness; and I pledged myself, if possible, to make a special appeal to the people of this country. But before I can venture to do so I must be assured that the scheme of settlement in the Ghab area is now certain to go forward.
The concluding questions, therefore, which I would venture to ask of the noble Earl are these. Is the scheme now definitely in process of being carried out? Have the proposed Executive Settlement Commission and Trustee Committee for carrying out an administrative settlement in the mandated territory of Syria been appointed? If the scheme is really going forward can he say whether the actual re-settlement of the Assyrians in the Ghab region has begun, or when it will begin? Also, can he tell us what numbers are immediately to be settled? Over how many years is it contemplated that the process of re-settlement will be spread? Again, I should like to be assured that, if the scheme is now certain to be, or is actually being, carried out, the Government strongly urge that some effort should be made in this country to raise a considerable sum by voluntary subscription, and do they attach real importance to this point in the sense that such help is essential if the success of the whole scheme is to be assured?
If the answer of the Government is in the affirmative to these last questions, I am myself ready to inaugurate such

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an appeal, and I may add I have already secured the appointment of a strong Committee to further it. Indeed I am only awaiting the reply of His Majesty's Government this afternoon before taking immediate steps to go forward. If the Government can give the assurance that this scheme is now well on the way, and that it is in their judgment of real importance that, in addition to the £250,000 contributed by the Government, there should be, if possible, a large sum raised from voluntary sources, then I am prepared to do my best. I hope that many people in this country, possibly some of your Lordships among them, will be ready to take some personal share in delivering a people, for whom they have so long felt deep sympathy, from their present intolerable position and in providing for them a home where they may live together in peace.
I hope I have not unduly taken up your Lordships' time this afternoon over the affairs of a small, obscure, and distant people. This country has not been wont to measure its interest in, or its responsibility for, oppressed peoples by their mere numbers. Some of the finest episodes in our history are concerned with what we have tried to do for very small minorities. This is a question not of numbers or of intrinsic importance, but of our honour and of the cause of humanity. I am sure that His Majesty's Government will do its utmost to enable this ancient people after its long and troubled voyages to reach some haven of security at last. I beg to move for Papers.
LORD NOEL-BUXTON: My Lords, when this question has been raised in your Lordships' House in the past the obligation involved in the history that the most reverend Primate has given us has been recognised by all Parties. This is no Party question, but I should Like to say that the Party which we on these Benches represent are behind none in advocating the discharge of our national duty in this matter. It happens that many of us in the Labour Party have been associated with the relief work that has had to be done these few years past, work which might very well have been undertaken as Governmental work, but which has been falling on private shoulders and which has been very readily undertaken to the best of our ability. It might be thought that at this day the
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question is not an urgent one, but it can be added to what we have just heard that there is an urgency at this very day on account of the danger in which a very great number of the Assyrians find themselves. There are large numbers who, we are informed, are not at all anxious to move, and indeed are perfectly in the dark as to what kind of provision is to be made for them, but they feel it is better to move anywhere than remain where they are in a situation which may at any moment become again dangerous for them.
The facts of the case have been fully given to us, and I shall not take a moment of your Lordships' time in repetition, but I may add just one thing that some of your Lordships may have forgotten—namely, that the British officers who have been in charge of the Assyrian levies in Iraq have formed an extraordinarily high opinion of the Assyrians. They have been very much attached to them, and regard them as conspicuously deserving of help. There is no need to recount the peculiarly hard fate that has been theirs, and today there are only three points to which we need give our attention—the question whether the plan for their settlement is a good one, the extent to which this country owes them a duty, and the obligation which falls on private individuals to subscribe to the supplementary unofficial appeal which has been adumbrated. The League of Nations has fully admitted its concern in the question, and now for a considerable time has undertaken a prolonged study of it. The Report of the League of Nations Committee is a most interesting document. It shows how this particular need of a place for a large body of men is to be associated with a real economic development. Happily, in the example which is before us, we see a genuine economic improvement which would have been worth making in any case, and which is not artificially created for the particular object as if it were relief works for the unemployed.
There is another report which would interest your Lordships—the report of Captain Gracey who, on behalf of the Save the Children Fund, accompanied the League of Nations Committee. That gives in more graphic detail the very interesting aspects of the scheme, an account of the qualities of the Assyrians, and the nature of the country to which they are destined. Captain Gracey was familiar

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with the Assyrians during the War and, moreover, he had great experience of similar settlement schemes in the case of the Armenians. That experience is most encouraging for our purpose to-day. In a country not very far off, on the Syrian coast, there are villages of Armenians who were brought there after being driven from their homes some years ago, who have made good and who, moreover, to a great extent have repaid the small advances which had to be made to them. They have by some extraordinary means which we in England, especially at the Ministry of Agriculture, might envy, subsisted on holdings of about five acres; a larger portion is designed in the present scheme. The district that has been selected on the Orontes River, consisting of marshy land which might become very rich by drainage, and depending on a reservoir of water dammed up above it, might imaginatively be compared with Egypt once Lake Tsana, is adequately harnessed for regulating the water supply. It forms a very interesting and very hopeful economic unit.
May I say one word as to the other point—the responsibility that we ought to feel as a political responsibility? I think we must admit that by every canon of honour we are morally and directly responsible. The Assyrians became unpopular in connection with the services that they rendered to us. We have experienced the fear that this might be one of those cases where we, as a Government, have been led to encourage confidence in a body of people and have in the end exposed them to trouble from which we were not able to rescue them. That was a danger alluded to by Sir Samuel Hoare in the speech which he lately made on his resignation. We ought to be very conscious of that, and very anxious to be on our guard. It is gratifying that in this case the danger of having led these 24,000 Assyrians into trouble will, I hope, be removed. We gave an assurance when we gave up the Iraq Mandate that the Assyrians would be safe and our assurance proved to be unfounded. Indeed, one of the League representatives felt bound to say, after the massacres, that he would not have agreed to the change of status except on the ground of that assurance. Consequently, it is not too much to say that the good name of this country was at
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stake, and there has been the keenest anxiety on that account.
One recalls the very similar anxiety which was felt in regard to our responsibility for the Armenians whose aid in the War was on similar lines. That responsibility was recognised shortly after the War by the leaders of political Parties, but it was not discharged. Large numbers of people in this country were mortified by that fact and deeply desirous that such responsibility should not be neglected again. Indeed, the conduct of Governments does sometimes lag behind the private ideals of the men who compose those Governments. In this case, all the more, we may be very thankful that His Majesty's Government have seen their way to announce that a large contribution will be made.
I would like to say that I am deeply conscious of the debt that we all owe to the most reverend Primate for his action in this matter. I happen to know that it has meant to him, not the discharge of one of his innumerable functions, but persistent toil, for which, I think, we cannot be too grateful. And we should be very ungrateful if we did not recognise that if the country has indeed been saved from what would have been a betrayal, it is very largely due to him. Not only should the Assyrians be grateful, but so also should all who value morality in politics. There remains the question of the way we should regard the private appeal for charity. The Government do not see their way to complete the task, and part of it falls on private charity. I would only say that this is an object which ought to appeal to us all, and we ought to realise that both charity and honour enjoin generous response to the appeal.
LORD LLOYD: My Lords, as one who in years prior to the War had manifold opportunities of appreciating the great qualities of the Assyrian peoples, I rise to supplement in a very few words the plea which the most reverend -Primate has made, and to say how very glad I am that at long last this debt of honour, which I think it is, is going in some measure to be discharged, and that the pledges given so categorically by Lord Curzon at Lausanne are going to be fulfilled. There have been in the past, as noble Lords will remember, some attempts to suggest that our responsibilities in regard to the Assyrians were not

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so definite or so clear as the most reverend Primate has, I think rightly, stated them to be to-day. It was urged, I remember, in one debate in this House that because it was the Russians who recruited the Assyrians in the first instance to fight in the War and not ourselves, therefore we had no responsibility. Those who made that suggestion must have forgotten, however true that may have been before the Revolution, that immediately after the Revolution, when General Baratoff was charged under the Dunsterville force with the operations in the Caucasus and to the South, it was the Assyrians who were used to harass the Turkish lines of communication, and the whole of the Baratoff and Dunsterville forces, Russians and Assyrians, were in the pay of the British Government. I do not think in such circumstances our responsibility for their military activities can be positively denied.
I should like if I may to say one word on a point which has not been touched upon—namely, the very great debt which Iraq owes, and through Iraq which we also owe, apart from the War, to the Assyrian levies. It will be in the memory of all your Lordships how grave and difficult was the situation in Iraq between the years 1924 and 1926. The Iraqi Government was surrounded by Kurdish as well as Arab difficulties, and if that troubled situation had not been cleared up before General Laidoner came up to the League of Nations Boundary Commission, I think it is almost certain that General Laidoner would have awarded the vilayet of Mosul to Turkey and not to Iraq. It was due to the soldierly qualities, the fidelity, the courage and loyalty of the Assyrian levies at that time, and only due to them, that that situation was safely cleared up. Iraq not only gained all the great oil wealth to which was largely due the considerable surplus in Iraq's Budget which it had last year, but she preserved all the granary of that great province, including the rich areas of Khoi Sanjak, Sulemanieh and indeed stretching out in all its fertility down to Kurkuk, which she might have lost. Therefore Iraq owes almost everything of her present financial situation to what the Assyrians did for her at that time.
In view of those facts it is worth noting that really the Iraqi Government are not
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making a very heavy contribution towards the Assyrians to-day. Although I for one should like to see His Majesty's Government settle the whole matter and so save the most reverend Primate the onerous duty of making yet another appeal to the public, I think His Majesty's Government have at present put up a great deal more money than is obvious at first sight. That is to say, the £250,000 which is given by Iraq, or alleged to be given by Iraq, for this purpose, is not in fact given by Iraq at all; it is given by His Majesty's Government. His Majesty's Government, as I think the noble Earl will not deny when he conies to speak, made a remission of £250,000, as I understand, to Iraq in respect of a debt of £600,000 for the Iraq railways on condition that they would give £250,000 to the Assyrians in this matter. The real fact therefore is that His Majesty's Government have given both sums. It is a matter of some regret to me that the Iraqi Government, who have profited so much by the valour and loyalty of the Assyrians, were not able to do a little more than they have done. I hope that when the most reverend Primate makes his appeal at the Mansion House they may find an opportunity of contributing a larger sum—and it may well be a larger sum—than they have been able to give at present.
If it is a matter of satisfaction to all of us that this debt of honour is being discharged, it cannot but be rather a regret to think how great a loss Iraq is suffering by our inability to have settled this matter before we parted with the Mandate. France has always been desirous of irrigating the great Orontes valley to the north of the Ghab area and we are now going to irrigate it for her. She will have the benefit not only of a very largely increased number of taxpayers, but a loyal and valiant body of Christians who cannot but be a great source of support to France in the future, as they grow in strength, in the difficulties which she has to encounter with Syrian nationalism. All that body of loyal people might have been at the disposal of Iraq if His Majesty's Government had in years past been able to settle the matter themselves. That, however, is all past history and I do not propose to say more about it. I will conclude by saying how greatly I welcome the statement which the most

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reverend Primate has made to-day. I have on one or two occasions had the audacity to differ from him in political matters. On this occasion I can join whole-heartedly with him and can join also in the expressions of gratitude which have been made for the action he has taken to-day.
THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (EARL STAN-HOPE): My Lords, may I begin by saying how grateful I am to the most reverend Primate for putting this Motion upon the Paper and enabling His Majesty's Government to make a somewhat full statement of the situation in regard to this difficult question. It is some two years since we had the last debate in your Lordships' House on the Assyrian question, and I do not think I need cover the ground that was covered then. I may say in passing that I am afraid I cannot place the responsibility of this country quite so high as was done by the most reverend Primate, and certainly not so high as it was put by the noble Lord opposite. It is quite true that when we gave up the Mandate we held ourselves responsible for making a recommendation that Iraq should be allowed to join the League of Nations, but our pledge was limited to saying that Iraq was suitable to become a Member. I do not want to go into controversies in regard to other parts of the world, but I think your Lordships will all agree that we were perfectly justified in giving that pledge by what has happened since. It is quite true that there have been most unfortunate and regrettable instances of conflicts between Assyrians; and Iraqi troops, but none the less I think your Lordships will agree that the Iraqi Government has shown itself fully fitted to become a Member of the League of Nations. That was the only responsibility we undertook, and although I entirely agree with my noble friend Lord Lloyd, as to the splendid services rendered by the Assyrian levies not only in the War but in other directions, His Majesty's Government cannot say that we have any further obligation than that moral one.
I will now pass to more recent developments. The whole Assyrian question entered upon a new phase in October, 1933, when by a decision of the Council of the League of Nations it was decided that no practical
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purpose would be served by inquiring into the confusion of past events. As the most reverend Primate has stated, a Committee was set up to go into the question of the future of these unfortunate people and to see what could be done. That Committee consisted of six members representing Spain, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Denmark and Mexico, the last named country subsequently being replaced by Ecuador. It was obvious, if only from the series of events to which the most reverend Primate referred—the unfortunate outbreak of attacks between Assyrians and Iraqi troops in August, 1933—that it was essential to try to get the Assyrian people out of Iraq at the earliest possible moment. It was not an easy question to solve for climatic and economic reasons and, perhaps still more, because of racial difficulties.
As your Lordships know, the first concrete scheme put up was for settlement in Brazil on land in the Parana district which was owned by a British company. The prospects were good, the land seemed suitable and the report to the League showed that settlement there might prove a practical proposition. Unfortunately, however, local opposition began to arise in Brazil, and eventually legislation was introduced in that country restricting immigration into Brazil in such a way as to make the scheme impracticable. In September, 1934, His Majesty's Government suggested to the Council Committee the possibility of settling the Assyrians in the Rupununi district of British Guiana. A report was drawn up by representatives who were sent out by the Council of the League but that report revealed, as the most reverend Primate intimated, serious difficulties of many kinds, and it was quite obvious that settlement in that area presented far too many difficulties to justify such an experiment.
The Council viewed with great apprehension the possible consequences of failure to solve the question and in a final attempt to reach a solution turned once more to the idea of settlement in Syria, which had been deprecated at an earlier stage by the French Government. My noble friend Lord Lloyd is not quite correct in saying that France would have welcomed at an earlier stage a proposal to settle the Assyrians in that country. It took a great deal of persuasion to get the French eventually to agree. After

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the fighting with Iraqi troops in August, 1933, over 600 Assyrians escaped into Syria and were interned there. As a result there were long negotiations, and the French Mandatory Authority agreed in September, 1934, to receive the families and dependents of the men already there to the number of 1,500. As a result there was a provisional settlement of 2,200 Assyrians on the Upper Khabur River in north-east Syria. Finally the League Committee on March 22, 1935, appealed to the French Government to accept as permanent settlers in the territories in the Levant under French Mandate not only the Assyrians already settled provisionally in that country but also such of those remaining in Iraq as might desire to migrate to that country.
On the 14th April last year the French Government responded to this scheme indicating what they thought were three possible schemes—namely, extension of the small existing settlement on the Upper and Middle Khabur River; secondly, a larger settlement on the Lower Khabur River; and thirdly, one within the State of Latakia in that part of the valley of the Orontes known as the Ghab plain and on the slopes of the Jebel-Ansariyeh to the west of that area. They stipulated that the Council of the League should give an assurance that this settlement would not involve any burden on the French Budget or the local Budgets of the mandated territories. Finally, the League Council accepted the French offer and the provisos that were attached to it, but owing to the high cost of the capital works involved, which the French Government indicated would be necessary before settlement could begin, the only one of the three schemes which seemed possible was the extension of the area already provisionally settled on the Upper and Middle Khabur River.
In May and June of last year Señor Lopez Olivan, the Spanish President of the Council Committee, visited Syria and Iraq, and his visit had most important results. He first of all made every effort to obtain from the Iraqi Government an adequate sum of money with which to start an Assyrian settlement fund, and he was able to secure a conditional offer to pay £25,000 as well as the cost of trans-petting Assyrian emigrants to the frontier of Iraq. He was also able to relieve the situation in Iraq by arranging for the immediate transfer of a further 1,400 desti
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tute Assyrians from Iraq to the existing settlement on the Upper Khabur River, an operation which was rendered possible by the Iraqi Government advancing £60,000 of the sum they had offered. Further convoys of Assyrians were discharged to Syria in September, bringing the numbers in the Khabur settlement to over 6,000 in all. That, I think, is the number at present occupying that area.
However, the most important result of Señor Olivan's visit was his recommendation, after discussion with the French Mandatory Authority in Beirut, that the Committee should direct its efforts to a permanent settlement in the Ghab area rather than on the Upper Khabur River. The Council eventually adopted this recommendation after a considerable amount of consideration. The reasons for it were, broadly, these. There were serious political objections to placing the Assyrians on the Khabur River at all. That area is very close to Iraq, and a settlement there might be a cause of friction between Syria and Iraq. Also the Turks themselves objected, owing to the proximity of their own frontier. On the other hand, the Ghab area is preferable from every point of view. It is on the left bank of the Orontes River and therefore comes within the State of Latakia, the great majority of whose population is composed of other minorities, chiefly the Alawites, which would obviously facilitate the introduction of a new minority. Moreover, as the administration of the State of Latakia is directly under the French Governor, the settlement comes much more directly under French control.
The area, as was briefly stated by the noble Lord opposite, is rather an interesting one. It is a valley thirty-eight miles long and five to seven miles wide, about five hundred feet above sea level and about twenty miles inland east of the Mediterranean. I was only about fifty miles from that area this time last year, and if the country in the Ghab valley is at all like what I saw in the Lower Lebanon, I can only say that it is an extraordinarily attractive part of the world. The Ghab valley, as the noble Lord opposite stated, is in some parts marsh and in some parts even covered with open water. The reason for that is partly that the Orontes River is not really wide enough to carry off the water from the valley, but the marsh is due still more to there being a natural dam,

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composed of basalt, at the northern or bottom end of the valley. The first thing that will be necessary to make this valley suitable for settlement will be to drive a tunnel through that basalt in order to drain off the water. At the top end—that is to say, the southern end—of the valley it is proposed to make a reservoir, so that in the dry seasons of the year irrigation will be possible. Three things, therefore, will become necessary: a tunnel through the basalt dam at the bottom end of the valley; a reservoir at the top end; and the widening and deepening of a section of twelve miles of the Orontes River in order that it may be able to take off the water. In addition a number of small drainage channels will be necessary: first of all in order to irrigate the land, and secondly in order to drain off the surplus water once more into the Orontes from the foot of the valley. That is why the cost of the settlement is considerable.
The detailed plan for the Ghab area was worked out at Beirut by the French Mandatory Authorities in consultation with two representatives of the League of Nations, of whom one, M. Cuénod, a Swiss expert on the transfer of populations, has since been appointed President of the Board of Trustees. The total cost; of the scheme on a basis of 21,000 Assyrian settlers was estimated at £1,220,000 originally, of which £820,000 represented the cost of' reclamation and £400,000 the cost of settlement, including the cost of the provisional settlement of those Assyrians already placed in the tipper Khabur valley.
In July, 1935, the Committee of the League of Nations renewed the appeal for funds which had been made by the Council of the League some eighteen months before. That appeal was addressed to the Governments of all States who were Members of the League. Further, a special appeal was made both to Iraq and to His Majesty's Government. Now although, as I have said, His Majesty's Government felt that we had no actual liability for the placing of these Assyrians, we did decide, in order to give a lead to other nations in the League and in the hope that our action might be followed widely elsewhere, to make an offer to the League. As your Lordships are aware, that offer
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amounted to £250,000, but it was made on fairly wide conditions. These were, that the settlement scheme should provide satisfactorily for the Assyrians and be financially well regulated; secondly, that there should be a reasonable probability that funds from other sources, combined with the contribution of His Majesty's Government, would be sufficient to ensure success; thirdly, the willingness of the Iraqi Government to increase their contribution from £125,000, as I have previously stated, to an amount at least equal to the offer of His Majesty's Government; and lastly, the assumption by the League of the residuary liability after taking account of all independent contributions.
The result of our offer, and of our discussion and hard work at Geneva, lasting over many weeks, has been this. Although the French mandated territories were unable to go as far as we had hoped in regard to meeting the capital cost of the works, they have agreed to increase their offer of 22,000,000 French francs by a further 6,500,000 French francs, subject to eventual repayment by the Assyrians, and to accept liability for any excess expenditure on the reclamation account which shall exceed the estimated cost of 62,000,000 francs. If there are any savings on that estimate, then they will share those savings with the Council Committee. So, as regards the reclamation part of the scheme, the Council Committee have a fixed sum only to find. The Iraqi Government agreed at once to increase their contribution to £250,000 in line with our own. My noble friend states that we actually are finding that money. In point of fact, although it is quite true that there is some liability for the taking over of the Iraqi Railways, we thought that this was a very suitable way of getting a payment which might have been somewhat doubtful.
LORD LLOYD: We shall have to pay it, any way!
EARL STANHOPE: The third contribution is that of the League. The Assembly, after discussion by numerous committees, eventually decided that it could not accept unlimited liability for the remaining cost, and eventually agreed to pay a fixed contribution of £86,000. Although the League's decision not to

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accept the whole of the remaining cost did not fulfil one of the provisos put forward by His Majesty's Government, we decided that in view of the satisfactory scheme now proposed, and the importance of the subject, we would make our offer a firm one to contribute £250,000. The result of all that is this. Just in order to confirm the figures given to your Lordships by the most reverend Primate, the total cost of the settlement scheme as estimated is £1,146,000. Of this sum £820,000 is for reclamation, and £326,000 for settlement, always of course supposing that the number of Assyrians requiring to be transported and settled amounted to 21,000, including the 6,000 already in the provisional settlement on the Khabur. Towards that total of £1,146,000 the receipts promised are £250,000 from the United Kingdom, £250,000 from Iraq, £86,000 from the League of Nations, and £380,000 from the French mandated territories. That amounts to £966,000, and, as you will see, it leaves a gap to be filled of £180,000.
I think it is only right to tell your Lordships at this stage that our estimate is that the number of 21,000 Assyrian settlers is likely to be exceeded. It is at present impossible, I am afraid, to give the most reverend Primate the exact figures for which he asks. An inquiry to find out how many wish to leave Iraq began somewhere in the middle of December, but unfortunately it had to be held up at the end of the year because M. Cuénod, the Swiss expert, to whom I have referred, had to return to Beirut to take part in the first meeting of the Trustee Board of which he is President. He returned in the middle of last month to Iraq, and the inquiry is still proceeding. I think it is likely to take some months, and until the snows melt it will be impossible to get at some of the Assyrians living in the mountains and ascertain their wishes. I am afraid the general opinion seems to be that the number is likely to be over, rather than under, the 21,000 for whom these estimates have been furnished. If that is the case it is estimated that additional settlers will cost a sum of £13 7s. per head to settle, and in addition the area of land available for settlers in the Ghab valley may have to be increased. There are, I believe, a further 12,000 acres on the left bank of the Orontes, that is in the State of Latakia, capable of irrigation and
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drainage, and additional land will add to the cost.
I may mention that the contributions so far settled are all fixed and final. It may be possible to meet part of the gap by means of credit operations, but the only security at present is the contributions which may become available from Assyrians who purchase their land. It is proposed that once they are settled in the area they should either purchase their lands outright or take them over on an annuity basis. It remains to be seen how much money comes in from that source. It is obvious that that is not sufficient security to raise so large a sum as £180,000, and moreover, payments will not begin until four or five years hence, because it would take that time before the drainage and irrigation works are complete. During the interval, of course, it is proposed that they shall be accommodated in villages at the top end of the Ghab valley, where land is available, and where grain crops can be grown to assist in feeding them. There is also pasture land for their herds. The only hope, therefore, of meeting this gap, and seeing the situation fully cleared up is a substantial response to the appeal which I hope the most reverend Primate will make to private charity. Before I proceed further with that part, may I say a very few words about the machinery of the plan and the method of financial control?
LORD LLOYD: May I ask the noble Earl a question, because I want the matter to be quite clear? Are the British Government actually paying £500,000—£250,000 on their own account, and £250,000 remitted from the Iraqi debt? Are the Iraqi Government paying anything or nothing?
EARL STA.NHOPE: The Iraqi Government are raising £250,000 themselves, and some time ago they paid £60,000 of it. That made it possible to settle provisionally people in the Upper Khabur River district. The whole £250,000 is being found and paid by Traci. I think your Lordships will agree that it is worth making clear the financial control with regard to the whole operation, because if we are going to ask people to contribute they will be anxious to know that the money is going to be properly spent and safeguarded. The ultimate financial control both for the reclamation scheme

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and settlement rests with the League of Nations. They undertake examination and approval of budgets, custody of funds until remitted to Syria, and auditing of accounts. In Syria, so far as reclamation work is concerned, the French High Commissioner assumes entire control, both financial and administrative, but the French High Commissioner has refused to accept responsibility for the financial control of the settlement part of the scheme, although he is quite prepared to assist in every way in regard to executive work.
The Council of the League therefore set up an autonomous body, with legal personality, called the Assyrian Settlement Trustee Board, which has been constituted at Beirut. It held its first meeting, I think, on January 3 last. It works under Statutes and financial regulations approved by the Council, and it has to submit periodical reports to that body on the progress of the settlement scheme, and the condition of the Assyrian settlers. The Council has power at any time to inquire how the Board is discharging its functions, and League supervision is thus adequately secured throughout the whole operation. The Board consists of three persons—M. Cuénod, the Swiss settlement expert, as President, M. Duprez, the representative of the French High Commissioner, and Señor de las Barcenas, a Spanish diplomat who is serving temporarily as a trustee, and I think had previously assisted the League in the financial rehabilitation of Austria. I am afraid that he is shortly ceasing to be a trustee, but his place is being taken by a very well-known American, Mr. Bayard Dodge, who is President of the American University in Beirut. There is no Executive Board apart from the Trustee Board, but they have their own executive officer, M. Burnier, who is a Swiss with long experience of refugee settlement.
The most reverend Primate asked me if there was need for contributions from voluntary sources, and I hope I have made it quite clear that His Majesty's Government see no other way by which this gap of £180,000 can be partially bridged except by a lead being given in this country from voluntary sources. We therefore shall commend the appeal when the most reverend Primate makes it and, as he knows, it has not only had the full
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support of Sir Samuel Hoare but also of my right honourable friend Mr. Eden, who is very strongly in sympathy with the whole proposal and most anxious that it shall be a great success. If, as we hope and believe, this scheme of settlement for the Assyrians proves a success, these unfortunate people, who have suffered so much and so long, will at last be provided with a permanent home, instead of being scattered among other peoples and other religions and open to every kind of danger and difficulty. But we shall have done much more than that; we shall have removed a source of friction and of danger from the Near East, and we shall have done much to establish peace on a surer foundation in at any rate one part of the world. It would be tragic if, for want of funds, it were not found possible to remove from Iraq all those Assyrians who, for one cause or another, desire to leave that country, and I trust that at any rate one result of this debate may be that funds will be forthcoming in ample measure to complete so valuable and so good a scheme in its entirety. I hope I have answered most of the queries which the most reverend Primate put to me, and I can only thank him once more on behalf of the Government for having enabled me to make so full a statement.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: My Lords, as I understand the financial position, it is this: that £180,000 has to be raised; that part of that, an unknown amount, may be raised by loans; and that the remainder, which is estimated to be about £50,000, is to be raised, according to the Government plan, by private subscription. I understood from my noble friend Lord Stanhope, that that£50,000 was not an absolutely fixed sum, because if there were more Assyrians who required to be settled there would be more money to be found, and I suppose that that also would have to come from private subscriptions. I know it is very late to do so, but I cannot help making an appeal to the Government to reconsider this part of their scheme. I recognise that they have done a great deal, and have done far more than at, one time seemed probable. I recognise the enormous advantage of getting this question settled and the part which the British Government and, still more, the most reverend Primate, have played in securing this result. But I do think it is terribly sordid, if the Government will

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allow me to say so, to say that they will insist on private funds being found to meet this sum of £50,000 or more that may still be required for this scheme.
I cannot accept my noble friend's view as to the responsibility of this country in this matter. At one time it became my official duty to know something about these matters, and I certainly formed a very strong view that during the time of the War we undertook, not a legal responsibility upon which an action would have lain, if it was a matter for action, but a very clear moral responsibility to the Assyrian nation. I do not think the thing really admits of a doubt, if you look at it impartially. And not only that. When the Mandate was ended it was very much discussed, and the details of it were most earnestly considered both in this country and at Geneva—I happened to be concerned with them—and unquestionably the future treatment of the minorities under the new Iraqi Government was one of the questions most urgently considered. The point was continually put: Is there no protection for these people? Are you quite clear that they will be safe? It was put over and over again. And it was due to the assurance given on behalf of the British Government that there was no danger, that, in part at any rate, the decision to put an end to the Mandate and to allow the admission of Iraq into the League was arrived at.
I really think my noble friend has not been sufficiently informed of all that took place on that occasion, or I am sure he would recognise that the moral obligation is very clear and definite. And it is clear in another respect. When the Assyrians settled in this country, they settled in the district that was allotted to them by Iraq, which was then under Mandate, and was directed in effect by the British Government. I think it was probably the only place that could be allotted to the Assyrians, but it was a most unsatisfactory place, there is no doubt about it. It was a plain that was unsatisfactory, and the Assyrians could not all be put together; they were scattered about, and are to this day scattered about, and it was due to that that the danger of the massacres arose.
EARL STANHOPE: My noble friend will remember that we wished to put them in an entirely different area, but
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the League settlement of the boundary between Iraq and Turkey upset the whole business.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: That is true. We would much rather have put them in their old homes if that part of the country could have been allotted to them. But they had been settled before the question of the boundary was determined, and it was our hope to get the boundary extended, when we intended to put them in a different place. However, all those circumstances really make it absurd to contend that we have no special responsibility in this matter. We certainly have, and I am quite sure that history will have no doubt at all on that subject. If that is so—and really the grant of £250,000 shows that the Government recognise a special responsibility in some form or another—surely it is a wretched thing for the Government to say: "We will grant the £250,000, but we will not grant the added £50,000 or £60,000 necessary to clear up the thing and make a good job of it."
Something has been said about the burden that will be placed on the most reverend Primate, but that—though a very serious matter—is not the only thing. Where will this £50,000 come from? It will come from the pockets of the charitable people, and if it does not go to this cause it will go to some other cause. It means that you are diverting from other causes, which are at least as worthy and at least as much in urgent need of assistance, this £50,000 which, in my judgment, fairly and honestly is a responsibility of the Government. I do beg the Government to consider the matter again. It seems to me a wretched way to settle a great question to leave this odd £50,000 to be found by private subscription. Of course, if it must be done then I hope most earnestly that the most reverend Primate will succeed, and that he will receive all the support of your Lordships in his unfortunate effort. But I do beg the Government to consider this matter once again. They have very nearly done a very good thing. Do not let them allow £50,000 to stand between them and a really satisfactory settlement of this question.
THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY: My Lords, I cannot but hope that the Government will pay heed to the eloquent plea addressed to

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it by my noble friend who has just sat down, but I must express my own gratitude to the noble Earl for the great fullness with which he has replied to my Question, the more so because I must apologise to him for having given him such short notice of it on account of the overcrowded nature of my life. I am grateful that there should be in the records of our debates this very full and clear statement of the position to which all those who are interested in this problem will at any time be able to refer. May I say also how grateful I am to the present Foreign Secretary for the great personal interest which he has taken in this matter? It was because I knew how much interest he was taking in the matter that, personally, I felt I could not press him, as the noble Viscount who has just sat down has pressed the Government, because I knew he had done all that he had felt, with full knowledge of all the circumstances, it was possible to do. But I am bound to add I think a considerable portion of the public will not unnaturally take the position which has just been stated by the noble Viscount, and it may be very difficult to persuade the charitable public that it is for them to do what they will think is really due from the Government.
I can only say that if in the course of a few days I were to hear from the noble Earl that the Government had laid to heart the appeal addressed to them by the noble Viscount, I should be most grateful and relieved because, as has been indicated, it is no slight burden that is thrust upon me in this matter. I have already made myself responsible for starting the appeal for Red Cross work in Abyssinia, and I understand I am shortly to be responsible for an appeal on behalf of German refugees in all parts of the world, and it is not easy to undertake this responsibility also for the Assyrians. I can only use the formula that while I have no liability, certainly no liability, I do feel I have some sense of responsibility, and I hope the Government in this matter will once and for all give up speaking about their liability and be content to rest upon their responsibility. If an appeal is inaugurated, while there certainly will be the criticisms which have been expressed this afternoon by the noble Viscount—and I most earnestly hope that even at the last minute the Government may be able to
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meet that criticism—I cannot but hope that there will be sufficient interest on the part of the public of this country to say: "Well, whether we agree with what the Government have done or not, whether we think it is sufficient or not, at least we shall do our best to see that no Assyrian who wishes to leave shall, through no fault of his own, be kept in Iraq." In view of what the noble Earl has said I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

DEFENCE FORCES.
LORD STRABOLGI had given Notice that he would move to resolve, That in the opinion of this House it is desirable that there should be a full inquiry by Royal Commission, or other suitable body, into the organisation, equipment and control of His Majesty's Fighting Forces especially in view of the proposed increased expenditure on these Forces; and would move for Papers.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move the Motion that stands on the Paper in my name. Whatever other result it has, I believe we shall have the pleasure of the maiden speech in this House of the noble Viscount, Lord Mon-sell. I begin my few remarks with the customary salute on these occasions and welcome him to our Chamber, which I am sure he will adorn. Indeed it is quite like old times to see him sitting opposite again. As this Motion also concerns the other noble Viscount who has been recruited to our ranks, Lord Swinton, may I also welcome him on behalf of my noble friends and myself? Certainly, from my own point of view, it is a good thing to have two Defence Ministers in your Lordships' House, and I am sure both noble Viscounts will be of great assistance in the very important debates we have in front of us if all one hears is true.
I can relieve the anxieties of any one who thinks I am going to speak too long, by saying that my explanation will not raise the question of the need for a Ministry of Defence, which has been debated in your Lordships' House before. It will not raise the question of the Chiefs of Staff Committee or anything of that kind, not even the reorganisation of the Committee of Imperial Defence, because I consider at the present time the urgency

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is too great for us to wait for any such great constitutional change. There are serious anxieties felt outside as to whether the proposed rearmament, which will entail, I understand, a very large sum, is going to proceed on the right lines. There was a remarkable leading article in The Times of yesterday which no doubt the First Lord of the Admiralty saw. The Times is not a paper that supports me and my friends as a rule, but that article really contains the motive of what I have in mind in moving this Motion. This is What the article said:
"It would be a mistake to disregard the widespread uncertainty among the public over the value of the different Services and arms. For years they have been subjected to a bombardment of arguments concerning the effect of the newer means on the older—on 'bombs and battleships,' on battle and blockade, on air attack and air defence, on gas and high explosive. No large-scale programme can now be adopted without raising large questions of a broadly technical nature; and vital issues depend on the answers."
I must also mention there was a remarkable series of articles in another paper with which I do not usually see eye to eye, the Morning Post, dealing with the three Services, pointing out great defects in them, and urging drastic reorganisation of them.
No reorganisation of Cabinet Committees will really satisfy this body of opinion for whom I am trying to speak to-day. Our anxieties will not be relieved by the appointment of that great strategist and master of precise English, the Lord President of the Council, as a kind of super co-ordinating Minister. That will not satisfy those who feel anxieties about the trend of this rearmament programme of the Government. Why is it that we cannot be satisfied with the old methods of procedure? Because of three great changes which have been brought about. First of all, in the development and growth of the air arm. I need not dwell on that point. I have only to mention it for your Lordships to grasp what we have all in mind. Regarding the role of the Army in any future trouble, the application of the petrol engine, the internal combustion engine, to land fighting and the development of mechanical weapons—the tank and so on—as well as to military transport has brought about a decisive change. My military friends assure me that the application of the internal combustion engine has altered the whole func
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tion and method of using an Army on land. Thirdly—this is both a political and strategical question—there is the development of the collective system through the League of Nations.
I submit that it is no longer true to say that we have to consider ourselves as a unit and defend ourselves alone against any possible attack. We are now part of a vast alliance of fifty-nine nations. I accept the Government's plea that they are supporting the League and all that the Covenant of the League stands for, and therefore in that case we can rely on allies if we are attacked. For example, in the Mediterranean, according to the White Paper recently issued, we ought to be able to count in ease of trouble, on France, Turkey, Greece, Spain and Yugoslavia as allies, and on the benevolent neutrality of the other States Members. I suggest that that third development has altered the whole problem of Imperial strategy and has created a new state of affairs altogether. The danger that alarms so many people is that we are about to be committed in the next few weeks to a vast expenditure on so-called rearmament, either by loan or taxes—I do not know which and I am not going to inquire at this stage—or by a disguised inflation in the form of the manipulation of Treasury Bills and so on, and there will be grounds for doubt as to whether the money will be expended to the best possible advantage.
I am making no sort of attack on the two noble Lords who speak for their two great Departments of State in your Lordships' House. I am sure that they and the Secretary of State for War will give the best advice they can to the Cabinet on these problems, but I do suggest that, with the best will in the world, accepting the views of their carefully chosen professional assistants, that advice is not unbiased as things are to-day. I go further and suggest that there is a terrible responsibility on the Defence Ministers to-day, which I am sure they realise as much as any of us. They take the advice of their professional advisers, and I am not suggesting that they should do anything else; but it is also a fact that there is a convention to-day amongst the hierarchy of the three Services that they never criticise each other's proposals. It simply is not done.

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It would be unthinkable, for example, for the Chief of the General Staff to criticise anything proposed by the Board of Admiralty or the First Sea Lord (the Chief of the Naval Staff) or the Chief of the Air Staff. They do their best, each in his own sphere, but they support each other, and it is not etiquette, if I might put it that way, for these high officers to question any proposal or any suggestion made by the heads of sister Services.
I am speaking perfectly impersonally, but suppose I myself were a member of the Cabinet to-day, not the head of one of the Defence Ministries, I would welcome, with this terrible responsibility, an independent inquiry such as I propose in my Motion. It comes to this, that what I propose is something on the lines of the Esher Committee after the South African War, to inquire into the three Services together and decide on one or two problems which I will briefly describe to your Lordships. I want the strongest and ablest Committee available under an independent Chairman, and I believe that you have the wealth of experience, of prestige and of knowledge in this country that could man a small strong Committee of the kind I have in mind. I consider that we ought to make this inquiry before we commit ourselves to a great programme of rearmament.
I am not talking about filling up certain immediate gaps this year. The Admiralty, for example, have a year's grace before they have finally to decide to lay down the keels of new battleships. Under the present Treaty I think they are precluded from doing that until the end of the present year. That gives a year's breathing space. As your Lordships know, it is usual to order equipment before you lay down keels. I do not want to see ourselves committed to vast sums ranging from £200,000,000 to £300,000,000 or £400,000,000 (figures stated freely in newspapers which support the present Government) spread over a period of from five to seven years. In fact, I have seen it stated in one influential quarter that it is proposed to spend £300,000,000, raised by loan or by manipulating Treasury Bills, to be expended in, I think, three years. If we make such a vast expenditure and then find that part of the money has gone in wrong directions, or might have been better spent in other directions, it will
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be nothing short of a grave national disaster.
On what is it proposed to spend this money? I am not in the secrets of any-of the Service Departments, and I can only gather what I can from pronouncements of Ministers and from statements in the Press. The Admiralty is proposing to replace the ships now growing obsolete or considered obsolete, by new and similar vessels and to increase the cruiser fleet. The Air Council is committed under their programme, which has been adopted by successive Governments for a number of years now, to create a striking force equal to the nearest Air Force within flying distance. This may be to-day France or Germany—I do not know which has the strongest Air Force. It may be some even stronger air power in the future. But in any case that will mean very great expenditure. The Army Council, I understand, is going still further to mechanise the Army and to provide more anti-tank and antiaircraft artillery. What all this is going to cost I certainly do not pretend to know. The only figure that I will hazard to your Lordships is what a mere policy of replacement would cost for the Royal Navy and the addition to the cruiser fleet which the Admiralty are now claiming to make up for the drop of the programme of twenty extra cruisers when the Labour Government were in office.
Suppose we simply replace the present vessels with vessels of equivalent size and power. I do not want to anticipate any results of the present Naval Conference because I know nothing about it. All I have heard is that the noble Viscount, Lord Monsell, makes an excellent Chairman of Committee A. But simply to replace the existing fleet that has grown old would run us into figures something like this: Eleven capital ships at about £8,000,000 each; twenty trade route cruisers at about £2,000,000 each; fourteen new cruisers to replace obsolete vessels, say about the same amount, £2,000,000 each—this depends of course on whether we can get a reduction in size by agreement; this is only an illustration—forty torpedo boat destroyers at about £500,000 each; and forty-five replace destroyers at about the same figure each. That works out at £198,500,000, nearly £200,000,000. If the sum required for replacement is of that order, I submit that we really should consider cer-

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tarn problems before the country is committed to them. It may be said: "Well, the Government are issuing a White Paper in a month's time and they will tell us a good deal in that White Paper." But when that White Paper is issued it will be too late; it will be chose jugée; the Government will have committed themselves and, without great loss of prestige, they will not be able to alter their programme, And that figure of replacements does not include submarines—I still hope that the First Lord will persuade the nations of the world to give up that abominable weapon—nor aircraft carriers nor mine sweepers. Therefore it is a very conservative and modest estimate. You need, in addition, more personnel to man your extra cruisers, and there is to be expenditure on naval bases also. Altogether the figure is colossal. And that is for the Navy only.
I do not venture on any estimate of what the proposed expenditure on the other two Services will be; but I would like to say very seriously indeed to your Lordships that as far as I have been able to make out the present tendency is to prepare to defend ourselves in case of a war. What kind of a war? A war, I am afraid, like the last Great War. Now if there is one thing we can be absolutely certain about, it is that if another great war comes to plague the world it will be utterly different from the last war. We have a national habit of always preparing for the last war. When we started the Crimean War there were bitter complaints that we were using tactics developed in the Peninsular War. When we began the South African War we were using the tactics of the Crimean War, and in the Great War we began, at any rate, with equipment and ideas very largely based on the South African War. We are still doing the same thing in our preparations. If another great war does come to plague the world, I am afraid that unless we alter we may have a rude awakening.
Now the noble Viscount, the First Lord of the Admiralty, may counter this by saying: "Oh, yes, but your Party"—meaning the Labour Party—" always oppose any armaments and you are responsible for the present weakness of the Forces." It is the sort of thing we hear on the hustings, although of course it will not be put quite so crudely here
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as on a political platform. Let me deal with that briefly but, I hope, completely. The official policy of the Labour Party, which I am authorised to state on behalf of the Leader of the Party in another place, the policy which has been supported by the great majority of my Party over and over again, is that we are prepared to vote for the credits for the necessary armaments to enable this country to play her part, but no more than her part, in a system of collective security. We are prepared to do that, but we want to be sure that the expenditure is in the right direction. For that reason I venture to make this suggestion to your Lordships, that we should have either a Royal Commission or some other suitable body to inquire into the whole question and report the facts.
It will be admitted that there are very acute differences of professional opinion, not confined to any one of the three Services or to any one nation, on this subject. I do not propose to give any opinion of my own on those differences, and I do not want the noble Viscount to think that I am suggesting this or that type of armament. I would not be so presumptuous. But I think he will admit that there are considerable differences of opinion, respectable differences of opinion, not confined to one Service and not confined to one nation. Let me deal first with naval weapons. There are acute differences of opinion there between our own Naval Staff and the Americans. The Americans, from what I can gather, demand a battleship of a minimum tonnage of 35,000. They say that is the minimum size which can be efficiently protected against air attack. I understand that our Admiralty has been prepared to recommend a limitation of 20,000 tons. The Japanese, who, after all, are efficient seamen and certainly efficient strategists, were prepared to agree to the abolition of all ships of the line above 10,000 tons in size. There at once is a very serious difference of opinion. And there is in this country a school that would agree, if everyone else agrees, that 10,000 tons is quite enough for a ship of the line.
Now with regard to air attack. On April 4 last year the noble Viscount made a most interesting speech, if I may say so, in a very sympathetic atmosphere at

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the annual dinner of the naval architects. No doubt they cheered him to the echo. If I may summarise what he said, it was to the effect that the air menace against warships, particularly battleships, was exaggerated, and that the battleship was still the pivot of our defence. I do not think I have misrepresented the noble Viscount's argument. He was not alone, of course, in putting forward that opinion, for the White Paper issued last March, Command Paper No. 4827, which has been debated in your Lordships' House, says that the capital ship—a horrible and misleading expression which really means nothing—
"remains the essential element upon which the whole structure of our naval strategy depends."
That is what is said in the White Paper. But if the pivot has to be kept out of the range of aircraft, I suggest we are in rather a bad way.
In the same speech the noble Viscount quoted the American Naval Board findings after the 1925 experiments in the United States—namely, that the battleship had not been rendered obsolete by air attack. The extraordinary thing about these experiments is that they are used both by the airmen to justify their contention and by the Admirals to justify their contention. In the Congressional Report this conclusion is stated:
"It will be difficult, if not impossible, to build any type of vessel of sufficient strength to withstand the destructive force that can be obtained with the largest bombs that aeroplanes may be able to carry."
Great experiments were carried out by the United States in 1921 and 1925. As far as I know they are the only really large-scale experiments that have been attempted. Since then there have been great advances in aeronautical engineering. I should like to ask the noble Viscount, if he feels able to answer the question, whether we have carried out any large-scale experiments under practical conditions. I certainly have not heard of them. We have carried out practices, but nothing like the sort of experiments carried out by the Americans. If we have not done that I suggest that we might use up two or three of our aged battleships, which are due for scrapping, in making such experiments. It may be cheaper in the long run.
There is much talk about the latest anti-aircraft guns, and I am quite pre-
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pared to believe that they are wonderful weapons. I can only take my information from the published catalogue of Messrs. Vickers, which goes all over the world. They illustrate a wonderful gun and give its performance. It sounds marvellous. I would like to ask your Lordships to consider these figures. A Super-Dreadnought costs £8,000,000. A large multi-engined bombing aeroplane, with a three hundred miles radius, costs £8,000 or thereabouts. Therefore, for the cost of one Dreadnought battleship you can build one thousand very large aeroplanes. I admit that the battleship lasts much longer, but, on the other hand, you can build new aeroplanes much quicker, and if you have the personnel and the organisation you can replace your Air Force again and again before you can begin to make progress with a new battleship. Suppose a squadron of six battleships was attacked by 6,000 bombing aeroplanes, or even by only 4,000 bombers with a thousand other aircraft to lay smoke-screens and a thousand fighters to guard the bombers. I do not know how skilful our gunners might prove themselves, but if they could bring down one quarter of the attackers I think they would be doing marvellously well. I can imagine that a squadron of battleships, however powerfully armed, would be obliterated by such an attack with modern bombs filled with the explosive and incendiary substances now available. As I say, there may be a very good answer to this, and it may not be in the public interest to give that answer publicly. Very well, but let the matter be investigated by an absolutely impartial and strong body so that it may be ascertained where the truth lies. I do not ask for the true information myself. I only want the Cabinet to be informed of the truth.
I will only deal briefly with the other questions of acute professional difference which should be investigated impartially. In the first place, there is the defence of bases, and that applies not only to the Navy but to the other Services as well. Is it really possible to defend your bases against determined air attack, and, if so, how? My latest information is that we are not in the future to rely so much on fighter and interceptor aeroplanes to shoot down attackers in the air as on anti-aircraft guns mounted on land. I do not know, but it is a fact that six months

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after the happy speech of the noble Viscount to the naval architects our Mediterranean Fleet left Malta, and the general opinion of the man in the street in this country was that it was healthier for our ships to leave Malta because of its exposure to air attack in case of trouble. Remember the Italian Air Force is not very formidable as yet. The Italians have spent a great deal of money on the older weapons. As for the alleged threat to our ships in the Eastern Mediterranean, I ventured in our last debate on Abyssinian affairs to state that I thought the danger was much exaggerated, and I could give reasons here again. But, however that may be, the alleged threat seems to have brought about a sudden change of course in our high policy which ended in the helmsman, Sir Samuel Hoare, being put on the beach. Whatever the foundation for the optimism of the First Lord on this whole question of the defence of war vessels against air attack—and I am sure it is well founded and that he honestly holds it—there is at the same time both respectable and well-informed naval, military and air opinion which combats this optimism.
I hesitate to say anything about this, but there are also acute differences with regard to the Army. There is certainly apparently something very wrong with the Army, as I shall show in a minute. In the last ten years, Army Votes have been between £36,000,000 and £44,000,000 a year, and yet we are told that the Army is lacking in the most essential equipment. I do not propose to express any opinion with regard to the professional debate as to how far we should mechanise or whether we are justified or not in still spending a million pounds a year on the cavalry. There is no doubt a very good case for cavalry; in fact, I rather think that the recent experience from Abyssinia seems to show that an Army can be over- mechanised. But I think there is something very wrong indeed when a member of your Lordships' House of such great military experience as Lord Allenby could write in the public Press last November the following extraordinary statement.
This is what the noble Viscount the Field Marshal had to say:
"The majority of our tank units are still equipped with vehicles which cannot be regarded as fit for a modern European
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war. The Army is lacking in anti-tank weapons. The same is true of other items of equipment."
And then may I draw your Lordships' attention to these words, because so many of you have played, and are playing, a great part in building up the Territorial Army?
"The state of the Territorials is immeasurably worse. The Territorial Army to-day possesses no tanks at all."
This is from Lord Allenby. I think that is an astonishing state of affairs, after the money that has been spent year after year on the Army. We are also told on very high authority that the Air Force is relatively weak, and there has been an outpouring of statements from Ministers, from the Prime Minister downwards, to the effect that the Navy is weak, obsolete and inefficient.
I am not proposing this Commission with the intention of seeking ground for the impeachment of His Majesty's Ministers. I want to make that perfectly clear. I see the former War Minister in his place, and the noble Viscount on the Woolsack was a War Minister before him; I want to make it immediately clear that I have no intention of seeking to impeach them. Indeed, they may have a most excellent defence; but I should like that defence made before the sort of Commission I have in mind. This question is too serious to be left to be settled by the present methods. Before we rush into a vast programme of increased armaments, I hope that we should be sure that the money will be spent to the best advantage of this country as a State Member of the League of Nations, and therefore in the interests of world peace. I beg to move.
Moved to resolve, That in the opinion of this House it is desirable that there should be a full inquiry by Royal Commission, or other suitable body, into the organisation, equipment and control of His Majesty's Fighting Forces, especially in view of the proposed increased expenditure on these Forces.—(Lord Strabolgi.)
THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (VISCOUNT MONSELL): My Lords, it is with considerable trepidation that I address the House for the first time, especially from this Bench. Since last November, when I made what I may call a bowing acquaintance with your Lordships' House, I have been occupied as Chairman of the Naval Conference, and

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my time has been rather more than completely occupied. I have therefore not had any opportunity of studying the manners and methods of your 'Lordships' House, and so I beg, if I transgress, that you will grant me clemency.
The noble Lord whose Motion we are now discussing has made a speech of great topical interest. He has covered a great deal of land, sea and air, but what he wants to do is, I think, what His Majesty's Government want to do: to get the closest co-operation possible between all the Services, and to get the greatest efficiency possible in those Services themselves. I am sure, however, that the noble Lord will not be surprised when I tell him that the Government cannot accept the extremely wide Commission of inquiry for which he has asked to go into "the organisation, equipment and control of His Majesty's fighting forces." The noble Lord opposite instanced the Esher Committee, but a much better analogy is the Hartington Commission that was held in 1889. That Commission only dealt with a portion of what the noble Lord wants dealt with, and yet it took a year and a half to report. I do not know whether the noble Lord realises how long this Commission, with its great width, would take to report: I think it would be at least two or three years before it rendered its report to the Cabinet. And, my Lords, in the opinion of the Government we cannot wait for our deficiencies to be made good. I think it will probably be the opinion of this House as a whole that we have delayed too long already. We have stayed our hands after the eleventh hour, in the hope that other nations would follow our example. They have not. We are bound to put our deficiencies right, and I think the great majority of people in this country think we have already taken sufficient risk in so delaying. That is the first reason why the Government cannot accept the Motion of the noble Lord: because we cannot have any more delay.
The second reason is the question of personnel. Where are you going to find the men who could usefully sit on this Commission and tell our professional sailors, soldiers and airmen what equipment they should have, how they should be organised, and how they should fight?
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We must remember that these professional sailors, soldiers and airmen have risen to the top of their professions and are able to command the best talent of their respective Services on their staffs. They have at their backs our incomparable Civil Service, and they can and do seek the knowledge of the best brains, the best scientists, the best technicians in the country. Moreover, they are the people who will have the supreme responsibility of directing and operating our Defence Services in time of war. Sir William Robertson once remarked to Sir Maurice Hankey during the last War that he could invent a hundred ways of winning the War so long as he had not to be responsible for carrying them out. The Royal Commission which the noble Lord suggests would, I submit, divorce advice from the responsibility for carrying out advice, a divorce which has been proved over and over again to be fatal.
The third reason why the Government cannot accept the Motion is that the work which the noble Lord asks for has been done, and the inquiry that he asks for has been carried out, by the proper people—namely, those responsible for it. They have been continually engaged—not merely during the sittings of a Royal Commission but continually engaged—in the study of our defensive problems. This morning I tried to make out a list of the number of meetings that had been held on this subject since I had been at the Admiralty. The figures are very big. Apart from the Cabinets, which I have not counted and upon whose agenda defence very often figures, there have been over 120 special Cabinet Committee meetings dealing with defence problems. The Committee of Imperial Defence and its numerous Sub-Committees have held over 880 meetings on these defence problems; seventy-four of which have been dealing with the very important business of the principal supply officers and industrial organisation. Your Lordships will see that altogether over 1,000 meetings have been held dealing with the very subjects upon which the noble Lord is asking information, and which have been dealt with, I submit, by the people who have got to use these weapons and who must have the responsibility in a war.
LORD MOTTISTONE: What is the period to which the noble Viscount refers?
VISCOUNT MONSELL: The period of the last Government—four years. My Lords, the noble Lord opposite mentioned several things as examples of his reasons for wishing to have an inquiry, but I think he made his principal example a question to which he says reference was made in The Times yesterday—that old controversy of what he called bombs versus battleships. I think it is a bad example for the noble Lord to bring forward, because nobody is able to give a final answer to-day. There can be no realistic test, no final decision on this question until—please God we never have it—we have a war because, until aircraft carrying personnel are fired at there can be no realism at all in this matter What one can safely predict is that from a, modern fleet—I would draw your Lordships' attention to the fact that in this controversy a battleship is assumed to be alone and isolated, whereas in fact it is nothing of the sort—there will be a terrific concentration of anti-aircraft fire. This controversy, I submit to this House, if it is a controversy designed to see whether we should have battleships or aircraft, is a barren controversy, because we are absolutely obliged to have both—both for our defence and for any contribution we may make to collective security.
I think, my Lords, there are few people in this country who would advocate this country alone abolishing capital ships. The noble Lord, I understand, does not like the term, but capital ships includes battleships and battle cruisers. No country shows the slightest sign of doing away with capital ships, and I would remind your Lordships that at this moment there are seven of these vessels being built in Europe, four of them of the largest size allowed under the Washington Treaty. If I may give your Lordships just two examples why it is impossible to do away with the capital ships I will take the example of the last War. Our Battle Fleet in the North Sea was able to prevent the German Fleet from getting out into the Atlantic on to our trade routes. If we had had no battleships nothing on earth could have prevented the German Fleet from getting out into the Atlantic and destroying our trade and lighter forces at leisure. We, with our lighter forces, would never have been able to bring theta to action. That is an example from home waters. With regard
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to the question of wider defence, and the defence of our Empire in any distant waters your Lordships may like to think of, if we had not capital ships in those distant waters our lighter forces, our bases, and our territory would be at, the mercy of the enemy who had those capital ships.
We certainly do not underrate the immense offensive power of aircraft. We realise very well that they greatly add to our problems and that they must hamper our movements just as mine fields and submarines hamper our movements, but all I say and all I said at the naval architects' dinner was "please do not exaggerate." Let us look at these matters in the right perspective. As a matter of fact the potency of the latest weapon invented has always been exaggerated. If we go back to the Middle Ages we find that at one of the Lateran Councils the crossbow was solemnly outlawed as a weapon hateful in the sight of God. Later, we have had the torpedo boat, the destroyer, and the submarine, and as each has appeared the British fleet has been completely sunk on paper by the amateur experts, to their complete satisfaction. The modern battleship can discharge, in rough figures, about 1,000 shells weighing nearly a ton in one and a half hours. And a modern battleship therefore has to be built to withstand this tremendous attack. A modern battleship has also to be constructed to stand great explosions of the highest form of explosive under water. And so the bomb is not really a new problem. It simply means a re-arrangement. It means that where vertical armour did in the old days you now want horizontal armour. It means that where horizontal guns in the old days were sufficient you now want gulls that fire vertically. And I can say that we are more than satisfied with the progress we are making in anti-aircraft guns.
The noble Lord referred again to my speech at the naval architects' dinner, and to the finding of the United States Naval Board, and he quoted something from that. Well, it must be a curious document, and no wonder that both sides in this very barren controversy find comfort from it, if it was quoted correctly by the noble Lord. But I have never seen that portion in the Navy Board's Report that was quoted by the noble Lord. I

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have here some quotations from the Report that appeared after those experiments, published in April, 1925. The Board, after full consideration of all the experiments, actually recorded its conclusions in the following terms:
"It cannot be said therefore that air attack has rendered the battleship obsolete."
It also said:
"The battleship is the element of ultimate force in the Fleet, and all other elements are contributory to the fulfilment of its function as the final arbiter in sea power."
And that is the opinion of America today. It is the opinion also of all other countries; we are not alone in thinking that. And it is interesting to note that when the French laid down their two new battle cruisers the other day M. Piétri was then Minister of Defence; the Italians have laid down two new ships, and, as everybody knows, the three Services in Italy are under the head of a single Minister; while Germany is building battleships to-day, and Germany also has a Minister of Defence.
The noble Lord asked what experiments we have been carrying out, and he admits that we have perhaps been carrying out some experiments; but I noticed in a very interesting article which he wrote, I think in the Nineteenth Century of this month, that he stated that we had carried out no experiments at all, and that the last experiments on a large scale were carried out by the United States a great many years ago.
LORD STRABOLGI: No large-scale experiments.
VISCOUNT MONSELL: No large-scale experiments. I am sure that the noble Lord was quite unintentionally misleading the public, and incidentally he paid a tremendous tribute to the secrecy, or the non-talkativeness, of a great number of people in the Navy, in the Civil Service, and in the Air Force, who lately have taken part in a great number of large-scale experiments. I agree with the noble Lord that the public have a right to know if the Admiralty have carried out sufficient experiments to enable them to provide adequate protection against the air menace, both by anti-aircraft armament and by hull construction. These experiments have been carried out. They naturally have been
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secret experiments, but in the opinion of the Admiralty we have now by those experiments adequate information for the construction of the modern battleship. There were a great many other questions that the noble Lord opposite raised. I think they would be best dealt with when we get the White Paper on defence matters. I hope that the noble Lord will think that his speech and my reply have adequately ventilated this subject for the moment, and for the moment only, and that he will not press his Motion.
LORD MOTTISTONE: My Lords, I do not wish to detain your Lordships except to say, first of all, with what pleasure we listened to the First Lord making his first speech in this House—one of the best speeches I have ever heard on this subject, either in this House or the other. We hope we shall very often hear him. The only point I would make is that I think he got the best of my noble friend who moved this Motion in pointing out that a Royal Commission or other appropriate body would of course delay what we all now know to be so urgent, so of course that is not a solution. But I feel bound to say—and I know that the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, will agree—that there is an uneasy feeling in the public mind that, though it may well be that the Chiefs of Staffs Committee and other bodies have got co-ordination between the Services to a better pitch than before, the fault lies without a doubt at the very top. The head of the Committee of Imperial Defence under our Constitution at present is the Prime Minister. I claim—and I know that Lord Salisbury would claim, because he has said so in this House again and again—that at the head of all this we must have a man who gives his whole time to it. It is a whole-time job, and we must have a man, and he must be a Minister, who will give his whole time to it. Having said that, I hope that my noble friend will not press his Motion to a Division, because I think that a good answer has been made by the First Lord of the Admiralty.
LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, I should like to be allowed also to congratulate the noble Viscount the First Lord of the Admiralty, on his maiden speech in this House, and I am sure your Lordships ought to be most grateful to me for having instigated it. I also desire to thank him for the very full and

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adequate reply, from his point of view, that he gave to me, and for dealing with toe questions I have raised. I will follow the advice of the noble Lord who has just sat down and will not press fie Motion. May I just be allowed to say this? I did not intend that this Commission should tell the soldiers and sailors what they needed, but I wanted a Commission with adequate time to examine the programmes and the plans of the Defence Departments and to have them justified; because, if I may give only one example to your Lordships, it should be a Commission with plenty of time and the necessary knowledge of affairs and experience to get the noble Lord and his advisers to explain how they propose to use the large battleships in certain possible wars with certain allies and so on. I think that would be a most interesting study. I do not know whether the noble Lord can reply to me, but I would very much like to know how they propose to do it.
The fact that all these other Naval Staffs also propose to go on building big battleships does not answer the question at all A very gallant Admiral and an old friend of mine, who said at Geneva at the world Disarmament Conference that to the British Navy battleships were more precious than rubies, was really telling the whole truth. They are like the Peeress's rubies, used on a special occasion perhaps once a year, and the rest of the time kept in a safe. But, because she has rubies, all the others roust have rubies, too. Fashion is followed in these matters also. As to the fighting justification for large battleships, I should like to have had the whole subject thoroughly thrashed out, but that is a very large question, and we need not go into it now. I desire leave to withdraw my Motion.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

CONSOLIDATION BILLS.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT HAILSHAM): My Lords, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name on the Paper. It is one that is moved in every Parliament for setting up the necessary Committee to examine Consolidation Bills in order to ascertain that the law is not being altered under the guise of consolidation.
Moved, That a Committee of six Lords be appointed to join with a Committee of the House of Commons as a Joint Committee on Consolidation Bills in the present Session.
That the Lords following be named of the Committee:

M. Aberdeen and Temair,

E. Lucan,

L. Stanmore,

L. Merthyr,

L. Carnock,

L. Amulree.

—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
Ordered, That such Committee have power to agree with the Committee of the House of Commons in the appointment of a Chairman.
Ordered, that a Message be sent to the Commons to acquaint them therewith, and to request them to appoint six members to be joined with the said Committee.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.
VISCOUNT HALIFAX: My Lords, before moving that the House do adjourn, I think I ought to mention to your Lordships that I understand that certain Orders under the Government of India Act will be considered by the Indian Orders Committee to-morrow. We hope to have the Report of the Committee and, if your Lordships would allow it, to be in a position to deal with these Orders on Thursday afternoon, if they are found, on the Report of the Committee, not to raise matters of great moment or controversy. It is important that they should be got through the House at the earliest moment. On their passage depends, I understand, finance arrangements in some of the Provinces of India.
EARL PEEL: Could the noble Viscount tell us when we shall know whether any controversial question has arisen?
VISCOUNT HALIFAX: I understand that these Orders come before the India Committee to-morrow, and I should hope it would be possible, perhaps, to give some indication whether any momentous matters were found to arise before the end of the sitting to-morrow. I would make that my endeavour.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: May I ask my noble friend when we shall have these Papers? Are they to be circulated? How does he propose to deal with them? The Committee will deal with the matter to-morrow—is that so?
VISCOUNT HALIFAX: That is so.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Assuming they accept the Orders, will they be laid before Parliament? Will they be presented by the Committee?
VISCOUNT HALIFAX: They will, I understand, be laid on the Table as soon as available. The Lord Chairman is, as the noble Marquess knows, Chairman of the Committee, and as soon as the Committee has finished its work the Orders will be laid on the Table and become available.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Of course, it may be they are merely formal matters, but if they really raise questions of substance, I should be sorry that the precedent should grow up that these things can be dealt with without giving time to your Lordships to consider the Papers, though they agreed to them. They may be matters in which everybody would only be too ready to facilitate the business of the Government and get them through, but I should be very sorry if my noble friend thought he only has to mention that these Orders are to be laid before the Committee and presented to Parliament and we should agree to them in a hurry. But I do not wish to interfere with my noble friend at the present time.
VISCOUNT HALIFAX: If I may say so, what my noble friend has said seems to me to be entirely reasonable, and it was for that reason that I, in making the announcement to the House, said that I hoped, if the Report shows that the Orders raise no matters of moment, the House might allow them to be dealt with. I shall be perfectly willing, here and now, to give my noble friend the assurance that if it is found the Orders do in fact raise matters of greater moment than the
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House ought to be asked to decide at short notice, I should be willing, on behalf of my noble friends, to ask that they should be postponed and taken one day early next week. I hope it will be found, as was found in another place, that they do not, in fact, raise any matters of that kind.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Thank you very much.