§ LORD KILMAINE asked His Majesty's Government whether the idea of a Channel tunnel between France and England has been finally abandoned and, if so, for what reason. The noble Lord said: My Lords, the subject of the Question I have put down on the Paper today is one that used to be of considerable interest several years ago to many people on both sides of the Channel, but I have not heard it discussed or mentioned in the Press for some considerable time. If I remember aright, the last time the matter was before your Lordships the main objections raised to the scheme were on grounds of strategy. It was held that in the event of war the existence of a tunnel between this country and the Continent might be a source of considerable danger. I remember hearing this argument disputed by those who were in favour of the tunnel, who pointed out that in the event of a war and of the tunnel being thought to be in danger, either country having control of the ends of the tunnel could quite easily flood it or blow it up or otherwise put it out of action. In any case these arguments held and the scheme was dropped.
§ In these modern times, supposing that unfortunately another war should break out and there was a risk of invasion of this land, surely the invasion would come from the clouds and not from either across or under the sea? I notice that recently there has been instituted a Channel ferry 696 which has successfully conveyed passengers and freight even in the recent rough weather, but I have yet to learn how people using this ferry enjoy themselves. I myself would much prefer, certainly in rough weather, to be in a comfortable steamer's berth than in a railway carriage with four or five other passengers. Living as I do nine months in the year on the Sussex shore, I know for a fact how from October to April there are very few days when the sea can be called calm. I cannot believe that this Channel ferry scheme will be popular.
§ I have spent half my life in France. I know the French people. I have always found them delightful and most anxious to make one's stay in their country happy and pleasant. I certainly feel that it is vitally important that this country and France should be on the very best possible terms because, if another war were to break out, which in the present state of the world and from the way all the rations seem to be arming at a feverish rate might come to pass sooner than some people expect, it would be very desirable that we and the French should be comrades-in-arms. I suggest therefore that a Channel tunnel at the present time might be of the very greatest benefit to both countries. There is no doubt it would be very valuable to trade and commerce, and it would greatly stimulate tourist traffic. Moreover, in the unfortunate event of war, it would be of great assistance both for the conveyance of men and arms and, still more, for the return of badly wounded people from the seat of war, always provided of course that the tunnel, if it existed, could be rendered immune from hostile attack. Therefore I beg to ask His Majesty's Government if this scheme has been finally abandoned and, if so, for what reason.
§ LORD LAMINGTONMy Lords, I hope His Majesty's Government will give an answer in the negative to the suggestion made by the noble Lord in his speech. He asks what reasons there are which have prohibited the building of the Channel tunnel. These reasons have been stated time after time by the authorities responsible for the defence of this country. The favourite reason for the construction of the tunnel to-day is that our insular position has now gone owing to the introduction of flying. But if in- 697 roads have been made into what has hitherto been an impregnable system, why add another breach? It seems an illogical argument. All naval and military authorities have always been against this proposal, even when we have had Governments rather in favour of the idea. At some future time there may be a unified European system, a federated Europe, and it may be that the Channel tunnel can then safely be constructed; but in the meantime it would be a distinct danger.
I see no reason for going behind what has been decided in the past. It is not only in time of war that I regard this tunnel as a danger; but in time of peace you would have this, artery connecting you with all the complications of European politics, and you would always be afraid that some advantage might be taken by another country to impose some disability on us because of this tunnel. I might add that once privately the late Lord Haig told me he had seen a letter of mine in the newspapers opposing the construction of the tunnel, and he said: "If you want support for your opposition, I would support you. I entirely oppose the idea." One would imagine that if any man would have valued the construction of this tunnel it would have been Lord Haig. I therefore trust that there will be no reason advanced why this weakening of our defensive system should be approved. I hope we shall have an answer against a tunnel from the Government and that the reason will be that the construction of such a tunnel would not add to our security.
§ LORD MOYNEMy Lords, it seems to me that the case for the Channel tunnel has been completely shattered by the development of the danger from the air, because surely in war-time now it would not be a question of using the tunnel: it would be a question of trying to keep it open. It is absolutely certain that if we want to keep up regular and safe communications with the Continent under modern conditions it should not be by a tunnel but by means of ships. If we had a tunnel, is it not perfectly certain that all our Channel communications would fall into disuse? Our docks, our quays, our railway system would rust; ships would be laid up, and no longer built, and we should find ourselves entirely without the resources upon which we depended 698 so vitally in the last War. We do not oppose the Channel tunnel to-day because we fear the danger of any difference with our French neighbours; it is because we want to be able to keep in touch with them, and because we know that the traditional method of sea-borne commerce and sea-borne communications is the only safe way.
THE EARL OF ERNEMy Lords, in 1930 the Government issued a White Paper on this subject. In it there is a very full statement which I need not go into in detail, but the conclusion of it was, briefly, that having regard to the element of doubt indicated in the Report as to the feasibility of construction (a pilot tunnel having to be driven through first), the weakness of the economic case, the great cost (which would be £30,000,000), the long period which the capital expenditure would take to fructify, and the small amount of employment provided in comparison with the expenditure, there was no justification for a reversal of the policy pursued by successive Governments for nearly fifty years in regard to the tunnel. The policy of the Government to-day is exactly the same as it was in 1930.
The noble Lord, Lord Kilmaine, thought that in peace time the Channel tunnel would be a great benefit in improving communications between England and France. It is generally admitted that the tunnel would largely increase the number of passengers crossing the Channel, but doubts have been expressed as to whether this would prove an economic advantage to this country. The number of British passengers going abroad for purposes of pleasure would be increased, but this would be an economic loss to this country, and it would require a substantial alteration in the proportion of foreign and British passengers, of which there is no evidence, to ensure any appreciable benefit to this country.
The noble Lord went on to say that the development of air power makes it more important than ever that there should be communication between England and the Continent immune from air attack. On that point the noble Lord, Lord Moyne, rather bore out what I am about to say, that it cannot be overlooked that the entrance to the tunnel would be specially liable 699 to attack from the air, that additional air forces and anti-aircraft defences would be required in connection with the tunnel, and that the cost of such an addition must be added to the estimate of defence requirements. In the event of an international crisis, the existence of a tunnel would almost inevitably lead to a public demand for measures whether of naval, military, or air defence, which would tend to concentrate an undue proportion of our defensive resources in the region of the tunnel, to the detriment of the general defence of the country. The Government are not aware of any overwhelming advantages which the tunnel would have in peace time to outweigh the disadvantages which have been indicated. Therefore the view of the Government is that nothing has occurred since the issue of the White Paper in June, 1930, to cause them to reconsider the attitude then adopted.