THE ITALO-ABYSSINIAN DISPUTE.

HL Deb 24 October 1935 vol 98 cc1193-252

Debate again resumed (according to Order) on the Motion of Lord Marley, That an humble Address be presented to His Majesty for Papers with reference to the Italo-Abyssinian dispute.

VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD

My Lords, I think you will all agree with me that the debate that we have so far had on this subject has been one of the most interesting debates that have ever taken place in this House. The speeches have been remarkable in many ways, but particularly for the great variety of points of view that they have presented. I think I may say that almost everything that could possibly be relevant to the subject has been discussed, except, perhaps, the Motion on the Paper, which I do not think anybody has in fact said anything about; and yet I am myself a warm supporter of the Motion on the Paper. I think it is very important that Papers with reference to the Italo-Abyssinian dispute should be presented as soon as possible. I know that it is very difficult to do anything under the existing conditions. At the same time I feel very strongly that not only Parliament but the whole country is entitled to the fullest possible information on this subject.

I am one of those who regret the days when it was customary for Governments to present a Blue-book on this kind of topic, in winch the whole of the correspondence on the subject was set out, so that any one who wanted to know really what had happened, and what was said and done, could find out in one volume. I confess that I prefer that a good deal to the rather skimpy White Papers which are DOW the fashion. Whatever is done, I hope the Government will seriously consider this proposal to present Papers, and will do whatever they can in the matter. It is all the more important because, as we have been informed, a General Election is impending, and un doubtedly this question will be one of the questions to be very much discussed in the Election.

Perhaps your Lordships will allow me to interpose a very short expression of regret that it has been found necessary to have that Election at this time. I read with great interest the Prime Minister's explanation, which was no doubt very cogent, and yet I cannot help feeling, somehow or other, that the suddenness with which it was resolved upon, the abruptness with which the dates were fixed, and so on, have produced an unfortunate impression in the country. I regret it all the more because I cannot help feeling at this moment, in spite of the Prime Minister's view that we have reached a lull—which I confess seems a sanguine view of the position—that it is of vital importance that the whole Cabinet, and particularly those Ministers specially concerned with foreign affairs, should be able to devote their whole time, attention, and energy to this question. It would be a grave pity if, for instance, it became necessary to withdraw some of our representatives from Geneva, in order to enable them to make electioneering speeches, or still more if it became necessary to postpone any action at Geneva because it was incompatible with the engagements of Ministers at home.

For these reasons I do regret it, but broadly speaking, and apart from that matter, I am one of those who are decidedly, and indeed with great conviction, supporters of the present policy of the Government in this matter. I, of course, do not pretend to say that there is nothing which might not be fairly criticised in what they have done, but I think that since the present Foreign Minister and the present Prime Minister took office, it is true to say that on the whole, and broadly speaking, and allowing for the enormous difficulties, which were partly inseparable from the task committed to them, and partly perhaps the result of previous action that had been taken, they have done well and have deserved well of their country.

I do not want to add any bitterness to the discussion, but I must say that I was a little surprised to read the Foreign Secretary's statement that in his view no change whatever had taken place in the policy of this country since the beginning of the year, in this matter. I do not want to go into recriminations about the past, though I share very much the views of my noble friend Lord Rennell—though he was so very kind and courteous to the present Government. I shall have a word to say about that later on. But, broadly speaking, I cannot doubt that there has been a great change and, after all, if there has not been a great change how can anyone account for the reception, not only in this country but all over the world, of Sir Samuel Hoare's celebrated speech in the Assembly at Geneva? It was greeted everywhere as a new departure, as a new statement, as showing that Britain was again taking her rightful place in the leadership of the world. If there was no change it seems to me very difficult to account for that enthusiasm. It is all very well to explain with the utmost Cabinet loyalty that everything was perfectly right before. Yet I think this is a case in which we may fairly say that the world at large forms its judgment without appeal, as the well-known Latin tag has it.

That, however, is by the way, because the present policy of the Government, whatever may be said about the past, is to support the League of Nations. It has been repeated in the strongest language by the present Prime Minister with a variety of metaphors by him and his colleagues—the"sheet anchor," the "corner-stone" and what not of the foreign policy of the Government is the League, and that is their convinced and resolute determination. I was delighted to read in the report of the debate in another place a very strong re-affirmation of that view, by the Prime Minister to some extent but even more strikingly and vigorously by the Minister for League of Nations Affairs, who used language which was exceedingly comforting and consoling to myself. Your Lordships, I am sure, will not suspect me of desiring to give you a lecture on the League of Nations, even if I were capable of doing so. That would be an extraordinary impertinence on my part, and I hope I should not be guilty of it. But I do want to remind your Lordships, when you say your policy is based on the League, of what, broadly speaking, is the scheme of the League.

It has really two broad principles: first, international co-operation should be posited in every possible way, and, secondly, there should be certain machinery for the prevention of war. No doubt the two are the same in one sense. The whole object of the institution of the League was the preservation of peace. There is no doubt about that. Everyone knows it. The framers of the scheme undoubtedly proceeded on those two broad lines—international co-operation and the prevention of war. And they did it rightly, because it is perfectly certain that you can have no effective and fruitful international co-operation unless you can find some means to get rid of the scourge of war and the constant weight of the fear of it on all international relations. When you come to the machinery for the prevention of war I think it may be described in very few words. There are provisions for the peaceful settlement of every dispute, either by direct negotiation between the parties—that of course must be left to the parties—or by some form of arbitration, or by some judicial settlement by the Court at The Hague, or else by discussion and mediation by the Council of the League of Nations.

Those are the conceptions of what you ought to do to try to get a peaceful settlement of the dispute, and any dispute that is "likely to lead to a rupture," to employ the actual words used—likely, that is, to produce war—is to be submitted to one or other of those methods of peaceful settlement. It is only after everything of that kind has been tried that any possibility of war is recognised or admitted by the Covenant as legitimate. Of course it was based, as all my noble friends know, on what happened in 1914. There had then been a dispute between what was Serbia and Austria-Hungary, and our Foreign Minister, Sir Edward Grey, had done his very utmost to induce the parties to bring their dispute before some kind of conference—I do not think there was any question of referring it to arbitration—to bring it to some kind of international conference, a prototype of the Council of the League of Nations, and to get that discussed so that they should not be rushed into war while passions were still hot. And not only shall that be done—so the Covenant provides—but until it has been discussed and the Council has reached some decision, and three months have elapsed, nobody is to move in the direction of resorting to war. All those provisions have been most carefully made.

I was really amazed to hear the noble Lord, Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, speak of the unveiled hostility of the British delegation to Italy. I have sometimes felt it my duty to make criticisms of His Majesty's Government, but I think I never said anything; so utterly baseless as that. It really was the most outrageous thing to say. If any possible criticism may be directed against my noble friends it would not be that that I should say. I should say that if they had done anything amiss they had shown too great a patience, too great a desire to meet the Italian view. And, after all, quite apart from the actual proposals that were put forward more than once, not by my noble friends but by the various bodies at Geneva, there was from the very outset pressure from Abyssinia to have the whole dispute referred to arbitration or to the Council of the League and a pledge by Abyssinia that, whatever the arbitrator said, whatever the Council said, they would accept it. In face of that, which is on record, who can say that there was any unfairness to Italy? Not only was that rejected, but the Italian Government indignantly denied that any one had the slightest right to interfere or to intervene in the dispute between them and Abyssinia. My noble friend Lord Hardinge went on to say that there had been no attempt to meet the Italian case.

LORD HARDINGE OF PENSHURST

No attempt at conciliation.

VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD

No attempt at conciliation—even worse. I should have thought there was really no kind of justification for such a charge as that. For my part I have no criticism to make on the great patience and energy which the Government and others threw into the effort to present plan after plan and proposal after proposal to the Italian Government until war broke out. I am afraid that they were quite unsuccessful, and that it is indeed conceivable they did harm rather than good. But I do not criticise the Government on that ground, because I think they were bound to do everything they could until war broke out. Whether it is desirable to go on with that course now seems to me extremely doubtful.

I think it is time now for the Italian Government to say quite definitely what are the minimum terms on which they would abstain from their enterprise. When we know that, it will no doubt be proper for the League to consider that and see what, if anything, can be done. But until that is done I am afraid that the kind of hysterical appeals which are made, not by this Government but by certain other Governments, to the Italian Government, produce only the impression that we are very anxious for peace, very anxious. to get out of this disagreeable affair—I forget the phrase the Prime Minister used yesterday—and that there is no necessity for the Italians at present to be the least alarmed or the least uneasy as to what will happen. They are therefore the least inclined to come to any kind of reasonable settlement in the matter. I may be wrong. The Government are in charge of the negotiations, and they have means of knowledge which I have not. I merely venture to ask them to consider, as no doubt they have considered, that aspect of the case. That is as far as the mediation side of the procedure of the League is concerned.

Now as to direct prevention. It is common to talk of sanctions, and I am afraid the word has become so embedded in this kind of discussion that it is impossible to get rid of it; but I regret it, because sanctions, to the English mind, imply something in the nature of punishment. That is really not the conception of the Covenant of the League of Nations if you read it carefully. It is not punishment at all. My noble friend Lord Cavan, in the very charming and delightful speech which he made on Tuesday, said he rose in mitigation of judgment or punishment of Italy. If he will forgive my saying so, I really do not think that is at issue at all. The whole question is prevention, and I very much wish that, instead of talking of sanctions, we talked of preventive action. The whole point is prevention. As far as Article 16 is concerned, that is the only thing it aims at—prevention of the continuance of war. There is no provision, no suggestion, of any punishment of the aggressor as far as Article 16 is concerned. Article 10 is another matter. Once a war ceases, the obligation to exert sanctions under the Article ceases also. It is to prevent the recourse to war. That is the whole purpose of Article 16, and there is not, therefore, any question of punishment at all.

The first object of the League is to prevent the outbreak of war. No doubt that is a very important, perhaps the most important, function of the League. I am quite ready to concede that at some time or another, not now, but in the future, it will be well to examine whether the machinery for preventing an outbreak could not be made a little clearer than it is at present. Undoubtedly, that is the first business of the League—to prevent an outbreak. As soon as it became clear, as it did become clear, I think, a year ago—at any rate, on the information which Lord Rennell was good enough to give to the House, and which no doubt was not special private information of his own, but was common knowledge to any of those who cared to enquire—that there were obvious preparations for some big military movement in Eritrea as early as September of last year, from that moment it became the duty of the League, as soon as the attention of the Council was called to it, to take every possible measure to prevent an outbreak of war.

I quite admit the extreme difficulties of acting at that stage, but I must say, as I am bound to make some criticism, that I think it doubtful whether, to put it mildly, everything was done that could have been done to prevent an outbreak of war in the earlier months of this dispute. Personally, I have heard as yet no explanation of why Abyssinia was discouraged from proceeding with her desire to bring the matter formally before the League as early as last January, on the plea that she had better settle what was then the Walwal incident by negotiation under another treaty. When she again returned to the charge, I believe in March, she was again, I understand, persuaded not to press her desire. I think that was a mistake. I think it was perfectly plain there were important influences in Italy which desired a military expedition at that time. I do not think that is really open to doubt, and though that may not have been so plain at that time as it appears to me to be now, yet there was enough, I think, to justify the gravest doubts as to what were the real intentions of that Government. That being so, and indeed on every ground, I believe an inquiry before the Council of the League might have produced very important results. I confess I regret that that inquiry was not carried out.

But we have passed long beyond that and now we have got to, a stage that the war has actually broken out, and unquestionably the duty of the League is now to prevent its continuance, to stop the war. That is unquestionable; and this is where my noble friend Lord Ponsonby criticised the whole conception of the Covenant of the League most strongly. He will correct me if. I misstate him, but I think I am right in saying he thought the whole duty of the League to try and stop the war was entirely misconceived, at any rate as far as Article 16 is concerned. It is, of course, as I have tried to say to your Lordships, part of the duty of the League to promote settlement by agreement or mediation, and I think everything that could be done in that direction was done. But we have seen that, in point of fact, where one party is determined on, war, mediation and conciliation are not enough. We saw it in the case of Japan and China most clearly. Everything there was done that could conceivably be thought of to try and get a peaceful settlement and it wholly failed.

Therefore, the question is whether you are not to go further, or whether, having done all that, you are to sit quiet and say: "Well, Abyssinia is going to be overrun by Italy; we cannot do anything more." He justified, if I understood him rightly, his view of what ought to be done upon the assumption that when the Covenant was formed the idea was that there would be overwhelming strength on its side. I agree with him that the conception of overwhelming strength does underlie it. I do not think you will find it expressed, but it does underlie the idea of Article 16. I think this is the real test of any proposed action: is it such action as will have so many chances of success that an ordinary reasonable man may properly undertake it? That is not a question of unanimity. You will not find anything of that kind in Article 16. Article 16 says that upon the recourse to war in breach of the Covenant it becomes the duty of each Member of the League to take all the action it can—there are examples stated—to stop the war. But I think it is true to say that it only imposes an obligation to do that when action of that kind has a reasonable chance of success.

You could not, for instance, insist on Luxemburg by herself advancing to the restraint of Russia, to take a very extreme and absurd instance. It means something winch is practical and reasonable, and I think you must certainly, in construing diplomatic documents, have that always in consideration, but as long as you get sufficient strength on your side, whether it be economic or of any other kind, to do it, you are bound to do it. You are bound to do it individually, and it is not true to say you are bound to wait until every single country is on your side. That is not the conception of Article 16. You must have overwhelming strength, but not necessarily unanimity. I think anyone who reads the Article will agree with me there. It is in my judgment a "several" obligation, if I may put it in technical language, to carry out joint action, but the action must be general, and it must be effective. For that reason I most heartily approve of the Government's anxiety in this matter to move with France, because, at any rate as far as naval matters are concerned, if it comes to military sanctions, and indeed as far as economic matters are concerned, the association of France with any action for stopping the war seems to be practically essential.

Therefore I quite agree with every step the Government have taken to induce France to take her full share of the obligations which rest upon her, as they do upon other Members of the League, in restraining and in preventing the continuance of this war. I think that is right. As a mere matter of worldly wisdom, I doubt whether the Government are right in perpetually saying that under no circumstances would they take isolated action. It is quite true they could not do so, but it is not a matter that, personally, I should think it was practically useful to the temperament of a Dictator to be perpetually asserting. But our duty—and that is what I want very much to press on the House—is to do everything we can to stop the war. That is our duty, and we have got to discharge it unless we are not only going to be false to our signature of the Treaty in which the Covenant is contained but also to abandon all effort to organise peace. That is the contention which I mainly desire to press upon your Lordships. How that is to be done and what particular step ought to be taken is a matter which must be left to the responsibility of the Government of the day. We may suggest, but it is for the Government to decide, and it is for them to decide what is; essential to stop the war and to take whatever steps they think will be effective for that purpose. I do venture to press that very strongly upon the Government.

My noble friend Lord Ponsonby—he will forgive me for devoting so much of my attention to what he said, but it is really a compliment to him to do so, such a compliment as I am able to pay him—said that in making this kind of proposal in the Covenant, those who drafted it were dreaming. I think he used that expression. I do not know if he actually called them dreamers, but that was the substance of what he said. They may have been. I do not speak, naturally, of myself (I am accustomed to being called a dreamer) but who were the people who framed the Covenant? They were the President of the United States and his most trusted adviser, the ex-Prime Minister of France, the actual Prime Minister of Italy, the Foreign Minister and, I think, Prime Minister of Belgium, and a number of other people of that calibre. I must not leave out my own colleague General Smuts. They considered it very deeply and very carefully. They went through the Covenant half a dozen times at least. In the end, they decided that this was the best plan. They had many plans before them, but they decided this was the best, partly on suggestions of President Wilson, but I think we may say more on suggestions of the Committee of the British delegation, and partly on suggestions made by other members of the Committee. They may have been dreamers; they may have been impregnated with a violent excitement of victory. I do not think they were. I think they were most passionately anxious to prevent a renewal of war, and I believe that passionate anxiety was the thing that informed and penetrated the whole of their debates.

What after all is my noble friend's alternative? He is not one of the people who think that this or that bit of the League of Nations can be recast. His proposal, if I understood him rightly, is quite different. He aims at settling international differences, producing a condition of international content, abolishing all international discontent. I wonder whether he has considered in detail—I am not going to do so—all the questions which would have to be settled, and what possible settlement could be imagined or devised which is going to give complete satisfaction to the parties to these very difficult disputes. I will not mention more than one. But take an obvious one, the settlement of the Polish Corridor. Whatever conceivable settlement you could suggest is one which will have very strong objections raised to it by one country or another. And so it is with many of the other questions. I must say, if he will allow me to do so, that for somebody who despises dreamers that seems to me a somewhat nebulous conception of the possibility of universal peace. I go further and say that if you proceeded in that kind of way, which after all is only the old diplomacy dressed up—because, after all, the purpose of the old diplomacy was to settle outstanding difficulties between the countries—you will go the course that you went before the war. You will have violent differences of opinion. Some of them will be settled no doubt, some will not be settled. They will remain, creating bitterness and leading to preparations for war, armaments, alliances, the whole apparatus that we saw before 1914. I cannot doubt that if you go back to that system, a system which has prevailed for many centuries, it will and must result, as it has constantly resulted, in terrible and desolating wars from time to time.

My noble friend was good enough to quote some phrase of mine in which I stated, or he thinks I stated, that any war must be a war everywhere—a war anywhere must be a war everywhere. He did not say exactly where it was used. He seemed to think I was contemplating the scheme under the Covenant. He is entirely mistaken. I was contemplating the scheme apart from the Covenant, my view being that the very thing which made the last war a world war, the very same influences and causes, would make any future war a world war. And I may remind him that my observation was not by any means original; it is one which was made, I think, in a particularly vigorous form by a, friend of his, the Russian Ambassador. But it is certainly my conception that the only real way of safety is not by attempts to find out every difficulty and difference between countries and to settle them (which I am satisfied will never be a possibility) but to try to induce the nations to say: "Of course there are difficulties and of course there are differences of opinion, but the one thing we must not do is to try to settle them by force of arms." That is the line on which advance has been made in every other circumstance, as I think.

I speak with the greatest deference in the presence of the Lord Chancellor, but I think he will agree with me that very early in the English law it was established that you had no right to redress your own grievances by force of arms, even if you were entirely in the right and the other person was entirely in the wrong. That is the principle which should be established. It is the principle which has been established in a number of cases, and has gradually extended the area of peace over great portions of the world's surface, and in my judgment that is the way in which we must proceed. I am afraid I must say one more word about my noble friend, and that is about his policeman.

LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE

I killed him yesterday.

VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD

Yes, that is the one. Really I think that of all the instances that could be given that was not quite a fair analogy of what is proposed. The police act for two purposes. One is in order to secure a criminal and have him punished. But they exist also to prevent crime, and it is only in the second aspect that you can in any way compare action under the Covenant to police action: it is to prevent crime, not to punish crime. Therefore to say that the League is to be compared to a policeman going after a burglar who has stolen a spoon is to say that which is not the case.

LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE

I have longed to interrupt the noble Viscount several times, but this time I must. Does he not think that the imposition of sanctions is punishing the Italian people?

VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD

Certainly not. That is just the point. It may in fact inflict hardship on them.

LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE

Is that not punishment?

VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD

No. Punishment is to inflict a penalty for a crime. This is to use such force as will prevent the commission of a crime. That is the whole distinction.

LORD MARLEY

The crime is being committed.

VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD

Let me give an illustration. A hundred and fifty years ago this City was in the hands of the George Gordon mob, a mob inspired by a half-lunatic religious enthusiast, and consisting in fact of every kind of person who saw an opportunity of loot and violence. For three days this City was in the hands of that mob. They burned and destroyed, they killed and injured anybody that they chose. There was no police, and for a time, as everybody knows, nothing was done. The magistrates lost their heads. Then the King, as a matter of fact taking the law into his own hands in the proper sense, said: "This is a thing which must be stopped." He called out the troops, and in a very short time the whole of the riot was put an end to and the burning ceased. I do not, remember the details but no doubt there must have been a certain amount of injury inflicted, probably on persons who were quite innocent, because you cannot avoid that when you are acting in that kind of way; but I think that without doubt and without question everybody in subsequent ages has applauded the action of the King and has said that that indeed is the thing that you must do in order to preserve order against a serious invasion of it such as took place then. That is the principle of the Covenant, and not the principle of the burglar being pursued by a policeman. It is the policeman using force in such strength as to make it impossible to have war.

I am afraid I have detained your Lordships too long, but I have nearly finished. To my mind the question which I have been very imperfectly trying to expose to your Lordships is the real question which is raised in this dispute. It is not any question of rights or wrongs as between Italy and Abyssinia. It is not only the question of our honourable obligation in pursuance of our signature of the Treaty. That is a very important consideration no doubt, but that is not the only thing and in my humble judgment it is not the most important thing. The important thing is whether or not we can succeed in devising some means or another of organising peace on such terms that a breach of the peace will become, as I hope, impossible, at any rate extremely difficult and unlikely.

I read with the greatest pleasure the speech of the Minister for League of Nations Affairs delivered yesterday. He said, and I am sure he said it with absolute truth, that if the League fails, while he would not say that at some time or another we should not be able to establish a fresh organisation of peace, that might be so—indeed I should personally go further than that and say that it must be so—yet for a generation we should feel the effects of it if the League failed now. If the League fails now you will have no protection until your new scheme, if it ever eventuates, has come to light. You will be thrown back on the system which existed before 1914. There is nothing else open to you. My noble friend's proposals, if he will allow me to say so—and I hope I have not been in anyway disrespectful to him—are really quite insufficient to give any hope or any possibility of permanent or even continued peace. We should be thrown back on the frightful perils of modern war. I am not going to enlarge upon them now. We all know them; we have had them discussed—the air perils and all the rest of them.

Here is this plan for organising peace and preventing war. It may be imperfect; indeed it is certainly imperfect and of course it must be imperfect, but I believe it is practicable. I believe, with Mr. Eden, that it can succeed. At any rate it has been accepted and endorsed by seven different British Governments since the War; it has been accepted and endorsed by more than fifty other States. There is no other plan which has been suggested which seems to me to have even a distant chance of success. I hope and trust that the Government in this matter will show no weakening. I was rejoiced to read the strong language which Mr. Eden used yesterday, that there was no change in the Government's policy, that there was no idea of abandoning their sanctions or anything of that kind. Whatever becomes necessary and whatever is essential to make this scheme of peace a success, I hope the Government will have the courage and the energy to pursue it, and I am quite satisfied that if they do they will receive the enthusiastic support of the people of this country.

EARL PEEL

My Lords, like my noble friend Viscount Cecil, I have derived much comfort from some of the statements made by His Majesty's Ministers, and in fact I am almost inclined to regret that through the exigencies of Parliament some of those statements were not made at an earlier stage, because they have certainly dispelled many illusions and many stories that have been propagated during the last few months. Having carefully studied the statements made both in this House and in the other, I think the Government have most successfully rebutted any charge that they have shown any lack of early observation of the tendencies in Italy or that they have not been careful in warning that country of the state of opinion in this country as to their action in Abyssinia. It is rather more difficult to make out from those statements whether or not the collective action of the League has been quite as active as the action of the British Government itself.

There is one point to which I should like to refer which I do not think was mentioned by either of my noble friends on the Government Bench when discussing the action we had taken during the last, year. There was a reference in the speech of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to some proposals made by Italy or some arrangement made between the French and Italian Governments in January of this year. Those proposals of an economic character I understand were communicated to the British Government and they were asked to exchange views with the Government of Italy on that point. As far as I understand from the observations of the Secretary of State no reply was given. Other circumstances occurred and this friendly suggestion from Italy apparently did not receive any answer. The Secretary of State said, I think, that no answer was asked for, but I would like to know from the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack, if he speaks, how it was that these arrangements never bore fruit because at that time they were obviously of a very friendly character.

I listened with very great interest to my noble friend Viscount Cecil's criticisms of Lord Ponsonby. The observations I intend to make this evening will be very brief because I am in agreement with a great deal that has been said in this House, and I am bound to say that in contrast to the noble Viscount I find myself, with a good deal of surprise, in agreement with many of the observations made by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby. I have often noticed that when public men relinquish official posts they generally make better speeches than they made before. In examining the position I think it is simplified by the fact that after what has happened there can be very little dispute, or perhaps no dispute, about the fact that under the Covenant of the League of Nations Italy is the transgressor and has been so pronounced by fifty nations. But then we are only at the beginning of our difficulties, because we have the difficult task of considering the practical action to be taken. Our aims are, no doubt, to bring the war to an end, to avoid war, and to maintain the authority of the League as an instrument of peace. But some unofficial critics have put this duty on a very high plane. They have said that you merely have to see that a breach of Article 16 has been committed and your duty is then quite plain under that Article.

I certainly agree with those who say that as regards the sanctity of an obligation it does not matter whether it has been entered into with five Powers or ten Powers, or fifty Powers. It is equally binding. But the action which should be taken as a result of breach of an agreement surely does differ very much according to whether the League of Nations is composed of all the. Powers of the world or only of a certain number of them. Perhaps that is rather too obvious to be discussed. It is quite plain that if you have, say, seventy Powers, and thirty-five of them are in favour of economic sanctions and thirty-five Against, it would be useless to put those economic sanctions into force because it would merely mean a transfer of trade from one set of nationals to another. Therefore I think you get the position that there is no absolute obligation, no question of honour which leas to be implicitly followed, but there is a fair weighing up of ways and means. I think this was felt by the League itself when it proceeded to take action, because under Article 16 on the outbreak of war, when an 'act of war has been committed, all States Members of the League have at once to sever all trade or financial relations with the aggressor. There is no question of wait- ing. I may have misunderstood my noble friend Viscount Cecil but I understood him to say that Article 16 really applied to action for the prevention of the outbreak of war.

VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD

No, said something different.

EARL PEEL

I thought that was what the noble Viscount said. The 'absolute nature of the obligation would be very difficult, to follow, and I think this was felt by the League itself because it did not immediately sever all relations with Italy, but met to consider what sanctions should be applied and in what manner and when they should be applied.

VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD

If I may be allowed to interrupt I would like to call attention to the decision of the Second Assembly—my noble friend is no doubt familiar with it—in which it was pointed out that the obligation under Article 16 was agreed by everybody, but that it might be applied in various ways according to the circumstances of the case.

EARL PEEL

If I may say so, that is exactly the point I was making. I was dealing with the absolute obligation and the fact that that obligation must differ according to the circumstances of the case, and that methods by which that particular obligation is to be enforced must differ. The point I desire to make is that expediency comes in and that it is not a question of absolute bondage to a particular authority. Further, in considering this question attention has been very naturally concentrated upon Italy's relations with Abyssinia, and there is a danger, therefore, that we may take rather too narrow a view of the particular position between Italy and Abyssinia. Italy, of course, is a very great country which has played manifold parts, which has many relations with other Powers, and we cannot forget that after the Versailles Conference Italy cherished a feeling of grievance that she had not received what she considered her fair share in the development of countries outside Europe. These things, I submit, cannot be excluded from our judgment when we are dealing with the problem of Abyssinia. And again, you have this other case: that France has no doubt found great difficulty, so far as an out- sider can judge, in maintaining the impartiality of a judge in view of her relations with Italy and also her attitude to Germany. I certainly am not surprised that there may have been some dubiety and some hesitation displayed by her in her action.

Moreover, Italy as one of the units of the European society is a great contributor to that society. It would be a very great misfortune if she were driven by too insistent action into ruin, desperation or bankruptcy. The marvel is again, to those looking at it from an outside point of view, that with her slender resources and her not very strong financial position she should have embarked on so large and so costly an adventure. Surely great care ought to be taken that Italy is not driven out of the League and added to the number of those Powers that stand outside. Another consideration is that Italy is not a prisoner who pleads guilty. All the reports coming from Italy to which one has access are that she is more and more concentrated behind her Leader; that her young men are aflame with enthusiasm, and that, so far from flinching under the ban of some fifty Powers, she claims to defend herself against an aggressor. This may be said, of course, and has been said, to be the mere arrogance of violaters of treaties, but it is a fact that must be reckoned with and that shows how complex and difficult the general situation is.

I come, then, to the question of what are called, of course, the economic and military sanctions. I do not think I can quite follow the argument of my noble friend when he said that these sanctions could not be treated as punishment. They may not be treated by some people as a punishment, but in effect they are the severest penalties that can be inflicted on a country. If you are going, say, to stop the external trade of this country, I cannot imagine any more terrible penalty being imposed upon the whole life of the country; and if you draw distinctions between deterrents, penalties and punishments, there is not very much distinction in the minds of those who suffer from them. Sanctions, economic and military, imply the imposition of force, and are, anyhow, quite opposed to the conception of the League. I know my friend says, and of course rightly, that it is part of the general conception of the League: that is to say, as arbitrator, as peacemaker. I did not quite gather from the speech of the noble Viscount exactly to what length he was urging the Government to go. He was, I thought, a little general in his statements.

To those who are urging further development of sanctions I am inclined to ask: "Are you going to the extent of war?" That question, it seems to me, ought to be asked frankly and fairly from those who say that the Government, or the Government and the League together, should press Italy further and further. That is an issue, a very plain issue it seems to me, that has to be faced. Now you may say that the League is already putting into force, and going to put into force, these economic sanctions. Can you draw a real distinction between economic sanctions and military sanctions? Strictly speaking, I suppose you cannot. Their character is that of the application of force. Both of them, I think, are contrary to the conception of the League as an instrument of negotiation, of suasion and of peacemaking—though I admit, of course, that they are contained in Article 16. I do not make any suggestion that this Covenant was drawn up by dreamers, but I do say that it was drawn up by men—of the highest eminence, no doubt—who contemplated a situation quite different from that which obtains to-day. The noble Viscount says he disagrees with that. I should like to know later what his reason is for saying so.

The League is not to trade with Italy; it is to declare a general boycott of all Italian trade. One of the tests which the noble Viscount set was whether action would be effective. I have no doubt that, before deciding on putting on these sanctions, the League has considered—as it must consider—whether, in spite of the action of those countries which say they are not going to follow the advice of the League but are going to trade with Italy, more especially those countries which are contiguous with and adjacent to Italy, the trade boycott will be effective or whether it will not. I was myself a little anxious lest this cutting-off of trade with Italy would involve something in the nature of a blockade, which certainly has a very close resemblance to an act of war, and I was much relieved to hear from the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that the Government did not contemplate a blockade and therefore that there is some other method—I am not quite sure what it is—of enforcing this boycott. But that declaration that there is no blockade and that a blockade is not to be considered was, at least to me, highly satisfactory.

During the last few days some statements have been made by the Government which, again, I think are very reassuring. One was made by the Prime Minister himself, in which he said that we shall act collectively, not one inch before and not one inch behind. The army is to march, therefore, on an even front. There was also that very remarkable statement, which must affect people's judgments—anyhow on the expediency of sanctions—and which was quoted by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs but which has not yet, I think, been quoted in this House. It is, nevertheless, of the greatest importance. Against economic sanctions said Signor Mussolini— we shall set our discipline, our frugality and spirit of sacrifice. To military sanctions we shall reply with military sanctions. To acts of war we shall reply with acts of war. That has been most plainly said, and I do not see, after reading that statement, that anybody can doubt that acts of war—

THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (THE MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY)

That was quoted in this House.

EARL PEEL

Well, I will quote it again, if I may. I am sorry to repeat a quotation, but I think that those points together are of the very greatest importance. I am much obliged to my noble friend for correcting that, I think, venial error. Further than that, we were informed that there have been no discussions with France or suggestions of military sanctions—no suggestions. I venture to hope, and I say so most respectfully to the Government, that if we have not raised them in the past we shall not raise them in the future, because, of course, military sanctions definitely mean, not military sanctions, but war. Now may I say very shortly indeed the reasons why I, at any rate, am strongly against these so-called military sanctions? I think they would be too great a strain upon the League, and we cannot expect the League after twelve or fourteen years to have gained that firmness and strength and general position in the world which one hopes it may achieve as the years go on. The economic sanction has laid a great strain upon Members of the League. It is quite clear that many of them will riot act upon this economic sanction. Many of them are availing themselves of Clause 16, and are asking for compensation, I understand, if they support the League. I would suggest that those who do not support the League, and who gain trade in consequence, should be the contributors towards those others who are the sufferers.

The next point—and the great men who organised the League no doubt considered this most fully—is that the League itself is not in any way organised for war or the carrying on of war. You can hardly imagine any body less capable of carrying on a war. That must necessarily arise from the arrangements of the League. I am not one of those who deprecate the action of the League so far. I think that considering the organisation and methods of carrying on business, they have acted so far with very remarkable rapidity, but the ground on which I do most strongly deprecate this military action is this: Everything in the world may be said to be settled either by persuasion or by force. I do regard the League of Nations as standing strongly for persuasion and conciliation, and I do not think you can mix those two things, persuasion and force, together. I believe that when the League is found to be organising for or promoting war it steps outside its proper functions, because whatever war it may be—you may call it a righteous war or a war to end war, or a war to coerce the transgressor—it is still war in all the character of war, and it stamps upon its authors and creators a character which is wholly different from the character of conciliation and peacefulness. I think the noble Viscount will agree with me that we as a country took that position ten years ago, when we rejected the Protocol of Geneva.

VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD

Nothing to do with it.

EARL PEEL

We rejected it on that ground, that it would emphasize the. coercive character of the League to the detriment of its conciliatory character. I only wish to say two things in conclusion. One is that I congratulate the Government upon being so much cooler in their observations than some of their supporters. The Government, no doubt, have been accused of taking too vigorous action at Geneva, and it has seemed to many of us that other Powers were really sheltering themselves under British skirts and allowing this country, perhaps, to suffer the odium of conducting the case against Italy. I am glad that this view has been dissipated by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who told us that, although it was not known publicly, other Powers had been taking equally vigorous action. I regret that this was not fully known at an earlier stage.

Then, again, I think the situation has been made far more difficult by some of those who have indulged in furious fulminations against Italy. Those fulminations have not assisted His Majesty's Government in the task which they have had to face in dealing with this situation, because we have to deal not only in a collective capacity but also in a judicial capacity with these quarrels, and I think our observations and criticisms ought to have a judicial rather than a combative cast. It is a great mistake to imitate Judge Jefferys, who is said to have abused the prisoners he was trying, and I have never heard that this made the prisoners think they were having a fair trial. It would be far easier to persuade Italy of our disinterestedness if we could be more moderate in our language against her. Nor do I think that the Italian case has been sufficiently put before the people of this country. We know the case of Abyssinia, but I do not think we have heard in the newspapers sufficiently of the case of Italy against Abyssinia.

I do not think myself that even though war was not prevented we must necessarily form the judgment that the League has failed. The League will have done all that it can do, and it will have used its utmost efforts within the scope and range of its duties. I believe myself that those powerful States now outside the League are far more likely to be attracted to it if the League does not depart from its character of persuasion, and does not have recourse to force. It must be some time at least before the League can establish throughout the world a character not only for disinterestedness but for conciliation, which I believe in the end will be far better for the peace of the world than an attempt to enforce military sanctions.

I should have said—there are those who are far more familiar with the situation than I am—that there is so much combustible material lying about Europe that it would be extremely dangerous to start a war. I have not much faith in the power of the League to stop war once it has been started, and a general conflagration in Europe would bring to an end entirely the Italian difficulties, but the League would be hopelessly broken in the process. We must make every effort to see that Italy is not driven like a pariah outside the comity of nations. I think one must believe that this ban of so many nations on the action of Italy must itself in time have a great effect upon the character of the Italian action, and even if not Italy must realise that if they have broken the Covenant in this way and defied the action of the fifty Powers composing the League, they can hardly effect final or satisfactory recognition of any arrangements they might have to make in Abyssinia. Hard and difficult as this road is it seems to me better than the use of military sanctions and the certainty of a general war.

There were two things said by the Secretary of State to which I will refer. One of them I do not entirely understand, and that was about the question of giving Italy greater access to raw materials. I do not know whether the Lord Chancellor would find himself able to give any explanation of that point, because as far as access to raw materials is concerned everybody is at liberty to buy, and the only trouble during the last two or three years has been that raw materials have been so cheap that they have hardly paid those who produced them. Prices are no doubt rising now, but one would like to have a little clearer conception, if the Government see their way to give it, of that scheme of the Foreign Secretary. The other observation of the Foreign Secretary to which I allude is this. He said In the meanwhile not a day or week shall pass without the Members of the League showing their readiness to find an honourable settlement to this unhappy controversy. May I say that to that proposal of the Foreign Secretary I most fully and most heartily subscribe.

EARL HOWE

My Lords, I intervene in this debate with the very greatest possible diffidence in view of the distinguished position of those who have preceded me, and I do so without any special knowledge whatever. I have no access to any information except that which is available to all of us in the public Press of this and other countries. Those of your Lordships who have great knowledge of these matters should merely consider me as an ordinary member of the British public, imbued, like yourselves, with very deep anxiety with regard to the state of affairs in the world to-day. We have heard this afternoon, perhaps more so than during the two preceding days of this debate, reference to military sanctions. Military sanctions, to me at any rate, simply mean one thing—war. My, mind absolutely recoils in horror from the mere thought and suggestion that there can be war between Great Britain and a country like Italy—a country in regard to which we were told by the gallant Field-Marshal (Lord Cavan) the other day such wonderful things about her Army. It is simply unthinkable to me that there can be any question of war between Italy and this country.

Like many of your Lordships I have been fortunate in the last few years in having repeatedly visited Italy, going through the length and breadth of that country and coming in contact with all sorts of people, even Ministers of the Italian Government. I have also been able to go about to many of the countries of Europe, and all this year I have been increasingly anxious with regard to the sort of conversation one hears and the general trend of comment in foreign countries about our own country. Our own attitude does not seem to be in the least understood by a good many people abroad. I would like to say at this juncture that I do not rise to make any unfriendly criticism of the action of our Government. I am perfectly certain that they have done their level best and probably the only thing that could be done at the time, and under the very difficult and absolutely unprecedented circumstances that prevailed. But, at the same time, one could not visit any country of the Continent this year without hearing questions of the sort that I am going to indicate.

The first one is: Was it true that this country did not inform Signor Mussolini in January what its attitude would be to a breach of the Covenant of the League? That situation has been very largely cleared up, I hope, by this debate and the debates in another place. At the same time, I do net know that it has even yet been absolutely stated, quite clearly and succinctly, by His Majesty's Government that they did inform Signor Mussolini that, if matters went as they have gone since, the British Government would make this a test of the Covenant of the League of Nations—because I think I am right in saying that that is really the situation that we have arrived at to-day. In fact, so far as I understood what the noble Marquess told us the other afternoon, it -was more or less clear that this is regarded by the Government as a test of the Covenant, by which it stands or falls. We were told the other afternoon that the British Government did make it quite clear on several occasions to Signor Mussolini that British public opinion and the Government would view such action as was contemplated, or was possible, with the gravest anxiety and alarm, but I do not know whether it was stated that it would be treated as a test case under the Covenant. That may have been implied: I do not know.

Another question asked all round the Continent to-day, to which it would be helpful if a clear answer could be given is: Why does Britain make a test case of this Abyssinian controversy, and why did she not also take similar and very strong action in the case of Manchukuo and in the case of the Chaco dispute, and possibly in the case of Corfu? I do not say that those cases were entirely analogous. I had the opportunity of listening to Mr. Anthony Eden in another place yesterday, and it was quite clear from what he said that the case of Manchukuo is not on all fours with this case of Italy and Abyssinia. But if a perfectly clear answer could be given to this point I believe it would do good in making our position better understood abroad. Another question asked abroad which T have heard from many people is this: Why could not Britain be more sympathetic in her attitude to Italy? I know that Italy has transgressed. She has been declared to be the aggressor and has transgressed against the Covenant. But we have been told by Government spokesmen that Italy is not on her trial or anything of that sort, and if it is at all possible even in days to come for the Government to take a sympathetic attitude if advances of a peaceful character are made, I only hope and pray that they will be responded to. Only to-day we have seen in the newspapers an announcement that Italian troops are being recalled from the frontier of Libya and Egypt. If that is a gesture of peace, I hope and pray with all my heart that it will be responded to.

Another thing that is said on the Continent is that Britain is always to the fore in proposing sanctions and extreme action at Geneva in the case of Italy. I think that is probably a very unfair comment. I am perfectly certain that what action we take there is right and proper. At the same time the opinion is held that we have been foremost in it. Only yesterday I listened with care and attention to the great speech made by Mr. Anthony Eden in another place, and he certainly distinctly said that we have been foremost in such action as had been taken at Geneva—in fact, it was our duty to do so because of our position in the world. But in this matter, surely, the Government view is that we all have responsibilities? There must be no unilateral action. All nations must bear their share of the burden. That is, I think, what most people will understand from the great speech of our Prime Minister, and, if that is true, then the responsibility was equally upon France as upon ourselves to take such action as has been taken. That leads me to the League of Nations.

At the present moment, as has been mentioned by everyone who has spoken in this debate, three of the greatest nations stand outside. So long as we had a real League of Nations, then I cannot help feeling we should be quite safe and the world would be quite safe if action, however drastic, was taken by the League of Nations; but if you only have an incomplete body such as we have now, with three of the most important Powers standing outside, it does seem to me you have got a position which is going to be intolerably difficult—in fact, I do not see that we have a real League of Nations at all. A policy of sanctions has been embarked on. Sanctions, to me, seem to be merely a sort of international policy of pinpricks. It seems to me impossible for sanctions to be effective—unless you have a blockade, and it is impossible to have a blockade without a war. Do we want to goad Italy into a position like that? This was referred to by the noble Earl, Lord Peel, who preceded me.

At the beginning of this unhappy dispute between Italy and Abyssinia, I know from my own personal knowledge of many people in Italy, there was a considerable division of opinion, as was indeed only to be anticipated, amongst Italians themselves with regard to the merits of the case and the action proposed. That opinion may not have been articulate. We would not expect it to be in view of the organisation of the government in that country, but at the same time it was there. I am told now on the very best authority, and I know it to be true from my own personal observation, that Italy to-day stands absolutely united behind her Leader, and that whatever action was decided upon by the Italian Government, and by Signor Mussolini, would be followed unswervingly by the entire nation. I do not like to feel that Italy may possibly be goaded by a policy of sanctions. I cannot see how these sanctions are going to be effective. You have got most important nations standing outside and, short of a blockade, I cannot see how they are going to come into play. There is one other point about sanctions. Italy is one of the few countries with which at the present moment this country has a favourable balance of trade. It seems to me that the boycott of Italian trade, so far as this country is concerned, is going to be a much more serious thing, and will mean a loss of markets which it may be impossible to get back. Also, it seems to me, that for all time it may be we shall earn the undying enmity of a very great people.

Another point is this. Only a few days ago, it was announced that the Government had decided to enforce conditions of neutrality as far as Italian shipping is concerned. When the learned Lord Chancellor comes to reply to this debate I personally should be deeply grateful if it were possible for him to say just a word with regard to the policy of neutrality which is going to be enforced. I understand it to mean that Italian shipping may only stay in our ports for 24 hours, that Italian ships can only take a small amount of fuel on board, and so on. If you enforce a policy of neutrality with regard to Italian shipping, is there not a danger of a corollary to that? If you enforce neutrality in the way I have mentioned, is there not a danger that Italy may say: "All right, we also will enforce a policy of neutrality. We will insist on the right of visit and search." After all, the League of Nations have decided in favour of the import of arms to Abyssinia. Arms and poison gas, and heaven knows what, are probably now at this very moment on the way to Abyssinia. Would it be unreasonable of Italy to say: "All right, we must insist on the right of visit and search of these ships, and if we find them carrying arms, we shall claim the right to stop them"? It does seem to me there is a possibility of great difficulty and international complications arising.

I do not want to take up the time of your Lordships or trespass on it too long, but there are two other things I want to say before I sit down. First of all we listened to a remarkable speech from the noble Viscount, Lord Cecil, this afternoon. I was hoping that the noble Viscount would tell us exactly how far he really does want the Government to go in the application of sanctions. I understand that the noble Viscount is going to address a great meeting at the Albert Hall shortly. We have had utterances from many other people about sanctions. I believe that the most reverend Primate, the Archbishop of Canterbury, also made a public statement with regard to sanctions a short time ago. I hope that everybody who talks about sanctions will tell us directly whether they are in favour of this country, if necessary, going to war, broadening the area of war, bringing the war out of Africa into Europe if need be, in order to stop the war in Abyssinia. I feel that the country is entitled to a quite clear declaration on this particular point. It is of the first importance. The noble Lord, Lord Snell, began his notable speech as Leader of the Opposition in your Lordships' House, by telling us that he thought the attitude of the Socialist Party on this point was quite plain. Perhaps it is quite plain to a humble individual like myself. We are shortly going into an Election, and we shall hear a greet deal about the attitude of the Socialist Party as far as sanctions are concerned. They kicked out Mr. Lansbury, their Leader, because he refused to agree to a policy of sanctions.

LORD STRABOLGI

That is not a fair statement. He was not kicked out; he resigned.

EARL HOWE

I accept that. He resigned. Very good. We have also had it from the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, that he also resigned because he could not bring himself to agree to a policy of military sanctions with regard to Italy. Therefore I think we can conclude that the majority of his Party are in favour of military sanctions, and also, if need be, in favour of war between this country and Italy in order to enforce sanctions. That is a most important point. Finally, I would like just to say this. It seems to me we are in some danger of getting into a position very similar to that which Signor Mussolini has occupied all these months—namely, that we may only be able to go on by having a war, or retire with discredit. That seems to have been Signor Mussolini's dilemma all this year. In view of the Italian preparations and the great force he had sent abroad, I personally did not see how it was possible for Italy to stay her hand. At the same time, I hope and pray that, whatever happens, His Majesty's Government will realise that the people of this country are passionately devoted to peace. We all beg and pray His Majesty's Government not to land us in any position, not to adopt any course of action or policy which may have the result of making it necessary to employ military sanctions against that country. I am quite certain that is a course of action that this country would never forgive.

THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY

My Lords, I have spoken so much on this grave matter that I had not intended to take part in this debate, but in view of certain criticisms which have been either made or implied, either here or elsewhere, I have been compelled to reconsider my intention and to inflict a few observations upon the matter on your Lordships. Moreover, it might be thought that on a question of such grave anxiety it was natural that some voice should speak from that part of the House which I have the honour to represent. A word about this criticism. It has been implied that, with others with whom I have acted, I have been animated by some hostility to Italy. I know well that certain words which I have used have been quoted and commented upon in home, and I am anxious to dispel that entire misrepresentation. So far as my own feelings about Italy are concerned, they were most fully and eloquently described by the noble Lord, Lord Snell, on whose position as Leader of the Opposition I would take leave to congratulate him. Certainly I have always cherished just those feelings about Italy which he so eloquently expressed. Moreover, I do not think I have ever spoken on this matter without acknowledging, with the Secretary of State, that it is necessary, would have been necessary in any case, to pay regard to Italy's need of expansion and even to the grievances which Italy urged against Abyssinia.

I think there has been a great deal of justice in the complaints that have been made that Abyssinia has been very slow, it might even be said culpably slow, in fulfilling the obligations on the strength of which she was admitted to the League of Nations. I must admit that some of these remarks that have been made about Abyssinia seem to me to show less than generosity to the Emperor for all the efforts he has made, in spite of tremendous difficulties, to bring a more civilised order into his country, and I think it is only fair to remember that, after all, only a hundred years have passed since this country, after centuries of civilised rule, still retained the status of slavery in its Dominions. I must add that, inasmuch as Abyssinia, from the first referred any possible dispute with Italy to the League in accordance with its own pledges in this matter, the Emperor showed himself riot less capable of civilised conduct than his opponent. But our contention is that, admit as much as you like all the difficulties created possibly by the treatment of Italy by Abyssinia, admitting to the full these and those submitted to the League, it was not for Italy to take it into its own hand to judge its own cause and at once to mass a great military force against the country about which it felt these grievances.

Article 12 of the League made it obligatory on Italy to refer the matter to the League and to refrain for at least three months from embarking upon any act of war. It is true that I have said, and have no reason to regret having said, that we viewed the action of Italy in launching a great military machine against the Abyssinians with indignation, but that word is not a whit more strong than the words that were used by the noble Lord, Lord Hardinge himself, in his very reasoned plea for consideration to Italy. These were his words: I regard her aggressive attack on Abyssinia as a most unjustifiable proceeding and one that cannot be sufficiently condemned. I have never said more than that, and I leave it there. If there be in this present time chances of some suggestions from Italy as to a possible basis of conciliation certainly they should be treated with every desire to be fair and considerate, and welcomed, provided that they be not such terms as, if they were granted, would even seem to justify Italy's act of aggression. In other words it is impossible to emphasise too much the fact that the dispute is not in any sense one between this country and Italy but one between Italy and the League of Nations.

Then I come to the criticism that with others I have expressed militant views. The noble Lord, Lord Hardinge, I think, spoke of the militant views of some of the most eminent and right reverend members of the Episcopate.

LORD HARDENGE OF PENSHURST

I was not referring to your Grace.

THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY

I wondered whether the noble Lord included me in those complimentary terms, but at any rate there was no doubt as to the eloquence of my noble friend Lord Ponsonby and its application to the unfortunate person who is now addressing you. I am sorry that neither I nor, I think, any of my brethren were present when Lord Ponsonby made his indictment. We were engaged in duties elsewhere. Let me only say about it that I have never pressed for military sanctions. I should abhor the necessity of any war sanctions, as they are called, as cordially as any noble Lord who has spoken, but the question of military sanctions to my mind has not yet arisen. I do not see how it can arise. The basis of the action of the Government, as I understand it, throughout has been that we shall only be responsible for collective action, and in this matter we have every reason to know that collective action will not be secured for anything that could be called military sanctions. Of course everything depends upon the possible act of the aggressor Power who may choose to regard some episode in this economic pressure as a casus belli, or who might perhaps be obliged not to repudiate some act on the part of some of his forces which might be regarded by others as a casus belli But I think that is extremely unlikely. In any event, even if it became necessary in any sort of way to apply military force, it would only be clone in conjunction with those who have shared with us the burden of collective action and, therefore, there is no question of the possibility of any such thing as the noble Earl, Lord Howe, contemplated of a war between this country and Italy.

No, my Lords, I have only argued on this matter on the ground of principle, that in principle there is a great distinction between war as an instrument of policy and the use of physical force in order to uphold the rule of law within or among States against the rule of force. I know that my noble friend Lord Ponsonby professed his intention to nail once for all to the counter the false coin (I think his words were) that there must be force behind the arm of the law. I am not going into that matter. I should have liked, if it had not been for what was said by my noble friend Viscount Cecil, to have dealt a little with Lord Ponsonby's policeman, because I think it could have been shown that the analogy is very misleading. The point is not that we desire in any sort of way to apply punishment to Italy or to any Power that has broken the Covenant, but that we desire to protect that community of law, that observance of a common rule of law on which ultimately any community, whether within the State or among States, must depend. I have never been able to be persuaded that any Christian principle involves the refusal to restrain the law breaker either within the State or among States, for that would mean the dissolution of that common order and security which I believe to be divinely ordained to be the basis of our common social life.

Of course—and I have always said so—force is no final remedy for anything. The ultimate causes of war, if you analyse them, are spiritual: fear, jealousy, ambition—movements of the spirit of that kind, and they can ultimately only be counteracted by stronger spiritual force. The ultimate security lies in the minds, convictions, consciences of individual citizens in every part of the world. Lord Ponsonby seemed, at any rate, to echo the familiar taunt that in these matters Christianity has failed, to which the only reply to be given is the familiar one that it is not Christianity but the Christians who have failed: and Christians have failed because they have riot put their loyalty to a supernational Kingdom above the loyalty which they felt they must in all circumstances render to their own country. They have not restrained the natural instincts, ambitions and excitements of their own countries by remembrance of that higher allegiance to a higher Kingdom to which they are pledged. I have no wish—this is not the time nor the occasion—to enlarge upon such a theme, but simply to prove my own sincerity I may remark here that I am now engaged in endeavouring to approach all the Christian communions in Europe with a view to making an appeal to their own members to place that loyalty foremost in their minds, actions and disposition.

But, my Lords, to return to the point, for the present I think it is certain that things being as they are and as they can be contemplated as in all probability likely to be, it is not only needless but it is even mischievous to talk about war. So far from being militant our whole contention is that it is the cause of world peace that is involved in upholding and supporting the Covenant of the League. But though I would repudiate, and passionately repudiate, any clamour for war, I must equally deprecate any clamour for mere peace. I do not want at this stage to embark upon any kind of academic discussion, but. I think that this is a question which does ultimately depend upon principle, and I think it is of the greatest importance to insist in point of principle that peace in itself, as I have so often said, is not an ideal. Peace is merely a state which results from the achievement of ideals. Foremost amongst those ideals must be justice, the honour of observing treaty obligations, and some common rule of law. If these things do not exist you cannot have peace, whatever you may choose to call it. Such a peace based upon acquiesence in the violation of justice or of the rule of law is an illusory peace, and the pursuit of mere peace for its own sake defeats its own end, for the peace obtained by such acquiesence is certainly one which could never stand and which would be quite inconsistent with the basis upon which any settled peace can be built.

Can it be doubted that if the League in this matter had merely said: "Because the action of Italy in defiance of the League is an awkward event, because it may bring with it difficult consequences, we are simply to let the aggressor go free," that would certainly have meant that the League would have proved its impotence to fulfil the functions for which it was created, and that it was impotent to defend the only thing resembling a community of nations which we have yet been able to establish? I make my own the words used in another place by the Secretary of State, that Europe would then be faced with a period of almost unrelieved danger and gloom. The only alternative would be those rival alliances with which we were painfully familiar before the War and which have proved to be not a safeguard but a menace to peace. Moreover, the path of any future aggressor would have been made much easier and any future threat of the disturbance of peace would have become a much more imminent danger than it would otherwise have been. On the other hand, if the League in any real measure succeeds in applying the restraints which it has devised and thereby shortening this wretched war, then I think certainly a great step will have been taken in showing that collective security can be a reality in Europe.

Complaints have been made, I know—but I am no judge of these things—about the slowness of the procedure of the League. To me these recent happenings have brought much more promise than disappointment. I think it is most remarkable that on the first occasion when those who have been responsible for signing the Covenant of the League have been compelled to consider the consequences of upholding it they have not shrunk. We may or may not think that they might have done more: others think that they ought to have done less; but at any rate they have not shirked their responsibilities, and they have shown that it is possible even for a League admittedly imperfect, as the noble Earl, Lord Howe, has pointed out, to act in such a way as must certainly give any future Power of military ambitions good cause to pause before it proceeds further. And if the League as it now is is able to do that, how much more effective would the action be of any League on a larger and fuller scale that may hereafter be created.

With this—and this is all that I desire to say now—there will come, I think, two other most welcome consequences. In the first place, it will be possible for the League in a better atmosphere to fulfil another of its functions, not only to prevent war but to remove or at least to mitigate the causes of unrest which are the most fruitful causes of war. Two of these have been mentioned. I have mentioned them repeatedly and I notice that the Secretary of State has specifically referred to them throughout. The one is the need of some more equal distribution of the natural resources of the earth; the second is the removal of those barriers which are preventing the natural movement of trade among the nations. If the League, buttressed by any measure of success at this time of supreme testing, can address itself to some international action to remove these potent causes of unrest, it will have done much to increase the basis of peace.

In the second place, I cannot refrain from adding, it will then be possible for the League to resume that endeavour to secure a general reduction of armaments throughout the world to which it is pledged by Article 8 as really as under any other part of the Covenant. And it will be able to do so with a far better prospect of success than it has had hitherto, because if at the present testing time the League achieves any measure of success, there will be behind the proposal a sense of confidence in collective security such as has hitherto not been possible. Certainly, we cannot acquiesce in the possibility of the competitive race of armaments beginning again. If it once begins, where will the end of it be? Imagination staggers at the answer to that question. These, my Lords, are some of the reasons why I am impelled to give my cordial support to the action which the League of Nations now taking and to the action of the Government in cooperating with it, and I have every reason to know that in speaking thus I have behind me a great multitude of the Christian citizens of this country.

LORD STRABOLGI

My Lords, I desire to offer a few concluding observations on behalf of the Party which sits on these Benches. The most reverend Primate, if he will allow me to say so, caused great rejoicing in my heart when, in his concluding observations, he drew attention to an omission from every speech from the other side of the House—I know the most reverend Primate's position is only geographical in this House—an omission which I have noticed in other speeches. We have had references by the noble Viscount, Lord Cecil, and others to the speech by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at Geneva, which created such a stir and interest throughout the whole world, but the broadcast speech of the Secretary of State to the United States was equally remarkable. One of the most remarkable passages in that speech was the one stressed by the most reverend Primate in his concluding sentences, in which the Secretary of State drew attention to the need of removing trade barriers, of removing obstacles to intercourse and exchange of goods between nations. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was able to make that observation to the American public, but although I have read with great attention his speeches to the. British public I have seen no mention of it in those speeches.

Mention has been made in this debate of certain differences in the Labour Party on the great question which we are discussing. I hope an noble Earl, Lord Howe, did not mind my interrupting his very interesting speech when he spoke about the position of my right honourable friend Mr. Lansbury. Mr. Lansbury was not kicked out of the Labour Party. He resigned and was begged to reconsider his resignation as leader. Of course he remains a member of the Party. I believe I am speaking for all my colleagues when I say that we should welcome nothing more than that he should lead us again. I speak also for my colleagues on these Benches when I say that exactly the same observation' applies to my noble friend Lord Ponsonby. At Brighton, where the Labour Party's debate also lasted for three days, the voting was twenty to one in favour of the official policy of the Party, and it is to that policy that I desire to address myself. If there have been certain dissensions in our Party, I submit that this debate in your Lordships' House has revealed far more clearly than the debate in another place, for reasons which I will come to in a moment, the profound differences that divide the Conservative Party.

The speeches of the noble Earl and other noble Lords, such as Lord Hardinge—who, if he does not speak for the Conservative Party, speaks for the governing classes who dominate the Conservative Party—differed profoundly from the speeches delivered by the noble Marquess who leads your Lordships' House and members of the Cabinet in another place. Even the speech of the noble Earl, Lord Peel, who always speaks with moderation, showed the same implied criticism of the policy of His Majesty's Government up to about a week ago. I will come to the question of how far that policy has changed before conclude my few remarks. The fact of the matter is that real Conservatives in this country, in your Lordships' House and elsewhere, are pro-Fascist. They believe in the Fascist system. They are opposed to democracy, and they are therefore pro-Italian. Those who move about the country as I do find it everywhere. The most reverend Primate speaks, of course, as he says, for great numbers of Christian citizens. The speeches which really represent the Conservative view were those delivered by the noble Earl, Lord Howe, who spoke earlier, and by the noble Lord, Lord Hardinge. These differences are far more fundamental than any temporary differences there may be in the Labour Party on these matters. Why have we heard these differences expressed in your Lordships' House, and not in another place? We heard the beginning of it in the revolt led by Mr. Amery. The reason is that we are very close to a General Election. That Election was referred to by the noble Earl, Lord Stanhope—I thought quite gratuitously—in his otherwise very interesting speech.

There is another matter also which has not been referred to in this debate. We really have, of course, much to answer for in this unfortunate dispute. If I may venture on legal phraseology in the presence of the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack, who will conclude this debate, I would say that we have been accessories before the fact. In December, 1925, a secret agreement—or an agreement supposed to be secret—was entered into, at a time when of course we had the same Prime Minister as today and the same senior officials in the Foreign Office, between His Majesty's Government and the Government of the King of Italy. In effect the economic interests of the west of Abyssinia were granted to Italy as a virtual monopoly. It was proposed that our interests in Lake Tana be safeguarded. That agreement was supposed to be kept secret and privy, but the French got wind of it and became alarmed and insisted on its being discussed. The Notes were sent to the Negus and he immediately-appealed to the League of Nations. I do not know what afterwards happened, but I believe the matter dropped. The Italians have referred to that agreement, and of course they have been justified in referring to it. Be it noted, my Lords, that this was two years or eighteen months after the admission of Abyssinia as a Member of the League of Nations. That is far worse, I think, than the Treaty of 1906 and has far less excuse and far less justification.

My noble friend who leads the Opposition, in his speech on Tuesday, spoke for all of us in saying that we have no hostility against the Italian people. He also spoke for all of us in saying that we have no desire to interfere with the domestic affairs of Italy. That is perfectly true. But, my Lords, we have a right to complain of, to object to, and, in its consequences, to resist the foreign policy of the Fascist States of Europe. We have a right as a people, if we are sincere—certainly the Labour Party have the right and the duty—to resist the deliberate glorification of war, the teaching of this hateful new pagan religion of extreme nationalism, lifting the State above all human rights, the instilling into the minds of the young the belief in violence and force as a mean of attaining national ends. This hateful doctrine is being practised and preached in the Fascist countries of Europe, and the Fascist foreign policy must be admittedly a danger to the peace of the world.

In this debate the domestic policy of the Ethiopian Government has been dragged in. As the noble Viscount, Lord Cecil, has reminded your Lordships' House this afternoon, the nature of the government in Ethiopia is quite irrelevant to the issue. We are not asked to support Ethiopia and her Emperor in this matter. As noble Lords have pointed out who have spoken for the Government from the other side, we are on the side of the League of Nations or we are against the League of Nations. It is not a question of hostility to Italy or to Abyssinia; we are against the policy which has led to the present horrible situation in East Africa, to which I referred a moment ago. But that does not mean to say that, because we do not like the Government in Italy, for that reason we wish to overthrow Fascism. For many years I have had to resist—and I used to resist in this matter the noble Earl, Lord Howe, from the other side of the other Chamber—the proposal to intervene in Russia because of hatred for the form of government in Russia. If I am to be logical in this matter—and my Party is logical—we do not ask the League to intervene between two Members in a dispute because of the form of government of either of them. We are, however, bound to resist the foreign policy which Italy has adopted and will continue to resist it if it is continued in the future. That is one of the reasons why, as a Party, we are supporting collective action by the League and not one Member of it against another. In other words, we are pro-League and not pro-Abyssinia.

The noble Earl who spoke yesterday for the Government, Lord Stanhope, made, if he will allow me to say so, an extraordinarily valuable addition to our information when he dealt with the criticism that was also made by the noble Earl who spoke to-day from the other side of the House, Earl Howe: the suggestion he made that we did not warn the Italian Government earlier of the consequences of their present act. I have not seen this statement in any other speeches, and I therefore thank the noble Earl particularly for this piece of information which he gave to your Lordships. At the very important meeting at Stresa in April, according to the noble Earl, the Abyssinian question was discussed, but it was discussed by officials and not by Ministers. That was the information very kindly given to your Lordships by the noble Earl speaking for the Foreign Office. Who was present at that meeting at Stresa as representing His Majesty's Government? Mr. MacDonald, then Prime Minister, and the Home Secretary, Sir John Simon, then Foreign Minister. We now have the admission, which we have long understood was the case from unofficial sources, from the noble Earl himself. At this meeting, a splendid opportunity of really bringing the matter into the open and discussing it frankly and freely with the head of the Italian Government, it was not mentioned at all; only the Foreign Office officials discussed it. In fact, generally, reading with great care the statements on this matter, I think there is some justification for the complaint made on the Continent, and, as suggested to your Lordships by the noble Earl, Lord Howe: that we did not make it clear enough and plain enough either to the Italian Government or, still more important, perhaps, the Italian public, what would be the consequences of their act and that we intended to stand by the Covenant of the League. The kind of representations that were made, no doubt with great skill and diplomatic force, by our Ambassador in Rome and others, could not have been of the nature that they should have been, or we should not have these complaints made from Italy at the present time.

As have referred to the noble Earl, Lord Stanhope, may I make one very brief comment on his gratuitous remarks about the coming Election? He prophesied the defeat of the Party for which I speak. Might I venture on one word of advice to an older and more experienced man than myself? If I may, it is this: it is better to boast when you are taking your armour off than when you are putting it on. Let us return to this matter when he and I—who will certainly come back—reassemble next month!

THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (EARL STANHOPE)

I was only thinking that the noble Lord's Leader seemed so very unwilling to go into the struggle at all and put any armour on for the contest.

Loan STRABOLGI

My noble friend who leads the Opposition is a man of peace, but on the platform he is very pugnacious, as his opponents will find and as they have found in the past. In a fight there is no better man to be with, as I know from past struggles in the other Chamber.

Now the Italian Government has also made another complaint, and to show my impartiality I want to say that I have some sympathy with that complaint. The Italian Government have complained that they are being treated differently in this case from Japan in the Sino-Japanese dispute. That has been answered in a fashion by Mr. Eden, in another place, and I heard his remarks last night. Frankly, I was astonished at the excuse put forward. Apparently we are treating this matter differently because, in the dispute between China and Japan, the Chinese did not withdraw their Ambassador from Tokyo and because there was no formal declaration of war, and therefore the cases are different. I submit, my Lords, that the truth is this: that we and other Powers concerned—not the French; the French were admirable on that occasion, as everyone who knows the inner history of what went on is aware—who should have been forward in the defence of justice, failed in our duty on that occasion. At the time it was deplored in your Lordships' House; it was deplored in another place by members of my Party; and we see the consequences. The Italians now cite that case; it was a direct encouragement in the present dispute. If we fail again now, this will be a further encouragement to aggressors. We had a responsibility in that case as a Member of the League of Nations. Hitherto, as far as I know, we have maintained our responsibility in the present case, and I hope we shall continue to do so.

One further comment on a remark made by the noble Earl, Lord Stanhope, which was also referred to by the noble Viscount, Lord Cecil, and by other noble Lords who have addressed your Lordships. Why is it necessary to say that in this case the wrongdoer is not to be penalised? Why is it necessary to say that? The exact words of the noble Earl which I put down at the time, were "There is no desire to penalise Italy as a wrongdoer." Why not? The noble Viscount, who speaks with such unequalled authority on this matter and on all questions of the interpretation of the Covenant, as everyone recognises, says the object of the League is not punitive.

VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD

I was dealing exclusively with Article 16 at that moment. There are other Articles which might have to be considered from a different point of view, but of Article 16 I think it is right to say it is not punitive.

LORD STRABOLGI

I am much obliged to the noble Viscount, but the noble Earl did not qualify his remarks. He made a blunt declaration that there was no desire to penalise Italy. I agree with the most reverend Primate that if we can get a quick settlement we should be prepared to forgive a great deal and to make concessions ourselves; but I do hope that, however much there may be no wish to punish the wrongdoer, we are not going to be invited to support a settlement by means of bribing the criminal. If we are going to begin to pay bribes, to pay Danegeld to Powers who think they have a grievance, where will it end? These are wrongdoers. They are transgressors against the Law of Nations. Whatever view one may have about the punishment of wrongdoers these are wrongdoers, and if a wrongdoer succeeds in his crime and is immune from penalty that naturally is an encouragement to other wrongdoers. We had that situation until recently in the, United States of America. There the law in certain States was weak and wrongdoers were able to continue their careers without fear of punishment. They were able to influence the Judges, and the people of the United States, the decent citizens, were faced with anarchy. One of the great tasks which have been at any rate partially accomplished by President Roosevelt has been the restoration of law in the United States.

Now, may I also put this consideration to your Lordships? While the most reverend Primate was addressing your Lordships there came over the news agency tape machine certain suggested terms of settlement which I gather came from Rome. One was that the Italians should police the whole of Abyssinia. On the first day of this debate we had a very remarkable speech by the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, in which he paid a great tribute to the military prowess of the Abyssinians as soldiers. He said that there were one million of these fierce warriors. I am sorry he is not now in his place, because I should have liked to say to him that I could well imagine that one million of these fierce warriors, armed with modern weapons and led by himself, would probably conquer half Africa. This is really a terrible menace. Imagine a million of these savage and fierce warriors, with all the instruments for mass massacre, enrolled under the Fascist banner. The noble Viscount referred to the declaration of the Foreign Minister with regard to the access of all nations to raw materials. With the control of raw materials may go control of the human raw material—the cannon fodder. General Smuts has referred to this danger in a recent speech, and I hope I may make this suggestion. I hope that when a final settlement comes about a serious attempt will be made by the Government to have the peoples of Africa demilitarised, and thus avoid the terrible menace arising from having these fierce and savage coloured armies brought under the influence of European officers, and so being a menace to their neighbours and even to European countries.

However, this debate as it has continued must have been reassuring to Lord Mottistone and to others who have been apprehensive that their Italian friends would suffer, because I fear that the Government have once more changed their policy. Viscount Cecil welcomes their change of policy. I also welcomed it at Brighton. At that time we believed that with the change of Prime Minister and Foreign Secrtary there was also a change of heart. There may have been at the time, but something has happened since then, and I am afraid there has been another change. I do not think that those who fear that we are about to do something drastic towards Italy need be too alarmed, judging from what has come under my observation here and in another place. There is one very interesting fact at the present time of which I would take leave to remind your Lordships, and that is that, unless I am completely misreading Article 16, we are already breaking the Covenant. These sanctions are not to come into force until October 31, if then, but under Article 16, which I have been re-reading, and to which Lord Peel also referred, we are compelled, if we keep our word—we States Members of the League—immediately to break off all commercial and financial relations with the aggressor.

I remember the discussions in the Assembly referred to by the noble Viscount. It was my first visit to Geneva. I remember that occasion, but these words were not altered, and the words are extremely plain. It says that Members of the League "hereby undertake immediately"—not on October 31—"to subject it"—that is, the aggressor— to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the Covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the Covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not. That we are not doing. We are told that under no circumstances shall there be military sanctions. Never! Perish the thought! Then we are left with the economic sanctions. We accept that. Let us make a success of the economic sanctions.

How are we going to make them a success? I notice that the exports of Italy are to be boycotted, except bullion. That is not under Article 16. Italian imports are allowed except on certain key points. That is not within Article 16. Might I ask a technical question of the noble and learned Lord Chancellor? When and if it is proposed to apply these economic sanctions how is it going to be done? Will it be by Order in Council, or under the Emergency Powers Acts, or by Acts of Parliament? I ask that because if it is to be done by Acts of Parliament then, as far as this country is concerned, nothing can happen until the middle of December—till after the Election which so interests the noble Earl opposite. If it is to be by Order in Council, or other method, might I ask the noble and learned Viscount what is to be done about penalties for evasion? I think this is important, because obviously there will be a great deal of money made, at the beginning at any rate, out of a bootleg trade—smuggling and illicit trade—and obviously there must be serious penalties. This is the first time that this method has been tried. It is novel, it is admittedly complicated and difficult, and everything should be done to make it successful. Nothing effective was done under the Covenant in the case of the Sino-Japanese dispute. There all the, States Members of the League, could have acted very promptly and resolutely. The very worst policy is to attempt economic sanctions and then allow them to be ineffective and a failure. That will do terrible harm to the League.

That brings me to a question which I do not wish to shirk at all—military sanctions. I suggest that there has been already a very grave departure from the policy hitherto pursued by successive Governments in this country, in our declaration that, whatever the rest of the League proposes to do, under no circumstances in this dispute will we resort to anything that may be described as a military sanction. I suggest that that is a precedent. It may be justified. There may be very good reasons for that declaration, but it is a departure from previous practice. Now this is the difficulty in which those who think with me and my Party find ourselves. We have been prepared to support that degree of defensive force for this country which was necessary for a system of collective security; not for so-called national defence, not for splendid armed isolation, but to play our part as Members of a League of Nations which would be prepared to restrain an aggressor. That has been the accepted position of my Party for many years. Indeed, it is almost the position, as I read it, of the Prime Minister in his defence of his so-called rearmament programme in another place last night. We require arms as part of a system of collective security. But, if I interpret aright the policy of His Majesty's Government now, the collective system of security through military aid is finished—it is at an end. All that is left is the economic and financial sanctions, moral sanctions, the boycott. It is a very serious matter that we shall have to consider with the very greatest care.

Before leaving this question of armaments I must refer to a most remarkable statement made by the Minister for League of Nations Affairs in another place last night—a most mischievous statement which I thought marred an otherwise brilliant speech. Mr. Eden said that we had disarmed to the edge of risk, and that this fact encouraged the present dispute. That is a most mischievous statement to make and, I venture to say, quite untrue. We had a debate on the famous, or infamous, White Paper earlier this year. Then the most reverend Primate made a great plea for filling up our deficiencies in view of what he understood was the weak and inefficient state of our forces, and I ventured to suggest that the most reverend Primate had been misinformed as to the facts. That of course is the case. There has been a continuous and false and mischievous propaganda representing our defensive forces as in a weak and rotten condition. Noble Lords in this House have played their part, I regret to say, in this agitation, and it is that which has done us harm in the present case; it is that which may have encouraged Italian ambition, the belief that one of the great pillars of the League was virtually disarmed, according to the spokesmen of the Big Navy party. But to pretend that our arms are so weak and that that has been an encouragement to Italy is, I venture to say, completely false.

The strategic position in the Mediterranean, as anyone can see for himself—and I am very glad to see the noble and gallant Earl, Lord Beatty, in his place—is immensely strong at the present time as compared to the reactions of the aggressor Power who might, as has been suggested, hit back. I am not talking now about the defence of the seven seas, I am talking about defence of the Middle Sea, and there is no naval officer to whom I have talked who will admit that our naval forces are in the weak and rotten condition in which they are represented to be in certain circles. And, if they were, somebody ought to be court-martialled and hung, because we have since the Armistice spent immense sums on armaments. The most reverend Primate—he will forgive my referring to him again because of the tremendous weight and influence attached to his words—has been misled. What could he not do with the money, if he spent it on housing, that we have voted in Parliament for armaments since the end of the Great War? Nearly £2,000,000,000—actually £1,900,000,000—has been spent on armaments since the end of the War. We have re-fitted ships like the "Royal Sovereign" at a cost of £1,000,000. Upon a battleship which originally cost £4,000,000 we spent £1,000,000 in modernising and re-fitting her. It is really libellous, and entirely misleading in any case, to pretend that the British Navy is rotten and inefficient, as Lord Lloyd and other noble Lords have done from time to time in your Lordships' House. It is that which may have caused some of the mischief.

And now to talk about rearmament is really a misnomer. We have during all these years—and in spite of what the Lord Chancellor has said about our having to pay our soldiers and sailors more—spent more on our armed forces than any other State in the world with one exception, the United States of America; and if we are not getting value for our money, well, somebody ought to answer for it. I have reason to know from naval sources that in countries bordering on the Mediterranean this continual belittling of the Royal Navy has done us harm, and it ought to be stopped.

I said just now that I was afraid that the noble Viscount, Lord Cecil, would presently have to register another change in Government policy. I am afraid we shall find that that is the case. The retreat has begun. Things were going, I thought, extraordinarily well. I believe that the achievements of Geneva were really remarkable under all the circumstances. The mobilising of world opinion was wonderful. I found it in travelling on the Continent of Europe, just as the noble Earl, Lord Howe, did. When we were in that Conference at Brighton, to which reference has been made—a Conference of which I shall always be proud—we hoped that at long last the National Government had undergone a change of heart, but on the road to Damascus they have seen a fierce white light. For too many years now Europe has been rattling back along the road of reaction, class warfare and militarism. Democracy is assailed in all countries, and successfully assailed in half the countries of Europe. We hoped as the result of this unfortunate dispute that the common will of the peoples of the world would be successfully asserted through the League of Nations, and that at long last the liberty-loving peoples, the common peoples, would be given some encouragement. We hoped, also, that the instigators of hatred and cruelty would be checked and humiliated.

I make no apology or concealment. We hoped that the Fascist system, in foreign affairs particularly, as I say—the glorification of wars and those who hope to profit by militarism and wars—would suffer as a result of League action. To that end we were prepared to sink our differences and to play our part as Englishmen in what we thought was a great and worthy adventure. I hope that when the noble and learned Viscount, the Lord Chancellor, comes to reply he will assure us that our hopes were justified. In other words, are we really at the beginning of a brighter chapter in the history of this troubled Continent of Europe, a period of peaceful co-operation between peoples, of disarmament, as the most reverend Primate said, both physical and mental, of helping each other? Are we entering on a period when the really wonderful scientific achievements of our age can be made use of for the betterment of humanity? It may be the beginning of a golden age for Europe. On the other hand, have the forces of reaction prevailed, and have the National Government in particular really begun their retreat? Is the League of Nations still to be further weakened, an armaments race to be initiated and the scramble for markets and for raw materials to be continued, with the inevitable result of another and still more terrible war, destroying all our achievements in the things that matter, and ushering in a new Dark Age of barbarism, cruelty, and oppression? I suggest, my Lords, that is the choice.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, after the somewhat discursive speech to which we have been listening for the last three-quarters of an hour, I do not propose to occupy your Lordships' time for longer than is absolutely necessary. The noble Lord who has just sat down began his observations by seeking to find differences in the Conservative Party. I prefer, in my concluding observations, to try and point out to your Lordships the large measure of agreement upon fundamental questions which I think this debate has shown. In the first place it is remarkable that throughout this debate there has been no person on any one of your Lordships' Benches who has thought in any way to qualify or challenge the decision of the League of Nations that Italy's action in attacking Abyssinia was a breach of the Covenant and rendered her an aggressor within the meaning of that instrument. In the second place, everybody agrees that that fact does compel the Members of the League, if they observe the Covenant, to enter upon their duties under Article 16.

It is true that the noble Lord who has just sat down said we are all breaking our obligations under Article 16 because we have not already severed all relations with Italy, but I am sure your Lordships will remember that in 1921 the provisions. of Article 16 were considered and certain amendments were proposed, and the Assembly resolved, without any formal alteration of the Article, that the Members of the League would act in accordance with the Resolutions. The Resolutions included a provision that unilateral action by the defaulting State cannot create a state of war: It merely entitles the other Members of the League to resort to acts of war or to declare themselves in a state of war with the Covenant-breaking State; hut it is in accordance with the spirit of the Covenant that the League of Nations should attempt, at least at the outset, to avoid war, and to restore peace by economic pressure. Then it goes on to say: The Council shall recommend the date on which the enforcement of economic pressure, under Article 16, is to be begun, and shall give notice of that date to all Members of the League… It is not passible to decide beforehand, and in detail, the various measures of an economic, commercial and financial nature to be taken in each case where economic pressure is to be applied. When the case arises, the Council shall recommend to the Members of the League a plan for joint action.

LORD MARLEY

Would the noble Viscount read Resolution No. 14 as well?

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

In cases of prolonged application of economic pressure, measures of increasing stringency may be taken. The cutting-off the food supplies of the civil population of the defaulting State shall be regarded as an extremely drastic measure which shall only be applied if the other measures available are clearly inadequate. What that has to do with what I have just read I am completely at a loss to imagine.

LORD MARLEY

It reinforces the argument.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I thought it was sufficient without that.

LORD MARLEY

The noble Viscount is very quick to take offence.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

In the third place, with the exception of the noble Lord who has just spoken, I think every one of your Lordships' House who has taken part in the debate concurred in the profound dislike and regret which was expressed at our finding ourselves in any way at variance with our very old friends the Italian people.

Finally, I think everybody in this House, again with the exception of the last speaker, was united in a profound desire to maintain peace in the world. We differed to some extent as to how best to achieve that end, but of the sincerity of the desire expressed in all quarters I do not think there can be any possible doubt. If I may just deal very shortly with the observations from all sides of the House, first of all from the Socialist Party, there was the speech of the noble Lord to whom I offer at once my congratulations and my condolences on the office to which he has been elected. That was the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Snell, defining the official attitude of his Party, and I confess I listened to that speech with some little amusement. I have often heard in times of stress an attitude taken up by an Opposition that, although they may not entirely sympathise with everything which the Government of the day are doing, still in an emergency, when we are face to face with difficulties with foreign Powers, it is their duty to range themselves behind the Government of the day and show their patriotism by giving it unswerving support. But the noble Lord, Lord Snell, regarded the fact that he was supporting the Government in the action they were taking, not as a matter to be proud of or as a patriotic duty, but as a matter for which he had to apologise and try to explain away.

He was very sorry to find himself supporting the National Government. His Party had done their very best to see whether they could not find some way of dissociating themselves from the action that the Government were taking, and it was only because, as Internationalists, they felt bound to support the League of Nations, that they had been reluctantly compelled to admit they could find no fault with what we were doing. In other words, patriotism was a vice rather than a virtue! At any rate that line of argument seems to me to reinforce the fact that we have been taking a line with which it is difficult to find fault, because it is not a case in which the Opposition comes to our support because international difficulties have arisen. It is a case in which they have been driven to accept our action as correct in spite of their burning desire to find it wrong if they possibly could.

It is quite true the noble Lord went on to complain in vague and general language of delays in the action of the Government. I think the best answer to him is to be found in the speech of his noble friend, who is still a member of his Party, Lord Ponsonby, who pointed out things which showed that there had been no delay either on the part of the Government or of the League. He said' that there was no fault to be found with either on that score. Lord Ponsonby took a very different attitude from that of the noble Lord. He always in this House puts his argument pleasantly and forcibly and attractively, but I venture to think that when you analyse the attitude which the noble Lord took up it is a cynical philosophy of despair. The noble Lord, Lord Snell, said that those who believed only in the no use of force were animated by a lofty ideal. Lord Ponsonby, to do him justice, disclaimed any lofty ideal. He said there was no question of religion, no question of morality in the attitude he adopted; it was more a matter of expediency. But even as a matter of expediency it seems to me that his whole argument broke down.

He told us at one moment that he believed in the League of Nations and then he went on to urge that we ought to disregard the obligation we had undertaken under the League. He told us he regarded force as necessarily futile and ineffective and never able to achieve anything. He went on to say that in his view the whole British Empire had been built up by the use of force, and that the Italian Empire before the War was largely built up in the same way. He told us that all the nations of the world were actuated by self-interest, and yet he professed to believe that in the moral opinion of the world there was to be found a solution for all our difficulties. It seems to me that that counsel was not only a counsel of despair but it involved ultimately a return to the law of the jungle.

Then came the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi. He asked me a question which I should like to answer at once. He asked me how it was proposed to enforce any of the sanctions imposed by virtue of the decisions of the League of Nations. The answer is that they would be imposed, if necessary, by Order in Council, and the Order in Council would no doubt prescribe the penalties for any breach of the provisions of the Order. Apart from that, the noble Lord suggested that we were, I think his words were, accessories before the fact to anything Italy had done, because of an agreement in 1925 or 1926. I am at a loss to understand to what he could be referring, because the only agreement in 1925 or 1926 which was entered into with Italy was an agreement this country made with Italy and which afterwards, as the noble Lord said, was communicated to the League of Nations, under which Italy disclaimed the taking of any economic interest in the developrnent of the water power resources of the Nile and we on our side disclaimed any interest in any economic action, by means of a railway between the Colonies, which Italy might be able to arrange with Abyssinia. How that can be compared with an attempt to invade Abyssinia or her territories simply passes my comprehension, and it seems to me that it is an abuse of language to suggest that an arrangement between two great Powers that they will severally respect the prior chance of one or the other to obtain economic Advantages in one part of the world or another is to be regarded as being an accessory before the fact to the armed conquest of a territory involved. The noble Lord knows exactly what is done in the case of economic and com- mercial arrangements between great firms all over the world. These are constantly being made, and I have never yet heard that they had to resort to force in order to enforce their bargains.

The noble Lord complained, I gathered, because we had not gone to war with Japan in 1931 and because we had not threatened to go to war with Italy in 1935. He professed himself to be amply satisfied with the state of our defences. I can only say that those better qualified than the noble Lord to form an opinion do not share his view, and that if we were in any danger of embarking upon the policy which he seems to advocate it seems to me we should have to increase our defences not one- or two-fold but ten- or twenty-fold in order to meet the obligations which his policy would entail. Perhaps the Liberal Party will excuse me not answering them as they are not here to listen.

Then there was a speech from the Cross Benches, from my noble friend Lord Cecil. It was, as we should all expect, a very helpful speech from the Government point of view. I do not want to quarrel with it. He began by saying that he detected a change of policy in the Government within the last four or five months. I can only say that I have been in the Government during the time when the change of policy is alleged to have occurred and that neither I nor, so far as I know, any of my colleagues have been conscious of any change or have ever detected its occurrence. He asked us whether we could not produce Papers in accordance with the actual terms of the Motion. That point has been considered and has been dealt with, as I think my noble friend probably knows, in another place. We should very much like to publish a White Paper, and we shall certainly have to do so sooner or later. As far as we are concerned we should rather do it sooner than later, but, after very careful consideration and discussing it, we have definitely come to the conclusion that to approach the various Powers interested for their consent to the publication of anything which would be at all complete would not be wise in the present juncture and under existing conditions. I can only assure my noble friend that we share his view that there must be publication, and that we shall be glad to undertake that publication as soon as we think it is in the interests of the dispute and of the settlement which we all desire.

I pass to one or two questions from the Conservative Benches. My noble friend Lord Peel, in a careful analysis, asked me what about the proposal on January 29 of this year for a discussion with Italy about economic development. That point was dealt with in another place. The answer is this. The proposal was, as he accurately said, one for discussion of economic development. Obviously such a proposal must involve consultation with the adjacent British Colonies, and as soon as the proposal was received we set up a special Commission to deal with it and to investigate the commercial interests involved. We communicated with the East African Colonies in order to ascertain their views. Before it was possible to go any further with the project than that, the whole situation had so changed and deteriorated that it would have become ridiculous to embark upon discussion on the basis of economic development when it was only too obvious it was a great deal more than economic development that Italy was contemplating. I think it is fair to the Italians to say there never has been from them any complaint or suggestion that we have been in any way remiss in that regard.

Then the noble Earl, Lord Howe, told us what he had heard on the Continent about this country. Not for the first time, it seems to me, Continental opinion was singularly ill-informed. They professed to believe that we were only engaged upon this discussion in order to make a test case to see if the League was any good. I do not suppose anybody in your Lordships' House, and I doubt whether anybody in this country, imagines such an idea ever entered the mind of the Government or of that great body of public opinion which is, I believe, supporting the Government. We were asked why we are not more sympathetic to Italy. We are very sympathetic to Italy, we are most anxious to remain on the best possible terms with Italy, but we cannot allow that fact to prevent our implementing our obligations as loyal Members of the League to which we gave our adherence.

Finally it is said that we took the lead in Geneva and were always to the fore at Geneva when this matter was under dis- cussion. It is true that we took a leading part; it is quite untrue to suggest that we are the only ones to put forward proposals. Indeed, as has been pointed out, some of the proposals which have been attributed to us in the Italian Press did not emanate from Great Britain at all, but came in one case from France and in another case from another foreign country. I cannot help thinking that a great deal of what has been said in criticism of our attitude with regard to Italy is based on a misunderstanding as to what our complaint against Italy is, just as I think that a great deal of what has been said, about our not being bound by the Covenant of the League any longer to fulfil our obligations, because so many of those who were originally hoped for as Members have ultimately either dropped out or never joined, is based on a misconception of our attitude in this matter.

Let me first deal with our attitude with regard to Italy. Italy's case, we are told, and have known for some time, is first of all that she has a need for expansion, with a growing population and an overcrowded area, and that she must find elbow-room somewhere. As was stated in the telegrams which were read by the noble Earl, Lord Cavan, and the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, she said that Abyssinia was a very bad neighbour, was not carrying out her obligations to suppress the slave trade, and was a perpetual menace to the Italian Colonies. We have not pronounced judgment on either of these allegations. We do not deny them. We have not been able to investigate them. What we complain of in respect of Italy is not that her national policy demands expansion nor that her national policy demands protection against Abyssinia. What we complain of is that having that national policy, she has, in defiance of her pledged word, used war as an instrument of her national policy, and that is a thing which she has promised not to do. In breach of her Covenant under the League of Nations, she has not respected the integrity and independence of a sister State which she is pledged to respect. She has therefore brought into operation the provisions of the Covenant of the League, which we ourselves are most reluctant to see made applicable.

Then as to the gap, as it is called, in the signatures to the League, we admit that the original conception of the framers of the League has not been realised; we admit that the absence from the League of some great States in the world must weaken its influence and authority and must render it much more difficult to carry out; the obligations. But we are not in this case doing what we are doing merely because we have signed an agreement and are bound to honour our word. Our obligation, as I at least see it, lies much deeper than that. It goes back to the conception which underlay the formation of the League after the Great War. I have always believed that when that War came to an end, the one lesson above all others which was burnt into the very soul of our people was a realisation of the savagery, the horror, the uselessness of war, and a determination that if by any means they could avoid the repetition of that horror in the world, they would see to it that it never came again.

As a result of that burning ideal the nations after the War saw quite plainly that to go back to the old pre-War system of the balance of power, of treaties and counter-treaties, would ultimately and inevitably lead to another conflagration worse even than that through which the world had just passed, and the one means which they then thought practicable of avoiding that dreadful event was to set up a new conception, to set up what we are accustomed to-day to speak of as the system of collective security. Instead of having nations arrayed one against the other, bound by alliances to support one another against their sisters and friends, the conception was a League of all the nations, which should agree, one and all, to maintain peace one with another, and to regard an attack against any one of them as an attack against the whole.

It is that conception which Italy, by her action, has threatened to overthrow. It is that conception which England stands to support and to maintain. It is the belief of the Government that in the League and in that Covenant of the League of Nations lies at least the best chance that the world has yet seen of getting away from the risk of war throughout the world and the destruction of civilisation which war involves, and the Government are determined, so far as in them lies, to do their utmost to carry out their obligations in the League of Nations, in combination with their sister States, going, it is true, no further, but on the other hand not hanging back, to maintain and to see, through whatever means can be collectively devised, that that Covenant does not fail and that ideal is not destroyed. My Lords, I believe that in that policy we have behind us the overwhelming support of the great mass of the people of this country; and since there has been a reference to Elections and Party cries, let me say that I believe that in three weeks time you will see that that faith is justified.

LORD MARLEY

My Lords, at this late hour I do not intend to delay the House more than a few minutes before coming to a decision as to whether we shall take a D vision on this Motion. What we on this side have to decide is whether we have sufficient information to satisfy us that we can afford to ask leave to withdraw the Motion. I want for two or three minutes to review what has resulted from the debate of the last three days, and then to say whether I consider the information given is adequate. I think that the speech of the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack (who, if I may say so, is rather quick to take offence and rather quick to see criticism when it is not always given) speaking for the Government, has shown that the Government have been perfectly right in protecting the interests of Great Britain in North Africa. Those interests are of course Imperial interests; they are interests in connection with our Colonial Empire and the Government have got to watch over those interests; and in a capitalist régime nobody will blame them. If they are clever enough to secure the support of the League of Nations for this work, they deserve every praise from their own supporters.

It is curious that their support of the League of Nations is rather sudden. In the debate which we have had, a number of your Lordships have pointed out that while they had no enthusiasm for the League in the Japanese-Manchurian dispute, no enthusiasm for the League in the Chaco dispute, none in the Corfu dispute, suddenly we find immense enthusiasm sweeping the supporters of the Government when it comes to a case in which our own interests are involved. Of course, as my noble friend Lord Ponsonby pointed out, self-interest must be the motive of any Government, otherwise they would not be fit to be running the country. In passing, let me say that although my noble friend Lord Ponsonby said he was speaking along lines differing from those taken by his friends on these Benches, that is not entirely the case. Some of us support the line he took just as we believe the line taken by the noble Lord, Lord Hardinge, in his very statesmanlike speech, represents a point of view very well worthy of hearing in your Lordships' House.

But, of course, the reason for this attitude is the fact that the great ideal of the League has never been realised. Article 16 was conceived not by dreamers but by practical people and had the League developed as it was intended that article would never have been needed to be used, otherwise it would have been drawn in a different manner. Within eighteen months, as the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack pointed out, it had to be entirely redrawn by the Resolution adopted by the Assembly on October 24, 1921, which the noble and learned Viscount quoted. As soon as the League was not universal it was clear that with States outside the League if we were compelled to implement sanctions the procedure would not be workable. The reason is that you cannot get nations to join together in military action. In the Great War it took four years before we could work with the French under common leadership, and then there was constant friction and trouble. So it was that the Government gradually realised that this was not a practical means and, as it would appear, decided to come to terms with Italy and France and to adopt a policy of rearmament in this country. With that we profoundly disagree, and we believe that in a General Election the people of the country will not support the rearmament proposals of the Government consequent on their discovery that Article 16 of the Covenant of the League is not, in fact, a workable proposition.

It is true that the Labour Party supported the League in 1919 when we knew it was a League to maintain the status quo, a League of Nations who had gained as the result of the War against those nations who had lost, and that factor has been made abundantly clear in recent years. At the very beginning the United States of America refused to come in because they were not prepared to accept force under Article 16 to maintain this untenable position. Within a few years Japan came out because she was a country that wanted expansion and the League was against her. Germany came out because she was a country that wanted expansion and the League was against her. Italy will come out because she is a country that wants expansion and the League will be against her. It is true that Russia was not originally in the League and referred to the League in not too complimentary terms as "the thieves' kitchen at Geneva," but she subsequently found it advisable to become a Member of the League, not for the motive suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Hardinge, but because she wanted to use any instrument which might tend to prevent the outbreak of war. To Russia more than to any other country peace is vital to-day and therefore Russia is a valuable Member of the League.

We believe that as a result of this debate it will be realised that the ideal of the League, if it is to be preserved, demands a revision of certain Articles of the Covenant. We believe that the world is not ready for this plan of universal sanctions. We believe in the proposition of the Government that there should be a re-division of the raw materials in the world—and let me say that I hope to that will be added re-division of the markets of the world—and that the securing of a real planning of the raw materials and the markets of the world can only be done through the association in the League of a number of Socialist States. We have got to substitute for a capitalist and Imperialist policy the policy of Socialist planning of markets and materials. We believe that it is only by that means that we can use a reconstituted League of Nations to secure world peace. I beg leave to withdraw the Motion for Papers.

Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.