Lords Sitting of 5 December 1935

Preamble
The House met at a quarter past four of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
THE ADDRESS TO HIS MAJESTY.

  MESSAGE FROM THE KING.
  His Majesty's Answer to the Address of Tuesday last reported by the Earl of Shaftesbury as follows:
  "I have received with great satisfaction the loyal and dutiful expression of your thanks for the Speech with which I have opened the present Session of Parliament."

THE LATE PRINCESS VICTORIA.

  MESSAGE FROM THE KING.
  His Majesty's Reply to the loyal and dutiful Address of the House of Lords, passed yesterday, was delivered by the Earl of Shaftesbury as follows:
  "I return you my sincere thanks for your loyal and dutiful Address expressing sympathy with Me in the great loss which I have sustained by the death of my beloved sister the Princess Victoria.
  "It is a source of consolation and comfort to Me in my sorrow to receive this further assurance of your constant and affectionate interest in all that concerns Me and my Family."

LORD DE CLIFFORD.

  MESSAGE FROM THE KING.
  The King's Answer to the Address of yesterday reported by the Earl of Shaftesbury as follows:
  "I have received your. Address praying that I will give orders for the fitting-up of the Royal Gallery for the trial of Edward Southwell, Lord de Clifford, indicted for felony, and that I will appoint a Lord High Steward to continue during the said trial. I will give directions accordingly."
  The Clerk of the Central Criminal Court (Wilfrid Walter Nops, Esq.) attended at the Bar.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT HAILSHAM): Clerk of the Central Criminal Court: what have you there?
  THE CLERK OF THE CENTRAL CRIMINAL COURT: My Lord, I beg to hand in the return to the Writ of Certiorari directed to the Justices and Judges of the Central Criminal Court in pursuance of the Order of your Lordships' House of yesterday's date.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Hand them in.
  The Clerk of the Parliaments (Sir Henry J. F. Badeley) received the documents at the Bar.
  Ordered, That the Gentleman Usher of the Black Rod attending this House do forthwith take into his custody the body of Edward Southwell, Lord de Clifford.
  The Gentleman Usher of the Black Rod (Lieut.-General Sir W. P. Pulteney) acquainted the House that he had accordingly taken the said Edward Southwell, Lord de Clifford, and had him now in custody.
  The Gentleman Usher of the Black Rod advanced to the Bar with Lord de Clifford, who, having come to the Bar, knelt.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lord, you may rise.
  Lord de Clifford rose.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lord, this is a fit opportunity for your Lordship to address the House if you wish to say anything. If not, you may retire.
  Lord de Clifford bowed and retired.
  THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (THE EARL OF ONSLOW): My Lords, I beg to move, That Edward Southwell, Lord de Clifford, be admitted to bail; that he do produce a surety to be bound in£50 and to enter into his own recognizance in£50 for his appearance before the House when he shall be so ordered.
  On Question, Motion agreed to, and ordered accordingly.
  The Gentleman Usher again attended at the Bar with Lord de Clifford.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lord, I have to acquaint you that this House has ordered that you do produce
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  a surety to be bound in 250 and do enter into your own recognizance in£50 for your appearance before the House when you shall be so ordered.
  Lord de Clifford then bowed and withdrew.

ROTHESAY CORPORATION GAS ORDER CONFIRMATION BILL. [H.L.]
THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (LORD STRATHCONA AND MOUNT ROYAL): My Lords, I beg leave to introduce a Bill to confirm a Provisional Order relating to Rothesay Corporation Gas.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 1a—(Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.)
On Question, Bill read 1a; to be printed, and (pursuant to the Private Legislation Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1899, Section 7) deemed to have been read 2a and to have been reported from the Committee.

BRIDGE OF ALLAN GAS ORDER CONFIRMATION BILL. [H.L.]
LORD STRATHCONA AND MOUNT ROYAL: My Lords, I beg leave to introduce a Bill to confirm a Provisional Order relating to Bridge of Allan Gas.
Moved, That the Bill be now read la—(Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.)
On Question, Bill read 1a; to be printed, and (pursuant to the Private Legislation Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1899, Section 7,) deemed to have been read 2a and to have been reported from the Committee.

NATIONAL TRUST FOR SCOTLAND ORDER CONFIRMATION BILL. [H.L.]
LORD STRATHCONA AND MOUNT ROYAL: My Lords, I beg leave to introduce a Bill to confirm a Provisional Order relating to the National Trust for Scotland.
Moved, That the Bill be now read la.—(Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.)
On Question, Bill read 1a; to be printed, and (pursuant to the Private Legislation Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1899, Section 7,) deemed to have been read 2a and to have been reported from the Committee.

PERTH CORPORATION ORDER CONFIRMATION BILL. [H.L.]
LORD STRATHCONA AND MOUNT ROYAL: My Lords, I beg leave to introduce a Bill to confirm a Provisional Order relating to Perth Corporation.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 1a.—(Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.)
On Question, Bill read 1a; to be printed, and (pursuant to the Private Legislation Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1899, Section 7,) deemed to have been read 2a and to have been reported from the Committee.

JUDICIARY (SAFEGUARDING) BILL. [H.L.]
LORD RANKEILLOUR: My Lords, I beg leave to introduce a Bill to safeguard the independence of the Judiciary, and to move that it be now read a first time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 1a.—(Lord Rankeillour .)
On Question, Bill read 1a, and to be printed.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA (REPRINTING) BILL.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (THE MARQUESS OF ZETLAND): My Lords, not many words will be required from me to commend the Second Reading of this Bill to your Lordships. The Bill, as explained on the First Reading, is designed to divide into two parts the Government of India Act of 1935, in order that both India and Burma may have statutory authority for the constitutional changes which are taking place in those two countries. The Bill itself is short and, I hope, not controversial. It consists of one operative clause and two Schedules. The operative clause instructs the Clerk of the Parliaments and the King's Printer upon the steps which they are required to take to give effect to the purpose of the Bill. It also provides that the two new Acts, the Government of India Act and the Government of Burma Act, shall be numbered consecutively after the Chapter number of this Bill, if it becomes law, and it further provides that the date of the two new Acts shall be August 2, 1935, and that
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from the time when these two new Acts reach the Statute Book the earlier Government of India Act, 1935, shall cease to have effect.
The two Schedules set forth the verbal changes which are necessary when the Act is divided into two Acts, those in the First Schedule referring to the Government of India Act, and those in Schedule 2 referring to the Government of Burma Act. Not all these Amendments, however, are due to the actual dividing of the Act. A meticulous examination of the text of the Government of India Act, 1935, has brought to light a few small printing errors, and also a few cases in which some slight change is desirable in the interest of grammatical propriety, and opportunity has been taken, now that it has been provided by this Bill, to give effect to those changes. The changes under these two heads—namely, correction of printers' errors and the improvement of the grammar of the Act—are altogether eleven in number. Five of them correct purely printers' errors. Those five are the first, third and fourth paragraphs and the sixth paragraph of Part II of the First Schedule, and the paragraph beginning with line 37 on page 4 of the Bill. I do not think I need trouble your Lordships with examples of these. They a-merely alter the punctuation where that is necessary to make the sense quite clear, and make other changes of a similar kind.
Of the other six proposed Amendments one only might be said to have the effect of making a possible change in the Statute. That one is the one set forth in the second paragraph of Part II of the First Schedule on page 3, and I would briefly explain to your Lordships what that change is. In Section 94 of the Government of India Act, subsection (3), you will find the following provision:
"A Chief Commissioner's Province shall be administered by the Governor-General acting to such extent as he thinks fit through a Chief Commissioner to be appointed by him in his discretion."
Section 95 states that:
"in directing and controlling through the Chief Commissioner the administration of British Baluchistan the Governor-General shall act in his discretion."
It has been pointed out to me that if that clause remains as drafted it might suggest that it was only when he was

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acting through a Chief Commissioner that the Governor-General should act in his discretion. That, of course, was by no means the intention of the Act, the intention being that whether he was acting through a Chief Commissioner or acting directly himself he should be acting in his discretion. It has been therefore thought desirable that the opportunity should now be taken of omitting the words in Section subsection (1) of the Government of India Act—namely, "through the Chief Commissioner." That is the only alteration of any substance, and I hope your Lordships will agree that it is desirable, in order that the intention of that section may be made perfectly clear, that the Amendment should remain. I beg to move.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(The Marquess of Zetland.)
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I had intended to put a question to my noble friend in reference to this Bill, but in truth all that he has said has really anticipated my question. I was going to ask him whether there was really in effect any change of substance in the Bill as compared with the Act which we passed last Session, but he has assured your Lordships that, except in one particular, there is no change whatever. I am no judge of the reasons why it is important that this Act should be divided into two. I am sure that my noble friend has been well advised, for some obscure reason no doubt, but still a good reason, to make that change, but sonic of us were a little bit alarmed lest there might be changes of substance in the course of the drafting. He has, however, explained that there is no change of substance except in one particular, and that the object was merely to make clear what had evidently been, as I understand from him, the intention when the particular clause was passed. In these circumstances of course there is no reason why we should delay the House for a moment in discussing the Bill.
On Question Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

THE ITALO-ABYSSINIAN DISPUTE.
LORD NEWTON LORD NEWTON rose to call attention to the action of His Majesty's Govern
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ment at Geneva in connection with Abyssinia; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, in following the numerous discussions which have taken place in connection with the present unfortunate dispute with Italy it has struck me that one fact of some importance has been ignored. Now, I do not think that anybody who has had any acquaintance with foreign affairs will contradict me when I say that sentiment has always played an immense part in our conduct of foreign affairs; and, although it does us considerable credit in some ways, it has been productive of much trouble in others. In the first place, no other nation is animated by this sentiment. They are therefore incapable frequently of understanding our attitude and attribute to us motives which are in reality non-existent. But it also has occasionally had most unfortunate consequences. I am unfortunately sufficiently old to remember the painful impression which was created by our championship of the Danes in encouraging them to resist the Prussians and the Austrians in the sixties, and there must be many persons present here this afternoon who have a clear recollection of the melancholy results of our attempted interference on behalf of Bulgarians and of Armenians, and, to come down to a later period, of the unfortunate results of our encouraging the Chinese to resist the Japanese operations in Manchuria.
Well, we are engaged more or less upon the same line of action now, though it is not precisely similar. We are engaged—when I say "we" I am not speaking of the Government only; I am speaking of the two Opposition Parties as well—in a kind of crusade on behalf of what I, personally, consider a phantom. These united Parties are struggling to obtain the resuscitation of the prestige of the League of Nations. The sufferings of the Abyssinians have receded more or less into the background, and that is what we are occupied upon. We were told, I think it was only on Tuesday, not only that all the political Pasties are united upon this policy, but that they have the nation behind them. That is a statement which I absolutely refuse to accept. The voter had no choice ill the matter; both Parties being in agreement, he had no opportunity to vote for an alternative, and the statement that the country as a

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whole is entirely in support of the policy which I have described is, to my mind, completely incorrect. At all events it is a policy with which I am not afraid to say that I am in complete disagreement, and it seems to me that we were provided with a providential means of escape and of disinteresting ourselves from the whole dispute.
I think it was in the year 1923 that my noble friend Lord Halifax was sent to Geneva to represent the Government, and he opposed the entry of Abyssinia into the League. If he lives to my age he will perhaps look back to that episode in his career as one of the most meritorious actions that he ever took. At all events it has been completely justified by events, and I only wish that he had been successful. Well, I shall be told that if we had adopted the attitude which I advocate it would have been a base and cowardly and treacherous action on our part. I do not think so. Let us assume for a moment that we had done so. What would have happened? We might have intimated to the Italians what we thought of their conduct, but at the same time we might have said: "We do not think this is a matter upon which we are called upon to fight. We entirely disapprove of what you have done, but we do not propose to interfere." Well, what would have happened? War was inevitable. The war between Abyssinia and Italy was obviously shown to be inevitable as far back, say, as last February, if not earlier, and it was only infatuated people here, who believed that Mussolini was bluffing, who ever entertained any doubt upon the subject. Of course, what would have happened would have been what has happened.
The campaign would have been started at the same time and in the same way as has been done now. Although the war was inevitable there can be no doubt whatever about it that it was intensely unpopular in Italy. Well, the war would have begun, and it would have continued, and it would have arrived at the stage at which it is now, and by that time, what with the dissatisfaction in Italy, the increasing expense, and the extremely unpromising future—in fact, the folly of the whole thing—probably before long both sides would have been very glad to have found an excuse to offer, and successful intervention might have been
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provided by the League itself. Supposing that had taken place, then the ultimate solution which is envisaged by Sir Samuel Hoare, and which is quite, incapable of fulfilment now, might have been attained. Some arrangement would have been arrived at which would more or less have saved everybody's face, and part of Abyssinia would have passed to Italy, as is inevitable in any case. That is what would have happened, and nobody would have been very much the worse.
But what is the position now? What, I should like to ask, have you got to show in the way of a success for your policy up to now I do not think I am exaggerating when I say that the only ostensible success that I can discover is the triumphant rhetoric of Sir Samuel Hoare and Mr. Eden at Geneva, and it seems to me that the more successful their rhetoric is the deeper we shall get plunged into difficulty. Now, what is the actual result? The League has not only failed to prevent war, but it is unable to stop it now that it has begun. It has not, in fact, saved a single life, and it is not likely to do so. The tranquillity of Europe has been so much disturbed that it is now almost in a state of turmoil. Every country is agitated at the possibility of war breaking out, and the feeling of security which prevailed in Europe not so long ago has been largely disturbed.
In the case of Italy we have transformed that country from one of our best friends into a determined enemy, an enemy who will never forgive the harm which they consider we have done to them and from which we shall suffer for a long time to come. We have already begun to suffer in the sacrifice of our trade, beginning with the coal trade, and for probably a generation Italy will be a hostile instead of a friendly Power, side by side with us in the Mediterranean. If you come to France, I have no hesitation in saying that I believe we must be almost as unpopular at this moment in France as we are in Italy; and in that connection I cannot help alluding to a somewhat artless letter which my noble friend Lord Cecil addressed to The Times the other day. He wrote a letter reproaching M. Laval for his very lukewarm support of our policy and stated he was rapidly losing his popularity ha this country. If a statesman has got to make a choice of

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popularity, I imagine he will prefer to be popular in his own country rather than in any other. Why should we expect anything from him at all? We do not know exactly what happened, but we do know M. Laval came to an arrangement with Italy, either in the early part of this year or at the end of last year, under which he made a considerable loan to the Italians, and it is generally believed—it has never been denied, although the actual facts are not known—that he gave Italy a free hand in Abyssinia. In these circumstances how on earth can he be expected to support us? He has been in a very difficult position. He is rather in the position of a man who has been making love to two ladies at the same time, got engaged to both of them, and now does not know which to throw over, and will end in being equally hated by both of them.
The Government, aided by the Opposition, are now busily occupied in establishing sanctions. I do not observe any enthusiasm on the part of anybody else for sanctions except on the part of M. Litvinov, a sinister figure whose object is perfectly plain. The object of the Soviet Government is, and always has been, to create dissension and discord between the European Governments, and they see a very good opportunity of doing so. M. Litvinov is so keen about sanctions that he is actually prepared to employ them with regard to the people who refuse to undertake to apply sanctions themselves. Yet, in spite of that, I expect that all this time he is sending oil as fast as he can to Italy at this moment. But nobody else besides M. Litvinov shows any zeal at all in favour of sanctions. My noble friend the Leader of the House, I think it was, triumphantly told us a clay or two ago of the number of Governments which have associated themselves with us with regard to sanctions. I cannot help thinking that the attitude of those Governments must rather resemble the attitude of people who go to a charity dinner and are so moved by the speeches made that they write their names down for various sums in the hope that they will never be called upon to pay. That, I expect, is the position of the nations who have more or less pledged themselves to sanctions. They are, most of them, not in a position to exercise sanctions at all, and therefore it does not make very much
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difference; but I think that on the whole the Government most opposed to sanctions was the French Government.
The only sanction that would really be efficacious in bringing the war to an end is the prohibition of oil. If you could secure that no doubt the war could be brought to an end, but I do not think there is the smallest prospect of anything of that kind taking place. I sincerely hope there is not, because if you were rash enough to embark on oil sanctions you would embitter the controversy so much that it would be difficult to see the result. But I do not think there is any danger of that. Fancy thinking that an American oil company, for instance, or an English oil company would be dissuaded by moral suasion from selling when it wanted to do so! There is another thing I observe. When these people pledge themselves to sanctions it is not an unlimited promise; it is all limited by provisions. For example—the noble Earl, Lord Stanhope, will correct me if I am wrong—all those who have pledged themselves have stipulated that they are not to be called upon to impose sanctions unless all the States outside the League have done the same thing. I observe a report in the Press—I do not know how much authority should be attached to it—that that lofty altruist M. Titulescu, on behalf of the Little Entente, intimated that if the Little Entente were called upon to apply sanctions they would expect to be compensated in the event of loss. Who is going to pay the compensation? I believe these simple people think we should pay compensation. But we are the people who are going to lose. The existence of a compensation fund is a pure phantom of the imagination, and it argues something like impertinence that people should make requests of that kind.
In view of the state of things now existing which I have pointed out, and in view of the trouble, confusion and fear that have been created, I ask whether all this is really worth while. It is all being done, as I have already explained, for the purpose of restoring what is called the prestige of the League I have before now expressed my astonishment at the attitude of all prominent politicians in this country. Not one of them has made a speech of

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any importance relating to foreign affairs without professing his devotion to the League of Nations even in its attenuated form. They seem to look upon it as a semi-divine instrument which is infallible, and think that if it were to disappear, even temporarily, it would be an irreparable misfortune. I do not follow this argument at all. It makes no impression on me. The devotion of politicians in this country—it is almost entirely confined to this country—to the League of Nations can only be paralleled by the devotion of the Liberal Party to the fetish of Free Trade, and both Free Trade and the League of Nations are in a parlous condition at the present moment. I say nothing about Free Trade, but the League of Nations in its present condition is in the position of a man who has had not one paralytic stroke but several strokes. Yet all these people I have mentioned are going about imploring us to come to his rescue, and assuring us that if we only adopt their particular nostrum, their particular kind of pick-me-up, he will be restored to his pristine health and vigour, and all will be well. I do not think it can be done.
Neither am I appalled at the prospect of the League vanishing for a time. At the present moment it clearly does not work. It is a mutilated machine which is incapable of functioning, and if it did disappear I do not think it would make any real difference to the world at large. If it did disappear—and it will have to be remodelled one of these days in any case—there would be an opportunity for my noble friends Lord Cecil and Lord Lytton to exercise their ingenuity in devising a, new institution which would act more efficiently and in a more rational and useful manner.
In this particular case the Italians are, of course, in the wrong. Everybody must admit that, but they have a much better case than is generally supposed the merits of which have been obscured by the brutalities of Signor Mussolini himself. But I can sympathise to a considerable extent with the Italian people, and I can understand their honest astonishment, for instance, at our attitude. They must be saying to each other, if they do not say it to us: "What extraordinary people these English are; we thought they were our friends; yet when we undertake a punitive expedi
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tion on a large scale we are only doing what they have been doing on a small scale about every three months in India, and the same sort of thing that the French are continually doing in Morocco. But more extraordinary still," they might add, "we did a much worse thing a good many years ago." In 1911 the Italians, without the vestige of an excuse, seized Tripoli. There was no justification for it at all, yet not a word was said by us or by any other Power in condemnation of their action. A Power that has an achievement of that kind to its credit or discredit and has, to use a common term, got away with it, is entitled to be considerably surprised at the intense indignation which its action has produced at the present time.
There is a great deal more to be said in justification of the Italian proceedings with regard to Abyssinia than is realised. They can produce in justification for their action, provocation, the desire for expansion, the fact, upon which I hope my noble friend will throw some light and for which reason I have put down a Motion for Papers, that they were uncertain in that they were not told what our attitude was going to be, and, lastly, that they are only doing exactly what other people have been doing with absolute impunity. They might say with justice: "Why are we to be singled out alone as culprits? If you are going to be logical you ought at this moment to be working hard at promoting sanctions against Japan and against Germany, and the reason you do not is perfectly obvious. You do not do it because you dare not do it. You select us as a feebler Power in order to demonstrate your discontent or displeasure with our proceedings."
I see rumours in the newspapers that there is still a chance of conciliation. I sincerely hope that there is something in those rumours, and that my noble friend will be able to tell us that there is something substantial as the basis of truth in them. We are at this moment dealing with a Government, or rather with a man who is abnormal. He is a man suffering from violent megalomania, a man of a desperate nature, and it really does not pay to drive a desperate man too hard. It is sometimes advisable to condone an offence rather than to endeavour to exact full reparation, because the consequences may be even worse than the original offence. I think that is the case at the

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present time, for this reason. I, at all events, hope that the application of sanctions will cease. As for oil sanctions, I rule them out as an impossibility, but I cannot help expressing the hope that the ordinary sanctions, which I believe are in force at the present moment, will come to an end, because I do not believe they will have any really effectual influence. Moreover, they will be a great inconvenience to many other people, and will only make discontent and, probably, in the long run, do more harm to the people who inflict them than to the people who are suffering from them. For that reason I hope any opportunity, however slight, that offers itself for a solution or a compromise of some kind will be eagerly snatched at by His Majesty's Government.
In the remarks I have made I am not likely to meet with much sympathy in this House, although there may possibly be a few persons who do sympathise with me. What I do feel, and what I am absolutely convinced of, is that most of the people in this country feel as I do upon this subject, and will be only too glad to see their wishes carried out. If you could put to the people of this country the question: "Are you in favour of fighting if necessary for the prestige of the League of Nations, or would you prefer to abandon the League of Nations for a time upon the assurance that the peace of Europe and your own peace would be untroubled?" I do not feel the smallest doubt as to what the answer would be, I beg to move the Motion for Papers.
LORD MOTTISTONE: My Lords, on the last occasion when I addressed your Lordships I protested against the removal of the embargo on the importation of arms into Abyssinia, and I repeat now what I said then that though it might seem a small point it was really the vital point in tins matter. I regret that I was not present in the concluding stages of that debate and I apologise to the House. My absence was due to an important official engagement in connection with National Savings. There is a salutary rule that you should not read your speeches and that when you have made a speech on any subject you should stay until the end of the debate. I will always endeavour to observe that rule. Some of the things which I have to say will, I know, shock and horrify your
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Lordships, but I do not say them lightly and I do not say them without good evidence. The last time that I spoke in this House I told your Lordships that I had learned from various societies in this country and from the soldiers who had recently invaded Ethiopia that the state of affairs in Abyssinia was so terrible that it cried out to heaven for redress. Of course people then said: "Oh, well, the Italian soldiers cannot say anything else." I have, therefore, been at pains since then to try to get at the truth quite apart from Italian propaganda or Abyssinian propaganda. Someone may say: "What has all this got to do with sanctions and the present controversy?" My Lords, it has everything to do with them because if what. I am going to tell your Lordships be true we are committing a great moral wrong, a crime for which we shall be condemned by civilisation for centuries to come if we continue to allow the importation of arms into Abyssinia.
In criticism of myself I was once told, when I was said to be not fit for a certain command, that I was just a front-line man with a front-line mind. I accept it for this purpose. I am thinking now, as we sit here, as it might be at G.H.Q., of the actual people, millions of them, who are affected by these sanctions, and especially by the importation of arms. Let me deal first with the Abyssinian people. I told your Lordships that I had received some horrible facts which I will not go into in detail, but I said I had endeavoured to verify those facts. All my information comes from British sources. It comes from British officers. They asked me and I ask the representative of the Government, Earl Stanhope, to verify it by appeal to our own officials throughout the confines of Abyssinia. We are not dealing here with propaganda, we are dealing with facts. It is not likely that these officers are liars. It is unlikely because they remain officers; it is unlikely because they remain members of famous clubs which would expel them if they were liars; and it is most of all unlikely because they appeal to our own officials and they say that those officials will support them in every word that I have told you.
I said that we must not read our speeches, but I have taken the trouble to write down certain statements which

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I believe to be absolutely true and which I do not think can be contradicted by the noble Earl, who received me most courteously this morning, or by anybody in the Foreign Office. Firstly, the authority of the Emperor of Abyssinia for all practical purpose has disappeared. A well-meaning man, who desired to abolish slavery and some of the tortures to which I will draw your Lordships' attention, he ha; found himself totally incapable of so doing. The state of affairs in Abyssinia—a vast country, mind you, in which live the only untamed group of savages left in the world—is as bad as or even worse than ever it was. However good his intentions, I am here to say that the Emperor of Abyssinia, with the best will in the world, cannot control his chieftains or the petty chieftains who rule the Amharic tribesmen, these armed desperadoes who rule over seven million Abyssinians whom they have conquered. Domestic slavery continues as before, and I would remind your Lordships of what was said by Wilberforce, by Lincoln and by all who supported him in the war between North and south in America, that the wicked Dart of slavery is not so much the hard lot or' the slaves—though I am told that in Abyssinia when they are very young or are getting old it is indeed a hard lot—as the degradation of the slave-owner that follows.
That has happened here. As a consequence, these chieftains and their petty chieftains commit crimes against civilisation which are far worse than any others of which I have ever read or heard. And I will say here that my chief informant is a British officer who has just spent almost a whole year in the centre of Abyssinia, who knows the language, who acknowledges gratefully the help he has had from our own officials. He told me some facts, a, few only of which I will relate to your Lordships. As many of your Lordships know I have been through a good deal of horror during six years of front-line warfare, bat it is hard to sleep at nights when you think of these things. This is the result of the degradation. There is in Abyssinia today, at the hands of these Amharic tribesmen who rule the country against the will of the majority, ruthless cruelty in the buying and selling of slaves for export internally and externally. The export of slaves to the Persian Gulf con
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tinues with all its horrors, unbelievable horrors, and of that I defy contradiction, for our own people in the Persian Gulf will corroborate the statement. The torture of men and children and especially women continues in the most dreadful form in the case of all these savage tribes. I suppose it is even true of civilised people when they get quite remote from restraint. It is all right as long as they do not get angry, but when they do there is a peculiar form of torture constantly practised on women who are suspected of unfaithfulness. The result is that the women die by slow degrees. Their shrieks are heard literally for miles. Very few survive this ghastly torture, though a few do. I know a man who saw one who did survive. Having been a good-looking girl a few days before, she was then like a very, very old woman, just not a corpse.
I, your humble servant with the frontline mind, thinking of the actual people concerned in the importation of arms, ask whether it is not strange to think that, unless these people are liars, at this very moment, while we are sitting here at G.H.Q., as it were, poor women, probably dozens of them, are giving their last dying shrieks in the agony invented by these desperate blackguards to whom you propose to supply arms. Even as I speak now, in the dark holds of some Arab dhows there are for certain hundreds and probably thousands of slaves, some half of whom will die of suffocation, especially if some cruiser comes into the offing. But it is a very profitable business if you land only half your slaves. That is going on at this moment while I address your Lordships. I am reminded by seeing the noble Earl, Lord Birkenhead, opposite, of what was said to me by his father, who was my greatest friend. He was speaking of the law, and he said that, in matters of right and wrong, you must not think of the past, you cannot cure it; you must not think of the future for the moment, you cannot control it; you must think of the present and act accordingly. That was the way in which the distinguished lawyer I have quoted always did act. I put it to your Lordships, if what I have said is true, are we, with the shrieks of the dying in our ears, going to be like the Levite and pass by on the other side saying "sanctions, sanctions"? No, that is impossible. Some things may be right, some things may be wrong, but

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to supply arms to Abyssinia when these horrors are going on—that must be wrong.
I implore your Lordships and I implore His Majesty's Government to put a stop to this wicked thing. When you come to think of it, it is a most extraordinary thing that we are doing. I should not have thought it possible. I sometimes rub my eyes and wonder if we are not dreaming, when all the time, quite near to this country where these incredible brutalities are perpetrated—which must make not only every Christian but every humane man shrink with horror to reflect upon—within a few miles, in Kenya, in the Sudan, in British, French and Italian Somaliland, and, further away to the west, in Algeria and Morocco, and indeed in the south, all these incredible horrors have practically been put an end to. When I was at the Colonial Office for four long years I remember well the trouble we had in trying to extirpate the great brutalities that took place in West Africa. It has been done: there are no screams of dying women there. No!some good, honest English fellow comes along, as he does in Kenya, the Sudan or Nigeria, and says: "Come, come, this won't do." He is taking his life in his hand, very likely, but he stops it. That is what we call—what I call—the blessings of civilisation, and it is true that if you were to poise yourself above the Dark Continent of Africa, you would see a whole great continent where, with few exceptions, some form of justice prevails.
But there is one corner where one million fierce, untamed men, who won battle after battle against their own people, who scored off the Dervishes when even we could not succeed, who conquered all the surrounding territories—and turned, incidentally, for I am speaking now only about the moral side of the matter, fertile provinces into desert lands—are now entrenched in their mountains with their arms and defy civilisation. But you are sending them arms. Am I dreaming? Are your Lordships dreaming? In the last debate Lord Strabolgi, differing from me, in this at least agreed. Again I challenge contradiction from my noble friend opposite who leads the Government so ably. There is not a man who has to do with Africa who will not say that there will be no peace in Africa until you have disarmed those Amharic tribes. Foolishly—for one does
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these foolish things at times—we made a treaty with these Amhara, thinking that the Emperor had control. At least Italy thought so, and when they entered the League of Nations we agreed that it might be true that the Emperor had control. He has no control. When we made a treaty agreeing to the importation of arms, no one who knew Africa would ever have thought that he had control over those savage races.
But, my Lords, there is a strange thing in these matters. I read in the gracious Speech that "My relations with foreign Powers continue to be friendly"—I will deal with that in a moment. But I also read that we have found it necessary to impose economic and financial sanctions. Is the giving of arms to one side and withholding them from another "economic and financial"? I was told by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, when he was good enough to see me, that the legal aspect—of course I accept his opinion—is that, as a consequence of the agreement in the Protocol of the League of Nations, you might regard it as not an act of aggression. It will surprise your Lordships to know that once upon a time I came out first in an examination in International Law. You may say that they must have been a very inferior crowd. Still, it was at Cambridge University, and it is something to be first in any company. Well, it is news to me that anything can alter that great body of doctrine which cannot really be called law but which can be called the international law and custom of nations. After all, although I am not a lawyer, yet the basis of law is common sense. Suppose I am engaged in a street row with some other man and another fellow comes up and gives him a bit of lead pipe with which to hit me. I may call him all sorts of things, but I should not call him neutral. No; by this very act against which I protest we have ceased to be in the position which we ought to hold.
Now I come to the situation of other front-line people. The Italians in Eritrea, Abyssinia and Somaliland—how is this policy of ours affecting them? Clearly, we do not permit the importation of arms into Abyssinia in order that they may be put into a museum. We presumably suppose that the Abyssinians will attack the 200,000 young Italian soldiers who are now soldiering there. Suppose that our policy of giving arms to the Abyssinians

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is successful—and unless we are complete hypocrites and humbugs, or great fools, we must do this for a purpose, which is that these 200,000 young fellows, with their commanders, may be defeated—what will be the result? I have been at pains to inquire from various persons, all of whose names I will give to my noble friend, who have special knowledge of Africa and the East.
With a curious unanimity they say that, if our policy were so far successful that, the Italians who have now advanced some distance into their country were compelled to retreat owing to the restrictions of sanctions and the importation of arms to their enemy, then these tribes, now quite disunited and. with no authority except their own, would all unite in the hope of loot; that a massacre—which, of course, would shock the conscience of mankind—would ensue, of a description not known since perhaps Genghis Khan or further back than that. But what we all agree in saying is that, if that did happen, it would be the end of every white man in Africa. Some people doubt that; I only tell them what the professors say; those who know the languages, know what is happening with all these strange, mysterious people in Africa, who do not exactly like to give up the cruelties which gave them the power which they have. That is where they come in.
Now I turn to Italy itself. In the last debate everyone who spoke said that he had some special concern and reason for caring for Italy. I have a very special reason which entitles me to make the appeal I am now going to make, with some chance that my words may reach that lovely country. My grandfather, who was later the oldest member of the House of Commons, was the leader of the band in England who espoused the cause of Italian unity. It was he who invited Garibaldi over to this country. He spared neither time, money nor effort in the cause of Italian unity; he is known in Italy as "Italy's Englishman." I, quite unworthily, am known as the grandson of Italy's Englishman. I was brought up in the tradition of Italian unity and taught to admire those Italian men and women who did this wonderful thing and formed a great and real nation. Of course I care deeply for them, and I think that perhaps therefore I understand them a little.
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Perhaps I am entitled to say that I was right when I prophesied, as I did, that the imposition of sanctions upon Italy would not make them tame and quiet, but would only stiffen their resistence. Now, who can doubt who was right and who was wrong? There may be a question about this or that thing, there may be a question as to which is more important, Italy or Japan, but the fact is that the whole of the Italian people are as one, men, women and children, determined to continue to fight in a cause in which they passionately believe. As to that there is no doubt whatever. I challenge contradiction upon it. I have many Italian friends, and those who were doubting before, and they were many—some indeed were hostile—are now all united. In that touching message, which you must have read, in lash night's evening newspapers, from the greatest lady in the land in Italy, you have a sign and a symbol of this unanimous passionate devotion of the whole 44,000,000 people in Italy to a cause which they believe to be just.
I ask your Lordships to look at this picture. On the one hand you have 6,090,000 unfortunate people in Abyssinia, subject to the wicked despotism of a million others, who are committing the most frightful atrocities. On the other side you have 200,000 young fellows—we all know what a charming people the Italians are—up against 6,000,000. It is true that they have certain great advantages, but they are also exposed to grave dangers, especially when darkness falls. I am not referring in my remarks to the Government of Italy, but to the people of Italy, who passionately believe that they are in Abyssinia to right a grave wrong. Then across the sea you have 44,000,000 people, the descendants of the race which produced such men as Mazzini, Garibaldi and Victor Emanuel. They are all united in an equally passionate resolve. Whatever else is right or wrong, it cannot be right to send arms to those blackguard people who are committing these atrocities. As I have said before; I will not, rest so long as this wrong continues. I do not propose to divide the House, although I would be prepared to do so if necessary, but I will pursue this question, for I know that if you continue you are doing two things at once. You are running the risk of making these wicked people stronger, and you are causing infinite anger to the rest of the Italian people.

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It is not armaments that make wars. It is anger that makes wars, and by the course that we are pursuing we are angering 44,000,000 of good civilised European people. If my words could reach Italy, and I am told that they travel far there—not from any merit of my own but because of my family relations with that country—I would say that whenever I pass the tree which Garibaldi planted at my home, I pray that this impending war may not take place, that wisdom may prevail, and that peace may be brought about, but it must be a peace with honour for the Italian people. We must not seek to impose upon the united Italian people a disgraceful peace. I hope it will be realised that now is a golden moment for holding out the hand of friendship. Everyone in England knows that the Italian soldiers have shown an example of patriotic devotion which could not be excelled. To quote from The Times and other correspondents anyone can see that Italy has got a good and valiant Army. No one can say now that they are going to make peace because their people are disunited. The British people as a whole long for peace with Italy, and I pray God that this may come.
THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY: My Lords, we have all listened with great interest and admiration to the impressive speech which the noble Lord has just delivered, and we have admired his vigorous eloquence and his obvious sincerity. I am sorry that it is difficult to sustain such eloquence, but I would venture to say that at any rate the noble Lord has not erred on the side of understatement, and if I might mention one particular in which I thought he used exaggerated terms, it was that in which he described the whole Abyssinian people as blackguards. I venture to submit that in this matter, certainly, the Emperor of Abyssinia in his quiet and dignified appeal to the League of Nations showed greater qualities than the leader of the Italian State in ignoring his own obligations and mobilising the whole of his forces against Abyssinia.
LORD MOTTISTONE: I hope the most reverend Primate will allow me to intervene. The blackguards to whom I referred are the tribesmen. I paid a tribute to the Emperor of Abyssinia.
THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY: I fully accept the noble Lord's explanation. With regard to the condition of Abyssinia, as with all countries with which we are all very imperfectly acquainted, there is very great difference of evidence. The noble Lord has quoted those who have spoken to him about the internal conditions of Abyssinia. I also have frequently seen those who are living in Abyssinia and working amongst the peoples there, and although they entirely admit the difficulty of bringing any civilised rule into those districts, they give a very different description even of some of the parts of Abyssinia to which the noble Lord has alluded. With regard to slavery, of course it exists. We all know and lament that. It was brought before our notice in a recent debate, but I should be very much surprised if the noble Earl who will reply for the Government would corroborate the statement made by the noble Lord in the form in which he made it, about the extent of the export of slaves across the Persian Gulf. I think there again he did not err on the side of understatement.
The reply to what the noble Lord has so impressively said is this: If it be true that, with all the good intentions of the Emperor of Abyssinia, the condition of that country proves the impossibility of controlling these rough tribes to whom the noble Lord has alluded, that was certainly much more the case when Abyssinia was admitted to the membership of the League than it is now. It is quite certain that since that happened many measures have been taken by the Emperor—not as successful as we should have wished, but at any rate greater than had ever been taken before. And yet it was Italy itself, not this country, who asked that Abyssinia should be admitted to membership of the League of Nations. Then was the time to make these protests, when things were worse than they are now; and so far from their being made by Italy, it was Italy who asked that Abyssinia should be admitted to the League. And the reply, as I imagine, to all that the noble Lord has said is this. Admit to the full all that can be said against the disorders and the comparative inability to produce civilised rule in Abyssinia; admit that Italy was particularly concerned in respect of its advocacy of Abyssinia's

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admission to the League—admit all that; our point is that it was the business of Italy to bring these matters before the League of Nations, of which Italy and Abyssinia were alike Members, and that it was not the way to deal even with these grave problems for Italy at once, and before submitting the matter to the League, to mobilise its forces against Abyssinia. I do not wish to pursue that matter much, further because I think that is the real reply.
In regard to the particular point of the danger of allowing arms to be brought into the possession of the Abyssinians at this particular time, of course for a thousand reasons one laments that that should have to be done; but to have sustained an embargo against the introduction of arms until hostilities broke out and thus to nave prevented the Abyssinians from having almost the most rudimentary means of defending the integrity of their own country, and now to forbid any arms entering, would really be not neutrality, but taking sides, and allowing Italy, without any possible resistance, to work its will upon the Abyssinian people.
And there is another aspect of the question to which I would invite the noble Lord's attention. He spoke most impressively about the danger of aiming this body of Africans in that particular corner of Africa, and he spoke of the mysterious movements that spread among these African peoples. I also have had a good deal of evidence about. the mysterious movements and communications passing among these African people, and as against what the noble Lord has said it has to be remembered that one of these movements is this—a most anxious watch as to how far one white Power, by the use of all its scientific means, can be allowed to break the independence of the one separate, independent African community in Africa. That is an aspect of the danger in Africa which must be at least borne in mind, as well as the one to which the noble Lord called our attention. But if there be this difficulty about the importing of arms because this dispute has unhappily begun, once again I must say that a large share of the responsibility must lie with Italy itself, that if Italy had dealt with this matter as she ought to have dealt with it, and, was hound by her own obligations to deal with it, through the League of
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Nations, and not independently, it might never have been necessary for this most difficult problem to arise.
Now may I turn for a short time to the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Newton? We always listen to his speeches with pleasure. We admire their wit and their incisiveness, and I certainly did not lack in my appreciation of those qualities in his speech this afternoon. But I had this difficulty in my mind as I listened to him. The noble Lord called attention to the way we had behaved in regard to the Danes and in regard to the Bulgarians and the Armenians, but I have yet to learn that we were under any such obligations as we have incurred voluntarily in our membership of the League of Nations in these questions to which he called our attention. The noble Lord spoke of our having punitive expeditions of our own going on continually in India, but I have yet to learn that those against whom these punitive expeditions may be directed are, like ourselves, members of the League of Nations, as is the case with Abyssinia. And therefore these analogies, however interesting, are, I would submit to your Lordships, wholly irrelevant to the present discussion.
What seemed to me strange in the speech of the noble Lord was that he seemed to regard the solemn obligations which the country has undertaken in the Covenant of the League of Nations as having no great bearing upon the issue. To my mind they are fundamental and vital. It is because this country has deliberately chosen to give its adhesion to the League and to the Covenant that it is under obligations in this matter from which, until these obligations were undertaken, it was wholly free.
LORD PHILLIMORE: And in China?
THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY: I am not going into that now, because I am quite sure that the noble Earl who will reply will be quite able to deal with it, and with the other criticisms of the procedure of the League of Nations. What I submit to your Lordships is that, whatever may be said about the difficult case of China and Japan in this matter, at any rate the primary fact to consider is the honouring of our obligations under the League now. When Abyssinia appealed

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to the League it became a very vital question as to what attitude the British Government would take. It was bound to be a decisive attitude, it was bound to be an act of leadership, which would be followed one way or another. I submit that under the obligations which we have solemnly incurred it was quite impossible for this country, when that appeal had been made, to refuse to allow the procedure of Article 15 of the Covenant to take effect. And, in accordance with that procedure, once the Council of the League had reported, as it did, that in its judgment Italy had committed an act of aggression against another Member of the League, I submit that it was equally impossible for the British Government, with its great responsibilities, to have refused to allow Article 16, which deals with sanctions, also to take its effect.
I think that if the British Government had refused at that juncture to take the action which it did it would have inflicted a blow upon the League of Nations comparable only to an announcement that it would withdraw from the League altogether. Because if the British Government had not taken a decisive line it would have meant that in all probability the League, in regard to this particular challenge, would have been proved ineffective in carrying out the functions for which it was created, and I venture to think that would have had the very gravest effect upon the whole future of all that system of collective security which the League was founded to sustain. And therefore I am most thankful that at Geneva Sir Samuel Hoare took the decisive line which he did, and that it was immediately accepted and endorsed by the representative of France. The noble Lord says that we are engaged in a fad of resuscitating the League of Nations, but what I submit is that it is no longer open to us to talk about the League of Nations as a fad, an aspiration, a dream, and the like. It is a body into which we have solemnly entered and by whose Covenants we have bound ourselves. It is not an aspiration, it is a fact; and it is a fact that lays upon this country the most peremptory obligations.
Complaints have been made as to the procedure of the League, and the noble Lord is quite entitled to call attention to the slowness and the cumbrousness of its
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procedure. I am not surprised at that. What does surprise me is that on the first occasion on which the League of Nations has really had to face an emergency with which it was created to deal it has found it possible to bring together fifty nations, foreseeing all the risks and all the losses in which they would be involved, and to induce them to stand together for the Covenant of the League. If nothing else had happened, quite apart from the issues of this conflict, I think that registers a step forward in European relations and proves the League to be not something on paper but a reality with which any future aggressor against the public peace will have to reckon.
Of course we know, as the noble Lord so justly said, that an issue of great testing is whether or not this embargo on the export of oil to Italy is to be included among the sanctions, but if we have, as I think we could not avoid doing, given our adhesion to the imposition of these sanctions, there is inherently no difference between the export of oil and the export of any other articles which have been brought under the sanctions, with this exception that it is one most likely to prove effective. I know that Signor Mussolini has said that the application of this particular sanction would be regarded as an unfriendly act, and I appreciate all that was said by my noble friend Lord Mottistone and others about the reluctance with which we even hear the word "unfriendliness" and the like between ourselves and Italy, though I think the responsibility rests with Italy and not with us; but it is not an act of which Signor Mussolini may complain.
It is not the act of this country or the act of France, it is the act of the League itself, and the League is not attacking Italy. It is asserting a principle which Italy herself was bound to observe, and ought to have observed, by her obligations under the Covenant. I think it is a little strange, and shows a slight lack of perspective, to talk of fifty nations being guilty of an unfriendly act against Italy. I am very sorry it should be regarded as an unfriendly act. Signor Mussolini has said that he would not regard the application of economic sanctions as an act of war, nor will he, and there is no difference, as I have said, between this sanction and any other except the fact

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that it is likely to be more effective. But at the same time—and I could not conclude without saying this—it is a measure of very great severity, and I cannot dismiss from my mind the effect it may have upon he people of Italy themselves, depriving them, who have no resources of their own in the supply of oil, of what may be necessary to meet some of their most urgent needs. Therefore I agree that before imposing a sanction of this kind, which is so severe and which may have such very painful reactions upon the innocent people of Italy themselves, every attempt should be made to see whether, before the operation of an agreement to apply this sanction comes into effect, it may not be possible even at the eleventh hour to reach some reasonable basis of peace.
That is what I understand to be what is called, and I think criticised as, the dual basis of the policy of the Government. I am quite confident from what has been said in the gracious Speech that Sir Samuel Hoare and M. Laval will not agree to submit to Italy or to accept from Italy any proposals which would not prove to be commendable to the three parties—namely, Italy, Abyssinia, and the League and I am quite sure we shall all agree that while we eagerly desire some basis of peace, it must be one which will come within the lines of the proposals made long ago by the Committee of Conciliation at Geneva. I admit that circumstances in many ways have changed since that report was presented. I venture very tentatively, and so far in agreement with the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, to suggest that there is this measure of change, that it has been proved, I think, by the conduct and course of affairs that the control of the Emperor of Abyssinia over some of those outlying non-Amharic provinces which are so loosely attached to his Empire is very small, and with regard to these particular territories it may be possible to come to some arrangement which may be the basis of a possible peace. What I think we should all feel is that nothing must be done in the way of peace which would seem to justify the act of Italy in making what the nations of Europe have declared to be an act of aggression.
Let me close with this. It is to me not so much distasteful as almost hateful, as one who by his very office is pledged to the principles of peace, even to seem to
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advocate the application of severe measures against a friendly country, and I would not dare to do so unless I were genuinely convinced there was a moral principle involved. Even at the risk of being considered sentimental by the noble Lord, Lord Newton, I submit that it is a moral question whether or not nations that solemnly bind themselves to treaty obligations are to be entitled to set them at naught when it suits their own purposes and ministers to their own ends. If that is once accepted as a tolerable principle in Europe I do not see how any prospect of settled peace can ever be obtained. The only hope for any general settlement and appeasement of European affairs is in proving that there is such a thing as the honour of nations in observing the word of their bond.
It may be very difficult at times. I fully admit—I think the Government have always admitted—the naturalness of the economic desires and difficulties of Italy, but it would be a very strange thing to acquiesce in the principle that when a nation begins to feel the pressure of economic need or is conscious of economic aspirations it should therefore be justified in tearing to pieces any treaty or obligation which stands in the way. It is because this moral principle seems to me to be involved in this matter that I feel justified in doing what otherwise I should very greatly hesitate to do, and that is to take any part in a discussion as to whether or not these severe measures should be brought to bear against a friendly people.
In spite of what the noble Lord, Lord Newton, says, I believe that in this matter the opinion of the great majority of the citizens of this country stands behind the Government. I know how difficult it is to say these things, especially when they are heard abroad, without giving rise to the charge that we are shielding British interests under the cloak of moral principles. I can only say quite honestly that in this matter no idea of British interests has ever entered into my head. I do not even know what the British interests involved may be, and I am certain that that is so with the great bulk of my fellow countrymen. I believe their support of the League of Nations comes from a most honourable instinct. At the risk of being misunderstood, I would venture to say that perhaps the British people is the only

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one which has a really disinterested devotion to the principles for which the League of Nations stands, and that it comes by that opinion, not so much by argument as by one of those instincts which are alike the honour and sometimes the danger of a great people. Therefore I am sure that the Government may still believe that if they pursue that double policy which I have indicated they will have behind them the cordial support of the great body of the citizens of this country.
THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN: My Lords, I think it was Hegel who said that the tragedy of history was not the conflict of right against wrong but the conflict of right against right. I feel that in the present situation there is something of this Hegelian tragedy and that is why I venture to address your Lordships this afternoon. I think that anybody who listened to the speech of the noble Lord who introduced this debate to-day must feel that he is still living in the pre-War world. It is quite impossible for this country, or indeed any nation who signed the Covenant of the League of Nations, to return willingly to the form of international procedure which he recommends, and I would ask him to consider whether the methods which he applauded were in their outcome quite as successful as he thought. After all, they culminated in the World War and the destruction of about 30,000,000 people. It was a system under which nations admitted no kind of law as governing their conduct and lived in a state of anarchy, the eventual outcome of which was, and inevitably must always be, war.
I do not think that anybody can doubt that Italy, having signed the Covenant of the League of Nations, the very essence of which was an undertaking that if any nation had a dispute with any other nation it would first submit that dispute to impartial investigation, report and examination by the League before it resorted to war, proceeded in the most reckless and indeed brutal manner to ignore all those obligations and to go to war in the defence of what was obviously against the collective opinion of mankind. I do not think anybody can dispute that the primary responsibility for this situation and for the infliction of sanctions must rest on Signor Mussolini himself. Nobody can fail to realise the immense
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difficulty of the task in which we are engaged, that of building up the system of international relations foreshadowed by the Covenant of the League of Nations, the beginning of the introduction into the world of a reign of law, an enterprise which admittedly will take decades, perhaps centuries, to accomplish, but upon which the best hopes of the great mass of mankind, I believe, are now centred, and certainly the hopes of this country.
The alternative to the League system is not peace. The alternative is that we go back into a far worse alliance system than that in which we were involved in 1914, one in which an accident, a fool or a knave in any part of the world will be able to plunge the whole world instantly into a world war, even more rapidly than was the case in 1914. That is the real point, and unless we succeed in making the nations recognise that there is some reality in and some power behind the Covenant of the League of Nations, we must inevitably return to the alliance system such as I have indicated. Therefore, I think it is worth while taking a very great risk at this time if it is possible to establish in the world the conviction that it no longer pays for nations to indulge in unprovoked aggression without first, at any rate, exhausting all reasonable possibilities of securing their legitimate ends by the pacific procedure laid down in the Covenant of the League. That is why, though with the utmost reluctance, especially against a great people like the Italians, I fully support any sanctions which may be necessary, not to humiliate and destroy Italy in the slightest degree but to stop hostilities and force a solution of the problem on fair and just lines.
That, indeed, is the best way to accomplish the end which my noble friend has in view, the ending of the importation of arms into Abyssinia. As soon as we can get a real peace conference, then the importation of arms into Abyssinia can cease. Therefore my hope, as the most reverend Primate has just said, is in proportion as the Italian people realise both that there is real determination behind those people who want to see the beginnings of the reign of law established in the world and that they are prepared to take resolute action in support of law, and also that there is no hostility to Italy and that they are

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willing to consider any way of meeting the real and urgent needs of Italy to-day.
It is this second aspect of the Abyssinian problem which adds the element of tragedy to the situation to-day. I cannot forget the fact that from 1900 to 1914, 670,000 Italians left Italy every year for the New World and that to-day there is no net emigration. That must be producing an almost intolerable problem in Italy and I think the rest of the world must consider that fact. The population of Italy is further rising by 400,000 per annum. In considering this problem we ought to remember that South America is a far more suitable field for emigration for the Southern European people than Africa. It contains far more fertile country and has a population of only 75,000,000, as compared with a much bigger population in Africa. That is the first aspect of the problem of the peace. I think we have got to consider the needs of Italy in a much more sympathetic and practical way than we have considered them hitherto, and one of the greatest contributions to peace would be that we should make it clear to the Italian people that we sympathise with their fundamental needs and are anxious to find a legitimate way of meeting them.
But there is another aspect. I cannot help feeling a deep sympathy with what my noble friend on the left (Lord Mottistone) has said about the barbarous conditions which exist in Abyssinia to-day. The more I consider it the more it seems to me clear that the central evil in Abyssinia is a combination of a feudal system based on slavery and the existence of a subject people who can be looted for slaves. As long as that state of affairs continues, you cannot end the sort of evil he describes. I would invite the Government to see whether it is not possible to publish a racial map of Abyssinia—I have seen one—in order to show the distribution of races in Abyssinia. If this map is accurate it shows very clearly that the core of the evil is the fact that a dominant, rather brutal, very militaristic people has at its disposal a very large area into which slave raids can be made, and the continuance of slavery rests on the fact that there is a very large area from which it is possible to draw slaves. If that is true it seems to me that an
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essential element of the settlement must either be the establishment of a very strong League control over the whole Abyssinian Government or the separation from the Amharic area of these areas which have been administered in a brutal manner and are the source from which slaves are derived.
There is only one other word I would say. I am not altogether attracted by the formula that the peace must be one which is acceptable to Italy, to Abyssinia and to the League. If the League sets out, as in some measure it must do, to be an arbiter, if its basic principle is that third parties should be the ultimate judges of disputes between nations, what we have to consider is what would be a right and permanent solution of the problem and not merely what we can get Italy or Abyssinia to consent to. Therefore, we ought to think over the whole problem very carefully in an impartial way, to try to familiarise ourselves with all the facts of the situation and particularly with the distribution of population in order to arrive at the right permanent solution. Only if we have a clear mind on that matter shall we get a peace that will bring about a permanent settlement both for Italy and Abyssinia.
LORD RENNELL: My Lords, I rise not exactly to make a correction but to put one matter which has been raised in a rather different aspect. I had not intended to speak, because I did not understand from the terms of the Notice on the Paper that the whole question of whether or not the League of Nations is desirable was going to be raised. I think anything I might have said on that point has been said sufficiently by the most reverend Primate. My reason for rising is an expression used by the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, in reference to slavery. I had a good deal to do with the repression of slavery many years ago in my younger days in East Africa, and I suppose I have signed more liberation papers than probably any other of your Lordships. It is possible that matters have changed a good deal since then, but the repressive work carried on by our cruisers had become extremely effective. The difficulty was that we were unable to search dhows under the flag of another nation, and there was also the difficulty

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of penetrating into or getting too near the territorial waters of other States.
Apart from the question of horrors, which I am not able to discuss because I know nothing about them, I understood my noble friend Lord Mottistone to refer to the transport of slaves into Arabia across the Persian Gulf. I do not know whether it is quite fair to fasten responsibility for that solely on the Emperor of Abyssinia, who is doing his best to put down slavery, but who has to contend with difficulties. Just as we had difficulties through being unable to search dhows, he has difficulties to contend with inasmuch as the whole country is not really under the control of ordered government. What I wish to point out is that the whole of the sea coast for hundreds of miles north and south of the part exactly parallel with Abyssinia is in the hands of a European State, either Great Britain, France or Italy. It is, of course, a very wide area, and so is the outlying part of the Emperor of Abyssinia's territory. I do not know exactly at what point dhows manage to get away with slaves, but I am pretty sure that they do not get away from British territory. At any rate, at the time I was there vigilance was very close. Therefore it seems to me that a considerable part of the responsibility for the transport of these slaves from Africa across the Persian Gulf lies upon the countries which occupy the seaboard. In the interests of fair play there ought to be a proper division of responsibility and the whole of the blame for this miserable transport, which of course is as old as the world, ought not to be laid at the door of the Emperor of Abyssinia, who is doing his best to grapple with a difficult problem.
LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, my noble friend Lord Snell has asked rue to say a few words in this debate in view of the character it has assumed and the speeches that have been made. Our official policy is I think well known to your Lordships. In the recent Election we found ourselves in the perhaps unusual position of defending a good deal of the Government's recent foreign policy and I dare say our electoral fortunes were affected thereby.
EARL STANHOPE: Improved thereby.
LORD STRABOLGI: Not that that matters in the least because what is right is right, and we can only support a policy with which we agree. I only want, for a few moments, to reinforce that point of view by some reference to what has already fallen from other noble Lords. I do not know what the noble Viscount, Lord Monsell, the First Lord of the Admiralty, was thinking when the noble Lord on the Liberal Benches was discussing the traffic in slaves across the Red Sea. May I be allowed to say that when I was pursuing this same matter of the slave trade in the House of Commons, some years ago, before this sudden crusading idea of the Italians, the information I received from the Admiralty and from the Foreign Office was precisely the same as that given just now by the noble Lord, Lord Rennell. We have a most honourable record in the Navy for interferring wherever we could in this abominable traffic. It is one of the proudest feats the Service has performed. We were hampered—I played some small part in the work myself—by the laxity, to put it no higher, of Italian officials in the Italian coastal areas, in allowing slaves to go through their territory. We felt that if they would only play their part, the suppression of the traffic would be very much easier.
LORD MOTTISTONE: Only the Italians?
LORD STRABOLGI: The noble Lord asks whether it was only the Italians, and I am afraid the French also were not as vigilant as they might have been. At any rate it is not right to put all the blame on the Negus. I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, agrees with me there. The noble Marquess, Lord Lothian, made a proposal which I hope has no sinister suggestion behind it. He wants a racial map of Abyssinia drawn up. I would suggest to the noble Earl, the Under-Secretary of State, that such a map would depend for its accuracy on who draws it up. When, in the past, we have seen racial maps they have usually been preliminary to proposals for partition. Although we do not say that there must be no frontier rectification as part of an equitable settlement, we do say that anything in the way of the partition of Abyssinia would really be contrary to the law of nations and the defence of that law which the most reverend

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Primate so eloquently described. I will shorten my remarks by saying that nearly everything that fell from the most reverend Primate expresses our Party point of view.
When the noble Marquess speaks about sympathy with the Italian pressure of population, I would say that this is a matter that will be debated a good deal in years ahead and that we ought to keep our sense of proportion in that respect. There are other countries in Europe that are feeling the pressure of population. The Poles at present are feeling the pressure of population and are saying that if there is any sharing out of Colonies they want their share. I hope that the noble Marquess and others who take this point of view will consider this matter with very great care and circumspection. If you look at the population of Engand—I do not mean Scotland and Wales, but England proper—we have a population of 742 to the square mile. The population of Italy is, I believe, 347 to the square mile, little more than half ours. This question of the pressure of population can be argued with great force by our fellow-subjects in India. The population in the Indian plains is very overcrowded, as the noble Marquess knows perfectly well, and there is a most powerful argument put forward by certain Indian politicians, especially those who speak for the inhabitants of the north-west coast of India, who are adventurous, sea-faring people, for the right of Indians to go to Africa and have land there on which to settle. I suggest that this whole question of the right of peoples who claim to be overcrowded to be allowed to settle in other people's territories against those other people's will must be approached with the greatest care and circumspection. It is a most thorny and difficult subject. It is an easy thins to say that we have too much of the territory of the world and we must share it out; but that is not the way to deal with this particular question between Italy and Abyssinia.
Might I also say this, my Lords? There was an interruption when His Grace the Archbishop was speaking from the other side of your Lordships' House: someone mentioned China and Japan. I am not going to pursue that matter either, as His Grace did not, but this policy of giving the so-called restless peoples something to satisfy them, or allowing them to take
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territory which does not belong to them, in the hope that that will bring peace and contentment to those people, has, in regard to Japan, been a lamentable failure. First Formosa, then Korea, which we were bound by treaty to preserve. I do not know if Lord Newton referred to the Korean case—I was called out of the House for a moment—but that is a most glaring case in which, for reasons of policy and state at the time, we did not interfere. Then came Manchukuo, then Jehol, and now the Japanese are about to swallow another four Provinces of China. My information about China is from first-hand sources, which the Under-Secretary of State can check if he will, and it is that the Japanese policy is to get the whole of the Yangtse Valley under their control—I will not say in their possession—as far as Hankow. That is what this policy of trying to satisfy aggressors has done with regard to Japan.
THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN: If I might interrupt the noble Lord for a moment, I am put into a, perfectly false position. The instance I gave was that the Italians had migrated to the extent of 622,000 people per annum, not to territory under their own control, but to South America. I mentioned the sort of outlet which might possibly relieve the problem—which does not disappear because the noble Lord ignores it—and that was emigration to South America. I did not suggest that South America or any part of it should be handed over; that would be contrary to the Monroe doctrine. I pointed out that the problem which arose, arose fundamentally from the introduction of these barriers to trade and emigration which are preventing the normal adjustments which otherwise would take place.
LORD STRABOLGI: If the noble Marquess had used t hat last sentence first, I should have found myself in agreement with him. It is not only the obstacles to emigration, but also the obstacles to trade, that have created the difficulty. The problem of Italy, I suggest to my noble friends, is not one of overcrowding but, one of unemployment. We have the largest Empire in the world and we, in spite of the four years' rule of noble Lords on the other side of the House and the Ministry in another place, are suffer

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ing from a terrible unemployment problem. It is not a question of having Colonies to send your people to or raw materials under your control. The difficulty has been brought about, as the noble Marquess has rightly said, not only by the stopping of emigration but also by the stopping of the channels of trade; and, more than that, by the policy of deflation followed by the Treasury and the Bank of England in this country and to a large extent by the United States, and by the stopping of foreign lending. These are among the causes of bad trade conditions in the world, and there are of course others, including a faulty monetary system.
The cause of the problem is not only overcrowding but unemployment, which is brought about by bad economic conditions. I will not be tempted now into suggesting what my Party's policy is with regard to that. The noble Lords opposite heard it very fully debated earlier in the year on the Motion of my noble friend Lord Sanderson. That policy is going to be the real solution of your problem, but I suggest again, in answer to the noble Marquess, that trying to buy off these aggressive Powers, these dissatisfied Powers, these restless Powers, by pandering to this demand for territory, which is more a question, I am afraid, of prestige than of really wanting to settle their people in these lands that they covet, will not solve the problem. In this matter we find ourselves against the noble Lord, Lord Newton, and able to support the Government in their recent policy. So far they may have been slow, they may have been hesitant, but we have to approve of their recent action. We only hope that they will stick to it and not be tempted to take what may appear to be an easy road to an apparent peace which will mean no peace at all.
LORD MOTTISTONE: Do I understand that the whole Labour Party approve of the importation of arms into Abyssinia at this present stage?
LORD STRABOLGI: I do not think I am called upon to answer that question, but the broad outline of our policy was supported by a twenty to one majority the last time we discussed it very fully for three days as a Party.
THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (EARL STANHOPE): My Lords, the debate to
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which your Lordships have been listening has, as not unusually happens in your Lordships' House, spread over a very wide field. Only six weeks ago we spent three days in discussing the question of Abyssinia, and I think I should certainly not be meeting the wishes of your Lordships if I were to go over all that was said on the previous occasion. The noble Lord, Lord Newton, complained that we had not taken measures to make our views known to Italy. If he will read what was said on the previous occasion, he will find that I took a great deal of the time of your Lordships in giving in great detail what was done, and he will find there a very complete answer to that criticism. So long ago as the 28th of February the British Ambassador at Rome was instructed to tell Signor Mussolini of the serious view the Government took of the situation which was arising in East Africa; that was repeated still more strongly a little later at the beginning of May, and it went on right through that period.
May I say how grateful I am for the speech that was made by the most reverend Primate? As he always does, he told your Lordships with great clearness his view of the situation, and I cannot hope to put it as well as he put it to your Lordships. There is only one point on which I quarrel with him, and I quarrel with him on that severely, if he will allow me to do so. He left the question of China to me; I wish that he had tackled it himself. At any rate it is outside the terms of the Motion, and therefore I do not think I need say anything further except that at present China has not appealed to the League of Nations. If she does, then of course we shall have to deal with the situation, but it is at this moment entirely different from anything with which we have to deal in Abyssinia.
To deal briefly with some of the points that were made, the most reverend Primate showed quite clearly that this country is tied by its engagements under the League of Nations, and I would remind your Lordships that we cannot suddenly say: "Here are obligations that we have undertaken; we find them inconvenient, and should like to get rid of them." Part of the Covenant is that no nation can leave the League of Nations without giving a full two years' warning of its intention. Therefore, if my noble

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friend really believes that the League is wrong and that we ought never to have been landed in our present predicament, he should have moved two years ago that it was time for this country to leave the League. I am not aware that he has done so, and I think he would find very little support if he did. Certainly, during the General Election, on several occasions I talked about the policy of His Majesty's Government and I found not only that it was listened to with great attention by the audience, with far more interest than my remarks usually receive on the public platform, but with obvious approval. I, have not the smallest doubt that when Lord Strabolgi said he found he was supporting the policy of the Government he did so because he realised it brought the Labour Party votes.
OPPOSITION PEERS: No, no.
EARL STANHOPE: There is no doubt that the policy of the Government has got behind it the general approval of the people of this country, because whenever mention was made of it on the public platforms, it was perfectly obvious—
LORD NEWTON: They had nothing else to vote for.
EARL STANHOPE: They showed no criticism of the policy which is being pursued by the Government. I admit there are one or two newspapers which take a different line, and I realise that Lord Beaverbrook, although I do not think he has got many more, has got at least one recruit.
LORD NEWTON: I repudiate that.
EARL STANHOPE: The noble Lord spoke of events before the League of Nations and instanced the invasion of Tripoli by Italy. At the present time the smaller nations certainly are firm in support of the policy which is being pursued by all in common at Geneva. At a meeting which I attended only this morning in the Secretary of State's room, when discussing with the Dominion High Commissioners the policy that we individually and collectively, as part of the British Empire, should pursue, it was stated by one of the High Commissioners that when he was out there, taking part in the discussions at Geneva, there was a complete feeling of brotherhood
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amongst the nations present; and that it made not the smallest difference which individual proposed a resolution because if lie did not propose it, probably the one next to him at the table would do so. All the nations present who have taken part in this discussion had definitely one purpose in mind, and that was to bring this unfortunate dispute to an end at the earliest possible date.
My noble friend asked me about the question of oil sanctions, and whether it was true that every country would refuse to impose sanctions unless all countries outside the League also cut off supplies. Of course our whole attitude in regard to sanctions is that it is of no use imposing a sanction unless you feel it is likely to be effective. That is why in proposal No. 4 we have limited the actual articles on which an embargo is established to those over which Members of the League have a considerable amount of control—such things as rubber and tin—and it was for that reason that in the original proposals we left out oil and coal. They stood together, because if you cut off coal Italian shipping cannot get to the African coast, and if you cut off oil Italian lorries and planes are unable to operate in Abyssinia, but we were not sure that Italy could not get those commodities from countries outside the League of Nations. There is no question of our refusing to impose sanctions unless everybody comes in, but of course we should drop a sanction if it were found likely to be ineffective. Obviously, we should only be cutting off our noses without having the smallest effect upon Italy in the direction of bringing the war to a conclusion.
My noble friend said he thought that there would be a general consensus of feeling in this country that we ought to drop the League of Nations, provided the safety of this country and the individuals inhabiting it was assured. I have no doubt of that, but the whole point is that at the conclusion of the Great War we realised, as the most reverend Primate has said, that the policy of alliances was dangerous and had not prevented a great war happening, and we therefore looked round to see if there was some other policy which might be more effective. As a result, we hit on the idea of a League of Nations and collective security. I admit that we now know that the policy of the League is unable

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to prevent war beginning, and it remains to be seen whether it will succeed in bringing war to an early conclusion. That is being tested now. Unless we are able to find something more effective we are not in a position to go to the people and say that peace is more assured if you leave the League rather than if you stop in it. It would be exactly the reverse, because we should then be in a position of isolation, with no friends to whom we could look for help if we required it.
Lord Mottistone took a different line. He was good enough to come and see me, and the information which he had confirmed a great deal of information which we have at the Foreign Office. I am prepared to admit that there are parts of Abyssinia where slavery and brutalities generally are deplorable, but I entirely agree with the most reverend Primate in saying that conditions undoubtedly are better than they have been. As Lord Strabolgi said, our sloops, not our cruisers, in the Red Sea have been most extraordinarily effective in stopping a great deal of the slave running, and I think Lord Mottistone was wrong in saying that slaves at this moment are likely to be transported. Of course everybody admits that Abyssinia is a very backward country, and has many customs and even many things of which everyone of us disapproves. It is not only this country which disapproves. The League of Nations has shown quite definitely that it disapproves, and if your Lordships would turn to the Report of the Committee of Five, you will see that in paragraph 4 it uses language which showed quite clearly that in the Opinion of the Committee Abyssinia needed assistance. And of course in the rest of the proposals that were made by the League they dealt with that question of slavery and with a police and gendarmerie service; so that the situation which lie described—although I do not think we should go as far as he did in his description—is at any rate one that we all recognise is deplorable.
The Emperor himself, as I think the most reverend Primate said, has been doing great work in trying to improve the situation, and although my noble friend said that he had absolutely no control over his chieftains, our information is that, although that control is not perhaps as great as it might be, it is at any rate
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a great deal more than it was before this war began. Although it is certainly true that Italy is more united now than perhaps she has ever been, it is also true that probably Abyssinia herself is equally more united that she has ever been. We all know that there have been desertions from the Abyssinian side to the Italian side, but anybody who knows the situation in Abyssinia just after the rains were ended and knows the amount of sickness and famine prevalent among the natives, and the effect of Maria Theresa dollars and the chance of getting very good food, will realise the considerable effect that these have.
The noble Lord referred to the question of the supply of arms. Since he came to see me I have been thinking over the reason why he definitely took the view he did, and I think I begin to realise it from his speech this afternoon. He spoke about having a front-line mind. I want to get him out of that front-trench mind, and to get him a little further back, because the man who is in the front line as a rule sees very little of the battle. It is usually seen better by those who are not so close up If he will think of it, the complaint that Abyssinia is being supplied with arms and that these arms are being used against Italy does not hold unless he is prepared to say that Italy is perfectly right in waging war as a means of meeting her grievances. If her men had not marched into Abyssinia, those arms would not have been required, nor could they have been used. I think there is very little doubt that, although there had been complaints made of raids, which are a quite different matter, Abyssinia never had at any moment intended an invasion either of Eritrea or of Italian Somaliland. Therefore the complaint that arms are now being used against Italians has been brought upon themselves by their invasion of the country of a fellow-Member of the League.
In point of fact the arms that have been supplied from this country are, I understand, very few. They have come mostly from elsewhere, but there is a treaty by which we guarantee that arms which arrive on the African coast shall be allowed to go into Abyssinia provided they fulfil certain conditions. Those conditions are that the arms shall be going into the hands of the Government of Abyssinia itself, and not into those of

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individuals, who might use them for raids or for civil war and for all the other things that they do in Abyssinia of which we have reason to disapprove. Therefore we are bound by treaty to allow arms to go in once they get there. Of course we are further bound now by the engagement which we have taken in common with all these other countries to allow arms to be sent to Abyssinia and to forbid them to be sent to Italy.
Since the last debate took place the Co-ordination Committee has been meeting, and five resolutions, which were already known when we were discussing this matter, have come into effect. The first was the one to which I have just been referring, the prohibition of the export or transit of arms, munitions and implements of war to Italy. The second is the prohibition of all loans, banking or other credits to the Italian Government or for any public authority or person in Italian territory and other financial prohibitions of a like character. May I say that it is not only the oil embargo which is likely to be effective, but the financial position of Italy is certainly going to be most serious in the near future, not only from her ordinary situation, but from the effect of the sane-lions which are now operating. The third proposal was the prohibition of the importation of all Italian goods except gold or silver bullion and coins, and to that we made a further exception in the middle of the Election, when I went out to Geneva, that books and newspapers should also be excepted from that embargo.
The fourth proposal was an embargo on certain exports to Italy which might assist the prosecution of the war, such as transport animals, rubber, aluminium, nickel and tin. And the fifth resolution was the organisation of mutual support, as indicated by Article 16 (3) of the Covenant, between Members of the League in the application of the economic and financial measures taken under Article 16. None of these sanctions were in force when we were discussing this problem before, but the first two came into force in this country before the end of October and the third and fourth on November 18. The only other proposal which has been made since and has come into force is that called 2 (a), providing for the suspension of clearing agreements with Italy as from November 18.
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On November 6 the Committee of Eighteen adopted a proposal known as Proposal No. 4 (a) which is commonly known as the oil sanction. This provides for an embargo on certain additional exports to Italy—namely, petroleum and its derivatives, pig-iron, iron and steel and coal and fuels derived therefrom. The wording of the Resolution of the Committee of Eighteen is as follows:
"It is expedient that the measures of embargo provided for in Proposal 4 should be extended to the following articles as soon as the conditions necessary to render this extension effective have been realised:"
Then comes the list of the articles to which I have referred, and it goes on:
"If the replies received by the Committee to the present proposal and the information at its disposal warrant it, the Committee of Eighteen will propose to Governments a date for bringing into force the pleasures mentioned above."
The meeting of the Co-ordination Committee had been arranged for November 29 at Geneva, but, as your Lordships know, the French Government have been passing through a crisis and we were informed, and the Secretariat of the League was informed, that France could not on that date be adequately represented at Geneva. It was therefore generally agreed that the Committee should meet on December 12, when it was hoped that various French Ministers will be able to attend. May I make it quite clear that the only reason why this postponement was made was for the reason which I have given, that France wished to attend a meeting on such an important proposal, and there is no question of the weakening either of this country or of other Members of the League in the sanctions and the measures which they wish to take?
It has been said, I know, by some people that this country is opposed to the oil sanction because we are making money out of oil. it may interest the House to know that the amount of oil which normally goes into Italy from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company is somewhere about 10 per cent. of the amount which Italy normally imports. In the last ten months, I think it is—I am not sure whether we have got the figures for November, but it may be eleven months—we have actually imported into Italy less than we did in a similar period of 1934. Therefore there has been no extension whatever of supplies by the Anglo-Persian

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Oil Company. The amount of oil has increased very materially from some countries, and it remains to be seen whether the proposals which will come up for consideration next week—on the 12th of this month—will prove that an embargo on oil is likely to be effective or the reverse. If it is likely to be effective then I imagine that the Committee of Eighteen will adopt the proposals.
But it is not only in regard to sanctions that we have been taking our part. I think it was the most reverend Primate who referred to our dual policy of sanctions on the one hand and proposals for peace on the other. On November 2 the Prime Minister of Belgium, who is also the Foreign Minister, M. van Zeeland, suggested to the Co-ordination Committee that Great Britain and France should be entrusted with the task of endeavouring to find terms of peace which would be acceptable to Italy, to Abyssinia and to the League of Nations itself. The noble Marquess, Lord Lothian, rather objected to that phrase. He said he thought it was for the League to impose its own terms of peace, but how he proposed to do it he left us guessing. My own view, and I imagine it is the view of your Lordships generally, is that as we have not the smallest intention of taking part in this struggle ourselves, we must endeavour to find proposals acceptable both to Abyssinia and to Italy. I admit it is a hard task, but to set forward a scheme which may be an ideal one, but which neither the one side or the other is likely to accept, I am afraid gets us no nearer to obtaining that peace which we all so earnestly desire.
The task of finding terms of peace is being pursued by His Majesty's Government with the utmost energy in the hope that we may find a common basis which may prove acceptable before this new sanction is to come into operation. There is, of course, no basis whatever for the charge that we are working for peace behind the back of the League of Nations and that we are endeavouring to settle this matter without consulting the League. We are working at the request of the League of Nations and on its behalf, and it is not we but the League itself that will have to decide whether terms, if we are able to arrive at terms, are acceptable or the reverse. I think the noble Marquess will agree
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with me that the League will also consider—and it will be one of the first things it will consider—whether the terms are likely to be accepted by the two disputants and therefore likely to bring peace into operation.
May I say once more that, of course, the very last thing that we desire to impose is any kind of humiliation on Italy. On the last occasion on which I spoke I stated we were anxious to see an Italy strong, contented, and stable, and that, of course, is quite as much our view to-day. We feel, and those of us who know something of what is going on, feel it increasingly, that the financial position in Italy is already giving Italy's friends great cause for anxiety. If we were hostile to Italy we could wish nothing better than that she should exhaust her resources by going on with this war. We believe that it is to Italy's interest that this war should be brought to a conclusion by means of an equitable peace at the earliest possible moment.
We realise that sanctions, with all the disturbance to trade which they involve, must inevitably cause losses to every nation which is taking part in them, and not least ourselves, and must at the very least hinder that world economic recovery for which we are all hoping. I am not at this stage going to be tempted into pursuing the line which the noble Marquess invited me to follow with reference to Free Trade and emigration, but may at any rate say, as he, I think, suggested, that these are matters of extraordinary difficulty and complication, and I am not sure that they would be very much relieved by adopting a system such as we had in this country of one-sided imports. It did not seem to profit us very much, and I am not sure it would help other countries either. It is obvious that these considerations can only be entertained when the world is at peace and there is a greater feeling of security than there is at present. It is one of the main reasons why we should desire to get peace as soon as possible.
I feel certain that no assurance is required from me that the Government will use its utmost endeavours as a faithful Member of the League to bring this unhappy dispute to an end at the earliest possible moment, on terms which will be such as those who are the disputants can honourably accept and, we hope, on terms

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which will enable the past to be forgotten. We must work to inaugurate a new era in the relations between Ethiopia and her neighbours, especially Italy; an era in which Ethiopia will be able with friendly assistance from the League to make rapid progress towards the modernisation of her administration and the development of her economic resources, and consequently towards the greater happiness and prosperity of her people. The noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, will realise from what I have said that in our suggestions for terms of peace at any rate we have not lost sight of the improvement of conditions in Abyssinia to which he referred.
The noble Marquess raised the question of a racial map. I admit I have not seen one, and I am not sure that it is entirely possible in view of the fact that some of the tribes are nomadic and therefore not necessarily in the same place for the whole period of the year, but resident for some period in one part of the country and, when that part dries up, move to another. When the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, suggested that a racial map
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usually entailed partition he should remember that these cases are usually those where it has been found that inhabitants on the fringe of one country are similar to those across the border belonging to another nationality. He will not suggest that the non-Amharic tribes are the same race as the Italians on the one side of the border or ourselves on the other. Therefore the temptation to go into the question of a division does not exist in the case of Abyssinia. I think a racial map might not get us very much further at the present moment. Although such a map is always interesting, I do not know whether in this case it would be of great value. I have only, in conclusion, to say that there are at present no Papers I can lay. Perhaps it does not quite look like that in view of the pile in front of me on this Box, but I think that most of them have in fact been published, and I do not think my noble friend would be edified if I suggested giving him the rest.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.
House adjourned at ten minutes before seven o'clock.