Lords Sitting of 8 November 1934

Preamble
The House met at a quarter past four of the clock, VISCOUNT MERSEY on the Woolsack.
LAND DRAINAGE PROVISIONAL ORDER (No. 1) BILL.
House in Committee (according to Order) on re-commitment of the Bill: Bill reported without amendment.

INCITEMENT TO DISAFFECTION BILL.
Order of the Day for the House to be put into Committee read.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Viscount Hailsham)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly:
[The EARL OF ONSLOW in the Chair.]
Clause 1:
Penalty on persons endeavouring to seduce members of His Majesty's forces from their duty or allegiance.
1. If any person maliciously and advisedly endeavours to seduce any member of His Majesty's forces from his duty or allegiance to His Majesty he shall be guilty of an offence under this Act.
LORD STRABOLGI LORD STRABOLGI moved, after "If," to insert "in time of war or national emergency." The noble Lord said: The Amendment which stands in the names of myself and my noble friend Lord Arnold is to insert, after the word "If" in line 6, the words "in time of war or national emergency." Let me say at once that if the noble Viscount in charge of the Bill so prefers it, I and my noble friend have no objection to these words being put in Clause 2 if the subsequent wording of Clause 2 is altered—that is a drafting matter—or, indeed, the words could go into a separate clause. The reason why it may be found more convenient to the Parliamentary draftsman to have it in another place is that at first sight any one reading the Bill amended as I propose might suppose that any evil-disposed person is able to incite the soldiers and sailors of the King to mutiny
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at other times than in time of war or national emergency, and that this is therefore a free licence to such people to do their worst. Of course your Lordships are aware that that is not the case at all. Indeed, the Secretary of State for War made it perfectly clear that the existing laws enable proceedings to be taken against any person or persons who maliciously and advisedly endeavour to seduce any member of His Majesty's forces.
That is not the complaint at all of the noble Viscount. He and his Government and his minions are armed with all the necessary powers for dealing with people who endeavour to seduce the forces. What they do want is additional powers to enter private houses in search of evidence. That is the object of the Bill as the noble Viscount with great lucidity, if I may say so, explained it to us on Second Reading. I think I have made it clear to your Lordships that the object of this Amendment is not to give any licence to people to do what they cannot do already, or to give greater freedom to people to commit mutinous acts except in time of war or national emergency. Therefore my noble friend and myself have no particular reason for inserting the words here so long as the intention can be made clear by putting them in somewhere else. But Clause 1 does govern the rest of the Bill. The very wide powers sought in Clause 2 refer to the offence committed under Clause 1, and therefore it seems to us it would be better to amend the wording of Clause 1 by the addition of these words, although, as I say, if they went in after "If" at the begginning of Clause 2, if that would have the same effect, and if the noble Viscount is advised that that would meet the case better, we should be quite content.
The reason for proposing this Amendment is that we want to narrow the scope of the Bill to a time of national emergency. Admittedly in war the Executive must have additional powers. Nowadays in war, when the whole nation is engaged, all personal liberty goes to the wall; that we know. It is one of the prices we pay for militarism; we have to accept that. Now we come to the case of a national emergency. A state of national emergency was defined in the 1920 Act—the Emergency Powers Act.
It may be declared by the Government of the day. It has certain effects. It corresponds to the general mobilisation order in a country enjoying conscription. I myself come under the proclamation of a national emergency, so does my noble friend below me, Lord Marley. When we ceased to be officers on the respective lists of our forces we went on to the emergency list. I am liable to be called up on a declaration of national emergency; I am automatically called up as an officer on the emergency list. All the reservists in all the forces are automatically called up in the same way.
Your Lordships will remember it was actually done once since the War. I believe I am right in saying it was in 1921, during the régime of the Coalition Government, when there was a very long-drawn-out mining strike or lock-out, and thousands and thousands of Army reservists, Naval reservists, and officers of other ranks were called up and spent weeks in camp. I believe my noble friend Lord Marley was called up on that occasion and spent weeks in camp. I was not called up because I was at that time a member of the other House and, with other members in a similar position to myself, was exempted. Otherwise two or three hundred Members of Parliament would have had to go, and I suppose the Government's majority would have been in danger, so they said DO Member of Parliament was to be called away. Whether that applied to your Lordships' House I do not know. It is clear what a time of national emergency is; it is declared, it is statutory, and it is quite circumscribed.
The Government in introducing this Bill declared that they wanted certain powers to deal with people who incite the troops, but nobody has pretended, nobody has claimed and nobody has complained that there is any unrest in the forces at the present time. I think that is common ground between us. The noble Marquess who leads the Liberal Party in this House (the Marquess of Reading) said that if a case was made out he would be prepared to give the Government additional powers. I think he had in mind the consideration that in case of war the Government might ask for exceptional powers, and the Liberal Party would support them in that demand, but in time of peace, in ordinary times like the present, when the country is still
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peaceful despite the three years rule of the present Government, in times like this, when the country is tranquil and when, apparently, on the horizon there is no real danger of any change in the situation—I do not mean political change, I mean the state of mind of the people of the country—why should these powers be granted to the Government, powers which nobody likes, which nobody defends, which the noble Viscount himself does not enjoy asking this House for?
The noble Viscount himself admits that this is a painful duty. He did not use those words exactly, but he rightly led your Lordships to suppose he did not enjoy asking for these powers of search, of invasion of the privacy of the home. He would not ask for these powers unless he had to. The only person who has enjoyed this Bill, in his own words, is the Prime Minister. He has voted for the Bill with the greatest pleasure. Nobody else, not the noble Viscount, not the Attorney-General in another place, not the Ministers who have attempted to defend the Bill in the country have enjoyed it. The Bill has been a necessity forced upon them, because otherwise, they say, they cannot deal with certain obnoxious persons. But obviously that is for a time of emergency, not now. There is no trouble now and, therefore, I offer this solution to the Government as a helpful way of getting them out of a difficulty, the difficulty being that they have aroused an amount of suspicion and indignation in the country.
I would also ask the noble Viscount and the members of the Government present to think about another aspect of this matter. Have they considered the effect of this Bill, and of the controversy it aroused long before it came to your Lordships' House? Have they considered the effect of this Bill on foreign opinion? This is very germane to the object of this Amendment. The foreigner reading our newspapers, following all that happens in this country, is made aware that the Government are apparently alarmed about the loyalty of the forces, that apparently the Admiralty is alarmed about the loyalty and discipline of the seamen, or that the Minister for War himself is alarmed about the reliability of the soldiers, or the Air Minister, for all I know, may have been alarmed as to what cadets and airmen generally

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may do if a few more leaflets are left about in their mess rooms and places which they frequent.
People are always ready to paint the picture of this country black. We saw a very good example of it three years ago when the present Government was formed. About our financial position at that time there were alarmist reports in the newspapers, very largely exaggerated for a deliberate purpose. Foreigners took them seriously. They thought this country was driving headlong to ruin. Then there was a real run on the gold stocks of the Bank of England. To-day what is the situation? I do not want to rake up the matter again, but we had one most unfortunate event in a squadron of His Majesty's Navy three years ago. That was terribly exaggerated by the American and foreign newspapers. I had newspapers sent to me from abroad which painted the picture in the blackest colours. In every report it was said that the Government was trembling in its shoes, and all the rest of it. Now what happens? Admittedly, it is not because of these events that this Bill was introduced. Again we were told that there were plots against the troops and their loyalty, plots against the discipline of the Navy and that these powers had irritated and outraged the good sense of the people of this country, and were asked for by the Government reluctantly.
The foreigner reading of these things says that there must be something very wrong indeed in England, and when such ideas are entertained abroad, naturally they weaken our prestige abroad, and weaken our influence for good—I hope it always will be an influence for good. If my words are accepted the situation will be very different. These are special powers that the Government feel they must have in case of a sudden emergency, the danger of war, whatever it is. But in peaceful England, in reasonably contented England in spite of all its present trials, that these things should be asked for is a danger signal in the eyes of our friends and certainly of our enemies abroad, and will be so represented. If these words which I propose are inserted then the position is made much clearer. I think they are reasonable words, and they will go far to remove some of the hostility to the Bill which persists and is likely to persist while it remains on the Statute Book. Quite sincerely I offer
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them as a means of helping the Government out of the nasty mess into which they have got themselves.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 6, after ("If") insert ("in time of war or national emergency").—(Lord Strabolgi.)
LORD MARLEY: I want very briefly to support the Amendment moved by my noble friend. But I first wish to correct him on a small point of detail in connection with our liability to service. It is quite true that I was on the reserve of officers and was called up on the occasion of the mining trouble in, I think, 1921. I well remember that at that time in my barracks there was another officer of similar rank to me who was a Conservative candidate for Parliament. He was considered too dangerous to be put actually in command of troops engaged in this ticklish job of aiding the civil power and I was therefore kept in barracks to look after him. We two ran the barracks between us. Each of us had, I think, four companies and we very successfully drew large sums of money, which in my case went to aid the strikers. Unfortunately I am no longer liable to be called up because I am not as young as the noble Lord behind me. I am over fifty and therefore, although I was on the reserve of officers, I am no longer liable to be called up.
The point about this Amendment is that the Government have not produced a single case of disaffection among the troops in time of peace which justifies the tremendous breadth of this first clause. The only disaffection I can remember was in the time of national emergency, when large numbers of men who were called up were called up at a time which prevented them carrying through their normal work to earn a living. Where I was then, in Hampshire, large numbers of men were engaged in agriculture, on smallholdings and allotments, and immense trouble and difficulty and considerable disaffection were caused amongst those who were called up. But apart from the national emergency and apart from a time of war, I have yet to learn of a single instance of disaffection resulting from the activities of any members of the public, or even members of your Lordships' House, which justifies the breadth of this Bill. We realise perfectly well the

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difficulties that face a Government when a war is imminent, but to propose this sort of measure at a time of profound peace without any evidence of its necessity seems to me to justify the suggestion made by a noble Lord during the Second Reading debate, that there is some sinister motive behind the Bill. I notice that while the noble Viscount has explained certain reasons which were not a justification for the Bill, he has been very careful to avoid giving the actual reasons why the Government have introduced this Bill. I think it at least advisable, and from the country's point of view most desirable, that the Government should explain why they have introduced this Bill and given Clause 1 such a breadth of application.
THE EARL OF KINNOULL: I have no wish to offer undue obstruction to this Bill, but I look upon this Amendment as one of the most important on the Paper. Reading through the report of my speech in the Second Reading debate I notice that I asked the Government if they had got the breeze up. Perhaps that was not a Parliamentary expression, but I would like to ask them now if they really have any fear of any future insurrection, because as the Bill stands now it would appear that they have such a fear. If my noble friend's Amendment is accepted then the Bill would only be used in real times of national emergency. Do the Government really suggest that there is going to be war to-morrow morning, let us say, or war during their term of office? Or do they suggest that Sir Oswald Mosley and his Blackshirts are going to cause insurrection? Or have they any real fear, as would appear from Second Reading speeches, of the influence of Moscow and that our Communists are going to start trouble in the country?
I have yet to learn that Communists in this country have gained sufficient power to be taken really seriously. I have yet to learn that even Sir Oswald Mosley, in spite of the action of police in coming out with their autogiro and employing such enormous numbers of men at the Hyde Park rally, is a real force in the country. It may be that the Government are frightened either of him or the Communists, but if they are frightened neither of him nor the Communists, why will they not accept this exceedingly reasonable Amendment? If
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this Bill had been introduced in 1914, before the War, one would have understood it. One would have understood in those days that rebellion in Ulster really necessitated a Bill of this description. But to-day there is no budding revolution that I have heard of in this country. It may be that the Cabinet know more about it, and if that be the case I hope the noble Viscount will tell us where this budding revolution is coming from.
There is one other point to which I would like to refer, and that is the influence of this Bill on foreign opinion. As my noble friend has stated, the introduction of Bills like this naturally has a great effect on the foreign public. It is quite possible, I think, that this Bill may be regarded in Germany as the thin end of the wedge of Fascism. If the Government agree to accept this Amendment it will make it perfectly clear that we are not really worried at the present moment about the condition of affairs here. One would have thought that the Government, instead of introducing a Bill of this description—which I think I may say is liked by very few people in the country—would have shown more interest in the Poor Law, for instance, in the depressed areas, in the people who are living on the verge of starvation to-day. Not a bit of it. They are interested in Bills to give them these powers which in my belief, and I think in the view of all my noble friends, are certainly unnecessary. I very sincerely hope that the Government will accept this Amendment and make it clear, not only to the public of England, but to the public in foreign countries, that they do not suspect in the future any uprising in England, that the Bill is only for a time of real emergency and not for to-day.
LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE: I should like to emphasise one of the points made by my noble friends because I think it is really a point of substance. It is the fact—I am afraid the damage has been done already—that this Bill has given the impression abroad that the Government are nervous. I think that is extremely unfortunate, because there is no justification for it whatsoever. I entirely agree with what my noble friend Lord Strabolgi said with regard to the condition of His Majesty's forces, and

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that no sort of evidence has been produced that the pamphlets distributed have had the smallest effect. I heard of one instance where a leaflet of this description had been circulated and was brought on board one of His Majesty's ships. The captain was told that this leaflet was being circulated to his men, and his only reply was: "Pin it up on the notice board," so that everybody might laugh at it. That is the real spirit in which the sort of leaflet which is being distributed should be taken. If the noble Viscount would accept this Amendment, it would at any rate show that the Government did not intend to widen the scope of this Bill by applying it to ordinary peaceful times when there is absolutely no justification for it, but intended to restrict it to moments when there was an emergency.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: When the noble Viscount replies I hope he will express the view of the Government in relation to the addition of the words proposed by the present Amendment. What strikes me, and what I certainly would like him to consider, is that if these words are introduced in Clause 1, the difficulty will be that they relate to an offence which is already an offence but will limit the offence to a time of national emergency or a time of war. That will be a most unfortunate result. I rather gathered from what fell from the noble Lord who moved the Amendment that he had some doubts about the insertion of these words in this clause. Their insertion, of course, would have an effect upon the whole Bill. We know quite well that the law as it at present stands is quite sufficient to meet the offence. There is no doubt about that, and we are not discussing that. There is no controversy upon it; the Government are of the same opinion. But it is still difficult to understand why it was necessary to introduce this clause at all.
The words are rather different from those of the Acts as they stand at the present day. I am not. discussing that matter because I have already made some observations upon it, but I am concerned about the question of the addition of these words, and I really would ask the noble Viscount to tell us whether I would not be right in stating (as I think I am alter the short consideration that I have been able to give to it) that the effect of
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the proposed insertion would be to limit this offence to a time of war. Of course in time of war you do not need the limitation because an offence of this character would be dealt with at once by emergency legislation, but any addition here would certainly interfere with the law as it at present stands. If that is right, this insertion must be out of place here. When we come to discuss it in relation to search I shall have some other observations to make, but I would prefer to wait until then and until we know where we are with regard to this Amendment.
LORD STRABOLGI: Would it be better if this Amendment were withdrawn and, if the Lord Chairman would permit, if it were moved in line 10 after the word "If" in Clause 2? I think if my noble friend behind me would agree to that being done it would be better. I would be quite willing to do that. I have seen the difficulty which the noble Marquess has mentioned and have tried to express it.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (VISCOUNT HAILSHAM): As long as we do not have the same speeches over again on line 10 I have no objection.
LORD SNELL: We are entitled to say what we like on line 10.
LORD STRABOLGI: No, I am prepared formally to move if the Lord Chairman will allow me to do that?
THE LORD CHAIRMAN: If the noble Lord would withdraw the Amendment here and hand in his Amendment in another place in the form of a manuscript Amendment, I think that would be the best way of carrying out the wishes of your Lordships.
LORD STRABOLGI: I am much obliged to the noble Earl. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL THE EARL OF LISTOWEL moved, after "seduce", to insert "other than by an article in a newspaper". The noble Earl said: The importance of this Amendment is that as Clause 1 stands at the present moment it may be interpreted by our Courts of Law so as to trespass very considerably upon the freedom of the Press to produce in its

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columns any ideas it thinks fit, and upon the freedom of individuals to express in public ideas which are likely to be reported in the columns of the Press. That is the object of having a proviso to exclude the daily Press from the operation of this clause. Take an example of what might happen if newspapers were to fall in the same category as pamphlets which might be circulated among the troops or in the Navy. A newspaper might contain, for instance, a pacifist article, an article urging that force should be used in no circumstances, or an article written by a champion of one of the political theories such as anarchism, syndicalism or communism, which maintains that change and progress can only come about by sudden leaps and, if necessary, by the use of force. If a newspaper were to contain a purely theoretical article of that kind and if a copy of that paper were to fall into the hands of a member of His Majesty's forces, then immediately the newspaper would become legally liable. This liability would clearly extend to newsagents, to the publishers if they had copies of the paper, to the printers who put the article in type and to journalists who might contribute to the paper, not to mention those public men whose speeches were reported, and who in that way became liable to prosecution.
The freedom of the Press to express any views it chooses is surely one of our most ancient and most precious liberties. If we look back we shall see that some of our greatest men have always stood for absolute and unlimited freedom for people to express in print and in the daily Press whatever views they may seriously hold. Milton, writing on a similar subject, asserted that to kill a book was worse than to kill a living individual, and surely the same thing applies to a newspaper article if that article contains ideas—general ideas, political ideas, philosophical or religious ideas—which naturally and inevitably are infinitely more important than the mere physical organism which they happen to inhabit. It is essential that the Press should be free, not merely because freedom is of value for all civilised countries and for all cultured individuals, but because it is impossible to run a country on democratic lines or to govern by persuasion and argument unless ideas
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are able to circulate without any intervention, without any interruption, without any curtailment by the executive strength of the State.
After all, a soldier or a sailor is a citizen as well as a member of His Majesty's defence forces, and as a citizen he is entitled to know every idea which political Parties or religious groups may wish to express, in order that when the time comes for him to exercise his right and privilege of registering a vote he may be able to perform the essential function of citizenship, which is to contribute an instructive judgment to the public good. The noble Viscount who is answering on behalf of the Government may quite possibly say that these fears are absolutely unjustified, that this clause will never be interpreted so as to limit or curtail the freedom of the Press, and the freedom of individuals to express themselves in public. I am not questioning for a moment the sincerity of the noble Viscount when he makes that answer for himself I am not questioning for a moment the honesty of the Government which he supports, if he claims that that is their view; but on the other hand, if this clause does not intend to alter the existing law surely the Amendment is perfectly harmless.
Surely it can be made clear to the public that the Government do not intend to make any inroad upon the freedom of the Press. Surely it can be made perfectly plain that the Government can deal with incitement to mutiny or revolt in the Press by the existing laws, and that this particular measure does not alter the situation at all. In that case I hope the Government will be ready to accept the Amendment. On the other hand, I think we must consider the future as well as the present, and it may not be altogether improbable to say that Governments are bound to change in the future, and that even National Governments are bound to be superseded by other Governments. In that case emergencies may arise when the clause in question will be entirely differently interpreted. For instance, we see in Europe a wave of dictatorship, and democracy everywhere supplanted. Supposing a Government in this country were to decide that it wished to rule alone and without opposition. It could then very easily use this Bill to crush its opponents, by making them guilty of sedition and incitement, and in that case

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we should see what has happened everywhere—namely, the armed forces being made the blind tool of the existing régime, when it tries to stamp out its enemies in order to establish its supremacy once for all.
That is one possibility. Another is this. Supposing we are in a situation where war may be declared. The only war in which we can participate, owing to our present international obligations, is a war in defence of the collective peace system. We are pledged to that. But so far no war has been fought in defence of a collective peace system. Is it not possible that an occasion may arise, similar to those that have arisen in the past, when, owing to economic interests in other parts of the world and rivalries with other great. Powers, or crises arising from our great capital. possessions abroad, the Government decides that it will enter into a private war and neglect the general obligations into which it has entered? In those circumstances, surely it would be the duty of those who believe in our existing obligations to assert and express their views as strongly as possible; but in order to make certain that they will have the troops at their command so soon as the ultimatum is sent the Government will not be over-scrupulous, and will not respect the precedents set up by preceding Governments. It may easily stamp out all articles produced in the Press, and all the individuals who try to speak in favour of abstaining from a war that would in the circumstances be a criminal war. On those grounds I am moving this Amendment, and I sincerely hope the Government will see its way to insert a few words to make it explicit that no daily paper will be subject to legal proceedings under this Act.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 7,, after ("seduce") insert ("other than by an article in a newspaper").—(The Earl of Listowel.)
LORD ALLEN OF HURTWOOD: I would like to make a comment on the proposition which has been put, because I find it exceedingly confusing. I happen to be a critic of this Bill, as I said on the Second Reading, and hope to do what I can to make it better than it is, but I cannot understand what the noble Earl is really standing for. Does he or does he not condemn the crime envisaged in
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this Bill? If he presses the Amendment which he has moved it surely means that he does not condemn the crime, because if that crime can be managed to be confined to a newspaper, everyone who wishes to commit this crime will cease to publish pamphlets and leaflets and will confine himself to publishing newspapers, and he will be able to carry on propaganda of this kind. So far as I am concerned, as I said on the Second Reading, I condemn this crime without qualification at all.
The thing that seems to me to be wrong about the Bill is the right of search and the powers conferred upon the Executive, but that the crime itself is reprehensible, and one that would be most disastrous to noble Lords opposite, when they perhaps become members of a Government, I feel confident. Therefore I put, it to the noble Earl that he is falling into the same difficulty as the noble Lord who has just had to withdraw his Amendment in order to move it on a later clause. The first clause of this Bill is a good clause. It is a clause which condemns the crime, and I think my noble friend opposite made a bad slip, which he recognised perfectly well when he had to withdraw his Amendment. Now the noble Earl also is doing nothing more than this, that under a disguise of belief in the liberty of the Press he proposes to leave open the opportunity of committing a crime which I believe is a crime noble Lords on both sides of the House ought definitely to condemn.
LORD SNELL: I hope your Lordships will not accept the last definition of the purpose or result of this Amendment should it be carried. The difficulty is really not that which the noble Lord opposite has placed before your Lordships' House, and I trust the Government will not reject this Amendment without sonic serious consideration. The facts, as I understand them, are that those who are in responsible positions in the Press world are alarmed at the possibilities of trouble coming to them under this particular Bill. We on this side of the House are not accustomed to receive from the Press any favours. We are thankful if we are fairly reported, and if we are noticed at all; but we get no gratuities from the Press. Nevertheless we believe that the Press is an honorable profession, and, though it may be as liable

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to fall into error as other people, yet the honour of the craft of a journalist is one that will always be in the minds of those responsible at least for the English Press. Now the difficulty is really that of estimating properly what is dangerous in those circumstances and what is not. An editor in good faith may allow a comment which some military minded person with information or with prejudices that the editor has not at his disposal may think harmful; then the whole of the Press is involved. We submit that the full purpose of His Majesty's Government would be served if it were to make this difference in regard to the liberty of the Press. We have had singularly little in modern British history to complain of in regard to the faults of the Press and I think we should he doing no injury to the nation, and removing from those who are responsible for the Press a great anxiety, if this Amendment were accepted.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: When I listen to the speeches of honourable members opposite I begin to despair of inducing noble Lords on that side of the House either to read the Bill or to form the faintest idea of what is in it. The noble Lord who moved the Amendment told us that if a newspaper published an opinion as to Fascism or something of that kind in perfect good faith and meaning no harm, and some malicious or foolish person were to introduce that into the hands of a soldier or sailor, the writer in the newspaper, and the speaker of the speech which was reported in the newspaper, and the printer of the newspaper all became liable for prosecution under this Bill. Well, he has only got to look at the Bill to see how ludicrous that suggestion is, because the Bill which he is purporting to amend begins by saying that
"If any person maliciously and advisedly endeavours to seduce any member of His Majesty's forces from his duty or allegiance to His Majesty, he shall be guilty of an offence …"
It is quite obvious that the man who prints a newspaper for general circulation, without any intent of endeavouring to seduce a member of His Majesty's forces does not become guilty of a malicious and advised endeavour to seduce that member because someone, without his knowledge or consent or approval, hands the newspaper in question
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to a soldier or a sailor. The thing has only to be stated to show that it is wholly unreasonable.
There are two or three observations, and only two or three, that I want to make about this. In the first place the noble Earl professed to be a champion of the liberty of the Press, and he gave vent to noble sentiments about the importance of the preservation of that liberty. The Press has never had liberty to commit crime. There has never been a licence to the newspapers to commit criminal offences which other people are forbidden to commit. Then he says: "Why do you not insert this in order to show that you do not mean to alter the law?" But, of course, if you were to put in these words and to make this the only enactment, you would be altering the law. The present law is in the 1797 Act, which says that
"any person who shall maliciously and advisedly endeavour to seduce any person or persons serving in His Majesty's forces, by sea or land, from his or their duty and allegiance to His Majesty, or to incite or stir up any such person or persons to commit any act of mutiny …"
shall be guilty. Those words, with the exception of "and" for "or," are the same words as are reproduced here, and therefore the only effect of the noble Earl's Amendment would be that in cases where a newspaper did it you would have to prosecute under the 1797 Act, and where anybody except a newspaper did it you could prosecute, if you liked, under this Bill. That seems to me a ludicrous and absurd result.
There is further the point which was made on this side of the House, that if you pass this Amendment any one who wanted to seduce His Majesty's forces would proceed to put what he wanted to say in a newspaper, and this has been done in the following appeal addressed to soldiers:
"Let us use the knowledge of arms which they give us … and the arms themselves … not to defend these rulers from the wrath of the workers, not to help them bolster up their exploiting, profit-making system, but, when the opportunity presents itself, to overthrow their rule, and, in unity with our fellow workers, to establish a free, Socialist Britain."
There are half a dozen more equally choice examples. That is in a newspaper called the Soldier's Voice. Unfortunately for the preservation of the law, neither

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the publisher nor the printer ventured to put his name on it. Possibly when this Bill becomes law they may find that that practice is not quite so effective as it is at present. But I read that to your Lordships merely as a sample of equally poisonous trash that, could appear in a week's time if you were so foolish as to say that anybody may endeavour to seduce members of His Majesty's forces from their duty or allegiance, so long as they do it in a newspaper. That is the Amendment, which your Lordships are asked to accept, and you will not be surprised if I say that the Government are unable to accept it.
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: I trust that, even after that redoubtable onslaught, I may be allowed to add a few words which may not perhaps appear quite unreasonable. In the first place, I claim that what I said was, not deliberately but clearly, misinterpreted by my noble friend Lord Allen of Hurtwood. I was not claiming that newspapers should enjoy a special privilege enjoyed by no one else. No, I was simply saying that newspapers, in so far as they incited to mutiny, could be perfectly well dealt with under the existing law. And the noble Viscount himself, in quoting from a certain newspaper, said that unfortunately the publisher and minter had not added their names. He implied that, if they had, the Government could have taken legal proceedings. And what we maintain is that our present law is adequate to deal with seditious articles and incitements to mutiny that may appear in any quarter, and that we are not justified,
either by the present circumstances or in view of what may happen in the future, in further curtailing the freedom of the Press. That is all that we are asserting on this side, and I hope that now it is no longer open to misinterpretation.
The noble Viscount made it plain that those only could be guilty who had been proved guilty of entertaining in their minds the intention of seducing His Majesty's forces. Surely if we look at Clause 2 we shall find that accomplices in the act of seduction are included. I do not think the noble Viscount will challenge that interpretation of the Bill. He said I was misreading it; I claim that understood it perfectly. Accomplices are included, and I think that anyone who did not actively prevent someone else who to his knowledge intended to seduce His Majesty's forces, would equally be liable to prosecution. The net, therefore, is thrown very wide, and I do not believe I exaggerated when I said that all those who took part in the production of an article which was considered seditious, from the editor of the newspaper to the printer, the clerk, the typist, and so one could, by an interpretation of this Bill which I am glad to think the noble Viscount and the Government will never put upon it, be included. I therefore feel that the reasons that led me to put down this Amendment have not been weakened by what your Lordships have already heard.
On Question, Whether the said words shall be there inserted?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 8; Not-Contents, 85.

CONTENTS.

Arnold, L.

Hay, L. (E. Kinnoull.) [Teller]

Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L.

Faringdon, L.

Snell, L.

Hare, L. (E. Listowel.)

Marley, L. [Teller.]

Strabolgi, L.

NOT-CONTENTS.

Aberdeen and Temair, M.

Munster, E.

Truro, L. Bp.

Exeter, M.

Onslow, E.

Reading, M.

Plymouth, E.

Abinger, L.

Zetland, M.

Rothes, E.

Alness, L.

Scarbrough, E.

Allen of Hurtwood, L.

Airlie, E.

Stanhope, E.

Alvingham, L.

Dudley, E.

Vane, E. (M. Londonderry.)

Annaly, L.

Feversham, E.

Ypres, E.

Balfour of Burleigh, L.

Harrowby, E.

Barnard, L.

Iddesleigh, E.

Astor, V.

Biddulph, L.

Jellicoe, E.

Bertie of Thame, V.

Brougham and Vaux, L.

Lucan, E. [Teller.]

Elibank, V.

Carnock, L.

Malmesbury, E.

Goschen, V.

Clanwilliam, L. (E. Clanwilliam.)

Midleton, E.

Hailsham, V.

Morton, E.

Mersey, V.

Clwyd, L.

Mount Edgcumbe, E.

Conway of Allington, L.

Cottesloe, L.

Hutchison of Montrose, L.

Rennell, L.

Cranworth, L.

Jessel, L.

Rochester, L.

Danesfort, L.

Kilmaine, L.

Rockley, L.

Desborough, L.

Latymer, L.

Ruthven of Gowrie, L.

Doverdale, L.

Lawrence, L.

Saltersford, L. (E. Courtown.)

Eltisley, L.

Lloyd, L.

Sandhurst, L.

Elton, L.

Marks, L.

Southampton, L.

Gage, L. (V. Gage.) [Teller.]

Merrivale, L.

Stanmore, L.

Greville, L.

Middleton, L.

Strachie, L.

Hamilton of Dalzell, L.

Ormonde, L. (M. Ormonde.)

Strathcona and Mount Royal, L.

Harris, L.

Polwarth, L.

Hawke, L.

Rankeillour, L.

Templemore, L.

Howard of Glossop, L.

Redesdale, L.

Thurlow, L.

Howard of Penrith, L.

Remnant, L.

Wigan, L. (E. Crawford.)

Wolverton, L.

Resolved in the negative and Amendment disagreed to accordingly.
LORD ARNOLD LORD ARNOLD moved to substitute "and" for "or." The noble Lord said: Despite the rejection of the Amendment of my noble friend, I am afraid it will be necessary for me to keep your Lordships for some little time upon the present Amendment. We were not surprised that we were defeated in the Division Lobby. We are used to that in your Lordships' House. It does not really perturb us, and we console ourselves with the saying, "The greater the majority, the greater the scandal." This Amendment is one of supreme importance—how important I did not fully realise until the speech of the noble Viscount in reply to the last Amendment. The noble Viscount has constantly told noble Lords who do not agree with him that they ought to read the Bill. In his forceful way—I use that expression quite politely—he keeps telling everybody that they do not know the Bill, and that they ought to read the Bill. I can prove to your Lordships that the noble Viscount does not know the Bill and does not know it in a most vital particular. Not only so, but the Attorney-General did not know it until it was pointed out to him. This Amendment which I have down in Clause 1 to change the crime of seducing from "duty or allegiance" to that of seducing from "duty and allegiance," is obviously one of very great moment. Yet, will it be believed, when this Amendment was moved in another place it was quite clear the Government had not realised its significance. On the Second Reading it was stated by the Attorney-General, and the noble Viscount has said the same thing this afternoon, that the Bill in Clause 1 merely re-enacts what is law to-day. What the noble Viscount said in reply to my noble friend was that the Bill merely re-enacts the words of the
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Act of 1797. The noble Viscount is entirely wrong.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: The noble Lord did not hear me. I turned to the noble Marquess and said subject to the point about "and" and "or" which we had already discussed, and which we are to discuss in a moment.
LORD ARNOLD: I am sorry but that did not reach these Benches. If the noble Viscount said that I accept it, but the Attorney-General did not know that. He said three times that it was the same. Again, he said that Clause 1 of the Bill merely set out that which was already an offence, and that they were re-enacting in Clause 1 of the Bill what was already contained in the Incitement to Mutiny Act. There are many extraordinary things about this extraordinary Bill and one of the most extraordinary is that the Minister in charge of the Bill until it came up here had, if I may say so, to be instructed as to the significance of the words which were in the Bill. When this matter was being discussed in another place he first of all said he had not thought there was anything in it, that it was merely a niggling point, but after listening to the debate he said he thought there was a great deal more in it. The noble Viscount himself, when he was speaking on Tuesday, informed your Lordships that they were very much surprised in Government circles that the Bill had aroused the opposition which it has aroused. That shows, if I may say so, that they are entirely out of touch with the feeling of the country, and, apparently, entirely ignorant of the devotion of large sections of the people not confined to these Benches, or this Party, but to all Parties, to certain principles which this Bill undoubtedly assails.
The noble Viscount endeavoured on Tuesday to make out that this Bill was

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merely, as he said, re-enacting the Act of 1797, but the Bill goes very much further than that, as I shall show your Lordships. The words which I complain of, the words "duty or allegiance," instead of "duty and allegiance" quite obviously create two offences instead of one. There cannot be any dispute about that. Duty is not the same thing as allegiance for this purpose. The Bill, I repeat, creates two offences instead of one. That, again, is quite counter to what the Attorney-General has said. He has implied that it creates no new offence. He said it was merely a procedure Bill. That is not so. Quite obviously there is a vast difference between endeavouring to seduce a soldier from his duty and allegiance and endeavouring to seduce him from his duty alone. In 1914 great attempts were made, and to some extent I think they succeeded, to seduce soldiers from their duty.
The noble Lord, Lord Carson, for whom I personally have a great respect, although I differ from him politically, was so convinced in his own mind of the seriousness of the situation from his point of view that he went so far as to say he believed the Ulster Volunteers were justified to the very last extremity in using force or any other means in their power. He added:
"I know that that is a serious statement to make. I know what it involves."
He was quite deliberate; he knew all about it. He went on:
"I have the honour to be a Privy Councillor of His Majesty in Ireland and in England. I have the honour to be a K.C., and I believe we are morally justified in every step we take to protect our interests."
Similar speeches were made by other highly placed persons, but those persons were not prosecuted because we know that in this country there is one law for the rich and another for the poor. My point is this. Those words were used to seduce soldiers from their duty but not to seduce them from their allegiance to His Majesty. Under this Bill a man could be prosecuted for doing that because he could be prosecuted for seducing a soldier from duty apart from allegiance. That is therefore a very specific example of the very material and very vital difference between the phrases in this Bill and the Act.
An appeal to soldiers not to shoot down strikers, which is something we can all
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understand because it is a serious thing to call on men to shoot down, it may be, their own brothers or fathers or relatives in an industrial dispute, in which all the rights may be on the side of the strikers, would be an attempt to seduce soldiers from their duty, but not an attempt to seduce them from allegiance to His Majesty. This Bill makes that a definite offence. When you had to prove that it was an attempt not only to seduce from duty but to seduce from duty and allegiance at the same time, that was a very different state of things. It is, apparently, the Communists whom the noble Viscount has in his mind. They seem to trouble him so much that he talks about them by day and no doubt dreams about them at night. The activity of the Communists is, I personally believe, of most minute and quite unimportant dimensions, but an appeal by Communists, if there is such an appeal, to troops not merely to disobey orders but to overthrow the existing order of society, including the Monarchy, is an attempt to seduce soldiers both from their duty and allegiance and that would come under the 1797 Act on which the Government rely.
The noble Viscount apparently has not appreciated, and certainly the Attorney-General did not appreciate, that the Act and this Bill are entirely and fundamentally different. It is, therefore, not true to represent this as a small Bill or a trivial Bill, which is only providing a different procedure for dealing with the same offence. It is going to create an entirely different offence which may have most serious consequences, as I think I shall be able to prove to your Lordships. Why has the change been made? There is a great deal more to be said about it. The noble Earl, Lord Listowel, spoke about it and so did the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, and the noble Marquess, Lord Reading. There is not the slightest evidence of any need for change in the law. One of the weakest things I have ever heard—and I have heard many weak things in the course of a very long experience—was the explanation of the noble Viscount. He said there had not been any offence but there might he. Good heavens! if we are going to pass legislation to deal with every offence that might be committed Parliament will certainly break down. Nothing more preposterous has been put before a serious

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legislative assembly. There is no evidence that the Bill is required in the smallest degree.
Why we on these Benches are particularly opposed to this Bill is that in the form in which it now stands it may be adjudged a crime to seduce a soldier simply from his duty and not from his allegiance. If that is to be an offence—it has not been hitherto—then this Bill is undoubtedly a very serious matter from the point of view of pacifists and pacifist propaganda. That is a point with which I want to deal in some detail if your Lordships will be good enough to listen to me. I hope the noble Viscount will not talk about the Naval Discipline Act, 1866, or about the Army Act, where the words are the same. Those Acts apply only to men in the Service. They have no application to the general mass of the people. I think that the Naval Discipline Act of 1866 only applies to people actually on board ship.
Loan STRABOLGI: Borne on the books of a ship.
LORD ARNOLD: At any rate it applies only to Service men and not to ordinary citizens. A very large number of pacifists, most highly respected people, are extremely perturbed about the possibility because they consider the Bill may very easily be used against pacifists. The Society of Friends dealt with this matter only on Tuesday. The most reverend Primate, in the course of his observations, was good enough to say that he had a very great respect for the Society of Friends. He does not do much to assist them in their main propaganda, which is that of propagating peace, but he says that he has a great respect for them. This is the minute which they passed at a meeting on Tuesday:
"The Committee of the Society of Friends which is considering the Incitement to Disaffection Bill desires to make it quite clear that their opposition to the whole underlying principle of the Bill remains unchanged in spite of the Amendments which have removed some of its most glaring defects. Their opposition is not based mainly on the ground that it might interfere with their own religious propaganda, but on the much wider view of the paramount right of all citizens to hold and spread their seriously considered opinions in a peaceable manner without interference either from the Executive Government or from the Police. They regard the Bill as an attempt to re-establish in peace time the
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limitations on free speech which were such a deplorable feature of the war period."
That is signed by Mr. Harold J. Morland, Clerk of the Committee of the Society of Friends. Those views are shared by many people in the country.
I want to take a specific example to try to get this thing down to something concrete which cannot be evaded by the noble Viscount, because we all know he is a very airy debater. It is very easy for him to try to pass things off with the full Benches he has behind him, always ready to cheer anything he says if he wants them to do so. I am going, if your Lordships will listen to me, to take a specific statement by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Birmingham. It was dealt with to some extent by the noble Lord, Lord Allen of Hurtwood, and the most reverend Primate, but I think we should endeavour to get a little more light on the situation. The Bishop of Birmingham made this statement in regard to the Bill:
"By the means of a letter to an unnamed correspondent, the Attorney-General has attempted to allay the profound misgivings aroused among all workers for peace and among many lovers of freedom by the Incitement to Disaffection Bill. Incidentally, he referred to my own criticism of the measure, and suggests that I should look at the Bill more carefully. I have re-examined the Bill carefully and my objection to it remains.
"I still fear that under its vague provisions practically any worker for peace in time of war could by it be condemned. An active pacifist would desire the war to cease. He would say so publicly, knowing that his words might reach members of His Majesty's forces. If challenged, he would have to admit that his concern was not with abstract theory, but with the actual conflict, and that his wish was that the troops—practically all his adult male fellow citizens—should cease from fighting. Would he not be held at his trial to have been endeavouring maliciously and advisedly to seduce members of His Majesty's forces from their duty and allegiance? If the phrase of the Act were duty and allegiance, the accused pacifist might escape because lie could urge that he desired the troops to maintain their allegiance to the Sovereign. But this change the Attorney-General has refused to sponsor."
The Bishop of Birmingham went on later in his statement to say:
"To clear up the obscurity which surrounds this Bill, I would put a concrete question to Sir Thomas Inskip. I regard the present policy of the Government of India towards the tribes on the North-West frontier with abhorrence. These tribesmen, with their wives and children, suffer periodi-

225
cally from famine, and then the men raid the more fertile plains. The Government would do well to drive roads up their valleys, to develop their agriculture and to start domestic industries among them.
"Such a policy has not been attempted. Instead, whenever there are signs of disaffection, bombing aeroplanes are sent up, which have to fly high to escape bullets and consequently rain down indiscriminate destruction. I desire that this barbarism should cease. Knowing that my words, as published in the English Press, may reach members of the Royal Air Force concerned, I say that I cannot link that a Christian man should act under orders in this way. Naturally, I should be glad if officers and men represented to the political authorities that they felt unable to be the instruments of this policy. Am I not, by these words, committing an offence under Section 1 of the proposed Bill?
"Further, if my wife, with intent to spread my opinions has in her possession a marked copy of a newspaper containing the statement which I have just made, would she rot he guilty of an offence under Section 2 of the Act, and might we not each be fined £200, and also each be given two years imprisonment? Of course, I presume that, if the Bill passes into law, the Government will not take action against me for this promulgation of my views."
Of course they will not. As I have said, there is one law for the rich and one for the poor. The Bishop will be safe, but that does not mean that other people will be safe.
The most reverend Primate on the last occasion quoted what the Attorney-General said about this matter. It was to the effect—I am quoting the most reverend Primate's words from the OFFICIAL REPORT—that
"he would only bring himself under this Bill if it could be proved that he had conveyed or caused to be conveyed or had a deliberate intention to convey his statement to actual members of the Air Force so as to induce them to disobey their orders."
In short, unless you definitely go to a member or members of the forces with that object and intent there is no offence. But the Bill does not say that at all, and the point I am making is that it does not matter twopence what the Attorney-General says, and it does not matter a brass farthing what the noble Viscount says. This Bill will be interpreted by the Courts, and the noble Viscount knows as well as I do that it is absolutely beside the point to say that the Attorney-General said so and so in the House of Commons or that the noble Viscount said so and so in the House of Lords. The Courts would not pay the
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slightest attention. In fact, the late Lord Sumner, I suppose one of the greatest Judges of modern times, according to a note which was contributed to The Times after Lord Sumner's death, almost took a delight in construing Acts, if he could, in a sense different from, what seemed to he the intention of Parliament. That is the statement made in The Times. I think it is broadly correct, but it can be turned up by anybody. It was a very interesting notice which appeared after the lamented death of Lord Sumner not very long ago.
Therefore the most reverend Primate is entirely wrong if he is relying upon what the learned Attorney-General said or upon what the noble Viscount may say. The Bill is here, and that is what matters, and how it will be interpreted by Judges and by magistrates. What does the Bill say The Bill does not say anything about going to soldiers and sailors at all. It does not mention them in that sense, but it says, "if any person maliciously and advisedly"—we have been told by those Judges that that means with intent, or deliberately, that is all. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Birmingham admits that he did it deliberately and he says he meant it to succeed. He does not conceal his aim. The Bill says:
"If any person maliciously and advisedly endeavours to seduce any member of His Majesty's forces from his duty or allegiance to His Majesty he shall be guilty of an offence under this Act."
That is what the Bill says, and I say that undoubtedly in certain circumstances, particularly if you were getting near a time of war, if some person—not the right reverend Prelate, not a person so highly placed, but some more ordinary person—made a speech like that near Aldershot, he would not have a cat's chance before many county benches—not a cat's chance. They would convict him under these words, and if you quoted to them what the Attorney-General or what the noble Viscount said they would simply laugh at you.
Your Lordships know that what I say is perfectly true, and that is why we have to be so very careful in drafting these Acts. The responsibility rests upon us, because Courts will interpret the words according to their own views, and if we have the kind of mentality which the noble

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Lord, Lord Allen, exposed on Tuesday in his searching speech in regard to the foreign policy of the Labour Party—the kind of mentality which, for instance, the noble Viscount has—what chance would a pacifist have before a Judge? Not the slightest. But my contention is that pacifist propaganda if it is intended to seduce at all—which may be matter for much argument—at any rate can only be held to be seducing from duty, not from duty and allegiance. Therefore it has not hitherto really been an offence; but it may become an offence in future.
Look at the fears which this Bill has aroused. Already this has happened: printers do not know where they are and do not know what they may print. They cannot tell what the Courts will say. Here is a very influentially signed letter which is in the Press only this morning and I feel it necessary to read it to your Lordships because it is so apposite to what I am saying:
"During the debates on the Incitement to Disaffection Bill assurances have repeatedly been given on behalf of the Government that this Bill was solely designed to enable the Government to deal more efficiently with those who deliberately attempt to spread disaffection among members of His Majesty's forces, and was not intended to operate, nor would in fact operate, to check the expression of opinion or anti-war propaganda, however unqualified.
"Publishers are not concerned with politics as such, but they are very much concerned with free expression of opinion, and many of us have felt apprehension that the effect of the Bill would not he confined to the former laudable purpose. There is, unfortunately, already evidence that this is the case.
"During the past weeks the proofs of a children's annual"—
a children's annual !—
"have been returned to the publisher with a letter from the printer saying that certain marked passages could not safely be printed in view of the fact that the Incitement to Disaffection Bill would already be law by the time the annual appeared. The passages in question undoubtedly contain anti-war propaganda, which it is not for us either to defend or to criticise; but it is clear that the annual itself is written for children and equally clear that it is not addressed to, or intended for circulation among, members of His Majesty's forces. Yet we feel sure that, in view of the vague wording of the Bill"—
that is what I am complaining of—
"this incident will not be an isolated one and that the result of the Bill, as it stands to-day, will be to impose a severe burden on both printers and publishers and in the
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end to set up what will in fact be a secret, unofficial, and most embarrassing form of censorship exercised by printers (who will, quite naturally, have regard to the principle of 'safety first') over the publication of any literature of an anti-militarist character.
"This aspect of the Bill has been touched upon but not fully considered in the House of Commons. The Bill is now proceeding to its final stages in the House of Lords."
That is why I trouble your Lordships with this.
"We hope that the Upper House,"—
I do not altogether endorse this—
"whose tradition has been to pay particular attention to the constitutional safeguards of British liberties, will so amend the Bill as to relieve publishers from this dangerous and undesirable innovation. In so doing it will only be carrying out the avowed and, we have no doubt, sincere desire of the Government to limit the scope of the Bill to its ostensible purpose."
That letter is signed by Jonathan Cape, Hugh R. Dent, Geoffrey Faber, George G. Harrap, Allen Lane, Stanley Unwin, and Leonard Woolf.
Your Lordships will see that the Bill is already at work; it is stopping what has been hitherto perfectly legitimate propaganda, which is going to be a crime, or may in the future be adjudged a crime. Pacifism hitherto has not been a crime. Take my noble friend Lord Ponsonby who leads us on these Benches. He takes the view—and many people, and a growing number of people, agree with him—that as things are going the only end of war can come when a sufficient number of men in each country say that they will not fight. He is trying to increase that number. I very well remember during the course of the War, in the smoke room in another place, discussing the situation with a man who had no sympathy whatever with conscientious objectors. He made the point that "the whole difficulty about conscientious objectors is that there are not enough of them; if there had been more of them we should not have had the war at all." That is exactly what my noble friend Lord Ponsonby thinks, and that is what he is preaching and has preached hitherto with great success. He begs men not to fight.
That may be adjudged an offence and a crime under this Bill, but it may be of the highest importance to Great Britain that that policy should succeed.

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What the Government do not seem to realise, judging from the airy way in which the noble Viscount introduced this Bill, is that they are taking steps to stop the propagation of a definite policy and a very important policy which certainly is not a policy against allegiance to His Majesty, because in the event of another war, which according to Mr. Baldwin will mean the end of civilisation, it is as certain as anything can be that the monarch of this country will be overthrown. Therefore my noble friend Lord Ponsonby, so far from doing anything to seduce a soldier from allegiance to His Majesty, is really safeguarding the Throne, which is much more likely to be safe in the event of peace than in the event of war.
If you had the words "duty and allegiance" noble friend would be perfectly safe, but as the Government will not, have those words, there is no telling what may happen in future to propaganda of this sort. The Bill may be interpreted by the Courts in such a way as to make this, as I think, beneficent propaganda a definite offence punishable by two years hard labour and a fine of £200. I do not profess to be a lawyer, but I think it is correct to say that a man is presumed to intend the consequences of his actions, I think that is right. I am very happy to see that the noble Marquess nods his head, so that I know that I am right. That is why the Bishop of Birmingham, it seems to me, will undoubtedly come within the Bill. He is presumed to intend the consequences of his actions. He puts these views in the Press, and he intends them, he says, to influence members of the Air Force. My noble friend Lord Ponsonby may be presumed to intend the consequences of his actions. He made a most courageous speech on Tuesday last whether you agree with it or not, it was courageous. I think it certainly deserved more than the sneers it received from the noble Viscount opposite.
I know the noble Viscount does not like strong language from anybody but himself. He does not like us on this side of the House to put things in what he would call "purple patches," but really do not think it is any exaggeration whatever to say that this Bill may be introducing into this country, in effect, Hitler methods. Hitlerism is the suppression of opinion which does not suit the
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Government—views they do not agree with. That is what this Bill will do, particularly when you are getting near a time of war. It is quite idle for the most reverend Primate to console himself with the idea that the Bill has nothing to do, as he said, with the liberty and freedom to express opinions, and that it concerns only those who do certain specific things. I pointed out, and I want to emphasise it again and again, that there is no safeguard whatever of that kind in the Bill—not the slightest.
If this Amendment is accepted the position will be entirely different. Of course, we shall still disagree with the Bill, because we are against the whole Bill, but it would make a very material change if the Amendment were accepted. If the noble Viscount opposite is really speaking the mind of the Government when he says that all they wish to do is to deal with this poisonous propaganda, I see no reason why he should not accept the Amendment. It would be a very considerable safeguard. I do not think I have overstated the case at all. I have tried not to do so. If our apprehensions prove to be unfounded I shall be only too glad, but you can never tell, especially if the foreign situation worsens and war appears to be corning near. Then we should have all sorts of people getting busy about all sorts of speeches, and we should have them rushing to the Law Courts and asking for warrants, so that they may harry people and bring them before the magistrates and justices, before certain of whom the accused would have no chance, particularly if things were getting worse on the Continent. I venture to think I have shown that this Amendment goes to the heart and kernel of the measure, that it is a vital and fundamental Amendment, and I hope it will be treated seriously by the noble Viscount.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 8, leave out ("or") and insert ("and").—(Lord Arnold.)
THE MARQUESS OF READING: Before the noble Viscount replies, may I ask him if he will tell us whether, in view of the arguments to which we have just listened, he adheres to the view which he expressed, and which I have expressed, that no new offence is created? I confess I am rather troubled about that statement. I made it myself to-day. On

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the last occasion I criticised the Bill from a totally different aspect, on which I shall have a few words to say later, but my trouble now is that I am not quite sure how we stand. I assume, and indeed was led to believe by what my noble friend the Leader of the House said, that really there was no distinction between "duty and allegiance" and "duty or allegiance." I listened carefully to what he said. I had not looked at the other Statutes, and I accepted immediately from him the statement that these words "duty or allegiance" were exactly the same words as the words in the Discipline Acts, and that there was no substance or justification for attempting to draw any distinction.
I confess I have grave doubts about that now. If the other Acts to which reference was made were meant to apply only to the Services, it is clear it cannot be said that the introduction of the word "or" in those Discipline Acts is exactly the same as the word "and" in the Incitement to Mutiny Act. Leaving aside other aspects of the matter, I have hitherto been under the impression, from what has taken place in this debate, that the considered view was that really the change of the word "and" from the Incitement to Mutiny Act, 1797, to the word "or," made no difference at all, and created no new offence. If it is correct that there is no law applying to the general public which makes it an offence to seduce, or attempt to seduce, members of the forces from their "duty or allegiance," then undoubtedly this Bill is creating a new offence, and if that is correct I certainly do withdraw the observation I made, earlier to-day, in reference to the appeal from the noble Lord who moved the first Amendment, that really it was undesirable to deal with it in that way because it was only reiterating the law as it stood.
I therefore press my noble friend Lord Flails-ham to tell us what is the considered view of the Government and of himself of the change from "and" into "or." I really would ask him that question, and his answer will have a very great effect upon the vote which I shall give, and the lead which I shall attempt to give to those associated with me, upon this Amendment. I do not agree with everything that Lord Arnold said, but I think he was perfectly correct in the observation he made, that what must be
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considered is the language of the Statute or the Bill you are passing. I do not hesitate to make that observation. I have had to lay it down myself, sitting in a Court of Law as a Judge, and I am certain that my noble friend, speaking as an ex-Lord Chancellor, would not hesitate to say exactly the same thing—namely that you must have reference to the words of the Statute.
Neither the words of the Attorney General nor the words of an ex-Lord Chancellor, spoken in this House, as to the meaning intended to be given to language used in a Bill, have the slightest effect or relevance when the matter comes to be considered by a Court of Law. The one thing which stands out beyond all question is that in a Court of Law you are not allowed to introduce observations made either by the Government or by anybody else, but the Court will only give consideration to the Statute itself. That is elementary, but I think it is necessary to bring it home to your Lordships, because I think too much importance can be attached to language which fell from the Attorney-General. What we are concerned with are the words of the Bill, and I am asking the noble Viscount to tell us now, quite distinctly, so that in voting on this Amendment we may know what it is that we are voting upon, where we stand. I can understand a lawyer saying there is not a great difference between breach of duty and breach of allegiance, but that thought will never lead me to say that there is no difference, and that is the essential point in this case. I accept anything that may fall from the Leader of the House, but I am anxious to get his assistance in this in order that I may come to a conclusion, because if there is any difference, between the offence as constituted hitherto and the offence, as applied to the civilian, as it will be if this Bill passes in this language, then I shall be bound to support the Amendment.
LORD ALLEN OF HURTWOOD: I take a different view on these points from each group in turn. I find it difficult to understand why Lord Reading should let this particular point have such a considerable influence over the way in which he approaches this particular subject. Supposing it were true, for the sake of argument, that a new offence was created, and the introduction of this word "or"

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instead of the old ward "and" did in fact create a new offence, would that be a substantial reason for voting against this Bill? I should say quite the contrary. I happen to be in a peculiar position. I have myself broken my allegiance to His Majesty. During the War, like the members of the Society of Friends, I felt it my duty not to bear arms, but I do not think that any person has a right, even if he takes that view for himself, to try and influence other people who do not take that view to come into line and to break the law. And I believe that is a distinction that must be made. There is, at the present moment, a new movement growing up in politics thoughout the world and in this country, which is a formidable threat to orderly government by means of violent policies. If, therefore, we are now to find that those who wish to threaten orderly government, whether they be members of the Right or of the Left, should seek to find a way of doing that by saying "As long as we do not tamper with allegiance, we can try to seduce people from their duty," that seems to me to be a formidable threat to orderly government in this country.
I find myself line by line on this Bill in the most unique position. I first opposed one alteration and now favour another alteration of the law. It carne to my knowledge a few months ago, on the highest authority, that there was in contemplation in this country some kind of coup d'Etat on the B.B.C. which was being prepared in this country just in the same way as it was in Vienna. That came to my knowledge, and I have no reason to doubt the authority from which it came. If politics are going to permit this sort of thing to take place, it is our business, in the interests of the Socialist state that I want to see established in the future, to see that there shall not be the means of tampering with those forces of law and order which are to maintain the instructions of the Government, whether these instructions are given by a Government of the Right or a Government of the Left.
VISCOUNT HAIILSHAM: In order to answer the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, perhaps he will forgive me if I trouble your Lordships for two minutes by reading what in fact I said on the Second Reading. This is what I said on this very point:
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"The criticism was made in another place that the words were 'duty or allegiance' whereas the 1797 Act spoke of 'duty and allegiance,' and it was thought to make a distinction between the two., For myself, I share the view which I see my learned friend the Attorney-General expressed in another place, that it makes very little difference in fact which form of language you use."
Then Lord Rhayader suggested that there was more than one opinion expressed.
LORD RHAYADER: I expressed the opinion that the Attorney-General had expressed two opinions.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: Yes. And I said:
"I read carefully his speech and I did not think he expressed two opinions."
LORD ARNOLD: Did you read him in the Standing Committee? He undoubtedly did there.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: Do not let us argue as to whether he expressed one or two opinions. I think he expressed one, but we are not on that point at present. I am endeavouring to answer Lord Reading. As he said he was influenced by what I said it is important to see what I did say. These were my words:
"He expressed the opinion, which I share, that it made very little difference which form of words was used. I believe he was right. He went on to point out that in fact the words in the later Statutes were 'duty or allegiance' as in this Bill, but he expressed the view, which again I share, that if there was a great difference between the two, that if it was possible under the words duty and allegiance 'for a person to endeavour to seduce a member of His Majesty's forces from his duty, persuade him to disobey his orders and then to escape liability by saying: 'Well, I never seduced him from his allegiance,' then the sooner that is put right the better, and that this form of words was much the preferable one."
I adhere exactly to what I said there, but the noble Marquess asked me what was the position under the Naval Discipline Act.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: I did not find the reference in the OFFICIAL REPORT, but I distinctly remember the noble Viscount referring to the Naval Discipline Act.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: I did at one point.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: But I did not find it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: I certainly did, but I do not think it was in that context. It was later on. The Naval Discipline Act is an Act which deals primarily with the discipline of the Navy, and it has two sections which relate to this matter. The first, Section 12, deals only with people subject to naval discipline. It says:
"Every person subject to this Act who shall endeavour to seduce any other person subject to this Act from his duty or allegiance to His Majesty, or endeavour to incite him to commit any act of mutiny, shall suffer death or such other punishment as is hereinafter mentioned."
That deals only with seduction by a member of the forces. Section 13 deals with everybody who goes on to one of His Majestys' ships, whether a member of the forces or not. This is the language:
"Every person, not otherwise subject to this Act, who, being on board any ship of His Majesty, shall endeavour to seduce from his duty or allegiance to His Majesty any person subject to this Act, shall so far as respects such offence be deemed to be a person subject to this Act, and shall suffer death or such other punishment as is hereinafter mentioned."
I think it is quite clear that the effect of that is that any member of the Navy who attempts to seduce any other member of the Navy from his duty or allegiance is liable to death under Section 12. Any civilian who endeavours to seduce any member of the Navy on board a ship is also liable to the penalty of death or a less punishment. It does not cover everybody, because if a civilian happens to catch a sailor on shore then it does not come under "duty or", but under the earlier Act of 1797. If the civilian goes on board ship and attempts to seduce a sailor whom he meets there, then he is liable to death. That is the position, I think, under the Naval Discipline Act.
May I just say a word on the Amendment? I said that I thought it made very little difference—I did not say no difference, because there is obviously a difference in language—but very little difference which form of words is used. The noble Lord, Lord Arnold, said it made a great difference; it was fundamental; and he gave an illustration. He said, "Supposing you were to try to induce the soldiers to refuse to obey orders to shoot in an industrial dispute, that would not be endeavouring to seduce them from their duty and allegiance, but if you went on to ask them to try and
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overthrow the Monarchy, then that would be within the words "duty and allegiance." I have not had very long, and the noble Lord is always very positive in his statements, but I have had just time to look at one case that carries more weight than anything I can say because it is a decision of the Courts. It is a case called "The King against Bowman and Others," and it is fair to say that the real point on which, the case is reported is not this point but the question whether you have to name the persons said to be seduced in the indictment. Actually the words there used are set out. I do not want to read them, but they are an appeal to British soldiers, in an open letter, to refuse to shoot in an industrial dispute.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: Was that under the Incitement to Mutiny Act?
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: Yes. The case came before Mr. Justice Horridge. The argument I need not trouble your Lordships with, because it deals with another point, but Mr. Justice Horridge's summing up, or part of it, is quoted, and this is what he said:
"Ask yourselves this question: Why was this article printed and published? Was it, as the prosecution suggest, to induce soldiers to disobey their officers in the event of being ordered to quell a strike, or was it, as counsel for the defendants suggests, merely a comment upon the use of armed military force by the State for the suppression of industrial riots?"
Then he goes on later to say:
"Is this a comment on the State using armed force, or is it a suggestion that if the State does use armed force the soldiers are not to obey orders?"
On the answer to that question the jury were to find the prisoners either guilty or not guilty, and in fact the jury found the prisoners guilty, and they were sentenced. That is a case in which the very inducement was used which the noble Lord said clearly did not come within the Incitement to Mutiny Act, the inducement not to obey orders to fire in an industrial dispute, and in that case the learned Judge, in terms, says that if the suggestion is that if the State does use armed force the soldiers are not to obey orders, then that is, within the meaning of the Act, an endeavour to seduce them from their duty and allegiance.
I should have thought that was clearly right. That is why I have said the

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alteration makes very little difference. But let it be supposed that I am wrong, that the learned Judge is wrong, and that Lord Arnold knows the law better than the learned Judge, and that it is not an offence to try and persuade soldiers to refuse to obey orders to shoot, but that it only becomes an offence if you ask them afterwards to go on to endeavour to overthrow the Monarchy. Then I should say that the sooner that state of affairs was altered the better. It seems to me an outrageous proposition to say you can persuade a soldier to stay out of the battle, to say: "You can refuse the orders to risk your life, to go into the trenches and fight, and so long as you are willing to sing 'God save the King' when it is all over you have not been seduced from your allegiance and you have committed no offence." That does not seem to be a reasonable proposition, and I do not believe it is the law. The case I have cited supports my view; but, if it is the law, then the sooner it is altered the better.
LORD STRABOLGI: I do not want to add very much after the very interesting debate which your Lordships will agree we have had on this particular Amendment, but there are one or two comments I want to make on the explanation that the Leader of the House has just furnished. He quoted one particular case and a very weighty case it was, and, I think, it strengthens heavily the case for this particular Amendment. But may I ask the Leader of the House with his great knowledge and experience of all these matters, whether it is not a fact that a soldier can be punished even now for obeying orders to fire when there is no justification? There have been such cases in the past.
LORD MARLEY: The Featherstone riots.
LORD STRABOLGI: My noble friend has given me the title of one of them. At that time the noble Marquess was, I think, a distinguished member of the then Liberal Government.
Tins MARQUESS OF READING: Not a member of the Government.
LORD STRABOLGI: I think he was, at any rate, a prominent member of the House of Commons and of the Liberal Party, and so was the noble Lord, Lord
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Rhayader, who sits beside him, and most noble Lords will remember that particular case. It was a case where the soldiers should have been seduced from their duty because their duty apparently was to carry out an illegal order. That is one particular argument that I think your Lordships should weigh in deciding how you will vote on this particular Amendment. The noble Viscount, is still of the opinion that there is very little difference in this Amendment, but in that respect he does not satisfy the noble Lord behind him, Lord Allen of Hurtwood, his only vocal supporter, but, of course, a very valuable supporter, on this Bill. If there is very little difference, why not accept the Amendment?
I am going now to cite the lesser victims who may be affected. If the present wording in the Bill is allowed to stand, may I ask the noble Viscount, both as one of his Majesty's Secretaries of State and also as a very distinguished lawyer, what will be the position in such a case as this? A woman is in love with a soldier, and she persuades that soldier to overstay his leave. That very often happens. The noble Viscount has been a soldier himself, and he knows how his comrades have fallen very often in that way. It is afterwards found that the woman is a Communist. There are women Communists, and some of them are doubtless attractive enough to seduce soldiers from their duty within the present wording of this Bill. What chance is that poor woman going to have under the wording of this Bill? That is not an exaggerated case at all. The noble Viscount quoted the Naval Discipline Act as applying to civilians, but that only applies to civilians who are on board ship. The noble Viscount rolled off his tongue that the penalty in that case was death. He added, in a rather quieter tone, "or such other punishment as is hereinafter mentioned." That is for people who habitually go on board ships—bumboat men, canteen servants, and so on; it does not apply to the ordinary public. This is the first time an Act of this kind has been applied to the ordinary public. The Naval Discipline Act and the Army Act apply to men who have enlisted with their eyes open and who know they have certain duties to perform. Anyone who, in the wording here, maliciously and advisedly endeavours to seduce a soldier or

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sailor from his duty is now guilty of an offence.
The noble Viscount thinks there is very little difference. I suggest there is a very great difference, and we should think most seriously before we create a new offence. The letter of the law of the present Act of 1797 served, as we have heard, perfectly well to enable the present Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon, when he was a Law Officer, to deal with the case quoted by my noble friend Lord Kinnoull, of the engine driver who tried to persuade soldiers not to take part in an industrial dispute. He was prosecuted under the Incitement to Mutiny Act and punished. The present law is sufficient. We have heard at last from Lord Allen of Hurtwood the real reason for this Bill. I am much obliged to the noble Lord for the evidence he has given us. There was to be last spring, I think,
a coup d'Etat on the B.B.C. He had heard that from the higest authority; I presume from his revered leader because there can be no higher authority. Because some madmen, some feather brains, were going to rag into the B.B.C. pretending they were Professor So-and-so going to deliver a talk on fossils or téetotalism or perhaps on the Betting Bill, because there was going to be a raid on the B.B.C. and the B.B.C. was going to be seized, therefore we have got to have this ridiculous Bill!
LORD ALLEN OF HURTWOOD: I do not want to interrupt the noble Lord in his speech but may I say that it would be better if he would go a little more quietly when dealing with this problem? He should try to learn in this House to deal with such matters with more restraint. May I point out to him what I did in fact say? When I dealt with the case of the B.B.C., that was not to suggest that the foolish threat to the B.B.C. was the cause of this Bill but simply to give an illustration of the kind of new movements which are threatening orderly government and menacing law and order. It is vital that we should tighten up the law in order to prevent this development growing into a formidable danger.
LORD STRABOLGI: I am extremely obliged to the noble Lord for his advice to me on how I should address your Lordships. He has had far greater experience in this House having been here a longer time than myself, and I should naturally
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pay great attention to his advice. He now says it was not the cause of the Bill but it was an example of how the Bill can be used. That is really absurd. Is it supposed that people making an attack on the. B.B.C. building, or indeed upon this building, could not be dealt with by the Police? It reminds me very much of the story of the Army in the old days in Ireland. It was told to get ready to strike a blow for liberty, and when the soldiers were asked why they did not do so they said the Police would not let them. All these people can be dealt with by the Police under the present law. You might have a coup d'Etat on the B.B.C. or on any public place in the country, or even on this House, and the Police would soon interfere. We need some better reason than that for the Bill.
I am relieved to know that the Government are not quite so bereft of commonsense or humour as to be impelled to bring in this Bill by any consideration of that sort. My noble friend Lord Arnold spoke about the letter in The Times from a group of publishers. That letter is no exaggeration of the apprehensions felt by publishers. It so happened that that morning I had not seen the particular letter. I was at a board meeting of a publishing house of which I am a director. My secretary drew my attention to this letter, and I brought it before our managing director, who is anything but of the same way of thinking politically as myself and who certainly would have no sort of sympathy with any kind of incitement of the armed forces. He had a distinguished War record himself and a distinguished career in the Service. He agreed with every word of this letter to The Times. That is an absolute fact. The printers do not really know where they stand under this Bill. They are apprehensive. There is a great deal of pacifist writing at the present time. Take, for instance, the well-known book "All Quiet on the Western Front." I suppose it could be proved that if that book was read by a man intending to join the Army it might prevent him from enlisting, or if he was already in the Army it might persuade him to desert and forget his duty. Under Clause 1, unless there is some change in the wording, the printer can be proceeded against and, therefore, you have that most objectionable form of censorship, the censorship of fear, the censorship of

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poor men who do not know how they stand under the law, and who will refuse to print anything which they think may be objectionable to the authorities. There is a great deal in the Amendment and I beg your Lordships to consider seriously whether you should not support it.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: I am indebted to the noble Viscount for the answer he made upon this clause. I must, however, hold my own opinion on any legal proposition. I do not intend to discuss the legal proposition across the floor of the House, but what I do say is that it now appears quite clearly that a new offence is being created by this I am inclined to agree with the noble Viscount that there is very little difference between the two offences, but nevertheless I think there is a difference. I have given the matter some thought. I think I shall find myself in complete opposition to the views that may fall from the Labour members of your Lordships' House in regard to another Amendment which comes later and which has been referred to as an Amendment in regard to the incitement of soldiers to disobey their duty, and not to fire at strikers, That, I always think, is a wrong way of stating it, because that is not what happens. When such cases do arise the soldiers are simply called in for the purpose of restoring order. I want to guard against an impression that I may be taking the view which has been put forward by some speakers in this respect, nevertheless I do think that this Bill creates a new offence. I want to make that point without attempting to refer again to the criticisms I put forward when I discussed this Bill on the Second Reading.
There are points in this Bill that I do not like, and in particular the right of search. The special objection I made was that I could not see why it was necessary to introduce this Bill at this time of day after all the experience of the law we have had unless the Government could tell us some facts which necessitated its introduction. Nothing of the kind has happened. The Government have not given such facts. I said then, and I say now, that I would support the Government upon this Bill if they could tell us facts which would justify it, but what I object to is introducing this new Bill when
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apparently there seem no better reasons for it than have so far been given. Having said that, I only make this further remark to clear the ground and so that there shall be no misunderstanding. The observations of the noble Viscount of course I accept, but when you refer to the Naval Discipline Act it is quite clear that it has a very different application. This Bill is not confined merely to offences by those in the Navy. It applies to a member of the public who goes on board the ship and attempts to seduce a sailor from his duty. That is a totally different thing from the law as it is proposed in this Bill.
This Bill would apply to every member of the public not only when he goes On board a ship or when he goes into barracks, but when he makes a speech or when he distributes a pamphlet broadcast with the purpose of making his views known and in such a manner that the pamphlet will get to the Forces of the Crown, the soldiers and sailors, and that he intends it to get to them. It seems to me that that is a totally different thing from the Act to which have just referred. Objecting as I do, for reasons I gave on the Second Reading, to this Bill, particularly in regard to the right of search which it gives, brought in as it is for reasons which at present none of us know (because they have not been stated by the Government) I shall feel bound to support the Amendment because in my view there is a new offence created.
LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE: I had not intended to intervene on this Amendment, but I consider that the speech we have just listened to is of the very highest importance, coming as it does from the noble Marquess whose legal experience and knowledge are so well known to all of us. I do not desire to add any word to what he has said on the legal point, but I think that that opinion, coming from him, is likely to carry considerable weight in the country, and I cannot see why the Government, seeing that in their opinion there is very little difference between the "and" and "or" are not content to accept this Amendment. I have a suspicion that the Government are not going to accept any Amendment. That we shall see as time passes. As we get to close quarters with this Bill and Amendments are discussed I am

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more and more persuaded that I shall come within the net. I think that the rather scoffing way in which the noble Viscount referred to the pacifist position requires a little correction. I am not a conscientious objector and I am not a religious objector, although I have the greatest respect for both those classes of people. My objection is a purely common-sense objection. I introduced the common-sense attitude when other people had been trying for 2,000 years the religious attitude and the moral attitude. It is because of the commonsense attitude that I have been successful in converting a lot of people to my view.
But what would be my position if I tried in a speech to convert soldiers from their duty—that is to say to leave the Army—and to prevent recruits from joining the Army? Suppose a section was taken from my speech and printed as a leaflet—that has been done with some of my speeches—and that leaflet was distributed and got into barracks or among soldiers, what would happen? The Government seem to think that soldiers are always confined to barracks, that they are kept in a place from which they are not allowed to view the outer world at all. Actually, of course, they move about among the population, they see their friends, and they hear the views of all sections of the community. If this section of my speech, expressed as persuasively as I could do it, gets into barracks and amongst the soldiers, I certainly would come under this Bill, although I said nothing to seduce them from their allegiance. In fact, I think it is the best allegiance to the Crown and the best thing for this country to renounce the war weapon altogether. But I should be seducing them from their duty undoubtedly. Therefore, I should come within the net of this Bill. The argument appears to me to be entirely on this side of the House, and I venture to express surprise that the Government cannot see their way to accept the Amendment.
LORD ARNOLD: Before we go to a Division I should like to say a word or two in reply. It seems to me that the position is profoundly unsatisfactory. The noble Viscount attempts to prove too much. I might make the obvious point, but none the less relevant point, that
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if there is so little in it the Amendment might be accepted. I am much obliged to the noble Marquess for his words. It is true he did not accept my arguments entirely, but my natural optimism is never great and always under strict control, so that I did not expect that. I am, however, grateful to him when he gives his support on a vital point of this kind. There is a real point here whatever the noble Viscount may say. I would like to know more about the case before Mr. Justice Horridge which he brought up as having a considerable bearing on the case I put forward. I do not take that view. It only touches part of my case, but I should very much like to know a little more about that ease, whether it was brought before the Court of Appeal was set up, or, if it was brought afterwards, why there was no appeal. You cannot take one case as deciding a great principle which may affect legislation for the future.
If it is argued that there is no difference between duty and allegiance I would say that that is obviously untenable. It may be that in this particular case the Judge did not expatiate upon it and the jury may have given a wrong verdict. Wrong verdicts are sometimes given. We want more consideration of the verbiage than that. The noble Viscount entirely ignored the whole question of the effect of this clause upon what I call pacifist propaganda. He has not said a syllable about it. I brought forward the case of the Bishop of Birmingham. The noble Viscount has not referred to it, but it is on record. My noble friend Lord Ponsonby might address a meeting and, like the Rev. H. R. L. Shepherd, ask men not to go to war but to honour the Kellogg Pact. He has only to go down to Aldershot, which is very likely because he does not live a great way off and he is a man of great courage, and he would be brought within the Bill. The noble Marquess, Lord Londonderry, admitted that the Government had to take notice of this propaganda, which shows that it is a powerful thing. The point is that men of lesser courage than my noble friend would be deterred from making such speeches. There has been no reply to that point. On the question of men being presumed to intend the consequences of their action, many a man has been hanged who never committed

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murder. Three men were sentenced to death in the spring of this year. It was perfectly obvious that only one man could have committed the murder, but they were all sentenced, because, I understand they were in circumstances where murder might have come. This is a very vital point. I have referred to the letter written by publishers to The Times. It
Resolved in the affirmative, and Amendment disagreed to accordingly.
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL THE EARL OF LISTOWEL moved to add to the clause:
"Provided that a speech or article in the Press advising members of His Majesty's forces not to allow themselves to be used in an industrial dispute shall not be held to be an offence under this Act."
The noble Earl said: I venture to think that this Amendment which stands in my name is one of very considerable importance, and this on the ground that it raises a fundamental issue for which all
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will make nervous people afraid and they will refrain from printing what they might have printed which great advantage to this country.
On Question, Whether the word "or" shall stand part of the clause?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 90; Not-Contents, 17.

CONTENTS.

Aberdeen and Temair, M.

Aberdare, L.

Howard of Penrith, L.

Exeter, M.

Abinger, L.

Hutchison of Montrose, L.

Allen of Hurtwood, L.

Jessel, L.

Airlie, E.

Alvingham, L.

Kilmaine, L.

Dudley, E.

Amulree, L.

Lamington, L.

Feversham, E.

Annaly, L.

Latymer, L.

Harrowby, E.

Balfour of Burleigh, L.

Lloyd, L.

Iddesleigh, E.

Barnard, L.

Luke, L.

Jellicoe, E.

Biddulph, L.

Marks, L.

Leven and Melville, E,

Bingley, L.

Merrivale, L.

Lucan, E. [Teller]

Brougham and Vaux, L.

Middleton, L.

Malmesbury, E.

Carnock, L.

Ormonde, L. (M. Ormonde)

Midleton, E.

Clanwilliam, L. (E. Clanwilliam)

Polwarth, L.

Morton, E.

Rankeillour, L.

Mount Edgcumbe, E.

Cobham, L.

Redesdale, L.

Munster, E.

Conway of Allington, L.

Remnant, L.

Onslow, E.

Cornwallis, L.

Ritchie of Dundee, L.

Peel, E.

Cottesloe, L.

Rochester, L.

Plymouth, E.

Cranworth, L.

Ruthven of Gowrie, L.

Radnor, E.

Danesfort, L.

Saltersford, L. (E. Courtown)

Rothes, E.

Darling, L.

Sandhurst, L.

Scarbrough, E.

Daryngton, L.

Southampton, L.

Stanhope, E.

Desborough, L.

Stonehaven, L.

Vane, E. (M. Londonderry)

Elton, L.

Strathcona and Mount Royal, L.

Ypres, E.

Fairfax of Cameron, L.

Gage, L. (V. Gage) [Teller]

Strickland, L.

Astor, V.

Greville, L.

Templemore, L.

Brentford, V.

Hamilton of Dalzell, L.

Thurlow, L.

Elibank, V.

Hampton, L.

Wakehurst, L.

Goschen, V.

Harris, L.

Wigan, L. (E. Crawford)

Hailsham, V.

Hawke, L.

Wolverton, L.

Howard of Glossop, L.

NOT-CONTENTS.

Reading, M.

Doverdale, L.

Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L.

Faringdon, L.

Rhayader, L.

Esher, V.

Hare, L. (E. Listowel)

Sanderson, L.

Mersey, V.

Hay, L. (E. Kinnoull) [Teller]

Snell, L.

Stanmore, L.

Arnold, L.

Marley, L. [Teller]

Strabolgi, L.

Clwyd, L.

Mendip, L. (V. Clifden)

those who oppose the present measure Are contending—namely, the issue of personal liberty and individual freedom as against the authority of the executive power in the State. That is a very great and very broad principle, and is the common ground of all those who are opposing this measure; and it is illustrated extremely clearly in the Amendment which I am now venturing to bring before your Lordships. May I ask your Lordships to read this Amendment carefully, because in conversation with a noble Lord I have already found that its intention and mean-

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ing have been the subject of a certain degree of misunderstanding?
If I may very briefly summarise its object I would express myself as follows. Is it not reasonable and possible to hold the view, and is it not a proposition which could be advanced by a person who would not be dubbed as insane or lunatic, that the military should not be used when industrial disputes arise in any part of the country? I am not saying for a moment that this view is correct; I am equally not contending that it is false. I ask your Lordships most respectfully to consider this question. I wish your Lordships to entertain in your minds the problem whether this is riot a possible opinion for any citizen of this country to hold: that the military have no right to intervene in quarrels or difficulties which arise between employers and those they employ. If you are prepared to grant me this much, then I think you will be prepared to grant the logical consequence of this assumption—namely, that those who hold this view should be entitled to express it through the ordinary channels, if they choose, in the Press or any other literary medium that may come their way. That is all I am contending for in this particular Amendment, because if the Bill in its present form were to come into law, and one of your Lordships were to advocate this view outside your Lordships' House—because within the House you would enjoy the privilege of any member of Parliament—you would be subjected immediately to legal proceedings. It seems to me that the whole of this Amendment hangs on whether your Lordships are prepared to accept the initial assumption that it is a reasonable and possible view for citizens to entertain, that the military should not be used in these particular cases.
In case your Lordships should be opposed to the reasonableness or possibility of this conviction I should like to present, very briefly, some arguments that those who hold this view might be expected to adduce. They would say, I think, that the proper function of the military is defence of the life and property of the citizens of this country, whether at home or abroad, and that strikes and lock-outs are quarrels between employers and employed, and are not intended as an attack on the life
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or the liberty of any individual citizens, or of any group of citizens; that they cannot possibly be considered as an attempt at revolt or rebellion. What I think they would say, further, would be this: Supposing an industrial dispute becomes so bitter that certain individuals who take part in it do create disorder, those individuals are surely to be dealt with by the Police; that it is the proper function of the Police to see that single individuals do not disturb the peace; and that it is ludicrous and absurd to suppose that all the strikers, or for that matter all the employed, are engaged in a rising, which would be the only possible justification for the use of the military.
Again, they would say that all soldiers have a conscience, like everyone else, and have a right and a duty to use their conscience. For the most part the ordinary private is recruited from the working class, and a very difficult and curious moral situation might arise. Supposing a company of soldiers was sent from London to one of these distressed areas, say, a mining area in South Wales or Durham, where, for the sake of argument, trouble had broken out. Obviously, in the first place, they would be very loath to use their arms against the very people whom they had been accustomed to regard as their fellows, and as the section of the community which shared with them the same sort of life and the same sort of economic circumstances and general interests. That, however, is not the crux of the situation. It might be much more acute than that. Supposing among this detachment sent to South Wales there was a miner or several miners. Supposing it was sent to the very village in which a miner-soldier had been brought up, and that when ordered to fire he should see in front of him his own brother or father, or his most intimate friend. In that case would not a very acute conflict of conscience arise, in which the private in question might find himself obliged to decide that he must disobey the orders of his officer and obey his conscience?
This Amendment would enable people to draw the attention of anyone who was considering recruitment in the Army, or who had entered the Army, to such possibilities as these. There is yet one more contingency, which will perhaps appeal even more to your Lordships. It is that of a clash between military law and the

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law that governs us civilians and citizens in the ordinary routine of our lives. If a detachment of soldiers is sent off to quell an industrial dispute, or to keep order in a district where such a dispute has occurred, it is not entitled by the ordinary law of the land to use any more than a reasonable degree of force. Supposing that in the heat of the moment a soldier is ordered to fire on a crowd which, as it subsequently transpires, was not about to attack the military, and was peaceful in intention: he would be guilty of a crime under the ordinary law of the land.
Is it really the case that we are not entitled to draw the attention of any member of His Majesty's forces to the fact that if he exceeds what is described as a reasonable degree of force when he is ordered to take part in a civil or industrial dispute, he will he committing a crime? Are we to be forbidden to draw the soldier's attention to what is fundamentally a possible conflict between two codes of law which exist together at the present time? I would suggest that on the very general ground that liberty of opinion is of the highest value to civilisation this is an opinion that is entitled to expression whether we agree with it or not, and that very awkward situations may arise if we do not allow people to express themselves in this matter. I sincerely hope that your Lordships will be able to accept the Amendment.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 9, at end insert ("Provided that a speech or article in the Press advising members of His Majesty's forces not to allow themselves to be used in an industrial dispute shall not be field to be an offence under this Act").—(The Earl of Listowel.)
LORD RHAYADER: I have a good deal of sympathy with the desire of Lord Listowel, but I cannot think that this Amendment is one which your Lordships should accept. I speak as one who is against the Bill as a whole. The Government have given us no reason for bringing in this Bill. I do not think they have made any case at all for strengthening the ordinary law, and I voted for the last Amendment, thinking it undesirable to create a new offence and to extend to the mass of the people of this country penalties to which they have not been subject. But I am bound to say I cannot go with the noble Earl in this Amendment. In the first place, I would ask him
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what is an industrial dispute. At what point does the situation arise which he contemplates? Is it wherever the magistrates have to call for the aid of the soldiery to assist in keeping order, in circumstances where there may be a dispute between the employers and the employed? I do not really know myself quite how far an industrial dispute is a clearly defined situation which can be recognised at once. But then the difficulty I have is this. Why does he address the unfortunate soldiers of this country? They are not the people to whom you should address your persuasions. I assume that the noble Earl thinks that soldiers should not be employed in industrial disputes. There is something to be said for that view, but I do not think, as a matter of fact, that soldiers are employed to end industrial disputes: they are employed to keep order. But why talk to the soldiers? The soldier has accepted employment on the terms that he will obey the orders given to him by his superior officers. Is he to judge on every occasion when an order is given? Has he time to judge whether he is to refuse to obey orders?
I submit that the noble Earl and his friends in this matter are addressing themselves to the wrong people. They should not talk to the soldiers, they should talk to the House of Commons or to your Lordships' House. It is Parliament which should settle the purpose for which the soldiers should he employed. Let the noble Earl talk to the public. There is nothing to prevent him from writing letters advising the public that members of the forces should not be used in industrial disputes, and it is not fair to the soldiers to be engaged in a special campaign of this kind. That is a matter which the nation should decide for itself. It is for Parliament and the people to determine the purposes for which soldiers shall be employed, and it is creating unnecessary unrest in the Army—doing the very thing that I assume you do not desire to do—to go specially to the members of the forces in order to preach this doctrine, which is not very widely accepted in this country. Begin in the proper place. Begin with the public, come to Parliament, and, when you have Parliament and the public behind you, you will easily get the Army to carry out the orders which you will still have to give to those soldiers, and

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they will be engaged on terms very like those at present, and subject to the orders of their superior officers and of those who employ the Army—that is, the Government of this country. I think the noble Earl would do well to withdraw the Amendment.
LORD CARNOCK: I think that the noble Earl has probably not had very much to do with soldiers, and perhaps he does not know very much about the law. The soldier's duty, not as a soldier, but as a citizen of this country, is to prevent a felony. I have not got the facts here, but if the noble Earl would read up about the Gordon Riots, it was held then that it was the soldier's duty, whether as a soldier or a civilian, to prevent the commission of a felony. Therefore, the question of the soldier against the civil law does not arise. The noble Earl has also told us a terrible story of a private soldier being asked to shoot on his relations. May I tell him that he can trust the regimental officers of His Majesty's Army to see that that never happens, and it never will happen.
LORD MARLEY: The noble Lord opposite twitted my noble friend Lord Listowel with not having had much experience of the Army or of the law. Well, I have at least had a great many years' experience of the Army, including many years on the General Staff.
LORD CARNOCK: I had many years of regimental service.
LORD MARLEY: I am very glad to hear it. So have I. And I think I can perhaps speak with some little authority from the point of view of the Army. Now what we have done is to create a new offence by this Bill, and we are now going to apply that new offence to the use of the military in aid of the civil power, which is most undesirable. As long as that offence was narrowly construed, and carefully safeguarded, the danger was less, but now that we are widening the effect of the law, bringing all kinds of ill-defined and uncertain elements of the population under the terms of this Bill, I think there is a serious case for omitting from the operation of the Bill the activities of the troops in aid of the civil power.
The Amendment is to insert this sentence:
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"Provided that a speech or article in the Press advising members of His Majesty's forces not to allow themselves to be used in an industrial dispute shall not he held to be an offence under this Act."
Speaking from the point of view of the soldier I want to say that it is well known to your Lordships that for centuries the Army in this country has been held in considerable mistrust, historically speaking. It was always the failure of the family who enlisted. It was considered a disgrace to have had a member of the family in the Army, and the nation distrusted the Army to this extent that still, to this day, the standing Army can only continue to exist by the passing every year of the Army Annual Act to enable it to be legally constituted.
I believe that this use of soldiers in industrial disputes is utterly repugnant to the men themselves. I believe they hate being used in connection with disputes in which, as my noble friend said, their close relations, their fathers, their brothers, their sons may actually be engaged. The noble Viscount who leads this House and who is also Secretary of State for War knows perfectly well that the state of recruiting for the Army is extremely unsatisfactory. Has he ever asked himself if possibly one reason why it is unsatisfactory is that men are not prepared to adopt a mode of life under which they may be employed to shoot down or apply force to their own relations and at least to their comrades who are workers in industry? Therefore, in the interest of recruiting, I believe the Government would be well advised to accept this Amendment proposed by my noble friend. It is going to be extremely difficult in the future to use the military in industrial disputes. It was all right as long as you had infantry with rifles, bayonets, and so on. It is much more difficult when it comes to machine guns, and I do not really see a man of the noble-mindedness of the noble Viscount ordering his men to use machine guns on strikers or men engaged in an industrial dispute. How much worse is it going to be when it comes to employing a mechanized army. Are we going to use tanks against strikers? I believe that in the interests of the Army itself we should be very well advised to accept this Amendment. Recruiting is more difficult because men are not prepared to be placed in this position.
There is another aspect of this matter, and that is that in Great Britain under the law, as I understand it—and let me confess at once to the noble Lord who spoke from that corner of your Lordships' House that my knowledge of the law is confined to being a student in one of the Inns of Court—I understand that a soldier is also a citizen of this country and that he has duties as a citizen which have been held by law to transcend his duties as a soldier. I am subject to correction in this, but I seem to remember that in some riots in connection with some mines belonging, I think, to the father-in-law of the noble Lord who so earnestly supported the opposition to my noble friend's Amendment—the Featherstone collieries, in which riots occurred in connection with an industrial district—certain persons were shot and injured, and a judicial inquiry held subsequently found that the order to shoot was entirely unjustified and made it clear that the soldiers as citizens should have refused to fire. What a difficult position we are putting these men in!
Does the noble Viscount not think that by accepting this Amendment he would make it easier for men to become soldiers and so aid in one of the difficulties of his position—namely, the encouragement of recruiting? I do not believe that troops ought ever to be used in industrial disputes, and from the point of view of the soldiers I hope very much that the Government may see their way to accept this very reasonable Amendment. From the point of view of strikers and men engaged in industrial disputes I think the matter is still more important. In an industrial dispute the men have so much more suffering to face than the employers, for, after all, the employers always have other sources from which they may draw their incomes and secure their living, whereas strikers have only that industry to live upon, and they face immediate starvation when it comes to a strike. Therefore I believe strikers are always right in an industrial dispute. It is our duty, as legislators, on behalf of the vast body of the citizens of this country, to consider the mass of our fellow men and women who are workers and not employers, and that is another reason why the Government would be well advised to accept this Amendment, not only in the interests of the soldiers, but in the interests of the vast mass of
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the population who suffer when the military are employed in such a dispute.
VISCOUNT ESHER: Before the noble Viscount replies I should like to ask a question of the noble Earl who initiated this debate. I rather gathered that he is never in favour of the use of troops by the civil power. Is that actually the case? Suppose the brother of the soldier, instead of being an industrial striker happened to be a supporter of the Fascist Party and wore a black shirt, I should like to know whether in that case the noble Earl would feel differently about the use of the military by the civil power?
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: I do not think I need trouble your Lordships very long because the noble Lords, Lord Rhayader and Lord Carnock, gave such admirable reasons why this Amendment cannot possibly be accepted. I agree with what they said. Nothing could be more unjust than to say, as this Amendment seeks to do, that soldiers may be used in aid of the civil power when it is necessary for the preservation of law and order and that they must be punished for mutiny and disobedience of orders if they refuse to obey when they are told to take part in that duty, but that those who seduce them from the performance of their duty are to go scot free. I need hardly add that it is an entire mistake to talk about soldiers being used in industrial disputes. That is not what happens. Whether a dispute has its origin in some industrial matter or whether it has its origin in any other, you cannot use soldiers on one side or the other; but sometimes as a result of that dispute it happens that law and order are threatened, and in order to preserve law and order it is necessary to invoke the aid of the military in support of the civil power. When that happens the soldier is bound to do his duty, and to say he shall be punished for not doing it but that anyone may endeavour to persuade him not to do it and go scot free, sometimes by the use of the extravagant language such as was used in the particular case to which I called attention some time ago, seems to me a most unjust thing to do, certainly a grievous wrong to the military forces of the Crown.
LORD SNELL: The noble Lord, Lord Rhayader, told us that the right thing to do in these cases when trouble arose in the country—acute, sudden, passionate trouble—owing to industrial disputes, was for us to bring these matters before your Lordships' House. This afternoon we have tried that experiment, and when my noble friend Lord Listowel put forward an Amendment in proper language and with entire courtesy he was lectured as though he had committed some grievous moral offence. We cannot hope to have the knowledge of the law possessed by the noble Viscount. We have not his legal experience, but we have certain responsibilities placed upon us as an Opposition, and up to our powers we shall fulfil those as we see our duty. The noble Viscount has sufficient knowledge of another place to know that that method will not expedite the conduct of public business. In any case we shall feel it our duty as well as our right to say what we think is proper upon this grave matter.
The issue which is before your Lordships' House is one of personal feeling, of moral apprehension. Some of these men in the Army will be the sons of miners or railwaymen or people engaged in other crafts, and they may suddenly have placed upon them this enormous test of their feelings, a conflict of duties. It is all very well for the noble Viscount to say that they are not called upon to put down strikes but merely to preserve order. Is it disorder for a workman suffering under what he thinks is a grave grievance to withhold his labour until that grievance is remedied? That is the only weapon he has, and if that is to constitute disorder sufficient for him to be shot down by the armed forces then I think there is some moral protest which can be made against it. On the other hand, have we never heard of a barrister, for instance, throwing up his brief? It is a similar thing, but I do not imagine we shall ever have the Army going down to the Inns of Court to put a matter of that kind right. If the noble Viscount would do me the courtesy of listening I will try not to delay the House longer. Is it part of the soldiers' contract with the State to become, for instance, strike breakers? Suppose that a dispute arose, the ships were not being unloaded, the trains were not being run, is it part of the soldiers' contract with the State to
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break an industrial strike, which may or may not be just from the point of view of the worker, by undertaking these civic duties? It is not a question of disorder, it is a question of whether under those acute circumstances the troops could be used to break a strike.
I will only just say on the general question that the men intensely dislike it. If a man is on strike, and if he has the power to make a speech or the power to express his views by writing an article, and under acute feeling he uses injudicious or hasty words that he would not use at any other time, if he speaks out of the poverty he feels rather than from a sense of balance and justice, that does not seem to me to be a ease for the shooting down of himself and his fellows by the troops. Acute feelings are aroused in industrial disputes. There is hunger on one side fighting bank balances on the other, and we hold that it is not fair to the soldier to require him to do this thing.
I want to conclude my remarks by expressing an opinion of my own. I represented for many years in the House of Commons a military constituency. I know the soldiers very well and my sense of obligation went to this, that the whole time that I represented Woolwich I never went inside the gates of Woolwich Arsenal, and I never went inside the gates of the barracks because I thought it not Tight to take politics inside a Government institution of that kind. But I did meet these men. I met them every day in all sorts of ways. It is true the soldier always has a grievance. One form of his happiness is that of complaining. Complaining is the luxury he enjoys most because it is cheap and always can be indulged in. Sometimes the soldier's language would shock your Lordships if you heard it, and very frequently it astounded even myself. But soldiers are not children, and you are treating the soldier unfairly when you suggest he would be thrown off his balance by a stray Communist leaflet. He is not a child of that kind. He knows that four and two make six, but he has his own view about the world and frequently about the Army Commander, and it is not protection from a stray Communist leaflet that the soldiers want.
They want protection from other things. They want protection from private arms

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manufacturers who stimulate international disputes and thereby lead them to the possibilities of war, and from fire-eaters who are always dragging the tail of their country before the rest of the world. I think your Lordships would do well to trust the men. They have never failed their country yet, and for my own part, knowing them quite well, I do not believe that the circulation of any Communist leaflet, the hasty utterance of a speech in Hyde Park or elsewhere, or an article appearing in a newspaper would divert them in the least degree from their duty. We shall feel it right t o take this Amendment to a Division.
LORD BALFOUR OF BURLEIGH: am sure everyone on this side of the House must appreciate the earnestness and sincerity with which the noble Lord who has just sat down has spoken. None of us on this side of the House wish to impute to the noble Lord any motive other than his obvious sincerity, but is there not just a little misunderstanding and conflict between the arguments which he has put to your Lordships? The noble Lord has drawn a picture on the one hand of the soldier being ordered to shoot down his relatives, and on the other hand of the soldier being used as a strike breaker. Surely the two pictures are not comparable. As the noble Viscount has explained, if the military are called in it is not a question of strike breaking, but it is a question of maintenance of order. The noble Lord drew a picture of the ships not being loaded at the clocks. My recollection of the general strike when it took place a few years ago is not that the military were called in to do the work of the strikers, but they were called in to keep order, and it was the civilians who rallied to the support of the Government and did the work.
LORD MARLEY: Will the noble Lord allow me to point out that in the Amendment now before your Lordships it is "allow themselves to be used in an industrial dispute" and that includes strike breaking as well as the other form.
LORD BALFOUR OF BURLEIGH: It is precisely that phrase "to be used in an industrial dispute" which is so vague, far more vague and objectionable from that point of view than any phrase in the Bill. All I wanted to conclude by saying, when the noble Lord interrupted
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me, was that it was not the soldiers but the civilians who put an end to the strike and that the use of the military, as the noble Viscount said, was for the preservation of order and not for strike breaking.
LORD SANDERSON: The noble Viscount the Leader of the House has said that it is unfair that a soldier should be punished for not doing his duty while the person who persuaded him not to do his duty goes scot free. The noble Viscount has said that once or twice. I think he said it in his Second Reading speech. With the greatest respect to the noble Viscount I think that is not so. The soldier has to decide according to his conscience whether he shall do his duty or not. He can weigh up the matter as well as anybody else after he has received advice. Surely the fact of my giving him advice and asking him to consider whether or not he ought to take part in an industrial dispute is quite a different thing from a man neglecting his duty. If I give him advice that is merely an expression of opinion, an opinion which I have the right to express. If I tell a soldier or write to a soldier advising him not to take part in an industrial dispute, that is one thing, and it is another thing if the soldier, having considered my argument and knowing the penalty, decides to run the risk of that penalty. Because a soldier, knowing the law, decides to run the risk of punishment, that is no reason why I should be punished for expressing an opinion on the subject.
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: My noble friend on the Liberal Benches asked me a question, and I hope your Lordships will allow me to answer it, although I do not think it is pertinent to the issue before us at this moment. He wanted to know whether I personally was in favour of the use of the military in industrial disputes. My opinion is that, as a general rule, the Police ought to be sufficient to deal with individual cases of violence that may occur during an industrial dispute, and that exactly the same principle should apply to Fascists, or any other small bodies of individuals who may disturb the peace. I do not make any discrimination between Parties or classes. I cannot help feeling that in the very interesting discussion we have had the point at issue has been neglected, and the very common error has been fallen

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into of arguing stubbornly against a case that has not been put forward by those who proposed this Amendment. That has been so even in the case of the noble Viscount himself. A dispute has arisen between those who believe that the military should be used in industrial disputes, and those who maintain, on the other hand, that the military should not be allowed to intervene in such cases. That is not the issue raised by this Amendment. The issue, as your Lordships will perceive, if you read the
Resolved in the negative and Amendment disagreed to accordingly.
LORD STRABOLGI: Before we finally part with this clause may I ask the noble Viscount if he will answer one point which I raised and which I do not think he has answered? It is a point of some importance, not the case of a pacifist propagandist, but the case of the lesser person who seduces a soldier from his duty—who persuades him to overstay his leave for one reason or another. I would ask the advice of the noble Viscount upon this point, but as I read it, such a person who for one reason or another induced the soldier to miss a troopship, for exampe, is liable to two years imprisonment or a fine of £200. I do not think that that can he the intention and
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Amendment carefully, is simply whether a view of this kind may be expressed in a public speech, or in an article that appears in a newspaper. It is fundamentally an Amendment that stands for freedom of speech and freedom of the Press, and that is what I put before your Lordships.
On Question, Whether the proposed proviso shall be there inserted?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 8; Not-Contents, 69.

CONTENTS.

Arnold, L.

Hay, L. (E. Kinnoull) [Teller]

Sanderson, L.

Faringdon, L.

Snell, L.

Hare, L. (E. Listowel)

Marley, L. [Teller]

Strabolgi, L.

NOT-CONTENTS.

Aberdeen and Temair, M.

Mersey, V.

Hawke, L.

Exeter, M.

Howard of Glossop, L.

Reading, M.

Aberdare, L.

Howard of Penrith, L.

Abinger, L.

Hutchison of Montrose, L.

Feversham, E.

Allen of Hurtwood, L.

Kilmaine, L.

Iddesleigh, E.

Alvingham, L.

Lamington, L.

Jellicoe, E.

Amulree, L.

Luke, L.

Leven and Melville, E.

Annaly, L.

Marks, L.

Lucan, E. [Teller]

Balfour of Burleigh, L.

Merrivale, L.

Malmesbury, E.

Bingley, L.

Rankeillour, L.

Midleton, E.

Brougham and Vaux, L.

Redesdale, L.

Morton, E.

Clwyd, L.

Remnant, L.

Mount Edgcumbe, E.

Cottesloe, L.

Rennell, L.

Munster, E.

Cranworth, L.

Rhayader, L.

Onslow, E.

Danesfort, L.

Ritchie or Dundee, L.

Plymouth, E.

Darling, L.

Rochester, L.

Radnor, E.

Daryngton, L.

Saltersford, L. (E. Courtown)

Rothes, E.

Elton, L.

Southampton, L.

Ypres, E.

Fairfax of Cameron, L.

Stanmore, L.

Foxford, L. (E. Limerick)

Strathcona and Mount Royal, L.

Astor, V.

Gage, L. (V. Gage) [Teller]

Esher, V.

Greville, L.

Templemore, L.

Goschen, V.

Hampton, L.

Wakehurst, L.

Hailsham, V.

Harris, L.

Wigan, L. (E. Crawford)

Wolverton, L.

I think we ought to make that matter clear.
LORD ARNOLD LORD ARNOLD Before the noble Viscount replies there are one or two observations which I should like to make upon this clause before we go to a Division upon it. The noble Viscount did not, reply to what is really the most serious charge made against this Bill by the opponents of the Bill. He appears to be still lingering under the delusion that this Bill deals, and can deal, only with absolutely subversive Communistic propaganda. We have put the other case; the noble Viscount has completely ignored it, and I do submit quite respectfully but quite firmly that that is not the way in which a very vital matter of this sort ought to be discussed in your Lord-

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ships' House. We have put points of tremendous substance which are awakening the greatest apprehension in the minds of a very large number of people in this country, people whose character is of the highest, and we have a right to have the view of the Government on the case which we put.
It is quite true, as I have said to your Lordships two or three times, that whatever the noble Viscount says will have no effect whatever upon how the Bill is interpreted. He may, therefore, ask what is the good of bringing up the point. The good of bringing up the point is that the public may be informed of the dangers of this Bill even more than they are at the present time. I brought up the case of the statement of the Bishop of Birmingham which has attracted a tremendous amount of attention in the country. The noble Viscount has not deigned to say anything whatever upon that matter; and after all the Bishop of Birmingham is a member of your Lordships' House, and I think we are entitled to have his views upon that matter. They were stated in another place, and the matter has been discussed here by the most reverend Primate and by the noble Lord, Lord Allen of Hurt-wood. I think the noble Viscount should give us his views upon the case of the Bishop of Birmingham. He knows perfectly well what it is because it has been debated again and again. Hitherto he has absolutely ignored it.
On the question of general pacifist propaganda the point upon which we want some pronouncement is the danger which arises from the intention of the consequences of the man's action being presumed by the Courts. May I read what has been said by a very great authority upon this very question, Dr. Ivor Jennings, Professor of International Law at the London University. The first part of the passage which I am going to read is not a quotation of the words of Dr. Jennings, but I read it to lead up to what he says, and I will read his words at the end:
"This provision regarding intention, however, does nothing to safeguard the legitimate distribution of pacifist and antiwar literature."
This is the point:
"Not only under the influence of political prejudice or in conditions of national hysteria, magistrates will be perfectly"—
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and now follow the words of Dr. Ivor Jennings—
"'entitled to deduce intention from the circumstances'".
The noble Viscount knows perfectly well what that means, and he knows how very important those words are. So that the point is that the writer or distributor of pacifist literature, if charged with malicious intention—and Mr. Justice Horridge has laid it down that "malicious" only means "deliberate"—may very properly deny that it was his intention to cause any disaffection, but he could not deny that in certain cases pacifist pamphlets do in fact have that effect. That is the point, and we should like to have some pronouncement upon that from the noble Viscount. I submit that it is a thing for which we are entitled to ask before this clause passes, and I should be very much obliged if he would deal with the matter in detail, so that we may have the views of the Government upon it, not only for our benefit but for the benefit of the public.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: I always hesitate to answer hypothetical questions, because, of necessity, any legal point depends on a precise statement of the facts, and unless you have all the facts your answer on legal points may very often be misleading, but I will do my best to state what my view is on the questions so far as I understand them. Lord Strabolgi wants to know whether the lady who persuades her soldier friend to overstay his leave is guilty of an offence under this Bill. My impression is that technically she is guilty of an offence under the existing law, and that therefore she will still be guilty of an offence, with this difference, that at present she is liable to penal servitude for life and indictment and all that sort of ridiculous nonsense, but under this Bill she would in such a case, if she were ever prosecuted, at worst get off with a nominal fine. It reduces the penalty but does not alter the offence.
Then Lord Arnold asked me about the Bishop of Birmingham. I am sorry, but although it is true that I have read the debate in another place, and I read the words used there, I have not studied them carefully; I was content to take the Attorney-General's answer in another place. But I think the answer is that if

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the Bishop of Birmingham makes a statement to members of His Majesty's forces with the endeavour to seduce them from their duty or allegiance, he is guilty of an offence, and the fact that he is a Bishop, with all respect to the Episcopal Bench—and all who now occupy it—does not seem to me to make any difference.
LORD ARNOLD: If the noble Viscount will permit me—this is a very vital thing with regard to this Bill—what does he mean when he says: "makes that statement to soldiers"? Does he mean that he must go to Aldershot and wait outside the barracks until soldiers come out? The Bishop's statement, as he makes it, is to soldiers.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: If he intends, and is trying, to seduce a soldier or soldiers from obeying orders, then I think it is an offence at present, and it will certainly remain an offence.
LORD ARNOLD: Is the noble Viscount's position that the Bill makes no difference in law?
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: In that regard, none. Then the noble Lord asks about pacifist pamphlets. "Pacifist" is a very vague word, and it depends upon what is in the pamphlet. There are many pacifist pamphlets which advocate no war, and advocate no fighting in circumstances which some of us think would justify resistance. Those are all right. They always have been, and will remain so. But though it is called a pacifist pamphlet it does not escape being criminal if it is an
endeavour to persuade soldiers to refuse to obey orders. That is an offence, and you have to prove, in order to convict under this Bill and under the existing Act, that the document is such as reasonably to amount to an attempt to seduce soldiers and sailors, and that it is issued to soldiers and sailors, or caused to be issued to them with that intent. If you prove that then you prove an offence under the Incitement to Mutiny Act, 1797, and under what I hope will be the Incitement to Disaffection Act of 1934.
LORD MARLEY: Did I understand the noble Viscount to say that a woman who persuades a soldier to overstay his leave is liable to penal servitude for life?
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: I think it is arguable that perhaps she may be. I think under the Incitement to Mutiny Act she would come within it, and if so then she would come within this Bill. That is all.
LORD MARLEY: Then overstaying leave is somehow or other destroying allegiance?
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: That may be.
LORD STRABOLGI: I think the last admission is extraordinary, and I shall certainly ask the House to divide against Clause 1.
On Question, Whether Clause 1 shall stand part of the Bill?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 49; Not Contents, 9.

CONTENTS.

Aberdeen and Temair, M.

Goschen, V.

Howard of Penrith, L.

Exeter, M.

Hailsham, V.

Lamington, L.

Luke L.

Feversham, E.

Aberdare, L.

Marks, L.

Iddesleigh, E.

Abinger, L.

Merrivale, L.

Jellicoe, E.

Alvingham, L.

Rankeillour, L.

Leven and Melville, E.

Amulree, L.

Redesdale, L.

Lucan, E. [Teller.]

Annaly, L.

Remnant, L.

Malmesbury, E.

Balfour of Burleigh, L.

Rennell, L.

Morton, E.

Bingley, L.

Rochester, L.

Mount Edgcumbe, E.

Cottesloe, L.

Saltersford, L. (E. Courtown.)

Munster, E.

Danesfort, L.

Southampton, L.

Onslow, E.

Daryngton, L.

Strathcona and Mount Royal, L.

Plymouth, E.

Elton, L.

Radnor, E.

Foxford, L. (E. Limerick.)

Templemore, L.

Rothes, E.

Gage, L. (V. Gage.) [Teller.]

Wakehurst, L.

Ypres, E.

Greville, L.

Wolverton, L.

Howard of Glossop, L.

NOT-CONTENTS.

Arnold, L.

Hay, L. (E. Kinnoull.) [Teller.]

Rhayader, L.

Faringdon, L.

Sanderson, L.

Hare, L. (E. Listowel.)

Marley, L. [Teller.]

Snell, L.

Strabolgi, L.

Resolved in the affirmative, and Clause 1 agreed to accordingly.
[The Sitting was suspended at eight o'clock and resumed at a quarter past nine.]
Clause 2:
Provisions for the prevention and detection of offences antler this Act.
2.—(1) If any person, with intent to commit or to aid, abet, counsel, or procure the commission of an offence under Section one of this Act, has in his possession or under his control any document of such a nature that the dissemination of copies thereof among members of His Majesty's forces would constitute such an offence he shall be guilty of an offence under this Act.
(2) If a Judge of the High Court is satisfied by information on oath that there is reasonable ground for suspecting that an offence under this Act has been committed, and that evidence of the commission thereof is to be found at any premises or place specified in the information, he may, on an application made by an officer of Police of a rank not lower than that of inspector, grant a search warrant authorising any such officer as aforesaid named in the warrant together with any other persons named in the warrant and any other officers of Police to enter the premises or place at any time within one month from the date of the warrant, if necessary by force, and to search the premises or place and every person found therein, and to seize anything found on the premises or place or on any such person which the officer has reasonable ground for suspecting to be evidence of the commission of such an offence as aforesaid:
Provided that—

(a) a search warrant shall only be issued in respect of an offence suspected to have been committed within the three months prior to the laying of the information thereof; and

(b) if a search warrant under this Act has been executed on any premises, it shall be the duty of the officer of Police who has conducted or directed the search to notify the occupier that the search has taken place, and to supply him with a list of any documents or other objects which have been removed from the premises, and where and documents have been removed from any other person to supply that person with a list of such documents.

(3) No woman shall, in pursuance of a warrant issued under the last foregoing subsection, be searched except by a woman.
(4) Anything seized under this section may be retained for a period not exceeding one month, or if within that period proceedings are commenced for an offence under this Act until the conclusion of those proceedings, and subject as aforesaid, and to the provisions of this Act conferring powers on courts dealing with offences, the Police (Property) Act, 1897 (which makes provision with respect to the disposal of property in the possession of the Police),
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shall apply to property which has come into the possession of the Police under this section as it applies to property which has come into the possession of the Police in the circumstances mentioned in that Act.
THE LORD CHAIRMAN: Perhaps I might explain that in view of the fact that Lord Strabolgi withdrew his Amendment on Clause 1, he has handed me a manuscript Amendment, the same as the one on the Paper, which will come after Lord Marley's Amendment. Therefore, I shall put to the House the question that the word "If" stand part in order to save the other Amendment.
LORD MARLEY LORD MARLEY moved to leave out subsection (1). The noble Lord said: In moving this Amendment may I express the hope that the noble Viscount who leads the House has had a good dinner and is in a more reasonable frame of mind, and that he will be more willing to give accurate information on the Bill when he replies to the points raised? He has certainly been guilty of suppressing a number of facts, and has failed to answer questions on certain aspects of the Bill in his replies. He has certainly misled certain members of your Lordships' House and misrepresented certain aspects of the Bill. Of course, he is a splendid fighter, but I think his valour sometimes outruns his discretion, and this led him into certain inaccuracies which misled some members of your Lordships' House, notably, the noble Marquess who leads the Liberals. It is very important in his position that we should have extremely accurate replies on this important measure. In particular, I want to take exception to his reply in connection with the newspaper controversy. He quoted from a leaflet called "The Soldier's Voice" which he says is a newspaper, though he knows perfectly well it is not a newspaper. There is a statutory definition of a newspaper, which is a publication which is published regularly, at least once every twenty-eight days, and the proprietor of which is registered. "The Soldier's Voice" is not a newspaper.
There is no doubt that this subsection is one of the most important parts of the Bill, because it provides the definition of the offence outlined in Clause 1. I do not believe that this Bill is aimed mainly at so-called Communist agitators, nor do I believe that it is aimed mainly at pacifists. I believe it is aimed at the

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events which may take place in those few vital days preceding a possible declaration of war, days when tension throughout the country is extremely dangerous, when agitation against war may have the effect of destroying that popular support of a declaration of war without which no Government can make such a momentous decision; a time when those in favour of pacific action may be able to have an immense influence on great wavering sections of the population. I have a feeling that the sinister motive which has been referred to several times from various sides of the House may possibly be this motive of ensuring that any attempt to prevent popular support of that "extension of national policy," to use the words of Clausewitz, of which armed force is the final expression, shall be defeated. There can be no doubt that a declaration of a state of emergency, some declaration of national conscription, might at once make absolutely impossible any pacifist activities, any activities designed to prevent those who have been conscripted into the forces of the Crown or recalled to the colours from supporting the warlike attitude of the Government. I do not know about that, and I do not expect the noble Viscount to answer any hypothetical questions; I merely give it as a possible explanation of the real intention behind this Bill.
Let me read this subsection to noble Lords, because one of the stock replies of the noble and learned Viscount is his pathetic reiteration that we on these Benches have not read the Bill. If only he would give up this imagination that he is the only person who reads a measure brought before your Lordships' House, if he would acknowledge that we are capable of reading and understanding, and do read and understand, measures far too well sometimes for the Government! To get rid of that taunt, which is quite unworthy of the noble Viscount, I propose to read the subsection under discussion. It says:
"If any person, with intent to commit or to aid, abet, counsel, or procure the commission of an offence under Section one of this Act, has in his possession or under his control any document of such a nature that the dissemination of copies thereof among members of His Majesty's forces would constitute such an offence he shall be guilty of an offence under this Act."
The scope of this subsection is almost unlimited. It is capable of such an
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infinity of interpretations that I cannot see there is any real limit to the extent to which it might be used. While, as was stated by my noble friend Lord Listowel a few minutes ago, the avowed object of this Government is limited in extent, I believe that it might be used most unscrupulously by any Government finding itself in a position where it desired to prevent free expression of opinion and to crush out opposition to any warlike preparations on the part of that Government. Moreover, under this subsection, any prominent man or woman who has expressed in the past pacifist views, views against war, views in favour of international friendship, may quite easily be caught up in the toils of the measure and be proved to have committed an offence under it. Not only that, but under this Bill the speeches of those persons may be taken into account to prove intent, also the antecedents of individuals, their activities now and in the past, the character of individuals and their position. The powers given are far too wide, far too ill-defined and vague.
I believe that this subsection of the Bill is capable of the most dangerous and vindictive application. I would like for a moment to analyse the two sides of this subsection. There is first of all the question of intent, and then there is the question of the possession or control of a document. I submit that in this subsection—and I think it wants very careful examination—those two things are not intimately connected. That is to say, you can prove intention with regard to the general activities of an individual and then you may have him for an offence because of the possession of a document quite other than and totally unconnected with the particular intention which is alleged against the individual. I believe that as it is worded this subsection is capable of that interpretation. It will not be the interpretation of the noble Viscount which will be taken in the Courts, it will be the actual wording of the Bill itself. Those individuals' intentions, as the Attorney-General's statements have indicated, will be a question of fact varying with every individual. For instance you can consider intention as applicable to a person merely because it is claimed that he has a thoroughly bad character.
There are very few members of your Lordships' House who have public bad characters, though I have no doubt privately we are no different from anyone else. It has been said by Bernard Shaw that this place is better than the House of Commons because, while most of us are here merely because we are the sons of our fathers, the House of Commons is a collection of selected undesirables. I of course do not follow Bernard Shaw in that. I think that probably we are about an average. According to the Attorney-General, apparently everything a man has done or said may be an index to his intention, and, under the law of evidence, events and incidents which have nothing to do with the particular case under consideration may be given in evidence if they are directed to showing the man's intention. For instance, membership of an organisation may be quite sufficient to establish intention. The members of the Society of Friends, as I shall show in a moment, publish some documents which certainly come under the second part of this subsection. Membership of the League of Nations Union might bring in that well-known criminal Viscount Cecil, for example. He would be qualifying for two years imprisonment and a fine of such astronomical proportions that I cannot conceive its amount. Certainly members of anti-war and pacifist organisations would qualify under the intention part of the subsection we are considering.
Whereas ordinary evidence must be relevant to the facts at issue, when it comes to intention evidence of other events is admissible—evidence of other events not connected with the particular facts at issue. There is a legal doctrine—here, of course, I speak subject to correction—of presumption of continuance of activities. Apparently, if an individual has been active in a certain direction, it is presumed that he is continuing those activities. Therefore, his intention is quite sufficiently provable when it comes to a case under this Bill. It seems easy to prove intent. Printers and publishers are particularly hit by this subsection. My noble friend Lord Arnold quoted from The Times an extremely interesting letter signed by a large number of publishers about a manuscript for a children's book which was considered to be so dangerous in its anti-war proposals that the printer
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did not dare to print it. Not only are authors hit, but apparently typists who type their manuscripts would be among those who "aid, abet, counsel or procure the commission of an offence." There we should have typists, printers, publishers, book-sellers, newspaper advertisers and distributors. With regard to advertisers, there was a very interesting case some years ago, when Sir Archibald Bodkin, then an advocate at the Criminal Bar, declared that war would become impossible if all men were to take the view that war was wrong. He made that remark in the course of proceedings against members of the committee of the No Conscription Fellowship who, under the then existing law, were sentenced to six months imprisonment. That remark was subsequently printed as a poster, and the printer was fined one hundred and twenty pounds with the alternative of ninety-one days imprisonment merely for the sin of intending to display the poster.
It seems to me the whole of this chain of persons involved between the author and the publisher and the distributor of any document of a pacifist nature comes in under this far too wide Bill as capable of being charged with aiding and abetting the commission of an offence. It is quite clear, therefore, that the Bill does definitely stifle free speech and free expression of opinion and does lay the foundations for the building up in this country of a slave State. A vital point to remember is the legal presumption that everyone intends the natural and ordinary consequences of his actions or intended actions, and therefore disseminators in the way of their business are thus deemed to intend to circulate to anyone into whose hands or before whose eyes a paper, document, poster, etcetera, may come. Hence they cannot prevent a soldier seeing or buying a book or newspaper; and that, of course, is the whole position that we are taking up, that after this Bill becomes an Act, free speech becomes gravely endangered if that free speech or that expression of opinion has anything to do with pacifism, with antiwar, or with trying to persuade the people not to take part in fighting and in the use of armed force.
So much for the first part of this subsection, intention. If it is so easy to prove intention against any individual,

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prominent or otherwise, but particularly prominent individuals, having got your intention you have then merely to discover a suitable document in his possession. The intention then is easy. Is it equally easy to discover a document which is suitable for the purpose of constituting an offence? And here the definition is amazingly wide. Let me try to give an analysis of it. Any document which, if placed before a soldier casually, might be considered by him or anyone else to be an attempt to seduce him, even by the internal evidence of the document, is quite sufficient to fulfil the requirements of the Bill, and it is impossible to say beforehand whether or not many documents actually fulfil the requirements of the second part of subsection (1) of Clause 2.
Let me give some examples. Of course manuscript notes or notes for speeches found in the house of one of these persons whose intention is so easy to prove are ample evidence, because they would be, according to the Bill, a document of such a nature that "the dissemination of copies thereof" would do the trick. May I remind your Lordships how very easy it is, if unscrupulous persons are conducting the search, to plant manuscript notes or to plant notes for a speech in the premises being searched? There is very real danger there. It has been done again and again. It has been done in this country as well as in other countries, and there is real danger of the planting of such a type of document.
LORD BALFOUR OF BURLEIGH: I hope the noble Lord will pardon me for interrupting him, but does he suggest that it has been done by the Police in this country? If so, I think he ought to give instances.
LORD MARLEY: The noble Lord knows that history will show numerous cases of this type of action, and we have the words of the Attorney-General in another place when he stated that there was never any difficulty in obtaining an agent-provocateur and that he himself has sent an agent-provocateur to obtain certain documents without the slightest difficulty. With regard to articles, I hold in my hands a copy of the supplement to Time and Tide, a supplement dated November 3 and edited by Sir Norman Angell, that well-known pacifist, whose intentions can so easily be in-
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ferred from his public and private activities. This document contains—and I strongly recommend to your Lordships the immense value of buying a copy of this paper, though I need hardly say I have no financial interest in it—extraordinarily interesting excerpts from the evidence heard by the United States Senate on the munitions industry—evidence of bribery and corruption of the most colossal kind by the great munition industries, not only of America, but of Great Britain—evidence of collaboration between Vickers and the Electric Boat Company, which must have the effect, if read by any soldier, of disgusting him with the type of people who are supplying him with the arms which he is to use in fighting, and which must have the effect on any reasonable being of disgusting him with the use of every conceivable type of filthy underground activity, as described in this document. I turn it up at random, and I read extraordinarily interesting evidence of the use of prostitutes in getting business.
LORD CARNOCK: Is that really evidence?
LORD MARLEY: Naturally, I said so.
LORD CARNOCK: Is evidence of prostitutes relevant to this debate?
LORD MARLEY: Very much so, because I am going to point out how it is going to disgust soldiers, and is likely to have the effect of turning soldiers against their duty. Let me take an example here. Asked whether Vickers were using women of doubtful character freely for the purpose of selling their goods, Mr. Miranda answered "Yes," and, asked whether they used women of doubtful character in South America, he replied "They do sometimes." Asked whether women were effective, he said "Not with me." Do noble Lords think that any soldier is going to fight under these conditions, when he learns that these great firms are selling arms to both sides in every conflict, and that the British soldier, when he is asked to fight, is quite likely to be shot down by the arms supplied by a British firm to the enemy? These articles will certainly subject Sir Norman Angell to the possibility of arrest, for we read that he is advocating that people should read this document, including soldiers.

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Articles in the Press of this general kind will be published very much less freely in the future than in the past, because not only Sir Norman Angell but the publisher, printer and distributor will be liable under this Bill to two years imprisonment and an enormous fine. One copy of this found in the house of any individual known to have pacifist views, known to intend that soldiers shall be encouraged not to fight, is sufficient to secure that man's conviction. And what about books? Have any noble Lords read the memoirs of Mr. Lloyd George and his attack upon the generals for what he claims to be their crass stupidity and obstinacy in forcing to death thousands upon thousands of men in the mud of the battlefield of Passchendaele. Surely any solder reading that is likely to be disgusted—
THE EARL OF CLANWILLIAM: Hear, hear.
LORD MARLEY: I am very glad to have the agreement of the noble Earl.
THE EARL OF CLAYWILLIAM: We do not agree with Mr. Lloyd George.
LORD MARLEY: I am not concerned with that.
THE EARL OF CLANWILLIAM: The noble Lord asked us if we had read the book. I have not.
LORD MARLEY: Well, I am very sorry. I hope the noble Earl will obtain a copy, and then he will speak with more authority on it. But I am not concerned with the effect of this book on noble Lords. I am concerned with the dangerous effect it will have on the minds of private soldiers who, reading that book, will believe that the officers commanding are dangerous, obstinate, inefficient and brutal, and may be incited thereby not to carry out their duties. Now, that is a very serious position, and therefore I say that one copy of Lloyd George's book found in the house of a person known to have intent to seduce is quite sufficient to secure the conviction of that person.
LORD CARNOCK: Lloyd George?
LORD MARLEY: Lloyd George; and I hope very much that if somebody is going to be prosecuted, the Government will try their hand on Lloyd George at the beginning, and see what success they
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have. Similarly, I think Mr. H. G. Wells's book, in which he examines the mentality of the generals would be sufficient as a document to secure the conviction of any well-known pacifist if a copy were found in his house.
There was some amusement at the possibility of the League of Nations Union being an organisation membership of which might be dangerous. But let me quote an excerpt from a pamphlet by Dr. Maxwell Garnett, who is secretary of the League of Nations Union, which I believe, if found in the house of one of these individuals, would be sufficient under this Bill to secure a conviction. Dr. Garnett, in his pamphlet "Organising Peace," which is an official publication of the League of Nations Union, used the following words:
"The only common sense policy is to enrol the forces of sanity and decency in all nations in a joint endeavour to get the world out of its foolish and wicked old dream about war's nobility and utility. Probably an enormous number of people, certainly most ex-soldiers, have got hold of some of this truth."
These words can only have value when addressed not only to the civil population, but to ex-soldiers, many of whom are still reservists, and I think therefore that under this Bill, although Dr. Garnett might deny his intention to disaffect these reservists, yet it could be shown that the probable consequence of his words and his guilty intention must be inferred from the consequences of his deliberate act in writing these words.
Then what about the Society of Friends—a most dangerous organisation, pacifist, one that urges all men and women to take no part in war? I believe that certain pamphlets of the Society of Friends would be amply adequate documents to find in the hands of one of these well-known persons. For instance in the pamphlet, "In the Next War," published by the Friends' Peace Committee it is said:
"The only way in which war will ever stop is for the fighters to refuse to fight."
That is a perfectly deliberate attempt to seduce fighters from their duty and allegiance. In another pamphlet, "The Warless World," published by the Society of Friends, it is said:
"The fundamental peace principle of Christianity demands the utter rejection of war, unequivocally and without compromise."

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And I see that Professor Gilbert Murray, after examining this Bill, gave it as his opinion that if the Bill is passed and is strictly administered by an unscrupulous Government, all those possessing the literature of the Society of Friends will be liable to imprisonment.
Surely this Bill is far too wide if I am right in all these examples of documents which could be used to create the offence under discussion? The worst case in my opinion is a resolution passed by that wicked organisation, the Labour Party, at their annual conference. I have a copy of the annual report of the Labour Party Conference at home. I cannot hide it. I have no doubt that if, and when, it is desired to imprison me my words will be remembered and that incriminating document will be found. Why do I say "incriminating"? I want to remind your Lordships that membership of political Parties is not forbidden to soldiers. We have in the Labour Party many serving soldiers who are members. One resolution, carried unanimously at the Annual Conference of the Labour Party, says this:
"We pledge ourselves to take no part in war and to resist it with the whole force of the Labour Movement."
That is a most dangerous document to have. Soldiers who are members of the Labour Party are "to take no part in war and to resist it with the whole force of the Labour Movement."
We heard something about the B.B.C. just before we adjourned for dinner. The British Broadcasting Corporation has already been frightened by the possibility of this Bill becoming law. When Professor Haldane was asked to broadcast his views on war the British Broadcasting Corporation, knowing that Professor Haldane's speech would be published in the Listener, knowing that such a document might be a document within the meaning of the Bill, and would therefore render them liable for aiding and abetting, refused to allow him to speak. Professor Haldane argued, of course, that the way to stop war was to find out those who profit by war, and then he included a sentence that I commend to your Lordships. He said:
"In 1921 the Greek Government rejected the British, French and Italian proposals for a peace with Turkey, and launched an offensive in Asia Minor. The following year the Greek Army was defeated. There was
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a revolution, and the Commander-in-Chief, the Prime Minister, and four other Ministers were executed. This was one of the most impressive gestures for peace made in our time."
I suggest that the B.B.C. were perhaps wise not to publish that in view of this Bill and the probability of its becoming law, but the Daily Herald published it, and so the Daily Herald is now liable, and it will be interesting to see the use made of that when it is desired to secure a conviction.
We all know the liability of the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister is known to have made statements which are most seditious. Take the statement in which he said that:
"Beneath the uniforms of the soldiers now engaged in fighting us were workmen—miners, textile workers, engineers, railwaymen. Our workmen, joining hands with them, should be fighting the common enemy in every land—capitalism, militarism, secret diplomacy."
That statement was made during the War. What a dangerous sentence to find as a document in the house of any individual whom it is desired to prove guilty of an offence under this subsection, which I say is infinitely too wide. I do not say the Prime Minister is alone in this Government. We have similar statements by the Dominions Secretary. He was asked when the War would end, and he said:
"God knows—but what is more important is: Will there be another? Not if the workers of the world are alive to their responsibility."
These documents are ample, I submit, if found in a house or on the premises of persons of well known pacifist views, to supply the prosecutors with all that is necessary to secure a conviction against such a person.
We have had the case of the Bishop of Birmingham, mentioned by my noble friend Lord Arnold. The Bishop of Birmingham deliberately intends, apparently, to advise soldiers not to fight. Suppose that he were a Vice-President of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel or of the British and Foreign Bible Society, and there were discovered in his house five thousand copies of the Bible and by his bedside a marked copy with certain seditious sentences clearly marked, I believe that would be ample documentary evidence of his intention to commit the offence, and of the document being available by which the offence

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might be committed. We know that the Attorney-General in another place has made it clear that in certain circumstances the use of the Bible would be a document amply sufficient to fulfil the need of documentary evidence in the case of a person of well known pacifist views.
Not only is this the case. It is not only possession that is involved, but it is possession and control, and not only is it the individual concerned, but it may be servants of that individual who will also be brought into the case. For example, in the case of a public library the librarian is responsible if such a document is found in the library of which he is librarian. The ramifications of the clause as drawn are so infinite and so wide that I believe it to be a most dangerous and serious clause to put into the law of this country. I believe I have proved the vagueness and the immense breadth of liability and the danger of this subsection. I want to conclude by reminding your Lordships that this Bill, when it becomes an Act, may well be used by a Socialist Government in the case, for example, of another Curragh plot to seduce soldiers from performing their duty of supporting the socialisation of the means of production, distribution and exchange against the resistance of the possessing classes. You are putting a weapon on the Statute Book which has two edges. I hope that your Lordships, or some of your Lordships, will realise our absolute sincerity in our opposition to this Bill, will realise our real belief in its dangers for the future of the country, and will not consider that we are idly opposing it merely because the Government are forcing a measure on this House, but that we are concerned with the future of this country, and believing that this Bill is a danger, consider therefore that it should be opposed. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 10, leave out subsection (1).—(Lord Marley.)
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: I do not think I need take so long in answering the noble Lord as he has taken in moving this Amendment. The noble Lord has entertained us for some considerable time with extracts from evidence given in some American inquiry as to the private manufacture of arms, which would seem more relevant to the debate now going on in
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another place than to anything before your Lordships. The noble Lord has told us that he has read and understood the subsection. He has read it to your Lordships, and therefore we know that he has read it. I can only say that from his speech he seems far from understanding it. May I explain in a few sentences what this subsection does? Clause 1, which we have already passed, makes it an offence, maliciously and advisedly, to try and seduce a member of the forces from his duty or allegiance. Clause 2, with which we are now concerned, makes it an offence for persons to have in their possession, or under their control, certain documents under certain conditions.
There are two conditions which are necessary to constitute an offence under this subsection. The first relates to the object of the person, and the second relates to the nature of the document. With regard to the object, of the person who is accused, it will be necessary for the prosecution to establish that the object with which the accused person has this document, whatever it be, in his possession, is to commit, or to aid, abet, counsel or procure the commission of an offence under Clause I. That is to say, before a prosecution can succeed, it is necessary affirmatively to prove that the object of the person accused is to seduce a member of His Majesty's Forces from his duty or allegiance. That is the first condition and, unless that is satisfied, no prosecution can succeed. The noble Lord has told us what he said the Attorney-General had explained as to what was relevant evidence, The important thing is what it is that has to be proved. In fact, the Attorney-General, so far from saying that the character of the person charged would be sufficient, said this:
"One has to prove two things. First, to prove an intention to commit an offence under Clause 1, and, secondly, to prove possession. The proof of intention is a proof which the prosecution must undertake. It has sometimes been suggested that the character of a person charged will he proof of intention."
The noble Lord told us that the Attorney-General said that was so. The Attorney-General went on to say:
"Any lawyer will know that that is wrong. You might as well attempt to prove that a man who was charged with being drunk while in charge of a motor car on 1st November was guilty because he had been drunk on 1st October. His character and his ante-

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cedents would have nothing on earth to do with the charge, and could not be given in evidence."
LORD MARLEY: May I interrupt for just one moment? The actual words used by the Attorney-General were—"a person of thoroughly bad character, a Communist." That is character.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: I am reading a verbatim extract from what the Attorney-General said.
LORD MARLEY: What I read was a verbatim extract.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: And with great respect to the noble Lord I do not propose to be diverted from it. He said that the Attorney-General had told the House of Commons that the character of a person charged would be proof of intention. I am reading this short extract to show that the Attorney-General, so far from saying that, said the precise opposite:
"His character and his antecedents would have nothing on earth to do with the charge, and could not be given in evidence. The prosecution will have to prove intention by giving evidence of some overt acts, as we lawyers say, in a phrase which I think is understood, and will have to undertake the onus, and discharge the onus before a magistrate or, if the person charged prefers it, before a jury, of showing that this intention exists."
I read that merely to show what in fact was said, so that your Lordships shall not be afraid, after the noble Lord's explanation, that the Attorney-General's language had been quite so surprising as some of you may have thought it was.
Then the other point which has to be proved is not only the intention with which the document is possessed, but also the nature of the document, and in order to ascertain that you have got to look at the document.
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Hear, hear.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: That seems to me rather a sensible thing to do and I am glad that we are agreed. You have got to look at the document and you have got to see from the document itself whether it is "of such a nature that the dissemination of copies thereof among members of His Majesty's forces would constitute" an offence under Clause 1, that is to say that the document is of such a nature that you could not spread it among members of His Majesty's forces without com-
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mitting the offence of endeavouring to seduce them from their allegiance. What is the good of reading the sort of letters and books and so-called evidence which the noble Lord read, when those are the words of the Bill, and when that is what has got to be undertaken? I do venture to think that this is an eminently reasonable clause. I come back, as I said before, to what the purpose of it is. The purpose of it is this, that whereas at present the person you catch and punish is the innocent tool, under this clause the person you catch and punish will be the person who has organised and intended to carry out a conspiracy to seduce His Majesty's forces.
LORD SNELL: I do not wish to detain the Committee on this point for more than a minute or two, but I should like to explain that if we felt it necessary to spend some time upon our criticism of this clause it was not our intention either to "entertain" the House (as the words were) or to obstruct its proceedings. It did seem to us that this subsection opened up the great principle of the Bill and therefore it would serve the purposes of your Lordships' House if we explained our position upon it at rather more than the usual length. I will say no more upon that point, but the speech of the noble Viscount has left me in a state of perplexity. I should like to know how the intention of a man can be discovered. That is the real point which the noble Viscount has been astute enough not to deal with. You can judge the words of a man; you can judge his overt acts and apply to them certain qualities; but how you are to judge what a man's intention is has not been explained. How does the noble Viscount know what my intentions are? I assure him that so far as I know they are entirely pacific and I hope not seditious, but how does he know what my intentions are? How do I know what are the intentions of His Majesty's Government? I do not know, but I suspect what they are. But a. suspicion is not sufficient to give a man two years for, or to put a fine of £200 upon him. That is the real point which I want to impress upon your Lordships, and it is the point of our discussion of this subject.
Before I close I would just like to say this. My own limitations in appreciation of this House are fairly well known,

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and I do not recall any of the criticisms I ever made upon it, but I have always believed that almost the one thing that placed it high in the estimation of the country was its regard for the personal liberty of Englishmen, and there were times during the War when the House of Lords seemed to remember that there was such a thing as a British tradition and a British Constitution. Yet on this occasion, when something so fundamental to the liberty of the individual is being discussed, we can scarcely get an argument in justification of it. That seems to be a matter for some regret. We still affirm our supreme anxiety about this subsection, and we feel that the arguments which have been advanced have not been answered, and we shall carry our opposition to a Division.
LORD BALFOUR, OF BURLEIGH: I think the noble Lord was complaining a little unfairly when he said "We cannot get our arguments listened to." We have listened with patience for three-quarters of an hour.
LORD SNELL: I beg the noble Lord's pardon. I thought I said we could not get our arguments answered.
LORD BALFOUR, OF BURLEIGH: The noble Lord said it was not fair to convict on suspicion, but surely the effect of the clause is that you have got to prove intent in order to convict. I believe there are many Acts of Parliament in which an intent is an offence. The noble Lord says that suspicion is not enough, but it is provided in the clause that the intent has got to he proved.
LORD ALLEN OF HURTWOOD: I wonder whether if, instead of moving the Amendment which stands in my name, I might venture to speak on this Amendment, and so save the time which otherwise would be taken by my Amendment. I hope I am not inconveniencing the House by intervening now, but I think this subsection still contains one element of very grave doubt. In this clause you find the phrase "any document of such a nature that" it will have a certain effect. I submit to the noble Viscount that those words are of such a nature that if they remain in an undefined condition, they make it difficult, for the administration of this clause to be carried out justly and equitably in every case. There is great uncertainty as to what precisely
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this phrase does mean. I do believe that in a strict rigid sense the document is defined in the Bill as drawn, but when you have matters of this importance which are going to have a considerable public interest it is important to have a clause so drafted that it commands public confidence in the wording used.
Whether the noble Viscount himself and the Attorney-General can understand it or not, printers and publishers at present do feel in considerable doubt as to what precisely is covered by that vague phrase "of such a nature"; and I have tried in my proposed Amendment to define more precisely the meaning of the phrase, and in the Amendment which I should have moved occur these words: "designed for that purpose and directed to that end." If that phrase could have been introduced into the Bill a great deal of what Lord Marley has said would not have been relevant, because every one of these documents which might come under suspicion must then have been deliberately designed for the purpose of the offence, and definitely directed to the object. I believe that if it were possible for the Government to give sympathetic consideration to these words, a great deal of the public misapprehension about this Bill would be cleared up, even though it is true that it is textually covered by the present drafting.
The reason which makes this matter so technically difficult and so dangerous to public confidence is that the procedure under this Bill is the procedure of the search warrant. If, for instance, the document were to lie taken before a Judge in an ordinary public Court, and the arguments for and against the nature of the document were to be publicly argued before the Judge, then the document would be examined by the Judge and a definite verdict upon its character could be given. But in this case it is a Judge in Chambers on an ex parte statement who has to pronounce on the document and say whether a search warrant shall be given. Say that he gives the search warrant, and says that the search in respect of that document shall take place, then the inspector goes into the private house in order, partly, to try to see to what extent that document is to be found in the house. But under subsection (2), when the inspector arrives in the house, he is not only entitled to

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take as evidence the document which has been brought before the Judge in Chambers and argued on an ex parte statement, but he has also to seize anything found on the premises which he may feel is evidence in connection with the case. Therefore, the next stage in the proceedings, where definiteness is so vital, is that the document is considered by an ordinary inspector, who uses what judgment he may possess in order to try to decide what documents are seditious, and as long as there is that possibility that an inspector may seize anything which he thinks to be a document of the kind that would be evidence in the case under Clause I, the consequence may be that printers, journalists and editors may be in grave doubt as to what precisely is, and is not, covered by the phrase a "document of such a nature."
In this debate I have to speak sometimes on one side and sometimes on the other, but a Cross Bench attitude is sometimes of help. Assurances given by the noble Viscount I accept without any question at all. I am perfectly convinced that there is no sinister intention in this Bill, but assurances given in Parliament are absolutely of no value when the Act comes to be administered in the Courts of Law. If the assurances which had been given in the House of Commons during the passage of the Military Service Acts during the War had been valid in the Courts of Law, I should never have been the guest of His Majesty's Government on so many occasions and for so long a period of time. Therefore having that experience in mind, and remembering that it is not only the intentions of this Government but the intentions of other Governments which are involved, and our descendants who will be subject to the administration of this Bill, if it were possible for the Government favourably to consider trying to define this vague clause more amply than it is now defined, I believe they would be doing a public service and would be removing one of the great apprehensions that at the present time surround this measure.
LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE: I only rise to say that I think the noble Lord who has just spoken has added to the confusion of our proceedings by moving his Amendment now. There are
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seven Amendments on this subsection, and although many of us might be prepared to support the noble Lord on the particular point he has raised I think it would be preferable for us to get the Amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Marley out of the way first, and then the seven Amendments on the subsection can be debated separately and voted on.
THE LORD CHAIRMAN: I did riot understand that the noble Lord, Lord Allen of Hurtwood, moved his Amendment. He merely asked to speak on his Amendment at this stage.
LORD ALLEN OF HURTWOOD: Might I say that I thought it would be a great pity to duplicate the discussion? Speeches are far too long in any case, and if I were to raise the whole subject again it would be a great mistake. Therefore I thought I would speak now.
LORD ARNOLD: This is a matter of supreme importance. I have been a long time in your Lordships' House now, and I do not remember this sort of thing happening before. We shall get into most inextricable confusion if we attempt to do business in this way. I have great respect for the noble Lord, but he has not been very long here, and I do not think the procedure he has adopted is one that should be followed. I hope there will not be any more of it, otherwise the debate becomes more difficult, and it is difficult enough already, because we do not get a proper reply even to one Amendment.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: May I say just one word in defence of the noble Lord, Lord Allen? I gather he is not going to move, so he is in exactly the same position as if he had not put an Amendment down. The Amendment we have been discussing is to leave out the whole subsection, and nobody can doubt that the noble Lord who moved dealt exhaustively with the whole subsection. The noble Lord behind me points out his misgivings with regard to some words in the subsection as to which he would desire to have elucidation. I cannot see myself that there is anything inconvenient or improper in the course he has taken, and, if I may, I shall endeavour in a few words to answer the points he has raised. I agree with the noble Lord that in a Bill which is even suspected—I think I said

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this on Second Reading—of dealing with any question of the liberty of the subject, it is of the greatest importance that we should do our best to ensure that the Bill is not misunderstood. Whether or not that end has been assisted by some of the attacks made from the other side, I think may be doubted; but I agree with the noble Lord that that should be our object.
But when I come to the actual Amendment that he suggests I would ask the House to believe that the Government tried to get the words which were best for the purpose, and if the noble Lord will forgive my saying so his own words do not really help. It is very difficult to find words which are not capable of being misrepresented. If I may remind him for a moment—and this is only an illustration of the sort of difficulty that arises—in the Trade Disputes Bill when the Government proposed words very like these he now suggests, the words "a strike designed or calculated," a tremendous attack was made on the ground that the word "designed" was so ambiguous, and it was said we ought to have something which was more definite and clear. I am quite sure if the word here had been "designed," although the noble Lord would perhaps have been satisfied, we should have had just as bitter complaints from the other side and just such an attempt to make out that the words were not intelligible.
There is this further difficulty, which is perhaps a technical one, that if those words were used you would have to prove what was the design of the person who originally produced the pamphlet. That might be a very, very difficult thing. The material thing is what is the design of the person who has the pamphlet whom you are prosecuting, and it does not matter whether the original writer designed the particular words which are in the pamphlet for one purpose or another so long as they are, if disseminated among the forces, calculated to produce this result of seducing them from their allegiance, and are held by the possessor with the intention of using them for that purpose. For that reason we think that the words we have got in the Bill are as clear as it is possible for us to make them.
LORD RHAYADER,: I listened to the noble Viscount with some disappoint-
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ment. I rather hoped that my noble friend Lord Allen would have elicited a better response from the Government than he has received. This clause, with its wide application, is really the main cause of the anxiety of the country about the Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Marley, who devoted a great deal of time to analysing the clause, I think has voiced what is felt in the country. None of us know at this moment what documents are referred to in the Bill. We have not the smallest idea whether the circulation of portions of the Bible specially marked might become incriminating documents, or whether sermons preached in the interests of peace are dangerous to the speakers. The Government give us no help whatever. Surely the thing we want to get at is the circulation of documents which are designed, which have the intent, which are written and circulated with the purpose of seducing the troops. That is what the Government profess to be aiming at, that and nothing more. Yet they put in this Bill words so wide that nobody in the country knows whether any book, pamphlet, sermon, speech, article, notes of a speech, or anything which is reduced to writing may not come under the condemnation of this clause.
The Government cannot say that this fear is baseless, because they have refused from the beginning to justify their Bill by saying what is going on which requires this legislation. Not one word has been said in either House to prove the necessity of the Bill. The Government refuse altogether to say what are the documents that they mean to condemn. They wish to have power absolutely unlimited in scope to keep any document which in certain circumstances is made use of in regard to the troops. I submit that the Government are asking us for an amount of confidence which they have not justified. I do not wish to withhold from the Government any power which may be necessary to them to keep order or discipline among the soldiers. We have a free Army and a man need not go into the Army unless he chooses to do so. He makes a contract. I do not want the Government to have a power so wide that books, written long ago, and speeches which were never intended to be used for seditious purposes may all come under the condemnation of the Bill. I think we have real reason to

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complain that the Government have given us no help to allay the anxieties of the country which are very real and far-reaching. I do think that, although they have accepted many Amendments and this Bill is very different from when it was introduced, their refusal to define what sort of a document they really mean in words which cannot be mistaken, their refusal to limit this terrible power which they are now taking into the hands of the Executive will do something to lose them support in the country. The country would be glad enough to give them power to preserve discipline in the Army, but not willing to give them these immense powers when nobody knows who may come under condemnation, or what documents may be the cause of his conviction.
LORD MARLEY: May I say that I am disappointed with the reply of the noble
Resolved in the affirmative and Amendment disagreed to accordingly.
LORD STRABOLGI LORD STRABOLGI moved, in subsection (1), after "If," to insert "in time of war or national emergency." The noble Lord said: I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Viscount? I expected that sort of reply but I am disgusted with it, because we never get adequate arguments in reply to the arguments we try to put forward. We put forward our arguments with perfect sincerity because we believe that this Bill is a danger to the future of the country. I apologise to the Committee if my arguments were put at too great a length, but it was difficult to compress into a smaller space a speech on a subject which I believe to be of such vital importance. We feel that our arguments are serious arguments, and deserve a reply less airy, rather more detailed, and rather more informative than was vouchsafed by the noble Viscount who leads the House.
On Question, Whether the word "If" shall stand part of the clause?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 65; Not-Contents, 10.

CONTENTS.

Aberdeen and Temair, M.

Brentford, V.

Fairfax of Cameron, L.

Exeter, M.

Hailsham, V.

Foxford, L. (E. Limerick)

Airlie, E.

Gage, L. (V. Gage) [Teller]

Aberdare, L.

Greville, L.

De La Warr, E.

Abinger, L.

Hampton, L.

Feversham, E.

Alness, L.

Harris, L.

Iddesleigh, E.

Alvingham, L.

Howard of Penrith, L.

Jellicoe, E.

Amulree, L.

Hutchison of Montrose, L.

Leven and Melville, E.

Annaly, L.

Kilmaine, L.

Lucan, E. [Teller]

Balfour of Burleigh, L.

Kinnaird, L.

Malmesbury, E.

Biddulph, L.

Lamington, L.

Midleton, E.

Bingley, L.

Luke, L.

Mount Edgcumbe, E.

Brougham and Vaux, L.

Rankeillour, L.

Munster, E.

Carnock, L.

Redesdale, L.

Onslow, E.

Clanwilliam, L. (E. Clanwilliam)

Remnant, L.

Plymouth, E.

Rennell, L.

Radnor, E.

Cottesloe, L.

Ritchie of Dundee, L.

Rothes, E.

Cranworth, L.

Rochester, L.

Vane, E. (M. Londonderry)

Danesfort, L.

Southampton, L.

Ypres, E.

Daryngton, L.

Stonehaven, L.

Douglas, L. (E. Home)

Strathcona and Mount Royal, L.

Allenby of Megiddo, V.

Ebbisham, L.

Astor, V.

Elton, L.

Templemore, L.

Wakehurst, L.

NOT-CONTENTS.

Allen of Hurtwood, L.

Hay, L. (E. Kinnoull)

Rhayader, L.

Arnold, L.

Snell, L.

Faringdon, L.

Marley L. [Teller]

Strabolgi, L.

Hare, L. (E. Listowel)

Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L.

Page 1, line 10, after ("If") insert ("in time of war or national emergency" ).—(Lord Strabolgi.)
LORD ARNOLD: I wish to say something upon this Amendment. There seems to be a sort of understanding that there were not to be any speeches upon this Amendment, but I was not involved

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in that understanding because I had not spoken upon it for the first time. I wish to make the position in regard to that very important matter quite clear, because the noble Viscount who leads the House appears to be under the impression that he could give directions which would restrict the debate. The noble Marquess sitting on the Liberal Benches, when an Amendment, similar to this was moved on Clause 1, with rather more courtesy than knowledge of the rules of procedure of the House, asked the noble Viscount whether he would agree to the Amendment being moved where it is now being moved, and the noble Viscount said he would agree to that on the condition that the speeches made were not repeated. As a matter of fact the noble Viscount has no authority in the matter—no more than I have, or the bench on which he is sitting. Noble Lords are entitled to speak as often and as long as they like, and they are going to do it.
There is no closure in this House, and no power to stop speaking, unless you move that a noble Lord be no longer heard. If the noble Viscount cares to do that let him do it. It is an important matter and should be cleared up. I happen to be the only member who during many years of the history of this House has been closured. It was in 1927, on the repealing of the Seven Hours Bill for miners, when Lord Salisbury moved the closure upon me. It was a most unconstitutional proceeding, and the noble Marquess had next week to eat humble pie and to promise not to do it again. In particular, he incurred the censure of the noble Viscount, Lord Ullswater, probably the greatest living authority on the closure. There has been no obstruction on this Bill, absolutely none, and we should get on much better if the noble Viscount would endeavour to apply 'himself seriously to the arguments put forward. We on these Benches at the present moment number about eight, and we represent about a million voters each, or on this Bill probably two millions each.
In the country this Bill is hated, and the only way in which a so-called National candidate can make any headway is by "trimming" on this Bill. The Government know that the Bill is a ghastly mistake, and if they had any decent political courage they would withdraw it even now.
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should very much like to hear the discussions on this Bill inside Government circles. I suspect the Government are told to give way, or to get the Bill through or out of the way, because they are sick of it. It is a very serious Bill, and it is not in accordance with the traditions of the House, or the utility of the House, if it has any utility (as to Which I have grave doubts, after the debate to-day) that our arguments should be pooh-poohed as of no account, or else misrepresented. Even the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, with all his great experience, was deceived by the noble Viscount on the question of "duty or" and "duty and," and when the matter was made clear to him he said with commendable honesty that there are two offences, and he was going to vote against that clause.
That gives all the more reason for the Amendment of Lord Strabolgi. He put forward the question of the soldier's sweetheart who asks her lover to stop over his leave, and the noble Viscount said that is an offence punishable under the present law by penal servitude for life. Personally, I do not believe that any Court could hold that an action of that kind affected allegiance. But it might be substantiated if it affects duty, and that comes in this Amendment. But the more we go on, the worse the position gets. The points we brought up in regard to the happenings this week, that letter in The Times and so forth—these are not imaginary apprehensions; they are held by a very large number of people. The Bill is not what the noble Viscount represented it to be, simply a Bill for dealing with dangerous Communist propaganda. It goes far beyond that. I believe I am correct in saying that it was only on the last Amendment that the noble Viscount seemed to have any glimmerings that the Bill had anything to do with the great principles of liberty. Well, that is not the view of the country. There is widespread apprehension in the country, and this debate has done nothing to decrease it.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: I imagine it is desired that I should say a word in answer to the Amendment. I am not dealing with the speech of Lord Arnold, because he has not said a word which has even the remotest relevance to the Amendment.
LORD ARNOLD: That is not so.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: This Amendment was originally moved on Clause 1. But Lord Strabolgi saw that it was hopeless on that clause, it did not fit, and he suggested that it would come better under Clause 2. Now there is a difference of principle between noble Lords opposite and ourselves which vitally affects this Amendment. The noble Marquess, Lord Reading, said on Second Reading that if the Government was able to show a state of emergency he would be prepared to give all the powers which are contained in the Bill, but he said the state of emergency had not been proved to exist. We, on our side, do not in the least regard this as an emergency measure; it is not to meet a case of emergency. If there were, in fact, a war or a national emergency, which is the only case in which the noble Lord suggests that this Bill should become operative, I think myself that probably very different powers would be required beyond those which this Bill confers. Certainly they were in the last war, and I imagine the same thing would happen in any future war.
But at the present time we say that there is going on, week by week, and month by month, and year by year a series of attempts to seduce members of His Majesty's forces from their duty and allegiance to the Crown. If those attempts were ever to succeed, the unfortunate person who yielded to those solicitations would be liable to extreme punishment, and the view which we form, and which I am not in the least ashamed of reiterating, is that it is not right to allow people to go on unchecked, endeavouring to seduce the members of His Majesty's forces, and at the same time to say to the members of the forces that if they are seduced they are going to be severely punished. We believe that the right course is to punish anybody who makes the endeavour to seduce, not in time of emergency but to-day, and that it is not right to limit the power of punishment to those who actually disseminate the criminal documents, that it is far more important to apprehend and punish those who are responsible for their dissemination. It is for that purpose that this Bill is introduced, and therefore it is we cannot accept the
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Amendment which the noble Lord has moved.
LORD STRABOLGI: I thank the Minister for War for dealing with the matter that I raised on the very first Amendment at the beginning of this sitting. No doubt he believes it is very necessary to have these powers even in time of peace. What we have just heard is a justification for this measure in time of peace and tranquillity. There are these endeavours going on, he tells us, day after day, week after week, month after month—I cannot imitate the Minister's eloquence, but that was the effect of it. That may be, but what we have not heard, and I am sorry to have to repeat this again—it was brought up by the noble Marquess, the Leader of the Liberal Party, and by Lord Rhayader and others—is what is the effect of these attempts. From all I can gather—and I have been at some pains to enquire from friends who are serving officers in all three Services—the troops are reasonably contented. They grumble, as most men in uniform do, but there are really no cases of seditious outbreak amongst them.
I believe that a little time ago—and I shall give the Minister for War this point—a number of young Communists, men of fine physique, enlisted in one of His Majesty's regiments of Foot Guards. I am told they were excellent soldiers, clean, good soldiers, but at the first sign of real trouble in the country these men stepped out from the ranks—that was during the General Strike in 1926—and called upon their comrades to follow them—in other words, to mutiny. They were not followed, and they were taken outside the barrack gates and naturally dismissed His Majesty's service. That did happen in 1926, and it is very remarkable. I am told these men were good soldiers, and obviously men of great sincerity who believed in the Communist solution of our present economic troubles, and they proceeded to carry out their convictions. But this Bill will not affect any such men whatsoever. These men do not read pamphlets—the "Soldier's Voice," and the "Red Signal," or whatever they call the curious documents I have heard of for the first time. These men go into the Army with the deliberate intention of stirring up trouble, and with no result whatsoever. So far as I can hear—and we have two of His Majesty's Secretaries of State, representing two of our great

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fighting forces on that Bench, and I am sure they will bear me out—the general bearing of the troops and the discipline of the seamen are excellent. Therefore, we say, there is no need for this Bill. That is the reason for my Amendment. The noble Viscount gave his reasons. I thank him for his arguments. He has at least given us a full reply. I have tried to meet his arguments and to explain why we shall have to divide the House on a very great question of principle.
VISCOUNT ELIBANK: The noble Lord who has just spoken is a past-master in the art of obstruction. I was fortunate enough to be a member of another place at the same time as the noble Lord, and I have heard him stand up in that place on many occasions and reiterate arguments on the subject of the debate over and over again as he has done this afternoon and as he is doing this evening. Unfortunately I have not been able to be in the House during the past few hours, because I was attending a dinner at which we were discussing a very similar subject to that which your Lordships' House is discussing this evening, but before I left the House I was listening to exactly the same arguments, exactly the same trend of ideas, from noble Lords on the Opposition Bench as have been portrayed in the arguments to which I have just listened in the last five minutes since I came back to your Lordships' House.
The whole argument is that there is no reason for the Bill because neither the Army nor the Navy nor the Air Force has broken out into sedition. You might as well say you should take no precautions against your house being set on fire. You might just as well take no precautions against a burglar entering into your house and taking away such valuable articles as he might find there. Surely the whole reason for this Bill is that it is definitely known—we have heard it from the noble and learned Viscount the Leader of the House over and over again this evening, and we have read it in the debates that have taken place in the House of Commons—that there are Communistic activities proceeding in the country to-day with the definite object of undermining the loyalty and the goodwill of the forces of the Crown. If that is the case what Government would be worth its salt if it did not take the action that is suggested in this Bill? What is the good of looking the stable after the
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horse has been stolen? That is the whole trend of the arguments from the Opposition Benches to-day.
I venture to charge the Opposition here with not presenting arguments on every Amendment which they bring forward according to the Amendments themselves, but with bringing forward arguments with the sole purpose of obstructing this Bill in order so far as possible to prevent its passing in time to go on the Statute Book. I hope that noble Lords opposite are not going to continue this form of obstruction, but that they will present at least new arguments for the Amendments which they are about to introduce, and not weary the Committee with the same arguments over and over again to which we have been listening to-day.
LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE: I must protest against the charge which the noble Viscount has just brought forward of obstruction. If we wanted to obstruct we could have put about one hundred Amendments on the Paper, and we could have intentionally kept your Lordships for several nights and perhaps endangered the Bill. We wanted to do no such thing. We dismissed the idea entirely, and we put down a mere two dozen Amendments on the most important points, knowing that outside there is a very deep feeling about this Bill which we intended to voice in this House. Why is this Bill brought forward at the time that it is in your Lordships' House? We are very often forced in the last few days of the Session to pass a number of Bills, and, as we all know, this House is not a revising Chamber when a Conservative Government is in power; it is a registering Chamber; and we shall find that to-day when not a single Amendment is accepted. But the idea of obstruction is monstrous. My noble friend Lord Strabolgi has not spoken more than three times, I suppose, during the whole of this sitting. The noble Viscount strolls in here after dinner and makes this charge against us, not having sat through the debate, which I think has been at a very high level and very carefully dealt with on our side.
If this Bill was of such supreme importance as the Government pretend why did they not see to it that they got it through the House of Commons earlier? Why were there blank days in the Com-

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mittee upstairs from want of a quorum? There were enough National Government supporters on that Committee to have carried on the work and given a quorum every day the Committee sat, but they did not do so. I do not know for how many days the Committee was suspended because there was no quorum. That was because in the ranks of the supporters of the Government there was as much doubt And misgiving as there is outside. We have every right to see that the Bill is
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL THE EARL OF LISTOWEL moved, in subsection (1), to leave out "or to aid, abet, counsel, or procure the commission of". The noble Earl said: Your Lordships have listened with such exemplary attention and patience to the long debates which we have had this afternoon and evening that that alone is sufficient to prove that the reproach of obstruction does not represent the considered opinion of the majority of your Lordships. It is a very encouraging symptom to those of us who represent an extremely small section of your Lordships' House that we who speak—and this is our only claim to be able to speak—as the mouthpieces of hundreds of thousands of individuals in the towns
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properly argued and that arguments are brought forward so that the country can read them. If we have made slow progress so far it is because our arguments have not been met. Therefore we have had to repeat them and repeat them we shall for a few hours more.
On Question, Whether the proposed words shall be there inserted?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 9; Not-Contents, 64.

CONTENTS.

Arnold, L.

Hay, L. (E. Kinnoull) [Teller]

Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L.

Faringdon, L.

Rhayader, L.

Hare, L. (E. Listowel)

Marley, L. [Teller]

Snell, L.

Strabolgi, L.

NOT-CONTENTS.

Aberdeen and Temair, M.

Hailsham, V.

Foxford, L. (E. Limerick)

Exeter, M.

Gage; L.(V. Gage) [Teller]

Aberdare, L.

Greville, L.

Airlie, E.

Abinger, L.

Hampton, L.

De La Warr, E.

Allen of Hurtwood, L.

Harris, L.

Feversham, E.

Alness, L.

Howard of Penrith, L.

Iddesleigh, E.

Alvingham, L.

Hutchison of Montrose, L.

Leven and Melville, E.

Amulree, L.

Iliffe, L.

Lucan, E. [Teller]

Annaly, L.

Kilmaine, L.

Malmesbury, E.

Balfour of Burleigh, L.

Lamington, L.

Midleton, E.

Biddulph, L.

Lloyd, L.

Mount Edgcumbe, E.

Bingley, L.

Luke, L.

Munster, E.

Brougham and Vaux, L.

Rankeillour, L.

Onslow, E.

Carnock, L.

Redesdale, L.

Plymouth, E.

Clanwilliam, L. (E. Clanwilliam)

Remnant, L.

Radnor, E.

Rennell, L.

Rothes, E.

Conway of Allington, L.

Ritchie of Dundee, L.

Vane, K. (M. Londonderry)

Cottesloe, L.

Rochester, L.

Ypres, E.

Cranworth, L.

Southampton, L.

Daryngton, L.

Stonehaven, L.

Allenby of Megiddo, V.

Douglas, L. (E. Home.)

Strathcona and Mount Royal, L.

Astor, V.

Elton, L.

Elibank, V.

Fairfax of Cameron L.

Templemore, L.

Resolved in the negative, and Amendment disagreed to accordingly.

and villages of this country who are apprehensive on account of this measure, are able to voice unpopular opinions without interruption and with serious attention during a very long period of time.
Your Lordships will have observed that the majority of our Amendments occur in relation to subsection (1) of Clause 2 of this Bill. The reason for that is that we regard this subsection, as my noble friend on the Front Bench has said and as the noble Lord, Lord Rhayader, has said, as the source of the poison that we believe this Bill to contain, and if we are unable to eliminate, as we should like to eliminate, the whole subsection, we shall make every endeavour to obtain concessions from the Government on minor points. One of the concessions we

297
should like to obtain is represented by the Amendment tabled in my name. The object of this Amendment is to limit the scope of the clause. As the passage in question now reads, not only those who are directly responsible for a passage in a book or for a pamphlet which is deemed to be seditious will find themselves liable to legal proceedings, but ally others who have at any time given them assistance in the production of literature of this nature, or who, having knowledge that such opinions were going to be expressed in print, did not actively take steps to prevent these intentions being carried out, would be liable to legal proceedings and to be found guilty in a Court of Law.
What we want to do is to limit the responsibility of those who are concerned with the documents or pamphlets deemed by the Courts to be seditious entirely to the man or the woman who writes the article—to the fount-head, which the noble Viscount urged was exactly the person whom he wished to reach, and not the "tool"—I think that was the word he mentioned. But as the clause at present stands it is not merely the author of a pamphlet or of an article in a newspaper who will be held responsible, but also the newsagent through whose hands this article or journal passed, the publisher who was responsible for its production, besides the printer and all those, both employers and employed, who took a hand in the production of a printed work deemed by the Courts to be seditious, would become liable as the clause is at present.
There is a second objection to these words that arises, if I may remind your Lordships, from the history of the Bill itself. When His Majesty's Government introduced this measure in another place these words did not figure in its text. On the contrary, the words then used were:
"If any person, with intent to commit an offence under Section one of this Act, has in his possession or under his control any document without lawful excuse."
The words "without lawful excuse" were at that time inserted. It was later discovered by those responsible that only those who had lawful excuse to have in their possession articles or objects deemed illegal were the Police; that is to say, that everyone who might have in his possession a document quite casually, sometimes quite accidentally,
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would be liable because only the Police were entitled to hold objects such as pornographic literature and the like which are banned by the law.
Now, in order to narrow down that extremely wide and inclusive wording the Government substituted the new wording found in the clause. But we are also assured by the Attorney-General in. another place that the new wording makes very little difference. If that is so why did the Government take the trouble to alter the drafting of the clause? Why was is not content to leave it as it stood and allow everyone to say openly how far it was likely to include the innocent within its scope, and to deter the production of passages of unpopular literature because publishers are naturally afraid of legal proceedings? But instead of that the Government have altered the wording. If, as the Attorney-General claims, the new wording makes very little difference, we are in a position to say that as the clause stands it is likely to include many perfectly innocent people through whose hands an illegal document has passed, and also to discourage very seriously the printing and publication of books, pamphlets and manifestoes that might possibly, according to the views of the printer or publisher, be deemed seditious by a Court of law. An example of this has already been given in the shape of a letter which appeared a few days ago in The Times, sent by a number of distinguished London publishers, speaking on behalf of a single firm, saying that a passage in a children's annual might be deemed seditious. It is on these grounds that I am moving this Amendment.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 10, leave out from ("commit") to ("an") in line 11.—(The Earl of Listowel.)
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: I am afraid it is quite impossible to accept this Amendment, which is, I do not say a designedly wrecking Amendment, but an Amendment which would in effect defeat the purposes of the Bill. I say that for this reason. If the Amendment were carried you would have to prove, in order to bring anybody within this subsection, that a person had these documents in his possession or control with intent to commit an offence, that is to say, with intent himself to endeavour to seduce a

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member of His Majesty's forces. Such people are not the people whom I regard as the more guilty. The man who actually makes the endeavour to seduce, the person who throws the pamphlet over the barrack wall or stuffs it in the soldier's pocket or drops it on the parade ground, or whatever other course he may adopt to bring it to his attention, is not the man I want. The man I want to catch is the man who has planned this attack on the loyalty of the soldier, and has organised the attempt to seduce him. These are the people the Government are aiming at, and these are the people whom this Bill will catch if the clause stands as drafted, but whom the Bill will wholly fail to catch if the noble Earl's Amendment were accepted, because they would say: "We never meant to make the endeavour. All we meant to do was to hand them to somebody else who, on their part, were going to be the persons who were going to commit the offence under Clause 1."
LORD ARNOLD: Is that the reply which the Government would give to those publishers who have put the letter in The Times? We have definite evidence that something which would have been printed in a children's annual, which was perfectly harmless and most desirable, is not going to be printed and circulated. That we know; that, is a concrete case. Has the noble Viscount no kind of concern for that sort of thing? Does he not care a scrap when we adduce evidence that the Bill is going to stop the dissemination of sound pacifist doctrines? Is that not to count in the scale? Is everything to be placed on the one side, and yet on the other side nothing whatever is produced? Surely some words should be devised which will make it perfectly possible for these publishers to pursue their ordinary, legitimate, useful, and entirely good activities which are now going to be stopped? It is impossible to say how far this kind of thing will go. Are we to take if that the noble Viscount, speaking on behalf of the Government is entirely unconcerned about that?
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: Although I do not want to speak too often, the answer to the noble Lord is that if there was the slightest shadow of ground for the apprehensions which this anonymous printer entertains it would be a matter
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of grave concern; but since the letter which the noble Lord cited in terms says that the document which was going to be printed was a children's annual, only addressed to children and not intended for circulation among His Majesty's forces, it is perfectly obvious, if anyone had read the Bill, such fears are entirely chimerical. It only shows how far misunderstanding and misrepresentation have gone that anyone could conceive any risk was involved in such a case.
Loan ARNOLD: I do not think that answer entirely meets the case. It is well known that if you have a law of this character it is going to have an effect upon activities. There is no question the result will be that good sound doctrines which otherwise would have been gut before the people of this country will not be put. The apprehensions may be unfounded, but they will operate.
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: I am grateful to the noble Viscount for his courteous reply to the Amendment. Although comforted by the knowledge that the noble Viscount himself and the Government he represents would not interpret this clause so as to trespass seriously on the liberties of the Press and on freedom to express pacifist opinions, yet we have to consider the interpretation that will be put upon it by magistrates in our police courts, and not merely at the present moment but in future times when the country may be in a state of stress and agitation. With that in view I am still obliged to maintain that my Amendment would be a useful addition to this measure.
On Question, Amendment negatived.
THE EARL or LISTOWEL THE EARL or LISTOWEL moved, in subsection (1), to leave out "has in his possession or under his control" and insert "circulates." The noble Earl said: This Amendment also affects subsection (1) Clause 2 which we on these Benches regard as the essential bulwark that we are endeavouring to demolish, and which is going to do more harm than any other part of the measure. This Amendment is a very fundamental and crucial one, and expresses, I think, the considered view of the great majority of those inside and outside Parliament who have been stubbornly resisting this Bill. The Amendment proposes to substitute the small and apparently unimportant word "circulates" fir the phrase occurring

301
about the middle of the subsection—namely, that a person, "has in his possession or under his control any document of such a nature" and so on. According to the Bill as it now stands proof of intention is likely to be inferred by magistrates—and it is, after all, magistrates who will in the first instance hear cases that are brought under the measure—from the physical possession of documents that are deemed to be seditious.
That is based on a very ancient and very widespread legal practice. It is based on the assumption that a man is responsible for the whole consequences that result from his action. That principle may apply in a great number of cases, but it is by no means universal. How many of your Lordships have performed actions which afterwards you have regretted? How often has one done something in a moment of temper or forgetfulness that one certainly did not intend to do, and would not have done if one had considered the consequences of one's actions. This assumption is at bottom a legal fiction, and it is absolutely untrue that by merely having in your possession any pamphlet, any document, any book that is considered by the Courts to be seditious you automatically are proved to have possessed it with the deliberate intention and purpose of committing a criminal act.
That is the great danger under the present wording of this clause. That is the supreme danger to the liberty of the subject. The whole of the English criminal law is based on giving the benefit of the doubt to the accused. Of that we are justly proud and the whole world envies us. We cannot believe that it is sufficient proof of guilt to demonstrate that a certain individual has in his possession at a given moment a document or a number of documents that the Court declares to be seditious. That is contrary to a very ancient practice of English criminal law. The practice is that a man cannot be deemed guilty of an offence unless he has committed some specific action which was evidently calculated to bring about and make effective his criminal purpose. It is not enough to prove that a man intended to burgle or intended to murder, or had letters in his possession in which there was a threat to murder or commit burglary. It has to be proved that his
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physical action has been calculated to effect a burglary or a murder.
That is an ancient and well-established principle of criminal law and it is a fundamental guarantee for the liberty of the individual. By substituting the word "circulates" we shall bring this measure into line with the ordinary criminal law. We shall take the worst sting out of it which is its threat to civil liberty, and we shall only make guilty of an offence those who by their physical actions have made themselves responsible for a crime as defined in the Bill. I sincerely hope that your Lordships, feeling the grave responsibility resting upon those who set such a precedent—a precedent that affects so closely the liberties and rights of British citizens—will endorse the view of those who speak from these Benches, of lawyers of distinction outside the House and of the very large volume of public opinion that is seriously apprehensive of this measure because it believes that it carries a serious threat to our most valued heritage, the heritage of civil liberty and individual freedom. I believe if your Lordships accept this Amendment you will make this Bill as innocuous as any Amendment can make it.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, lines 12 and 13, leave out ("has in his possession or under his control") and insert ("circulates").—(The Earl of Listowel.)
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: Your Lordships will not be surprised when I say we are unable to accept this Amendment. The noble Earl, in his concluding remarks, said the Amendment, if accepted, would make the Bill innocuous. I would add that it would make it largely inoperative. It is not proposed to alter the earlier part of the clause which requires the consideration of an intention to commit an offence or to aid, abet, counsel or procure the commission of an offence. That remains whether the Amendment is accepted or not. What this Amendment proposes to do is to say that if a person with intent to commit or procure the commission of an offence of trying to seduce a soldier "has in his possession or under his control" a criminal document for that purpose, be commits no offence unless it is proved that he has circulated it. If he has circulated it to the forces, then of course he is caught under Clause 1 and there is no need for Clause 2. If on the other hand the in-

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tention of the Amendment is to provide that we must show that one of these conspirators—one of these guilty parties—has handed the document to another, that is an extraordinarily difficult thing to prove, and with all respect to the noble Earl it does not seem to me that it makes the two people either more or less guilty than they would be without the act of exchanging the document.
Nothing in this clause has anything to do with the burden of proof as to intent about which the noble Earl gave his views as to the law; it merely says that there are to be three ingredients in order to constitute an offence, all of which must be proved by the prosecution: first, criminal intent; second, actual possession or control; and third, a criminal document. If all those three are proved, then an offence is committed; unless they are all three proved, an offence is not committed. The words "possession or … control" are one of the ingredients of the offence, and do not, by their absence or presence, make any difference as to the legal onus of proof or as to the methods which would be required to establish guilt.
LORD SNELL: We thank the noble Viscount for an answer in which he has tried to make clear to us what he believes to be the legal interpretation of this clause. I need hardly say that we do not regard his interpretation of this Amendment as being satisfactory. We are under the gravest apprehension as to what the words "in his possession or under his control" might be construed to mean. Let me try to illustrate it in this way. I personally am a person of known political bad character. I have represented the views of the Labour Party, which, as we are told, means to bring the country to ruin and disaster, for practically the whole of my adult life. Therefore, I am a suitable subject for the attention of the authorities under this Bill. I do not believe, that is to say, that the sole duty of a man consists in getting his soul saved, and voting Tory at elections. I have other ideas as to my social responsibilities. I am, therefore, as I say, liable to be suspected.
I have in my possession and control a good deal of literature, varying from the Prophet Isaiah to the famous Communistic manifesto of Marx and Engels, and
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a great deal of stuff in between them. That might, with the other disadvantage to which I have referred, make me subject to the attentions of the authorities under this Bill. But apart from that, supposing that somebody chooses to send me by post subversive literature of this kind (and I get an avalanche of stuff every morning, including unwelcome solicitations from whisky touts and all the rest) I may be visited by the authorities directly I have had my breakfast and before I have had time to absorb this poison, and caught with this subversive literature in my possession and under my control. I say that it is not inconceivable that a spiteful reactionary might do that, or might deposit in my coat pocket the necessary literature to get me convicted. That is what agents-provocateurs are for, and if the noble Viscount thinks I am sketching a hypothetical case I have only to say that in other parts of the world this thing is done, and whilst I believe our virtues are as great as those of other nations, I do not think we are entirely free from political prejudices and those faults which are common to all mankind. We put that argument seriously, and we hope that the Government will pay more attention to them than they seem inclined to do.
LORD MARLEY: May I add one word to that? The noble Viscount did not say anything about one real advantage of the Amendment moved by my noble friend, and that is that it does away with much of the objectionable character of the power of search. It does not deprive the authorities of the power of search, but it does away with much of the objectionable character and danger of that power. Therefore I believe that a great many people in this country who fear this new power of search for unspecified documents, would feel very much relieved if that great danger were eliminated. Then, again, it gets rid of the fact that mere possession is not made to be part of the criminal offence of the person involved, and that, surely, is an advantage to meet the legitimate fears of so many of our fellow citizens. It also does away with the really terrible ambiguity of the words "in his control". No one knows what they mean, and surely there is an advantage in getting rid of ambiguity from any Bill, however necessary.

305
There is one other point that I want to deal with, and that is the point raised by Lord Snell, of the delivery of documents by post, which would then be found in the possession of the individual. These might have been deliberately sent by post. I have the misfortune, or perhaps the good fortune, to live immediately over the Chambers in the Temple occupied by the noble Viscount, and I have reason to fear the possibility that documents of a seditious nature, sent to him for examination or even for his information, might possibly be delivered by mistake into my innocent letter box by the postman. I do not know how much I risk imprisonment under this Bill—I dare say quite serious risk—and I have no doubt it would give a great deal of pleasure to many persons were I caught in this way. I do not mind, it cannot be helped, but. I do submit that this danger is a real danger, especially if it is intended to catch someone in this way.
LORD STRABOLGI: May I give one example of the activities of Scotland Yard a few years ago in forging documents? It was admitted in another place by the Government of the day that Scotland. Yard had printed, forged and concocted bogus copies of the Russian paper Pravda, which I believe means "truth," in thousands, that they had obtained the guillotine from the Stationery Office and guillotined off the printer's name and address, and they intended, of course, to circulate them among the White Russian forces who were acting in conjunction with the interventionist forces sent to Russia illegally without the consent of Parliament by Mr. Churchill who was then Minister for War. That was proved and admitted, and lame attempts were made to excuse it. If that could be done once it could be done again.
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: The answer of the noble Viscount has not allayed my fears. He said quite explicitly that in order to prove guilt three ingredients were essential: (1), criminal intention; (2), the possession or control of certain objects; and (3), the physical documents or objects which the person had in his possession. But, true
as that is, let me ask him for a moment to consider how the law would work. The Police prosecute somebody, and they would only prosecute somebody because they had some suspicion that that person was committing an illegal action. The suspicion is most likely to arise from the fact that he is known to have in his possession certain seditious pamphlets or other documents. He is brought before the magistrate with the pamphlets. He has obviously been in possession of these pamphlets, and all that remains to be proved is that these pamphlets were intended for the seduction of His Majesty's forces. How is the magistrate going to decide what motives were operative in that man's mind? He must assume that the possession of these documents is valid evidence for the inference that that individual was guilty of a criminal motive.
I do not believe, when one examines an instance of that kind, that there can be any doubt that the Bill will be interpreted in that sort of way. I am not merely objecting because of certain instances of injustice which this procedure is likely to entail; I am protesting because it raises the much wider question of individual freedom, because it enables a person to be convicted of a crime, not because he has committed any action which can be referred to as leading directly to this breach of the law, but because he happens to have in his possession certain papers which, if they were circulated, if they were handed to certain other individuals, would constitute a breach of the law. That is why I must persist in the Amendment, and why I hope very sincerely that your Lordships may be able to accept it.
LORD STRICKLAND: I am not in charge of the Bill, but when I am told that nobody knows what is the meaning of "accessory before and after the fact," I think I may say that even those who failed in their examinations know something about that.
On Question, Whether the words proposed to be left out shall stand part of the clause?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 62; Not-Contents, 10.

CONTENTS.

Aberdeen and Temair, M.

Airlie, E.

Iddesleigh, E.

Exeter, M.

De La Warr, E.

Lucan, E. [Teller]

Feversham, E.

Malmesbury, E.

Midleton, E.

Amulree, L.

Howard of Penrith, L.

Mount Edgcumbe, E.

Annaly, L.

Hutchison of Montrose, L.

Munster, E.

Balfour of Burleigh, L.

Iliffe, L.

Onslow, E.

Biddulph, L.

Kinnaird, L.

Plymouth, E.

Bingley, L.

Lamington, L.

Radnor, E.

Brougham and Vaux, L.

Lloyd, L.

Rothes, E.

Carnock, L.

Luke, L.

Vane, E. (M. Londonderry)

Clanwilliam, L. (E. Clanwilliam)

Rankeillour, L.

Ypres, E.

Redesdale, L.

Conway of Allington, L.

Remnant, L.

Astor, V.

Cottesloe, L.

Rennell, L.

Brentford, V.

Daryngton, L.

Ritchie of Dundee, L.

Elibank, V.

Douglas, L. (E. Home)

Rochester, L.

Hailsham, V.

Elton, L.

Sandhurst, L.

Fairfax of Cameron, L.

Southampton, L.

Aberdare, L.

Foxford, L. (E. Limerick)

Stonehaven, L.

Abinger, L.

Gage, L. (V. Gage) [Teller]

Strathcona and Mount Royal, L.

Alness, L.

Hampton, L.

Alvingham, L.

Harris, L.

Strickland, L.

Templemore, L.

NOT-CONTENTS.

Allen of Hurtwood, L.

Hay, L. (E. Kinnoull.) [Teller.]

Rhayader, L.

Arnold, L.

Snell, L.

Faringdon, L.

Marley, L. [Teller.]

Strabolgi, L.

Hare, L. (E. Listowel.)

Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L.

Resolved in the affirmative, and Amendment disagreed to accordingly.
LORD STRABOLGI LORD STRABOLGI moved, in subsection (1), to leave out "any document" and insert "documents." The noble Lord said: This Amendment in my name should be read with two Amendments lower down—page 1, line 13, leave out "of such a nature that" and page 1, line 14, leave out "copies thereof" and insert "which." I do not know if your Lordships would allow me to move them together. If I am allowed to do that the clause will read "If any person, with intent to commit," and so on, "has in his possession or under his control any documents the dissemination of which among members of His Majesty's forces would constitute," etcetera. I suppose I can only now actually move the first Amendment, and I do not intend to move the other consequential Amendments if your Lordships do not accept this first Amendment. I take them all together to save time. The difference is very important indeed.
Under the Bill which the Secretary of State for War has introduced as part of his duty the possession of a document—a document—by a person who has the intention to use it illegally, a document which, if reproduced and distributed in camps or barracks or on board ship, might upset the discipline of seamen or soldiers, is an offence. It may be a letter, if you like, from a soldier in China complaining of ill-treatment out there which,
308
if cyclostyled or hectographed and distributed among a battalion under orders for China, might induce some soldier to miss his troopship. Possession of that letter, unless the person could prove his innocence, would be an offence. If the prosecution, with all their resources, with their prestige and the money behind them, could induce the court to believe that the person accused intended to cyclostyle or hectograph that letter, he would be liable to two years imprisonment or a fine of £200. I want to alter the Bill to read, not "document" but "documents."
The Secretary of State for War said that nine years ago when he was Attorney-General, he had reason to believe that there were secreted in a certain house thousands and thousands of pamphlets, leaflets or handbills for distribution among His Majesty's forces, and that he was not able to interfere with the people who had these thousands and thousands of leaflets because he had not the powers contained in this Bill. All right, I meet the Secretary of State for War. I will give him these powers. If one of His Majesty's Judges thinks that he is being told the truth when an inspector says there are these thousands and thousands of leaflets with which the Secretary of State for War made your Lordships' flesh creep, then let him go ahead and deal with the people concerned. But it is very different from the possession of one document, one piece of

309
paper, one handbill. The importance of this matter was shown at the end of the Second Reading debate. Your Lordships will remember the very interesting and eloquent speech of the Secretary of State for War in reply to the debate. He was answering one of his supporters, Lord Allen of Hurtwood, who was complaining about the wording of the subsection we are now discussing, and the noble Lord had questioned the possibility of proving that a document would have this effect—note, my Lords, a document, not "documents," as I allow the noble Viscount the Minister of War. This is what the Minister of War said, and I draw your Lordships' attention to this wording, because if anything shows intent, these words of the noble Viscount show what his intent is and what his reading of the situation is: and it is to me astounding.
He says, answering the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Allen of Hurtwood:
"He will forgive ray saying that it does nothing of the kind. It deals only with documents which amount to and are intended to be an endeavour to seduce the armed forces of the Crown from their allegiance—that and nothing else."
Now note these words:
"It is just as easy to see whether a document bears that character as it is, for example, to see whether it is an obscene publication under another Act."
Earlier in the evening your Lordships heard, no doubt with great interest, as I certainly did, the things which have to be proved. It is admitted that there are many borderline cases. There are documents which, if not distributed to the troops, we are told would be harmless. There are others which might depend on the circumstances of the time; but it is idle to pretend that a searching policeman raiding a newspaper office, a publisher's office or private dwelling-house, on seeing the sort of document that my noble friend Lord Ponsonby or my noble friend Lord Snell writes, would be able to tell at a glance that that was a criminal document as easily as he could tell that an indecent photograph was an indecent document.
The use of that argument shows that the noble Viscount, with great respect, has totally misjudged the situation. He does not understand the opposition to the Bill; and, again with the greatest respect, I do beg hint to study it himself
310
again. We have been accused of not understanding the Bill, but if the noble Viscount really thinks that you can compare documents of a supposedly seditious nature with, for this purpose, pornographic photographs—which I admit any policeman can easily see are illegal or criminal—it is an extraordinary exposure of the mind either of the Government or of the noble Viscount himself that he should use that argument. The Amendment which I propose meets the whole of the case. We object very much to seeing a person—I care not whether a Fascist, a Communist or anybody else, or whether he be a person who was opposing a Government which I was supporting—dragged before a Court because there is found on his premises a document. I grant the noble Viscount that he may have a case for attacking a person who has piles and piles of documents ready for distribution; I give him the second case, but I resist him in the first. For that reason, I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 13, leave out ("any document") and insert ("documents").—(Lord Strobolgi.)
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: The noble Lord cited the end of my speech on Second Reading and said that a policeman would not be able to tell whether a document was a document which would be an endeavour to seduce members of His Majesty's forces from their allegiance. He will forgive my saying, with regard to that, that I do not agree with him; but even if he were right, at the moment I do not see why he would find it easier to decide that question if he found two copies of the document than if he found one, and that is the effect of this Amendment. Why, if you find two copies of a pamphlet, it would be quite easy to tell whether it has a criminal meaning whereas if you found one copy of the same document you could not understand it, is to me not very plain at first sight.
But let me explain another reason why the Amendment will not do. The noble Lord is willing, he said, to concede to me the case where there are a number of copies of the same criminal pamphlet, as I will call it, but supposing I find the arch-villain, the man who is really composing this, and I catch him with the very document which he has composed,

311
of the most poisonous character, before he has had time to get it printed, why should it be that if I were able to catch the printer after he had printed off A thousand copies I should be able to prosecute him, but that if I catch the man who composed the draft before the printer has time to print them off, he is to go scathless? To my mind that would be a very improper position. I would point out that of course it is not enough to prove possession and control and the criminal character of the document. There is always a third element which has to be established—namely, intent to commit or assist in committing the offence of endeavouring to seduce members of the forces from their allegiance.
The noble Lord has said that a man found with the document would be convicted unless he proved his innocence. It may have been a. reminiscence of what he said in earlier days before the Bill was altered and it read "without lawful excuse," and the argument was then put forward that it put the burden of proving his innocence on the person accused. In order to make it clear that that was not so the clause was altered in another place. It is now incumbent on the prosecution to prove that the document is or was in the possession of the accused person, and that the document is in itself
an incitement to mutiny, but also that it is possessed by the person accused with the intention of committing or aiding in committing the offence. I suggest that there is no reason for saying that a person who has in his possession a criminal document is not guilty of an offence because he had not had time to copy it.
LORD STRABOLGI: The Minister for War was good enough to answer the case of a man who has in his possession two documents, one of which has been copied, but I was referring to the cases of thousands of documents cited by the noble Viscount on the Second Reading. I was prepared to grant him the case of the man who has piles and piles of documents ready to send out to our soldiers in India, or wherever it may be, but the noble Viscount wants to have the arch-villain who has written one document. I would rather trust to the good sense of our soldiers and sailors than arm the Executive with such powers, and I ask your Lordships to accept the Amendment.
On Question, Whether the words proposed to be left out shall stand part of the clause?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 59; Not-Contents, 9.

CONTENTS.

Aberdeen and Temair, M.

Aberdare, L.

Harris, L.

Exeter, M.

Abinger, L.

Howard of Penrith, L.

Alvingham, L.

Hutchison of Montrose, L.

Airlie, E.

Annaly, L.

Iliffe, L.

De La Warr, E.

Balfour of Burleigh, L.

Kinnaird, L.

Feversham, E.

Biddulph, L.

Lamington, L.

Iddesleigh, E.

Bingley, L.

Lloyd, L.

Lucan, E. [Teller.]

Brougham and Vaux, L.

Luke, L.

Malmesbury, E.

Carnock, L.

Middleton, L.

Midleton, E.

Clanwilliam L. (E. Clanwilliam)

Rankeillour, L.

Mount Edgcumbe, E.

Redesdale, L.

Munster, E.

Conway of Allington, L.

Remnant, L.

Onslow, E.

Cottesloe, L.

Rennell, L.

Plymouth, E.

Daryngton, L.

Ritchie of Dundee, L.

Radnor, E.

Douglas, L. (E. Home.)

Sandhurst, L.

Rothes, E.

Ebbisham, L.

Southampton, L.

Vane, E. (M. Londonderry.)

Elton, L.

Stonehaven, L.

Fairfax of Cameron, L.

Strathcona and Mount Royal, L.

Brentford, V.

Foxford, L. (E. Limerick.)

Elibank, V.

Gage, L. (V. Gage.) [Teller.]

Strickland, L.

Hailsham, V.

Hampton, L.

Templemore, L.

NOT-CONTENTS.

Allen of Hurtwood, L.

Hare, L. (E. Listowel.)

Marley, L. [Teller.]

Arnold, L.

Hay, L. (E. Kinnoull.) [Teller.]

Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L.

Faringdon, L.

Snell, L.

Strabolgi, L.

Resolved in the affirmative, and Amendment disagreed to accordingly.

LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE moved, at the end of subsection (1), to insert:
"Provided that any person who has entered into a contract to print any such document shall not be deemed for the purposes of this section to have such document in his possession or under his control."
The noble Lord said: I have great hope of this Amendment, from something that fell from the noble and learned Viscount. Replying to Lord Strabolgi, he said that it would seem unfair to catch the printer and not to catch the arch-evildoer. I do not think there is any difference of opinion about our wanting to get at the man who is at the bottom of the nefarious proceedings, but we want to spare the various other people who are not primarily responsible. There is the author; and the author may be taken to be primarily responsible. He is the person we want to get at. There is then the publisher; there is the typist; there is the printer; and there is the distributor. A certain amount of blame can certainly be brought against the distributor, although, as the noble Viscount has said en more than one occasion, he may be a mere tool. But the printer may be entirely innocent. The printer may have undertaken a purely commercial transaction to print so many leaflets without any idea of what their destination is to be, without any very clear knowledge of the implications of their contents.
I think it is a very great mistake to go on supposing that these crude Communist leaflets, worded in flamboyant and rude language, have any effect at all. In fact, there has been no proof brought in the course of this debate that they have really injured the loyalty of any of His Majesty's forces. But I can conceive leaflets being drafted of a very insinuating character, and very persuasive in their nature; not perhaps easily recognisable at first glance as seditious, but having very considerably more effect than the leaflets quoted so far. The printer may have no sort of idea that what he is printing is more than a pacifist leaflet of which he has to print so many thousands. I feel that he certainly ought to be protected because he will undoubtedly have had large numbers of these leaflets on his premises and their destination may be unknown to him. They may not even be given to a distributor; they may not even be
314
given to paid agents to go round and distribute them. They may find their way into the possession of a soldier outside a barracks who may take them inside a barracks, and they could be possibly distributed in that way quite unknown to the printer. The printer appears to me to be a man who ought to be singled out for protection, and think that is the view of the noble Viscount, because he referred to the printer just now saying that it would be extremely unjust that he should be caught when the author went scot free. I say it is unfair that he should be caught even when the author is caught because of all the sorts of people through whom the leaflet or literature passes the printer may be the most innocent, and yet he will have this document in his possession and under his control, as the Bill at present stands. No doubt stacks of documents would be in the warehouse of the printer and they would be under his control and they might be sent from his premises without his permission. My purpose therefore is to protect time printer.
The letter that has been quoted more than once that appeared in The Times from a number of publishers has been dismissed by the noble Viscount, who said that they could not have read the Bill, and that in no conceivable circumstances could any printer or publisher find himself incriminated under any clause of this Bill by the action which is described in that letter. That may be so, but the trouble is that there is a certain vagueness about the Bill, a certain difficulty in the interpretation of it of which we had an example yesterday between two such eminent exponents of the law as the noble Viscount who leads the House and the noble Marquess who leads the Liberal Party in this House. That two such high authorities should differ only shows what a lot of mistakes will be made by laymen, and the nervousness already shown before the Bill is passed into law, by the printers and publishers, only shows their apprehensions. This is undoubtedly going to check printing and publication of perfectly harmless documents. Whether justified or not printers and publishers are now going to refuse a mass of compositions which otherwise they would have freely and openly published, simply because they are not quite satisfied that

315
a Bill which is still in dispute between high legal authorities may not in its meshes catch them sooner or later so that they may find themselves in gaol.
To my mind there is not the least doubt that that apprehension is going to be increased by the debates in both Houses of Parliament, not because of the imaginations which we are supposed to show, but because of what has been said by the legal luminaries of the Government—the Attorney-General in another place and the noble Viscount here. I have hopes that this safeguard which I propose will be accepted. The words are:
"Provided that any person who has entered into a contract to print any such document shall not be deemed for the purposes of this section to have such document in his possession or under his control."
That will safeguard the printers. This Amendment is a test of whether this House is a revising body or whether, as I said just now, you are merely going to register line by line the Bill as passed in another place. It is a reasonable Amendment and is consonant with the views expressed by the noble Viscount himself. I hope he will see his way to accept it.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 16, at end insert the said proviso.—(Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede.)
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: I am sorry if I disappoint a hope which the noble Lord opposite says he entertains. If I believed it was a reasonable Amendment and was necessary and feasible I would do my best to meet him, but I am afraid I cannot see that it is either. First let me indicate why it would defeat the whole object of the Bill. If this Amendment were passed and anybody wanted to keep a stock of offending pamphlets directed to seduce members of His Majesty's forces from their allegiance, all that would be necessary would be to leave them at the printers until they were wanted for distribution and there would be no offence. In other words, you would make the printers' premises a kind of Alsatia in which you could safely keep any documents of this nature. I do not suppose the noble Lord means to do that.
On the other hand, let me point out that it is not necessary for the purpose for which he designs it. He says he wants to protect the printers, by which,
316
I suppose, he means the innocent printers. He nods his assent. Obviously he would not wish to protect printers who printed pamphlets with the intention that they should be used to seduce His Majesty's forces. But it has to be proved by the prosecution that the printer has that intention. The innocent printer is safe already. The only printer who comes under this section is the printer who prints documents which are in themselves an inducement to the members of His Majesty's forces to disobey orders and betray their allegiance and who prints these documents with the intention that they shall be used for that purpose. Unless that intention is proved he is not guilty.
Loan ARNOLD: Several points arise out of what the noble Viscount has said. He contends that the real purpose of the Bill would be defeated by the printer keeping on his premises stocks of pamphlets. It would be perfectly possible, as the noble Viscount knows, to meet that case and still substantially accept the Amendment. He suggests that printers are persons who know the subtleties of the law and are able to decide whether they will be held to have had intent or not. He is entirely wrong, and that is one of the evils of the Bill. It will arouse apprehensions which may be unfounded, but evidence has already been given that those apprehensions will be aroused, and many printers will refuse to print perfectly proper pacific literature which otherwise they would have printed. Therefore its amount and its circulation will be reduced, and there are many of us who say that that is a bad thing for the country.
Dr. Sheppard is conducting a campaign at the present moment to find out how many men are definitely prepared to state that they will not fight in the event of another war. His letter has appeared in the Press, and part of it is this:
"It seems essential to discover whether or not it he the truth, as we are told, that the majority of thoughtful men in this country are now convinced that war of every kind or for any cause is not only a denial of Chistianity"—
I suppose there cannot be any doubt about that—
"but a crime against humanity which is no longer to be permitted by civilised people."

317
Then he asks men to sign a declaration to this effect:
"We renounce war, and never again directly or indirectly will we sanction another."
That letter of course means, in effect, that Dr. Sheppard is asking men to sign a declaration which is in accordance with the Kellogg Pact which this country has signed, and which the noble Viscount's own Government signed.
That is all that Dr. Sheppard is doing, but after this Bill is passed, I can quite understand many printers would refuse to print that for circulation they know not where. They would be running a risk. The noble Viscount shakes his head, but when these things are to be interpreted by certain benches of magistrates, I would not give a cat's chance for their likelihood of getting an acquittal in certain circumstances, especially if the situation on the Continent of Europe is worsening and war clouds are appearing on the horizon. That is the evil of the Bill—that it will stop things being done which in the view of many of us ought to be done. The noble Viscount seems quite unable to appreciate that fact. Whatever there may be to say on the other side is in our view entirely outweighed by fundamental consideration of that kind.
LORD RHAYADER: I will not detain the Committee for more than a few moments, but I may point out that this is no new quarrel. It is close upon 300 years since John Milton published a pamphlet which was called, if I remember rightly, its second title, "The Liberty of Unlicensed Printing." As I understand the meaning of the Leader of the Opposition, it is precisely that liberty of unlicensed printing, not interfered with by the Government, that be is asking for by this Amendment. I must confess that I am greatly disappointed at the answer which the noble Viscount gave. How is the printer to know what is going to be the effect of his publications? Why should he know? He is asked to do printing, he is not asked to do thinking and consideration of what he is printing. I believe there are some offences he may commit, but I do not see why you should multiply them. I think it would be far better not to interfere with the printing, unless the authorities can bring home to the printer that he is an offender under the present
318
law. The effect of it will be what has been described by the noble Lord, Lord Arnold; the effect must be to frighten printers and prevent them from undertaking business.
The Government are occupied with the unemployment problem. I suggest to them that it is very undesirable that they should raise fresh apprehensions and fears in the minds of various people in this country lest they should be doing something which will bring them into conflict with the taw. Our people are not disorderly people, and mostly they do not want to get into the clutches of the law. They wish to avoid it, but they do not know much about it. I think that lawyers and those who are in the habit of dealing with criminals get a somewhat distorted view of the people of this country. We really have been a free country. We hardly realise that in going about the country in our daily lives we are in constant danger of the law. What the Government are doing now is to multiply the occasions upon which people may be brought into conflict with the law, and that is the real reason for much of the opposition to this Bill. People do not want to be interfered with. I wish the Government could have seen their way to define their purpose more clearly, and make the Bill more definite, so that people in the country might know when they were about to commit an offence.
LORD MARLEY: May I say a very brief word in connection with the reply of the noble Viscount? He said the innocent printer who had these leaflets stored had nothing to fear; but suppose the printer is himself a keen member of the Society of Friends, and a keen supporter of encouraging people not to fight; if, in addition, he has leaflets printed for someone else stored on his premises, may it not be possible to unite those matters so that they constitute an offence under subsection (1) of Clause 2 of this Bill? I fear there is serious danger, and I feel that the Bill might be twisted to get at that man, should it happen that an unscrupulous Government followed this Government. A Government not of the high scrupulousness of the National Government might be able to twist this Bill in order to catch such a man, although he was perfectly innocent. With regard to leaflets left

319
at the printers by the arch-villain, the author, those leaflets are still under the control of the arch-villain, the author, and therefore the author can be got at, because he can direct what shall be done with them. It seems to me that those two reasons are additional reasons why the Government should make some concession on this Amendment.
LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE: I confess I am disappointed, because I thought the Leader of the House was going to meet us on this Amendment. I do not abide by the exact wording of it, but I am anxious that the innocent printer should be protected. I am not concerned with the criminal printer. The case seems so clear to the noble Viscount that he cannot understand anyone mis-
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL THE EARL OF LISTOWEL moved to insert at the end of subsection (1):
". Provided that no person shall be deemed to have had any such intent as aforesaid unless it be alleged and proved that he has committed some overt act directed to the publication of such document as aforesaid to a member of H.M. forces."
The noble Earl said: This Amendment, which I am moving in the absence of Lord Passfield, has been considerably reduced in size by the elimination of a
320
understanding it, but it appears that people like these publishers have already misunderstood, and humbler people will misunderstand it still more. It is going to restrict to a large extent the activities of printers, who have a great deal of fear and misapprehension in their minds as to what is legitimate and what is illegitimate, and we shall have innocent printers refusing to take the risk of printing that which is perfectly innocent. I feel it is a point where we must stand up for the innocent printer and divide the Committee.
On Question, Whether the words proposed shall be there inserted?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 10; Not-Contents, 57.

CONTENTS.

Allen of Hurtwood, L.

Hay, L. (E. Kinnoull.) [Teller.]

Rhayader, L.

Arnold, L.

Snell, L.

Faringdon, L.

Marley, L. [Teller.]

Strabolgi, L.

Hare, L. (E. Listowel.)

Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L.

NOT-CONTENTS.

Aberdeen and Temair, M.

Aberdare, L.

Harris, L.

Exeter, M.

Abinger, L.

Hutchison of Montrose, L.

Alvingham, L.

Iliffe, L.

Airlie, E.

Annaly, L.

Kinnaird, L.

De La Warr, E.

Balfour of Burleigh, L.

Lamington, L.

Feversham, E.

Biddulph, L.

Lloyd, L.

Iddesleigh, E.

Bingley, L.

Luke, L.

Lucan, E. [Teller.]

Brougham and Vaux, L.

Middleton, L.

Malmesbury, E.

Carnock, L.

Rankeillour, L.

Midleton, E.

Clanwilliam, L. (E. Clanwilliam.)

Redesdale, L.

Mount Edgcumbe, E.

Remnant, L.

Munster, E.

Cottesloe, L.

Rennell, L.

Onslow, E.

Daryngton, L.

Ritchie of Dundee, L.

Plymouth, E.

Douglas, L. (E. Home.)

Sandhurst, L.

Radnor, E.

Ebbisham, L.

Southampton, L.

Rothes, E.

Elton, L.

Stonehaven, L.

Vane, E. (M. Londonderry.)

Fairfax of Cameron, L.

Strathcona and Mount Royal, L.

Foxford, L. (E. Limerick.)

Brentford, V.

Gage, L. (V. Gage.) [Teller.]

Strickland, L.

Elibank, V.

Hampton, L.

Templemore, L.

Hailsham, V.

Resolved in the negative, and Amendment disagreed to accordingly.

second proviso. It is, I think, one of very great importance because it raises a matter of general principle affecting theories of jurisprudence and social philosophy as well as concerning, naturally, the specific individual cases that will in future be dealt with by the present measure if it passes into law. Your Lordships are well aware of the fact that it has been one of the best established principles of English law that a man is not to be considered guilty until he has been so proved up to the hilt. The onus probandi lies on the prosecutor, and

321
not vice versa. This is not the practice in all countries by any means. It implies that no man shall be considered guilty unless some other individual, or the State, has succeeded in proving his guilt up to the hilt. The onus probandi, therefore, lies on those who bring an accusation, and it is assumed that an individual is innocent unless the accusation is substantiated.
The present measure is an infringement of this very ancient principle. It is a very serious infringement of the principle that a man is completely innocent unless his accusers have succeeded in completely establishing his guilt. The elements of proof required by the present Bill are not the same as those which are demanded by ordinary criminal law. That is the essential point. The general rule in criminal law is—and I would draw your Lordships' attention to these words—that an overt act is necessary to constitute a punishable offence. What does this imply? It means that an individual cannot be proved guilty under this measure if the Amendment is accepted unless it has been established not only that he possessed a certain document declared to be seditious, not only, according to the inference of the magistrate, that he possessed a criminal intention in relation to the document, but also that he has actively participated in the dissemination and the circulation of seditious propaganda, that he has committed some action which is definitely directed to a criminal end, that he has dropped a leaflet in a barrack square, that he has pushed a pamphlet into the knapsack of a soldier, that he has sent by post a document of this kind to a sailor or any other member of His Majesty's forces, that he has performed an action which in criminal law makes him subject to the operation of that law.
This Amendment, if accepted, would bring the present measure into line with ordinary English criminal law and by so doing it would maintain an ancient tradition that the accused is innocent unless his guilt has been established up to the hilt by the fullest possible degree of proof. It affects another issue which is even as great and important as that of the liberty of the subject. We believe in this country that ideas in themselves may not be penalised and that any thought, however subversive, however
322
seditious, however revolutionary, may legitimately be entertained until it has resulted in some action which violates the law of the land. The fundamental principle is that we do not penalise the holding of revolutionary ideas. If we did the Sermon on the Mount, would be an illegal document. The literature of the Society of Friends would be banned. And it is not merely religious literature that is revolutionary. Those who study political theory and teach political theory would become criminally liable because they were in possession of works of revolutionary Socialists like Karl Marx or of Communists or of Syndicalists.
As the Bill stands it does not make clear the gap between the entertainment of an idea and its translation into practice. It allows the possession of a document that contains seditious or revolutionary ideas, and the holding of seditious or revolutionary intentions, to be the criteria to brand an individual as a criminal. It would be a most dangerous thing to allow that to become the law of the land. It is absolutely essential that there should be added a. third criterion—the commission of sonic criminal action—and in the absence of that third criterion it should be impossible for a magistrate to condemn any citizen in this country who is prosecuted on a charge of sedition or incitement to mutiny. That is fundamental as a defence of our liberties and as preventing the establishment of a precedent that would encourage succeeding Governments to trespass on the liberty of the individual and to increase the authority of the Executive. I hope the noble Viscount will accept the Amendment because it seems to me, and will seem to thousands who have been agitating against the Bill outside Parliament, that it goes to the very heart of the Bill. If accepted we should agree that His Majesty's Government had gone very far to meet the critics of the Bill.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 16, at end, insert the said proviso.—(The, Earl of Listowel.)
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: The concluding sentence of the noble Earl is one with which I quite agree. We should indeed go far to meet the Opposition if we accepted this Amendment because we should go very far to destroy the purpose of the Bill. I confess I have been in a little difficulty about this Amend-

323
ment, because I was not quite sure what the original proposer of this Amendment meant by "overt act directed to the publication of such document." I am obliged to the noble Earl opposite, because I think he has now made that quite clear. He began by telling us that in criminal law the onus of proof lies on the prosecution, and he suggested that this ancient principle of our law was infringed by this Bill. He will forgive me for saying that, whether or not that was true under the original form of the Bill, it certainly is not true to-day. There is nothing in this Bill which shifts the onus of proof. The three ingredients of the crime are quite plainly stated: criminal intent, actual possession or control, criminal document; and the onus of proving each one of those three facts rests upon the prosecution and upon nobody else. Therefore there is no shifting of the onus of proof.
But I do not think that is really quite what the noble Earl meant, because he went on to say that in his view, in order to be convicted of an offence the alleged criminal must be proved to have actively taken part in the actual dissemination of one of these criminal documents. He said a little later that it was essential to add the commission of a criminal act to criminal motive and to possession, by which I understood him to mean—and I hope I understood him correctly—that it was not enough to prove that a person had in his possession or control a criminal document and that he had it in his possession with the intention of committing a criminal offence; you must go on to prove that he had committed a criminal offence before you could convict him. With great respect, I do not agree that that is desirable. If it were, we should not need this clause. If a man can already be proved to have distributed criminal documents, that is to say, documents intended to seduce His Majesty's forces from their allegiance, he has committed a crime under Clause 1, and we do not need Clause 2. Clause 2 comes into operation, not as the merely unnecessary addition which it would be if the noble Lord's Amendment were carried, but as a wholly separate crime, and the crime is that the man is in possession of criminal documents which he intends to use for a criminal purpose. The Committee will judge whether we are right, but in our view it would be very foolish and idle to say that when a man can
324
actually be proved to have distributed these documents you can punish him, but when you have caught him before he has succeeded in doing it, though you prove that he intended to do it and that he has got the documents for that purpose and that they are documents of that character, you cannot punish him because you have fortunately been able to prevent him fulfilling his criminal intent.
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: The noble Viscount has put the case of His Majesty's Government so clearly and lucidly that I feel quite certain that no member of your Lordships' House can be under any possible misapprehension as to its nature. I only say that it is with very deep regret that I have heard that he is unable to make any compromise. He has declared that for him the possession of a document which is proved to contain seditious matter, and the intention to use that document in a manner which would infringe the law, are sufficient evidence of guilt, and in saying so he has declared that he desires a very abrupt innovation and a very startling departure from the customary methods of English criminal law, and one for which he and his supporters have adduced no case at all. For such a departure as this it would be required of any Government to show that there was a national emergency when special measures infringing upon the liberties of the subject should be taken in order to preserve the stability and order of society. He has not made any case of that kind and he is simply asking your Lordships to put a new crime down on the calendar; to allow an infringement of the liberties of the subject, without adducing any need that might have made legitimate such a very drastic alteration of our existing law.
LORD STRABOLGI: Before we leave this matter may I ask the noble Viscount to give an opinion on this question? Does he remember the famous Zinoviev letter, which had such effect in the 1924 Election? How would this Amendment affect that case? That letter was never actually produced—I do not believe it ever existed—but it had a tremendous effect upon the history of Europe. It destroyed a Government and replaced it by a Government of which the Minister for War was a member in another place. It was simply

325
a rumour, an allegation. Under the Bill before this House the person who was alleged to have received the letter—I think it was a member of the Communist Party, and the letter was one of those "poisonous" documents which the Minister of War has described, calling upon soldiers to revolt and that kind of thing—would have been prosecuted. Actually he never was, but if this Amendment were accepted it would also have to be proved that, having received the letter from Moscow, he then intended to use it. There is a great difference there. The man, although a member of the Communist Party, might be quite innocent, and believe in spreading his ideas by peaceful and proper means. Under this Bill he could be prosecuted, but under the Amendment he would be safeguarded. I would rather go to the trouble of asking your Lordships to support us in this Amendment than run the risk of injustice to one man, even if he be a Communist of the bad character
Resolved in the negative, and Amendment disagreed to, accordingly.
LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE moved, in subsection (2), before the first "evidence," to insert "documents named in the information will provide." The noble Lord said: Important as many of the Amendments have been that we have discussed to-day, I do not believe
326
which has so alarmed and disturbed the sleep of the noble Viscount.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: Does the noble Lord want me to answer a question? The answer, of course, is that if the Zinoviev letter did, in fact, contain inducements to the forces to betray their allegiance, and it was found in the possession of somebody in this country, that person would not then be committing an offence under the Bill as it stands unless the prosecution went on to prove that he intended to use the letter for the purpose of actually seducing the forces.
LORD STRABOLGI: How can they do that?
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: if they cannot prove it, then they will not convict him.
On Question, Whether the proposed proviso shall be there inserted?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 10; Not-Contents, 55.

CONTENTS.

Allen of Hurtwood, L.

Hay, L. (E. Kinnoull.) [Teller.]

Rhayader, L.

Arnold, L.

Snell, L.

Faringdon, L.

Marley, L. [Teller.]

Strabolgi, L.

Hare, L. (E. Listowel.)

Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L.

NOT-CONTENTS.

Aberdeen and Temair, M.

Aberdare, L.

Harris, L.

Exeter, M.

Abinger, L.

Hutchison of Montrose, L.

Alvingham, L.

Iliffe, L.

Airlie, E.

Annaly, L.

Kinnaird, L.

Feversham, E.

Balfour of Burleigh, L.

Lamington, L.

Iddesleigh, E.

Bindley, L.

Lloyd, L.

Lucan, E. [Teller.]

Brougham and Vaux, L.

Luke, L.

Malmesbury, E.

Carnock, L.

Middleton, L.

Midleton, E.

Clanwilliam, L. (E. Clanwilliam)

Rankeillour, L.

Mount Edgcumbe, E.

Redesdale, L.

Munster, E.

Conway of Allington, L.

Remnant, L.

Onslow, E.

Cottesloe, L.

Rennell, L.

Plymouth. E,

Daryngton, L.

Sandhurst, L.

Radnor, E.

Douglas, L. (E. Home.)

Southampton, L.

Rothes, E.

Ebbisham, L.

Stonehaven, L.

Vane, E. (M. Londonderry.)

Elton, L.

Strathcona and Mount Royal, L.

Fairfax of Cameron, L.

Brentford, V.

Foxford, L. (E. Limerick.)

Strickland, L.

Elibank, V.

Gage, L. (V. Gage.) [Teller.]

Templemore, L.

Hailsham, V.

Hampton, L.

that there is one that is more important than that which I am about to move. If it is accepted the subsection will then read:
"If a Judge of the High Court is satisfied by information on oath that there is reasonable ground for suspecting that an offence under this Act has been committed, and that documents named in the information will provide evidence of the commission thereof …"

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The point of that is briefly this: What is provided for under this subsection is a general search, and what I desire to insert in the Bill is that the search should be restricted to the documents which the Police are looking for—that is to say, that the officer will come into a room, and if he finds the documents he is looking for, his search will then be at an end, and he will not be able to rummage about the whole room to find what he conceives to be further incriminating documents and take away as much literature as he wants. This question of general search came up in another place, and it is very interesting to read the exact words used by the Attorney-General, because he defines the purpose of this Bill very clearly.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: Will you give me the reference?
LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE: It is the eighth day of the proceedings in Committee, dated June 14, column 241. He said:
"Everybody uses the expression 'general warrant,' but some people forget what it means. It means to carry away all the papers; not merely to go and take papers which are evidence of a crime having been committed, but all the papers. That is what some honourable Members overlook."
He was quoting a case that arose some years ago, and he says:
"This Court said to themselves: 'Where is the power conferred on a magistrate to issue a general warrant and carry away all the papers?'"
The Attorney-General goes on to say that Lord Camden said in the case he was quoting:
"Where is the written law that gives any magistrate such a power?"
Then the Attorney-General goes on:
"In those days, as far as I know, there were no Statutes which gave a right of search and to carry away papers. The Chief Justice said that if the Secretary of State or any magistrate is going to make an order for carrying away papers, he must put his finger on the Act of Parliament justifying such an Order. That is precisely why we are here to-day. If the Chief Justice was wrong in saying that you must point to a specific provision in the law that allows you to carry away papers, we should not be here to-day. We could act on what we call our Common Law rights for a magistrate to issue his warrant."
Referring to another Member he was answering, the Attorney-General went on:
"The honourable and gallant gentleman is not following the point. Chief Justice
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Camden says: 'Where is the law for this warrant of a general character to be issued?' The answer is, there is not any such Act of Parliament on the Statute Book, nor is there to-day such an Act on the Statute Book, but there are fifty-two Acts of Parliament which do contain a power to seize specific papers in connection with specific offences, and this particular Bill is to enable an answer to be given to any successor of Chief Justice Camden who asks: 'Where is the law which allows a general warrant to be issued?' If this Bill is passed, we shall turn to it and say: 'This is the authority for the magistrate.'"
It is clear that what is intended by this Bill is that it is a general warrant for searching premises, for taking away incriminating documents for which the Police are told to undertake this service, and further to continue to search until all the literature in the room is taken away and examined.
I think that is most objectionable. It is stretching the point much farther than is needful. You want specific evidence. You know the document you want. You have found that it is being distributed. You think you know the premises from which it emanates. You send police to find it and they find it. That is sufficient. They have found the evidence they wanted. The owner of those premises, the author of the document, is incriminated and can be punished. If they do not find it I think their operation should come to an end. If we are going to have people going into houses on suspicion, which it will always be, and search the premises and, having found a document, not to be content with that, but to go opening all the cupboards and chests of drawers in the room, taking away all documents whether private and quite irrelevant to the case or not, then I say that is putting in the hands of the law a capacity to encroach on the English home in such a way as has never been allowed before. There is no need and no reason for it.
We have not got the same apprehensions as noble Lords opposite with regard to the necessity of this measure or to the danger of these Communist leaflets. The whole thing is so grossly exaggerated. If the noble Viscount wanted to get some idea of English Communism I would ask him to ask Sir John Simon or the noble Earl, Lord Stanhope, who will probably have heard from the Russian Ambassador to this country what he thinks of British Communists. They are

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considered as a joke and those people who do consider them an a joke deal with them in the proper way. When I represented Sheffield in the other House I had a great deal to do with Communist interruptions. They were always directed more or less against attacking the Labour Party than any other Party. I found the method that always succeeded was to treat them as a joke. Here is the Government shivering in its shoes, terrified of these ridiculous leaflets, and. now giving this right of general search into premises and ransacking the whole place even after they have discovered the wretched leaflet or stack of leaflets they are looking for. This is a most objectionable feature of the Bill and I cannot help feeling that even at this late hour, after we have been refused every Amendment, the noble Viscount will see reason and accede to my request.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 20, after ("that") insert ("documents named in the information will provide").—(Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede.)
LORD STRABOLGI: The night is young and we have now reached the real fighting around. Our previous Amendments were Amendments of substance but as the Secretary of State for War will no doubt agree they have been preliminary skirmishes. Now we come to the most objectionable part of the whole Bill, the general right of search. I repeat those words deliberately in spite of the speech we heard from the Secretary of State for War on Second Reading. If the words in the Bill are allowed by your Lordships to remain and if my noble friend's very reasonable Amendment is rejected you will empower police to go on a general fishing expedition into people's houses, into newspaper offices, into printing works, into clubs, into places the Government do not like inhabited by people the Government do not like. That has been repudiated by the Courts, by successive Governments and by your Lordships' House for a century and a-half.
You see what the Great War has done. We are back in the Middle Ages or back in the rather darker ages of a century and a-half ago. We have had one or two speeches from noble Lords who represent the National Labour group, in which they made the point that I made myself three years ago in another place when we were discussing certain troubles, that a
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Labour Government might be glad of these powers to use against Fascists or near Fascists or people who wanted to take unconstitutional action to resist an elected Parliament and a Government supported by it. That is perfectly true. A Labour Government in the future with a majority might desire to deal with attempts at unconstitutional action, but I hope if this Bill receives the Royal Assent and remains on the Statute Book that no Labour Government will use these powers that we are now discussing.
VISCOUNT ELIBANK: Vain hope.
LORD STRABOLGI: We have perfectly good powers already. If the noble Viscount organised an illegal force we could deal with him under the existing law with the greatest ease. We do not need these powers. But an unscrupulous Government with no strong evidence against the noble Viscount could raid his country seat and his town house on a fishing expedition by using these powers;, and they would then ransack every room in the place, blow open the safes and turn out the cellars, search all his relations and all his servants, and all the rest of it. I would resist and criticise and object to any such action although he was organising, and was supposed to be organising, a Blackshirt force against a Government which I supported. I only take that very hypothetically, because I know that the noble Viscount has far too much sense and is far too much of a good Scotsman, if I may say so, to attempt anything of the kind.
This Amendment is really the test of the Government's sincerity. At present, as the Bill is drawn, an inspector goes to a Judge of the High Court and swears that he will find certain evidence in a certain place if he gets a search warrant. In seeking for that evidence or finding it, as the case may be, he then can remove other documents. If noble Lords will turn to page 2 and look at lines 5 to 10, particularly lines 9 and 10, they will see that having obtained this search warrant the Police are then entitled
"to seize anything found on the premises or place or on such person which the officer has reasonable ground for suspecting to he evidence of the commission of such an offence as aforesaid."
I am sure it is clear what very wide powers are asked for in the Bill. It is

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surely clear even to the noble Viscount how very objectionable in the eyes of the public those particular powers are.
We have been told again and again in this very interesting debate by the noble Viscount that he is seeking to check Communists, or a section of Communists, who are printing thousands and thousands of leaflets for distribution to the armed forces. Very well, we accept that. But there may be times of excitement, as noble Lords on this side of the House have pointed out and we must point out again to your Lordships; there may be periods of stress, and hysterical periods, as we have had before in this country, when the judgment even of the authorities is upset, when people lose their mental balance, and you have "spy mania" rife. Noble Lords will remember that at the beginning of the War people in the East End of London went mad, and they nearly killed an unfortunate butcher rejoicing in the ancient Scottish name of Strachan. They said that with a name like that he must be a German, and they nearly beat the unfortunate fellow to death.
It is at periods of that kind that the powers in this Bill will be misused to hunt and harry by police raids, by searches in the middle of the night, by terrorising the families of people who are obnoxious to the Government of the day, or opposing an attempt to embroil us in a war. Those are the days we are thinking about, and it is to prevent those scandals in the country that we ask your Lordships to support us to-night. As I say, the night is young. We have now reached the real part of the Bill that matters, the part of the Bill which, if it reaches the Statute Book in its present form, will add to the contempt in which the Government is held in the country and which it only needs an opportunity for the country to express at the polls.
LORD ALLEN OF HURTWOOD: I really would ask my noble friend if he can, to be accurate in the way he listens and the way he reproduces what he hears. Nobody has ever said from the National Labour group that a Socialist Government would be glad to have these powers in order to use them when they were in power. So far as I am concerned I have said precisely the opposite. I tried to beg my noble friends opposite to be careful, not in asking for new powers
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which they may use, but in starting new disobedience which may be to their disadvantage. I take as examples of new disobedience the calling upon troops not to drop bombs when they are told to drop bombs on the North-West frontier or calling upon troops to disobey orders when they are dealing with industrial disputes. Those are the warnings which I offered to my noble friends. It would be very much better if they would try to be accurate.
As to the Amendment which has been moved by my noble friend Lord Ponsonby, I would be glad indeed if the Government could be induced to accept it. I share with him the belief that this is perhaps the most important Amendment that has been moved during this debate. Whatever may have been said in another place or here, I believe that under this clause does come the danger of the general search warrant. Unless the documents which are sought for are definitely identifiable, we are starting in this country a process which must ultimately be that of going to seek for any documents which may be found in n search initiated by a Judge in Chambers who granted a search warrant. I have seen it done. I have seen an inspector look bewildered at rows of pamphlets and books, trying to make up his mind what they mean. I realise that the Government are reaching the stage when they cannot accept any Amendment, but if they can accept this Amendment I believe they will be taking from this Bill one of the grievous mistakes which has been made.
LORD STRABOLGI: Is it a fact that the Government have made up their minds to accept no Amendments?
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: The Government have not made up their minds to refuse to accept any Amendments if a case is made out for them. It is true that I do not see on the Paper any Amendments which seem likely to commend themselves to the Government, and that is all the more natural because, as your Lordships may remember, this Bill was very exhaustively debated in another place and the Government have gone to the extreme limit of concession in hoping to meet any reasonable apprehensions which might be entertained. How far we have been from succeeding in that has been demonstrated to-night, because

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we have been shown to-night that some people's apprehensions can never be allayed.
Turning now to answer points which have been raised, it is said that this power is the power of general search warrant. I wonder if noble Lords remember what a general search warrant is. It is a document issued on the authority of the Secretary of State authorising the police to go and look, in some cases without naming any individual, and in other cases naming an individual, and see what he has got, and bring it all back. Lord Strabolgi went so far as to say that in times of stress the Government would send the police, and the police would be allowed to go on a general fishing expedition to see what they could find. That happens to be the very thing which this Bill does not do and carefully avoids doing. Instead of the Secretary of State or the Government sending a policeman, nobody can go until he has got the authority of a Judge in Chambers, and although there are a great number of Statutes giving power to issue search warrants, this is the only one, so far as I know, in which only a Judge of the High Court can give permission. Secondly, before the Judge of the High Court can allow a warrant to issue he has to be satisfied by sworn evidence that there is reasonable ground for suspecting an offence to have been committed, and evidence is to be found on specified premises, and when the Judge is so satisfied and a police officer goes in pursuance of that authority he does not, as is suggested, have a general right to seize anything he finds but only a right to seize things which he has reasonable ground for suspecting is evidence. So every sort of precaution is taken and every feature of a general search warrant which has been condemned as objectionable is carefully excluded from this Bill.
Then the Leader of the Opposition has said that this is an unprecedented power, but of course I do not think he could have meant that. It is quite true, of course, that this search warrant for this offence is not in an existing Statute, otherwise there would have been no need to pass this Bill; but to say that this sort of power of search is an unprecedented one is a complete mistake. I could give a number of instances. I
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think the closest analogy is in the Official Secrets Act, 1911, where it is provided that:
"If a justice of the peace is satisfied by information on oath that there is reasonable ground for suspecting that an offence under this Act has been or is about to be committed, he may grant a, search warrant authorising any constable named therein to enter at any tune any premises or place named in the warrant, if necessary, by force, and to search tie premises or place, and every person found therein, and to seize any sketch, plan, model, article, note or document, or anything of a like nature, or anything which is evidence of an offence under this Act having been or being about to be committed, which he may find on the premises or place or on any such person, and with regard to or in connection with which he has reasonable ground for suspecting that an offence under this Act has been or is about to be committed."
I quote that because it happens to be very close to the words here, except that the words in the 1911 Act are somewhat wide.
Quite obviously we could not accept the Amendment. The result would be that, although you got a search warrant and although on going to look with the search warrant you found the most objectionable and obviously criminal pamphlets of the character you suspected, unless they happened to be the documents of which you had laid the information you could not do anything, and you would have to leave the man to take them away scathless until a new search warrant had been obtained. That would be a futile and idle thing to do, and I think the precautions I have mentioned ought to satisfy your Lordships that every care has been taken not to give any unreasonable power to the Police.
LORD ARNOLD: I do not think that the reference to the Official Secrets Act is really applicable. That Act is one in which the offence consists not in the possession of a document, but either retaining it unlawfully or else communicating it to some unauthorised person. It could only be very limited in its application anyhow, because very few persons could possibly have a warrant issued to them under that Act. The noble Viscount has to his own satisfaction dealt with the charge which my noble friend brought against this general search warrant, but the fact remains that the Attorney-General admitted that there was a. general search. He said:

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"Where is the law which allows a general warrant to be issued? If this Bill is passed we shall … say this is the authority …"
We want to get at the facts. We see that frequently the noble Viscount entirely evades the point and the spectacle which your Lordships' House has exhibited to-day in connection with this Bill is not one that does it credit.
Your Lordships' House is supposed to be a revising Chamber, and above all you are supposed to see that measures are not passed for which there has been no mandate, unless a case has been made out for them. It is absolutely certain that there is no mandate for this Bill, and also that no real case has been made out for the Bill. Yet from the 700 odd Unionist Peers who are supposed to come here and safeguard the interests of the people and particularly to see that measures like this are not passed, measures putting back the clock for 150 years—what I suppose the Prime Minister calls "on and on and on"—not one syllable has been spoken from that side of the House by one single Unionist member except the noble Viscount, who has constantly misrepresented the case. From our Party point of view I could wish for nothing better. It will be very good propaganda. We shall make it our business to tell the people of the country how the House of Lords behaves when it is dealing with a measure for which there is no mandate whatever. If this were a Labour measure it would not have a moment's shrift. It is highly regrettable that not one single Unionist member has had the independence and the manliness to stand up in this House for the liberties of the people. What was condemned 150 years ago as something not to be tolerated is to-day, in 1934, in a few hours, being rushed through the House of Lords, without any proper reply being made to the arguments, and, as I said, not a single Unionist Peer saying a single word in defence of the liberties of the people.
LORD MARLEY: May I ask the noble Viscount one brief question? I have noticed that three or four times in the course of the Committee stage the noble Viscount has said this with regard to subsection (2) of Clause 2, that if a Judge is satisfied by "sworn evidence" or "evidence on oath," but the terms
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of the Bill are "information on oath." It seems to me there is a very serious difference between information on oath and sworn evidence. I should like to know which the noble Viscount means. I think I am right in saying that on at least three occasions he has used the words "sworn evidence," and that, I believe, will be borne out by a scrutiny of the OFFICIAL REPORT in the morning. If I am right, I think he is definitely misleading the Committee, and I should be very much obliged if the noble Viscount would say whether or not there is a difference between sworn evidence and evidence on oath.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: None at all.
LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEY: I do not wish to take up the attention of the noble Viscount unduly at this early hour of the morning, but I should like again to ask him one specific question. It may be more suitable to the next Amendment, but if the noble Viscount can give me a satisfactory answer he will at least have the satisfaction of knowing that I shall not detain him on the next Amendment. The noble Viscount said that in fact this Bill did not entail any right to a general search warrant, and the distinction that he drew between any general search warrant and this Bill was that a general search warrant must apply to some specific person. It is quite clearly laid down in this Bill that on information being laid and on consent of a Judge of the High Court being obtained, a search may be made for unspecified papers, and a search may be made of any and every person found in such premises. It seems to me that it might well be that some perfectly innocent person—innocent, that is to say, of any offence under this Bill—may find himself searched by police under this Bill, and if that is not a general search warrant I would ask the noble Viscount to explain what is.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: A general search warrant is a search warrant issued on the authority of a Secretary of State authorising the police to search in some cases any premises or persons without specifying them and in other cases to search defined premises or persons, and to seize anything they like without any regard as to what it must prove or have relation to. This search warrant only

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enables you to search specified premises and people on those premises.
LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEY: Possibly innocent people?
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: Possibly innocent people. We do not assume for one moment that everyone is proved guilty merely because they are on the premises, and they will not be punished unless they are guilty. But you search to find, not to bring anything you can find but anything which the officer has reasonable ground for suspecting to be evidence of the commission of the offence of incitement to mutiny.
LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEY: I thank the noble Viscount for his explanation but it is not clear now. It seems to me that this would take place after application had been made to the Judge of the High Court and it rests entirely with the discretion of the officer what is incriminating. I am not for a moment suggesting that the guilty should go scot free. It may well be under this Bill, if it becomes law, that a person innocent of this particular crime may be, and for no good reason, hauled in for an offence quite outside this measure. The noble Viscount has said that this is not a general search warrant because a general search warrant is issued by the Secretary of State. That is so, but surely that is a specified form of general search warrant. There may be, and indeed under this Bill will be, general search warrants, although without precedent, issued not by a Secretary of State, but for all that they will be general search warrants. The term general search warrant says nothing about the Secretary of State at all. You may have one without any authority of the Secretary of State, but on the authority of the Police backed up by a Judge of the High Court.
LORD PONSONBY OF SFIULBREDE: I am disappointed at the way this Amendment has been received. I certainly thought it was one that would
appeal to the noble Viscount in charge of the Bill and that he would concede it. I must say that when his definition of a search warrant is read to-morrow in the printed report and put alongside that of the Attorney-General we shall feel very much confused as to what a search warrant is. They do not seem to tally. I am not sufficiently conversant with legal phraseology to be able to follow them completely, but there seems to be considerable doubt as to what powers are exactly involved in a search warrant. One thing I am frightened of is planting. I think that is a very real danger. The agent provocateur is an accepted personalty. The Attorney-General spoke of using him as if it was like using a private secretary. He said: "I find no difficulty from my agent provocateur in getting indecent books." We all know that that man may on some occasions plant leaflets and undesirable documents in somebody's house and that there will be the general search warrant, although the particular documents that the searcher is looking for may not be on the premises. I think that is extremely dangerous. These legal definitions and political definitions do not clear the air at all.
I am reminded of the desire of the National Government to preserve the liberties of this country, and then I look to the Prime Minister for a definition of liberty and find this:
I want to say and let it be known to those who are timorous about liberty, that it is necessary for us now, in view of the example that has been set to us by nation after nation in the world, to take steps to protect our liberties against those who are using the liberty of our liberties to undo that liberty.
If that is the method by which Governments make their definitions no wonder the Government is in great confusion.
On Question, Whether the proposed words shall be there inserted?
Their Lordships divided:—Contents, 11; Not-Contents, 54.

CONTENTS.

Allen of Hurtwood, L.

Hay, L. (E. Kinnoull.) [Teller.]

Rhayader, L.

Arnold, L.

Snell, L.

Faringdon, L.

Marley, L. [Teller.]

Stanley of Alderley, (L. Sheffield.

Hare, L. (E. Listowel.)

Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L.

Strabolgi, L.

NOT-CONTENTS.

Aberdeen and Temair, M.

Aberdare, L.

Harris, L.

Exeter, M.

Abinger, L.

Hutchison of Montrose, L.

Alvingham, L.

Iliffe, L.

Airlie, E.

Annaly, L.

Kinnaird, L.

Feversham, E.

Balfour of Burleigh, L.

Lamington, L.

Iddesleigh, E.

Bingley, L.

Lloyd, L.

Lucan, E. [Teller.]

Brougham and Vaux, L.

Luke, L.

Malmesbury, E.

Carnock, L.

Middleton, L.

Midleton, E.

Clanwilliam, L. (E. Clanwilliam.)

Rankeillour, L.

Mount Edgcumbe, E.

Redesdale, L.

Munster, E.

Conway of Allington, L.

Remnant, L.

Onslow, E.

Cottesloe, L.

Rennell, L.

Plymouth, E.

Daryngton, L.

Sandhurst, L.

Radnor, E.

Ebbisham, L.

Southampton, L.

Rothes, E.

Elton, L.

Stonehaven, L.

Vane, E. (M. Londonderry.)

Fairfax of Cameron, L.

Strathcona and Mount Royal, L.

Foxford, L. (E. Limerick.)

Brentford, V.

Gage, L. (V. Gage.) [Teller.]

Strickland, L.

Elibank, V.

Hampton, L.

Templemore, L.

Hailsham, V.

Resolved in the negative Amendment disagreed to accordingly.
LORD ARNOLD LORD ARNOLD moved, in subsection (2), to leave out "and every person found thereon." The noble Lord said: As I wish to do what I can to facilitate business I shall not speak separately to the two Amendments I have on the Paper. This Amendment, I admit, is not of equal importance with the one which your Lordships have most unhappily just rejected, but it is of very great consequence. This clause gives power of what I call general search—that is how it is generally understood—and that is something which, as we have been told, we have not had in this country for 150 years. But it goes further. In this insensate hunt for so-called incriminating documents this clause gives power not merely to enter a man's house, at any time, by force if necessary, whether he is there or not, but it gives power of searching for documents every person found on the premises.
The noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, has indicated that a power of search is needed to get at bulk documents. Quite clearly, if that is what is intended it is not necessary to have the power to search all the persons on the premises. That, I think, is obvious. The pamphlets that can be concealed on the person can be only very few in number, and if that is all that is in question, I think we might take it as being quite certain that the person or persons who might have been incriminated will have taken good care, before the search came, that those particular pamphlets were not on his or their persons but were somewhere else.
Therefore that is totally unnecessary. But think what it means. It means that police may come breaking into the house, perhaps into the house of some noble Lord here; he may have a house party of guests, who may know nothing whatever about the matter, but they may be subjected to search. All the servants, and every one on the premises, may be searched. And that applies not only to a house, because the words of the clause are "premises or place," and "place" has a very wide connotation. It would apply to a hotel, it would apply to the Albert Hall. You might get a search warrant, go to the Albert Hall and search every person in the Albert Hall, under this clause.
It is all very well for the noble Viscount to suggest that that is a thing which could not happen, but there is nothing in this clause to prevent it. It has happened in other countries; it has happened in Ireland—not in a place as big as the Albert Hall, but in a big hall. Take the Ulster disaffection of 1914. I think there is no doubt whatever, especially after the memoirs of Sir Henry Wilson, that a search warrant would have been obtained to go to the Carlton Club, and everybody in the Club would have been searched. This surely is a, very extraordinary provision. I see that one of the supporters of the Government, a National Liberal, refers to the powers in this clause as outrageous. I say that this particular part of the clause is clearly outrageous. There is surely sufficient power in the general search which has been given without this monstrous power of searching every person on the premises, many of whom will know

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nothing about the matter. The noble Viscount said that he had not accepted any Amendment because no sufficient reason had been given for acceptance. I should like to ask the noble Viscount whether there is any precedent, apart from the Official Secrets Act, for the right of search of persons found on premises in this indiscriminate way.
Are we again setting up something which is entirely new, and for which no reason has been adduced? I do not say there is no reason, and I am asking for information, but is there any precedent in any Act of Parliament for this general right of search of persons in this indiscriminate way? I may have more to say when we have heard the reply of the noble Viscount, but I think it is clear from the attitude of the Government that they are not going to accept any Amendment, that they are not taking the Bill seriously in this House and that whatever we may say it does not make any difference. Nevertheless, it is our duty to raise these points and we shall do so.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 9, leave out, ("and every person found thereon").—(Lord Arnold.)
LORD STRABOLGI: When the Minister for War comes to reply may I ask trim whether when he did his military service in South Africa he saw prisoners searched for documents? It means complete stripping. It meant even more in the last war. It is rather drastic, and I am not going to describe it in this House.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: Lord Arnold said I had told your Lordships that the object of the Bill was only to deal with bulk documents. I never made any such statement. If his memory goes back even an hour he will recall that I resisted an Amendment to exclude a single document on the ground that this clause was intended to deal with single criminal documents just as with many of them. The instance which I gave was the original of an offending pamphlet which was found before the pamphlet had been produced in quantity.
LORD ARNOLD: We get a certain amount of assistance for our Amendments on this side of the House, and I was informed that at one stage of the debate the noble Viscount did say this about these documents, but if he denies that I will withdraw it.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: I have referred to both documents. All I am saying is that I never said that the purpose of the Bill is confined to it, and unless it is confined to that document of course the argument of the noble Lord falls to the ground. He asked me if there was any precedent. The precedent which I actually had was the one which he knew about, the exact precedent of the Official Secrets Act, passed in 1911. But it happens that I was able to find another. I believe there are a good many, but I cannot vouch for that. I can give one at once—the Dangerous Drugs Act, 1923. You will find in Section (1) (a):
"If a justice of the peace … is satisfied by information on oath that there is reasonable ground for suspecting that any drugs to which this Act applies are, in contravention of the provisions of this Act or any regulations made thereunder, in the possession or under the control of any person in any premises, or that any document directly or indirectly relating to or connected with any transaction or dealing which was, or any intended transaction or dealing which would if carried out be, an offence against this Act, or in the case of a transaction or dealing carried out or intended to be carried out in any place outside Great Britain, an offence against the provisions of any corresponding law in force in that place, is in the possession or under the control of any person in ally premises, he may grant a search warrant authorising any constable named in the warrant, at any time or times within one month from the date of the warrant, to enter, if need be by force, the premises named in the warrant, and to search the premises and any persons found therein, and, if there is reasonable ground for suspecting that an offence against this Act has been committed in relation to any such drugs which may be found in the premises or in the possession of any such persons, or that any document which may be so found is such a document as aforesaid, to seize and detain those drugs or flint document, as the case may be."
I believe that there are other precedents, but that is one which I am able to put my hand on at short notice. The fact is that if you were to exclude the power of search all that the ingenious criminal would need to do would be to put the documents in his pocket or in the pockets of any friends he had, and the policeman, though he might see them there perfectly, could do nothing, either to seize them or to see if they were there. Therefore the purpose of the Act would be completely defeated, except in those cases in which there were so many documents that neither the occupier nor any-

343
body with him could collectively wish to smuggle them away on their persons. That, I have no doubt, the House would not wish to be the law, and therefore I think the Amendment must be defeated.
LORD ARNOLD: Apparently the position is that if one man is allowed to conceal one or two documents in his pocket then he is a dangerous person. How on earth are you going to seduce the troops by having an odd leaflet in your pocket? On the question of precedent I was asking for information. My information was that there was no precedent, and I suggest that the precedent the noble Viscount has produced is not really a very
Resolved in the affirmative, and Amendment disagreed to accordingly.
LORD STRABOLGI LORD STRABOLGI had given Notice that he would move, in subsection (3), after "woman," to insert "or female child." The noble Lord said: I presume the Government are accepting this Amendment?
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: No.
LORD STRABOLGI: What? Now I really receive my first shock since I had the honour of joining your Lordships' House. I thought I had, at any rate, helped the Government on one occasion. If noble Lords will look at subsection (3) of Clause 2 they will see that as the result of some agitation in another place,
344
satisfactory one in relation to this Bill. Moreover, I have been told that under the Dangerous Drugs Act very often the person or persons are named in the warrant. In any case it is perfectly obvious that those implicated must be very few in number. It is a totally different thing to what may happen under this. Our case for this Amendment is really unshaken. I do not expect the Government to accept it, but we intend to force it to a Division.
On Question, Whether the words proposed to be left out shall stand part?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 52; Not-Contents, 10.

CONTENTS.

Aberdeen and Temair, M.

Aberdare, L.

Hutchison of Montrose, L.

Exeter, M.

Abinger, L.

Iliffe, L.

Alvingham, L.

Kinnaird, L.

Airlie, E.

Annaly, L.

Lamington, L.

Feversham, E.

Balfour of Burleigh, L.

Lloyd, L.

Iddesleigh, E.

Bingley, L.

Luke, L.

Lucan, E. [Teller.]

Brougham and Vaux, L.

Middleton, L.

Malmesbury, E.

Carnock, L.

Rankeillour, L.

Midleton, E.

Clanwilliam, L. (E. Clanwilliam)

Redesdale, L.

Mount Edgcumbe, E.

Remnant, L.

Munster, E.

Conway of Allington, L.

Rennell, L.

Plymouth, E.

Daryngton, L.

Sandhurst, L.

Radnor, E.

Ebbisham, L.

Southampton, L.

Rothes, E.

Elton, L.

Stonehaven, L.

Vane, E. (M. Londonderry.)

Fairfax of Cameron, L.

Strathcona and Mount Royal, L.

Foxford, L. (E. Limerick.)

Brentford, V.

Gage, L. (V. Gage.) [Teller.]

Strickland, L.

Elibank, V.

Hampton, L.

Templemore, L.

Hailsham, V.

Harris, L.

NOT-CONTENTS.

Arnold, L.

Marley, L. [Teller.]

Stanley of Alderley, L. (L. Sheffield.)

Faringdon, L.

Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L.

Hare, L. (E. Listowel.)

Rhayader, L.

Strabolgi, L.

Hay, L. (E. Kinnoull.) [Teller.]

Snell, L.

and a good deal of indignation in the country, the Government gave way to the extent that a woman who is to be searched shall only be searched by a woman. I propose to add the words "or female child." I telephoned to nay solicitor this morning and asked what was the legal definition of the age of a woman, and he said he understood it was the age of puberty, or seventeen.
A NOBLE LORD: Sixteen.
LORD STRABOLGI: May I ask the Minister for War—is it sixteen or seventeen?
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: "Woman" merely means a person of the female sex.
LORD STRABOLGI: I am very much obliged. The Minister for War then is better informed by his advisers than my solicitor was. However, if that is so then a girl of ten, twelve or fourteen years is a woman.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: Yes, but of course there are Acts of Parliament in which there is a definition for the purposes of those Acts of what a woman is. Such an Act is the Mines Act. But in the absence of a statutory definition for the particular purpose a woman simply means a person of the female sex just the same as a man would be a person of the male sex.
LORD STRABOLGI: Is a girl of 15 a woman and must she be searched by a woman and is every other female child a woman?
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: Yes.
LORD STRABOLGI: Then I will not persist in my Amendment.
LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEY: Would the noble Viscount consider substituting the words "female person"?
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: It is quite unnecessary.
THE LORD CHAIRMAN: Is the Amendment withdrawn?
LORD STRABOLGI: I do not move.
THE EARL OF KINNOULL: Before the question that this clause stand part of the Bill is decided, I would like to say that I think there was some misapprehension with regard to an Amendment which I put down to leave out the words "or under his control." I think the Lord Chairman, if I may say so with great respect, did not understand that my Amendment raised a totally different point from that raised by the previous Amendment.
THE LORD CHAIRMAN: If the noble Earl will forgive me, may I say that his Amendment was exactly the same and he had an opportunity of explaining when the Earl of Listowel's Amendment was under discussion. The Committee had taken a decision on the point.
THE EARL OF KINNOULL: I do not want to detain the Committee but my Amendment was intended to raise a
346
totally different point. I want to know what these words "under his control" really mean. It seems to me they are extremely vague. Is it to be presumed if a member of your Lordships' House happened to have a servant who was a member of the Communist Party or the Fascist Party or any other Party that may spring up in the future, that he is under your personal control? Or, again, if you work for an employer and he happens to have views different from yours, and fills his office with various pamphlets, and the police raid the premises, are those pamphlets supposed to be under your control if he is not there? I would like to have a statement from the noble Viscount as to the exact meaning of the words.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: The sort of thing which I should think the draftsman probably had in mind—I do not give it as an exhaustive definition but as an illustration—is that a person having criminal pamphlets might, instead of keeping them in his own house, send them to his bank. If he had an overdraft the bank might technically have some, sort of lien on them, but they would really be under the control of the person depositing them. Again he might send them to a safe deposit. He might leave them with the printer and leave his bill unpaid, so that again there would be a lien. In all those cases there would be great difficulty in establishing possession in the eye of the law. I do not lay down positively that in none of them could you do so, because possession is rather a technical thing, but at any rate there would be considerable risk that people might evade the Statute by having documents in that sort of custody which were not technically in the possession of the guilty person, but which were none the less under his effective control.
LORD STRABOLGI: Upon that particular point of their being "under the control," I think the examples given by-the noble Viscount are very extraordinary indeed. I thought we were trying to deal with the circulation of poisonous, nefarious leaflets to the loyal members of the forces. We are now told that if a banker has these documents, or if a safe deposit has them, that is an offence and that all this machinery is required to deal with it. How pathetic!
LORD MARLEY: We shall be bound to press to a Division our opposition to Clause 2, because as we have tried to point out, it contains so very many objectionable provisions, and because we have obtained no satisfaction whatever in any single one of the Amendments which we have moved after great thought, and with great care, and which we have attempted to explain, in order to meet the desires which we believe exist very widely throughout the country. For that reason, and particularly in view of the fact that subsection (1), for instance, contains so many objectionable features in such
Resolved in the affirmative and Clause 2 agreed to accordingly.
LORD STRABOLGI LORD STRABOLGI moved, after Clause 2, to insert the following new clause:
Safeguards for political and other publications not intended for H.M. forces.
". It is hereby declared that it shall not be an offence under this Act for any person:

(a) to have in his possession or under his control with intent to publish and distribute the same to the public generally or to any section of the public other than His Majesty's forces any document the publication or distribution whereof to persons other than members of His Majesty's forces would not prior to the passing of this Act have amounted to a criminal offence; or

(b) to print, publish or distribute in any newspaper, book or pamphlet distributed

matters as search, and such matters as the total inability to get a clear definition of the meaning of the conglomeration of words which forms subsection (1) of Clause 2 of this Bill, and in view of the objectionable features surrounding the whole position of search, and the searching of individuals in the house, we shall be bound to force to a Division our opposition to Clause 2.
On Question, Whether Clause 2 shall stand part of the Bill?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 53; Not-Contents, 10.

CONTENTS.

Aberdeen and Temair, M.

Hailsham, V.

Hampton, L.

Exeter, M.

Harris, L.

Aberdare, L.

Hutchison of Montrose, L.

Airlie, E.

Abinger, L.

Iliffe, L.

Feversham, E.

Alvingham, L.

Kinnaird, L.

Iddesleigh, E.

Annaly, L.

Lamington, L.

Lucan, E. [Teller.]

Balfour of Burleigh, L.

Lloyd, L.

Malmesbury, E.

Bingley, L.

Luke, L.

Midleton, E.

Brougham and Vaux, L.

Middleton, L.

Mount Edgcumbe, E.

Carnock, L.

Rankeillour, L.

Munster, E.

Clanwilliam, L. (E. Clanwilliam)

Redesdale, L.

Onslow, E.

Remnant, L.

Plymouth, E.

Conway of Allington, L.

Rennell, L.

Radnor, E.

Daryngton, L.

Sandhurst, L.

Rothes, E.

Ebbisham, L.

Southampton, L.

Vane, E. (M. Londonderry.)

Elton, L.

Stonehaven, L.

Fairfax of Cameron, L.

Strathcona and Mount Royal, L.

Brentford, V.

Foxford, L. (E. Limerick.)

Elibank, V.

Gage, L. (V. Gage.) [Teller.]

Strickland, L.

Templemore, L.

NOT-CONTENTS.

Arnold, L.

Marley, L. [Teller.]

Stanley of Alderley, L. (L. Sheffield.)

Faringdon, L.

Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L.

Hare, L. (E. Listowel.)

Rhayader, L.

Strabolgi, L.

Hay, L. (E. Kinnoull.) [Teller.]

Snell, L.

or sold to the public generally or to any section of the public other than His Majesty's forces any matter the publication or distribution whereof to persons other than members of His Majesty's forces would not prior to the passing of this Act have amounted to a criminal offence; or
(c) to print, publish or distribute any matter calculated or designed to advocate peace or abstention from war or from armed resistance or from enlistment in armed forces or any like matter if the publication or distribution thereof to the public generally or to any other section of the public other than His Majesty's forces would not prior to the passing of this Act have amounted to a criminal offence."
The noble Lord said: It is a rather formidable looking cause, but if you will be good enough to glance at it you will

349
see that it is not quite so intricate as it might appear. It was put down in the anticipation, unhappily realised, that we would not be able to improve Clauses 1 and 2, which are left exactly as they reached this house, and in our opinion are extremely objectionable. However, there it is; we have done our best. The next best thing to do is to see that this new power which the Minister for War requires to safeguard his soldiers and sailors from contamination by Bosheviks is not used to suppress ordinary political propaganda, which is already legal. At any rate we can put up that safeguard, we hope. Paragraph (a) says that it shall not be an offence under this Act for any person
"to have in his possession or under his control with intent to publish and distribute the same to the public generally or to any section of the public other than His Majesty's forces any document the publication or distribution whereof to persons other than members of His Majesty's forces would not prior to the passing of this Act have amounted to a criminal offence."
That safeguards the general public who may have in their possession documents perhaps of an extravagant nature, antiwar propaganda, anti-Government propaganda even, which it is not an offence to have at present, but which admittedly, if it were sent to the troops, might be an incitement to mutiny, and therefore would be an offence.
Paragraph (b) is designed to safeguard the working printer, the publisher, the newspaper personnel and people of that, kind, so that the printing or writing of a newspaper or pamphlet and its distribution to any section of the public apart from His Majesty's forces shall not constitute an offence. Take, for instance, a political club. There might be some document prepared for members of the Carlton Club when a Labour Government was in power of a really subversive character, but we allow liberty of expression in this country, and no one in his senses would think of prosecuting the author of that pamphlet. If, however, that same pamphlet were shown to the soldiers or sailors it is possible that some of them might be disaffected, and then it would be an offence. Paragraph (b) safeguards that position.
Paragraph (c) specifically deals with pacifist propaganda by people like the Society of Friends, the League of Nations Union and Canon Sheppard, who is at
350
present inviting people to sign an undertaking not to engage in war under any circumstances. Lord Ponsonby ran a great and successful campaign to the same end some years ago. A member of your Lordships' House, Lord Beaver-brook, through his newspapers, no doubt with perfect sincerity and certainly legally, is advocating that we should not engage in any kind of war. All this is peace propaganda. All of it is perfectly legal and should be allowed, but if Lord Beaverbrook—who, if he had been present, might have supported me on this point—tried to carry his objection to war, which is very strong, to the troops about to sail for the theatre of war, then he might be guilty of an offence. I expect he will be guilty of an offence already under the present Mutiny Act, but I do not want to go over that ground again.
One of our arguments is that the Secretary of State has plenty of powers already, but he says these additional powers are necessary. Well, let him have them. We have done our best. We believe they are both unnecessary and mischievous, but he must safeguard those present activities such as those of Lord Beaverbrook, the Society of Friends, Dick Sheppard, the Bishop of Birmingham and all such people. That is the object of subsection (c) of this Amendment. I think this new clause is reasonable and we have called it "Safeguards for political and other publications not intended for His Majesty's forces." The Secretary of State wil doubtless reply: "Ah, but look at my Clause 1—that is 'If by publishing maliciously and advisedly'—ant look at my Clause 2—intent has to be proved." I asked him how he was going to prove intent, and he indicated there was no way of proving that which he could explain; and that, no doubt, will be what the noble Viscount will explain to your Lordships.
But we are still nervous about the effect of this Bill. In spite of what the noble Viscount says here, and the peaceful atmosphere of your Lordships' House, with everyone good-humouredly enjoying an interesting debate, and the excellent explanations of the noble Viscount, we have got to remember that some poor wretch may be dragged before the Courts at a time of popular excitement when there is a good deal of prejudice about, and we want some safeguard for him.

351
He may be perfectly innocent of stirring up mutiny among the troops; he may be doing what it is legal to do at present, and we want to make it continue to be legal. It is for these reasons that my noble friend Lord Ponsonby and I have put down this new clause, which I now beg to move.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 2 insert the said new clause.—(Lord Strabolgi.)
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: The noble Lord showed his commencement of understanding of the Bill when he indicated what part of my answer to his arguments would be. It is quite true, as he observed, that I should refer your Lordships to Clauses 1 and 2, in order to see what the Bill does, before we decide whether it is necessary to put in a special safeguarding clause to say what it shall not do, because, quite obviously, if the things included in the safeguarding clause are obviously already outside the existing clauses, then there is no use for the safeguarding clause. I am bound to say I do not find the safeguarding clause very precise. I have been listening for some hours to noble Lords saying how vague our Bill is, but I do not think we have got anything quite so vague into the Bill as noble Lords opposite have succeeded in getting into their safeguarding clause.
The short answer I would make is that the clause is unnecessary, or else it is definitely mischievous. If the clause means what it appears on a first reading to mean, and as I gathered from the speech of the noble Lord that it is intended to mean—that it is merely going to protect what is called pacifist propaganda which is not intended to be circulated among the troops, but is merely intended to appear in the ordinary Press or to be circulated to a section of the public other than the troops—then quite obviously you are not within either Clause 1 or Clause 2; you are not within the Bill at all. Clause 1 provides that in order to come within the Bill you must maliciously and advisedly be endeavouring to seduce a member of His Majesty's forces. But if this new clause were intended so as to create the defence that other people as well as His Majesty's forces were to receive these documents or that you were giving them to the public or a section of the public, let us say to an unemployed man whom you
352
engaged for the purpose in order that they might give them to His Majesty's forces—if it means those things obviously it defeats the whole purpose and object of the Bill. Similarly, the rest of the three paragraphs referring to Acts which would not, prior to the commencement of this Act, have amounted to a criminal offence, seems to be re-raising in a new form the controversy which we have engaged in already between "and" and "or." If I am right in thinking, as does the Attorney-General, "and" and "or" make very little difference, then that part of the wording of the clauses would not do much harm. If on the other hand, as Lord Arnold thinks, it makes a very great difference, why then these words would in fact destroy what we have done already and would be a reversal of the position we have already taken. Whichever view, therefore, is the right one, it seems to me that this clause is not one which your Lordships would be well advised to Accept.
LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE: My noble friend and I do not stand out for the exact wording and we should be quite prepared to accept any wording that the noble Viscount preferred. Our intention is that the various sorts of political propaganda which may conceivably be mistaken as malicious should be safeguarded. We do not want this idea that, people who have unpopular views should be suppressed. I am afraid the noble Viscount thinks that people with unpopular views should be suppressed. We believe people should say what they like. I think it was Voltaire who said: "I disagree profoundly with what you are saying, but I would sacrifice my life for your right to say it." I think that is very sound and it is really the system we have gone on in this country with our safety valve of the Marble Arch. Foreigners regard with surprise that we should tolerate anything of that sort. It is these great safety valves that we want in our public life, not these pettifogging Bills with their penalties. I think they are more apt to create the very offence you want to suppress.
What we desire is that there should be inserted in this Bill, which we still consider to be pernicious, something that will properly safeguard legitimate political propaganda which in certain circumstances, mistakenly no doubt, may

353
find its way into a barracks and be so worded as to have some effect on soldiers one way or another. It is all too vague. People are likely to be caught in the nets of this Bill so easily that my noble friend and I felt that, anyhow, this class of propaganda, however near the wind it might be, ought still to be allowed and safeguarded and not come under the provisions of this Bill.
LORD ARNOLD: There are one or two observations of the noble Viscount which raise still further doubts in my mind. I do not raise this point in any sense obstructively. We do want to know what the view of the Government is. This Bill, finally, will be interpreted by the Courts, but at the same time it is customary in Parliament to discuss and have the views of the Government. The noble Viscount said the ordinary pacifist propaganda other than to troops would be perfectly permissible. May I point out that immediately war is declared we may have a Military Service Act and every male from 18 to 50 might become a member of the forces? That means, presumably, that during the war there may be no pacifist propaganda at all; that this Bill would stop it. But leave that out of account. Is it the view of the noble Viscount that a man may go down to the Aldershot area and hold a meeting asking men not to fight and asking for signatures, which is often done at these meetings? It would be a meeting for the general public but obviously at Aldershot some soldiers would be there. Is it the view that that would be ordinary political pacifist propaganda and would be no offence under this Bill?
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: I have said that I very much demur to answering these hypothetical questions because you do not get the full facts and the full facts make all the difference. A mere speech saying that you were against war and did not think people ought to fight would be perfectly harmless, but a speech intended to persuade soldiers to infuse to obey orders would be now as well as under this Bill a very grave offence.
LORD STRABOLGI: I would like to ask the noble Viscount to be a little more explicit about the position of newspapers, I notice in the House the noble Lord, Lord Iliffe, who I think con-
354
trols the largest group of newspapers in this country and who both as a member in another place and here has been quite rightly very jealous of the liberty of the Press. May I ask the noble Viscount to envisage a Labour Government in office and the Morning Post inciting against that Government a movement of resistance. Suppose there was a kind of stay-in strike in the City of London, which we are told might happen, and that we were getting near a state of emergency. The Morning Post, as it would be entitled to do—and I would fight for it having the right to do so—would criticise the Cabinet and call them dishonest, dishonourable, unpatriotic men, as it has often done before.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: As it does now.
LORD STRABOLGI: The Morning Post does now! I must start reading it again. I did not know it was so impartial. The Morning Post circulates largely in officers' messes ashore and afloat, in the Army and the Navy. You might get Mr. Gwynne publishing some of those violently clever leaders and some inspector might go before a Judge and swear that he believed the Morning Post editor to be a person who, in the words of Clause 1 of this Bill, "maliciously and advisedly" was endeavouring "to seduce" members of His Majesty's forces from their duty—I will not say from their allegiance to His Majesty, because the Morning Post would never do that. I believe a case could be made out under Clause 1 of this Bill. I am not a lawyer—not even the hair-splitting lawyer referred to by the Secretary of State for War on Second Reading—but I believe even I could make out a case against the Morning Post under Clause 1 of this Bill. I believe the Secretary of State for War could make out a much stronger case against the Daily Herald on account of recent issues.
Do noble Lords remember—it is only a few years ago—the proposed intervention against Russia? Do noble Lords remember what happened at the London Docks, that a number of dockers refused to load a munition ship called the "Jolly George"? I am sure the Secretary of State for War remembers it. It was a very good example of strike action against war and a very successful example. Those few dockers were the

355
spearhead of a great mass of public opinion at the time. The Government of the day were wise enough to recognise that if they had gone to war at that time they would have split the nation in twain, and they were afraid—and quite rightly, too. At that time the Daily Herald was a weekly Herald, and it was edited by the Leader of the Opposition in another place, the Right Honourable George Lansbury; and they were at that time inciting everyone and anyone, in uniform and out of uniform, to have nothing at all to do with that threatened war against Russia in defence of Poland. Of course they were perfectly right, but as this Bill is now drawn, I certainly believe that the Minister for War could make a case against them, if he were once more to put on his full-bottomed wig and his robes and went to Court as a prosecutor. I would not much like to be the defender against him, with those powers which he has in this Bill. We want to safeguard that position, and we want to safeguard the right of people to print and publish what they like, as long as it does not offend against public morals or decency, to the civilian population. By Jove ! if we have to fight again for liberty of speech in this country, for the liberty of
Resolved in the negative and the Amendment disagreed to accordingly.
the printing press and liberty of thought and expression, we will go into the fight with the greatest pleasure against all the embattled forces opposite.
LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEY: I will anticipate the probable reply of the noble Viscount opposite by saying that I am a fool, but it does seem to me that every time a hypothetical case under this Bill (because there is no other) is suggested to His Majesty's Government, the reply always is that there is no new offence created under this Bill, and indeed no new penalty. If that be the case—and the noble Viscount has repeatedly told us that it is the case—I would like to know, without being told that I am a fool, just what is the object of passing this Bill?
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: The noble Lord had better ask that on Third Reading.
LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEY: Then I assure the noble Viscount that I will ask it.
On Question, Whether the said new clause shall be there inserted?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 9; Not-Contents, 50.

CONTENTS.

Arnold, L.

Hay, L. (E. Kinnoull.) [Teller.]

Snell, L.

Faringdon, L.

Stanley of Alderley, L. (L. Sheffield.)

Hare, L. (E. Listowel.)

Marley, L. [Teller.]

Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L.

Strabolgi, L.

NOT-CONTENTS.

Aberdeen and Temair, M.

Aberdare, L.

Harris, L.

Exeter, M.

Abinger, L.

Hutchison of Montrose, L.

Alvingham, L.

Iliffe, L.

Airlie, E.

Annaly, L.

Kinnaird, L.

Feversham, E.

Balfour of Burleigh, L.

Lamington L.

Iddesleigh, E.

Bingley, L.

Lloyd, L.

Lucan, E. [Teller.]

Brougham and Vaux, L.

Middleton, L.

Malmesbury, E.

Carnock, L.

Rankeillour, L.

Midleton, E.

Clanwilliam, L. (E. Clanwilliam)

Redesdale, L.

Mount Edgcumbe, E.

Remnant, L.

Munster, E.

Conway of Allington, L.

Rennell, L.

Plymouth, E.

Daryngton, L.

Sandhurst, L.

Radnor, E.

Ebbisham, L.

Southampton, L.

Rothes, E.

Elton, L.

Stonehaven, L.

Vane, E. (M. Londonderry.)

Fairfax of Cameron, L.

Strathcona and Mount Royal, L.

Foxford, L. (E. Limerick.)

Elibank, V.

Gage, L. (V. Gage.) [Teller.]

Strickland, L.

Hailsham, V.

Hampton, L.

Templemore, L.

LORD SNELL LORD SNELL moved, after Clause 2, to insert the following new clause:
Direction for search.
". Before making a search under this Act, the person about to make it shall call upon two or more respectable inhabitants of the locality in which the place to be searched is situate to attend and witness the search.
The search shall be made in their presence and a list of all things seized in the coarse of such search and of the places in which they are respectively found shall be prepared by the person making the search and signed by such witnesses, but no such witness shall be required to attend the court as a witness of the search unless summoned by it."
The noble Lord said: I am afraid it has become farcical to ask the Government to consider these proposed Amendments and new clauses on their merits. Nevertheless I commend to the attention of the noble Viscount the clause which is set out on the Paper. It seems to us to be entirely reasonable, and if it were passed it would relieve a certain alarm and anxiety as to the method in which search should take place. The Bill empowers a Judge of the High Court, if he is satisfied there is reasonable ground for suspecting that a man possesses material associated with some offence under this Bill, to grant, on the application of a police officer of a stated rank, a warrant to search the person's house and premises, and so on, if the police officer has reasonable ground for expecting to find evidence of the commission of an offence. That raises once again the great trouble we have had throughout this debate, and I do not propose to continue the argument at any length.
I sympathise with the fatigue of your Lordships, a fatigue which I share to the full, and I do not want merely to repeat, but in moving this we bring no sort of question as to the impartiality of the Judge. He acts on information supplied to him by a police officer, and so it is really a question of an officer of a given rank being concerned. The evidence submitted may be nothing more than a reasonable suspicion on the part of the officer. We have raised before to-night the possibility of such evidence being provided in advance of such a visit—I think the word "plant" is that which is used. I think it is not likely, but it is not impossible that such a thing should take place, and therefore we want to take every kind of precaution against it.
There is also the point that Police inspectors are, of course, responsible per-
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sons and would act always within what they thought was the law and their duty. There is no question about that in mind, but at the same time Police officers are not distinguished for political wisdom, or for balance on nice philosophical points, and sometimes not for toleration. They are apt to be respecters of persons, and would be deeply influenced by the source from which a complaint came to them. That an energetic member of a Watch Committee had a suspicion against a political opponent, and procured a Police officer to make a search—that would, in my judgment weigh heavily on the mind of the officer concerned. I have had long and very friendly relationships with the Police, and I believe in their competence and their probity, but I am not always satisfied that they have always an impartial political mind. And that is true of any other officer, true indeed of all of us in this House: there is a, limit to the impartiality that we can achieve.
Therefore we desire that whenever such a search is made there shall be these two or more respectable inhabitants of the locality to be witnesses of any search that is made. This would serve the double purpose of protecting the Police themselves against accusations of partiality or anything of that kind, and it would be a security to the people who are being searched and would relieve the mind of the community of a certain hesitation that it must always have in the case of a public officer going into a man's private house, overhauling his papers, taking what he wants, and then making an accusation before the High Court and so on. In spite of the lack of success we have had in the previous part of the debate, we hope that the noble Viscount may see fit to meet us favourably on the point which I have put before you.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 2 insert the said new clause.—(Lord Snell.)
LORD MARLEY: I desire to reinforce the plea of my noble friend with regard to this new clause, because I think it is very much in the interests of the Police themselves that this fear and suspicion among the inhabitants with regard to this so-called general search should be mitigated at least by the presence of two or more respectable inhabitants. I do not altogether like it, because I think the

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whole business of this search for unspecified and unnamed documents is so utterly and completely objectionable and foreign to all ideas of British justice and decency that my objection is fundamental to the whole position in this Bill; but if you are going to have a beastly, unpleasant, and unjust system to apply to people whom you dislike, which the Bill does, then perhaps you can mitigate to some small extent the unpleasantness and beastliness of it by some such plan as is involved in this addition. I am not sure that it is very much better, because I do not know that we should like, any of us, our neighbours, however respectable, to take part in a search of our private papers, let alone a search of the members of our household. But on the whole I think it is an improvement, and I hope very much in this case that the Government will be able to give us some satisfaction.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: The noble Lord, Lord Snell, began by saying he had almost given up hope of the Government giving careful consideration to his Amendments, but I would remind him with regard to this Amendment, at any rate, that not only has it been carefully considered by the Government, but it was also very fully discussed in another place. Arguments were put both by those who share the views of the noble Lord and by the Attorney-General and the Solicitor-General, both of whom spoke on this clause, giving reasons why it could not be accepted, and the view of the Government was endorsed by a very large majority in another place. May I very shortly give what I think are the answers to it? First of all, if the ground of the suggestion is that you cannot trust the Police, I would like to say at once that we do not think there is any ground for any suspicion against the Police. But if it were true, contrary to what I believe, that the Police could not be trusted, that they were going to plant something upon some unfortunate and innocent man—
LORD SNELL: I hope I did not convey the suggestion that the Police themselves would provide that evidence. I assumed a case where someone had planted material prior to the visit of the Police.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: That relieves me of what I was going to say on that point. We are dealing, then, on the assumption that there is no ground for
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suspicion against the Police that they are going to do anything improper. On that hypothesis, when the Police go to look for the evidence which is to be found on the premises, they will find what has been planted there. They will find there just as much whether they go with two respectable inhabitants or without them. I do not think the presence of two respectable inhabitants will do anything to prevent the Police drawing just the same inferences as they would if two respectable inhabitants were not there. It does not seem to offer a safeguard against that risk if it exists, which I do not think it does. There is no means in the Bill to compel two respectable inhabitants to go. There is no means of choosing them, of making them sign or of reconciling any differences between them as to what is really found, and I should have thought you would have extreme difficulty in asking two respectable inhabitants to spend their time in going through their neighbour's private papers.
Finally, when one hears that this provision will mitigate the beastliness—I think that was the word—of search by the Police, I suppose all these things are a matter of taste. Personally, if I were going to have my private papers searched, I should much prefer that they were searched by the Police alone and not to have my neighbours come in to look at everything as well. There is this additional force in that observation, that the Police at any rate would be quite sure not to make any improper use of the information because they are under discipline and can be dealt with by the authorities if they do anything outside their duty, whereas there is nothing to prevent two respectable inhabitants telling everyone in London what they have found out. I do not think it is mitigating the beastliness of having your private papers looked through to say that not only are the Police to do it, who are responsible and confidential people, but also that two respectable inhabitants whom the Police can persuade to do it should have the fun of going through papers and doing what they like with the information they obtain.
LORD SNELL: I am not satisfied with the reply and I did not expect I should be. I am afraid I shall have to ask the House to divide.
On Question, Whether the proposed new clause shall be there inserted?
Resolved in the negative and Amendment disagreed to accordingly.
Clause 3:
Provisions as to punishment of offences.
3.—(1) A person guilty of an offence under this Act shall be liable, on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or to a fine not exceeding two hundred pounds, or on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding four months or to a fine not exceeding twenty pounds, or (whether on conviction on indictment or on summary conviction) to both such imprisonment and fine.
(2) No prosecution in England under this Act shall take place without the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.
(3) Where a prosecution under this Act is being carried on by the Director of Public Prosecutions a court of summary jurisdiction shall not deal with the case summarily without the consent of the Director.
(4) Where any person is convicted of an offence under this Act the Court dealing with the case may order any documents connected with the offence to be destroyed or dealt with in such other manner as may be specified in the order, but no documents shall be destroyed before the expiration of the period within which an appeal may be lodged, and if an appeal is lodged no document shall be destroyed until after the appeal has been heard and decided.
THE EARL OF KINNOULL THE EARL OF KINNOULL moved, in subsection (1), to leave out "two years" and insert "six months." The noble
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 9; Not-Contents, 51.

CONTENTS.

Arnold, L.

Hay L. (E. Kinnoull.) [Teller.]

Snell, L.

Faringdon, L.

Stanley of Alderley, L. (L. Sheffield.)

Hare, L. (E. Listowel.)

Marley, L. [Teller.]

Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L.

Strabolgi, L.

NOT-CONTENTS.

Aberdeen and Temair, M.

Hailsham, V.

Hampton, L.

Exeter, M.

Harris, L.

Aberdare, L.

Hutchison of Montrose, L.

Airlie, E.

Abinger, L.

Iliffe, L.

Feversham, E.

Alvingham, L.

Kinnaird, L.

Iddesleigh, E.

Annaly, L.

Lamington, L.

Lucan, E. [Teller.]

Balfour of Burleigh, L.

Lloyd, L.

Malmesbury, E.

Bingley, L.

Middleton, L.

Midleton, E.

Brougham and Vaux, L.

Rankeillour, L.

Mount Edgcumbe, E.

Carnock, L.

Redesdale, L.

Munster, E.

Clanwilliam, L. (E. Clanwilliam

Remnant, L.

Onslow, E.

Rennell, L.

Plymouth, E.

Conway of Allington, L.

Sandhurst, L.

Radnor, E.

Daryngton, L.

Southampton, L.

Rothes, E.

Ebbisham, L.

Stonehaven, L.

Vane, E. (M. Londonderry.)

Elton, L.

Strathcona and Mount Royal, L.

Fairfax of Cameron, L.

Elibank, V.

Foxford, L. (E. Limerick.)

Strickland, L.

Gage, L. (V. Gage.) [Teller.]

Templemore, L.

Earl said: I move this Amendment on behalf of my noble friend Lord Sanderson, who put it on the Paper. We think a penalty of two years is really too much. If we were satisfied that under the Bill the real culprits were going to be caught, we would not so much object to this penalty, but as this Bill is drafted it seems to me, and I think to my noble friends, that it is very probable that the person who is not primarily responsible is going to get it in the neck. Therefore I think the penalty is too high.
Amendment moved—
Page 3, line 5, leave out ("two years") and insert ("six months").—(The Earl of Kinnoull.)
LORD MARLEY: I want to support my noble friend in this because I am very frightened of this prison business. Two years is a long time. I do not know what we would do without our Leader if Lord Ponsonby went to prison. For six months we might manage—especially if there was the Recess—but two years is a terrible time. After all, we are not used to prison. Very few of your Lordships have been in prison. I think one of our supporters has been in prison, and one or two on the other side. I think we beat the House of Commons in the number of

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members of your Lordships' House who have actually been in prison. But my point is that prison is rather harder to those who are not normally used to a hard life than it is to other people, and I feel that two years is rather too long. I very much hope that this very severe penalty—and I speak feelingly in anticipation—may be lowered to six months.
LORD STRABOLGI: I think the Secretary of State for War can accept this Amendment quite safely, because after all he only wants to get the tall poppies cut down for only a few weeks. Six months would be quite long enough to keep them out of the way.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: I think noble Lords opposite are under a misapprehension. The Bill does not say that everybody who is convicted under the Bill shall go to prison for two years. Two years is the maximum sentence. As a matter of fact under the existing law the maximum sentence is penal servitude for life, and this Bill, instead of giving penal servitude for life, provides that in a prosecution under this Bill the maximum that can be inflicted is two years. So that your Lordships really will be very fortunate, and those who are so anxious to be martyrs will have a more modified crown than that to which they might originally have aspired. I quite agree that there will be some offences under this Bill for which two years would be grossly excessive, but those convicted of those offences will not get two years; they will probably be let off with a small fine, or they may even be bound over, or otherwise treated lightly. It is in the discretion of the Judge, and two years is the maximum that can be given. If your Lordships think what is the gravest form of offence here, an offence in which there may be a deliberate attempt to induce soldiers to mutiny, to shoot down their officers and to desert to the enemy, to suggest that two years punishment is too much for that, whereas the man who listens to the inducement may be sentenced to death, seems to me rather an extravagant proposition.
THE EARL OF KINNOULL: I understand from the noble Viscount that as the law is at present, a person may be sentenced to penal servitude for life for this offence, and that if this Bill is passed in
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its present form that person can be sentenced only to two years?
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: If he is prosecuted under this Bill.
THE EARL OF KINNOULL: Is it not probable that the magistrate, in view of the existing law, would sentence an offender under this Bill to the maximum of two years?
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: The magistrate has no such power. It is only on indictment that a person can be sentenced to two years imprisonment.
THE EARL OF KINNOULL: Very well, a Judge.
LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEY: I would ask the noble Viscount whether offences under this Bill are exactly the same as under the Mutiny Act of 1797 and Acts following upon it, under which penal servitude for life is the maximum penalty? Are we to understand that that penalty is by this Bill rescinded, and that the maximum penalty will be two years and the equivalent fine?
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: You can prosecute under either Act. If you prosecute under this measure, the maximum that can be inflicted is two years, but the maximum offence under this measure might be one which deserves at least that amount.
LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEY: The noble Viscount has given us to understand that this Bill is to replace the other Act.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: No; if the noble Lord had been here, he would have heard me say just the opposite several times.
LORD FARINGDON: I have to thank the noble Viscount; he has been so kind to us all. He has reduced the amount of punishment to which we are liable. A great many noble Lords on the other side have said kind things about the Quakers. The Quakers believe that in no circumstances is one entitled to kill another man. I equally believe that to kill another man is always murder, no matter what the circumstances, and if one believes that one must inevitably try to persuade other people not to commit murder. Therefore it seems to me, and I beg your Lordships' pardon for wast-

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ing your time so late at night, those of us who believe that killing is murder must inevitably try to persuade people who are liable to commit murder, namely, the members of His Majesty's forces, not to commit murder. To do that appears to be under this Bill an offence. I ask your Lordships' pardon while I draw your attention to the Met that to me and I believe to the Leader of my Party in this House this Bill is fatal. We must inevitably go to prison. Your Lordships are very kind to us really, because under the old Act we should have had to go to prison for life.
LORD CARNOCK: Is not the noble Lord wasting our time, as nothing he has said is relevant to this Bill.
LORD FARINGDON: I do not know at all whether what I have said is relevant. I am just making an appeal, based simply on my feelings and not necessarily from facts or figures. I am simply making an appeal for people who believe in peace at any price and who, under this Bill, may be sent to prison. I do not say that the present Government are going to send us to prison—they are far too nice—but another Government which is less kind might easily do so.
On Question, Amendment negatived.
LORD SNELL LORD SNELL moved, in subsection (1), to substitute "fifty pounds" for "two hundred pounds." The noble Lord said: I will not keep your Lordships very long on this Amendment, because the principle has been argued on the previous Amendment and I am rather afraid to speak about it at all, for I understand that any comment on or criticism of this Bill is a waste of your Lordships' time. On the point raised I should like to say that in a less exalted place when a man makes a maiden speech he usually is not interrupted. In this matter our fear is about this £200, that the maximum might be imposed. There is no danger at all of the Morning Pose or organs of that kind being prosecuted. Our anxiety is for the poor little printer who, anxious to get a job, makes a contract to print a thing. He has probably not read it diligently, he may not be fully aware of the significance of the things he prints, but he may nevertheless be got at in this way, and it seems to us that to punish a little man of that kind with a fine of £200 would really cripple him. The Gov-
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ernment would get all that they require by a much reduced fine. We suggest that £50 would give them all that they desire, and we are bold enough even now to ask them to accept the Amendment.
Amendment moved—
Page 3, line 13, leave out ("two hundred") and insert ("fifty").—(Lord Snell.)
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: I am afraid my answer must be like that which I gave last time, that this is a maximum penalty. It is quite true that there will be cases, no doubt, in which £200 will be too much. It is only the Judge on indictment who will inflict this penalty—if the case is tried summarily it is only £20. The Judge in the case mentioned by the noble Lord would give a penalty less than £200, and if perchance the Judge went wrong there would be, as of right, an appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal, which reviews all questions when there is any ground for it. So that I do not think that the noble Lord's anxiety is really very substantial.
On Question, Amendment negatived.
LORD STRABOLGI LORD STRABOLGI moved, in subsection (2), before "consent," to insert "written." The noble Lord said: Your Lordships will notice that the subsection reads:
"No prosecution in England under this Act shall take place without the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions."
I want the word "written" put in as an additional safeguard.
Amendment moved—
Page 3, line 12, after first ("the") insert ("written").—(Lord Strabolgi.)
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: This is not a, very important Amendment, but I can assure the noble Lord that it really is not necessary. I think invariably the consent is given, but in every case, if this clause stands, the consent will have to be proved in Court before the prosecution can succeed. That normally will be proved by producing a written document, but if for any exceptional reason the Public Prosecutor temporarily could not write, or if there were any special difficulty about producing the writing, or the writing had been destroyed, you would then prove it by calling somebody, either the Public Prosecutor himself or somebody who could prove that the Public Prosecutor had given his consent. The form we have taken here

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is the form in which it normally stands when these stipulations appear. It has worked perfectly smoothly in practice.
LORD STRABOLGI: The Public Prosecutor might give his consent by telephone. How do you prove that then in Court?
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: You would have to call the Public Prosecutor.
LORD STRABOLGI: That is far more trouble, and I think that the noble Viscount might accept the Amendment.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: I cannot accept it. This is a very common clause.
On Question, Amendment negatived.
LORD STRABOLGI LORD STRABOLGI moved, in subsection (2), to leave out "Director of Public Prosecutions" and insert "Attorney-General." The noble Lord said: The reason for this Amendment is very clear. In the event of any miscarriage of justice, any case in which wrong consent has been given, the Attorney-General can be questioned in another place. That is very salutary indeed. Your Lordships will remember that the reason for the downfall of the Government of 1924, the first Government of the present Prime Minister, was that a case arose which came to be known as the Campbell Case. I am not going into the details of it, because your Lordships will be aware of it. Several noble Lords, both on that side of the House and on this side, were members of that Parliament in another place, and the circumstances will be present in their minds. There were certain curious features about the case. I myself believe still that for very good reasons the Government of the day decided not to continue with the prosecution of a legless ex-Serviceman.
It was only a few years after the War and public sympathy was all with the disabled ex-Serviceman at that time, as it ought to be. For good reason it was decided that the case would not lie or that it was not in the public interest to go on with it, and Sir Patrick Hastings, the then Attorney-General, withdrew the case in a perfectly straightforward manner. But for the metaphysics and philosophisings and vagueness and prevarication of the then Prime Minister, who made a complete mess of things in the House of Commons, the matter would, I think, have gone through all right and
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there need have been no General Election in that year. I think that my noble friend below me, who was a member of that Government, will agree with me when I say that. But the Conservatives and the Liberal Party thought there was something amiss, and they were able to thrash the whole matter out on the floor of the House of Commons. Responsibility was held to rest with the Attorney-General. The Director of Public Prosecutions was Sir Archibald Bodkin, and he, too, was criticised, not openly perhaps, although there were some strictures on him publicly for his conduct of affairs. He was not supposed to have been altogether loyal to his chief. I do not know the facts, but I do know the joke that went round the smokeroom in another place and that was that "the Government has been punctured by a small Bodkin."
However that may be, we had a debate that was perhaps necessary, and certainly useful, and although, for the reasons I have given, it led to the regrettable end of the then Government, which I supported generally although I was not at that time a member of the Labour Party, it was a good thing that the matter could be thrashed out on the floor of the House. That is the reason that has induced me to put down this Amendment. I would rather have a political personage like the Attorney-General dealing with these questions than the Director of Public Prosecutions. The noble Viscount has been Attorney-General, and I am sure he will accept the compliment that this Amendment pays to that office.
Amendment moved—
Page 3, line 12, leave out ("Director of Public Prosecutions") and insert ("Attorney-General").—(Lord Strabolgi.)
LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE: There is some substance in this Amendment, though I do not believe for a moment that it will be accepted. I think it is necessary to link the procedure in this Bill to public discussion in Parliament. I think that some degree of public and Parliamentary interference with the working of this Bill would be very healthy, though I am afraid there is no hope of the Government accepting the proposal.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: This is a rather ungenerous Motion. I would remind noble Lords that the reason why this

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clause is in at all is because of a Motion moved from their Benches in another place and accepted by the Government as a concession to them after a full discussion. If we had added the Attorney-General instead of the Director of Public Prosecutions, I am sure we should have had a Motion by the noble Lord to substitute the Director of Public Prosecutions for the Attorney-General, and he would have made a very powerful speech showing how iniquitous it was to place this responsibility in the hands of the Attorney-General, subject as he was to political prejudice through being in close touch with the Cabinet and all that sort of thing. There would have been criticism that he should be allowed to have any say in a matter which, after all, might be regarded as trenching too much on political matters. As it happens, the House below chose the Director, and then we get an Amendment put forward and we are told the Attorney-General is a more suitable person. Personally I think either of them would do very well. I see no reason to disturb the decision of the House of Commons.
LORD STRABOLGI: I am glad the Minister for War is in such jocular mood and in such good humour. He has had a very great strain and I wish he had had some assistance to help him in this matter. But I am glad he has maintained his balance, as shown by his reply. There was no controversy in the other place. There was not a choice between the Attorney-General and the Director of Public Prosecutions. This subsection was put in as a safeguard in response to pressure in another place from those who were disturbed about the whole Bill. It is only because in this House we have a greater sense of the fitness of things that we have chosen the Attorney-General. If they had thought of it in another place they no doubt would have done so. We think there is a great deal of substance in this. After all, it does not matter who proposes Amendments in another place that affect the Bill, if we can still further improve it it is the duty of this House as a revising Chamber to do so. I hope, therefore, your Lordships will support us. I am afraid we shall have to divide the House.
On Question, Amendment negatived.
Clause 3, agreed to.
THE EARL OF KINNOULL THE EARL OF KINNOULL moved to insert the following new clause after Clause 3:
Act not to apply to a Parliamentary candidate.
". No search warrant shall be granted or any prosecution instituted under this Act against any candidate for Parliamentary election or against his agent or against any person or persons under his instructions for anything said, done, written or published in pursuance of his candidature after the issue of writs for the summoning of a new Parliament or after motion made for the issue of the Speaker's warrant for the issue of a writ to fill a vacancy until such time as the return to such writ or writs has been duly made."
The noble Earl said: This is the last Amendment but I think it is not the least. The first point I want to make is that soldiers, sailors and airmen during a General Election, or a by-election in their constituencies, are in the same position as civilians. They all have the right to vote. As voters they should have the right to receive the literature of every candidate and should be entitled to read it quite freely without any question of prosecution of the candidates or their agents. It might happen that one of your Lordships went down to a naval centre to support a candidate, let us say an admiral. There is no reason why a soldier or sailor should not be able to read the speech of the noble Lord if he spoke against the Government of the day.
In foreign countries where the Fascist element has gained the upper hand other points of view cannot be expressed. Herr von Papen had his desk broken open because he dared to make a speech in favour of liberty in Germany. That is the sort of thing that might happen if we had a Government of the Fascist or Communist type. I do not say this National Government would do that. Although I have denounced them on many occasions I do not think they would go as far as that. Herr Wilkes also had his desk broken open and his papers stolen. I say stolen, but I suppose they were taken by the political police. Therefore this is a very necessary provision. I hope the noble Viscount will accept the Amendment, or, if he cannot do that now, will consider it with a view to accepting some Amendment on the next stage.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 3 insert the, said new clause.—(The Earl of Kinnoull.)
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: This is a matter which had careful consideration at the hands of the Government in another place. It was fully debated on the Report stage in the House of Commons and the House rejected the proposal by a majority of between four and five to one. What was said in the other place left the Government in no doubt that it was right in rejecting this clause, and after listening to what was said by the noble Earl I am bound to say that he has not been more successful than his friends and colleagues in the House of Commons. The effect of the clause would be to provide that if a Parliamentary Election were in progress or in contemplation a candidate and anybody acting for him—I suppose they would be indefinite in number—would be allowed to commit this crime of seducing soldiers and sailors from their allegiance with impunity for the period of the election.
Why should they? You are perfectly entitled now and at any time to express your political opinions. You are perfectly entitled, under this Bill, at any time to try to persuade other people to share your opinions. What you are not entitled to do under this Bill is to attempt to get soldiers and sailors to refuse to obey their lawful orders, and I do not see in the least why the fact that you are a Parliamentary candidate should give you any wider licence in that respect.
On Question, Amendment negatived.
Clause 4:
Short title and application to Scotland and Northern Ireland.
4.—(1) This Act may be cited as the incitement to Disaffection Act, 1934.
(2) This Act shall apply to Scotland subject to the following modifications:

(a) subsection (2) of Section two shall have effect as if for references to a Judge of the High Court there were substituted references to the Sheriff, and any application for a search warrant under the said subsection shall be made by the procurator fiscal instead of such officer as is therein mentioned;

(b) subsection (4) of Section two shall not apply provided that anything seized under that section may be retained for a period not exceeding one month, or if within that period proceedings are commenced for an offence under this Act until the conclusion of those proceedings, and subject as aforesaid and to the provisions of any enactment, including this Act, conferring powers on Courts dealing with offences, any property which has come
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into the possession of the Police under this section shall be returned to the owner, or, if the owner cannot be ascertained, shall be disposed of in such manner as the Sheriff, in a summary application made to him, may direct;

(c) the powers conferred by this Act on the Sheriff shall not be exercisable by an honorary sheriff substitute.

(3) It is hereby declared that this Act extends to Northern Ireland, and in the application thereof to Northern Ireland the provisions of this Act requiring the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions to the summary trial of cases shall have effect as if references to the Attorney-General for Northern Ireland were therein substituted for references to the Director of Public Prosecutions.
LORD STRABOLGI: May I ask a question on Clause 4? It is a long clause, but we do not want to debate it at length and do not want to detain your Lordships' House; but may I ask why, in subsection (3), it provides that the Attorney-General for Northern Ireland is to give his consent? Is there no Director of Public Prosecutions in Northern Ireland?
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: I believe the answer is that there is no Director of Public Prosecutions in Northern Ireland. I am afraid I shall have to ask for notice of that question so that I may answer it on Third Reading, but I think that is the answer.
LORD STRABOLGI: I only asked in view of the noble Viscount's remarks on my former Amendment, that is all. With reference to the rest of Clause 4, this contains the title, "Incitement to Disaffection Act." I had a number of remarks to make on this clause, but I do not propose to offer them to your Lordships, as the night is getting rather late. I would make only one remark, if I may, to the noble Viscount and to the noble Marquess who sits beside him, who is also responsible for the contentment and good discipline of another of the great fighting forces. In a very delightful play which deals with matters of sedition and incitement, and which appeared on the London stage recently, a play called Richard of Bordeaux, the King in the period of his great power was asked on what he relied, or words to that effect. He said: "On five thousand archers paid every Friday." The real defence against the terrible things feared from the Communists and

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others of which this Bill is the result is a contented, happy and satisfied body of men, wearing the King's uniform. That is our case on this side of the House, and that is why we have objected to this Bill—not nearly as vehemently nor at such length as we could have done, but with the very least objection that we thought was commensurate with our duty as the Opposition in this House of Lords.
On Question, Clause 4 agreed to.
Bill reported without amendment.
LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE: My Lords, before the adjournment is moved I should like, on behalf of my noble friends behind me, to thank the Lord Chainman for the way in which he has performed the arduous duties which have fallen upon him. I think that the regulations of this House have prevented him leaving the Chair during the ten or eleven hours that the House has been sitting. May I also say that I think the noble Viscount the Leader of the House has had a very heavy task to discharge in conducting this Bill alone, and the whole proceedings have been conducted with the greatest possible good humour. I can assure your Lordships that we felt it our bounden duty to make what fight we
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could with our small numbers, and, although we have been obliged to keep your Lordships late, we did it for a public purpose. We thought we were really serving the Party to which we belong to the best of our ability.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: I am sure everybody would like to endorse what the noble Lord has said about the Lord Chairman, who has had a very arduous evening and morning. I only hope it will be a very long time before he has to spend so many hours again in the Chair. In the friendly atmosphere which prevails, may I ask the noble Lord, if it is not inconvenient, whether he anticipates that one day will be sufficient for the Third Reading? I understand he agrees, and in that case I propose that we should sit, not on Monday but Tuesday next. I would add that I understand what the noble Lord has said and naturally I accept his assurance that there was no intention of unnecessary obstruction. I congratulate the House upon having endured this somewhat lengthy sitting with so much patience and apparently so much good will.
House adjourned at twelve minutes past four o'clock on Friday morning.