Lords Sitting of 1 November 1934

Preamble
The House met at a quarter past four of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
The Lord Faringdon—Sat first in iParliament after the death of his grandfather.

CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS.
LORD STRICKLAND LORD STRICKLAND had given Notice that he would draw the attention of His Majesty's Government to sonic lessons applicable to India from the failure of the provision of designedly most ample safeguards in the Constitution of Malta, and to the resulting state of illegality, stagnation and reaction consequent on the non-application of safeguards in good time, and constitutionally; and move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, in submitting the Motion that stands on the Notice Paper, I hope that before entering into the question of the failure of safeguards I may be allowed to offer sincere congratulations to His Majesty's Ministers for having by the Letters Patent of August of this year enacted that henceforth Maltese is to be the principal language for the administration of justice in the Courts of Law of Malta. In the same Letters Patent English has been uplifted more closely to the position which it should occupy as the language of the Empire both in the administration of justice and also in education as regards the University and the elementary schools. Very anomalously in the secondary schools Italian is still compulsory it is a language which is barely understood by 10 per cent. of the population.
When it is remembered that education is free and attendance is compulsory and that in certain University courses Italian has been eliminated, it is passing strange that His Majesty's Government can allow so much waste of time, apparently, as suggested in the Press, because someone is seeking popularity with foreign authorities who claim, and who are wrongly allowed, to interfere improperly in the internal affairs of Malta. The great reforms in the administration of justice
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for which loyal Maltese have been clamouring from generation to generation have none the less been achieved after the; suspension of responsible government, and also after the suspension of the elected representation enacted in the Constitution by clauses that cannot be revoked except by an Act of Parliament.
May I remind your Lordships' House that Malta is not the only European country where responsible Government has been replaced by one-man rule? We only have to look across the Rhine and the Vistula and South of the Alps. It therefore calls for great caution before embarking in experiments with regard to constitutional methods that have failed in Europe and have not been found workable even in countries inhabited by Nordic races. In this country, with the proud title of the Mother of Parliament, Ministers of the Crown have recently been appealing to patriotic Englishmen of all parties to combine in protecting Parliamentary institutions against the machinations of what are called Fascists. Fascism is a euphemistic designation of methods of Government by the dagger and the gun in place of government by free discussion, by the pen, and by the Press. The purport of my argument is, that experience has shown that there is no middle course between representative government without Ministerial responsibility and a Constitution that grants full Dominion status. Wherever an attempt has been made to adopt a middle course, that is, to set up a dyarchical Constitution depending upon safeguards, the attempt has been immediately followed by increasing the demand for complete Dominion status and by utilising all the points of vantage to push that claim with the greatest rapidity and with very little restraint.
No thanks can be expected in any quarter for the grant of a method of government based on safeguards, and no expectations are likely to be fulfilled that such concessions will abate the difficulties that they are expected to meet. I ask your Lordships' House to adopt the view that the failure of Parliamentary institutions in countries that are Christian, and inhabited by Nordic races, and where constitutions have developed, slowly, should make this Imperial Parliament hesitate before extending further experiments, in popular government by

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safeguards, East of Suez and nearer to the equator. In no country could experiments to test the practicability of dyarchical government have been attempted with greater safety than in Malta, where representative institutions were introduced seven centuries ago by a Norman Sovereign of Sicily on a basis similar to the Constitution now working efficiently in the Norman Islands of Jersey and Guernsey.
In Malta there was a step in advance towards representative government about a hundred years ago—in 1847—when Letters Patent were enacted to establish a Council of Government for Malta, wherein a civilian Governor selected from the House of Commons was to preside as Speaker and hear the views of all parties, freely expressed under the privilege of Parliament, and where redress for grievances could be asked for and where a Governor responsible for the administration was in a position to arrive at important decisions on straightforward information publicly tendered, instead of having to rely on secret communications of legal advisers, A.D.C's and private secretaries or the gossip around the card table.
The Constitution of 1847 was inadequate, and the claim that Malta should be governed by a military officer, in the interests of the exercise of patronage and not in the interests of the Maltese, was a regrettable setback in the development of representative government. By the grant of the Constitution of 1887, on a Motion in this House by the grandfather of the present Earl De La Warr, now one of His Majesty's Ministers, a great step in advance was made in the development of representative institutions. The Constitution of 1887 went as far as was practicable whilst leaving executive responsibility in the hands of the King's Representative in all matters, including the making of appointments. An important safeguard in that Constitution was the power reserved to legislate by Order in Council. That valuable safeguard failed for want of willingness to make sufficient use thereof by the permanent staff of the Colonial Office.
The Constitution of 1887 was withdrawn legally, because the Letters Patent reserved the power to do so. Stagnation, favouritism and corruption under Crown Colony Government soon reached
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such a stage that something had to be done, especially after a financial scandal known as the "Strada Santa Croce ease." Quasi-Dominion status was established by the Constitution of 1921 and it was replete with every safeguard that could be suggested by the Admiralty, the Colonial Office, the War Office and the Air Force; and by supplementary Letters Patent, power was provided in emergencies to administer by Joint Committees, and to legislate by Ordinance after seeking the advice of a nominated Council and, in important matters, after summoning the Privy Council of Malta. The pro-British Leadership of the Opposition in the Parliament of Malta helped in every way to make the Constitution of 1921 a success, and this led to remarkable progress in the first years of self-government; but when the Party hostile to British culture was driven into opposition, it was not led with the object of making the Constitution a success, but with systematic obstruction in order to retard British culture and Maltese nationalism, and to substitute an Italian nationalism.
Eventually a Ministry hostile to progress and unwilling to co-operate with the policy of His Majesty's Government put to the test the applicability of safeguards. It will interest your Lordships to have submitted practical examples of what may have to be done when this necessity arises. How is any obedience to safeguards to be obtained in conflict with Ministers? Safeguards may be likened to a birch rod in a cupboard. When it has to be brought out, it will certainly be futile to expect those for whose correction it is to be applied to administer it to each other. Subordinates would be drastically ruined were they to side with imported officials; and they should not be expected to give weight to Oaths of Allegiance connected with strange religions and a Foreign Power. The word "safeguard" in itself presupposes the expectation of conflict with the Governor on the part of Ministers depending on a Parliamentary majority representing the electors, and speaking for the country notwithstanding that the electors may be only one in four of the population. In charge of the Imperial side of the dyarchy there is the Governor responsible to the English Parliament for Imperial interests, for safeguarding the Prerogative of the King, for protecting the Constitution, and for

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bearing in mind the rights of perhaps three-quarters of the population not having votes. The Governor is also responsible under reserved powers for the general maintenance of law and order and for the rights of temporary residents who are domiciled elsewhere.
It is axiomatic that a Constitutional Governor can only give orders through Ministers, and that subordinate officials are trained only to receive orders from, and through, Ministers; and it is obvious that when conflict arises between two sections of the dyarchy, Ministers cannot be expected to convey to subordinates instructions as to which there is declared disagreement. It is also obvious that a Governor cannot employ his A.D.C.'s and private secretaries to give orders over the heads, and behind the backs, of Ministers in the language of Hannibal in Malta or, East of Suez, in one or more of the 215 languages referred to in the Report of the Simon Commission. The Governor has either to surrender or appeal to a central authority to mobilise the Imperial forces unless he have full control and confidence in an adequate Police. To take away the Police from the authority of elected Ministers was a course legally impossible under the principal Letters Patent of 1921, and therefore two years ago power was taken in an Act of this Imperial Parliament to do so by Letters Patent. The emergency soon arose, and the Police were taken over. Nevertheless, fresh emergencies continued to accumulate and, without waiting for more safeguards in a, fresh Enabling Act, representative government was suspended. This was illegal because the holding of Elections and the continuation of an Executive Council are provided for in the Constitution by clauses that cannot be repealed or altered by Letters Patent. An Act of Indemnity is now necessary.
In another place the Secretary of State for the Colonies, when asked to explain the legal position, did not attempt to justify it; he merely declared that he was "unrepentant" as to what he had done. In order to establish the Maltese and the English languages in their present position, and in view of "rumours of war," a right thing was done in a wrong way, and one-man government has been established in Malta against the law, and by an abuse of executive power instead of being established by an Act of Im-
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perial Parliament. It cannot be denied that there are reasons for which a return to fully-responsible government is not possible for several years. Nevertheless, one-man government is condemned on all sides and the only alternative which loyal Maltese can demand is a very full measure of representative government without re-establishing the Ministerial responsibilty that failed.
There can be no doubt that what has happened in Malta will evolve similarly under any form of dyarchical Constitution East of Suez as soon as necessities arise for operating safeguards. Either with Parliamentary authority or without, the Police may have to be subtracted from the control of elected Ministers. Safeguards are not to be a dead letter, and if foreign money is not to circulate freely to corrupt loyalty and to divert British trade and to influence Elections by fair means or foul, the Imperial side of the dyarchy must have command of the Police. Appeal after appeal will follow to the central authority to support one safeguard after another. There will be reluctance and refusal to mobilise Imperial forces to support too frequently the application of safeguards, and suddenly one-man rule will be set up.
Under dyarchical government, coupled with responsible Ministers, when conflict is imminent between the two sides of the dyarchy, it is open to the King's representative to adopt the view that the electors should be consulted on the question whether the suppression of dyarchy is preferred to a change of Ministry, and for this purpose a Governor can refuse to sign Executive Council minutes or warrants on the Treasury. Ministers who are sincere and are not deeply involved in financial embarrassments are then compelled to resign. If they do not resign, they should be dismissed, and Ministers have then to be sought who are able and willing to assume the responsibility of carrying out a Dissolution notwithstanding that they are temporarily in a minority in the house that can unmake Ministries. This procedure is a rule of the game, and it is the duty of the King's Representative to play the game according to the rules, like a jockey riding a race. Under dyarchical government coupled with responsible Ministers, when a conflict is imminent between two sides of the dyarchy, it is open to those in

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authority to seek or not to seek instructions. That is a crucial point and I think the weightiest reason for condemning all forms of dyarchy.
When there was a conflict between the head of the Government in New South Wales and his Ministers and it was suggested that the head of the Government was acting on instructions from His Majesty's Ministers, in another place it was stated that no instructions had been given and no instructions would be given because, once appointed, a constitutional Governor had to perform his functions as the custodian of the Constitution according to his lights. That was a correct answer. Incorrect answers had previously been given to constitutional Governors in Australia and elsewhere on that point, but that same correct answer cannot be given under dyarchical institutions. On an appeal to the electors the Governor must wait and see, and when the result of the Election is disastrous he must be prepared to go, if a National Government cannot be formed. The Governor, however, should be full of hope, and should trust the good sense of the majority of the electors; because of the safeguards that would be applied if constitutional government were proved impossible. The swing of the electoral pendulum may be relied upon as the most important feature in Parliamentary government. In fact, in Malta just before the Constitution was suspended, the most orderly and enthusiastic public meetings were being held throughout the country condemning the Ministers who were lacking in co-operation with Imperial policy, and carrying by acclamations, votes of thanks to Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister for his language policy.
I ask your Lordships' House to adopt the view that if Dominion status, or quasi-Dominion status is not practicable in a great Imperial fortress, sympathetic consideration should be given to the immediate establishment of the greatest possible measure of representative government without Ministerial responsibility. There should be no difficulty in copying the Constitution of 1887 with the authority of an Act of Parliament and with additional safeguards and with improvements gathered from experience. The franchise has to be extended to give to the workers the rights due to them as principal producers of local wealth
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instead of the franchise restricted to some eight thousand who had to speak Italian under the Constitution of 1887. In a country where there are marked cleave-ages of race and religion, there must be proportional representation, not only in the Council of Government but also in the Executive Council; and the Governor should be more clearly bound than in 1887 to preside personally at meetings of the Council of Government and the Executive Council, and the King's Representative should be called upon by the Royal Instructions to be careful in exercising patronage so as to promote loyalty.
If on every opportunity in regard to patronage such Instructions were followed, there would be little, if any, further trouble in working representative government either in Malta or in dominions East of Suez. It should be clearly understood that far above all considerations of Party politics, and even of loyalty to the Crown or of anything else, the urgent necessity of keeping body and soul together is paramount in countries where the population is already overflowing. To get a post under Government is an incentive that has power above all others, and in order to obtain Government appointments every possible expedient is brought to bear. It has been a disgrace to British administration that the giving of appointments has been used as "hush money" and to provide bribes, and to obtain a good Press and to encourage what is called popularity. In European and Christian countries where Parliamentary government has been suppressed, the principle is followed that "he that is not with me is against me," and if instead of following that well-tested and only practicable method, an attempt is made in Malta, or East of Suez, to appoint, in turns, one who is a friend and then one who is not a friend, the result will be that soon no real friends will be found; and that, in time of stress, everyone with education, ambition and ability may become in disguise an enemy to Imperial rule.
During the debate on Newfoundland it was said that the constitutional application there could only be solved by having representatives of Newfoundland in the House of Commons. For this purpose your Lordships' House or the House of Commons may be equally useful. Be that as it may, educated persons of experience

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will not submit to the refusal to consider grievances when they are just land evident. Unfortunately, our ancestors were driven to fight for one side or the other in the days of the Wars of the Roses and in the days of the Roundheads, and to-day we have to fight in the house of Commons or elsewhere. Let us reflect that the refusal to consider grievances has produced Fascism in this country, and the way to protect us from the dangers of Fascism is to be more ready to listen to grievances when they are just, and not to adopt a policy of supporting subordinates right or wrong. Let us also remember that at one time in India, the policy of listening to nobody in the days of "pocket boroughs" in England compelled the loyalists of India to get control of eight or nine "pocket boroughs" in order that there might be somebody to represent them in the House of Commons.
The views submitted on the futility of safeguards are based on legal considerations and on experience. Let us consider sonic concrete examples. In Malta safeguards proved futile in prosecutions for sedition. Loyalists were unjustly prosecuted; and those hostile to British culture relied on the chances of acquittal. The Constitution of Malta also provides safeguards for religious toleration. Such safeguards are not and cannot be applied with impartiality all round by responsible Ministers where the population is of one religion. In Malta, the first Parliament had hardly begun to work when this fundamental safeguard was attacked by the passing of legislation making one religion dominant. Soon after another law was proposed to compel the King to surrender the Royal Prerogative, without a previous Imperial Act, so as to obtain recognition of titles of nobility conferred, or to be confirmed, by another sovereign authority. Later on, for reasons alleged to be religious, every Church pulpit was used to threaten extreme supernatural penalties against any one who voted for or against certain Parties in an electoral contest. Consequently, safeguards were futile and the Constitution was in part suspended. On that occasion the suspension took place in a manner that did not challenge the necessity of an Act of the Imperial Parliament, or call for art Act of Indemnity.
Let us turn our thoughts to another concrete lesson to be gathered from
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happenings in other matters that are as paramount in Malta as they are in India—namely, to questions of dogma and morals, and to customs that have religious sanctions. Do any members of your Lordships' House, who have been in India, think that responsible Ministers there will often, if ever, take efficient steps to prevent popular abuses in matters said to be religious, but which are such that Western culture and the Democracy of our Parliaments cannot admire? For example, may we not have to relinquish all hope for reform as to child marriage? And may we not expect a revival of suttee? This practice is not as yet a thing of the past. The burning of widows has been practised to decrease the danger of husbands being poisoned, or insufficiently looked after in their decrepitude. One of the most able of former Governors expressed the view that suttee might, under certain circumstances, become a Sacrament that would have to be recognised.
Or does any member of the legal profession, having a seat, in your Lordships' House, think that any safeguard could induce non-Christian Ministers to punish sexual aberrations such as are highly criminal with European nations, but are considered innocent in Asiatic countries? Crimes that are not crimes in Asiatic countries where there are different, conceptions of sexual relations, need not be further referred to here, but as regards the white slave traffic there has been a glaring example thereof in Malta, notwithstanding safeguards. We have witnessed that under the authority and in the name of General Sir David Campbell, as the King's Representative, a Minister of Police was allowed to publish in the Government Gazette, and to keep in force, a Government notice making it easy for European girls of sixteen years of age to be employed as barmaids in shops of that class, which were admitted on all sides of the local Parliament to be organised as the anterooms to "establishments of ill fame."
In Malta, the Minister of Police responsible was not summarily dismissed; his colleagues supported him. So precarious and slow is the application of safeguards that this Government notice, notwithstanding that it was against natural law and against public policy, was not revoked for weeks after the recalcitrant

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Ministers had been dismissed and one-man Government has been set up. It was only after a question thereon had been kept on the Notice Paper of your Lordships' House, that girls between sixteen and eighteen obtained from the Administration the protection to which they were entitled by the law of nature. Girls under eighteen, who are minors under the local law, were whilst under that age kept, whatever their own wishes might be, at the mercy of establishments denounced by Labour members as connected with the white slave traffic and they were so kept with the connivance of the Police. And this occurred notwithstanding much that is debated on such matters at Geneva.
We have witnessed under a British Governor an ex-priest sent to a lunatic asylum for months when he was not insane, so as to delay his giving in Court evidence distasteful to ultra-clericals. And we have likewise witnessed the editor of a labour newspaper most harshly prosecuted for having in his possession hooks ecclesiastically unwanted, such as those written by Mr. Bernard Shaw, and for keeping standard works of reference on political and social subjects which are necessary for the journalistic profession. It was considered by the Government to be "sedition" to write poetry and newspaper articles in a socialistic vein that would be laughed at in the English Press. Those writings were improper, but they were not seditious. As to this, both sides of your Lordships' House evidently sympathised with Joseph Orlando Smith, when this case was, on a previous occasion, debated here. He was secretary of the Parliamentary Labour Party; he is now President of the trade union council, but he has been hounded down, notwithstanding signal services to the Imperial cause at the time of the Invergordon mutiny and when similar occurrences were being arranged with bribery by Soviet organisers in Malta.
May I ask whether any spiritual Peer in this House or outside has any confidence that responsible Ministers in non-European countries will be allowed by their religion to join in safeguarding the toleration now enjoyed under the English flag by missionaries who describe as "heathens" and "pagans" the majority amongst whom they work? Have those who have drafted safeguards, and uphold that elusive system, considered what will
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happen to such missionaries? And may I ask whether any of your Lordships, or any member of His Majesty's Service whose assassination has been attempted, can expect that responsible Ministers in non-Christian countries where English officials are not wanted, will be adequately energetic in bringing to justice every, if any, would-be assassin? It is to be observed that the indigenous who wish to annex all advantages enjoyed by Englishmen, and to divert and absorb all British trade, do not stop at organising threats against life and limb; those out of sympathy with Western democracy are easily induced to commit overt acts accordingly, and have often murdered with impunity. Is it surprising that the number has increased of those who prefer full Dominion status to any system of safeguards?
It has happened in Malta that a Member of Parliament managing Party funds of the so-called Nationalists, according to that member's sworn information, was offered by a Police officer an undertaking to have the Leader of the Opposition assassinated for money. After an inquiry, that Police officer was neither acquitted nor dismissed. If the recipient of this offer to assassinate, who was a Member of Parliament, had falsely asserted that the offer had been made to him, he should have been prosecuted for swearing false information. This has not been done and the information is by the public widely accepted as correct, to the disgrace of the safeguard system. The informer was not allowed to bring forward, at the secret Police inquiry, held departmentally, many witnesses by whom he desired to prove his assertion. Your Lordships will be surprised to hear that the Police officer against whom the information was sworn received protection, amongst other reasons, because he had somehow previously obtained the Police Medal notwithstanding a notorious reputation. On the other hand, an English Commissioner of Police who had reported against the conduct of the reprimanded subordinate had to leave Malta on political pressure, and had to seek the assistance of this Parliament to get his pay. Such is the safeguard system in
practice.
When the Leader of the pro-British Party in Malta, whose assassination was in question, demanded access to the evidence, this was refused. There was a right to demand this access to assist in

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self-protection, in view of a previous attempt to shoot by another would-be assassin now in prison. As these things have happened under a dyarchical Constitution in Malta, a European and Christian country, quite recently, and notwithstanding that the ultimate command of physical force remained unquestionably in the hands of the King's Representative who is a General in the Army, can your Lordships expect, under any safeguard system, different developments in any other country which is not European? Can chaos be avoided where the command of the Police may be shared by those who are, or may suddenly declare themselves, hostile to the Imperial side of the dyarchy, and desire to supplant it whilst declaring loyalty to the Crown?
Force, quickly applied, is the one sanction that matters in an emergency. In Malta, because of dyarchy, the eventual control of physical force has been, and is, obviously, with the Imperial side of the Government, independently of the Police. In Ireland, the balance of power was the other way. In India, it cannot be both ways. It should not be left in doubt anywhere whether an armed force of police is likely to follow dismissed Ministers secretly, or to obey the Crown loyally. And whilst it is easy to find Governors willing to take the risk of being shot, will it continue to be possible, when the organisers of assassination are often immune, to find candidates for humbler posts in the service of the Crown Will such be willing to work when wives and families are not financially provided for and cannot be adequately protected from violence? Will they be driven to advocate dyarchy or full Dominion status?
To pass to another feature of dyarchical failure as evidenced in Malta, do we expect that everywhere safeguards will prevent systematic penalising ill the distribution of patronage and injustice to loyalists when these fall under the power of those who wish to snatch away all that is enjoyed by supporters of Western culture This is where the greatest of administrative blunders is to be enlarged. On the contrary, Malta and India could be easily governed if patronage were exercised Imperially and always so as to encourage loyalty, and not, as has sometimes happened, for popularity
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hunting purposes to the advantage of the disloyal. Public appointments should always and everywhere and in all eases be the reward of proved loyalty and should never he open to association with hush money or be used to the advantage by parties tainted with disloyalty.
As a matter of fact, contrary to promises made in this House and notwithstanding what we heard in another House from the present Secretary of State for the Colonies, when condemning for malpractices an educational officer in Malta, we gathered shortly after that the same officer received a high appointment in the gift of the Crown; and the same Secretary of State was unable or unwilling to over-rule the recommendations of ultra-clericals in favour of the same Albert or "Alberto" Pantaleresco. For over a hundred and thirty years the rule has been that ecclesiastical patronage in the Church of Rome, when exercised by the King of England, should be reserved for senior and truly loyal ecclesiastics; this rule was glaringly set aside. Misuse of patronage and neglect of safeguards in an appalling degree emerge from the Governor of Malta keeping in office as head of the Maltese Agricultural Department a lawyer who never practised farming and has been notoriously wanting in loyalty. And this notwithstanding that assurances were given in your Lordships' House last year that the less competent and those tainted with disloyalty would not lie treated better than loyalists in Malta and Cyprus.
It cannot therefore be expected that anywhere under dyarchical rule the loyalists can willingly rely on paper safeguards. Nor can it be hoped that loyalists will not be wiped out when that is the declared objective of triumphant political opponents. It is evident that in Malta, under a dyarchy, politicians could be in power without being loyal either to the King or to the people, and continue in office after losing the support of the electors, and this notwithstanding "safeguards." Will this not happen East of Suez? Perhaps it may be apprehended that, at the next General Election here in England, the loyalists of this Kingdom may be succeeded on the Front Bench by Empire wreckers. Such speculations are unconstitutional and undemocratic they are also futile. If such is the wish of the electors it is preferable to Fascism.
Those who experimented too rapidly in drafting expedients for dyarchy for Malta, have at least provided valuable lessons for those who are tempted to go too fast elsewhere. If so, something useful has been achieved. The prudent ones are those who learn by the experience of others and they need not be afraid of being called traitors; they should study results in good time. Moreover, it is futile to rely on any scheme of dyarchy when the offer is likely to be rejected with contempt, and to be branded as a delusion and a snare, because full Dominion status is the only audible demand that is of weight. The wish of the silent majority of the uneducated is to be left as they are, and this should be duly respected, and not challenged too rapidly.
Let there be a further period of tentative development during which only the efficient and the loyal are to be considered for all patronage in the gift of the Crown. Let those who are loyal to the King-Emperor be loyally and invariably supported. And let time be given to such allies as are great Princes and true loyalists East of Suez, in order that they may set up and organise an effective newspaper defence in at least some of the most prominent languages selected from the two hundred and fifteen languages mentioned by the Simon Commission. Such a Press would be a contribution towards insurance to safeguard thrones and public order, and a counterweight against an anti-British Press that would be almost all-powerful, and that has much to gain under Dominion status. And, lastly, let us not be ashamed to proclaim that the inhabitants of these Islands, be they employed or unemployed, and in particular the British youth of all classes, deserve, and mean to enjoy, an adequate share of trade and patronage wherever their Government is the principal source of happiness, wealth and security. I beg to move.
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY or STATE FOR THE COLONIES (THE EARL OF PLYMOUTH): My Lords, the noble Lord has travelled over a very wide range of subjects and he has dealt with many aspects of the situation in Malta in very great detail. I make no complaint whatsoever. He is fully entitled to do what he has done, but I would only point out that a num-
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ber of the points with which he dealt seem to me to be of local, rather than more general and Imperial interest. It is therefore quite impossible for me to follow him into every subject that he raised, nor, indeed, can I follow him into the dim ages through which he traced the history of Malta and its constitutional development. During the course of his speech the noble Lord struck me as dealing with the position in Malta from a theoretical rather than a practical point of view. In his Motion the noble Lord has attempted to draw a parallel between the position in Malta and the position that he thinks may develop in India. In spite of everything he said I am afraid that I have entirely failed to find any analogy whatsoever between the two cases. It is really absurd to attempt to try and compare Malta and India in any way. Malta is a very small Island in the Mediterranean. Admittedly it has a large population for its size, but it is essentially a fortress. India, on the other hand, is a vast territory with some 350,000,000 inhabitants and populated by peoples of many varying races and creeds.
Indeed, the conditions applying in the two instances are widely different in every respect. I repeat, you cannot compare the two countries in any way whatsoever; but even if an analogy lay in this case, I can in no way accept the contention of the noble Lord that the safeguards which were provided in the Constitution of Malta have failed in their purpose. I maintain that they have worked in exactly the way in which they were expected to work if certain eventualities arose. After all, the ultimate safeguard in a case of this kind must in the last resort rest upon the ability of the Governor, if necessary, to take over the administration of the country, and this is exactly what has happened in Malta. In what he did the Secretary of State stated in the House of Commons that he was entirely unrepentant. He is unrepentant, my Lords. He stated there that the Constitution of Malta was suspended because it was perfectly plain that Ministers were defying the policy which Parliament unanimously laid down should be followed in Malta.
The noble Lord has argued that the right thing in this case was done in the wrong way, and that the action that was taken in Malta when the Constitution was suspended was illegal. I cannot

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agree with the noble Lord in this respect. The Secretary of State, I need hardly say, before the decision was taken to suspend the Constitution of. Malta naturally took all legal advice as to his power and the power of His Majesty's Government in connection with the situation that had arisen there. They were advised that under the reserved clauses of the Constitution it was perfectly legal for the Imperial authority to assume the direct administration of the Island, so long as the Secretary of State was satisfied an emergency existed. The Secretary of State's discretion was absolute, and he was fully satisfied that the action of the Nationalist Ministry, to which His Majesty's Government took exception, constituted an emergency.
As I have said, the noble Lord has argued that the action that was then taken was illegal. He argued that rather the Opposition should have been called to take power as a Government; that, as I think he suggested, a Cabinet d' affaires should have been instituted. I am afraid that here again I have to Join issue with the noble Lord. Surely a Government of this kind, carrying on the work of administration in a minority so far as the Council is concerned, would be a complete negation of self-government and its objects. So far as I can see it the noble Lord's argument amounts to this in practice. It, would really mean that whenever a, Nationalist Government was in office, or when the Nationalists were returned in a majority on the Council in Malta, the situation which resulted would constitute a menace to the safety of the Empire, and the Governor should therefore take over the administration of the Island. On the other hand, when she Constitutionalists were returned to power that same condition would not operate, the whole position would he different, and Parliamentary institutions should then be allowed to continue to function. I venture to say that that kind of situation, if it were accepted, would be entirely ridiculous. It would be tantamount to saying in effect to the people of Malta, that they must have a particular kind of Government or no Government at all. I repeat, my Lords, that that would be an entirely untenable position to take up, and that in practice it would be quite impossible to operate. I maintain that when in 1933 the Constitution was sus-
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pended the only possible course was adopted in the circumstances that then obtained.
The noble Lord has dealt at very great length with the question of safeguards, and the difficulties which therefrom ensued in administering the Island, or rather the difficulties caused to the Governor in administering the island, and I think he has implied from what he has said that he feels that there should be a Civil Governor in Malta rather than a Military Governor. I think that is a fair inference from what the noble Lord said during the course of his speech. I repeat once again that Malta is a small place, and is primarily a fortress, and I venture to say that the political problems which arise there are really not so complicated that a Military Governor, with competent advisers at his disposal,
cannot easily deal with them. The Governor of Malta has a trained civilian adviser in the Lieutenant-Governor, and an expert on legal and constitutional matters in the form of the legal adviser. I want to make one thing perfectly clear, and that is that everything that has been done in Malta has had the full approval of the Secretary of State, that in the opinion of His Majesty's Government the present Governor, Sir David Campbell, has carried out very efficiently what was admittedly by no means an easy task, and is now administering the government of the country with great success.
The noble Lord has dealt with a number of different points, and there are one or two of them to which I should like to make a reply. He has raised once again the case of Mr. Orlando Smith. That question was discussed in this House when last we had a debate upon Malta, and at the end of my speech I said that the representations that had been made by noble Lords would certainly be considered, hut at the same time I made it perfectly clear that in saying that I was not in any way committing the Government to any particular line of action. I think a little explanation of this case is necessary. The actual charge which was made against the accused—there were a number of them—was that of having published, imported, sold and distributed, and without lawful excuse had in their possession, seditious matter in contravention of the Seditious Propaganda Ordinance, 1932. The noble Lord has adduced

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a number of reasons why the final verdict in this case was in his opinion not a fair one. He has stated that Mr. Smith has done great service to the country. I do not attempt to deny that assertion—I am not in possession of the facts—but I do say that that in itself is not an over-riding consideration. The over-riding consideration in this case was whether the accused in this particular instance had committed a crime and contravened this particular Ordinance.
What actually happened was that they were found guilty in the Court of First Instance, and, when they appealed, their appeal was dismissed on what were purely technical grounds. When that appeal failed the Governor remitted the sentences imposed by the Court on the grounds, inter alia, that, owing to this technical flaw, the convicted persons were deprived of the benefit of a second hearing. The Governor instructed the Public Prosecutor to inform the convicted persons before their release of the reasons which prompted him to exercise the prerogative of mercy and to convey to them a serious warning to Abstain from associations and activities likely to alienate His Majesty's subjects from their allegiance to the Crown or to create disaffection. I should explain that in Malta, the prerogative of mercy is vested entirely in the Governor. He exercises this entirely upon his own discretion, and the action which he took upon this occasion in remitting the sentences was entirely and quite properly taken on his own initiative. After the last debate in this House a request was made to the Governor purely for information. In reply, the Governor stated that in his view the first judgment was right and fair. The local law, he said, was admittedly far-reaching, but that was necessary in a fortress such as Malta. He remitted the sentences because, as I have explained, the accused were not given the benefit of an appeal purely upon technical grounds. If he had considered the first judgment wrong, he said, he would have granted a free pardon, but he does not consider further clemency called for or justified in this case. I might add that the accused naturally had the right of appeal to the Privy Council.
Then the noble Lord dealt with the case of Dr. Micallef, who had been Minister of Agriculture in the former
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Government and is now the head of the Agriculture Department in Malta, and he further dealt with appointments in general. I should like to say in this connection that in reporting this appointment the Governor intimated that Dr. Micallef was a zealous and an energetic agriculturist, who had the confidence of the farmers in Malta and was more likely than any other available candidate to make a success of the appointment. He stated that he was completely satisfied with Dr. Micallef's loyalty and devotion to the interests of Malta. Since that time the Secretary of State's agricultural adviser has visited Malta and investigated the position there and reported upon the agriculture of the Island. The outcome is that he gives no support to the noble Lord's criticism. Mr. Stockdale has reported on the Superintendent of Agriculture as follows:
" Dr. Micallef has no knowledge of agricultural sciences, but he has considerable ability and a keen desire to help the development of agriculture in the Maltese Islands and to improve the lot of the smallholders and tenant farmers. He has thrown himself heart and soul into the work of the Department of Agriculture and appeared to us to have the support of agriculturists in his native island Gozo, and that of a fair proportion of the producers in the Island of Malta."
Furthermore, Mr. Stockdale considered that, with the provision of satisfactory advisers, Dr. Micallef should be able to do good work for Maltese agriculture in the post of Superintendent. Following upon Mr. Stockdale's visit and report, grants for the assistance of Maltese agricultural projects up to the amount of just over £30,000 have been made by His Majesty's Government from the Colonial Development Fund, and, with the assistance of these grants, two English expert advisers are being provided for the Department of Agriculture.
I should like to say a word in general on the question of appointments. The noble Lord has suggested that, a certain amount of favouritism has been shown in the selection of people for appointment to the various posts that become vacant. I want to repeat that these appointments are made by the Governor purely and simply on merits. Who is the best man for the job, and who is most likely efficiently to carry out the work that he has to undertake? That is the only criterion, and it is really quite

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ridiculous to suggest that the Governor is in this case favouring those whom the noble Lord terms the disloyal people in Malta. I know, because I have talked with the noble Lord, that he does not assert that all Nationalists are disloyal, but I do say that that kind of inference might often very easily be drawn from what the noble Lord says by those who do not know what his views actually are. I therefore feel it incumbent upon me to make the position of His Majesty's Government in this matter once again perfectly clear. His Majesty's Government not only believe—they know—that the vast majority of people in Malta are absolutely loyal to the Crown and to the Empire, to whatever Party they belong. I therefore cannot agree that. the supporters of the noble Lord have any first claim upon what appointments are made under the present régime. As I have said, the policy has always been and always will be to select the best man for the particular work involved, provided of course that the Governor is satisfied as to the loyalty of the individual selected. I think that is as clear as I can possibly make the situation.
In his Motion the noble Lord refers to the stagnation which lie says has resulted in Malta owing to the non-application of safeguards. I really find it very difficult to understand the noble Lord's point of view and his very critical attitude to the present régime, because he has quite readily admitted this afternoon that the Governor, since the suspension of the Constitution, has gone a considerable way in the direction that he himself would have chosen. Apart from that it is entirely unfair to suggest that a condition of stagnation has ensued in Malta as the result of the suspension of constitutional government. On the contrary, the Governor has been doing a very great deal in various directions, economic directions, in support of education, for health purposes, in order to improve the conditions which exist in the Island. Great activity has been taking place recently in a number of directions. Let us take for a moment the industry of agriculture, which, after all, is the only productive industry in the country, and which I think I am quite justified in saying under self-government received comparatively little attention.
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I have already referred to the contributions which have been made from the Colonial Development Fund towards the development of agriculture in Malta in various ways, and I should like now, just for a moment, to explain to your Lordships for what purposes these contributions have been made. In the first place, a free grant of £3,000 and a loan of £9,000 have been made for research on the immunisation of goats from undulant fever which, as your Lordships are aware, particularly those who have visited Malta, is so very prevalent on the Island. A free grant of £22,000 spread over five years has been given for the establishment of a Government stock farm and a hostel for agricultural students. Further than that, for the appointment of an adviser in agricultural marketing and control of agricultural exports a grant of £5,000 has been made and a loan of £2,000. These, I venture to say, are real instances of the practical help which is being given to the one important productive industry in the Island. I contend that that does not savour of stagnation in any way whatsoever. Activities in other directions have taken place with regard to education, water supply, electricity rates in the Island, power control, the Connaught Hospital, radio diffusion, and a number of other matters. I submit that all that points to improvement.
I have attempted as far as I have been able to deal with the points which have been raised and have tried to explain to your Lordships that we are convinced that what the Island really wants now is a period of firm and progressive administration which will serve the real interests of the Maltese people as a whole. The Island wants to be free from the petty political quarrels that were rampant before the Constitution was suspended so as to be able to attend to the far more important subjects such as agriculture and education which can be developed and are going to be developed for the benefit of the Island and of the people who live in it. I feel certain that everyone in the House wishes Malta well. I venture to say that at this juncture, at any rate, it is only the present form of government that can assure the progress for which we all look. It is on these lines that the Governor is working, and I know we all hope that his efforts will bring with them happier and more prosperous times for the people of Malta.
LORD STRICKLAND: My Lords, I beg leave to express my gratitude for, and appreciation of, the courtesy with which the noble Earl who has just sat clown has answered my submissions, and I feel it a duty to show my appreciation by avoiding as much as possible the ground that has already been covered in proposing the Motion. There is, however, one point upon which I feel called upon to reply as a member of the English Bar, and that is the reference to the Colonial Development Fund. I have read recently the Act establishing that Fund. Malta is not a Colony, and the Act lays down quite clearly that that Fund is not to be drawn upon in favour of any country with a responsible government Constitution. Now Malta is a country having responsible government, so much so that an Act of Parliament is necessary to withdraw that form of government which has only been suspended in part. In fact the Letters Patent of 1921 were amended last August and it would not be possible to amend any Constitution that had been destroyed. No one can amend anything which is non-existent. Therefore the Constitution of Malta is still a responsible government Constitution. The Colonial Development Fund cannot be legally drawn upon for Malta, which is highly developed and over populated and not a "Colony." As a taxpayer in England I object to the other interpretation of that law, and I feel certain that the Comptroller and Auditor-General should surcharge and adopt my view. A tremendous effort is being made to bolster up the appointment of a Superintendent of Agriculture, and it is arguable that the Colonial Development Fund has been drawn upon for that purpose.
THE EARL OF PLYMOUTH: I really must protest against that suggestion. What has been done has been done in order to foster the one industry which is important to the Maltese people.
LORD STRICKLAND: I have many reasons for disagreeing. I wish further to reply on what has been said on the interpretation of the word "loyalty." It is quite possible that there may be well founded divergence of opinion on that subject. There were accepted historical divergences of opinion as to "loyalty" and "disloyalty" in the Wars of the Roses, and in the days of the Stuarts and
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the days of the Roundheads. I have never said that all the Maltese are disloyal. The majority of the Maltese are very loyal, but there are exceptions. When at a public function, while the National Anthem is played at the conclusion thereof, a Minister, afterwards dismissed, ostentatiously keeps on his hat, and when after he is accused of disloyalty for so doing in two leading journals of the Press, this ex-Minister starts a libel action to clear his character, and when afterwards he has been appointed "provisionally" as the head of a Department and he does not proceed expeditiously with that action to clear his character during his probation, I feel entitled to hold a different opinion as to whether that shows a standard of loyalty that should be acceptable. It is open to approve or disapprove of such standard in your Lordships' House. Much more remains to be said on another occasion.
As to the point whether the present constitutional position is legal or illegal I have to say this: until we know whose is the legal authority upon which the assertion is made that the position is legal any member of the Bar has a right to hold a different opinion. The law officers of the Crown have not been quoted. The mentality of the legal officers of the Colonial Office is moulded on Crown Colony practice their view of Constitutions is not that of constitutional lawyers accustomed to the problems of self government as in Australia, or of accepted text books thereon. As an example of the mentality of followers of Crown Colony practice, I may remind your Lordships' House that Colonial Office lawyers advised the representative of the Colonial Office, the noble Earl who had just sat down, to argue last year that notwithstanding full financial powers granted by the Constitution of 1921 constitutionally elected Ministers could be censured in your Lordships' House for spending a Reserve Fund. With the approval of the Maltese Parliament a fund, called a Reserve Fund, of £50,000 was transferred to the till, and the Ministers censured left three times that amount of cash in the Treasury on relinquishing office. There was no deficit and DO debt.
At the Colonial Office, what is responsible government is imperfectly understood. A further reason against quoting lawyers described as legal ad-

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visers without giving their names is the fact that although new we have to thank the Colonial Office most earnestly for having appointed to Malta Sir Alison Russell, a truly eminent and capable legal adviser, nevertheless it becomes necessary to mention that the Colonial Office had previously to that office appointed one after another two legal officers to Malta who were so unsuitable that they had to be got rid of, and for a period of blunders that wrecked the Constitution at the time they and the Colonial Office are responsible. It is a duty to your Lordships' House to say that it was with the greatest difficulty, and after protest after protest, that responsible Ministers put sufficient pressure upon those administering the list of legal candidates to understand that, such appointments with Military Governors are so important that no considerations of money or difficulty in inducing a suitable member of the Bar to serve, should have stood in the way of going outside the list of applicants and of candidates available for Crown Colony posts under the Colonial Office. More on this occasion should not be said except that I must on legal grounds continue to disagree with the view as to the point of law on the legality of the present administration of Malta.
I thank the noble Earl who has just sat down for having allowed me at length to discuss matters of local administration in Malta, but may I remind your Lordships that in another House, when the Constitution of Newfoundland was suspended and the position was being discussed, it was distinctly stated that in view of the suspension of self-government His Majesty's Minister on the Front Bench in another place assumed the duty and admitted the responsibility of having to answer questions relating to detailed matters of local administration. As to the reply that because India is "a big country" and Malta "a small Island" therefore the arguments based upon the inapplicability of dyarchical safeguards are of no weight, may I say, on the other side, that human nature is very much the same everywhere, and that legal principles are not altered by locality, wherefore lawyers who draft dyarchical constitutions based on safeguards have to meet similar difficulties in Malta and India; that if those safeguards fail for reasons dependent on human nature in Malta they will fail for the
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same reasons in India; and that the possibility of attempting to draft safeguards is subject to precedents that apply equally to India and to Malta. I beg leave to withdraw the Motion.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

JOINT COMMITTEE ON INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM.
THE MARQUESS OF LINLITHGOW THE MARQUESS OF LINLITHGOW moved to resolve, That it is desirable that the publication of the Report and Proceedings of the Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform, and of such further records as may be laid upon the Table by the Committee, shall take place simultaneously in Great Britain and in India, and that copies printed by His Majesty's Stationery Office be published in India at the same time that they are published in this country.
The noble Marquess said: My Lords, it is a salutary practice of Parliament that the Report of a Committee of either House be made available to that House, or in the case of the Report of a Joint Committee, to both Houses, immediately such Report has been voted by the Committee. Should Parliament not be sitting when such Report is voted, it is required to he laid as soon as Parliament meets. I think the House will agree that it is essential that the Report of the Joint Select Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform should be made public upon the same day in this country and in India. In order that this may be carried out, sufficient time must elapse between the voting of the Report and the day of publication, to enable copies of the Report to be sent to India. The purpose of this Resolution is to obtain the leave of the House to proceed with the necessary arrangements.
There is in existence a precedent for the course suggested—namely, the Report of the Joint Select Committee on Closer Union in East Africa. This was also laid on the Table of both Houses of Parliament on October 6, 1931, but not made public until November 2, in order that, there might be simultaneous publication in this country and in East Africa. Indeed it is difficult to conceive of any other course being taken in the case of Reports of major importance which concern a distant part of the Empire as closely as they do this country. Clearly it would be most

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undesirable that opinion overseas upon any Report of the magnitude of this one should be formed upon material necessarily condensed telegraphed out to India by news agencies and the like. If the arrangements proposed can be carried out I hope that—subject always to no unforeseen accident arising—simultaneous publication may be made on or about November 22. I may add that the course suggested meets with the approval of every member of the Joint Select Committee. I greatly hope that in the circumstances the House will agree to postpone publication in this country for the period necessary to secure simultaneous publication in both countries. I beg to move.
Moved to resolve, That it is desirable that the publication of the Report and Proceedings of the Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform, and of such further records as may be laid upon the Table by the Committee, shall take place simultaneously in Great Britain and in India, and that copies printed by His Majesty's Stationery Office be published in India at the same time that they are published in this country.—(The Marquess of Linlithgow.)
LORD LLOYD: My Lords, I only propose to offer one observation, and before doing so I should like to take this opportunity of congratulating the noble Marquess on the completion of his long labours and the work to which he has brought all the skill and assiduity which we should naturally expect from him. I am all the more glad to be able to congratulate him on the completion of his labours inasmuch As my congratulations on the results of his labours, if rumour is true, might be perhaps indefinitely postponed. But I do not think any of us wish for a moment to question the desirability of simultaneous publication, and it is pretty evident, I think, that we are some of us very concerned about a delay of nearly a month which we hoped might have been avoided. I naturally do not complain of the very long delays which have taken place since the Joint Select Committee was set up. We all know how arduous have been its labours, how much evidence has had to be taken; we know, too, how much evidence also has had to be shut out. Unfortunately most of the evidence that has had to be shut out, I
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fancy, has been on transferred subjects which affect very vitally the masses of the people in India.
But once no more evidence can be taken, once the Committee's work is terminated, it does seem to me that it is tremendously important that the situation of members of both Houses of Parliament should have very immediate consideration from His Majesty's Government. We have got an enormously long Report. We had a Cabinet Minister the other day telling us that the Bill was going to contain some hundreds of clauses. We are going to have this Report debated very soon, and I should have thought that it was of the highest importance, if any really careful scrutiny or even elementary digestion of so formidable a document by Members of Parliament were to take place, that it should be put into our hands at the earliest possible moment. It is scarcely fair to expect us to debate the question in about five or six weeks' time when we shall have had the Report for only about three weeks. I do not know if this delay was really necessary. I should have thought a copy of the Report could have been sent out—there are such things as aeroplanes—by aeroplane and multiplied in India. We could have saved a fortnight and probably more time in so doing. I do not know whether the noble Marquess has really realised how difficult a task it is going to be for a large number of members of both Houses whose familiarity with Indian problems is not so great as his own or even some of us who have been connected with that country—how terribly formidable it is going to be for them to formulate an opinion. I cannot believe that the Government wish to give slavish adherence to one side or the other in a case of this important magnitude. I for one would like my noble friend to tell us why a more expeditious method could not have been followed. There may be a good reason, but he told us nothing about it. He merely assumed that simultaneous publication must involve a delay of three weeks or a month.
THE MARQUESS OF LINLITHGOW: The noble Lord, Lord Lloyd, and your Lordships' House may rest assured that the possibility of using aeroplanes did occur to those responsible. The matter was very carefully gone into in great detail.

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Every possible solution was studied, and in conjunction with those who are really responsible for this matter once the Report has been passed—namely, the Stationery Office—it was decided that the way proposed was the best in the public interest.
LORD LLOYD: May I ask whether the noble Marquess can tell us, if the Report is not going to be in our hands until November 20, when he expects that we shall be called upon to debate it in this House? How long a period of digestion and study are we going to be allowed? If he cannot answer that question perhaps some member of the Government will be able to answer it.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (VISCOUNT HAILSHAM): My Lords, no date has been fixed on which the debate should takes place. As my noble friend knows, the new Session is expected to commence on November 20, and any day between then and Christmas would be available, I suppose, which was for the convenience of your Lordships' House generally. Naturally it will be open to any noble Lord to put down a Motion and to consult the general convenience with regard to when that Motion shall be debated. I cannot give a date. Obviously I do not know what are the feelings of the majority of your Lordships, but I take it that you would desire probably to debate the Report in some form before the Bill is Introduced. Presumably therefore the debate would take place before Christmas, but the exact date is a matter for the general convenience of your Lordships, which naturally I should study.
EARL HOWE: Is it in order for me to ask the noble Viscount the Leader of the House if he can give us any idea of the date when the Bill is likely to be introduced?
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: I am afraid I am not in a position to answer that question. Naturally the Government will be anxious to introduce the Bill as early as they can, but I should doubt myself whether it will be possible to do so before the new year.
LORD LLOYD: Surely the noble Viscount would not expect us to engage in a really intelligent discussion of so enormous a document in under three or four weeks? Yet apparently he envisages a debate well before Christmas.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: If it be felt that it would be more convenient not to debate the Report until January or February, I do not think the Government would have any objection. I was imagining that some of your Lordships would desire to discuss it, at an early date. If the general feeling is that the debate had better be deferred until the new year do not think there will be any objection raised from the Government Benches. It might, of course, have this disadvantage, that the Bill might be introduced in another place—because presumably it will be introduced in the House of Commons—before the Government had had an opportunity of hearing a discussion in this House. Beyond that there does not seem to be any extreme urgency for the debate. I can only assure your Lordships that we have no desire to hurry on the debate, but naturally we would wish to hear the views of your Lordships as soon as your Lordships feel in a position to give expression to those views.
LORD LLOYD: Then the noble Viscount cannot give us any idea when the Bill is likely to be introduced?
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: Not beyond what I have stated.
On Question, Motion agreed to, and ordered accordingly.
Report from the Joint Committee (with the Proceedings of the Committee) made.

SOUTH DOWNS PRESERVATION BILL. [H.L.]
Report from the Select Committee that it is not expedient to proceed further with the Bill: Read, and ordered to lie on the Table.
House adjourned at twenty-five minutes past six o'clock.