PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL OVER EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

HL Deb 22 February 1933 vol 86 cc791-827

LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDErose to call attention to the decrease in the control of the Parliament of the United Kingdom over foreign and Imperial affairs; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, the Motion that I have put down on the Paper covers a very wide range, more especially as I intend not only to deal with the decrease of the control of Parliament but necessarily also to find out where that control is now lodged and where the control is elsewhere assumed. It is, I admit, a large constitutional question that I am raising, but it is one that is very likely to be lost sight of in these days. We are all of us constantly occupied with urgent and pressing problems day by day and we lose some view of the larger problems which may be changing without our being aware of the fact. Focus is so directed on the detail that we are very apt to lose sight of the larger changes. And yet we are living at a time when affairs are changing more rapidly than they have ever done in any previous period of our history.

Not only do we lose sight of these larger problems, but we are very much averse from any drastic changes, from any hard-and-fast enactment of new constitutional procedure which would bind us. We have been accustomed to go along quietly, adapting ourselves to circumstances as they arise. Our motto has, to a large extent, been "Solvitur ambulando," which was translated by one of our Prime Ministers into the well- known phrase "Wait and see." Well, I believe there is some danger in this method of approaching matters. It may have succeeded in the past, but the changes are so rapid and so revolutionary in these days that I do not believe that this is a correct attitude for us to adopt.

I want to call attention to the weakening of Parliamentary authority, and I think it is a question of importance in these days when we look round the world and see the fate of so many Parliaments. The Parliamentary system has broken down in a very large number of countries. I mean the real Parliamentary representative system as we have known it. I do not mean the little puppet Parliaments which dictators have just to advise them. This breakdown of the Parliamentary system may reach very far, and may give us cause to ask whether this system which we have tried now for practically 700 years is in all respects the best one to deal with the urgent problems of to-day. I think your Lordships' House is an appropriate place in which to have a discussion of this sort because the urgency of present-day problems does not press so much upon us, especially at this period in the Session. There is an anecdote told of an Anglo-Indian official who had been absent from this country for a great number of years. He returned to London, and was driving with a man across Parliament Square. He said to his friend: "What is that place there?" And the friend said: "That is the Houses of Parliament." "Oh," said the Anglo-Indian, "do you mean to tell me that rubbish still goes on?" That is typical of a certain state of mind. That anecdote is told in the opening chapter of that very remarkable book which your Lordships all know, "The New Despotism," by Lord Hewart, the Lord Chief Justice.

I do not desire to touch on domestic affairs more than to say that in that book and other books that have been written on the same subject it has been very clearly pointed out that a large part of our legislation empowers Ministers to act by order and by regulation in such a way as to over-ride the authority of Parliament and of the Courts; and I would just quote this phrase from Lord Hewart's book, because it seems to me very relevant: The Old Despotism, which was defeated, offered Parliament a challenge. The New Despotism, which is not yet defeated, gives Parliament an anaesthetic. The strategy is different, but the goal is the same. It is to subordinate Parliament, to evade the Courts, and to render the will or the caprice of the Executive unfettered and supreme. And he proceeds to give a wealth of examples in support of his contention.

My object to-day is to call attention to the increase in the power of the Executive on the one hand and the control that has gone from Parliament in the realm of foreign and Imperial affairs on the other. Now to take foreign affairs first. Foreign affairs, as your Lordships know quite well, are matters which to a large extent must lie outside the purview of Parliament. The position of Foreign Secretary is very different from that of any other Minister, and a large part of his work is carried on without the knowledge of Parliament. That is necessarily so. But it has long been felt that his unfettered discretion in the matter of foreign policy might be a danger. it has been found to be a danger in the past, and I think on the whole the lesson has been learned, and I can give a number of quotations pointing to the fact that any concealment from Parliament or the country obligations undertaken with foreign countries would he au extreme danger. I do not want to go into past history, but instances will occur to those of your Lordships who are close students of our foreign relations.

But though that lesson may have been learned, the tendency still seems to he in the direction of allowing unfettered discretion to the Foreign Secretary. The policy is still to a large extent uncontrolled and there is a tendency on the part of the experts in foreign affairs to be impatient with the ignorance of those who are outside. If there is ignorance it is from lack of information. It is true that the Press furnishes us with a great deal of information with regard to foreign question, but it is impossible for newspapers to give full and authentic details on points which may at any moment arise of the highest importance. But I understand the point of view. In a very subordinate capacity I passed through three phases. When I was a clerk in the Foreign Office I used to help to draft answers to foreign questions and to share with my colleagues impatience at the inquisitiveness of Mem- bers of Parliament. The next phase was when I was a Member of Parliament and asked questions, when I entirely altered my point of view and felt how important it was that the country should be informed by means of my questions. The third and least pleasant phase was when, as a Minister, I had to answer questions, and again felt my first sensations of impatience at the ignorance of Members of Parliament. There is no doubt, however, that through the House of Commons the country can be instructed in our foreign relations and the House of Commons should have a very powerful voice in directing the activities of the Foreign Secretary.

With regard to treaties, there is no constitutional obligation on the part of a Government, to submit them to Parliament. I think that now any Government would most certainly submit a treaty to Parliament before ratification if it were one of great importance. In 1924 the Labour Government instituted the idea of all treaties being submitted to Parliament and in 1925 the Conservative Government discontinued that practice. It has not been adopted again owing to the technical difficulties which arose from the submission of a number of conventions and treaties that were passed during the course of the year; the machinery would not stand the burden of such delay. The fact remains that the bilateral treaty is a matter which cannot be altered by Parliament. Even if submitted before ratification it is a mere formality; but I shall return to that point at a later stage. It is obvious to your Lordships with regard to treaties, that you cannot alter them because alteration would mean setting up negotiations again with the countries in question. If that is true with bilateral treaties how much more true with regard to the development we have recently seen of the decisions of international conferences.

Since the War, with the development of the League of Nations, the International Labour Office at Geneva and the various bodies set up under the League there have been a number of conferences on international decisions which, when submitted to our Parliament, cannot be altered at all. I do not think that Members of Parliament in either House are quite fully aware of that. I think they sometimes believe that when these agreements are submitted to Parliament it is possible for them to be altered. It is not possible for them to be altered. myself welcome this new step towards international government. I think it is inevitable and I think it is desirable; but I think we should realise what it involves. It does involve to a certain extent some renunciation of our sovereignty. International government must involve that, and we should realise that while we can express opinions and have debates, the Parliament of the United Kingdom can make no change in these matters that are settled by international agreement.

Without referring to the past, may I just refer to the future? There are two international conferences—one sitting, the other likely to be held. One is the Disarmament Conference. I have no idea what decisions are going to be arrived at, if any, by that Conference, and I do not intend on this occasion to express any opinion about the nature of those decisions; but say regulations are drawn up with regard to the tonnage of ships, the weight of tanks, the calibre of guns, the number of aeroplanes— and it seems not at all improbable that regulations of that sort will be drawn up—when the debate comes upon the findings of the International Conference on Disarmament., in your Lordships' House and in another place, the military, naval and air experts will have a great deal to say, and I am not sure that they will realise that they will not be able to alter a figure, sentence or comma of that agreement when it is once made. Take another conference which I think is going to be called the World Economic Conference. I do not know what. it is going to discuss and I do not know what it is going to settle, but undoubtedly if it conies to any agreement whatsoever it will be upon matters of supreme importance to this country affecting the lives of all our people. When that settlement comes before your Lordships' House and the House of Commons you may discuss it, but it is a fait accompli that you will not be able to alter in any way.

We have a foretaste of this new method in the question of the American Debt. I believe that the Prime Minister is going over to America, but the Chancellor of the Exchequer already seems to think that the matter is not one that closely concerns the House of Commons because, in an answer to some questions addressed to him last week, he said that he had made a statement in the country on the question and it was quite unnecessary to repeat the statement in the House of Commons. This question of the American Debt is one of prime importance. Is the Chancellor of the Exchequer going to ignore the House of Commons before any policy is settled? Are we going to know what the Minister will discuss when he goes to America? Are we going to be told the settlement. when he comes back? And when decisions are come to at the Conference, is Parliament again to be ignored and to be unable to make any alteration? It seems very likely that all those things will happen. This is another branch of international government which means that the old time-honoured authority of the United Kingdom Parliament is going to be overridden.

A further step towards the weakening of the United Kingdom Parliament arises from the position of the Dominions. And here, if I might be allowed to do so, I would like to pass very briefly over the extraordinary rapidity with which the Dominions have, achieved the position of independent sovereign States, but an incompleteness that leaves gaps that to my mind are very dangerous, as I will show. In 1919 the Dominions became Members of the League of Nations as independent. sovereign States. They had an absolutely unique position, because not only were they placed on a footing of equality with the other States, Members of the League of Nations, but they had the privilege of forming part. of the delegation of the British Empire, acting as a unitary Power, and so were represented twice over. As Sir Robert Borden described it, they had a "peculiarly effective position." In the Report on Inter-Imperial Relations adopted by the Imperial Conference of 1926 there was a reference to the Dominions which I will quote, because it shows what an intensely difficult problem this is. It states that the British Empire considered as a whole,…defies classification and bears no real resemblance to any other political organisation which now exists or has ever yet been tried. So we are embarking on new ground, we have no precedent to guide us, and we have this vast Empire which extends over the whole of the globe.

In defining the mutual relations of the Dominions the Conference of 1926 stated: They are autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. That was a tremendous stride forward and gave them the status of independent sovereign States. They had naturally, I do not say taken advantage of, but risen to the status which has been granted to them, and further strides in their sovereignty have been made. They have now got Diplomatic Services of their own. Canada. has representatives in France, Japan and the United States. South Africa has representatives in Italy, the Netherlands and the United. States. The Irish Free State has representatives in Belgium, France, Germany, the Holy See and the United States. If think your Lordships can realise the complications that must sometimes inevitably arise from the British Ambassador or Minister Laving also by his side a Dominion Minister who may, or may not, always see eye to eye with him.

They have also got the right., naturally, to conclude treaties with foreign countries on their own, independently, always with just the sanction of the Crown but not with the sanction of our Parliament. The Statute of Westminster of two years ago further established their legislative independence, and last year a farther stride was made with regard to the Ottawa Conference. The Ottawa. Conference became precisely what I have just described to your Lordships is the ease with international conferences. I remember that when the agreements concluded at Ottawa came before this House there were several of your Lordships who were not aware that amendments and suggested alterations could not be listened to by the Government, because the whole matter was settled at Ottawa by the Imperial Conference. This House and the House of Commons had no say in the matter whatsoever, because I would remind your Lordships that the contention sometimes made, that Parliament has got the last word because it can turn the Government out, is really not to be considered for a moment. That is no safeguard whatsoever.

The new departure is that in addition to international government we have inter-Imperial government, which is overriding the Parliament of the United Kingdom. There were no variations in the. policy of Protection, which was inaugurated, allowed, and yet that policy, with its repercussions, not only affects the United Kingdom and the Dominions but affects our relations with foreign countries. Yet the Dominions, who can hardly realise the repercussions in the different parts of the world where the Dominions are situate, and can certainly not grasp the full implications of tariffs with regard to ourselves and foreign countries, have more voice in these decisions than the Parliament of the United Kingdom. A further body has now been established, for Empire economic co-operation—very necessary, I should think, though I would say in passing that it is rather curious that the only body of this super-Imperial nature which has been instituted should have been instituted by this Government on a question of a deeply controversial nature., politically, and on decisions which must in the nature of things be ephemeral; because the present Government are inaugurating a policy which they know lets aroused a great deal of opposition, and they know that in the nature of things that opposition may become the Government, and they know that in the nature of things it is not a permanent Empire development policy but a policy of tariffs at a certain part of our history. It is only for that that this body has been set up, to adjust the various tariffs and to function as a body, combined with our Civil Service, which can operate in details without the knowledge of Parliament.

In economic questions, just as in political questions, it; is very often the details that turn out to be of the highest importance. In the literature of this subject because a great deal of literature is growing up round this subject of the governance of the British Empire—this point with regard to super-Imperial bodies is put in a book by Mr. Duncan Hall. He says: There is the further difficulty that the gradual development in the Empire of a system of international administration is creating; a new bureaucracy. Although this new bureaucracy will play an extremely important part in the government of the peoples of the Empire, it will from the nature of its position be far more exempt from popular control, and even from Ministerial control, than the present Civil Services of each State of the group. I would like to ask the noble and learned Viscount who, I believe, is to reply for the Government, for more details with regard to this body of experts. Is it to be permanent? What precisely are its functions? Will its decisions be subjected to Parliament—not only to Parliamentary sanction but to Parliamentary revision, Parliamentary alteration?

Now I come to perhaps the most important part of all, where these two branches of the subject meet, the Imperial and the foreign; and I want to describe to your Lordships as it now exists the position of our Foreign Secretary, because it is a position which is not held by any Foreign Secretary in any other country in the world. The British Foreign Secretary before arriving at any decision has to inform, consult, and on certain occasions receive the approval of, the Dominions. Let me picture to your Lordships an instance. The Foreign Secretary is suddenly confronted with a decision which he has to make—and these decisions in foreign affairs have to be made with great rapidity. In these days things do not wait. A matter of peace and war in these days is not something which is gradually going to be prepared during a period of a few weeks or months, but it is a matter which is going to fall upon us in an hour or two. And even if it is not a case of peace or war a prompt answer is very often necessary. What has he got to do? He has to draft a telegram and send it to the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister, through the Dominions Office, has to despatch that telegram to the five or six other Prime Ministers: the communication is from Prime Minister to Prime Minister. The Prime Minister of the Dominion receives the telegram, sees the gravity of it, is reluctant—very reluctant, and naturally reluctant—to take a decision without calling his Cabinet together. He calls his Cabinet together. The Cabinet, seeing the gravity of the situation, are reluctant to act without the backing of their Parliament. But the delay! The delay may be days, it may be weeks, or it may be less. But, meanwhile, our Foreign Secretary is waiting to give a reply.

Could anything be more hampering in the conduct of negotiations or in the rapid intercourse of diplomacy than to have a Minister bound hand and foot in this way? And the extraordinary position arises that a Foreign Minister need not by practice—and certainly not by the Constitution—consult his own Parliament, but he has to consult and get the approval of the five Dominions. And it is not as if you could assume that the Dominions are naturally going to say: "Of course, yes, go on; you are the best judge." That is not at all the case. They have got their nation, they have got their independence, they have got their sovereignty, and we have had incidents in the past where they have not at all seen eye to eye with the policy adopted by this country. Let me give an instance—the Treaty of Lausanne. The Treaty of Lausanne was negotiated by our Foreign Secretary and by our Cabinet. Before ratification it was to be submitted to the Dominions. But it was found that the Dominions did not at all agree with the Treaty of Lausanne, and they resented very much not having been consulted before it was a fait accompli. Meanwhile our Foreign Secretary was under no obligation to submit the Treaty of Lausanne to his own Parliament before ratification, although I think it was done as being the more usual practice now, but there is no binding obligation to do anything of the kind. There is a binding obligation to consult the Dominion Parliaments.

A more grave instance of differences of opinion was in 1922, when Mr. Lloyd George, who was Prime Minister, sent off a telegram when there was an incident in Turkey, known as the Chanak incident, and thought that, by just simply sending the telegram to the Dominions, he could depend upon them to send troops in support of his policy. The loyalty of the Dominions is without any sort of question whatsoever. Their eagerness to help the Mother Country need never and can never be doubted; but they are not going to allow themselves to be embroiled in European quarrels whereby, owing to loss of temper or the mismanagement of diplomacy, the whole Empire is going to be plunged into war. And I look forward myself to the co-operation and help and support of the Dominions in checking any precipitate action of that kind. Well, the Chanak incident was followed by a great deal of controversy, showing that the Dominions had got their own views with regard to these foreign political entanglements, and were not just at the stroke of the pen, at the pushing of a bell, to be drawn into a great catastrophe of that sort.

In 1924, under the first Labour Government, the handicap to the Foreign Secretary of this method of information, consultation, and approval was felt. The Prime Minister—the same Prime Minister as there is to-day—made an endeavour to tackle this, and he sent a Despatch round to the Dominions describing the difficulties of the present system in two short paragraphs which I. will read. He said: First [the present system] renders immediate action extremely difficult, more especially between conferences on occasions where such action is imperatively needed, particularly in the sphere of foreign policy. Secondly, when matters under discussion are subjects of political controversy, economic or otherwise, conclusions reached at and between Imperial Conferences are liable to he reversed through changes of Government. There was a good deal of discussion, a good deal of correspondence, but nothing was done. And that clumsy method exists to-day.

This decrease of control is felt in many directions, domestic, foreign and Imperial, and, I would add, also Colonial. The other day we had an instance of how a very important Ordinance in Kenya., the subject of acute controversy and a great deal of protest in this country, was given the King's Assent through the Executive when Parliament was not sitting and before Parliament had any opportunity of expressing an opinion. There was a debate when the matter was all over. That is another instance of the tendency that there is to ignore Parliamentary criticism and not to seek for Parliamentary approval. Another instance I may give of how the influence of the Dominions may be more strongly felt than the influence of British people through their elected representatives is that the Union of South Africa claim that nothing shall be done in native policy all over Africa without consultation with South African feeling; no doubt very properly from their point of view, but where does our Parliament come in in the meanwhile? When is it going to be allowed to express its feelings?

The position of the Dominions is still in the melting pot. The representation that they have in this country is not uniform and is not entirely satisfactory. I think the experiment made by the Commonwealth of Australia of sending here a responsible Minister of their Government was a good one. The High Commissioners that exist at present do not like, and do not want to take upon themselves, the responsibility of giving decisions on behalf of the Dominions. If that was changed for a Minister Plenipotentiary of the Dominion, who could consult with us and could give the opinion of his country, I think it would be much more satisfactory. But I do not venture this afternoon on any constructive proposals. That would carry me too far. I only want to point to the system, as it now exists, and to draw your Lordships' attention to the dangers that are involved. It seems to me far more important that Canada should have a Plenipotentiary Minister here than that she should have a Plenipotentiary Minister in the other countries where she is represented. I think that the Dominions feel the difficulty, I would riot say of trusting, but of having in this country a representative who occupied a sufficiently commanding position to speak and give decisions on behalf of his Government. There is something in atmosphere. There is something in the atmosphere of the country you are in which rather alters your point of view, and if the Dominions feel that no representative here can really be entrusted with the responsibility of giving a decision on their behalf, we must fall back on this system of very long-drawn-out delays and the hampering of the Foreign Secretary.

I think the Empire Parliamentary Association has done, and is always doing, very good work in giving us valuable information with regard to the Dominions and giving the Dominions information with regard to ourselves, and discussing these problems. This particular problem was discussed by them in Australia a few years ago, and a great deal of literature has been written on the subject. We have now passed from the phase of parents and children. We are no longer primus inter pares. We are one of the Dominions and on a footing of equality, and yet we cannot help remembering that when it conies to matters of Imperial defence and matters of foreign policy, we are inevitably in a position where, I do not say we ought to have a dominant voice, but where the negotiations must be carried on through our particular representative. I think if the present Government wanted to face a bit of difficult work they would have in this question something of very great importance. I believe that drifting is very dangerous. Events move far too fast to-day, and we may lied ourselves in a very difficult position.

I do not know if Parliamentary Government is breaking down in this country. I am rather inclined to believe so at times, and I should be very sorry for it. In the realm of foreign affairs and that of Dominion affairs the debates in Parliament are becoming more and more academic, and the decisions of Parliament are becoming of less and less consequence. I do not know if there is any form of Foreign Affairs Committee which could be set up in order that there might be closer contact between the Foreign Secretary and Members of Parliament, and perhaps between the Foreign Secretary and the Dominions. I know the difficulties, but because it is a difficult question that is no reason why it should not be tackled. The present Government are speeding up, and I think rightly speeding up, methods of procedure in the House of Commons. The antiquated methods that were so frightened of touching any case because of the possibility of doing harm are being abandoned and they are proceeding by Order in-Council in many cases instead of by legislation. The sticklers for constitutional etiquette object to that. I myself think it is a move in the right direction and I think it might be developed a great deal further so long as the sanction and voice of Parliament is heard.

We are in a transition stage, and whether there is to be a mitigation of the Parliamentary system or not I do not know; but if there is to be a drastic mitigation of the Parliamentary system do not let us slip into it; let us deliberately undertake a change. The change is going on whether we like it or not. The question is what is our attitude towards it. The power of the Executive has enormously increased in all spheres, and the power of Parliament has consequently decreased. The position of ourselves and the Dominions is perhaps one of the most difficult and delicate. We depend on their loyalty. We depend on their undoubted affection. We have been a family, but, as we know, family quarrels are the worst quarrels of all, and the Dominions cannot any longer be regarded as children. I have raised this question which has interested me for some years past, because I have seen this change coming on with greater rapidity, and I have ventured to bring the matter before your Lordships.

I have stretched your patience far longer than I intended to, but I consider that the question of the future governance of this country, which is one of the leading nations of the world, and of the governance of the British Commonwealth of Nations, whose destiny must always be a matter of very close concern to us, are questions of paramount importance in the rapidly changing world in which we live. I do not believe that in our anxiety to safeguard the full autonomy of the Dominions we should too readily subordinate the interests of our own people or too easily abrogate the power and authority of Parliament. I am convinced, my Lords, that in the sphere of foreign affairs the peace of the world can best be safeguarded by reposing complete and full control in Parliament. and the people. I beg to move.

VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD

My Lords, I do not propose to detain the House for more than a very few moments, but one or two observations fell from the noble Lord on which I should like to say a few words. He really dealt with two entirely distinct questions, if he will allow me to say so, having no real relation to one another. There was first the question of the organisation of the Empire, which is a very important question, and he pointed out the extreme difficulties which may arise, and perhaps have arisen, with regard to foreign affairs as affecting the Empire as a whole. That is a very important matter which requires, I quite agree, very careful consideration. The truth is that our system, such as it was, has been during successive years gradually destroyed. It now practically does not exist at all. I do not regret it. I think that was the inevitable course of events. But it is true that we have done nothing to put any other system in its place. We have gone on taking down the old system and no new system has been set up to replace it. The point, as your Lordships will no doubt remember, Was put very forcibly by General Smuts in a lecture he delivered about three years ago in this country. I paraphrase his words from recollection, and probably I am very much maligning General Smuts; bat I think that roughly what he said was that the process of destruction had gone on long enough and there ought now to be a period of reconstruction. That is a very important matter, but I do not propose to trouble your Lordships with any views of mine on the subject just now. It is very difficult matter, a very delicate matter, and one that I agree calls for careful attention, hit I do not feel that I should be doing any good by discussing it here and now.

In addition to that my noble friend made an entirely different charge. It was that Parliament had less control over foreign affairs than it used to have. In one sense that is true, because Parliament has less control now—that is to say Parliament as an entity, the House of Commons as an entity—than it had over any part of our public affairs. That is because of the gradual development of the Cabinet and the increased power of the Cabinet, which has taken from the House of Commons a great deal of the power it used to have, even fifty or sixty years ago, and still more 100 years ago. In that sense, no doubt, Parliament has less control over foreign affairs as it has less control over other public affairs—that is to say, less detailed control. The only thing it can do, in effect, nowadays, apart from alterations in minor details which the Government of the day do not regard as of the first importance—that the House of Commons and this House also still retain the power of dealing with—is to reject a proposal of the Government and, as a consequence, turn out the Government Those are two powers which Parliament still retains. In all other respects power, as I see it, has passed to the Cabinet.

But apart from that general evil, if it be an evil, is it true that foreign affairs are worse treated than they used to he treated? I confess I should have thought rather that the contrary was the case. After all it is quite modern, as my noble friend pointed out, that Parliament should have the right to be consulted about a treaty. The Prerogative of the Crown is quite clear. It can make treaties without consulting Parliament unless it requires to raise money or something of that kind. Normally, it can make any treaty without consulting Parliament. But in the last twenty years it has become a rule of the Constitution—no doubt a rule of custom, as most of the rules of our Constitution are—that Parliament should 'be consulted, and Parliament always is consulted on every important matter. For what it is worth, Parliament can say that it will not. have a treaty and Parliament can reject it. There are certain treaties where the power of Parliament is Quite clearly reserved—conventions under the International Labour Office—and Parliament has on more than one occasion said it would not assent to conclusions arrived at in negotiation. It is a serious matter, because it means starting fresh negotiations; but it can be done and it has been done.

In regard to other aspects of foreign affairs I should have thought the conclusion was exactly the reverse of that stated by my noble friend. He cited the Disarmament Conference. It is perfectly true that we cannot do anything to change in detail the treaty which I hope will be made as a. result of that Conference. Parliament never has had that power and cannot have that power. It is obvious from the very nature of the case that is cannot have that power. But we have now what we never had before, the power of watching what is being done in conferences of that kind and making representations to the Government as to what Parliament desires should be the policy pursued, and that power is surely a very important one. It is one that has been exercised in the case of they Disarmament Conference and in other cases, and I think beneficially exercised, though can understand that the Government might not quite share that view. But I think that, on the whole, it is a desirable thing that Parliament and the country should follow what is being done while it is being done and make their observations at the only time at which they can make them usefully—that is, before a treaty has been definitely arrived at.

For these reasons I should have thought, with the greatest respect to my noble friend, that although the matter he has raised is one of great importance, it is not true to say that Parliament has less control over foreign affairs, except, as I have indicated, that it has in a sense less control over public affairs generally. I have been one of those in the House of Commons and elsewhere who has always tried to impress upon Governments—quite uselessly—the importance of not taking away the power of the House of Commons more than is absolutely necessary and of avoiding making every detail of a Government Bill a question of confidence. I have urged that they should give to the House of Commons greater freedom than it has at present. I regret very much that the trend of Government opinion, whether Conservative, Liberal or Labour, has uniformly flowed in the direction of increasing the power of the Cabinet and decreasing the power of the House of Commons. I regret it, but when my noble friend talks, and talks rightly, of the general uncertainty of Parliamentary institutions in the world, I think that if he will examine the cases where Parliamentary institutions have most failed and are in most danger of disappearing, he will find that the failure has been due to the very injudicious use by Parliaments of their powers.

It is not that powers have been taken away from them but that they have used them in such a way as to make government practically impossible or very difficult. Then comes a great movement, and they say: "Take these people away, they are a perfect nuisance to the State." That does not seem to me to be a thing that is going to happen here. It is not that Parliament is interfering too much. What he complains of, and I complain of, is that on the whole Parliament is losing the power of interference but that is a lesser evil than that it should reduce the whole of the government of the country to the complete chaos that we notice in some foreign countries, and which has been the prelude to revolution in others.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (VISCOUNT HAILSHAM)

My Lords, the subject of the Motion which has been introduced by the noble Lord opposite is one of the very gravest public importance, but I hope he will forgive me if I say that some parts of his speech semed to me, as I think they did to my noble friend Lord Cecil, to relate to other equally important subjects which did not fall within the terms of his Motion. There were three or four wholly separate topics with which he dealt. He began by referring to the Orders-in-Council, which he said were increasingly made for carrying on government. He quoted passages from the Lord Chief Justice's book, "The New Despotism," to show the growth of that practice and the evils to which it might give rise. That is a very interesting and important topic, and one on which several of your Lordships have very definite views, out I am quite at a loss to see what relation it. has to the question of the control of Parliament over foreign and Imperial affairs, because it is a matter exclusively, so far as I know, of the control of Parliament over domestic affairs.

While I am very glad indeed that the noble Lord takes an interest in the matter, it is perhaps a little remarkable that criticism of a policy which in his own language tends to subordinate Parliament and evade the Courts should come from the representative in this House of a Party whose avowed policy, as I understand it, is, if ever they come into power, by their first act to grass measures which will take away from Parliament all powers of interference with legislation, and which will preclude any appeal to the Courts by anybody who thinks he is wronged by the action which the Executive choose to take. I hope that the observations which he placed before your Lordships on this topic will be called to the attention of the Party of which he is an honoured representative, and that we may hear that that obnoxious programme has disappeared from their policy in the future. I do not wish to take up time with discussion of that topic, because I think he will agree with me it is not very directly relevant to the important other matters which he has brought before your Lordships' notice.

T come then to the matters which are directly relevant—the decrease of the control of the Parliament of the United Kingdom over foreign and Imperial affairs. My criticism of that proposition lies rather in the direction in which again I have been preceded by my noble and learned friend Lord Cecil—namely, that I doubt whether it is true that there has been a decrease in the control of the Parliament of the United Kingdom over foreign and Imperial affairs. It is true, as the noble Lord opposite has said, that it is open—he said to the Foreign Secretary, but he meant the Cabinet of the day, to advise His Majesty to make a treaty without bringing that treaty before Parliament, and that a treaty so signed by His Majesty on the advice of His Ministers is binding on this country without the consent of Parliament.

But that is not a modern innovation. It is not a practice which has grown up by way of a gradual decrease in the control of Parliament. Any study of authoritative works on International Law and on the constitutional law of this country will, I think, show that there is agreement among all constitutional authorities that it never has been part of the function of Parliament to decide upon the making of treaties. The commentator Kent put it in this way: The sole prerogative of making peace or war is vested in the Crown. Therefore also is it the Crown's prerogative to make treaties, leagues and alliances with foreign States and principals. And he goes on to point out that the only check on that power is the right of Parliament to deal with the Ministers who give advice of which it may disapprove. The only limit, so far as I know, to that constitutional principle—and it is not really a limit to the principle, but only a practical limitation of its power—is that where a treaty involves legislation or involves the payment of monies from public funds or involves the cession of territory, then it is necessary, certainly in the first two cases and probably in the third, to go to Parliament for its approval not on account of the treaty but of the doing of the act which the King by the treaty binds himself to do.

Therefore no wise Government would ever dream of advising the ratification of a treaty which could not be implemented without legislation or without payment out of public monies, without the approval of Parliament because they would know that only with Parliamentary approval could they carry out what they had undertaken to do. So far from there being a decrease in the control of Parliament, my Lords, I think the tendency has been in the other direction. I think it is true to say that modern Cabinets have fallen more and more into the habit of thinking it right to take Parliament into their confidence at the earliest possible moment, and to submit what they are proposing to do to the verdict of Parliament as soon as they are in a position to state with precision what the exact proposals are. They do that, not as a matter of constitutional obligation, but because any sensible Executive knows the great importance of working hand in hand with the Parliamentary majority of the day, and that the more Parliament is taken into the confidence of the Executive the More probable it is that the action's of the Executive will command the confidence of Parliament.

There were one or two instances which the noble Lord gave. He referred to the fact that nowadays international conferences became increasingly common and that they resulted often in international agreements, and he said these agreements cannot be altered by Parliament. That, of course, is quite true. Whether an agreement is bilateral or multilateral one party cannot alter its terms without the consent of the other parties. When the Executive of this country agrees with another country or a number of other countries to do a certain thing they cannot alter their obligation without the consent of those other countries. Parliament, when its assent is asked for, can refuse assent; and if it is a matter of major importance that refusal no doubt involves the defeat of the Ministry and a change of Government, or a General Election. But it is inherent in the nature of a treaty that Parliament cannot alter its terms because the terms are negotiated between this country and another and, once negotiated, they cannot be altered unless the other country consents. Parliament can say it will not agree to this Treaty but would agree to it if it had this or that modification, and then the Executive, if it sees fit, can approach the other party to the treaty and see whether that modification can be secured.

There was another illustration which the noble Lord gave. He stated that the Prime Minister was shortly to visit the United States. The noble Lord is better informed than. I am. I did not know any such decision had been taken—but let me assume that his information is accurate. He asked whether Parliament is going to be ignored and its time-honoured authority over-ridden. If the Prime Minister were to go on a visit to the United States no doubt he would consult his colleagues before he went, take them into his confidence as to the purpose of his visit and as to the negotiations he was going to carry out—if he were going for the purpose of carrying out negotiations; and no doubt he would go with their approval of the general line he was proposing to take and would keep in touch with them when over there by means of cables and wireless telegrams, so that they might be kept fully informed of the progress of what was happening; and no doubt if, as the result of that visit, there were any matter arranged which required legislation Parliament would be consulted at the earliest possible moment as to that legislation. But I am speaking purely hypothetically. I am not giving your Lordships any information as to what is going to happen, because I did not know that any decision for the Prime Minister to go to the United States had been taken, and therefore I am quite unable to state what the purpose of that visit will be if it takes place.

LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE

I was going by a paragraph in The Times this morning which I regarded as authoritative.

VISCOUNT HAILSHAM

It may be that The Times has sources of information other than those open to me. I can only speak from my information as far as it goes, and I did not know any such decision had been taken. However that may be there is no question of over-riding the time-honoured authority of Parliament. This Government, I am sure, is most anxious that Parliament should have the fullest opportunity of knowing what we are proposing to do and what we are doing and of expressing, I hope, their approval, but at any rate their verdict upon what is being done at the earliest opportunity.

The noble Lord referred to the fact that in 1924 a practice was introduced of not signing any treaty until it had been first laid before Parliament for a certain period. He pointed out that that was reversed in 1923 and that the Socialist Government of 1929 had not revived it. He gave the reasons and I think your Lordships will appreciate, and the noble Lord agree, that a practice which might be very convenient in a minority Government, which naturally would be very anxious to be assured of the support of those who were not members of their own Party in another place, would not necessarily form a precedent when you have a Government which represents the majority for the time being in the House of Commons. The noble Lord pointed out that in practice any such absolute rule would create very great administrative difficulties because there are a number of treaties of minor importance which yet might require to be carried out without delay, in regard to which there was no probability of Parliamentary objection, but which might be negotiated when Parliament might not be sitting for a considerable time; and it would be a real hindrance to the effective carrying out of the business of the country if that rule was absolute and binding in all cases.

The noble Lord turned from the consideration of foreign affairs to the other part of his Motion which dealt with Imperial affairs. I am not quite sure that I entirely followed the noble Lord in his argument on that part of his Motion. He referred quite rightly to the change of status of the Dominions which has been embodied in the resolutions of a series of Imperial Conferences and completed by the enactment of the Statute of Westminster. I did not gather that the noble Lord was criticising or opposing the Statute of Westminster. At any rate, it was a Statute passed as the result of arrangements, agreements, made by the Government of which the noble Lord was a member, and undoubtedly it was intended to carry out resolutions which had been reached at earlier Imperial Conferences. I agree with the noble Lord that the effect of the new status which is given to the Dominions does create difficulties in the sphere of negotiation with foreign countries. It no doubt is a difficulty for our Foreign Secretary that under the resolutions of the Imperial Conferences this Government is expected to give full information and full opportunity to the Dominions to express their opinion upon matters which are under negotiation, and that no arrangement can be made to bind any Dominion without its prior assent. No doubt the fact that this consultation has to take place does create a difficulty in the conduct of negotiations in which sometimes quick decision is essential, But I do not think that if you introduced a necessity to consult Parliament in the matter you would be taking any effective steps to remedy that sate of affairs or to lessen that evil; you would only be introducing another link in the chain or putting another cog in tie wheel, because you world still have the necessity for consultation with the Dominions.

I think that disadvantage is one which is inherent in the new status of the Dominions, and I agree with, the noble Lord that it is a matter which calls for consideration and discussion. In fact, as he knows very well, it is a matter which has received careful consideration and has been the subject of prolonged discussion at every Imperial Conference which has taken place—I think since the War. I am far from supposing that we have reached finality in the matter or that means may not be found of expediting those consultations and minimising the difficulties to which they give rise. But I do not think that the solution is to be found in inviting the Parliament of the United Kingdom to exercise a larger control over Imperial affairs; and that, after all, is the matter with which we are primarily concerned this afternoon. The noble Lord said he was not proposing to make any constructive suggestions to-day, but if he has any constructive suggestions and likes to send them to the Government I need not assure him that they will receive very careful consideration from my right honourable friend tie Secretary of State for Dominions Affairs.

When the noble Lord goes on to say that there has been established a new bureaucracy of super-Imperial bodies which creates more control outside Parliamentary hands then, with respect, I do not agree with him. In the first place I do not think we have established any super-Imperial bodies. What we have established is a number of inter-imperial bodies, which is quite a different thing. Just as there has been a very strong resistance on the part of this country against making the League of Nations a super-State, instead of a free association of sovereign States, so equally in Imperial affairs any bodies which have beer called into existence for the purpose of assisting co-operation between the different parts of the Empire have been jealously guarded against the suspicion of being given any sovereign powers, or any right to impose decisions upon the different sister Commonwealths that now make up the British Empire.

I am not sure that some of your Lordships may fully realise how much has already been done in the direction of creating bodies for consultation and for common action. When I was at Ottawa one of the matters which we had to consider was co-operation in economic matters between the different parts of the Empire, and we asked for, and obtained, what, I believe to be a full record of the number of committees of that character already in existence. It might be worth while if I tabulated them for your Lordships' information. There is first the Imperial Economic Committee. There is next the Imperial Shipping Committee, then the Empire Marketing Board, the Executive Council of the Imperial Agricultural Bureaux, the Imperial Institute, the Imperial Institute of Entomology, the Imperial Mycological Institute, the Imperial Communications Advisory Committee, the Mechanical Transport Council, the Imperial Forestry Institute, and the Empire Timbers Committee. There is, in addition, a number of somewhat analogous bodies. There is the Bureau of Hygiene and Tropical Diseases, the Wool Industries Research Association, the Empire Cotton Growing Corporation, the Standing Committee on Empire Forestry, and perhaps I might add, although in a somewhat different category, the Imperial War Graves Commission, which is an outstanding example of successful co-operation between the Dominions and the Mother Country.

The noble Lord asked me a question as to the new Committee, as he described it, which had been set up, and he wanted to know whether it was to be permanent, what were its functions, and whether its decisions were to be subject to Parliamentary control. I am afraid that the noble Lord has a little misunderstood the circumstances in which that Committee was set up, and the purpose for which it was created. When we were at Ottawa we were necessarily bound, owing to the exigencies of time, to divide up the matters which we were discussing into a series of Committees, of which the fifth dealt with the methods of economic co-operation. That Committee I happened to be serving on, and it passed a resolution which was adopted by the Conference and therefore became a recommendation of the Conference. That resolution recommends that a committee should be appointed forthwith, consisting of not more than two representatives of each of the participating Governments, to consider the means of facilitating economic consultation and co-operation between the several Governments of the Commonwealth, including a survey of the functions, organisation, and financial bases of the agencies specified in the annexed report— those included the agencies that I have tabulated, apart from the Imperial War Graves Commission— and an examination of what alterations or modifications, if any, in the existing machinery for such co-operation within the Commonwealth are desirable. The Conference further recommends that it shall be an instruction to the Committee to elect their own Chairmanh…and to report to the several Governments represented thereon not later than the 31st May next, with a view to the consideration of their report by the several Govern-merits not later than September, 1933. Your Lordships will see, I think, that that affords an answer to the questions put to me by the noble Lord.

He asked whether it is to be a permanent body. No, it is a body formed to give a report not later than the end of May, and that report will be considered by the several Governments. Its functions I have just read out in terms. He asked whether its decisions will be subject to Parliamentary revision. In fact there will not be decisions. The Committee is formed for the purpose of investigating the means of facilitating economic consultation and co-operation, and of telling the respective Governments represented what alterations or modifications are desirable, and the respective Governments, being armed with that report by the end of May, will then severally take the report into consideration and reach their own decision as to whether the recommendations of that report are such as to command their approval. It was hoped that the Governments would have time by September to consider the report and reach their own conclusions, because by September there is likely to be an opportunity for most of the Governments represented to have representatives of some kind available, more or less at the same place and time, so as to exchange views and see what conclusions emerge.

The two United Kingdom representatives are Sir Fabian Ware and Sir Horace Wilson. Sir Fabian Ware is Vice-Chairman of the Imperial War Graves Commission, and his record of work on that Commission, and the confidence he has won from I think every Dominion in the course of that work, make him a particularly suitable person to consider what means of co-operation are desirable and suitable. Sir Horace Wilson was a civil servant whose work at Ottawa was preeminent in enabling the Conference to reach a satisfactory conclusion. I hope that this explanation will fully satisfy the noble Lord as to the purpose and limits of the Committee to which he called attention. The noble Lord went on to say that it was curious that the Government should only set up a body in connection with a policy which had aroused opposition and was not permanent. I think he will realise that this Committee, to which I have called attention, is a Committee which does not really touch upon very contentious matters. It is a Committee which is designed to advise the Governments which appointed it on the general subject of economic consultation which a series of Imperial Conferences, held at different times—and quite different political complexions have characterised the Governments represented—have agreed in regarding as a very desirable thing. But when I say that, I am sure the noble Lord will not imagine that I agree with his view that the policy which was inaugurated at Ottawa is not likely to be a permanent policy. On the contrary, I could, if necessary, develop very cogent arguments which lead to the opposite conclusion.

Then the noble Lord asked me about the Colonies, and suggested that there again there had been a decrease in control. Again, I do not agree with his premise. I do not agree that Parliamentary control has diminished. I do agree, of course, that executive decisions by the Cabinet, on the advice of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, can be taken without reference to Parliament, but in practice, when there is any decision of importance, it can always be challenged in Parliament by the time-honoured and recognised methods. The commonest, of course, is to set down the Vote of that particular Department and discuss then any administrative decision which has been taken; and if Parliament disapproves the necessary consequence is that the Government suffers and the Minister or the Government as a whole, if it has forfeited the confidence of the House of Commons, has to resign, and another Government has to be found. I do not think control has lessened, except in the sense which my noble friend Lord Cecil indicated—namely, that in these days there is no doubt that, with the increasing volume of work which has to be dealt with, there is a tendency for Parliament to have less time to attend to the detail of administration. The executive power has to be left to the particular Cabinet in which the Parliamentary majority of the day has confidence, and there can only be a general control exercised, although any matter of detail can be challenged by bringing it up on the Vote, or on a special Motion, or on the Motion for the Adjournment of the House when Parliament meets.

I desire only, in conclusion, to assure your Lordships' House that I am quite certain that I am speaking the mind of every one of my colleagues when I say that the last thing that we should desire would be that either House of Parliament would suppose that we wished to take executive action without giving the fullest possible information to Parliament and without giving to Parliament the fullest opportunity of discussing and expressing its views. I think an instance which is shortly to be brought before each House in the case of the great problems of India is an indication of how anxious we are to take Parliament into our confidence and to ensure its co-operation in all matters of moment. I cannot undertake that we shall not take executive action on any matter without first asking Parliament, because such an undertaking would paralyses the efficiency of action of the Government, and would he an attempt to put on to the shoulders of Parliament a responsibility which of necessity rests upon the Ministers of the Crown. But I can assure this House that the last thing that we desire is to avoid the fullest possible consideration by Parliament of such action as we take, and that we welcome the co-operation of Parliament, the knowledge of Parliament, and, we hope, the approval of Parliament, in the steps that we are taking and in the policy which we are trying to carry out.

LORD ARNOLD

My Lords, the Motion introduced by my noble friend this afternoon deals with far-reaching matters vitally affecting every aspect of public policy. I do not propose to enter into those fundamental problems in the remarks which I shall now address to your Lordships' House, but rather to deal with certain points which illustrate, as it seems to me, the decrease of Parliamentary control and the harmful consequences which have resulted, and will result if decreased Parliamentary control continues. I will turn first to Ottawa—not in any way, of course, to re-discuss the Ottawa Agreements; there are other occasions when that has been done—but because the Ottawa Agreements do in a striking manner furnish a grave example of the decreased control of Parliament. There was no discussion about Ottawa before our Ministers left for Canada. It may be rejoined that there could have been a discussion. I, indeed, did toy with the idea myself of putting down a Motion in your Lordships' House, but that seemed quite futile, because I should have been told that it was entirely premature, that Ministers had not yet gone to Ottawa and it was utterly impossible to say what would happen there, and that we must wait until they came back. When they did come back Parliament was in effect informed that nothing could be done to change the Agreements made at Ottawa, no amendment could be passed, nothing whatever could be altered.

Now, let me give your Lordships a definite example, without, I trust, going into too great detail, of what happens if things are done in this way. The Ottawa duties—there were a great many of them —in certain of their sections applied to practically all imported fruit. The National Federation of Fruit and Potato Trade Associations desired, I believe, before Ottawa to get permission for one or two representatives to be at Ottawa for consultation when these matters of fruit duties were being considered. That permission was not given. When the Ottawa Agreements had been made and Ministers had returned to this country, as there were certain matters of very grave moment for the fruit trade, as I will indicate shortly, the National Federation of Fruit and Potato Trade Associations asked for an interview with the Prime Minister to put their case. They were told in effect that nothing could be altered; there was no use having a deputation or an interview, because the Ottawa Agreements must go forward in the form in which they came back from Canada. That is, as it seems to me, a very long way from Parliamentary control, and there were one or two provisions in regard to these fruit duties which, I think, could not possibly have survived Parliamentary discussion and control.

For instance, Ottawa put a heavy duty on oranges, and this duty, according to the Agreements there made, was to begin on April 1. The fruit trades wish that duty to begin on June 1. I will explain why. The presumption underlying these Ottawa duties on oranges was that they would be of some service to orange growing in South Africa. Why on earth the people of this country should have to pay more for their oranges in order to help the inhabitants of South Africa, most of whom are distinctly better off than are most of the people here, I do not understand. But that is what happens in tariff circles. As a matter of fact, according to the latest figures, in the two months, April and May, of the preceding year, whereas nearly 2,000,000 cwt. of oranges came to this country, in those two months only about 1,000 cwts. came from South Africa. If it had gone before the House of Commons a provision like that could not have withstood the criticisms which would have been directed against it. It would have been altered. As my noble friend's Motion indicates, if there is to be decreased Parliamentary control that is the kind of thing that happens.

The National Fruit Trades Association said: "If you are to have the duty at all let it begin on the 1st June; it is after that date that the South African oranges come in." Nothing could be done. No deputation was received. If it be said that the idea was to try to get the South African cultivation in a few days earlier a fortnight would have been sufficient for that. As it is the provision is injurious. It means dearer oranges for the people of this country—and oranges are a valuable fruit—without any service worth talking of to South Africa. On the contrary, it is, I hold, something quite injurious. These Ottawa duties are taxes, and it is no use, if I may say so with respect, the noble Viscount coming to your Lordships' House and saying, as he did just now, that it is the aim of the Government to give the utmost possible discussion and control over all matters of importance when their main policy—it has been their main policy on tariffs—is to remove tariffs almost entirely outside the area of Parliamentary discussion, control and amendment.

If there is one thing which is more firmly embedded in the British Constitution than any other, or has been until this Government came in, it has been control over finance and taxation. But that does not occur now. What has happened in regard to tariffs in general under the present Government? Here is another instance, and a very fundamental instance of decreased Parliamentary control. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has handed over a very important part of his functions to a Committee of Three. The Imports Advisory Committee has tremendous powers; in fact I do not exaggerate when I say you really have three financial Mussolinis set up by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. It is they who very largely say what is to be taxed and what is not to be taxed, so far as imports are concerned. It is quite true that after they have made a recommendation to the Treasury the Chancellor of the Exchequer is not absolutely obliged to put it into force, but as a matter of practice I think all of their recommendations are put into force. Then we have the procedure, if You can so call it, of a possible discussion on an Order-in-Council, but that is a totally different thing from the way in which Finance Bills and finance have been dealt with in this country in the past.

Unhappily—my noble friend did not touch on this—with the congestion of public business the control of the House of Commons over finance, quite apart from the actions of the present Government, is by no means what it was when I first went into the House of Commons more than twenty years ago. I think I am correct in saying that at that time—and some of my noble friends who have been in the House of Commons will bear me out—there was not, and had not been at any rate for a great many years, any closure in finance; but with the pressure of public business we came eventually to closure in finance and also to what is called the compartment procedure. Now the present Government has gone very much further, and has practically taken our financial policy outside the purview and control of the House of Commons. Your Lordships' House, of course, has no control over finance. I am not complaining of that. But so far as the House of Commons is concerned the way in which matters are now being conducted is, I consider, one or very great import to the country. It seems to me that it is impossible to defend this system. It may be said: "Would you like to have tariffs discussed one by one across the floor of the House?" Personally, I would much rather have that than the present procedure, though I do not say that is an ideal way of doing things. One of my main points is that I object to tariffs altogether. What has been done shows how, if I may use the word, sinister they are if they have to be imposed in this bole-and-corner way, for that is what it comes to. At any rate Parliament has practically no control under the present Government over tariffs.

Finally, I want to come to the Debt settlement with America, about which my noble friend spoke and to which the noble Viscount opposite also referred in his speech. This is a very important matter. The noble Viscount, with that emphasis which he so readily commands, particularly, if I may say so with respect, when he is saying something which is entirely controversial and often quite unsustainable—the noble Viscount tells your Lordships that it is always the aim and object of the Government, to give every possible opportunity for discussion. Does the noble Viscount really consider that is a true representation of what happened, for instance, last November and last December with regard to the Debt payment to tire United States? I think do the Government no injustice—I should be sorry to do them an injustice; I always find it very difficult to say anything in their favour, and on the rare occasions when that can be done I do not mind doing it—but I do them no injustice when I say that as a matter of fact the one aim and object of the Government last November and December seemed to be to prevent a discussion in the House of Commons on the question of the Debt payment to America.

Ultimately, they had to give way, and a very useful discussion took place which, as a matter of fact, revealed that there was not such a very great difference of opinion about it as might have been supposed. It was much more satisfactory to have had the debate in the House of Commons than to have this constant attempt to stifle discussion, because that is what happens too often now. These matters are represented as great mysteries which the common people cannot understand, and it is said they must be left to financiers and people like that. We have left a good many things to financiers during the last few years, and I think they are very largely responsible for the present condition of the country.

But to come to the Debt settlement. If there is going to be a settlement with the United States, I would like to discuss it not, I trust, in any controversial way. I regard this as a matter of supreme importance, because if this Debt settlement is again going to be made right outside the control of Parliament, and then later on some agreement is come to, and we are to be told that we must take it or leave it, that is a. very serious matter, more particularly if, which I am afraid is not. impossible, the Debt settlement is going to have a provision with regard to some kind of return to the gold standard. That is the point I want to put before your Lordships. There have been suggestions that when these negotiations take place it may be that, as part of the general agreement with America, if there is an agreement, there will be some provision for the return of this country to the gold standard in some form or other. For my part I am very nervous about anything of the kind, and a great many other people in this country are very nervous too, about the whole Debt settlement. They have not forgotten the so-called settlement made by Mr. Stanley Baldwin. In 1923 he went to America and came back with settlement which, we have been told, nearly led to the resignation of Mr. Bonar Law. That shows the pitfalls and difficulties of these settlements in America.

Here we are in 1933, ten years later, and the question is, what is going to happen? Who is going to the United States? If this is going to be settled outside Parliament, as am afraid will be the case with this decreased control of Parliament with which my noble friend's Motion deals, it is vitally important that the Ministers who have to undertake these very far-reaching negotiations should be those most suited to carry them on and to bring them to a conclusion which will not be, at any rate, too harmful to the interests of this country. The question has been raised as to whether the Prime Minister is going to America. Many paragraphs to that effect have appeared in the newspapers. I am discussing this merely as a question of public policy and, as it seems to me, an important public matter, and I say that in my view it is very undesirable that the Prime Minister should go to America. It is undesirable both on general grounds and on particular grounds. If the Prime Minister goes to America to negotiate some Debt settlement he will go much more as a plenipotentiary than, for instance, the Chancellor of the Exchequer. He will be adjudged over there an equal negotiator with President Roosevelt. As a matter of fact he will be in a different position, or he ought to be in a different position if the whole thing is not to be in effect kept outside Parliament.

The point I am putting to your Lordships is that the position of the Prime Minister in relation to Parliament is not the same as the position of the President of the United States in relation to Congress in that country. The President of the United States has much greater powers than a Prime Minister ought to have in this country. I do not say greater powers than he will have if the decrease in the power of Parliament is to go on. This is a matter in which the last word ought to be with Parliament, and although nominally in the United States the last word may be with Congress, yet, in effect, the President of the United States would really be in a much more powerful position as a negotiator than the Prime Minister. I also think it is very arguable whether it is a desirable thing, whether it is in accord with the dignity and prestige of this country, that the Prime Minister should go to America on a Debt settlement mission. That is very different from his visit to the United States in 1929 when he went on an international peace mission.

The real man to go, if anybody is to go, is the Chancellor of the Exchequer. It is a matter falling within the purview of his Department and it is much more in accordance with Parliamentary pro- cedure that he should deal with it. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has far more knowledge than the Prime Minister has of these matters. The Prime Minister certainly knows little or nothing about the gold standard. That was clearly shown when he spoke about the gold standard shortly after the formation of the National Government, when he entered into the most lugubrious prognostications about what would happen if we were forced off the gold standard. We were forced off the gold standard, and not a single one of those things happened, and within a short time people were saying what a good thing it was that we were forced off the gold standard and that we must not go back to it. I think that many people are extremely concerned about the gold standard. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, at any rate, has some knowledge of these things and it is most important that the right person should conduct these negotiations if these matters are going to be decided so much outside Parliament.

I am not suggesting for a moment that the present Chancellor of the Exchequer is the ideal person—amongst present Ministers I am afraid the best is a choice of evils—but I would far rather have the Chancellor of the Exchequer go to America for this purpose, because I consider that if the Chancellor of the Exchequer goes any arrangement he makes will be much more provisional and more open to amendment when he returns than if the Prime Minister goes in the position of a plenipotentiary. There will be some chance—I am afraid not much—of the House of Commons having a say in the matter if the Chancellor of the Exchequer goes, and I think it is most important if and when this mission is sent that that is what should happen. We do not want whoever goes to America to come back and present the House of Commons with a fait accompli. That is the danger to be guarded against. We do not want to be told, as we were told after the Ottawa Conference, and as we have been told again and again in financial matters, that nothing can be altered. In particular that relates to matters of currency. I am not going to discuss the Currency Act of 1928, but I think I could establish a good case for saying that the House of Commons had little control over that. It was something arranged outside with the Bank of England. Nor am I going to discuss the Bank of England, although it has infinitely more power than it ought to have because it, is not subject to the control of the House of Commons.

I cannot say that there is any decreased control there because it has not been subject to control, but unhappily the sphere with which it deals has become of such paramount importance that its power has become of much greater concern. I should say myself that no man in this country is more responsible for bad trade and unemployment than Mr. Montagu Norman. By reason of his obstinate, persistent policy of deflation he has done more than anyone else to bring the country into its present position. These things have been done largely outside Parliament because the House of Commons has no effective control over the Bank of England, and yet these matters are of fundamental importance to every man, woman and child. But as I have said it is not a case of decreased control except in the sense that the matters with which the Bank deals have become of greater and greater importance owing to the general and economic development of affairs. That is all I want to say. I do not want, and surely nobody wants, a Debt settlement with America which may involve some kind of return to the gold standard, and then for Parliament to be told that nothing can be done about it, that not a paragraph, not a word, nor a comma can be altered. If we make a return to the gold standard on the wrong basis it will cost this country more than if we went on paying the whole interest on the American Debt for the whole term which Mr. Bonar Law arranged, and repaying the capital as well.

The question which my noble friend has raised seems to me to merit the most careful consideration of the country, and, if I may say so, his speech was most valuable. This question of Parliamentary control affects not merely this country but other countries. After all, the British Parliament is the Mother of Parliaments and if Parliament in this country is to cease to be the effective instrument which it has been in the past, that is a very important matter not only for Great Britain but for other countries. This Government has unfortunately done a great deal to break down interest in Parliament. There was never more political apathy than at the present time. That is largely the to the unfair methods by which the present Government obtained power and to the lop-sided majority in the House of Commons. If in addition to that the actual work of the Government is to be done more and more outside Parliament, then our Parliamentary system will cease to occupy the position which it has done for so long in the political life of this country. That, I think, we should all agree would he something which ought, if possible, to be avoided. We ought to safeguard the prestige and the effectiveness of Parliament. That, at any rate, is my view, and in that matter I would perhaps go, in some respects, a little further than my noble friend. However that may be, I think we should all agree that if Parliamentary institutions are to be seriously weakened in the eyes of the people then the present grave outlook will grow darker than ever.

LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE

My Lords, I do not regret having raised this discussion because, I think, as I said, it is one that is important. Except for the information which the Leader of the House was good enough to give me with regard to the body for Empire economic cooperation, I cannot say he really met the points that I raised at all. He repeated in far more eloquent language than I can command the very points that I raised myself, but he did not deal with t he dangers that I considered would arise in consequence of these points. He spent a great deal of time telling us how international agreements could not be altered; but my argument was that they could not be altered—I never said they could be or ought to be altered by Parliament. My argument was that there was a great increase in these international agreements and therefore an encroachment on the power of Parliament, because Parliament could not interfere with them. An international agreement affecting our military forces has never happened before to the extent it may if any result comes out of the Disarmament Conference.

I am very glad my noble friend behind me emphasised the point regarding the negotiations on the American Debt, but I am afraid he will be disappointed. He will find that whether we are to give them the gold standard or not, it will not be by the consent of Parliament that it will be done. I do not know about the Prime Minister's movements. I certainly thought his Cabinet colleague would know. I took the paragraph I saw to-day in The Times as authoritative, but apparently it is not. The Prime Minister reminds me of the hymn— He moves in a mysterious way, His wonders to perform— and we do not know exactly whether he is going or whether he is not.

I think my noble friend Viscount Cecil who has left the House also a little misunderstood this question of international decisions. International government I quite agree is coming to the front, is increasing, and will increase. But while it may seem a matter of course to the noble Viscount, and to the noble Viscount who leads the House, and, if I may say so, to myself who has made a special study of these affairs, I can assure you it is not a commonplace matter to many noble Lords and many members of the House of Commons. They do not realise that these decisions are going to be increasingly made, encroaching on their powers, and that they will not be able to alter them at all. The noble Viscount made me rather feel that some of the points I raised were of very little consequence, but I can assure him that is not what is felt, and the literature that is growing up around these questions of the status of the Dominions and foreign policy, and therefore the peace of the world, is commanding the attention of international lawyers, politicians, and professors and students in pamphlets and in books. So I do not think I have wasted your Lordships' time on some question of little importance, hut, on the contrary, I have tried to bring a matter which I think of great moment forward for a debate in a Chamber where these methods can quite well be discussed. I know, however, there are no particular Papers that can be given to me on this question, and accordingly I beg to withdraw my Motion.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.