Lords Sitting of 20 May 1931

Preamble
The House met at a quarter before four of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
The Lord Dunleath—Sat first in Parliament after the death of his father.

LONDON MIDLAND AND SCOTTISH RAILWAY BILL.
Read 2a, and committed.
DONCASTER CORPORATION BILL. [H.L.]
Read 3a, and passed, and sent to the Commons.
ROMFORD URBAN DISTRICT COUNCIL BILL. [H.L.]
Read 3a, and passed, and sent to the Commons.
LONDON ELECTRIC, METROPOLITAN DISTRICT, AND CITY AND SOUTH LONDON RAILWAY COM PANIES BILL.
Read 3a, with the Amendments, and passed, and returned to the Commons.
SALVATION ARMY BILL.
Brought from the Commons; read 1a; to be printed, and referred to the Examiners.

MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDERS CONFIRMATION (ABERTILLERY AND DISTRICT WATER DISTRICT AND WESTERN VALLEYS (MONMOUTHSHIRE) SEWERAGE BOARD) BILL. [H.L.]
THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (LORD MARLEY): My Lords, I beg leave to introduce a Bill to confirm certain Provisional Orders of the Minister of Health relating to Abertillery and District Water District and Western Valleys (Monmouthshire) Sewerage Board; and to move that it be read a first time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 1a.—(Lord Marley.)
On Question, Bill read 1a; to be printed, and referred to the Examiners.

MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDERS CONFIRMATION (BRISTOL AND LEICESTER) BILL. [H.L.]
LORD MARLEY: My Lords, I beg leave to introduce a Bill to confirm certain Provisional Orders of the Minister of Health relating to Bristol and Leicester; and to move that it be read a first time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 1a.—(Lord Marley.)
On Question, Bill read 1a; to be printed, and referred to the Examiners.

PRESTON CORPORATION ELECTRI CITY (EXTENSION) ORDER, 1931.
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE DUCHY OF LANCASTER (LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE): My Lords, I beg to move that the Special Orders as reported from the Special Orders Committee yesterday be approved.
Moved, That the Special Orders, as reported from the Special Orders Committee yesterday, be approved.—(Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDER (CITY OF WOR CESTER) BILL.
Read 2a (according to Order), and committed.
MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDERS (MANCHESTER AND SOUTH STAFFORDSHIRE) BILL.
Read 2a (according to Order), and committed.
PUBLIC WORKS FACILITIES SCHEME (WEST SURREY WATER) CONFIRMATION BILL.
Read 3a (according to Order) and passed.

PUBLIC WORKS FACILITIES SCHEME (ACTON SWING BRIDGE) CONFIRMATION BILL.
Order of the Day for the Third Reading read.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 3a.—(Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede.)
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (THE EARL OF ONSLOW): My Lords, I would like to say one word on the Motion to read this Bill a third time, in reference to what was said in the debate on the Second Reading of the Public Works, Facilities Bill which took place on, July 28 last, when my predecessor, Lord Donoughmore, drew attention to the fact, that the procedure under that Bill gives your Lordships no power to discuss a Bill at all until it comes before you for Third Reading. But he also stated that this was safeguarded by the fact that if there is a real difficulty, if the House and the public are not satisfied with the result of the local inquiry, which of course is always made before the matter comes before your Lordships, the question can be referred to a Select Committee of the House.
There is one point that I should like to mention to-day and to which my attention has been drawn. In this particular Bill there are one or two very unimportant drafting inaccuracies, or perhaps departures from the usual precedents in drafting. Still, they are there. I do not think they are of sufficient importance to hold up the Bill, because they do not affect the clarity of the meaning of the Bill. But it might be that in some future event important drafting Amendments might be necessary, and I venture to suggest that some system of collaboration, perhaps only an informal one, might be introduced between the Department concerned, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Transport or whatever it might be, and the officers of the House. By that means, perhaps, drafting inaccuracies might be avoided and departures from precedent also. There have not been many of these Bills. This is the second this year, and I think there have been six of them altogether. It is, perhaps, desirable, when experience teaches us that something of this sort is necessary, that your Lordships' attention should be drawn to it with a view

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of improving the procedure in some slight degree in the manner in which I have suggested.
LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE: My Lords, may I say that I will convey to the Minister of Transport, who is the responsible Minister in this particular case, the expressions of opinion of the noble Earl the Lord Chairman.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, I should think that your Lordships' House is indebted to the Lord Chairman for drawing attention to this matter. The object of the Public Works Facilities Act, as I understood it, was to expedite the passing of measures which were designed to increase employment. Certainly it is important that in doing that we should not give up any safeguards in the direction of ensuring that the language of Bills should not depart from precedent or that their provisions should not be properly scrutinised. I had not known that this point was going to be raised, but, speaking for myself, I certainly hope very much that care will be taken that sufficient opportunity is given to the officers of the House, acting under the direction of the Lord Chairman, to be sure that nothing contrary to the usual practice passes through unnoticed, and to ensure that any such drafting points or, indeed, any more important points which depart from the usual practice, should be examined and brought to the attention of the House; so that before the schemes become law the House should at least know when it is sanctioning something which is out of the ordinary practice. I do not think I am saying anything which would be regarded as controversial, but I think it is important, now that this matter has been ventilated, that care should be taken to ensure that proper examination should take place of any schemes which are brought forward under the Public Works Facilities Act, and that the attention of the House should be specifically drawn to any departures from the ordinary practice.
THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (LORD PARMOOR): My Lords, I quite agree with what the noble and learned Viscount has said and also with what was said by the Chairman of Committees. I think that in matters of this kind, in order to ensure that nothing is done which ought not to be sanctioned,
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even in matters of drafting, it really is the duty of the Lord Chairman, if he will not mind my using that expression, and the officers of the House to bring anything exceptional to the notice of the House, and that irrespective of any attitude which the Department concerned may take. In fact, the responsibility lies upon us in this House, and we ought to be told in exercising that responsibility, whether any special conditions have arisen. I feel sure that the Lord Chairman and his staff will ensure on any occasion when there is any matter of that kind that we shall know it in the House in order that the House may make up its mind when coming to a decision.
THE EARL OF ONSLOW: My Lords, I should explain perhaps that this is the first time that the attention of the officers and the learned Counsel attached to the Lord Chairman has been drawn to any inaccuracy in any of these Bills. If the matter in this case had been of any importance, I should have moved the adjournment—I had not time here, it was only brought to my notice just before the House met—and should then have put down an Amendment on Third Reading. But it was not of sufficient importance. After what the noble and learned Lord the Leader of the House has said, I think I shall be encouraged to go forward and consult with the Departments so as to be quite certain that there are no inaccuracies or departures from precedent, and, if there are, to hold up the Bill before it comes to your Lordships' House in order that they may be corrected.
On Question, Bill read 3a, and passed.

CUMBERLAND MARKET (ST. PANCRAS) BILL.
House in Committee (according to Order) on re-commitment of the Bill; Bill reported without amendment.

OUR POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST.
LORD TRENCHARD LORD TRENCHARD rose to ask His Majesty's Government whether they will make a statement concerning an inquiry into the unification of control and policy in the Middle East; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, the Motion standing in my name is, I

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admit, very vague. It was meant to be vague, as I had thought at one time that it might be unnecessary to bring this matter before your Lordships, but I hope when you have heard the few words I want to say that you will consider it is a subject of such great importance that it should come before this House. I look upon it as a subject of the greatest importance in the development of this Commonwealth of ours. My Motion really deals with the question of control and policy in and around Arabia. I would ask your Lordships for a moment to picture in your minds' eye Arabia, a country some of you may know. It is bounded on the east and south-east by the Persian Gulf. With regard to the Persian Gulf I am dealing with the west side, the Arabian side. Then, on the south it is bounded by the Indian Ocean, on the west by the Red Sea, on the southwest by Aden, and on the north by two new commitments of the British Empire—namely, Iraq and Transjordania and Palestine.
Ibn Saud, which is a name familiar to all your Lordships, is the great potentate who reigns in the greatest part of Arabia, and his country borders on seas and countries in which we have definite commitments and responsibilities, some major and some minor, but they are responsibilities. Ibn Saud's country borders on Iraq on the north, the Sheik of Koweit's territory, the Trucial Chief's, a little further the Persian Gulf, then a little further down Muscat. Then again his country runs close up to that great fortress, Aden. I do not think that it will surprise all your Lordships, but it may surprise some if you realise that this comparatively small part of the world is dealt with by no less than three Governments—the Government of India, the Government of Bombay and the Government here at home. It is also dealt with by six Departments. There are the War Office, the Admiralty and the Air Ministry, which are combined by that excellent body the Chief of the Staffs Sub-Committee and the Committee of Imperial Defence. Therefore, really the Services are one. It is also dealt with by the India Office, the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office.
Every little raid—and I regret to say that for many years yet there will be continually raids by rival tribesmen—has to
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be dealt with by all these Governments and Departments. There are many other points that crop up daily and all these Departments and three Governments have to deal with them. I would like, if I may, to point out how I think this came about. Originally Arabia was an impenetrable country from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf. There was no Suez Canal, so that all orders that had to go to the Persian Gulf had to go through India, and all information or reports from the Persian Gulf had to go to India before they could get home to England. Even after the Suez Canal was built—it was opened in 1860 or thereabouts—the reports had still to go via India, and that took 27 days, and more sometimes. Now motor cars run from the Mediterranean to Baghdad and Basra in hours and aeroplanes fly continually in a matter of a few hours to the Persian Gulf. But it is still several days from the Persian Gulf to India. In other words, the Mediterranean, we may say, is now within eight or nine hours of the Persian Gulf, and it is still by sea about seven days from India.
There is another point that I would like to mention in order to show what change has taken place in the situation. In the days I am speaking of we had no responsibility in Iraq or Transjordania or Palestine. Those places have been added to the responsibilities of the British Empire, and they lay right across the North of the Arabian Continent. We shall see great developments—we see mention of them in to-day's paper—such as pipe lines and railways across the desert. Motor cars go now and aeroplanes continually go across and out to Australia, etc We can see that that desert is going to be opened more and more, and transport will go more and more across this country. Therefore, there have been great changes since the days when the Persian Gulf and Aden were dealt with by some of the Depart-meats. It may be said that Departmental Committees, upon which all Departments interested are represented, would meet the difficulties, but I feel certain they would not meet the position to-day. I do not think I need labour that point here. I know too well it misses the main point, and that is the one man or the one office that should be responsible on the many minor points. I

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know quite well that it is necessary to consult the Departments on many matters. That will be done when the one man is responsible just as much as now. A Departmental Committee has no power of decision of its own, but I would rather, with regard to this particular point, ask that the administration troubles should be left over for consideration in the future.
I may on some future occasion, if your Lordships will allow me, raise this question, but I am not really dealing with that point to-day. My point to-day is the Persian Gulf and Aden. I would ask your Lordships to picture that part of the world, thirty or forty years hence, composed as I have described it at the opening of my speech, with irrigation, with cotton, with railways, with increases of population. That part of the world will develop greatly. Is it too much to say that it may become as prosperous as the Sudan? Surely I may say, therefore, that the Persian Gulf is vital to our trade if Arabia develops as I have said. Surely it would be to the interests of the Empire as a whole to make that trade go East and West not North and South. Surely we should try to be able to trade with that country in the future. I would like to say also that it is vital not only as regards trade but as regards communication. I do not think "vital" is too strong a word. It is not only vital to one particular part of the British Empire; it is vital to the whole. It is on the direct road, the short road, from England through the Mediterranean to Egypt, India, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Hong Kong and our interests in China. This is where the greatest saving in time could be made with railways, with motor cars and aeroplanes.
I would have liked to ask the noble Lord, the Secretary of State for Air, if the Persian Gulf is not vital from the point of view of air communication in future development as he sees it, and I feel certain he would say "Yes." It is vital not only to India but to Singapore, Australia, New Zealand and our great interests in China. Surely in the interests of efficiency and economy alike this should be run from one place here at the heart of the Empire. It is also vital to defence. The noble Viscount who will speak after me, Lord Plumer, will be
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able to point this out better than I can, but I would like to ask this question: What made us go to Mesopotamia in the Great War? Surely one of the reasons was the fear of Germany coming down the Persian Gulf and being on the flank of our communications. That menace has gone, but there is still a very great menace that must be dealt with. I do press very much the question of the control of this area. It is one of immediate importance to the Empire as a whole, and should be given consideration now rather than later. I feel it is essential that one Government and one Department should deal with this.
With regard to Aden—if I may detain your Lordships a few minutes longer—we all know that Aden is an important fortress at the south corner of the Red Sea. It is of vital importance to the Eastern commerce of this country. I wish the noble Earl, Lord Beatty, could have been present here to-day to speak on this matter of the Persian Gulf and Aden. Through unforeseen circumstances he cannot be here, but although sometimes I have not always quite agreed with him, I believe that in this matter he would have supported the views I am trying to put forward. To return to the control of Aden. At present military control is run from Downing Street but there is another side of the picture, the civil side. As to the trade point of view, it may be that in the future in the development of this Empire coastal trade will be dealt with, and laws will be made which will make coastal trade in any ships except Dominion ships impossible. I believe that in the interests of their own Eastern trade they might pass Acts that would practically close Aden to export trade in British or Empire ships. There is another point of importance in regard to trade both in the Persian Gulf and in Aden. I read many reports that tariffs are being put on from the local point of view. Surely therefore it is necessary as far as we can to keep the control of this trade from the Empire point of view on the broadest possible basis. Others can put that point much better than I can.
Finally, I would say one word with regard to the inhabitants of this country. Arabia is inhabited by Arabians. They look for their religion to the West and not to the East. They look to Mecca and Medina; they do not look to the East.

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They speak Arabic and they go up to the shores of the Mediterranean. I have not brought up this point to add difficulties to a situation which I know is already difficult enough, but I feel that if this matter is not dealt with now the difficulties will increase a thousand times in the next twenty years, and that it really will be simplification if the question is dealt with early. I have tried to be careful and guarded in my utterances and I am not attempting to make this in any way a Party question, but I do feel that it is of such vital importance to the future smooth running of the Empire and its communications as a whole that it is right that I should lay it before your Lordships. I would ask His Majesty's Government if they would not at once institute an inquiry to report upon how, with the least disturbance politically, the control of policy in Arabia and the Persian Gulf and Aden, under Downing Street, could be brought about. I beg to move.
VISCOUNT PLUMER: My Lords, I beg to support the Motion which my noble friend Lord Trenchard has just put before you so ably, and I wish to endorse the recommendations he has made for the unification of Aden and the stations on the Persian Gulf. I should like, if I may be permitted, to emphasise two points in connection with his recommendation—first, that it is a gravely important matter and that that importance will certainly increase as time goes on; and secondly, that it is a matter which should be dealt with now. The noble Lord, Lord Trenchard, has not raised any question as to military control as between the Admiralty, the War Office and the Air Ministry. That is a matter which must come up later when the main issue is decided. But although he has not emphasised it, I know that he feels very strongly the embarrassment and difficulties in connection with the movements and disposition of units of the Air Force under the present complicated arrangements. The same thing applies, in my opinion, as regards the Army, and it is from the Army point of view alone that I wish to make a few remarks to-day.
It is, I think, an accepted truth of military, operations or preparations for them, that the smaller the force the more important it is that there should be concentration, central control and every pos-
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sible facility for arriving at a quick decision to be followed by prompt action. As compared with our responsibilities in all parts of the Empire, our Army must certainly be described as a very small force. For financial reasons the numbers are now reduced to what may practically be called bedrock. We have no striking force and no general reserves, and I think I am within the mark if I say that, without calling up reserves, it would be practically impossible to put even one Division in the field from the home troops. Abroad our commitments and our protective responsibilities are so great and so varied that it is quite out of the question to concentrate the troops any closer than they are at present. That being so, we are dependent for the fulfilment of our responsibilities on mobility. Now mobility must, I think, depend on there being central control. From that alone can follow facilities for rapid action and prompt decisions.
Aden and the stations in the Persian Gulf are not mere localities. They are vital strategic points of communication, as Lord Trenchard has said, not only with India, but with the Far East, and even still further afield. They are a matter of concern to the whole Empire. It has been found that present arrangements in connection with those places are cumbersome and unsatisfactory. In the future they are likely to be dangerous, for whatever may be the upshot of the present developments with regard to the government of India, it is quite possible that we may be at some future time confronted with a Government which, to say the least of it, is apathetic with regard to Imperial interests. I hope the Government will realise that the time is opportune for making a change. I know that there are arguments both for and against control being vested either in the Foreign Office or in the Colonial Office, but the main point is that there should be real unification of control, that the unification should be centralised and that, with that central authority, the threads should be held where they ought to be held, in the heart of the Empire.
LORD LLOYD: My Lords, I think we shall all feel much indebted to my noble friend Lord Trenchard for bringing to our notice the very important issues connected with the Persian Gulf and Aden areas and their administration, and I

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desire only to say a very few words in support of his plea that a less cumbersome machinery and more direct control should be substituted for the rather unsatisfactory methods of direction and administration of to-day. I need not remind your Lordships that ever since we started our factories at Jask in 1618, after the fall of Portuguese power, under a charter from Shah Abbas, the Persian Gulf has been an area of vital commercial and strategic interest to Great Britain. The adventurous energy of the East India Company in opening up factories all up the coast, the work of the Navy in lighting and buoying the Gulf, in stopping the gun-running from Muscat and in giving peace to the Pirate Coast and the Trucial Coast, the general persuasive interest that has been exerted by our forces on the policy of central Arabia—all these have amply justified our claim to a special position in the Persian Gulf: a claim which, as your Lordships will remember, was affirmed in 1903 by Lord Lansdowne's declaration and by many subsequent declarations from Lord Curzon and other members of His Majesty's Government at various times.
I was turning up this morning Sir Valentine Chirol's wonderful book on Middle Eastern policy, and there I stumbled across a quotation, which is apposite, I think, to our discussions to-day, from the writings of Captain Mahan who said that the "concession"—we might substitute for the word concession "maladministration"—
"in the Persian Gulf, whether by general arrangement with other Powers or by neglect of the local commercial interests which now underlay political and military control, will imperil Great Britain's naval situation in the Farther East, the political position in India, the commercial interests in both, and the imperial tie between ourselves and Australasia."
So definite a pronouncement by perhaps the greatest authority on sea power will, I think, be respected even by the staunchest advocates of a policy of self-effacement.
If such has been the importance of the Persian Gulf in the past, its importance to-day is much greater when not only the land and sea route to India is concerned but the air route as well. As the noble Lord has said, it is of far greater im-
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portance to-day because since those days we have acquired an oil interest of supreme importance to us as a naval power. Indeed, I believe I am right in saying that Abadan is the only purely British oil supply available for our Navy. I will not attempt to discuss here what would be our position in war time if America at any moment felt indisposed to continue to supply us with oil, or what would happen to our security whilst some question of neutrality in this connection was being discussed at The Hague under that Optional Clause by which His Majesty's present Government have so endangered the maritime security of this country.
In these circumstances it is obviously essential that the machinery of direction should be of a character enabling prompt action and quick decisions to be made in case of need. No one can say that the present system answers this description. All the more important is it during the present phase of Indian constitutional development, when the question of the degree of intimacy of India's relationships with England will be unsettled, that any area so vital to us strategically as the Persian Gulf should be under the direct control of Whitehall. Nor should the Government of India, who seem to be quite willing to contemplate the abandonment of a far more integral area—namely, Burma—object to relinquishing on the western flank control of the Persian Gulf. The fact is that the Persian Gulf has only in the past been administered by the Government of India because originally it was the East India Company that had created our interests in the Gulf, for the Indian marine performed valuable functions there: or, more particularly, because no one has ever bothered to alter the system once it was begun. Those who remember the long battles over the Baghdad Railway for ten years would be happier if they saw the culmination of those efforts centred in more direct and more efficient administration.
I can speak with some little experience about Aden, because when I was in India Aden was under my administration, though I shared it with at least two and perhaps three other Departments. For general administrative and Budget pur-

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poses the Government of Bombay was responsible; the Army authorities at Whitehall were responsible for military control the Colonial Office was responsible for Arab affairs in the Aden hinterland. This trinity of control was the greatest handicap to Aden's development, with the result that I recommended its transfer from the hands of my Government in Bombay to another authority. I venture to suggest that it is clear that Aden, which is in its nature really a fortress, should be administered very much under the same system as Gibraltar, with a military Governor, and under the control of the Colonial Office or another Department.
As the noble Lord has said, it is the question of principle which we desire to get established. We seek that the Government should recognise that the present system is unsatisfactory, and if we can gain that admission it will then remain a matter of discussion what is the appropriate Department of Government under which the Persian Gulf and Aden should be administered. No doubt a Whitehall battle among the Departments with regard to that matter must he fought. I would only discuss that to this extent. I would suggest that is is fairly obvious that none of these Service Departments could properly direct those areas because none of them are administrative in the particular sense of the term. Again, if the Persian Gulf and Aden were removed from the control of the Government of India, it would seem inappropriate that they should go under the India Office in London. Equally it would seem probably unsuitable that the Foreign Office should attempt to control great administrative areas, because they have no administrative section, and have already shown a very comprehensible embarrassment at times in their understanding of administrative duties with respect to the Sudan and Egypt, inasmuch as they are not fully accustomed to such duties.
I could not properly discuss the matter to-day, but I should think that the Colonial Office, with its wide administrative experience in every part of the world, would be able to devote itself to the administrative affairs of the Gulf and Aden, with less dislocation than any other Department. I have only this to put before your Lordships. We do desire, without attempting to embarrass
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His Majesty's Government, to bring to their notice the enormous importance of this question, and to suggest that it might easily happen that undue delay in dealing with this question might cause us at a later date most bitterly to rue our neglect and want of foresight.
LORD LAMINGTON: My Lords, four years ago I brought up this question, and therefore perhaps I may be allowed to say a few words upon it. As Lord Trenchard has said, it is a, very important question indeed, and I only wish I had known beforehand that he was going to take the line he has, because I would have looked up the debate of four years ago to see what the Government reply then was. I pointed out then that Arabia was a great block of country, self-contained, inhabited by a homogenous people, having one religion and one language. Therefore, if there was one area which could be dealt with properly by one Department it would be Arabia. Lord Trenchard has shown how very difficult the present system of administration is. There is one feature in particular which has not been referred to and that is the question of providing officials who speak the language. From time to time we have had to pitchfork into official positions any one who could be obtained. I wonder that Lord Lloyd, having served so brilliantly in Egypt, did not make particular reference to that difficulty.
Lord Lloyd suggested that probably the Colonial Office would be the best Department to deal with the special Department that ought to be created. He has had more experience than I, but I should have thought rather to the contrary, because so many of the questions which arise with regard to Arabia are political and Foreign Office questions. I should have thought that the essential Department would have been the Foreign Office. With regard to Aden I have repeatedly wearied your Lordships by drawing attention to the difficulties there, and there again, to my mind, the Foreign Office would be the right Department. It is, however, really a question of having one office dealing with the Middle East. Lord Lloyd has referred to the Government of India. Many Committees have from time to time reported upon the expense contingent upon the presence of our representatives in the Persian Gulf and Arabia. The Welby Commission in

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1900, and also the Geddes Report and the Inchcape Committee have dealt with this subject, and the Inchcape Committee, which last reported on the question, said:
"We are strongly of opinion that the present arrangement should be revised without delay and that the Government of India should take over the whole cost of certain consulates, etc., which abut on India and leave the others to the Home Government, possibly paying some share in one or two cases in which the two Governments have a mutual interest. It is in our opinion, very lesirable to ensure that India's liabilities in Persia should be strictly limited and defined. We recommend, therefore, that a revision of the existing arrangements be considered, and also that the possibility be examined of making a charge to shipping for lighting and buoying the Persian Gulf the cost of which is at present shared by India and the United Kingdom on the half and half basis."
But all the way through it is recognised that both Persia and our own country have both great responsibilities. The late Lord Curzon regarded the Persian Gulf and Persia as the glacis of the defences of India. He considered that the Persian Gulf and Persia were absolutely essential to the proper defence of India. I do not think, therefore, that we could leave out the Indian Government from a share of the responsibility, and also of the expense, of maintaining our position in that part of the Middle East. I hope that His Majesty's Government will see their way to making this change and having some co-ordinated authority, but I do not think you could eliminate the Government of India. I should think also it would be very unfortunate to do so. In these days we want to do everything possible to show that we recognise our interests and our joint responsibilities, and even the Simon Report, though it suggests that India possibly pays rather too much of the expense, does not at all favour the idea that India should cease to have some joint responsibility. However, I am glad indeed that the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Trenchard, has raised this matter, because for many years I have regarded it as of very great importance, and the present position is extremely unsatisfactory.
LORD STONEHAVEN: My Lords, the two noble and gallant Lords on the Cross Benches have, with all the authority that attaches to the high responsibilities that
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they have carried, drawn the attention of your Lordships' House to the very unsatisfactory state of affairs in a most important part of the Empire, and their statements and arguments have been reinforced by the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd, who himself has had close association with the region in question, and who also speaks with great authority. May I be allowed to approach the question from a different angle? It was, indeed, a point that was touched upon, but would like to expand it somewhat.
The Persian Gulf and Aden are essentially a part of the Empire, which the rest of the Empire looks to Great Britain to administer. As we develop the system of delegating greater authority to the different portions of the Empire it necessarily follows that there is a degree of authority which we cannot delegate, and our responsibility to that extent becomes greater. I think, therefore, that the moment is opportune to raise this question, because it is of interest not merely to this country, not merely to India, but equally to Australia and to the rest of the Empire, that the Persian Gulf and Aden should be administered in a manner which is not open to the criticisms brought against the present system of administration by noble Lords who are so well qualified to express that criticism. I hope that the noble Lord who represents the Government will be able to give satisfactory assurances to your Lordships' House that this matter is engaging his attention, and that reforms are contemplated that will satisfy the criticisms that have been brought forward.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (LORD PASSFIELD): My Lords, I certainly do not complain of this Question having been raised, and raised so ably as it has been, by the noble Lords who have spoken. Indeed I think they have rendered a service in bringing the matter so forcibly before your Lordships' House, and calling the Government's attention to the difficulties which have arisen, and which may arise, from the situation in these parts. But let me say at once that this subject has engaged the attention of the present Government, and is still engaging the attention of the present Government, and I am not going to contend that the present arrangements are either perfectly satisfactory or that they will necessarily escape reform as

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things happen. But I think it would only be candid to explain to your Lordships that, so far as the dealing with these different parts of the world is concerned, I think we cannot escape the conclusion that the difficulties arise from the nature of the case and not wholly or, as I venture to think, even chiefly, from the froward intention of past Governments or the present Government to maintain an unnecessary multiplicity in the organisation.
The debate has roamed over more countries than one. We call the whole of the territory for short the Middle East, but of course the circumstances are very different. The noble Lord, Lord Trenchard, laid stress at the beginning on the circumstances of Arabia. That in itself is not one question but several questions. After that we have the special case of Aden, which though it is in Arabia is different from all the rest of Arabia if only on the one technical point—which it is rather necessary to remember—that the fortress of Aden is British territory and in the British Empire, whereas the rest of Arabia is not British territory and is not in the Empire. Then attention was specially directed to the Persian Gulf, which also differs in status as well as in circumstances from the rest of Arabia and again from Aden. And Arabia itself, as we have been reminded, is bounded on the north by Iraq and Transjordania and such places as Koweit, with each of which our circumstances are necessarily different. We cannot take up the same position with regard to Iraq that we can towards Koweit or Arabia or Transjordania. We have still not mentioned Palestine in which we have a very special position, not the least easy to manage of all those that I have already recited.
Of course there is a great deal to be said in theory and from the point of experience for avoiding multiplicity of control, even when it is not accompanied by multiplicity of organisation. But, on the other hand, as we have found in the course of the debate, if you are going to try to put all the organisation and all our communications with these various and very differing parts of the Middle East into the hands of one Government Department, under one Minister, you at once land yourself in certain difficulties. The noble Lord, Lord
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Trenchard, said there were no fewer than six Departments concerned. That is perfectly true, but he himself went on to say that three of those Departments represented the three fighting Services and that they were necessarily all concerned to a larger or smaller extent in every part of this Middle East. But Lord Trenchard went on to explain, I think with great justice, that there was no great difficulty because these three Departments were united in the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff. For all fighting purposes or defence purposes you could not reduce the number of Defence Departments, but they were actively united and co-ordinated in a single organ—namely, the three Chiefs of Staff representing the three Services. I do riot think we can get any better organisation than that at present so far as these three out of the six Departments are concerned.
Then the other three Departments were the Foreign Office, the India Office and the Colonial Office. As the debate has proceeded, arguments have been brought forward which would seem to indicate that some noble Lords think that the whole of these various countries should be placed under the control of the Foreign Office. Others have suggested the Colonial Office and, indeed, Lord Lamington, I think it was, reminded us that the India Office could not be left out. That is die difficulty. It might be desirable if we could bring the peace administration, apart from the question of defence and the question of war, into one Government Department. But it would not be possible in the circumstances for one Government Department, whichever is the best adapted for the purpose, to deal with all these different countries without almost constant reference to one or other of the two other Departments. It is certain, for instance, that if you placed the whole of the Middle East under the sole control of the Colonial Office, that office could not proceed a step in any serious matter of policy without the Foreign Office coming in. All round the Middle East there are organised countries which are not part of the British Empire and which necessarily must come within the sphere of the foreign relations which are administered under the Foreign Secretary. In the history of our relations, as has been

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pointed out with great eloquence by Lord Lloyd, the India Office has been prominent in one part of the area, with regard to the Persian Gulf at any rate, and whatever happened it would not be possible for the Colonial Office, if it were told to administer all these countries, to ignore the feelings and desires of the India Office or the real interests of India.
There are, of course, little corners where that problem is somewhat easier. There seems no reason why the Colonial Office, which is already charged with the supervision of the Protectorate all round Aden, should not be equally charged with the fortress of Aden itself, as Lord Lloyd suggested, like Gibraltar. Just as Gibraltar takes its place among the Crown Colonies but under a military Governor with the primary intention of regarding it as a fortress even down to to-day (I do not know how long it will he necessary to regard it as a fortress) so Aden might be treated in the same way. But let us remember that Gibraltar has no Protectorate attached to it. It is separated from Spain only by a few hundred yards of neutral ground, as it is called; whereas Aden is surrounded by a Protectorate which extends into Arabia, which has been the source of a great many difficulties, and touches or joins, if we can say that there is a frontier at all, with the potentate in whom Lord Lamington is interested, the Imam of the Yemen, who is not part of the British Empire and with whom our relations are bound to be of a different character.
I venture to suggest that these difficulties which are presented by the varying circumstances of the different countries in the Middle East, can easily be exaggerated, and I want to state to your Lordships very definitely that, as a matter of fact, all questions of policy, big and small, are not left to be dealt with by this Department or that, or by the Government of India, but that really the responsibility is undertaken by His Majesty's Government as a whole. Just because of the multiplicity of separate interests which have to be taken into account and the necessary difference between the points of view which have to be borne in mind, it is at the present time—I do not know anything about the past—quite definitely the Cabinet which undertakes the control of all issues of
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policy in regard to these countries. The Persian Gulf from the point of view of policy is not administered by the Government of India. It is not administered by the Colonial Office. That is quire definitely undertaken by the Cabinet. As to the Departments concerned, we have now an arrangement by which they have an opportunity of day-by-day vigilance over all incidents. Apart from incidents which may be important, it is necessary that they should be watching because in the nature of the case in these countries quite minor incidents might develop into serious crises in a very short time. Consequently, we have to maintain a constant watchfulness on all the various parts of this Middle East territory, from Palestine, which has to be administered definitely as if it were a Crown Colony though under special restrictions and special requirements, to the other extreme such as the independent potentate of Central Arabia, Ibn Saud, and of course the other States bordering on the Persian Gulf.
The machinery by which the Cabinet not only decides the policy but controls the administration so far as this administration is maintained, has been overhauled in consequence of the decision which has been alluded to. The question has been very carefully considered. It is not merely a quarrel between Whitehall Departments. The real difficulties of the situation have compelled the creation of machinery which gives us a united organisation in which all the different interests and all the different points of view have to be taken constantly into account. I do not want to prophesy about the future, but I want to say in general terms which your Lordships will understand because I do not want to particularise, that His Majesty's Government have the fullest intention of maintaining in the hands of His Majesty's Government itself the whole decision of policy with regard to the whole of this Middle East. So far as this Government is concerned there will be no parting with those decisions of policy in any changes which we may expect or foresee on any side of the Middle East. That, at any rate, is the Government policy.
I should like to go back to the ordinary daily administration and to say that we believe we have now got an organisation, with the control in the hands of the

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Cabinet, which is working satisfactorily so far as so difficult a situation can work satisfactorily. Just as on the one side we have the three Service Departments represented by the Committee of the three Chiefs of Staff—we cannot reduce it to a smaller unit than that—so on the other hand we have the necessary Departments united in an analogous way, and I believe that the organisation is now working reasonably satisfactorily. At any rate, it does not seem possible to arrive at any improvement by turning out the Foreign Office and the India Office and saying the Colonial Office alone shall deal with these matters; or, similarly, turning out the Colonial Office and the India Office and saying the Foreign Office shall deal with them; or—there is still a third alternative—turning out the Colonial Office and the Foreign and saying the India Office shall deal with them. We cannot see any improvement in working in any of those ways, and we have not yet come to believe that the creation of a separate Ministry and a separate Minister, a separate Secretary of State for the Middle East, is at all warranted.
Consequently, I can only repeat that the Government have considered the matter very carefully. They have taken into account the considerations which have been urged in the course of this debate. They have made an organisation which is an improvement on anything that has gone before, and which, we think, secures constant vigilance with regard to minor matters, and the reservation of all issues of policy for the Cabinet as a whole. I do not want to go into the details of that organisation. It would not be proper to do so, for part of it is confidential; but at any rate those are the lines on which the Government have proceeded and on which they intend as at present advised to continue. We do not think that it is practicable to get a single Ministry in charge. Whatever changes may come in any direction the present Government have no intention of parting with the control of policy from the hands of the Cabinet as we know it. That I think would be the answer to the noble Lord, Lord Stonehaven, who suggested that the Empire looks to Great Britain to administer those territories in the Middle East, and, speaking generally, I accept that. The Government, I do not like to say administer,
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that is a little too detailed and technical, but the Government is responsible for every decision of policy—small policy as well as large policy—in all these territories, and we have no intention, whatever changes are made, of parting with that control of policy from the hands of the Cabinet of the United Kingdom.
LORD TRENCHARD: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Passfield, for his reply, but I will not follow him upon the subject of the departmental squabbles in Whitehall. I purposely, in my opening remarks, said that I was not touching on that question, but was dealing with the Persian Gulf and Aden. The noble Lord, if I understood him rightly, made an announcement of the greatest importance. I understood him to say that the Government have no intention of parting with the control of policy in the changes that are being discussed in Whitehall now.
LORD PASSFIELD: Yes.
LORD TRENCHARD: In those circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

AIR MAIL.
LORD SANDHURST LORD SANDHURST asked His Majesty's Government whether it is the practice of the Post Office in the case of packets marked for despatch by air mail, but insufficiently stamped, to despatch them by ordinary mail; and whether they will consider the alteration of the practice so as to admit of despatch by air mail subject to payment of a penalty fee on delivery.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I rise to put the Question which stands in my name. I have here an envelope which hears an eight anna stamp, and is marked "For despatch by air mail." When this came to me I had the curiosity to weigh it, because it was delivered by ordinary mail and marked, "Insufficiently paid for transmission by air mail." The weight shows that there is only a very small balance against the missive. No doubt the authorities were perfectly right in saying it was insufficiently stamped for the purposes of the air mail, inasmuch as it exceeded half an ounce;

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and I only mention these details to show the bona fides of the sender. I understand that sending a letter by ordinary post in these circumstances is the usual practice of the Department. In this case the recipient would gladly have paid a penalty fee in respect of the insufficiency of the stamping for the advantage of having the letter delivered, as intended; by air mail, and I, imagine that in most cases of this kind a recipient of a letter, stamped and despatched and marked "For air mail" would gladly pay the necessary penalty in order to receive the letter with greater despatch, having regard to the fact that people do not send letters by air mail unless they have a reason, and people do not pay four times the normal rate just for the fun of the thing.
In this case the letter, having been delivered by ordinary mail, the Post Office at one end or the other pocketed six annas, the ordinary rate being two annas, for which they gave no consideration whatever. In the first place that strikes one as hardly honest, but quite apart from that it does not seem to me to be good business. Had they followed the practice which is in force with inland letters of delivering the letter, subject to payment of double the deficiency, they would have taken, instead of six annas, double six annas, or about a shilling. That, I should have thought, would be better business from their point of view, and would be better business from the point of view of the recipient of the letter. I should imagine there would be very few cases of letters of this kind in which the recipient was not willing to pay an additional fee; so few that the penalty rate which would be charged would more than repay the Post Office for any letters which they carried and which were refused on delivery.
I am not, I hope, unreasonable. I think it would be unreasonable to ask the Post Office in all cases where a letter is marked "For air mail" to deliver the letter by air mail subject to a penalty, but I think there ought to be at all events some practice of enabling the letter to be delivered by air mail when the bona fides of the sender is not in doubt. What I do invite the Post Office to do is to reconsider its practice so as to admit of the delivery by air mail of all letters, so marked, and stamped with an air mail
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fee not deficient to an amount exceeding the rate for one half-ounce. That would mean that if a letter were stamped with eight annas or about 6d. as I think it is, at this end, the letter would be despatched subject to a penalty fee, if the deficiency did not exceed what was required to pay for an additional half-ounce and so on. I think that really would be a sufficient guarantee of good faith on the part of the sender. The recipient would have the satisfaction of getting the letter, as it was intended, by a rapid despatch, and the Post Office would have the advantage of the penalty fee. I venture to submit that would be a reasonable way of meeting the difficulty.
LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE: My Lords, the point raised by the noble Lord with regard to the particular letter in question is one which I must deal with by taking the general practice as a whole. Let me say to begin with that I think the particular case he has brought before your Lordships' House is rather an exceptional one. On the whole it is found that there are only about one in a thousand of the letters which are treated as the noble Lord suggests in his Question, being sent by the ordinary post instead of despatched by air mail, because of insufficiency of stamps. The practice is governed at present by the Postal Union Convention of London, which was signed by every postal administration in the world. The reason it is laid down that air postal fees must be prepaid by the sender, arid by the sender only, and that surcharges must not be collected, is because of the very high charges which are made for certain air mail services. For instance, there are charges for letters to certain South American countries by a French company which amount to 4s. per half 0z. Heavy letters are very frequently sent by this service, costing several pounds. It is quite obvious that there would be considerable difficulty in collecting substantial sums from addressees and a number of under-paid letters would probably be rejected and have to be returned to the senders. That is the general international convention by which we are bound and for those reasons.
But the question more especially raised by the noble Lord was with regard to letters from this country to India. This

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service carries more than half of the total air mail correspondence despatched from this country; so it is naturally of importance. We made the proposal some time ago to the Indian Post Office that there should be a mutual agreement—that an experiment should be tried in fact—that in the case of letters sent by air mail between the two countries insufficiently stamped, double the deficiency should be collected from the addressees. That, I think, was more or less the suggestion made by the noble Lord himself. An exceptional arrangement of this kind to modify the definite provisions of the Convention—because it would be exceptional and it would be outside what has been generally signed by the postal administrations throughout the world—can only be made, naturally, with the consent of the Indian authorities and the Indian Post Office. We have placed this suggestion before them, but the Indian Post Office have so far not given us a reply. If in their reply they say they are prepared to go on with this experiment it will be tried, and where there is such small cost as there is in the despatch of letters to India—it is only 6d.—the difficulty of collection from the addressees will not be considerable.
The Post Office take such measures as are practicable to minimise the inconvenience caused by withholding underpaid letters from the mail. When the name and address of the sender of an underpaid letter is known the sender is, whenever possible, given the opportunity of making up the deficiency. I was surprised to hear from the noble Lord that the letter in question was so near the proper weight, because in most cases if it is found that there is very little difference and that there is obviously only a mistake in weighing the practice is that the letter is forwarded by air mail without any penalty. I hope we shall be able to inform the noble Lord who has raised this Question when a reply is received from the Indian Office on the particular point at issue.
LORD SANDHURST: I am very much obliged to the noble Lord for his reply.

PRODUCTION OF OIL FROM COAL.
LORD SANDERSON LORD SANDERSON asked whether His Majesty's Government can give in-
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formation in regard to the scientific investigations by the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research on the production of oil from coal. The noble Lord said: My Lords, the Question I have to ask is one which was originally set down on the Order Paper by my noble friend Lord Rochester, and your Lordships will be sorry, I am sure, to hear that Lord Rochester is unable through illness to be in your Lordships' House to-day. Therefore I have been asked to raise this Question in his place. The Question is "To ask whether His Majesty's Government can give information in regard to the scientific investigations by the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research on the production of oil from coal." I do not propose to make a speech on the subject, as I have no expert knowledge, but we are going to have this afternoon what I am sure your Lordships will recognise as the very great pleasure of hearing the noble Lord, Lord Rutherford, speak on the subject. Your Lordships will, of course, recognise that Lord Rutherford is probably better equipped with expert knowledge on this subject than any other living man.
There are one or two points that occur to me as the merest layman on this matter. Your Lordships will remember that about three weeks ago we had a discussion in your Lordships' House on the question of smoke abatement, and my noble and learned friend the Leader of the House drew—if I may say so—a very alarming picture, and I think a justifiably alarming picture, of the pollution of the atmosphere which takes place and the harm thereby done to health through the burning of raw coal in open fireplaces and of the dangers of the domestic hearth. If it were possible to extract large quantities of oil from coal, I imagine that large quantities of smokeless, or at any rate cleaner, coal would be available, and we might, therefore, be able to retain our open fireplaces without injury to- the health of the community. Again, I suppose there is no doubt that the world supply of oil is strictly limited. Of course everything is limited, but I understand that there are very definite limits to the world supply of oil. If we could increase the supply of oil by extracting it from coal that, no doubt, would be of great advantage to the world. Lastly, there is the ques-

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tion of the state of the coal mining industry. There is no doubt, I think, that if we could develop this industry of producing oil from coal it would be of great advantage to our mining industry, because obviously one of the reasons for the disastrous state of that industry is the falling off in the demand for coal all over the world. If we could produce oil from coal on a large scale we should not only have a new industry growing up, but the demand for coal would enormously increase, and that would be extremely beneficial to all concerned in the mining industry. For these reasons—and there are undoubtedly many others—I think that it will be of great importance and value to your Lordships if the Government can give us the information for which the noble Lord has asked.
LORD RUTHERFORD: My Lords, in rising to deal with the important questions which Lord Sanderson has asked, I must crave your indulgence, for this is the first time that I have addressed this House. I must also ask for your forbearance if I attempt to explain, I am afraid very inadequately, a somewhat involved and technical subject. It is less than a year ago that I was appointed Chairman of the Advisory Council of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, of which the Lord President is the official head. In that interval I have endeavoured to get closely in touch with the work of the Fuel Research Station of that Department. I have visited the station and talked with the experimental staff engaged on the work, and I have also had the advantage of discussing the matter with a certain number of technical members of my Council.
In the first place, we all know that coal is a great natural asset to this country and is practically our only source of power. Formerly, we exported large quantities of this power in the form of coal to foreign nations, and we still have a considerable export trade, but in the last ten years or so a great change has come over the scene. Exports of coal have diminished, but at the same time we have become importers of power in the form of fuel oil amounting roughly to £40,000,000 a year. You all know that oil (and I include, of course, petrol) is a very convenient and flexible source of power and is absolutely neces-
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sary for many forms of our motor transport, but it seems to me that it is of very great importance to bear in mind that, if our supplies of oil were at any time suddenly cut short, the greater part of our transport services, our aircraft, our naval vessels and the larger vessels of the mercantile marine would be very soon immobilised. It is obvious, therefore, that it is of very great importance to consider carefully the question of the production of oil in this country so as to be independent of other countries. So far as we can see at the present time, the only source of oil in sufficient quantity in this country is our coal. Now coal is not a simple chemical substance, but a very complex one, containing a great many substances, and one type of coal varies very much in its properties from another. Oil that can be extracted from coal is not in the coal but, as your Lordships know, is a product of chemical reaction brought about by heat and, in some cases, by the addition of extraneous substances like hydrogen. With that question I shall deal later.
I should like for a moment to touch upon certain economic considerations, so as to try to put this subject in the right perspective, although the facts are no doubt known to all of your Lordships. Oil comes from a bore in the earth, and either comes out naturally or is pumped out with little expense. It can be conveyed in bulk by pipe lines and by sea for great distances at comparatively small expense. At the present moment the prices of oil fuel are very low. As you know, pure oil can be obtained at prices varying roughly between 50 s. and 80 s. per ton, and even petrol has been as low as 60 s. a ton. Coal, on the other hand, has to be got from the earth by the labour of man, and if you are to convert it into oil a very expensive and elaborate machinery is required and, what is more, a considerable amount of power and labour. The actual pithead price of coal at the present time is about 14 s. a ton. I think the consideration of these figures will show you that, under present conditions, it is impossible to convert coal into oil and to compete on a cost basis with natural oil, except to the very limited extent to which oil can be obtained as a by-product of certain special processes. On the other hand, oil was never so cheap as it is to-day.

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It was only a few years ago that prices were five to ten times as great as they are to-day, and I think there can be little doubt that sooner or later the price of oil will rise. Then the future situation may differ materially from that of to-day.
My interest in this subject is mainly on the scientific side. I should like to point out that it is only by the accumulation of accurate information that the best means of utilising our coal can be determined. Until we have this knowledge it is impossible to say what practical applications will result. It is not my province to speak on the policy that should be adopted to encourage or assist the commercial production of oil from coal, but I should like to point out that a sound policy can only be formulated in the light of knowledge both of the chemical and physical facts which regulate the technical possibilities and of the economic and political circumstances. While the latter may very well change from time to time, and thus properly lead to changes of policy, scientific facts remain unaltered, and the more fully they are known and applied, the more successful is any policy likely to be.
There are two general methods of treating coal by which oil can be obtained. One may be included under the general name of carbonisation, in which coal is heated under certain conditions. The other is hydrogenation, in which coal is heated and hydrogen at high pressure added. The use of carbonisation in the coke ovens has, as your Lordships know, long been practised in this country for the production of coke and gas, and I believe that somewhere about 38,000,000 tons of coal are annually used for this purpose. Apart from the coke and gas, the most important products to be obtained are benzol, which can be used as a blend with petrol, and a certain amount of tar. Methods of what we may call carbonisation or, more particularly, low-temperature carbonisation depend upon the heating of coal in a special retort in which air is not admitted. The products of this carbonisation are coke, gas, a certain amount of liquor, which is mainly water, and also about ten to twenty gallons of tar from each ton of coal, but the amount, of course, depends upon the type of coal that is being applied. In
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the gas industry in later years it has been customary to heat the coal to a still higher temperature, in order to get a larger amount of gas and a stronger coke. If we treat coal at a low temperature we obtain coke, but we obtain more tar and that is of a different quality from what you obtain from the high temperature methods. It lies between the ordinary natural fuel oil and gas tar. The other product from low-temperature carbonisation is a smokeless fuel, and as your Lordships know it is possible to produce by this method smokeless fuel to burn in the domestic grate as easily as (or more easily than) coal.
It was in 1917, when the Research Department was founded, that the Fuel Research Station was asked to begin experiments on this matter of low temperature carbonisation, for it was believed that by this method we could obtain at the same time smokeless fuel and also a considerable amount of tar which might be converted into oil. The results of these experiments are, I think, well known to many of your Lordships. They have been published. Also the results of the tests by the Fuel Research Station of other methods of carbonisation have been freely published, but certain difficulties arose which made it difficult for this method of low temperature carbonisation to be a general economic success. The reasons are, I think, fairly obvious in the light of later knowledge. In the first place coal is a rather bad conductor of heat, and when the coal is heated in the retort at lower temperatures the heat does not flow in sufficiently rapidly, and so it is necessary to employ rather thin layers of coal, to avoid an unduly lengthy period of heating, with a consequent low throughput compared with the rather elaborate apparatus required for the purpose.
In general there was another difficulty, that the retorts, which were made of cheap metal, were found to distort and require frequent replacement. No doubt that can be and has been improved by the use of better metal, but under those conditions there seems to be a likelihood that the cost of running these retorts will be unduly high. So far, fireclay retorts have been avoided for this purpose, for the reason that it was recognised that any cracks which led to the admission of

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air were fatal to this process, but the Fuel Research Department has taken up this question during the last year or two and has constructed 'a fireclay retort for low temperature carbonisation which shows great promise. Not only is it cheaper in the initial cost of construction but the amount of coal which can be passed through in a given time is considerably greater. At the same time this fireclay retort can be raised to a higher temperature, and it is possible to investigate the production of coke and tar at intermediate temperatures of 620 degrees Centigrade and gas retort temperatures of over 1,000 degrees. Preliminary experiments have already been made in that direction and it is proposed to take up experiments on a semi-commercial scale to investigate as soon as possible, for the benefit of industry, the conversion of coal into coke and oil at intermediate temperatures, and to study the types of coke and tar produced. So far, this retort has only been in constant use for six months, but the experiments will be continued in the next few years to test the efficacy of this method.
We now come to the question of what is to be done with the tar that is produced from the low temperature carbonisation. First of all it can be used directly as a fuel oil, but it is inferior to the natural fuel oil and consequently there is a very small and limited market for it. During the last year or two a study on a small scale has been made by the Fuel Research Department of the question of whether this tar, which is a by-product of this process, can be converted into oil. At the same time experiments have been made at the Chemical Research Laboratory at Teddington, to investigate in detail the constituents of this tar—the chemical substances contained in it—and their use as a source of fine chemicals. I cannot go into the interesting work done in that direction, but the work is still continuing. In order to convert the whole of the tar into oil, it has to be treated with hydrogen, and when that is done it is found that it can be converted into oil with the entire elimination of pitch and other unwanted substances. You can obtain motor spirit and diesel oil, both of the highest quality, and the proportion can be varied
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within wide limits. In general, there seems to be no difficulty about this process. Of course it may be expensive to put it through this process, but it is hoped in that way the tar may have a profitable market.
Experiments are going to be conducted in the next year or two, and arrangements have already been made to test the tar on a larger scale, to see whether the conversion into oil can be carried out on a commercial scale. The conversion of the tar into oil requires what are called catalysts, which are nothing more than substances which promote rapid chemical actions of certain types, but themselves are not altered. We know very little about the action of catalysts, and we are not at all sure yet, although many catalysts have been discovered, that we know the best catalyst, and continuous experiment is being made in that direction. The other uses of this material are being examined—namely, to see whether this tar can be converted so as to be used as a road tar, and whether it can be made up into briquettes and so on. Now I must just pass to the old processes of the production of coke—the coke oven and gas retort. These produce tar, and some of this tar can be converted by hydrogenation into useful oils. Another product of this tar, the creosotes, of which at the moment the price has slumped so badly, can be converted by this method into motor spirit, and investigations will be taken up in the next year or so to investigate this matter on a semi-commercial scale.
I now come to the other and, in a sense, the most important method of obtaining oil—namely, the process of hydrogenation. This consists in heating the coal to a temperature of about 450° Centigrade in a vessel which will stand pressure, and adding to it hydrogen at a high pressure, namely 200 atmospheres. As we shall see, reactions occur which lead to the conversion of a large part of the coal into useful oils. It was, however, largely due to the action of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research that, they were able to assist the German inventor Dr. Bergius to develop his method of production of oil from coal and to acquire the use of his method in this country. A plant was obtained from him which allowed about one ton

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of coal to be used per day and converted into oil. It was found that our own coals—and of this we could not have been sure beforehand—could be converted by this method into oil, and, what is more, as the result of these experiments the methods and processes for this purpose were considerably improved by the Fuel Research Department.
This process of hydrogenation gives motor spirit and heavy oils far in excess of any other method of treatment. Of course, at the moment for the reason I have given—the low price of fuel oils in this country—it cannot directly compete with the prices of imported oil. The technique is difficult, but not particularly difficult, and certainly not more difficult than certain other chemical processes which are in successful commercial operation. The one certain thing that emerges from these experiments is that it is scientifically possible to provide oil by the treatment of coal, and in that way we could hope to provide, not, all, but at any rate the bulk of the oils required for various purposes in this country.
There are thus two methods, carbonisation, in which you obtain coke and gas, and the oil as a by-product, and the other the method of hydrogenation, where a large part of the coal is converted into oils of various kinds. The development of these two processes in this country would have certain advantages. On the one hand, the carbonisation would give us a useful smokeless fuel and some oil, but the advance, apart from the improvement of technical method, depends not upon science but upon how far the nation is prepared to pay for a purer atmosphere. Similarly the development of the hydrogenation method of production of oil from coal depends on how far the nation is prepared to pay for the independence of its oil supplies from other countries.
There is another aspect of the problem which I must. Mention briefly. I have spoken of the various processes that can be used for the production of oil. But in order to apply this on a commercial scale we require to know the nature of our coal seams throughout the country. Coals differ, and for the sort of processes that I have mentioned small quantities of impurity may make great differences in the action. Some may act as catalysts and
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promote the reactions required, others may inhibit those processes. The ordinary chemical analysis is not sufficient for this purpose, but we require a systematic test of the coal to see how far it can be utilised for these processes. During the last ten years or so there has been a systematic survey of our coal seams by the Fuel Research Department, and a large amount of very interesting information has been obtained. It seems to me highly important that we should carry on and continue with this type of experiment to obtain the maximum information that we can about the nature of our coal seams, which are our national wealth.
In conclusion, I wish to point out that. I am strongly of the opinion that it is in the national interest that researches on the general utilisation of coal for the production of oil and other products should be vigorously prosecuted. We cannot have too much scientific knowledge of this complicated problem. Definite information may at any moment prove of great importance to the nation in making decisions, whether on economic or general political grounds. Research is in essence the exploration of the unknown, and it is impossible to forecast the results of experiment. As we know, experience has shown that research is more likely to be fruitful when guided by views or theories which are based on previous information. Whether such views are correct or not, the work cannot fail to add to knowledge and in many cases—that is the general observation of science—may produce results of value in quite unexpected directions. Even negative results may in some, or in many, cases prove as valuable as positive results, for they may prevent waste of money in attempts to develop processes that are fundamentally unsound. In many respects a full scientific understanding of this complicated problem is more essential to this nation than to any other.
EARL STANHOPE: My Lords, I want to say only one or two words because I was interested in this subject when I occupied the position of Civil Lord of the Admiralty—a Service which, of course, depends very largely upon oil. Your Lordships will all agree, I think, that, the speech to which we have listened is one of immense interest. Our only regret is that the members of your Lordships'

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House were not present in far larger numbers to take advantage of it.
This is a really vital question. Many people at the present time think that the Admiralty were extremely rash in taking to oil and in making no effort whatever to safeguard our supplies. That, of course, is entirely untrue. The Admiralty have given great attention to this subject for a number of years. It is not only the Admiralty which is concerned, but the nation as a whole and, not least of all, the Air Force. But there is one side of the oil question which is very seldom dealt with and is, perhaps, the most important of all. I refer to lubricants. We often talk merely of fuel oil or petrol. But, after all, lubricants come into every question of engineering. Whether it is steam power or anything else, bearings have to be kept oiled in order that there may be sweet running. Those who know the state of the country regarding the question of oil generally will agree, I think, that the question of lubricants is by far the most serious. Practically the whole of the lubricants that come into this country come from one part of the world only—North and Central America. Practically none comes from Persia or elsewhere. That is a very serious situation.
The noble Lord who has just spoken talked about our importing power. I hope the nation will realise what is meant by the importation of power, because there again the whole of our industries are affected. I had hoped the noble Lord would have been able to tell us even more than he has done, because I was under the impression that experiment and research had now arrived at such a stage that we were able almost to say that, provided the Government was prepared to impose a tax on petrol imported into this country and to allow petrol made from coal to go tax free, that industry might be set up almost at once if not now, and that very great assistance would be rendered to the coal industry, amongst others, by the Government being able to adopt that principle. I am afraid there is very little hope of the noble and learned Lord being able to tell us that his Free Trade theories will be (shall I say?) oiled to such an extent as to allow of Protection for home-produced oil. Of course, from the mining point of view, and from the point of view
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of the Services and of industry generally, it obviously would be of enormous advantage if a real step forward could be made in that direction.
A great many things have to be considered and tried out before we can go the whole length. I do not know whether the noble Lord on the Cross Benches (Lord Rutherford) could tell us whether scientists have now reached a stage when they can say what is the economic unit which can produce oil at the lowest possible price from coal, or whether they have not yet made up their minds whether it would be fifty tons or one hundred tons a day or a great deal more. It might be necessary in the first instance for the State to expend money in that direction. It would be the means of finding work for the unemployed, particularly in the engineering industry, which is very hard hit, and one which, perhaps the most severe members of your Lordships' House would not be inclined to criticise very severely. I do not know whether the noble and learned Lord opposite can enlighten us still further as to whether we have arrived at a stage when we can say what the economic unit for the production of oil is or whether he can tell us that the price is such that a duty on imported oil would enable oil to be produced here from coal. Those points are, I think, of such importance that we should be most grateful if he could give us that information. If he cannot give it to us now, we hope at any rate that the time is fast approaching when we shall be able to arrive at a satisfactory result.
VISCOUNT ELIBANK: My Lords, I have no intention of addressing your Lordships. I only wish to ask the noble Lord, Lord Rutherford, whether he can answer two questions, arising out of the very interesting speech which he made. The first one is, what is the size of the plant with which they have been experimenting or working on in connection with the first process, that is the carbonisation process? I am afraid I came in after he had commenced his speech; he may have made a statement about that, but I did not hear it—and this, of course, affects the point which has been raised by my noble friend Lord Stanhope regarding what is a commercial economic unit for producing oil. The second one is, could the noble Lord say whether

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the coke which is the result of that carbonisation process is a coke which can be used in the manufacture of steel, and whether that coke would be very much cheaper, as I presume it would be, than the coke which is used to-day in the manufacture of steel? Those are the two questions to which I shall be very glad if the noble Lord, Lord Rutherford, can reply.
LORD PARMOOR: My Lords, I think the first thought of all of us who have been present this afternoon—I wish the House had been more fully attended—is adequately to thank the noble Lord, Lord Rutherford, for the speech he has made and to recognise that we have a new member of our House who is not only supreme in the region of science but can express his views so clearly and so adequately even for the layman. I think it is of special importance in this House that we should have time and opportunity to discuss these far-reaching scientific questions. It is obvious that if we can induce Lord Rutherford to come amongst us and speak on these questions it will be for the great benefit not only of the House but of the country at large.
Before I go into one or two matters of detail—of course I do not intend for a moment to discuss the scientific questions which Lord Rutherford has already brought forward—there are one or two general statements which I think of great importance in approaching the subjects with which Lord Rutherford has dealt. I say that the more readily in that it is Under the Department of the Privy Council over which I preside that all these experiments which the noble Lord has related have been carried out. I often wonder when listening to speeches here whether your Lordships appreciate the immense amount of scientific investigation which is now going on under the control of the Privy Council, and which has been of the greatest possible advantage not only in connection with such matters as we are discussing to-night, but with the whole range of industrial production in this country. This Department has brought about what I think is the real thing we desire, the inter-action of scientific inquiry and industrial work. I dare say your Lordships are aware that a very important document is produced annually showing what the Scientific De-
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partment of the Privy Council is doing from time to time, but I am afraid there are so many documents of that kind produced it may have escaped the attention of some, at any rate, of your Lordships.
The first utterance of Lord Rutherford that struck me very strongly was this. He said that coal is the only possible source of power indigenous to this country. That is a very important statement indeed, because in old days we flourished very largely by having the command of coal, which made us the great power-producing country of the world. I think we are apt to forget the enormous change which has come over our industrial position owing to the growth of electrical and oil power. Then Lord Rutherford said—I ask your Lordships to consider this very carefully—that scientifically, it is possible to obtain from coal, which has become of less value, the oil that we need. Therefore, we have not only the raw material indigenous here, but, in Lord Rutherford's opinion (and no opinion can have greater weight than his) we can scientifically—I am not now dealing with the economic question—produce from that coal the power that we require by using oil as it is being used at the present time.
I entirely agree with what Lord Rutherford says on another point. It is his duty and knowledge, if I may use those two words, to advise us on scientific questions, while of economic questions he can only give what I may call a general sketch. But surely we must all agree with him that we ought to have every investigation possible in order to prove how far we can utilise our coal to obtain the oil we require as a motive power. I think the noble Earl (Earl Stanhope) would agree with that, particularly from his experience at the Admiralty. Just consider. If we succeeded—and I have had to think about this a good deal—what a splendid success it would be. Here is coal, our only possible source of power, which for the time has been largely superseded. We all know our export trade in coal is very much less than it was. Then we have the greatest living physicist, if I may so call him, coming and telling us that, although coal as a source of power has been superseded, we can scientifically obtain from coal, either by carbonization

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or by hydrogenation, the power which we require, and which would again make us independent, as we ought to be in this matter of power, of all foreign imports. I do not intend to embark, in spite of the invitation of the noble Earl, Lord Stanhope, on the economic question, because I do not think this is the occasion. I am sure he agrees with me.
EARL STANHOPE: No, no.
LORD PARMOOR: We want to keep our mind on the problem which Lord Rutherford has stated, and which he has done so much to elucidate in the speech which he made to your Lordships. It is some time ago now, it was in 1915, that the scientific department of the Privy Council was constituted. It has gradually grown into the largest, I believe, of all the physical organisations for scientific purposes which exist anywhere in the world, and at an early stage the question of coal carbonisation or hydrogenation became a matter of scientific inquiry. There were two directions to which this inquiry was directed. On the one hand, as has been pointed out, every effort was made to get a complete picture both of the amount and character of our indigenous coal supply. I think now that is being done. It was commenced in 1917, it was pressed on by successive Governments—of course we all want to get this scientific knowledge—and the organisation for this is now complete throughout the coal fields. That was a first step of enormous importance; but the effect of obtaining that information, I think brought to the mind of everyone how extremely important the further step was that we should ascertain whether, with a fair prospect of success on the scientific side, we could utilise the power which did in fact exist in our coalfields. All that happened as long ago as 1915. We instituted fuel research, which was carried out largely at Greenwich, and from that time the fuel research organisation, under the careful supervision of Dr. Lander, has made a continuous series of experiments on these questions of carbonisation and hydrogenation.
Of course, I entirely agree with the scientific view that Lord Rutherford has expressed, that further experiments are necessary, and that no channel should be left untried in order to see what is
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the truth about the conversion of our coal into a new source of power. A few months ago, or hardly as long ago as that, the present Government applied a sum of about £40,000, especially to be used for this one purpose in order to see what results may be obtained scientifically. All those questions to which Lord Rutherford referred, such as the form of the furnace and matters of that kind, can only be ascertained by a series of experiments, but the information which I have got—perhaps I am a little more optimistic than Lord Rutherford because I am much less scientific—is hopeful, and indicates that these experiments may be carried out to a successful conclusion. I do not think Lord Rutherford would differ from that, but, quite properly and rightly, with his great scientific knowledge, he has described the scientific side with both its dangers and its possibilities.
Just one word upon the economic side, only to this extent. Suppose, as I am sure Lord Newton would desire, that we did get rid of what has been called the abomination of the smoke nuisance, and there was a general desire and custom to use a form of coal which practically dissipates the difficulties that arise from the open fire, that at once would give an enormous market for one of the products which would come either from the carbonisation or hydrogenation of coal. Personally, I should regard that—Lord Sanderson referred to it—as one of the major advantages which a scientific experiment of this kind would bring to us if it could be carried out in ordinary practice. Again I think, if I may say so without appearing to be presumptuous, that the noble Lord, Lord Rutherford, was quite right in pointing out that as regards oil or petrol much must depend on the conditions of the market at any particular time. But although at one particular time the price might look unsatisfactory for the ultimate economic success of this scientific experiment, yet surely everyone who listened to Lord Rutherford was convinced that it was worth while and would be worth while to carry these scientific experiments to a conclusion in order that we may ascertain, if possible, that if we wanted it, and if prices were economically suitable, oil or tar or petrol might be obtained from an indigenous product in this country. I must say that it appears to

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me a wonderful outlook if we can substantiate the position—a wonderful outlook if, as I have said, with a product of 50,000,000 tons of coal in the year we could find an important new product giving us a source of power which we have not got at the present time in this country and which, I think, for every reason would be an enormous advantage if we could ensure it in the future.
Then there is the question of lubricants. That, of course, comes into the inquiries and experiments. I have a note here that it is receiving the constant attention of my Department and is one of the matters in reference to which thought must be given and experiments made. I cannot, as I have said, possibly impinge upon the scientific side, but it is an enormous advantage to have bad that dealt with at first hand. Your Lordships have now had a chance of understanding how the position really stands and I sincerely hope that with Lord Rutherford as our leader we shall carry these experiments to a successful issue. If so, we shall carry through one of the greatest industrial advantages from every point of view that this country could be given at the present moment.
LORD SANDERSON: My Lords, I should like to thank my noble and
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learned friend for his answer on behalf of the Government to my Question, and if I may I should like very much to include Lord Rutherford in my thanks for his most interesting and valuable contribution—a contribution, I think I may call it, to the answer of the Government.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.
LORD PARMOOR: Before we adjourn I should like to ask your Lordships to remember that Re meet at three o'clock to-morrow in order to have time both for the Third Reading of the Agricultural Land (Utilisation) Bill and also for the debate which is being raised by the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd.
THE EARL OF LUCAN: That question has been put off.
LORD PARMOOR: I did not know that, but it will still probably be convenient to meet at three o'clock because that will enable your Lordships to get away early, as you mostly want to do at Whitsun. Therefore we will meet at three o'clock.
House adjourned at twenty-five minutes past six o'clock.