Lords Sitting of 29 January 1931

Preamble
The House met at a quarter past four of the clock, The EARL OF DONOUGHMORE on the Woolsack.

DISARMAMENT.
LORD DICKINSON LORD DICKINSON had given Notice that he would ask His Majesty's Government whether they can make any statement as to the progress of international disarmament; and move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I have ventured to put this Question on the Notice Paper for the reason that I think we are approaching a very critical stage in relation to the problem of international disarmament, and I am sure that nowhere can one better address public opinion than from the floor of your Lordships' House. Two events have happened recently that have advanced this question considerably. The first is that the Council of the League -of Nations has decided to summon an International World Conference which is to take place in the month of January or February of next year in order to consider international disarmament; and the other is that, after five or six years of continuous labour, the Preparatory Commission that has been sitting in Geneva has prepared its Report and has presented it in due form, in a form which can be considered and adopted or altered by the Conference.
You have before you the Blue-book which shows the result of those deliberations and you will see that it affords only a skeleton to which real flesh and spirit have to be added. It will depend upon the deliberations of the Conference next year as to whether this Report results in anything or nothing. There must be one of two results: either some scheme of international disarmament based upon the proposals of this Report will be adopted, in which case I believe that there will be opened out a way to permanent peace; or it will fall still-born, will result in nothing, and then I cannot help thinking that there can be but one outcome ultimately, and that will be war. Which-
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ever is the result, your Lordships will, I am sure, agree that the effect upon the world will be momentous. I do not propose to trouble your Lordships with very many observations, first, because the importance of this debate will depend very largely upon what His Majesty's Government state in reply to my Question; and secondly, because we have among us to-day my noble friend Lord Cecil of Chelwood, who, I hope, will give us the benefit of his experience and advice, and who has more than any man—in the world, I may say—advanced this question to its present paint. In fact, I should not be far wrong if I said that had it not been for Lord Cecil's determination and the great personal influence which he exercises in Geneva, I doubt whether this problem would have advanced to anything like the stage which it has reached at the present moment.
Your Lordships will notice that I have intentionally inserted in my Question the words "international disarmament." It is very important that in discussing this question we should bear in mind that it is international disarmament that we are talking about. It is very important that people should understand this because, at the present moment, throughout the country there is great misunderstanding as to what is the object of those who are working in this direction; and I may say not only misunderstanding but a great deal of misrepresentation. Many people say that what we are aiming at is a weakening of our Navy and our Army. I submit that it is nothing of the kind. The reductions that will come about, if they do come about, will come about as part of an international scheme of general disarmament—a general scaling down of the forces of all the countries: and I believe that, far from weakening the British Empire, such a general scaling down of military armaments will result rather in strengthening the influence that the British Empire has for good in the world than in any weakening of it.
May I remind, your Lordships of the position of this question at the present moment? I know very well that many of you are as well acquainted with the history of this subject as I am, but, nevertheless, perhaps you will excuse me if I possibly repeat what you already know. Prior to the War, there was not much interest taken in international dis-

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armament. The question of international arbitration was much more discussed, and at The Hague Peace Conferences very little was said about disarmament. In fact, when the Chinese Plenipotentiary returned to his country after the last Hague Conference, he reported to his Empress that if she desired that her representative should have any influence in future Peace Conferences the first thing she ought to do was to build up a strong Army and an invincible Navy; and this was very largely the idea at that time. I remember the late Lord Justice Fry saying to me that in his opinion we should never abolish war until we bad abolished armaments. But very few people, I think, held his opinion at that time.
Nevertheless, when the Great War came to an end, a change came over public feeling, and in the negotiations which took place at that time a totally different opinion seemed to prevail. The Plenipotentiaries there agreed, unanimously to an Article, which ultimately became Article 8 of the Peace Treaties, by which they recognised that the maintenance of peace
"requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations."
By the same Article they charged the Council of the League with the duty of formulating plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several Governments.
The matter did not rest there. The idea of a general disarmament was carried into the operative part of the Peace Treaty, and Part V of the Treaty of Versailles, the Part under which Germany was compelled to disarm, commences with the following preamble:—
"In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and air clauses which follow."
Those are the clauses under which Germany was compelled to reduce her Army to 100,000 men and in which there were other provisions for limiting her armaments. These provisions were not inserted in the Treaty without a great deal of consideration and, indeed, negotiation between the parties. The Treaty of Versailles was not a Treaty which was only imposed. Its terms were not merely
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terms imposed by the victors upon the vanquished: it was an agreement accepted by Germany; and I venture to submit, and I am sure your Lordships will agree with me, that it is very important that both sides should observe to the full the obligations that they have accepted under the Treaty.
During the negotiations the German representatives stated that they would accept the disarmament clause provided that it was the beginning of a general reduction of armaments. In reply to this the Allied statesmen made the following announcement:—
"The Allied and Associated Powers wish to make it clear that their requirements in regard to German armaments were not made solely with the object of rendering it impossible for Germany to resume her policy of military aggression. They are also the first steps towards that general reduction and limitation of armaments which they seek to bring about as one of the most fruitful preventives of war, and which it will he one of the first duties of the League of Nations to promote."
I have ventured to make these quotations because. I think, in view of the coming Conference, it is very important that the public in all countries should know exactly what the nations who signed those Treaties are committed to.
It is perfectly true that there is no written promise on the part of any one of these nations to disarm. But I submit that it is impossible to study the proceedings at Versailles without reaching the conclusion that the States who signed those Treaties are morally bound to carry into effect the intentions that were announced there and upon the faith of which the Germans signed the Treaties. Indeed, I think we may extend that obligation beyond those who signed the Treaty because the United States also come under the same obligation. It is true that the Senate did not ratify the Treaty of Versailles, but the announcement which I have quoted was made with the concurrence of the President of the United States, and the idea of international disarmament was included in the Fourteen Points which formed the basis of the Armistice. Moreover, in the Treaty which Germany ultimately signed with the United States Part V of the Treaty of Versailles is specifically mentioned as being one of the stipulations of which the United States was to enjoy the benefit. It ap-

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pears to me that in those circumstances the United States is equally bound to cooperate in carrying through a real scheme of general disarmament in common with the other nations who signed the Treaties.
But whatever view we take of the strict obligations that have been incurred under these Treaties, in my view there is no doubt that the German people hold this opinion. They say, with a great amount of justification, that when the agreement was come to neither party contemplated that the Central Powers should remain perpetually in a condition of inferiority to the other European Powers. Germany was to be the first to disarm, but it was understood that the others were to follow. It seems to me that if this is not done, if nothing is done to carry out the avowed intentions of the Powers when they declared that they would bring about a scheme of international disarmament, then the German nation can claim the right to re-arm, and I cannot see how we can really resist that demand. The German nation, as are all other nations, are altering very rapidly. There are many who know nothing whatever about the War. In our population more than half of those who are alive now have no distinct recollection or experience of the War, and the young men and young women who are now moving in Germany and elsewhere will not consider, I believe, the causes of the War. All they will know is that they are called upon to pay heavy taxes in order to provide money for France and other foreign countries, and that they are kept in a perpetual state of inequality as regards their military power.
That, I submit, is a situation which cannot continue to subsist. It is a state of unstable equilibrium throughout Europe, and sooner or later it must break up. The question is whether that breakup will take place under peaceful conditions by peaceful arrangements or by violence. You can see this going on every day. The picture is no imaginary one. It is one that is shaping itself all over the east and centre of Europe. No one who travels over the frontiers of Germany or Hungary, or Austria or Bulgaria can fail to be impressed with what they see. On one side of the frontier in Germany or Hungary there is no sign of military forces, although I dare say there
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is a great deal below the surface. On the other side of the frontier there are large numbers of soldiers, all armed to the teeth and ready at a moment's notice to spring upon their neighbour. It seems to me that is a situation which no nation could be expected to tolerate, and I do not think it is possible that it should continue further.
I believe this is the cause of the remark able growth of militarism which undoubtedly exists in Germany, and is a growing danger. I think it is to this that is due the formation of voluntary organisations of a semi-military character, and the sudden growth of a powerful political Party in the Reichstag which makes it its prime object to revise the Treaty of Versailles and the other Peace Treaties. It seems to me that if there is any hesitation on the part of the Powers when they meet next year to debate this scheme for disarmament the consequences may be very serious to Europe and to the world. It is not impossible that there may be this hesitation, very largely because—and one cannot help admitting that it is justifiable,—the Continental Governments know that after all we have done war is still not impossible. They have not got very great confidence in the effectiveness of the Covenant of the League. They doubt, very much, whether the Kellogg Pact will ever be of any use to them when there comes a crisis, and they say, I think rightly, that no nation can disarm unless they have security against possible attacks. They are uncertain whether, if attacked, any one would come to their assistance.
For this position we in this country are largely responsible. It has been chiefly the actions of Parliament in the last four or five years and Governments that have prevented the League from devising a scheme which, at any rate, members of the League at that time thought would give security to all the nations. I think in all probability it may be necessary for us and other nations to reconsider our attitude with regard to the question of security that is to be given to the nations of Europe against any possible attack. That is one of the questions which will have to be considered very seriously between now and next year. I believe it is none too soon to investigate. It is for this reason, among others, that I venture to-day to ask this

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Question of the Government and to lay before the House these few observations, which, I hope, have not wearied your Lordships or been too lengthy. I beg to move.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: My Lords I do not propose to make any kind of criticism or complaint of the very interesting speech to which we have just listened. I certainly agree very much with my noble friend as to the immense importance of the Conference that is to take place in February of next year. It is, after all, absolutely unique in the history of the world. We are going to have there between fifty and sixty—nearer sixty than fifty—of the civilised nations of the world. I do not believe a Conference of that size on any subject has ever taken place, and they are going to deliberate on the question of how to bring about a reduction and limitation of armaments. That certainly is a matter of great importance for your Lordships to consider between now and then. Also I agree with my noble friend as to the moral obligation under which the countries who signed the Versailles and other Treaties are to promote the reduction and limitation of armaments. My noble friend quoted certain passages. I am not going to repeat them, nor am I going to add to them, though, as he knows, they can be added to. You can quote the Treaty of Locarno, and you can quote a whole number of decisions and resolutions and declarations made by the statesmen assembled at Geneva and elsewhere. Therefore, I do not think my noble friend puts it a bit too high in saying that there is a moral obligation resting on all of us to do our utmost to promote this cause of disarmament.
Before I proceed with my observations, which I will make as few as I can, but which I am afraid must be fairly numerous, I should like to begin by agreeing once more with my noble friend in his definition of disarmament. I do not propose to repeat this definition every time I mention the word. Perhaps your Lordships will understand that I mean the general reduction and limitation of armaments by international agreement. That is what I mean by the word disarmament, and I will not repeat that lengthy description of it again. I am not going to waste much of your Lordships' time in arguing that disarmament in that
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sense is desirable. Your Lordships are probably already of that opinion. It is obvious, I think, that the reduction of armaments is the only positive measure that you can take—the only positive precaution that you can take—on behalf of peace. You may make agreements for arbitration, you may make agreements for settlement of difficulties, you may do a number of things of that kind, but they are all something that you are to do in the future. If you can bring about a general reduction of armaments that is a definite and positive fact, something "acquired," as the French say, which really is different from any promise that has to be implemented in the future.
But, of course, the main advantage of any such policy, if it can be carried out, is that it does secure us against that competition in armaments which many of us remember as such a disastrous feature in the years that immediately preceded the outbreak of the late War. I need not remind your Lordships what a state of things it was, when every nation was watching every other nation as to what armaments were being made. If one nation added a new type of battleship, all the other nations felt it necessary to reply by similar ships. If one nation added another brigade or division to its Army, other nations had immediately to do the same. That was the frame of mind produced in Europe by that perpetual competition—and other things no doubt—which made it so easy for those who desired to disturb the peace to do so when 1914 gave them the chance. I do not wish to appear in any way as an alarmist, but I cannot conceal from myself, and your Lordships cannot conceal from yourselves, that very much the same state of things is beginning again. That is the fact. We have all to realise that there is this competition beginning again. It is not on anything like the same scale, I agree, but it is already beginning.
I was looking at the figures. I will not quote them, but in point of fact, in the last few years, the cost of armaments in almost every country except this one has risen, and is steadily rising. And even in this country, though I admit the same charge cannot be made against us, there is, nevertheless, a -similar state of things, not with regard to our Army or even with regard to our Navy, because it does

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not happen that we are in any competition in regard to those forces with the nations of Europe, but with regard to the Air Force it is so. Every Air Minister, when he comes down to the House of Commons to make his case for the Estimates he presents, always compares the Air Force with that of other countries as justifying the expenditure which he recommends to the House of Commons. And so it is, though of course still, more so, with all the other countries. As long as that state of things goes on, no one can say that the cause of peace is secure.
There is another great argument, as it seems to me, in favour of disarmament, and it is the enormous burden that these armaments lay on all the nations. They are not so heavy as before the War, but still they are very heavy; and in other countries it is, I am told, not only the actual money. There is what is called the blood tax—conscription—which is a tremendous burden. And what is the consequence? It is frightfully unpopular and the consequence is that the regular propaganda in favour of war is carried on—or was before the War and no doubt will begin again—in order to justify the expenditure and the burden, and to induce the peoples to submit to it. That is the case, and that undoubtedly was one of the predisposing causes of the late War. On the other hand, if you could once establish this system you would have an entirely new international outlook. People would turn their minds from the question of arming against their neighbours—because that would be fixed once and for all—and they would, I hope and believe, have a much more rational and peaceful attitude in international questions.
I have just sketched that argument because I did not want it to be thought that I neglected it, but, of course, it is, as I hope, arguing to the converted. I have no doubt everyone of your Lordships is in favour of international disarmament. What I fear may not be quite so commonly held is the feeling that disarmament is possible. There is a question whether it is practicable and capable of being carried out. I remember a few weeks ago I ventured to address your Lordships on some other question connected with foreign affairs, and I said that some particular step might be deferred until disarmament came about. I
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have a very vivid mental picture of one of your Lordships—one of the most respected of your Lordships—who smiled darkly, thinking, "Well, that puts that off for ever." Quite evidently that was in his mind. I think that opinion is not uncommonly held in this country and perhaps in your Lordships' House. I want very much to try to persuade your Lordships that it certainly is possible and that there is a very good chance of it being brought about—I cannot put it higher than that, of course—particularly if the people of this country, and the Government that represents them, whatever that Government may be, are really in earnest on the subject.
There are, my Lords, two aspects of this question. There is the technical aspect, and a very difficult one it is. That is the subject which, as my noble friend said, has been considered on and off at Geneva for the last five years, and ultimately—at the end of last December —the Committee to which this matter had been referred, a Committee consisting of representatives of between twenty and thirty Powers, including all the principal countries of the world, America and Russia as well as the principal countries in the League, arrived at a draft scheme a skeleton, a framework, which at any rate presented one solution of the technical difficulties in the way of disarmament. It is not a complicated scheme, although it took so long to obtain agreement upon it. It deals, as every scheme must, with personnel and with material. Obviously if you are going to reduce armaments, you have to reduce not only the men but, what is now-a-days perhaps even more important, the machines.
As far as personnel is concerned, the proposal is that the numbers shall be limited in the Army, the Navy and the Air Force in every country that adheres to the Convention. As far as the Army is concerned, the limitation is to be not only of the total numbers but of the professional soldiers and the officers as well, so that you will get a very complete limitation of the numbers of the Army. The Navies are naturally not so important from the point of view of numbers because numbers are more or less controlled by the ships. Therefore, it is only the general number of sailors that is to be limited. As regards the Air Force, there is a kind of compromise

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between the two. It is all to be limited, but there is to be a provision aiming at, or at any rate suggesting, limitation of the officers as well. In addition to that, as far as conscript armies are concerned, there is to be a limit of the period of service. A great deal of importance is attached to that because it is quite obvious that what you need to do is to prevent armies being used for attack. If no army attacks, there can be no war, and the great thing is, therefore, to make the armies as far as possible defensive and not offensive forces. Obviously, the example of Switzerland shows that you can carry that to such an extent as practically to remove all danger of attack. Accordingly, there is a provision that the period of service in conscript countries shall be limited. So much for personnel.
As for material, the difficulties are much greater, there is no doubt—much greater. We had to consider—I happen to know it was very carefully considered in this country, and I have no doubt elsewhere—what was the best way of limiting in the first place the material of Armies. If you are going to limit every gun, every rifle, every bomb, you are going to make either n perfectly ineffective limitation or you will have to provide for a very elaborate system of inspection in order to satisfy people that it is being done. Accordingly, after very careful consideration, we arrived at the conclusion—that is, the British Government arrived at the conclusion—that the only way to do it was to limit the cost of the material. No doubt it is not a perfect limitation, but it has considerable advantages because every nation publishes its costs, and though, of course, it is possible that a nation may deliberately falsify them, my own belief is that that is not normally done. Nations on the whole do carry out definite pledges. What they do not feel inclined to carry out is anything more than definite pledges. But if they limit their costs and the costs are published, I think you will have the best security you can get at the present moment.. It may be that you can limit such things as heavy guns and, possibly, tasks. But there is difficulty there, especially in the case of tanks. The tank to-day is a very different tank from that of five years ago and probably very different from what the tank will be five years hence.
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Mere limitation of numbers, therefore, would not be a satisfactory limitation, and I know no means of defining the exact fighting value of a tank yet. So we confined ourselves to limitation of costs.
As far as the Navies are concerned, there is limitation of ships. We accepted all the limitations that were set by the Naval Conference in London provisionally, and there is the limitation of the size of ships and of the guns they carry.
VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN: May I, before the noble Viscount goes further, ask one question? There is an Annex on page 63 of the Blue-book which gives the Report to the Council of May, 1926. In that there appears Table II, which gives the categories of ships, on page 80.
VISCOUNT CECIL or CHELWOOD: That has nothing to do with the—
VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN: What I wanted to ask was whether that category is the same as was arrived at in 1926, or whether it is not the final result after the London Treaty?
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: As far as the category is concerned, it is exactly the same as the London Treaty.
VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN: But it was not arrived at in 1926?
VISCOUNT CECIL CHELWOOD: No.
VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN: It appears that it was.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: Is it so stated?
VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN: The Annex is headed, "From May 18 to 26, 1926," on page 63.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: That is given only for purposes of reference. It is not part of the Treaty in any way. Somebody asked that the Report of the Commission that reported in 1926 should be added to the other documents in our final Report and, as nobody seemed to object, we put it in. But it really has not any great bearing on the subject. The Draft Convention provides for exactly the same limitation.
VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN: Then the table on page 80 is the one that you are recommending?
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: Yes, that is the one that we are recommending. So far as that point was concerned, we simply took the provisions of the London Treaty and put them into our Report. We did not do anything more than that, except with reference to a special provision with which I need not trouble your Lordships regarding some of the smaller Powers, which was quite a minor matter. I know that this question is a little complicated and I am not surprised that my noble friend finds a little difficulty in following it.
I have now dealt with the material of ships. With regard to the material for the air, a great difficulty arose—this is the only part of the proposals that I am not quite happy about—in regard to limiting the Air Forces. We have proposed to limit the numbers of aircraft and dirigibles and the total horse-power, though how that is to be measured is still a matter for inquiry. I feel personally that, as this stands, it is an unsatisfactory limitation. We did not feel able to propose that all the spare parts should be limited—and, I think, rightly, for these parts are small and it would be impossible to check whether they existed or not. But if you can have any number of spare parts, then evidently you can have any number of machines, which can be put together in the course of a few hours, and accordingly I am unhappy about that arrangement. The British delegation propose that the limit of cost should be applied to the Air Forces as well as to the other Forces. This decision was unfortunately taken in a very unsatisfactory division when most people did not vote. It was unexpected, and I hope that the Conference will put the matter right when it meets.
In addition to this, the Preparatory Commission suggests that there should be a general limit of costs for all, including the whole cost of Army, Navy or Air Force. I ought perhaps at this moment to give an explanation which I found we had to give constantly, even in the Preparatory Commission. There is no idea of comparing costs as such. The comparison will be between the strengths of the Army, Navy and Air Force, arrived at in other ways. When the strength has been arrived at, the cost of that strength will be taken, each for its own country, necessarily varying
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according to the costs prevailing in each country, and that will be an additional factor for showing that the permitted strength is not being exceeded. Those are the general lines of the provisions which we propose.
The only matter to which I need further direct your Lordships' attention is the suggested creation of a body called the Permanent Disarmament Commission, which would sit at Geneva and the duty of which would be to watch over the execution of the Treaty and to observe, so far as it could, whether there was any ground for thinking that a breach of the Treaty was taking place anywhere; and even more than that—for we do not naturally contemplate breaches as the normal condition of affairs—to observe how each of the provisions worked, and what changes might be desirable at the periodical revisions for which we also provided.
LORD DANESFORT: Before my noble friend leaves the question of the material that may be used by an Air Force, may I ask him if it was found possible in any way to discover a means by which you might either prevent or limit the manufacture of poison gases such as were used in the late War and might he used in a future war, having regard to the difficulties arising from the consumption of certain poisonous gases in industrial undertakings?
VISCOUNT CECIL of CHELWOOD: It was not our business to go too much into detail in that matter. We did put in a provision repeating the Treaty obligation not to use poisonous gases or bacteriological warfare, but, if I may say so, I agree with my noble friend that the matter does require further investigation in order to devise, as I think there might be devised, a really effective means of preventing the use of these gases in war. That is a very technical matter, and I do not think my noble friend will ask me to discuss it in detail at this moment.
LORD DANESFORT: It will require a good deal of power of inspection.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: I think not, but that is really a very technical matter on which I should be delighted to talk to my noble friend. I do not think it would be very suitable to

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discuss it in your Lordships' House. Two main criticisms of the scheme have been made. The Germans and their friends object that it is insufficient because we do not seek to abolish conscription. The British delegation have from the outset asserted that they desired to see the abolition of conscription, but so far we have been unable to persuade the continental countries to agree, and therefore it was impossible to do so. The other great criticism was that we ought to have a specified limit to materials of war. I think I have dealt with that point, and I will not repeat what I have said.
I have recently heard of another criticism in exactly the opposite direction —namely, that we were much too elaborate, and that the only hopeful way of proceeding was to lay down a few general principles and then to trust the nations to carry them out. I do not think that this is a practicable suggestion. I agree that every Treaty must to some extent be founded upon trust. That is obviously true, but I do not think that the proper plan is to make purely general observations and trust people to carry out the spirit of them. You must give them specific and definite obligations if you are going to do anything at all. In the Versailles Treaty, when we were disarming those who had been our enemies, we went through the most elaborate catalogue of reductions — far more elaborate than anything you will find in this Draft Convention—and even in the Naval Treaties the provisions are much more elaborate than anything that we have proposed. I think that it is desirable to keep a general disarmament treaty as simple and plain as we can, but I do not think that trust excludes precision, and I am quite sure that there is no more fruitful cause of misunderstanding between nations than to have obligations that are understood in one way by one country and in another way by another. That is very difficult to avoid unless you draft your document very carefully. To have a draft document in vague terms is the worst form of diplomatic negotiation.
In my judgment—I may be right or wrong on this point—cases of deliberate breach of treaties of this kind which oblige nations to take a particular course in reference to a particular subject are not very common, but, of course, most
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nations, having undertaken an obligation, consider—I think quite rightly—that they have observed that obligation if they have performed exactly what they have undertaken to do, neither more nor less. Accordingly, in a sense, what is called evasion is being practised, though to my mind it is not, really evasion but simply carrying out literally what has been undertaken. Those are the technical observations that I desire to convey to your Lordships in regard to this Treaty. I can only submit to your Lordships—and it is for you to judge when you have read the Treaty—that I do not see any technical difficulty in tilling up that Treaty with any figures that may be agreed upon, and establishing a satisfactory system of disarmament upon that basis.
This, of course, leaves out by far the greatest difficulty—namely, the political difficulty. I must admit that the political difficulties—it was not any part of our business to try and solve them; that is for the Conference—are undoubtedly considerable. There is, of course, the overriding difficulty, which in any such treaty must always be a matter of the deepest anxiety—namely, how to persuade country A to accept an armament less strong than country B. That is a difficulty which meets you always and continuously. Whether that can only be done by patience or not, I think in this particular case we have certain forces on our side which give me considerable hope that we may succeed.
To illustrate the kind of difficulties which we shall be up against, and in order not to give the impression that I am a facile optimist in these matters, I would like to run over the difficulties. There is, of course, the difficulty of Russia. There are many people who think that the present Russian Government is determinedly hostile to all other Governments and, indeed, much of its language appears to bear that interpretation—that it is only waiting for an opportunity to attack them. I, personally, do not take that view. I believe that the Russian Government, in spite of the language which it sometimes uses, is really at the present moment, and for the time being, genuinely desirous of peace. It says so very strongly when we meet at Geneva, and asserts it with the greatest vigour, even going so far as to suggest, plainly and even bluntly, that none of the nations

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really desires peace except itself. I, personally, accept that statement of their policy, because it seems to me it is very much to their interest financially not to spend more money than they can help, and politically because a Government such as exists in Russia cannot be desirous of showing a successful Army and a popular General. However that may be, and however opinions may differ, my own belief is that we shall find that the Russian Government will accept a reasonable scheme of disarmament.
Of course those who live next to Russia will naturally have some anxiety on the matter, and perhaps I ought to mention a clause which excited a good deal of criticism—an American proposal, providing that if a case of sudden danger arises in any country it shall be lawful for that country to suspend the operation of the Treaty, so far as it is concerned, on two conditions: (1), That it shall immediately inform the Council of the League and, I think, the Permanent Disarmanent Commission also, and other parties to the Treaty, of its intention so to do, and (2), that, as soon as the danger has passed, it will re-establish the Treaty system. I believe, although I confess at first I had some doubt about it, that to be a sound provision, which is likely to allow countries in a precarious position to enter into the Treaty and to carry it out—countries which I believe would not be able to do so if no such safety valve existed. At the same time it will, of course, enable them to have the protection of the Covenant.
Then we come to the question of Germany, to which my noble friend alluded. There is no doubt that the German Government, and the German people so far as one can tell, are passionately anxious to see their country restored to a position of equality among the nations. That is the thing which they care most about at this moment, and they rely upon their contention that either other nations must come down to their level of armament or they must be allowed to re-arm. That is put with extreme vehemence by the Party to which my noble friend alluded, and it is put in language which does not help to create a solution of the difficulties. Even in that case it does seem to me that Germany and the Germans would be quite insane if they rejected or opposed a measure of disarma-
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ment which, even if it did not go so far as they desired, went substantially and seriously in the direction they desired. Next comes the case of Italy, which has also announced that it demands equality, or something like equality. That may produce difficulties: I do not know. All I can say, with great freedom and truth, is that the recent declarations in Geneva and elsewhere on behalf of the Italian Government have been strongly in favour of peace and disarmament, and expressing readiness and anxiety to have the greatest possible amount of disarmament that can be arranged.
And then there come the final group—France, and a considerable number of Central Powers. Their anxiety, of course, is a familiar one—anxiety about invasion. I do not myself criticise that. It seems to me inevitable, if you look at their history and position. Undoubtedly they are very anxious about the subject, and it will make their statesmen reluctant to do anything which they think will expose them more easily to invasion. I am, however, satisfied that the people of France are profoundly convinced of the necessity of peace. I am quite sure that they desire it anxiously and will never sanction an adventurous policy on the part of their Government. Whatever changes take place in the Government of France, M. Briand remains as Foreign Secretary, and I am sure that he is deeply convinced of the desirability of peace for humanity and for his own country. I should be worse than ungrateful if I did not recognise that the attitude of the French delegation has been in the highest degree helpful, and has shown a desire to reach an agreement. That I think cannot be contested. Even apart from higher motives they do not desire to see a Germany re-armed.
Indeed, one may say with great confidence that there is no people who want war at the present day, and that no Government will dare to appear before the Conference as a Conference breaker. If they find themselves unable to agree to this, that or the other provision, they will have to make it 'abundantly clear that they do so, not because they desire war, but because the provisions are in their judgment not such as to secure peace. If they find themselves in a small minority it will be a very difficult position to establish. It is because of this general

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desire for peace, which I believe exists, that our position is so strong in these international gatherings. We do not belong to any of these groups. We have no interest except the maintenance of peace. My right hon. friend the Foreign Secretary made a statement the other day at Geneva which seems to me to put the case of this country in a nutshell. He said this:—
"On behalf of my Government, I say without hesitation that we know of no alliance and can know none except that of the Covenant itself, the great world alliance against war and against the armaments by means of which war is prepared and carried on. We are all allies, we Members of the League, in this righteous cause of disarmament. On behalf of the British Government and the British people, I assert that those only are our friends who will work with us to carry that cause to victory."
It is for that reason that I feel very strongly that our attitude and the attitude of the United States—for in this matter they are substantially in agreement with us—is vital to the success of this cause.
I believe that if we can continue, as we did right through this last meeting of the Preparatory Commission, to work in the closest cordiality, this Conference will reach a conclusion, not, probably, as successful as some of us would desire, but one which will mark a very substantial progress in the way towards peace and disarmament. And, if I may do so without impertinence, I venture very respectfully to present an appeal to my noble friends representing all Parties in this House that we should in this batter show a united front. Our influence is great: our responsibility is also great. I do think that it depends upon us more than upon any other nation whether this cause is to succeed or to fail, with all the incalculable consequences which that may have. If we can go into the Conference with an absolutely united people desiring the same thing, earnestly supporting whatever Government may exist at that time in the cause of disarmament, then our influence will be, I think, overwhelming; but, if we cannot do that, if we cannot accomplish the same union, which we accomplished during the War, in the still greater cause of peace, then indeed the fate of the Conference must be regarded as in the highest degree doubtful and problematical.
VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN: My Lords, I regret very much that the noble Lord, Lord Cushendun, is not here to-day, as he at one time held the same position as the noble Viscount at Geneva, and his acquaintance with the machinery of the League of Nations and the procedure at Geneva is very much greater than mine. But he is prevented by an engagement with which I am sure we all sympathise, and in which we offer him our very best wishes. I think we ought to be grateful to the noble Lord who raised this debate this afternoon, because I feel that there surrounds the procedure at Geneva an immense amount of obscurity, which prevents people in this country from realising what is going on. We seldom know what instructions are given to those who represent us there, and the procedure of the League of Nations is extremely difficult for an ordinary layman to understand. As a rule it does not march very fast, but every now and then we suddenly find ourselves confronted with something in the nature of a complete surprise, such as the action which brought us to being either actually committed, or very nearly committed, to a tariff truce, which I am sure nobody in this country understood was being discussed there, and certainly nobody imagined was going to be settled without a good deal of discussion in this country. So I welcome every opportunity there is of finding out exactly what is going on at Geneva.
I do not intend to go into the general question of disarmament. I hope that neither of the two noble Lords will complain if I do not refer very much to the general part of their speeches on disarmament. I would only like to say that I do not share the gloomy view, which they seem to entertain, that there are a great number of people in this country or in the world who are desirous of going to war again.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CITELWOOD: I never said so.
VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN: The noble Viscount began his speech by saying that there was a great danger of the resurrection of this warlike spirit about the country, and the noble Lord opposite (Lord Dickinson) said it was our fault that disarmament had not come sooner.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: I do not want there to be any misunder-

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standing. The last impression I should like to convey is that there is any immediate prospect of war, or anything of the kind. What I do say is that, if you allow this competition of armaments to go on and grow, you will gradually produce the same kind of situation as that out of which previous wars have sprung.
VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN: I was certainly reassured by the end of the noble Viscount's speech, because there he said that no Government wanted war and no Government was warlike; but the noble Lord opposite began with the theory that everybody was drifting back into a warlike spirit, which I emphatically deny. I think that the associations with which both the noble Lords are connected perhaps give them a lugubrious view of their fellow creatures, and the depressing atmosphere of Geneva helps to confirm that impression.
LORD DICKINSON: All I said was that in my opinion, if the Disarmament Conference comes to nothing, then we shall be faced with a warlike condition. That I still hold.
VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN: That is some time ahead; anyhow, we need not be so very much alarmed at the present moment. But I am very glad to hear that. What I really wanted to come to is what seems to me to be the total of what has happened at Geneva. The noble Viscount's statement, I think, makes the situation quite plain, and his letter to the Foreign Secretary in the Blue-book is very lucid indeed. It makes it quite clear that what has happened is that after five years of very hard and difficult work the Preparatory Commission have drawn up a sketch plan for a Convention which is to be presented in February, 1932, to the Conference for its consideration and for completion. We were all, I am sure, very much pleased to see in the Press the very high praise which was given to the noble Viscount at the winding up at Geneva of this lengthy Preparatory Commission, and we felt that it was a great tribute to the esteem in which our representative at Geneva was held by his colleagues there.
The Preparatory Commission have drawn up this framework of a Convention, but the tables are blank, as far as the figures of European States are concerned at any rate. But it does in-
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corporate the agreements reached in the Treaties of Washington and London for naval armaments. Of course, the London Treaty, in the view of many of my friends and of all the expert naval opinion in your Lordships' House, went to lengths in the reduction of our strength in several categories which were perilous to the safety of our overseas trade and the security of our Empire. It is not the time now to discuss that, but there was a clause in that Treaty which left us free to increase our strength if there was reason to apprehend danger from the excessive strength of any European Power. That is a very difficult clause indeed from a diplomatic point of view, I think, but the proper solution of it depends very much upon the result of the Conference in 1932. The position, therefore, is that we alone of all the European Powers have made enormous reductions in our naval strength, and that the figures for our reductions are known at any rate to those who are going to discuss the Convention.
VISCOUNT CECIL or CHELWOOD: I ought to explain that they were put into this Convention, but it was stated very emphatically in the Convention that they were merely put in to make the thing intelligible and not with a view of recommending those figures particularly to the Conference. The noble Viscount will find that stated.
VISCOUNT BRIDGENAN: At any rate, we occupy the position of being the only nation which has shown any concrete evidence of our intention and desire to make reductions. Those reductions can only be justified if they are met with corresponding reductions by the other Powers of the Conference. Therefore, if we wish to see a safe situation we must all wish well to the Conference of 1932. I can assure the noble Viscount that we join him most heartily in that. But the noble Viscount says in his letter:—
"Those who choose to assume now that the Conference will fill in figures that would not, in their view, be satisfactory, should reserve their strictures for use, in case of need, at the Conference; their reproaches cannot be aimed at the Draft Convention."
We certainly do not want to aim any reproaches at the Draft Convention. But if we are to wait until the Conference meets before we express our apprehensions, I am afraid we shall wait until it

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is too late. Therefore, I think, we ought to express some apprehensions as to what may happen, and to say that we can only be free from those apprehensions when the Conference shows that other countries are going to follow the lead which this country has given.
There was a phrase in the speech of the noble Lord opposite which I rather resented, in which he stated that it was our fault that nothing had been done before. We are the one nation that has done something, and to blame one's own nation for having done nothing when other nations have not only not reduced but have in some cases increased, does not seem to me—
LORD DICKINSON: I was referring to the action of this country with regard to the Geneva Protocol. It was not with reference to anything we have done in the way of reduction.
VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN: I do not know what the noble Lord means to say about the Geneva Protocol. What I do know, and what he cannot deny, is that we are the one country which has done something. Therefore I resent blame being addressed to us on the ground that we are impeding the reduction of armaments. In that connection it would be rather gratifying if the noble and learned Lord who leads the House and who, I understand, is going to speak, could give us any comforting assurance about the reductions of other countries. As far as we can see from the Press the naval expenses of other countries are rather inclined to go up. Could the noble and learned Lord tell us anything as to any result from the conversations of the representative of the Foreign Office who went to Rome to talk about naval disarmament. If he could give us any reassurance on that point it would be very comforting.
I would like to ask him another question. I was very glad to hear that the noble Viscount thinks there is no danger of war from Russia. We have heard or read a good deal lately about the reported enormous increases in the Air Force of the Soviet Government. Could the noble and learned Lord give us any comfort or assurance that that is exaggerated? What we have heard today leads all of us, I think, to feel that we can congratulate the noble Viscount
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upon the completion of a very difficult task. I know from experience what a difficult task the Preparatory Commission had to perform and we congratulate the noble Viscount on the very great part he has played in it. We must make it clear that, in filling in the framework of the Convention, the success of the Conference depends upon other countries showing that they are ready to make some sacrifices at least adequate and, if possible, equivalent to the enormous sacrifices that this country has made. If they do that I see very great hope of successful results from the Conference.
THE LORD PRESIDENT or THE COUNCIL (Loan PARMOOR): My Lords, it is very satisfactory, I think, that the speech of the noble Viscount opposite is all in the direction of showing a united opinion as between the political Parties of this country. Naturally, there must be differences of detail on a question of this kind, and I will endeavour at the outset to answer the two questions which the noble Viscount put to me. Perhaps he would allow me, first of all, to add my thanks to those which he gave to the noble Lord, Lord Dickinson, for his admirable summary of conditions as they exist. Still more are we indebted to the noble Viscount, Lord Cecil, who, above all men, whether here or abroad, has had most to do with the question of disarmament and can speak directly from personal experience.
With regard to the questions which the noble Viscount opposite put, I think the reduction of other countries is the very subject matter which will have to be dealt with at the Disarmament Conference. The question arises: Will they reduce, even if we desire to do it, their armaments relatively in order that a real scheme of disarmament may be established as between the different nations of the world? I do not think that anything more can be said at the present time, because the scale of disarmament to which the noble Viscount, referred is of itself only a scheme to be filled up. What we desire most ardently is that it shall be filled up in such a way that the reduction of the interested countries may lead to a system of general disarmament.
With regard to Russia, I have no special knowledge of the particular point to which the noble Viscount, Lord Bridge-

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man, referred. But I was very glad to hear what the noble Viscount, Lord Cecil, said about Russia. I am not one of those who believe in the warlike preparations of Russia at the present time. I agree also with the noble Viscount when he said that, if there is one country which in its own interest should at the present time avoid war, that country is Russia. I do not believe that Russia will take any such step as has been suggested, because it would be altogether inconsistent, not only with the professions which they have made, but also with their own interests as regards the future.
The Question of the noble Lord was "to ask His Majesty's Government whether they can make any statement as to the progress of international disarmament." I adopt the statement made by my noble friend Lord Cecil, but I should like to add one or two words to it as coming perhaps more directly from the Government's point of view. In the first place, I think there was no difference between the noble Lord who moved this Motion and Lord Cecil. I adopt entirely this position, that you have to choose between a competitive system of aggressive armaments and what Lord Cecil—T will not go into the definition again—called, directly and shortly, disarmament. What does that mean? I need not try to convince the noble Lord opposite about that. The immediate cause of the Great War, the disastrous war, the ruinous war, and, as I think, the stupid war, was the competition of aggressive armaments between the various rival countries interested. That had gone on for centuries, and it was recognised, at least as between European countries more particularly, that their foreign relations depended not upon a foundation of peace but upon a war preparation, constantly regarded, constantly looked to, and kept up by a system of comparison of the particular competing Powers at any one time. I am sure I shall have the assent of the noble Lord opposite when I make this statement, that any risk of the European countries and of the world at large falling again into the conditions of a general war such as the last Great War, should be at all costs avoided, and steps taken to make it as far as possible impossible.
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That is, after all, quite shortly put, disarmament.
I recollect that more than once the Prime Minister has said that disarmament and peace are interlocking conditions which mean the same thing. I think that that is absolutely true. It is not only the fact of disarmament, but it is the fact that disarmament means the organisation of international relationships upon a new basis of peace and conciliation. I do not propose to go into the points raised by the noble Viscount, I mean as regards the details of the Preparatory Commission which is going to lead early next year, as is now settled, to a Disarmament Conference; but I think it is quite clear from what he told us and from what so many of us have read and seen, that the scheme which he has suggested—the practical scheme, the skeleton scheme—if filled up in the direction I think the people in this country would desire, would lead practically to a condition of actual disarmament. I agree very strongly indeed with what he said. So do the Government. But we have talked long enough on the general questions. After all, the League of Nations is now, I think, more than eleven years old. The same remark, of course, applies to the conditions accepted, I might also say, as a debt of honour by the Treaty of Versailles to which Lord Dickinson specially referred. Unless we now come to actual figures and practical agreement, without in any sense being a pessimist or an alarmist—I am neither the one nor the other—I cannot help seeing that delay does create risks and may bring very great difficulties indeed. I do not want to go over what the noble Viscount said about Russia. I agree with him about that, and so, too, I do about Germany and France. In this country I hope we shall all be united in the sense that the noble Lord opposite has indicated.
The particular point I wanted to emphasise is a little different from the one which the noble Viscount dwelt upon. It is to be found in the actual statements made by our representative, the present Foreign Secretary, both at the Assembly at Geneva this year and in very remarkable language at the meeting of the Council over which he presided this year. IF he is right, as I think he is,

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not only in his own desire and the desire of the Government but in the general opinion of this country, it appears to me that that influence steadily and constantly exerted would bring about that which I think the noble Viscount desires. May I say a word or two on this point? I have a statement made by the Foreign Secretary at the Assembly, and a statement made by the Foreign Secretary when he presided the other day over the Council at Geneva. I quite agree with the noble Viscount opposite that it is very difficult to get true intelligence in this country of what is going on at Geneva. I have myself taken steps to get directly from Geneva all the information that is published, but even in that way it is very difficult to know exactly how conditions stand.
I have sometimes been almost alarmed, if I may use that expression, by the fact that a large number of people seem never to pay much attention to what is going on at Geneva, and, perhaps, what is worse in some respects, take their opinion from biased sources which come to us in summaries put forward by particular correspondents. In order to make this quite clear let me read a line or two from what the Foreign Secretary said at the Assembly. Speaking for the Government, he said:—
"In our profound belief, security and disarmament are closely interlocked, and nothing can make our peoples truly safe from war until a treaty of general disarmament has been made."
I gather from what the noble Viscount said that we are all, at any rate in this House, entirely in agreement with that statement. Then he went or to say—I am not reading consecutively because I want to shorten what I have to say:—
"The Assembly will forgive me if I say quite frankly what is in my mind on this issue. We can never fulfil the purpose for which the League has been created unless we are prepared to carry through a scheme of general disarmament by international agreement."
I make those two quotations in order that there may be an opportunity for many people in this country of knowing what the attitude was which was taken up by the Foreign Secretary, and what were the notable words that he used.
I do not address those quotations to the noble Viscount. If I understood his speech and his argument, he would be in
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thorough agreement with what was then said by the Foreign Secretary. Indeed, at the Council the other day there was a statement still more notable. I am not quite sure how far it was referred to by the noble Viscount, and I do not want to repeat anything he said, but these are words which struck me as words of primary importance in dealing with the real basic necessities of the present position. The words I want to quote are:—
"On behalf of my Government"—
your Lordships will know that I am now speaking on behalf of the Government myself—
"I say without hesitation that we know of no alliance and can know none except that of the Covenant itself, the great world alliance against war and against the armaments by which war is prepared and carried on. We are all allies, we Members of the League, in this righteous cause of disarmament. On behalf of the British Government and the British people, I assert that those only are our friends who will work with us to carry that cause to victory."
VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN: Whose words were those?
LORD PARMOOR: The Foreign Secretary's when presiding, as he was lately, at the Council of the League at Geneva. Your Lordships will not wonder that words of that kind made a profound impression at Geneva, because they indicated not only the determination of the present Government but the Foreign Secretary's opinion that the Government were backed up, to use his own expression, by "the British people." I did not myself discern any pessimism—as the noble Viscount opposite suggested—in what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Dickinson, or by the noble Viscount, Lord Cecil. I think they both stated very clearly that if the Disarmament Conference failed and we had to fall back on a system of competitive aggression, of rivalry in armaments, then indeed the outlook for the future would be dark and difficult.
I do not think that there is much more that I can say to-day, but I was asked for the opinion of the Government and in the two passages which I have read that opinion has been most admirably expressed. I note that Lord Dickinson is moving for Papers. I would like to say at once that all possible Papers which can be disclosed without detriment to the public interest should be disclosed

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and, as I hope, read and digested and considered in this very important matter. I am not aware of anything fresh that we could add to the Papers already published, but if the noble Lord would communicate with those who have control and knowledge of those Papers in the Department concerned and tell them what he wishes, I have no doubt they will meet him in every possible way. I hope that will satisfy him on that point. I only wish to add, although it may be superfluous, an expression of the gratitude of the Government and, I believe, the gratitude of the British people, for the great work which on their behalf the noble Viscount., Lord Cecil, has carried out now for a series of years at these various Conferences at Geneva.
LORD CLWYD: My Lords, before we leave this subject this afternoon, I desire in a word to express my deep interest in the discussion which has taken place, and, if I may be allowed, to express on behalf of those members of the House who sit on these Benches, our agreement with the tribute paid to the splendid services to the cause of peace which have been rendered by the noble Viscount, Lord Cecil, in connection with the disarmament question. It is difficult and indeed almost impossible to find words which are adequate to describe the feeling of gratitude to him for the most important services which he has rendered to the cause of international peace for many years.
The second thing I wish to do, if I may, is to say that those members who sit with me on these Benches authorise me to say that we associate ourselves with the good wishes which have already been expressed by the noble Viscount representing the Opposition in regard to the success of the Disarmament Conference next year. We shall, as far as we are able to do so, render every possible assistance in reaching the conclusion which we all unanimously desire. There are, of course, certain conditions which will have to be fulfilled in relation to the safety and the obligations of our own notion and Empire in the matter. We all realise and recognise that, but at the same time it seems to me that the most important thing is that our representatives at this Conference next year should go to the Conference with the knowledge that they
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have behind them not only the support of one Party, but of all Parties in this country, and that their paramount desire is to secure the benefits that will accrue from the successful issue of that Conference. I am very glad that the noble Lord, Lord Dickinson, has brought this matter before the House to-day in such a way as to enable this discussion to take place with, I am sure, helpful results.
LORD DICKINSON: I ask to be allowed to withdraw my Motion.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

IRISH FREE STATE: APPEALS TO PRIVY COUNCIL.
LORD DANESFORT LORD DANESFORT rose to ask His Majesty's Government whether their attention has been called to an announcement made in the Irish Free State Parliament on 11th December, 1930, by Mr. McGilligan, the Minister for External Affairs, to the effect that legislation in the Free State Parliament to abolish appeals to the Privy Council from the Free State Supreme Court was under consideration and would be introduced in due course; whether the consent or approval to this course of His Majesty's Government has been asked for or obtained; and whether His Majesty's Government approve of such action by the Trish Free State Government; and to move for Papers.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I rise to ask the Questions and to move the Motion standing in my name. May I say at once that the issue involved in this matter is a gravely important constitutional question of the maintenance of obligations which were imposed upon the Irish Free State Government by the so-called Treaty of 1921, and by the Constitution of that Free State which was established by legislation both in this Parliament and in the Free State Parliament. I have no intention to-day of reciting any of the attempts or devices—and there are many—by which the Free State Government have endeavoured to evade their obligations under the Treaty and the Constitution in regard to this matter of the right of appeal to the Privy Council. That right of appeal was contained in the Treaty—if I am right in calling it a Treaty. It was

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expressly confirmed by legislation both in this country and in the Free State, and I should hope it is too late to question the obligation of the Free State Government to abide by those obligations.
I do not intend—because I am going to speak very briefly to-day—to discuss the general question of the obligations which the. Free State Government entered into owing to that Treaty and that Constitution. All I would say about that is that every successive Government in this country since the date of the Treaty and Constitution have asserted in the strongest terms that it is not open to the Free State Government to depart in any respect whatsoever from the obligations of that Treaty without the consent of the other Party to it. In other words, in order to alter the Treaty or Constitution we must have an agreement between the people and the Parliament of this country on the one hand, and the people and Parliament of Southern Ireland on the other. No one has asserted the view that I have just enunciated more strongly and, if I may say so with great respect, more clearly than the noble Lord, Lord Pass-field, who, I gather, will answer my Questions to-day. More than that, I do not at the present moment recall any responsible Minister of the Free State having asserted that they are at liberty to evade or to depart from the obligations of the Treaty, as embodied in the Constitution, of their own motion and without the sanction of the Parliament of this country.
It was therefore with considerable surprise that I read the announcement that the Free State Minister for External Affairs, Mr. McGilligan, made in the Irish Free State Parliament on December 11 last, to the effect that legislation to abolish appeals to the Privy Council from the Free State Supreme Court was under consideration and would be introduced in due course. Having regard to that announcement, I have ventured to put upon the Paper these Questions to His Majesty's Government and, putting them very shortly, they are simply to ask: Whether the consent or approval of His Majesty's Government in regard to this action on the part of the Free State Government has been asked for or obtained; and whether His Majesty's
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Government approve of the action that has been taken or is about to be taken by the Free State Government. I hope that we shall have a very clear answer, as I am sure that we shall have a very definite answer, from the noble Lord. I beg to put my Questions and to move for Papers.
THE SECRETARY or STATE Ton THE COLONIES (LORD PASSFIELD): My Lords, the Questions which the noble Lord has put relate to a subject to which he has already several times called attention, and I will certainly give him an explicit answer. I agree with him, of course, that what he referred to as the obligations entered into between the Governments of this country and of the Irish Free State became a matter of contract from which no one party could depart without the consent of the other contracting party. That is quite clear. But I would venture to protest against the language which the noble Lord used in the opening of his speech, when he referred to the obligations "imposed upon." the Irish Free State Government by "the so-called Treaty." I would rather put it on the ground that it was a contract between the parties. If we wish to take it on the grounds on which it has been taken by successive Governments, I would not refer to it as an obligation imposed upon the other party. It is better to regard it as a Treaty or contract freely entered into by two contracting parties on equal terms, from the provisions of which neither can depart without the consent of the other.
The noble Lord referred to the action taken or about to be taken by the Free State Government. This puts me in some difficulty, because I ant not in a position to state what action would be taken by His Majesty's Government on the action taken or about to be taken. It rather depends upon what the action is when it is taken. I have heard before of speeches made by Ministers to the effect that something was in contemplation, and what happened afterwards has not been exactly that which had been stated in the speech. To give a specific answer to the noble Lord, the attention of His Majesty's Government has been called o a report of a statement made by the Irish Free State Minister for External Affairs in the Irish Parliament on December 11 last, to the effect that legis-

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lative proposals to abolish appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council were at present under consideration and would be introduced in due course. They have not, however, received any intimation from His Majesty's Government in the Irish Free State as to the terms or the intended legislation, nor have they indicated their consent to the introduction of such legislation. If and when such legislation were introduced, it would be necessary for His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to consider it most carefully in view of the terms of the Articles of Agreement of 1921, and the conclusions reached at the Imperial Conference of 1926.
It will be remembered that these conclusions were set out in the following statement:—
"…. it became clear that it was no part of the policy of His Majesty's Government in Great Britain that questions affecting judicial appeals should be determined otherwise than in accordance with the wishes of the part of the Empire primarily affected. It was, however, generally recognised that where changes in the existing system were proposed winch, while primarily affecting one part, raised issues in which other parts were also concerned, such changes ought only to be carried out after consultation and discussion."
In all the circumstances His Majesty's Government in the United-Kingdom think that it would be inadvisable at this stage to indicate the attitude which they might find it necessary to adopt in relation to projected legislation of the provisions of which they are not aware. I hope the noble Lord will not think that I have evaded his Questions. To put it more summarily: the answer to the first Question is in the affirmative; the answer to the second Question is in the negative; and consequently the third Question does not arise. In reference to the noble Lord's Motion for Papers, there literally are no Papers, because we have received no Dispatch from the Free State Government on the subject. I hope the noble Lord will be satisfied on that point, and will withdraw his Motion for Papers. I can assure him that, when the time comes and there are Papers, it will be the duty of His Majesty's Government to produce them when we know exactly what steps are going to be taken.
LORD DANESFORT: My Lords, I am afraid that I have not received a great
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deal of information from His Majesty's Government, but. I welcome the very clear statement which the noble Lord has once more made to the effect that the obligations which the Free State are under by virtue of the Treaty are matters of contract which cannot be altered without the consent of the other party to the contract—namely, this country and the Parliament of this country. I understand from him (he will correct me if I am wrong) that, even if the Free State Government were to pass legislation in their Parliament abolishing the right, to appeal to the Privy Council that is contained in the Treaty, such legislation would be entirely void and without effect unless there were legislation of a similar character in this country.
LORD PASSFIELD: I am sorry that the noble Lord should put a legal question of such profundity to me across the Table. I cannot give him a legal opinion as to what the effect would be in law. I am in agreement with him that it is a matter of contract, but I cannot he held responsible for the statement he has made as to the effect in law.
LORD DANESFORT: Then that really answers my question. Inasmuch as it is a matter of contract, the contract cannot be altered without the consent of both parties. As regards the matter of Papers, if there are none it is useless to ask for them, but if at a later date Papers should arrive in which the Free State Government ask for the advice or consent or approval of his Majesty's Government, I shall certainly ask for those Papers. I now withdraw my Motion for Papers.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT (SCOTLAND) (ADAPTATION OF ENACTMENTS) ORDER, 1930.
THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (LORD MARLEY)THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (LORD MARLEY) moved, That the Order made by the Secretary of State under the Local Government (Scotland) Act, 1929, entitled the Local Government (Scotland) (Adaptation of Enactments) Order, 1930, which was presented on the 10th December, 1930, be approved. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I want very

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briefly to move the Motion standing in my name, which is in connection with local government in Scotland. I was going to suggest that the Motion, as printed, is purely a formal Motion, but I am told that possibly there are one or two questions which noble Lords might desire to put, and if so I will do my very best to answer them. I may explain that the Motion is required under Section 76 of the Local Government (Scotland) Act, 1929. The Order, copies of which are on the Table, makes a number of minor alterations in General Public Acts which are necessary in consequence of the Act to which I have referred, mainly because that Act abolishes certain local authorities. That is the principal reason. The second reason for this Order is that the rates for varying expenditure are now consolidated under the Act. The details of this Order have been explained in the Command Paper, No. 3742, copies of which are also on the Table. The explanatory Memorandum goes into the whole question, and unless any questions are desired to be put to me I will content myself with moving the Motion standing in my name.
Moved, That the Order made by the Secretary of State under the Local Government (Scotland) Act, 1919, entitled the Local Government (Scotland) (Adaptation of Enactments) Order, 1930, which was presented on the 10th December, 1930, be approved.—(Lord Marley.)
THE MARQUESS OF LINLITHGOW: My Lords, there are two or three points which I would like to put to the noble Lord, and I will do so by referring to the explanatory Memorandum. On page 3, in paragraph (3), we are told that under the Land Valuation (Scotland) Act of 1929 the functions of the sheriff are to be removed. I would like to hear whether an appeal will now lie, and if so to whom. Then as to page 4, paragraph (6), I would like to hear whether the effect of the changes there described will be to affect in any way the liability respectively of either owners or occupiers, or whether their liabilities will remain as they now stand. There is one other point with reference to Section 373 (4) of the Burgh Police (Scotland) Act, 1892. I understand the first portion of paragraph (8) of the Memorandum, beginning on page 5 and going down to the end of the first
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paragraph on page 6, but I do not quite see the force or purpose of the last paragraph.
LORD MARLEY: I am much obliged to the noble Marquess, who did mention to me that he was going to raise certain questions. I will do my best to answer them. If noble Lords who are interested will turn to paragraph (3) on page 3 they will see that it relates to the Land Valuation (Scotland) Act, 1854. The point about that was that originally it referred to parishes which were partly in rural and partly in urban areas. I am not a Scotsman myself, but I am told by my wife, who is Scottish, that when we see "partly burghal and partly landward," it means urban and rural. The point was that in Scotland, as in England, when there was a divided authority there was disagreement, and therefore the Act allowed for the sheriff to act as arbitrating authority. Under recent legislation parishes ceased to be rating authorities, and therefore the ratepayers will be in either a rural area under the county council, or in an urban area under the town council. There will be a right of appeal to the valuation committees in each case, and the arbitration appeal is no longer necessary and the sheriff's duties are abolished.
The next question relates to paragraph (6) on page 4—Roads and Bridges. The position is that under the old Acts 'sometimes the occupier of the land was assessed for the full value of that share of the rates which went to the repair of the roads, and he was entitled to recover from the landlord by a reduction of the rent which he paid, or vice versa there was an arrangement under which the owner paid the rates and was entitled to recover a half-share from the tenant. In other words, each had a liability for half the rates, and the question put to me was whether that liability remained. It is a fact that the liability is not altered under this 'amending Act, but it is only fair to say that there are cases of landlords who may, perhaps out of affection for their tenants, have paid the tenant's share of the read rate and have not recovered it. Equally, there may be cases of tenants who out of 'affection for their landlords have paid the landlord's share and not recovered it. Under the amending Act those charitable arrangements, I am

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afraid, are not able to exist any longer, but I am told that in Scotland they are very few in number.
The next point was as to why this same fifty-fifty arrangement was not applied to the burgh general assessment. The reason for that is the fact that they are so applied except in the few cases in which burghs have taken advantage of the Burgh Police (Scotland) Act, 1892, Section 373 (4), referred to in the Command Paper which we are discussing. That section allows certain burghs in Scotland to maintain their old usage in the distribution of the assessment. It was felt that it would be unfair to destroy a usage which had grown up from antiquity, and which was prized by some of the most ancient burghs. Therefore the amending Act by that paragraph allows for the existing arrangements to continue without disturbance in the way in which they are under that ancient usage. There is one further point in that connection. There is no objection to any burgh which does not at
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present use the old arrangements going back to those arrangements, provided two-thirds of the town council agree, under the terms of the section in the Burgh Police (Scotland) Act, 1892, which has not been repealed, and is therefore available for any burgh which desires to return to it. I trust that these observations make the point clear and that the House will pass the Motion.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

MARRIAGES PROVISIONAL ORDERS (No. 2) BILL.
Reported, with Amendments, and recommitted to a Committee of the Whole House on Tuesday next.
House adjourned at twenty minutes past six o'clock.