THE ROUSE CASE.

HL Deb 29 April 1931 vol 80 cc936-57

LORD DARLING rose to call attention to the fact that certain newspapers published comments on the case of one Arthur Rouse, a man then under judgment of death, who had lodged an appeal against his conviction and sentence; to inquire whether His Majesty's Government is aware that certain newspapers published what they alleged were confessions, made, whilst in prison, by that convict; to ask whether His Majesty's Government intends to take any action to prevent a recurrence of such conduct; to call attention to the publication by newspapers of the evidence given before the justices in the case of Arthur Rouse, and to suggest the advisability of restricting such publication in the case of charges of the commission of indictable offences; and to move for Papers.

The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, the House will probably pardon me for taking advantage of its procedure, more liberal in regard to such matters than that of another place, to call attention to a matter which appears to me, and I think will appear to your Lordships, to be of grave public importance. Your Lordships can hardly be ignorant that lately a case engaged much of the public attention—a case peculiar in its circumstances and involving the trial for murder of a man named Rouse, who was convicted and executed. That case took considerable time and many comments were made in the newspapers during the course of the proceedings from first to last. I cannot help thinking that it will appear when I have read some of these to your Lordships, that in the case of certain newspapers undoubtedly there was committed what the law calls contempt of court. Nowadays that may appear not the most felicitous way of describing what took place. But this offence dates from a time when contempt meant not merely the mental process which it generally indicates now, but when it took the form not only of malicious or improper comment but often of acts of deliberate violence. It may mean both. Of course, as the Middle Ages passed away, those who wished to interfere with the process of justice did not do so by force of arms so much as by using writing to express their wishes and to injure those in their claims before the Law Courts in cases where they were opposed to them. There can be no doubt, I think, that this offence of contempt of court is a most grave one, and that the law is perfectly right in taking the sternest means at its disposal to put a stop to it.

If I might venture to substantiate what I have said, I should like to refer to the words used in a judgment in this House in 1742 by one of the greatest of our Lord Chancellors, Lord Hardwicke. In the St. James's Evening Post case he said:— There cannot be anything of greater consequence than to keep the streams of justice clear and pure, that parties may proceed with safety both to themselves and to their characters. It is a fact that contempt of court is by no means limited to, or is most common in, actions or words which show personal disrespect to the Judge or Judges composing the Court. It generally takes the form—a much worse form really, for the evil is more widespread—of interfering with what Lord Hardwicke calls the flow, pure and unadulterated, of the streams of justice so that those who would profit by them are unable to do so—the ordinary subjects of the Crown, that is to say.

In the case to which I desire to call attention there was, as I have indicated, considerable interference by certain newspapers, and although we must admit, and do admit, that on the whole the freedom of the Press is something which acts for the general good of society in this country, yet freedom, may be abused, and in this ease was abused. The best form of liberty—I should not wonder if most of your Lordships agree with me—is what has well been called the liberty of wise restraint, and those newspapers show the greatest wisdom who, in dealing with matters such as cases pending before the Law Courts, exercise the greatest amount of restraint. Certain newspapers entirely, to my mind, forgot their duty in that respect. They not only published a great deal which it was inexpedient to publish while the case was before the magistrates and was being tried at the Assizes, but, after conviction and after an appeal had been lodged by the convicted man, they published their views, in some cases in unmeasured terms, of what should be considered by the Judges in coming to a conclusion as to allowing or dismissing the appeal.

It may be said, and some people are not slow to say: "Oh, that does not matter; the case is before the Judges and the Judges cannot be influenced." If it were a jury everybody admits that they may be influenced, but it is said: "Oh, no, the Judges proceed upon perfectly different principles; they live upon a perfectly different level." I was myself a Judge, and I never thought myself so far above those human weaknesses as that, and I do not think my fellow Judges did either. If your Lordships would forgive me for a moment I should like to remind you of a story, well-known in the Law Courts but not perhaps here. When the Law Courts in the Strand were about to be opened the Lord Chancellor and Judges of that day prepared an address to Her Majesty Queen Victoria to celebrate the occasion, and the Lord Chancellor of the day read these words in beginning the address: Your Majesty, conscious as we are of our own imperfections, we venture "— And the Master of the Rolls of that day—it was not the present Master, Lord Hanworth—said: Lord Chancellor, I cannot agree with that. I am not conscious of any imperfection, and I cannot tell Her Majesty that I am. There was some discussion, and, after a time, a well-known, most learned and delightful member of your Lordships' House, Lord Bowen, said: Lord Chancellor, may I suggest that you amend the words in this way: 'Your Majesty, conscious as we are of one another's imperfections.' And I believe it was agreed to in something like that form.

This digression, which I hope your Lordships will excuse, is really to show that even Judges are not absolutely above any kind of influence, and it may be that if there is sufficient of it, comment and advice may deflect even the Judges from doing their duty, as it undoubtedly is supposed to do, and does, if addressed to juries. But this matter of whether comment is improper upon cases only before Judges and not before juries has, I think, been settled by authority, and I will refer your Lordships to it. The authority is contained in a judgment of the King's Bench Division—a judgment of five Judges—delivered in 1902 in the case of King against Tibbits and another. The words used in the judgment to which I desire to call attention are these: It would indeed be far fetched to infer that the articles would, in fact, have any effect upon the mind of either magistrate or Judge, but the essence of the offence is conduct calculated to produce, so to speak, an atmosphere of prejudice in the midst of which the proceedings must go on. Publications of that character have been punished over and over again as contempt of court where the legal proceedings pending did not involve trial by jury, and where no one would imagine that the mind of the magistrate or Judges charged with the case would or could be induced thereby to swerve from the straight course. The offence is much worse where trial by jury is about to take place, but it certainly is not confined to such cases.

With regard to the particular case of Rouse, he was convicted and he entered an appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal on February 7 of this year, and that appeal was heard on the 23rd of the same month. I put down this Motion first of all because newspaper comment took place during the pendency of that appeal. It was so bad that in some other organs of the Press it was found fault with. I should like to quote words—they are only typical of what appeared elsewhere—from what appeared in the Week End Review of March 21 of this year, in a letter which referred to the newspapers which have done their best to degrade British journalism in the last few weeks in connection with the execution of Rouse. For what other object can those sections of the Press have which have been giving the utmost publicity to everything morbidly sensational in regard to Rouse's last hours but to increase their sales? Is it to be expected that newspapers which exploit every sordid incident associated with murder trials and executions for commercial purposes will welcome any effort to rid the country of such a demoralising influence? My Lords, that is public comment, and if public comment is to be applauded we must applaud that.

What were the papers which indulged in comments of this kind? As I told your Lordships, the appeal was entered on February 7, and on the very next day, which was a Sunday, the People came out with an article headed "When Rouse was warned of danger," and there was a story of how some stranger had warned him that something was likely to happen to him if he took that particular road—something to his disadvantage. First of all there is a portrait of Rouse himself and then it is described as being "exclusive to the People." Then there is this comment: I understand that leave to call new evidence will be asked of the Court of Criminal Appeal when Alfred Arthur Rouse makes his last bid to escape the gallows. Whether or not the Judges will consent to hear that evidence remains to be seen. Then there comes this: Now dominating him in his prison cell, above all, above his wife, his troubles and his other worries, is the outcome of his appeal. He clutches eagerly to the forlorn hope of an acquittal; he will not hear of any possibility of failure. The phrase "forlorn hope" needs no comment from me. It goes on: Time after time he has gone over the details of the case as it will be presented to the Court of Appeal. And each time his optimism convinces him that he has a chance of winning. That optimism is the real reason behind Rouse's attitude to the world; behind his hearty appetite and his bright talks with callers.

Another newspaper on the same day, February 8, dealt with the matter thus. This is the Sunday Dispatch, and it had an article "My doubts about Rouse Conviction. By a Barrister-at-Law." I am told, my Lords—I cannot vouch for it further than it has been told me, and I believe credibly—that this barrister-at-law was a member of the Irish Bar and that a very few days after writing this he died. I regret it, but I cannot for that reason refrain from reading to your Lordships what he published. He published this: I set out some of the points on which it appears to me that the case for the prosecution was notably inconclusive: It may be said: "Oh, but this is an advocacy of Rouse." But that is not my point. My point is that they have no right to interfere, to criticise the prospects or the rights of an appeal from either side, neither for the prosecution nor for the defence. It is as bad to interfere with the course of justice if you do it on behalf of one party as if you do it on behalf of the other party. In criminal cases the party on one side is the Crown, which means all the people of England, and surely to interfere on the side of anybody, not to allow justice to take its course but to try to divert it against the Crown, is as bad as to try to divert it in favour of the Crown—although, of course, to many it may appear more generous to divert it against the Crown. This article goes on: Rouse entered the box to tell his own story heavily handicapped as a self-confessed liar. Let us not forget the shepherd in the fable who cried 'wolf' so often and so falsely that when at last he told the truth he was not believed. It goes on with many comments. I want to make what I have to say as short as I can, so I will not read it all; but the writer says this: There this mysterious and inexplicable Rouse case stands for the present. The Court of Criminal Appeal will review the decision, but to the ordinary lawyer, or perhaps to the ordinary layman, its importance depends on the considerations I have outlined. It is not enough to say that Rouse probably committed the murder. The real issue is: Was there conclusive evidence, amounting to virtual proof, that he did so?

The next instance to which I must draw your Lordships' attention occurred on the same day, Sunday, February 8. This article appeared in the News of the World on that day. It says: Sentenced to death a week ago … he has appealed on grounds not yet disclosed. Then it goes on to say—and this is a matter which I believe Rouse to the very end denied that he did—it was one of his chief points: Meanwhile, there are some people who profess to believe that Rouse did not commit the murder. Those who were in Court throughout the trial are convinced of his guilt. Like other murderers who have ended their lives on the scaffold, Rouse inches one or two mistakes. After striking his victim with the mallet"— a thing which he denied even in the Court of Appeal— he dropped the implement in order to throw the unfortunate man's body into the car—and forgot it. Then there comes this under the headings, "The Ruthless Lover—Town to Town Trail of Unhappy Women—Rouse recalls a Tattoo on His Victim": During the trial Mr. Justice Talbot referred to Rouse as a most facile liar. He is more than facile—he is a cool, crafty, calculating liar, as is proved by his own story of his hectic life of the last ten years. Then it goes into the cases of some of the wretched women. I think I need read no more of that article.

It is hardly necessary to argue, I should think, that what I have read from these three newspapers was a contempt of court of the most dangerous character, and when he dealt with the appeal of Rouse the Lord Chief Justice, after he had given judgment, made some remarks which are thus reported in The Times of February 24, the next day: Later in the day the Lord Chief Justice said that, with reference to the Rouse case, there had been, pending the appeal to that Court, a great deal of improper comment in certain newspapers, and in letters to the members of the Court, including one from a person describing himself as a Member of Parliament. They would have to consider"— I ask the newspapers to notice this— whether proceedings of that kind pending an appeal did not constitute a contempt of Court. From what I have read to your Lordships already, I think you will come to the conclusion that the Courts will not have very much difficulty in deciding that question when it comes before them.

I put clown this Notice of Motion and, of course, it appeared publicly, and today I received a letter which ends with this paragraph: This is an open letter and I have no objection to your stating what are my personal views. It is written by a member of this House, Lord Rothermere. I have not the pleasure and advantage of Lord Rothermere's acquaintance. I do not think I know him by sight. I have not at all events had the good fortune ever to hear him speak in your Lordships' House, but he wrote me this letter. I shall read three paragraphs from it. I shall not read the others for this reason, that although they deal with matters cognate to what I am now laying before your Lordships, they are not really relevant to the matter now before you, and although they contain some valuable observations I do not think, as they are not to the point in this matter, I ought to read them, especially as they mention a member of this House who is not present. The paragraphs I will read are as follows: I am very interested in the subject of debate that your are initiating to-clay, and I wish that my business engagements permitted me to attend. I gather that you are to raise among other questions the increasing tendency of certain newspapers to publish, especially in respect of murder cases, the life story of convicted persons, notwithstanding that an appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal may be pending. Speaking for myself, and I am sure my personal view will be shared by the proprietors of all reputable newspapers, I would welcome an authoritative ruling that matter to the detriment of a convicted person should not be published until the time for lodging an appeal has elapsed. Your Lordships will see that that goes beyond anything which I have suggested or which I have yet known to be suggested— I would welcome an authoritative ruling that matter to the detriment of a convicted person should not be published until the time for lodging an appeal has elapsed, or if an appeal is lodged, not until the appeal has been heard. That is most valuable to my mind in support of what I have been laying before your Lordships. It is most valuable confirmation that there is nothing to the detriment of reputable newspapers in omitting from publication the kind of thing that I have been laying before your Lordships. There we have the authority of a man with, undoubtedly, great influence in the Press, the owner of several newspapers. There is his opinion, that the law needs strengthening in that direction.

I am sorry to have detained your Lordships so long, but I really think that the noble Earl who brings forward the next Motion will not be altogether ungrateful to me. The other branch of the Motion that I have upon the Paper deals with proceedings before justices. Your Lordships know that if a case of any real notoriety comes into court before the magistrates the newspapers publish the evidence given, in some cases verbatim. They did so day after day in the Rouse case. Of course some things often are given in evidence before the magistrates which on the trial, after objection taken by skilled advocates, are excluded from the knowledge of the jury. That cannot be helped. There is nothing more difficult to my mind than to decide what is and what is not evidence. There are some things so very near the line that the Judges themselves have been known to differ as to whether the matter was evidence or not. It is peculiarly so in the case of motive. It is not necessary to prove motive for any crime, but it is very usual to try to do it, and to prove what may influence a particular human being is a difficult thing, of course. Yet it is often done.

The newspapers, as I have said, published the evidence here in full. They published some things which were not given in evidence at the Assizes. I should like it to be known, as many people are mistaken as to that, that they were not offered in evidence by the Counsel for the Crown. There was no ruling of the Judge that the things were not evidence, because, in their own discretion, the Counsel appearing for the prosecution did not offer them in evidence. That is not to say that they were not evidence. I have read them and I think many of them, if they had been offered in evidence, would have been admitted and could not have been rightly excluded, but Counsel for the Crown do not take every advantage that Counsel appearing for a client in a civil case take and are entitled to take. It is historic at the Bar that the Counsel for the Crown do not press the case against His Majesty's subjects as the same Counsel would press the case where one subject is making a civil claim against another.

In this case Sir Patrick Hastings appeared for the prisoner on the appeal. Sir Patrick Hastings, whose name is well known to all of us and is very well known on the Bench opposite, because time was when he was one of the Law Officers of the Party which is now in power, said this, which appears in The Times of the 24th February: Fortunately, or unfortunately, we now live in a world in which the assistance of a Press is always afforded to make certain that all the more unsavoury elements in a man's life, if disclosed, shall be given the most complete publicity in spite of objection. That refers, of course, to the reports of what was given in evidence before the magistrates. People have suggested various remedies for this. What I want to make known, as widely as it can be known, is that there is a perfectly legal and a very simple remedy. It was mentioned in regard to this particular case in the Justice of the Peace, a legal newspaper, on February 28 in these words: In the Rouse case we have had one more striking illustration that publicity, the great safeguard of justice, can turn into an instrument damaging to justice. The remedy is obvious: the exclusion of the public (including Press reporters) from preliminary investigations into sensational crimes. This is merely an alteration in practice. It requires no new legislation, for it is already law.

That may startle a good many people, but I believe it to be absolutely good law. An article appeared in that same paper on a later date, March 28, written by Mr. Mead, one of the Police Magistrates of the Metropolis, a man of the longest experience. I will not trouble your Lordships with the article, but he gave authority for all that he said; he argued the point and he cited cases. If anybody has an appetite for cases, the case which goes to the root of it all is Boulter's case decided in this House. He concludes his article with these words: It is suggested therefore that, in prosecutions of importance, application might be made to the justices that the proceedings should be private. As I have said, I think there is ample authority for what the Justice of the Peace wrote and for what Mr. Mead wrote in the article he published. The result, I apprehend, of what has been done in this Rouse case and of the licence which replaced liberty in so many of the newspapers will very likely be that in the next case of any great notoriety and importance, where someone is accused of a crime and feels that the widest publicity may be given to it, that sort of publicity of which Sir Patrick Hastings bitterly complained, the defendant will apply that the matter be heard in camera. I believe that the magistrates have the power to grant that and it may well be—and it will be decided then—that the magistrates, where an indictable offence is in question and where they are not a court of summary jurisdiction, will exercise their power to order all the people not concerned in the case out of court and that those people will include the reporters for the Press.

There is one other matter alluded to in the Notice I gave; it is the confessions. After this man was convicted, some of these newspapers published what pur- ported to be confessions of his guilt have several, but I think the worst of them all is what professes to be a facsimile—exclusive to the News of the World—of a letter written by Mrs. Rouse, wife of this condemned man. I shall not read it to your Lordships, but it contains this passage:— But I knew I was fighting a lost cause"— Your Lordships will remember the passage in one of the papers about a forlorn hope— for before he went to the Court of Criminal Appeal, he had told me that the jury's verdict was the correct one, and he was guilty. My own opinion is"— I will give him the benefit of this— that he was not in his right mind on November 5th. Your Lordships know that never was laid before the jury. He was not defended on the ground that he was not in his right mind. That is what his wife, says after he was convicted. Of course, the woman did not do that for nothing. It is not to be supposed that this woman, having maintained that he was innocent up to the Court of Appeal, suddenly sat down and wrote this letter all out of her own head and gave it gratuitously to the News of the World. That is not to be supposed for a moment. Everybody who reads that must come to the conclusion, as the Week End Review wrote, that these things are done for money, done to make money, done for the profit that they bring to the newspaper. No one can suppose that that woman did not get money for handing to the News of the World letters so valuable as that letter of hers stating that her husband confessed.

Only a few words more. I have laid before your Lordships what I think are good grounds for its being considered by the newspapers themselves as well as by the public whether there is not some means of putting a stop to what is a public scandal, injurious to the fair unbiased administration of justice. This is no new doctrine—the doctrine of contempt of court. Early in the fifteenth century there came before the Chief Justice in Westminster Hall, in a court within the sound of our own voices at this moment, a case of contempt of court by a member of your Lordships' House. The Judge was Chief Justice Gascoigne; the member of this House was Henry of Monmouth. Henry of Monmouth is there, above your heads, my Lords, to show what has been thought of the conduct of that Chief Justice—there above the Throne is depicted the scene as it happened on that day!

Your Lordships, I hope, will pardon me if I read to you what was said of this incident by Sir Thomas Elyot in "The Boke called The Governour." He gives an account of what occurred upon that day—how the Prince of Wales came and interfered on the part of a servant of his who was to be tried in the King's Bench, and was guilty of the offence of trying to pervert justice by wresting him from the hands of justice. Chief Justice Gascoigne said this to the Prince of Wales: Sir, remember yourself. I keep here the place of the King, your sovereign Lord and father; to whom ye owe double obedience. Wherefore, eftsones, in his name I charge you desist of your wilfulness and unlawful interprise, and from henceforth give good example to those which hereafter shall be your proper subjects. And now, for your contempt and disobedience, go you to the prison of the King's Bench whereunto I commit you; and remain ye there prisoner until the pleasure of the King your father be further known. And Sir Thomas Elyot adds: Whereat, being greatly abashed, the noble Prince laid aside his arms, and, doing reverence, departed and went to the King's Bench as he was commanded.

Now, on the next occasion when someone is brought before the Court of King's Bench for doing that which is calculated to pervert the course of justice, those words may well be used by the present Chief Justice to that hypothetical offender. He has already said that other means may have to be taken, and if there are these repeated contempts of court by newspapers of which we have lately witnessed so many, it may well be that the appropriate words for the Lord Chief Justice to address will be those very words used by Chief Justice Gascoigne, applying them, of course, to the offender before him, and that the punishment will be that which the Prince of Wales was ordered to undergo. We know the result: he gave up his evil courses, he gave up that wilfulness which Chief Justice Gascoigne condemned, and he lived to win the Battle of Agincourt. And I trust that those editors and correspondents may make use of what is left to them of life as well as he did, once he had been punished for his offence.

THE LORD BISHOP OF NORWICH

My Lords, I desire to follow up what the noble and learned Lord has said but with rather a larger background. He has touched generally upon the whole theory and practice of justice and punishment, but I do not think that is altogether a technical subject that only concerns the lawyers. I believe that in its implications it has a great deal to do with the general well being of the community. Punishment is an extremely difficult subject. Casual observers think it is easy, but the more one thinks of it—and I have thought over and over again about the meaning of punishment—the more difficult it becomes to correlate the various elements which are involved in the whole problem. Some of them do not arise in the matter raised in the Question of the noble and learned Lord. We are not to-day concerned with that aspect of punishment which seems to be winning almost exclusive attention. To-day attention is chiefly concentrated upon the reformation of the offender. Anyone who looks at the progress made in our prison reforms in recent years or considers the First Offenders Act and things of that kind, will be aware of the great advance that has been made over the whole field. But that does not arise. Nor do I suppose that we have much to say to-day upon the question of redress—a very important item of punishment. That has only a merely philosophic bearing on the subject which the noble and learned Lord has brought before us to-day.

But he has spoken of the majesty of the law, and I think that what the noble and learned Lord has said upon that subject might be carried further: for I, for one, consider that the majesty of the law would be far better maintained if, after the final sentence has been pronounced upon the murderer, no more at all was heard of him, nor of his doings. I had the great advantage at one time of some discussion and correspondence with a late eminent member of your Lordships' House, the late Viscount Haldane, who was almost as much of a philosopher as he was of a lawyer; and in our talk together that was a point in the legal transactions that appealed to him very much—the majesty of the law. And any of your Lordships who are acquainted with the great Greek tragedies will remember that this is no discovery of our own time, but has led to some of the finest literature in the whole world.

In this matter of punishment it is necessary to think of the warning aspect of punishment. Now, if the convicted murderer is to be a kind of hero, and if he is to be dealt with in newspapers in the foolish and vapid and sentimental manner that we see, then one cannot but fear that the element of warning that ought to be found in any adequate scheme of punishment will be entirely lost. Punishment has also to protect the community, and anything that leads to the convicted murderer winning what one might call almost improper sympathy takes from his punishment the warning effect it ought to have. We are taught that we ought to love our enemies; but that certainly does not mean that we are to make much of those who are the enemies of the community and are guilty of hideous crimes against the community in the persons of their victims. Punishment in a case of this kind is a duty laid upon society as a whole for its own protection and the protection of those who will be exposed to outrage if the guilty are left unchecked. Those things which the noble and learned Lord has brought before us and the other things that I have mentioned prevent punishment from carrying out its proper function of being a warning for the protection of society. So far as I can judge, there is not the least fear that we shall fall into the opposite mistake of being vindictive if we refuse to have anything to do with a melodramatic sentimentality; for if there is a sentimentality with reference to a convicted murderer, there is on the other hand a vindictiveness which is quite alien from the proper carrying out of the processes of the law. But we certainly shall not be thought to be vindictive if we put the convicted murderer in his proper place, and, apart from all undue feeling, carry out the sentence upon him without adopting a sentimental and feeble attitude towards him.

Twenty years ago for the first time it fell to my lot to confirm a man who had been convicted of murder. Since that time I have had to confirm another in the same position. But I cannot for a moment see that respect for the personal repentance of a convicted man in any way justifies us in making little of his crime and weakening the effect of his proper punishment upon others and in the protection of the community. Personally, I should like to think when the man has been finally sentenced and all the appeals are over, that it became impossible for the Press to pay any further attention to him, that he was carried off into oblivion and that no one had an opportunity of reading or hearing such dreadful things as those that the noble and learned Lord has put before us. We are indebted to him for bringing the matter forward, and I believe we should be wise to take a large and comprehensive view and go further than merely dwell upon the matters which necessarily constituted the main portions of his speech.

LORD DULVERTON

My Lords, I rise with a feeling of very considerable diffidence but with the full reliance that I shall receive that indulgence which your Lordships' House invariably extends to one who ventures to address it for the first time. I rise because the subject which was dealt with by the noble and learned Lord is one upon which I have felt strongly for a very long time. Although the particular feature of the case I have in mind is closely allied to that which he has presented, it may not be quite the same; at the same time, I feel that the matter is sufficiently near to it for me to bring it before your Lordships for consideration. In point of fact, some twelve months ago I drafted a Motion but I had no opportunity of speaking to it in your Lordships' House.

In the course of his remarks, the noble and learned Lord drew attention to certain features of Press publicity. Under two of our most cherished institutions—namely, trial by jury in open Court and the liberty of the Press—it follows that those matters which have become public in the Courts are left to the discretion of newspaper editors and proprietors as to how much they will publish or to what particular points they will make special reference by means of block headlines. I think your Lordships will all agree that, as far as the great journals of this country are concerned, that discretion rests in wise and reliable hands. That there are exceptions, I shall venture to point out later on. It would seem at the present time that this particular feature must be left to the discretion of the Press and to public opinion. Rut after a trial is finished, after the evidence has been heard, after judgment has been given and sentence passed, then public opinion, which may legitimately and rightly have followed every detail of the evidence upon which the finding has been reached, should be satisfied.

But there are, as your Lordships have had innumerable opportunities of observing, a number of instances where certain sections of the Press take a diametrically opposite view, and too often, under the most lurid headlines, too much additional information is forthcoming. I have here a number of cuttings taken from the Press over a period of some months. Were I to make any considerable quotation from them I should only be adding to something that I deplore. After all, the noble and learned Lord who spoke first has dealt very considerably with that aspect of the case. To take only one of them in the case with which the noble and learned Lord was mainly dealing, and to quote from memory, allusions were made to the fact that this particular condemned man had not enjoyed his breakfast, had not taken the same amount of pleasure in his game of draughts with his warders as he had done earlier in the time of his incarceration, going on even to the gruesome detail that when he was dressing himself in clothes which were intimately described, it was pointed out to him that he need not on that occasion put on a collar and tie. I venture to submit that there is something shocking to the susceptibilities in thus following a condemned criminal with the prying eyes of a Peeping Tom into the silence, the gloom and what surely ought to be the privacy and solemnity of the condemned cell. I submit that nothing that is useful to the public comes of it that it can only add to the morbidity of minds that are already morbid, and that if it were possible to take steps which would in some way bring pressure to bear on such organs of the Press a good step would have been taken.

This brings me to my main purpose, and at the same time to my conclusion. As has been said in another place, either these, I shall call them lurid, stories which are printed in certain sections of the Press are true, or they are pure fiction. If they are pure fiction, then I respectfully suggest it would be appropriate to take some steps to curtail the inventive powers of newspaper writers. If, on the other hand, they are founded upon fact, then it would appear that the only reliable sources of information are those servants of the State who are officials in His Majesty's prisons. And if that be so, if the Home Secretary does not already possess adequate powers to deal with the situation, I think your Lordships will agree with me that those powers ought to be conferred upon him. I conclude as I began by venturing to suggest that no useful public purpose is served, that it only adds to the morbidity and hysteria of people who indulge in reading these things, and, finally, that even a condemned criminal is entitled to some consideration and to some privacy when he is standing on the very threshold of eternity.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, the noble Lord has raised two important questions: firstly, as to newspaper comments made while the appeal of a convicted man is pending, and secondly, as to confessions alleged to have been made by a convicted man in prison. I should like to thank him for bringing this matter forward. In my view this House is indebted to him for the trouble he has taken in the matter, and for rendering a public service in calling attention to a growing evil. I cannot claim as long a judicial career as the noble Lord, but after seventeen years experience on the Bench, I find myself in complete agreement with nearly all he said, but I also find it very difficult to express my views in judicial language. I have made very careful inquiries into this matter in order that there should be no mistake as to the facts under discussion, and I now turn to the first question, as to newspaper comments when an appeal is pending.

Rouse was convicted upon January 31 last, and he had ten days in which to apply for leave to appeal. On February 6 he gave notice of his application for leave to appeal; on February 23 his appeal was heard and dismissed, and upon March 10 he was executed. Now Rouse being convicted, as I have already stated, upon January 31—a Saturday—on Monday, February 2, articles appeared in all the papers mainly of a temperate character, and generally expressing the view that the evidence might have been stronger. The Daily Express, however, proclaimed that the verdict was undoubtedly right, and professed to give facts which, they said, had not been presented to the public because of legal difficulties and the law of evidence. On the other hand, the Daily Worker of the same date protested that a man was being sent to the gallows on extremely flimsy and circumstantial evidence, that nothing had been proved, and that without the brilliance of the prosecuting Counsel the whole case would have fallen to pieces.

Again confining myself to judicial language, in my view both those articles were regrettable and unfortunate. These comments and the comments of other newspapers were considered, but in view of the decision of the High Court in the case of The King against the Editor and the publisher of the People, ex parte Hobbs, it was thought unlikely that the Court would hold that they constituted a contempt of court. The particular passage upon which that was founded was an interlocutory observation of the learned Lord Chief Justice in a similar case, where he asked: Is it suggested that the Court of Criminal Appeal will give less than a fair trial because of articles in a newspaper which it had not read? After the dismissal of Rouse's appeal on February 23, the Lord Chief Justice made some remarks which in The Times of next day read as follows: Later in the day the Lord Chief Justice said that, with reference to the Rouse case there had been, pending the appeal to that Court, a great deal of improper comment in certain newspapers and in letters to the members of the Court, including one from a person describing himself as a Member of Parliament. They would have to consider whether proceedings of that kind pending an appeal did not constitute a contempt of court. Now, my Lords, you will rightly appreciate that it is not for me here to lay down or to formulate a code of contempt of court. In my view it is not desirable, nor is it possible, to lay down any hard and fast rule upon the matter, or to introduce legislation defining what is and what is not contempt of court. Each case must depend on its own facts and its own circumstances and of those facts and those circumstances the Court is the best judge. Nor is it necessary to strengthen the hands or increase the powers of the Judges. Not only are they entitled to impose a fine, but, as was pointed out by the Lord Chief Justice in a recent case, they have the power to commit an offender to prison—a power which is not seldom exercised and one which the Courts can be relied upon to exercise in a proper case. No one desires to limit the legitimate powers of the Press. I doubt if it is possible to say that a newspaper can make no comment at all till the time for appeal has expired, but it is a consummation devoutly to be wished, and I welcome the views of Lord Rothermere read by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Darling. The position may be somewhat different when an appeal has been entered, but whatever comment is made and whenever comment is made, it must be reasonable and temperate in its terms and not such as to prejudice the accused's chances of appeal.

I think it is due to the Press of this country to say that in the majority of cases their powers are well and wisely used. Publicity may lead to the prevention of crime as well as to its detection, and it serves a useful national service. One recognises that in many cases the work of reporting is carried on under great pressure of time and circumstances, and due allowance is always made for an unintentional as distinguished from a deliberate offence. No question of principle is at stake. But there are many principles, and there is always a law of diminishing return in the application of principles. The further they are extended the less useful and expedient they are apt to be found. There is always a competition amongst principles and that which is most applicable at any given point has to give way further on to another principle which at that point is of greater utility and effect, and the most vital and the most important of all principles is that a person on trial or already convicted shall not be prejudiced either in his defence or in his subsequent appeal by newspaper comments. It does not lie in the mouth of an offender to say that no jury and no Court could have been influenced by the publication of the article complained of. The gist of the offence is the publication of the article. I can give this assurance to my noble and learned friend—and I give it gladly—that in the event of such articles appearing on a future occasion they will be brought before the Court so that the Court may have an opportunity of considering whether contempt has been committed or not.

I now turn to the second part—alleged confessions made by parties in prison. On March 16 Mr. Gardner asked the Home Secretary in the House of Commons whether he would make inquiries as to the circumstances in which what purported to be the confession of Arthur Rouse reached the Press. The Secretary of State replied: I have made searching inquiry. I am satisfied that no confession was passed out by any official, and I think it very unlikely that any such document was sent out or passed out in any other way. Now as to confessions themselves. There is no way at present of preventing publications of this kind by newspapers. It is only possible for the Home Secretary to state quite definitely in the House of Commons, as he did on this occasion, that no such confession was passed out by an official. The Home Office in these cases does not publicly state whether a person did or did not confess before his execution. For many years the Home Office rule has been not to publish confessions, or even the fact that a confession has been made, but in some exceptional cases where strong public interest has been aroused the Secretary of State has caused a notification of the fact, but not the details, of a statement or confession.

Some of the reasons for the Home Office practice may be stated. They are all derived from experience in particular cases. Firstly, the confession may not be in writing. It may be made to the Governor verbally some twenty minutes before the execution took place. If the prisoner has seen relatives on the evening before and has solemnly asserted his innocence, a controversy would certainly arise in those circumstances as to whether he ever confessed at all. Again, the confession may be made to the Chaplain, and although the Chaplain might communicate the fact in confidence he might stipulate that the fact that he has done so should not be made public, or he might keep the confession locked in his own breast. Roman Catholic chaplains and some other chaplains would on no account divulge a confession made to them. The confession, especially if made verbally, may be of a somewhat ambiguous character. One person might regard it as a confession of guilt: another might not. In such a case it might be impossible to say definitely whether the man had confessed or not.

Publication of the details of a confession is clearly out of the question. These confessions, even if written, are very often only part of the truth, and often may be in parts quite untrue. The prisoner may incriminate or possibly libel living persons, and it would be grossly unfair to publish to the world statements of that kind made by a man shortly before his death and likely to gain more credence from that fact. Finally, perhaps the strongest argument against publishing even the fact of a confession is that in cases where a prisoner has been convicted on circumstantial evidence, there is often nothing in the nature of a confession, and in those cases the public would be apt to conclude that the fact that a person had not confessed was an additional reason for thinking that he had been wrongfully convicted or convicted upon insufficient evidence.

I note with interest the remark made by the noble and learned Lord as to restricting publication in the case of charge's of the commission of indictable offences. It might be wise to prevent the publication of evidence which had been objected to in the court before the magistrate. There are no Papers to lay. May I say, finally, that I would like to add that in my opinion a great evil at the present time is the marketing of sensational and often imaginary stories in connection with current criminal cases. It is not in the interest of justice or public morality that the sordid details of a criminal career should be spread abroad. Nowadays newspapers are read by young and old alike, and I would venture to appeal to the editors and proprietors of our great English newspapers, and to ask them whether it is not desirable to discontinue the publication of such articles.

LORD PARMOOR

My Lords, we have a Royal Commission fixed for this time. I suggest, therefore, that the House do adjourn during pleasure, and after the Royal Commission we can transact the rest of our business.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

Does the noble and learned Lord press his Motion for Papers?

LORD DARLING

No, my Lords, I am amply satisfied with what the Lord Chancellor has said.

House adjourned during pleasure.

House resumed.