Lords Sitting of 26 November 1930

Preamble
The House met at a quarter before four of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.

BRITISH SUGAR INDUSTRY.
LORD OLIVIER LORD OLIVIER had given Notice that he would call attention to the position of the British sugar industry and trade as affected by foreign capitalist mass over-production and to the effects upon Colonial economic conditions and British interests; ask His Majesty's Government whether it is still their considered policy to take no action to mitigate these destructive operations of a system which the principles of the Labour Party, as declared by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, condemn as mischievous, whether it is still their intention as heretofore stated, to withdraw, as soon as the financial position of the Exchequer permits, the mitigating protection now afforded through the expedient of tariff Preference, and whether in that event they contemplate any alternative method of mitigation; and move for Papers.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, it may perhaps seem to indicate a lack of sense of proportion on my part that, at a time when on all sides we are constantly receiving complaints of the entire destruction of British industry and are constantly confronted with the rising numbers of the unemployed, I should again ask your Lordships' House to take into special consideration the case of the British West Indian sugar industry. But I think there is occasion to do so, because last week two Papers were laid arising out of the special difficulties of the British West Indian sugar industry and the sugar industry of Mauritius. First of all, correspondence was laid, by my noble friend as promised, with the British West Indian Colonies, British Guiana and Mauritius. Secondly, and very significantly, a Supplementary Estimate has been laid in the other House making provision for expenditure on relief of labourers and for other purposes in the West Indies. At the same time, as a schedule to the
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first-mentioned White Paper, the correspondence, there is a list of grants made from the Development Fund—none of which, I may say in passing, have any particular reference to the sugar industry. They have, however, brought the subject again rather into public notice, and it will be further noticed no doubt in another place.
I think there are some special reasons why it is not disproportionate to bring forward this question of the West Indian and British sugar industry. The position of the British Colonies takes them rather out of the run of our ordinary industrial interests, because we have special political duties towards the West Indian Colonies which are otherwise provided for than are our political duties towards our industries at home. In the second place, if I am not mistaken, the depression in prices and the underselling to which our British Colonial producers are exposed is far greater than in practically any other industry that I have been able to investigate. I will give figures in that connection later. It seems to me that, on that account also, we are dealing with a very special case. In the third place, I think that the ease of the West Indies raises in a very clear and definite manner the consideration of some of those questions that have been repeatedly occupying public attention generally—namely, how far we are to tolerate the anarchic operations of modern trade, to the destruction of one industry after another in which our own workers are engaged.
I am going very briefly to ask your Lordships to attend to a few figures, so that you may understand the situation. The present price of raw sugar, which is the ordinary staple world article produced by Cuba, the West Indies and so on, is £5 7s. 6d. per ton. That figure is in The Times to-day. It is perfectly impossible for any industry in the world to produce raw sugar at that price, or anything like it. The other day the chairman of an industrial enterprise in Havana gave an account of the terrible straits to which Cuba has been reduced, and he said that the majority of factories in Cuba could not possibly produce sugar at less than £9 6s. 8d. per ton without heavy loss, to say nothing of profit. That is the situation in Cuba to-day, and it confirms the analysis which my col-

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league of the West Indian Commission and I made of the cost of production of sugar. You may say generally that the Cuban producers are the persons principally responsible for the present condition of the world's sugar industry, and that they are now getting about half of what it costs them to produce their sugar, though they are paying practically nothing for the cane which they buy, except the cost of cutting and transport.
It is rather interesting to consider the case of Cuba, because it is the most serious in the world situation. The case of Java has been mentioned, but all the authorities that I have been able to consult declare that it is less important than that of Cuba. It is interesting to consider how the situation in Cuba has arisen. During the War, American financial interests conceived the idea, which they expressed in terms which I have noted down, that American sugar production should aim at dominating Porto Rico, Hawaii, the Philippines, Haiti, Santo Domingo, and Cuba and supplying the full requirements of the United States and of Europe (presumably destroying the industry of the West Indies) and establishing world sugar control. That policy has been pursued, and I speak of it in my Notice as "mass over-production," aiming at snatching control of the world market. American financial interests proceeded to obtain control of the sugar-producing areas of Cuba and to centralise the cane supply from the Cuban farmers in centrally situated factories until they had the control of the cane supply of those districts. They also obtained large concessions of virgin forest land, which they cut down, burnt and planted with large areas of cane. This land for many years required very little cultivation.
I was in Cuba this year and I found that those factories were spending practically nothing on cultivation. They have these large seas of cane, and between them at intervals fire-breaks on which Haitian labourers of a very barbarous-looking description were living in thatched huts and making their living between crop times by cultivating sweet potatoes and rearing a few goats. In crop time they handled the crop. For some time these factories have not been able to pay anything whatever for the cultivation of cane. At the same time the whole of the Cuban farming industry
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was undergoing a severe crisis. The farmers complained that they had to sell their cane to the factories at a price of 5s. or 6s. per ton,, which merely paid for the cost of transport and cutting. There was therefore, at that time, a very severe economic crisis in Cuba and a large amount of unemployment. The Government was instituting a policy of compulsory food production, and at this moment, as you will see, the Cuban people are reacting to that state of affairs by attempting revolution against the Government, which they think has sold them to American financiers.
The effect of this speculative mass over-production was that American interests in Cuba, Santo Domingo and elsewhere raised the Cuban production to over 5,000,000 tons a year, which is very nearly one fifth of the whole world supply. At the same time the Continental nations were not going to be cut out by that industrial warfare, and Germany, Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary re-constituted their own sugar industry in face of tremendous competition by a most drastic policy of Protection and subsidies. The first agent that has depressed the sugar market to its present condition is capitalist mass production for speculative purposes; but the second is subsidising, Protection and mass production on the Continent. All the Continental nations do this—Germany, Poland, Sweden and even Italy—but the special case which I will put to your Lordships is the case of Czecho-Slovakia, in order that your Lordships may see what is the kind of operation we have to contend with.
Czecho-Slovakia is a sugar-beet producing country. Czecho-Slovakia, according to the statement of her President, cannot produce sugar in its factories at less than 20 s. per cwt.—£20 per ton. In Cuba the average cost of production is £11 or £12 per ton and in our West. Indian Colonies about the same. How do they finance themselves in Czecho-Slovakia? They have an Import Duty of 21 s. per cwt.—that is to say fully equal to the value of the sugar—and they have a heavy Consumption Tax, which goes to the Government. Now as to the result of that Import Duty and Consumption Tax. It raises the price of sugar to about 6¼d. per lb., and gives the Government a fund. That sugar is now exported at £6 12 s. 6d.

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per ton, or just about one-third of its cost of production, and 600,000 tons are I exported. 500,000 tons of German sugar is put upon the markets at about half the cost of production, as well as 300,000 tons from Hungary, and about the same quantity from Poland, all subsidised by their respective Governments with high protective duties, and so dumped at one-half or one-third of the cost of production. None of those countries, and not even the people who are financing Cuba, seem 10 show any disposition to let go that extraordinary policy. Those Governments argue that it is necessary to increase their wheat production by giving a subsidy for beet, and in all these countries it is a matter of agrarian policy.
In Great Britain, the cost of production of sugar per ton is £25 10 s. Beetroot costs £17 18 s. per ton of sugar, whereas in the West Indies cane grown costs £5 or £6 per ton of sugar. You will, therefore, see the extraordinary handicap with which British beet sugar has to compete. The figures show that British farmers have never succeeded in growing more than 9 tons to the acre, whereas in Germany and Czecho-Slovakia the production is 14 or 15 tons per acre., in Barbados (average) 29 tons, and in some Colonies up to 50 tons. It is therefore difficult to look hopefully upon the future of the British beet sugar industry. Nevertheless, with this cost of production and a subsidy of about £18 10 s. per ton—next year it will he £11 10 s. per ton—the British factories have held their own, although sugar at £18 10 s. per ton, or less than the cost of production. That £18 10 s. includes the duty.
Going back to the actual cost of production of sugar, raw sugar now costs £5 7s. 6d. per ton, or a little more than ½d. per lb. On that the Exchequer raises a duty of ⅞d. per lb. I am bound to say that I think it is a pretty stiff business to put a tax of ⅞d. per lb. upon an article worth per lb.—a duty which is more than the value of the article. That value, with that duty, and the cost of refining, brings the actual cost of the sugar to a little more than 2d. per lb., and it is retailed at 2¼d. in the shops. I think it is ridiculously cheap to have sugar sold at 2¼d. per lb., and if the Exchequer wishes to be generous to the consumer, and reduce the price still
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more, it is surely quite possible to reduce the Sugar Duty, and, as is suggested in our Report, the West Indies would be pleased if we were to reduce the Sugar Duty to half the present amount and admit their sugar free. It might stimulate consumption.
These arguments have left my friends unmoved. I have said that I think the price of sugar is ridiculous at the present time. White refined sugar is at 2¼d. per lb., and the consumption per head in this country is 101 lbs.—substantially over ¼ lb. per head of man, woman and child per week, which seems to be a very liberal allowance, and even if the price were not reduced it would be possible to concede a little to the West Indian producers. Owing to the reduction in the price of sugar in the last few years our consumers have profited at the rate of about £14,000,000 per year, and since the Commission reported further reductions have benefited the consumers at the rate of £5,000,000 a year.
Now I want to come to the position to which circumstances have reduced our Colonies. We have had the White Paper laid before us, showing that the British West Indian producers are carrying on under great difficulties. The correspondence is there, and your Lordships will see that some of the Colonies, Jamaica, Trinidad and Mauritius, having funds at their disposal, have come to the assistance of their own sugar industry. In Trinidad, £2 per ton is given to private factories to keep up the price which they pay to the farmers, of 12 s. 6d. per ton for canes, which is really much too low for sugar cane. A reasonable price for sugar cane is about 17 s. 6d. per ton. However, they say that the factories must not pay less than 12 s. 6d. per ton. Mauritius adopted a scheme of advancing to the amount of £1 per ton by way of loan, and Jamaica also gave a subsidy of £2 per ton. Those three Colonies have been able to carry on their cultivation—the factories of course suffering considerable loss in several cases—but still they have been able to carry on their cultivation without much reduction.
British Guiana, which is not in a position to give any subsidy at all, has

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already begun to wind up her sugar industry. I mentioned in this House last time I spoke that, owing to the Chancellor of the Exchequer's misunderstanding of the effect of an additional 1s. on the Preference, he had refused, on grounds which appeared to me entirely illogical, to allow that extra 1s. for Preference. The immediate effect of that was that cultivation on estates which had yielded an output of 20,000 tons of sugar per annum was dropped. I do not want to labour the case of British Guiana because it is before your Lordships already. The Government of British Guiana have had to apply for relief. I am glad to say that fairly liberal subventions have been made by the Development Fund. But you have a Supplementary Estimate of £114,000 for direct relief work to relieve the population, and at the same time you are doing nothing whatever to maintain the sugar industry; and when the sugar industry in two or three years collapses you will have in British Guiana a condition which fills me, and probably all who know the country, with despair. In Antigua and St. Kitts cultivation is being maintained, because their factories were solvent and adopted a liberal policy. But employment in Antigua has been necessarily cut down and there and in St. Kitts you have grants for relief works.
Now I come to the ease of Barbados. Barbados is a very capably farmed and actively enterprising island. The cultivation in Barbados is first rate, and the Barbadians are extremely intelligent planters and business men, and they managed by great efforts last year positively to increase their crop of sugar. They had a good crop, but also in the work of their Agricultural Department they were able, by enormous diffusion of parasitic wasps and so on, to keep down sugar cane pests. The result was that they did have in Barbados the good fortune of having a record crop of sugar, and on the whole the Barbados people came out with a loss of only about £1 a ton all round. But still people do not like going on with such a loss. And the Barbadians have not too much capital behind them. This year the Barbadian sugar people and the Government are trying to concert some scheme of public co-operative assistance on the lines if the Trinidad or Mauritius schemes, for the industry, which ought to be kept
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going by this country in view of the enormous gains being made here by sweating the sugar industry in the West Indies. But my noble friends are entirely unmoved, although they are getting all these millions of pounds a year into the Exchequer, besides what goes into the pockets of the consumer.
The case of Barbados in one aspect offers a very severe criticism of one part of the Government's policy. In Trinidad there has been a very large development of the cane sugar farming industry, and more than 20,000 small farmers are now dependent on that industry. They have been maintained this year because the Government of Trinidad gave the factories a tonnage grant. I have here a most interesting Report by the Assistant Director of Agriculture. But I should like to read an extract first of all from a report of the Trade Commissioner in Barbados, which bears on the conditions of the labouring class. When I was out there the wages of labour were 1s. 8d. a day, and the labourers complained to me in a deputation that they could not get employed for more than four days a week. It is the policy of the Barbadian farmers to employ a large amount of unskilled labour, and they have a considerable surplus of labour. They think it is a good policy to have really more men on hand than they need to do the work. We disagreed with them as to its being a good policy, but, on the whole, it is a policy which commends itself to the community there. The Trade Commissioner, writing in July last, said—
"When wages were on the higher scale the hours of labour were curtailed, and most labourers were disinclined to work more than four days a week."
The higher scale is 1s. 8d. a day.
"They are now compelled to work six days a week to earn the same amount of wages."
The Trade Commissioner seemed to think that that solved the difficulty about the labour, but the real effect is that about one-quarter of the labourers have been thrown out of employment, the other three-quarters being employed at wages reduced by 25 or 30 per cent. That shows, by a totally independent and impartial report, what is happening in Barbados. He goes on:—
"Now, however, that grinding is almost finished, it is inevitable that money will

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soon become very scarce especially as work of construction and renovation will be reduced to a minimum."
Some of your Lordships take an interest in agriculture. I want to take you a little further into the question of this growing peasant industry in the Colonies, which is a most important development, because it is making the West Indian negro progressive and independent. The Assistant Director of Agriculture is a Cambridge graduate of high scientific qualifications who went out two or three years ago. He is evidently a man of clear and independent mind. He writes as follows:—
"The present position of all three classes of peasant farmers is a very serious one. The price of sugar in 1929 caused losses to a very large percentage of peasant farmers. greatly embarrassing their financial position, and thus preventing proper tillage and manuring for 1930. The lower price of sugar in 1930 is causing the cessation of cultivation by certain classes of peasant Farmers, except for such meagre yields as can be obtained from the commonly grown food crops during the wet season in unmanured soil with a minimum of tillage. A continuation of prices similar to those now obtaining will very shortly drive the great majority of peasant farms out of cultivation. The class of peasant farmer who has still a relatively large debt against his farm, and is required to complete payment within the next two or three years, will undoubtedly find payment impossible, with the result that in many cases possession of the farm will be lost, in addition to the whole or a portion of the sum already subscribed. The few who, by means of financial assistance from other sources, are able to complete payment, will have run their farms down to a low standard of cultivation, from which recovery to a normal productive standard will be expensive. The peasant farmer who rents land is, under present circumstances, not only unable to make sufficient money from his farm to meet annual rent charges, but, like other classes of peasant, is also unable to meet minimum costs of cultivation and cropping. Rented farms therefore also become neglected and run down to a low standard of cultivation. Not only has the low price of sugar distressed the small farmer by directly reducing the value of his sugar cane crop, but it has indirectly reduced the value of the main food crops (yams, potatoes, and eddoes) firstly by increasing their production and. flooding the already unsatisfactory local market, and secondly by lowering the purchasing power of the agricultural labouring community, which has, owing to economic circumstances, been compelled to accept a lower standard of wages. The difficulty and distress of the peasant farmer is therefore not removed by substituting for sugar cane an increased area of other crops such as yams, sweet potatoes, eddoes and other minor food crops."
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That is precisely what I foretold would happen, and it is happening. Your Lordships noted my observation that the labourers are now working six days a week instead of four. Most of them are what are called "located" labourers working under a yearly contract on the estate, and they rent an allotment of land from the estate on the condition that they cultivate cane and that they cultivate it for delivery to the factory. If they are working six days a week, they cannot possibly cultivate cane. The result is that the cane deteriorates and goes out of cultivation. That means that they not only have their wages cut down, but that they are getting less for the cane that they grow both because the price of cane has gone down and cultivation also has necessarily gone down.
I have gone into this question at some length because I have already tried to impress upon my noble friend on previous occasions that this idea that you can deal with the West Indian cane sugar question by giving relief grants to the people who are out of employment does not touch even the fringe of the problem. My previous attempts to explain that made no impression upon the Chancellor of the Exchequer. It is practically the same as saying that if you give unemployment relief to our agricultural labourers, you will save the farming industry of this country when other causes are destroying it, just as they are destroying the West Indian sugar industry. That is the position, I can assure your Lordships, in these Islands of Jamaica, Trinidad, Barbados and Antigua. Whenever there has been a beginning of the cane farming industry, that beginning of social development and progress is being destroyed. Once it is destroyed, it will be extraordinarily difficult to renew it, even if the factories survive.
As I have said on former occasions, under present conditions, even with a Preference of £3 15 s. a ton, only about a quarter, or possibly a third, of the British West Indian sugar industry could continue to be carried on when the price was about £8 a ton. But the price now is less, and how long those in this country who finance West Indian production will be able to carry

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on I do not know. The American financiers, having lost millions and millions of pounds on that spirited operation of collaring the sugar supply, have sent emissaries to the Continent to try to negotiate with foreign and Colonial Governments and Java a limitation of production and a restriction of dumping. So far the prospects of that enterprise do not appear to be very rosy. No one has yet succeeded by private negotiation, and I question whether anybody would succeed by official negotiation, in wheedling Germany or Czecho-Slovakia to the policy of not subsidising their farmers in the wheat industry. We ourselves are now subsidising our wheat farmers as theirs are being subsidised through the sugar industry.
The American financiers who control the Cuban sugar crop have taken rather drastic measures. They tried to get a law through the Cuban Parliament, but, failing in that, they got the Governor to issue an Ordinance that the sugar producers should limit their export to the United States, so that they will be able to get the whole of the American preference which hitherto they have not had, and they will then be able to put any reserve on the world market. The world production has been exceeding the world consumption by about 1,500,000 tons of sugar for some years past, and in Cuba they have in hand enormous stocks of unsold sugar to the extent of many millions of tons. If they took that 1,500,000 tons off the market it might have balanced over production this year. Unfortunately for the sugar market, and possibly unfortunately for the Continental taxpayers who have to pay for dumping, the Continental sugar crop has been about 20 per cent. above normal this year, and we are threatened with more sugar than ever next year.
I have said before, and I say again, Is it not a ridiculous abnegation of statesmanship, when you have a whole series of British Colonies and a whole British industry which supports your home industry depending upon a reasonable price, when they are perfectly capable of surviving if they can sell sugar at a reasonable price, to allow those communities to be destroyed and your export trade to those communities to
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be destroyed by the operations I have described, without taking means to protect yourself against those operations? I do not care how far that argument may lead you or me. I say that in the case of sugar you have an extraordinarily salient case illustrating how the industries of the world, not only in this country but elsewhere, are being destroyed by anarchic trade and by a lack of safeguards against mass production by syndicated capital and insane policies of subsidies by Governments.
Unless our Government take the lead, as many Governments have in the past, of saying: "We are going to protect our own Colonies and look after our own Colonial labourers by some kind of organised and statesmanlike arrangement," instead of saying: "We let world competition take care of itself, and when these people have been destroyed and the peasants have been driven out of their holdings, so that they cannot even grow yams or potatoes, and so on, then we will undertake the impossible task of maintaining the West Indian population by 'doles.'"—the position will not be improved. You have 160,000 people in Barbados and nearly 300,000 in British Guiana. When the Chancellor of the Exchequer says that he will grant relief, I reply that these are cases to which relief cannot be applied. Although I willingly acknowledge that the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary of State have been most ready at once to respond to the recommendations of the Governors saying that relief is wanted, I say that these "doles" are unable to meet the situation, and that the West Indian and Mauritius sugar industry is being progressively destroyed and will go on being destroyed, with results which are too distressing for me to contemplate.
That is the situation. I do beg the Secretary of State to give me some assurance as to whether we can expect any alteration of policy on the part of His Majesty's Government. We had a little gleam of hope the other day because it was noised abroad through the Press that at the Imperial Conference the Chancellor of the Exchequer had undertaken that for three years he would not reduce the Preference. But he has given us that

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undertaking before. He said before: "I will not reduce the Preference so long as the Duties exist." At the same time, there is the reservation that the rights of Parliament and that the necessities of the Budget must be considered. If the necessities of the Budget require the abolition of the Sugar Duty, our Preference will go with it. I should like a definite explanation on that point because there are people who are in doubt about it. Mr. Snowden has already told us "I will not touch Preferences until I remove the Duties; but I am going to remove the Duties as soon as I can." Does the Chancellor of the Exchequer mean that as soon as he is able to take off any of those Duties, which now act as Safeguarding and Protecting Duties, those Duties are going, notwithstanding his declaration to the Imperial Conference? If we could get a clear explanation that certainly not for three years the Sugar Duties would be taken off, that, would be a strong point and more of the Colonial producers would go on with their business. I have moved for Papers pro forma although I do not know what Papers there are for which I can move.
VISCOUNT ELIBANK: My Lords, I have taken part in so many debates on this subject in this House that I am sure your Lordships will pardon me if I once more express my views on this matter, which is of such vital importance to the Empire. The debates which have so far taken place in your Lordships' House have not been on such broad lines as the terms of this Notice. They have been confined rather to dealing with remedies for the salvation of the sugar industry of the West Indies and of Mauritius, but to-day we are asked to consider and discuss the question of sugar production from the point of view of the whole of the sugar production of the world, and its effects upon this country and upon the Empire. I think that we should be extremely obliged to the noble Lord, Lord Olivier, for having raised this issue to-day upon such broad lines. As the noble Lord, Lord Passfield, Secretary of State for the Colonies, has on a number of occasions informed us in the course of similar debates, it is only possible ultimately and adequately to deal with this question upon broad lines.
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It is true to say that whilst in this country we can give subventions here and there to necessitous areas, and to smaller Colonies, we cannot, in framing our main sugar policy, do so without, considering and dealing with it from the point of view of the whole of the sugar producing areas of the British Empire. If this be so, and I do not believe that your Lordships will disagree with that point of view, what is the policy which can best be applied throughout the whole Empire? I do not wish to minimise in any way—and I do not think the noble Lord who has just sat down wished to do so either—the efforts which have been made by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to deal with the deplorable conditions which exist in the West Indies and Mauritius owing to the sugar crisis. I have, like the noble Lord, read very carefully this White Paper which was recently published by the Colonial Office, and I realise—and this comes home to me with great force—that, with the existing Free Trade policy of His Majesty's Government, the Secretary of State for the Colonies has done his best to mitigate hardships in those Colonies. But I cannot conceal from myself the fact that those efforts have been of little avail, because it is the Free Trade policy of the Government which makes it almost impossible effectively to create any lasting or permanent remedy for the conditions in which those Colonies find themselves.
I should like to give to your Lordships an example of this. The Secretary of State suggested in the Despatch to the Governor of Barbados that relief works might be undertaken in order to mitigate the hardships in that Colony. What was the Governor's reply? It was, in the Despatch of August 29 last, as follows:—
"In Barbados development works of a kind likely to provide for the employment of thousands of people are beyond the scope of practicability. The Island is fully roaded. Every acre of it is fully utilised for agricultural purposes, and the labouring population generally know nothing of anything other than intense cultivation of the soil and the growing of sugar cane. In these circumstances, I consider that the only form of relief that ran in itself be an effective means of providing against the contingencies referred to is the maintenance, so far as is possible, of agricultural activities, and these, so far as Barbados is con-

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cerned, are restricted and must for practical purposes continue to be restricted to the sugar industry."
That is the practical question. How are His Majesty's Government going to maintain the sugar industry in that Colony and other Colonies? Or are they prepared in some instances, such as the Colony I have just spoken of, to allow the industry to go out of existence altogether; and, if so, how are they going to face the ruin and chaos, economic and political, which inevitably must follow upon such extinction?
The West Indian Sugar Commission, of which the noble Lord, Lord Olivier, was so admirable a Chairman, suggested the remedy—and in my opinion, it is the only remedy—and it is the maintenance and extension by this country of the Sugar Preference. It is fair in that case to see what the Sugar Preference has already done for the Empire sugar industry since that Preference was instituted in 1919, but before doing that I should like to examine shortly the figures of world sugar production for the year before the war as compared with the year 1927–28, which is the latest year in respect of which I have been able to secure statistics. For this purpose, I have separated the world production of raw cane sugar from the world production of raw beet sugar, and as a result I think your Lordships will agree there is a most interesting situation.
Take cane sugar first. In 1912–3 the world production was 9,500,000 tons. I find that in 1927–8 the world production of raw cane sugar had increased up to 16,500,000, or an increase of 75 per cent. during that period. Turning to the raw beet sugar production, I find that in 1912–3 it was 8,500,000 tons, while in 1927–8 it was practically the same, having advanced only to 9,000,000 tons, or an increase of only 6 per cent. as against an increase of 75 per cent. in cane sugar. Those figures are, I think, very significant, and they give cause for considerable thought, because they show what very great rivalry there is to-day between the production of the cane sugar growers and the beet sugar growers. They also show that as far as mass production is concerned probably the cane sugar growers have reached an even higher level than the beet sugar growers. This, as the noble Lord, Lord Olivier, has told
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us, has reached a high level in Cuba, where the production of cane sugar has increased from 2,500,000 tons to 4,000,000 tons in 1928. In South America I find that so far as cane sugar is concerned the production has quadrupled, from 500,000 tons to 2,000,000 tons in 1928.
Now this seems to me to show that any co-ordinating measures that could be taken to regulate the output of sugar in the world would have to apply more drastically to cane sugar than to beet sugar. In saying what I am going to say I do not wish your Lordships to think that I am against any investigation on a large scale of this matter, because I believe that there is always good to be gained by consultation and coordination over questions of production, especially where production has reached such a high level of over-production as it has in the sugar industry. What I should like to know is how these measures are going to affect this country and the Empire. To-day in Great Britain we are producing anything between 400,000 and 500,000 tons of beet sugar—a figure which I venture to believe could well be maintained, if not increased, to the advantage of the farmers of this country. But, when you go outside beet sugar production, the interests of this country are, in my judgment, centred in the cane sugar growing industry in our Dominions and Colonies, because in my opinion it is much more beneficial for us to import cane sugar from our overseas Possessions than beet sugar from European countries.
In making that assertion I should like your Lordships to bear in mind particularly this point. Cane sugar imported from our Dominions and Colonies has signified to this country during the past few years—1920 to 1928—orders for nearly £6,000,000 worth of sugar machinery. That was purchased in this country by the Dominions in order to increase their sugar production. Why? Because of the preferential system which had been adopted in this country. What has been the general effect of that Imperial Preference system? In 1913, just before the War, only 75,000 tons of sugar were imported from the Colonies, because in those days I think there was no importation from the Dominions into this country. As a result of Preference since the War that figure has hounded up to 700,000 tons—almost ten times as

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much as before the War, and, what is more important, amounting to nearly two-fifths of the whole of our sugar consumption in this country. That is a remarkable increase, and it is due to the Sugar Preference. It is due to the policy which has been so forcibly advocated by the noble Lord, Lord Olivier, in the West Indies, in this country and in this House. I have no hesitation in suggesting, therefore, that the policy of Great Britain should be to foster the development of cane sugar production within the Empire on the basis of increased Preference, so as to make this country and the Empire self-supporting in this respect.
What does this country gain by buying its sugar as it does to-day, or a very great part of its sugar, from foreign countries? Most of those foreign countries give us little or nothing in return. They purchase very few goods from us. They dump their sugar, as the noble Lord, Lord Olivier, has described to us, in this country at prices very far below the cost of production, very far below the cost at which we can produce in this country, very far below the cost. at which our Dominions and Colonies can produce it, and at prices which are injurious therefore to this country and to the Dominions and Colonies. His Majesty's Government to-day imply that so long as sugar is cheap it does not matter where it comes from. If people like myself prefer to have our sugar produced in our Dominions and our Colonies at a fair and remunerative price to the producer, even if it does cost a little more to the consumer—because there is something to be said on the other side as far as that is concerned—if we would rather have our sugar from those places than from Czecho-Slovakia, then we are accused of having a prejudice against the Government who send that sugar into this country.
Last week I listened to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, in a debate raised by my noble friend Lord Newton, with regard to the dumping of Russian goods and Russian wheat into this country at prices far below the cost of production. The noble Lord said that my noble friend Lord Newton was prejudiced against the Russian Government because he objected to that. In the same way, no doubt, I shall be told that because I object to
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sugar coming from Czecho-Slovakia I am prejudiced against the Government of Czecho-Slovakia. I never heard such nonsense. It is a matter of business, not a matter of prejudice. It is a matter of the conditions, and the improvement of conditions, in this country and the Empire.
Unfortunately, His Majesty's Government are not even on the horns of a dilemma. They have come down almost entirely upon the side of foreign countries as against the Empire. I can only conclude this because, without definitely saying so, both the Prime Minister and the President of the Board of Trade have indicated in public speeches since the Imperial Conference ended that this was the case. They say, in effect, that we cannot afford to lose our trade with foreign countries. But why should they say this at all? None of us wish to lose our trade with foreign countries, but those of us who are in active business—and they are not—realise that, whether we like it or not, owing to local fiscal policies we are losing our trade with foreign countries. Indeed, it is absolutely necessary, if we are to compensate this country in any way for what we are losing, that we should eater immediately and substantially into expanded and closer trade relationships with other parts of the Empire in as many ways as we can, and certainly in the way which I have indicated in the remarks I am making. If we do not, Great Britain will gradually decline and fall, and there will arise a new Gibbon to relate of the British Empire what Gibbon wrote of the Roman Empire, with the difference that, having regard to our opportunities, the decline and fall of the British Empire will receive greater condemnation at the bar of history in the years to come.
THE EARL OF PLYMOUTH: My Lords, I wish to intervene in this debate for only a very few moments, and for a specific purpose. We have debated this subject very fully on other occasions during the last few months, and the noble Lord, Lord Olivier, has dealt very fully this afternoon with the situation as it exists. He has made it quite clear to us that the situation, so far as the industry in the West Indies is concerned, is still extremely grave. I do not wish to enter into any details, because, as I have said,

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the subject has been dealt with very fully, but although no actual disaster has taken place up till now, this does not mean that, unless some active steps are taken at the earliest possible opportunity to relieve the situation which exists out there, there will not be a very serious catastrophe so far as the sugar industry in the West Indies is concerned.
The real reason I rose was to support the request of the noble Lord that in his reply the noble Lord, Lord Passfield, will clear away the doubt that clearly exists in regard to the question of the retention of the Preference in favour of Colonial sugar. When the Chancellor of the Exchequer was questioned in regard to this matter in another place, he gave a somewhat nebulous answer, and, as this matter is of extreme importance to the growers of sugar in the West Indies, I sincerely hope that the noble Lord will be able to make the situation quite plain this afternoon. When questioned with regard to the decision of the Imperial Conference that Preferences should be retained for the next three years, the Chancellor of the Exchequer replied:—
"This application, is, of course, governed by any provisions, e.g., as to duration, in the existing law relating to those Duties, and is subject to the rights of the United Kingdom Parliament to fix the Budget from year to year."
What exactly does that mean? We have heard already that, so far as the Safeguarding Duties are concerned, it means that the Preferences are not to be continued, that they will be allowed to lapse, but we should very much like to know the exact meaning of this interpretation in regard to the Duties on sugar.
Does it mean that the Chancellor of the Exchequer is liable, whenever he introduces a new Budget, to overthrow the Preference by abolishing the Duty altogether, or does it mean that this Preference will be retained for three years at least unless Parliament takes a different view from that of the Chancellor of the Exchequer? Is it the intention of the present Government—I hope that the noble Lord will be able to answer the question quite clearly—to retain this Preference for the next three years if the matter is left in their hands? That is all that I really wish to say on this very important question of the West Indian sugar industry. I think that, if
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the noble Lord is able to give that definite assurance this afternoon, it will at any rate do something, though perhaps very little, to mitigate the situation that exists out there.
VISCOUNT MERSEY: My Lords, before the noble Lord replies, I should like to ask whether any official attempts, as between Governments, have ever been made to arrive at world control of the over-production of sugar.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (LORD PASSFIELD): My Lords, as I have said on previous occasions when I have had to stand up to the assaults of my noble friend Lord Olivier, I have no promising tale to tell. Undoubtedly the situation in the sugar-producing Colonies is grave, and I should be very sorry to be at all optimistic as to what the consequences maybe next year or the year after, if the present crisis in the sugar industry of the world continues. I will attempt to deal with the criticisms and suggestions that have been made and, so far as I can, I will be absolutely frank with your Lordships about the position. My noble friend Lord Olivier said that the present situation was due, in the first instance, to the anarchy of capitalist production. I agree with him entirely, but I take it that what he means is that sugar producers all over the world have set themselves to increase production irrespective of demand. Each man and each district has striven to increase the production of sugar over a period of years without having any regard to what other people are doing and, indeed, without having very much knowledge. That is a very typical case. It happens constantly in other industries.
The result has been not merely a large increase in production all over the world, as to which the noble Viscount. Lord Elibank, gave us some interesting figures to which I shall return in a moment, but also—and this is the immediate cause of the slump in prices—to an enormous accumulation of the visible stocks of sugar in the world. I may he wrong, but I do not think that it is necessary to import into the discussion, as a cause of the fall in the price of sugar, any suggestion of sinister motives upon the part of Americans or anybody else. The plain situation is that, for one reason or

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another, you have this large accumulation of the visible stocks, which must be got rid of, and so long as that accumulation is there I am afraid it is rather difficult to expect any considerable rise in the price of sugar, even if there were no sinister motives concerned in the matter, as I do not think that there are.
Here again I should like to point out that we really ought to be careful when we talk about dumping. Naturally all these sugar producers all over the world, with their accumulated stocks, have to sell those stocks from time to time. They have to do their best to get rid of the sugar, and the result is, as you have seen, that they have sold their stocks at a price far below the cost of production. It is true that this is facilitated and aided by various fiscal movements, in Czecho-Slovakia and other places, but at the same time it would go on without them, because of the accumulation of stock. Cuban producers do not wantonly sell at so low a price. They sell at the best price they can get in the world market, but under the pressure of having to dispose of their stock they are virtually compelled to sell sooner or later at the world price. I do not think it is of any use talking about dumping, because at any rate in sugar that is done all round, by all countries. The West Indies are selling their sugar at a price below what it costs, as the noble Lord has said, and I would remind your Lordships that in another part of the British Commonwealth of Nations—namely, Queensland—you have almost precisely the fiscal arrangements which are described as wicked or sinister in Czecho-Slovakia. You have the Queensland sugar producers, stimulated by the desire of gain, increasing their output of sugar with the assistance of the Australian Government, which not only maintains a heavy Duty preventing other sugar from coming in, but enables the Queensland sugar producers to sell at a very high price indeed to consumers in Australia, and the balance which they do not need, has to be disposed of in the world's market at whatever price the Queensland sugar producers can extract, and that is very often a very low price.
Where you have an article produced in excess of the demand, so that stocks accumulate, you will have those stocks offered on the market at a cost below
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the cost of production, and that is the case with regard to sugar. The price of sugar which has gone down, as the noble Lord, Lord Olivier, pointed out, to such an extent, has gone down for the producers of sugar in this country also, and they are selling below their cost of production, and dumping is universal, therefore, in regard to sugar. It is not quite universal, but it is practically universal among the producers of sugar. That is the situation which the West Indian sugar producers and the Government have to meet, and, speaking frankly and candidly, I do not know how it can be met. I do not think it is possible to meet it, but I will deal with some of the suggestions which have been made. First of all, I want to point out that Lord Elibank said that it was due to the Free Trade policy of the Government, but I would like to remind the noble Viscount that in the case of sugar the Government of the United Kingdom has long been not at all pursuing a Free Trade policy. Here you have, with regard to sugar, all the elements which are put forward occasionally by noble Lords—
VISCOUNT ELIBANK: Will the noble Lord forgive me? What I said was that it was because of their Free Trade policy that the Government were not able to do anything.
LORD PASSFIELD: If the noble Viscount had had a little patience he would have understood me. We have here, with regard to sugar, in the policy of the Government, which is the policy of the last Government and the policy of the Government before that, all the factors of a Protectionist policy, or should I say an Empire Free Trade policy. You have first a Duty against the import of sugar. We are often told that none of these things can be done without a tariff. You have a Duty, not of 10 per cent., not of 20 per cent., but, as Lord Olivier said, a Duty of 100 per cent., roughly speaking. That is the heaviest possible Protective Duty that you can imagine.
Then we have a Preference for Empire sugar, and it is a large Preference of £3 15 s. per ton, which, as a matter of fact, is something like 70 per cent. of the price of sugar to-day, or about 30 per cent. of the cost of sugar in the West Indies. It is a Preference which is ex

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tended to all the sugar producers within the Empire. It does not go merely to the West Indies or to Mauritius, but also to Natal and the South African Union, and to Queensland, whose fiscal peculiarities I have been describing. There we have all the elements of the Protectionist armoury, and for good or evil we cannot be said to be pursuing a Free Trade policy in the matter of sugar. We have a very heavy tariff, heavy Customs, and a Preference for Empire producers, and, is order to make the thing complete, a very heavy subsidy indeed to British producers of sugar. If we have got into all this trouble whilst employing all the weapons in the Protectionist armoury, it is a little hard to be accused of having got there because we have stuck so tightly to a Free Trade policy. I do not want to be misunderstood. I am not prepared to say that the case has become worse than it would have been because a Protectionist policy has been pursued—that would be an argument for another time—but you cannot easily turn head over heels, from Free Trade to Protection, in this respect, because you have already gone far into Protection in respect of sugar.
Then Lord Elibank asked how we could maintain the sugar industry in Barbados and our other Colonies. That is what Lord Olivier wants to do. There is no way that I can see, which has been brought to the notice of the Government, by which the industry can be maintained at this high level of production, this enormously increased production to which Lord Elibank referred. except by a large additional subsidy from the British Exchequer, because, be it observed, the Preference of £3 15 s. per ton given to Empire grown sugar imported into this country is a direct money subsidy from the British Exchequer to sugar producers in the Empire; that is to say, that as a great deal more sugar comes in which is not British, and as the Duty which is levied would be paid by that foreign sugar, the Chancellor of the Exchequer finds himself deficient by every penny of that 15 s., just as much as if it were voted in the Estimates as a gift.
It has been suggested by Lord Olivier, and before this debate, that we should increase that gift to the West Indies and Mauritius, and, I suppose, to other Em-
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pire producers, by £2 or £3 per ton, in order to keep up the present extent of sugar production within the Empire. This Government has not seen its way to increase its expenditure by that amount and, if I might venture on a prophecy, I would say that any other Government would find it extremely difficult, in view of the demand for economy, to increase the expenditure of the British Exchequer by the necessary amount in order, much as we may sympathise with the West Indian producers, to keep up the present area of sugar-production throughout the British Empire.
LORD OLIVIER: Did the noble Lord state that I proposed an additional preference of £2 to £3 per ton? If so, he is mistaken. I only proposed an addition of about £1 per ton.
LORD PASSFIELD: It is perfectly true that, writing a year ago the noble Lord suggested that sum, but even on his own figures that would not be sufficient, except on the best estates, and since that time the world price has dropped still more. But nothing turns on figures. I mean, if you are going to maintain the present amount of sugar production in the British Empire, no remedy has been suggested except that of increasing this gift from the British taxpayer to the British producers of sugar by the necessary amount to enable them to go on producing without loss—and not merely the best of them to go on producing without loss, because if you are going to maintain the area and the amount you will have to save from loss not merely the best but the average and the middling, and theoretically right down even to the worst. But we will not push it as far as that; perhaps the worst might be allowed to go out of cultivation. But at any rate, whether it is £1 per ton or £2 per ton, it is a very considerable amount. No doubt it is small enough for one particular Island, but when you consider the sugar producers throughout the Empire it is an amount which the Chancellor of the Exchequer has not seen his way to grant, and which I can hold out no hopes whatever to your Lordships that he will be able to grant.
VISCOUNT ELIBANK: Would the noble Lord, before he leaves that question, say something about the trade which we receive in return from the Dominions and Colonies?
LORD PASSFIELD: I am sorry to say I cannot deal with that on this occasion. Of course, there is no doubt that if the West Indies were flourishing they would buy more goods from this country, and for that reason alone we would wish they were flourishing. But the noble Viscount will not suggest that, even in order to keep up trade in this country, the Chancellor of the Exchequer should increase his gift to the sugar producers of the Empire.
VISCOUNT ELIBANK: I certainly would.
LORD PASSFIELD: At any rate, it would have to be put, nakedly in that way before you could come to any conclusion on the subject. With regard to the Preference, it is not for me to expound what the Chancellor of the Exchequer has said. I have before me the declaration of His Majesty's Government at the Imperial Conference, in which it was stated—
"In the meantime His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have declared that the existing preferential margins accorded by the United Kingdom to other parts of the Empire will not be reduced for a period of three years or pending the outcome of the suggested Conference, subject to the rights of the United Kingdom Parliament to fix the Budget from year to year."
Now, I think that is clear enough. I do not need to explain what "preferential margins" mean. They mean that, assuming that the Duty had to be reduced, it would not be reduced to a point which would diminish the amount of the Preference. If there is a £3 15 s. per ton Preference on sugar to-day, whatever the Sugar Duty that £3 15 s. per ton would remain. I do not think there is any difference of opinion about what that means. The Chancellor of the Exchequer said, "Subject to the rights of the United Kingdom Parliament to fix the Budget from year to year." Obviously a Minister cannot arrogate to himself the right to say what will be done. At any rate in terms he must maintain the right of Parliament to do as it pleases from year to year.
But the present Government has announced its intention. I am not going to attempt any gloss upon that. I will, however, just add one word of explanation in regard to part of the source of doubt which was expressed in the House of Commons, and that was with regard to statutory limitations. That does not arise
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in the case of sugar. In the case of sugar there is no doubt at all that what the Chancellor of the Exchequer was referring to was the existing Preference of £3 15 s. per ton or thereabouts, and that he expressed the intention of the present Government not to reduce that Preference for the term of three years. The reference to the possible outcome of the suggested Conference at Ottawa I think hardly introduces any doubt into the subject. It is not for me, as I say, to put, any words into the mouth of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. That is the decision of the Government, and I think that will be clear enough to the West Indian planters and the West Indian interests; at least I do not think it could be put any clearer, so long as we do maintain that Parliament must be free to do as it pleases, even if the Chancellor of the Exchequer at some past time has said something as to what it ought to do,. But, subject to the supremacy of Parliament, the position is clear enough, I think, as regards sugar.
Now, I should like to say a word with regard to the over-production generally in the world. The noble Viscount, Lord Elibank, gave us figures and showed that, whereas beet sugar in the course of fifteen years had practically not risen at all, only from 8,500,000 to 9,000,000 tons—that was very largely due, of course, to the dislocation of the War, but it does not matter what is was due to; the influence of beet sugar on the price of sugar depends on its amount, and that therefore is not any vital factor—whereas, I say, beet sugar production had hardly risen at all, the production of cane sugar in the fifteen years has gone up from 9,500,000 tons to 16,500,000 tons. That is the cause which has produced this very large accumulation of visible stocks. We are face to face with what the economists, in their pedantic language, call "an inelastic demand" in the case of sugar. Apparently, the world is having as much sugar as it is prepared to pay for even at a low price, and all the attempts of our producers of chocolates and so on to encourage us to eat more sugar apparently do not have very much result on the aggregate demand of the world for sugar. In face of that fact the aggregate production has gone on piling up, and is still going on piling up, and consequently—we may dismiss

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all the fiscal accusations—the mere fact of the over-production must necessarily keep the price down.
The noble Viscount, Lord Elibank, asked a question as to whether anything was being done in the way of co-ordinating the world's production so as to obtain some sort of agreed limitation. I have, unfortunately, nothing that I can say about that. It is a very difficult thing to accomplish. Certain attempts have been made to get up negotiations in more than one quarter. Those attempts have been very favourably received by this Government, but I am bound to say that they do not seem to have got very far, and I am afraid that the over-production is so great, so multifarious all over the world, and so many Governments are interested in it, that I cannot say that I have any great hopes that anything will come of those international negotiations for a co-ordination of the world production so as to make it fit the world demand. But certainly the Government will be very glad to take part in, and to favour as far as possible, any such attempts that can be made. We should, of course, have to take the Governments of the Dominions and the Colonies interested in sugar along with us, as I assume that they would be willing to take part; and certainly we would have nothing to say against it.
I was going to tell your Lordships a little about the condition of the several Colonies, but my noble friend Lord Olivier has touched upon the salient points, and, as he knows and has told your Lordships, we are watching it very carefully, and we have already sanctioned attempts in the various Colonies to do what the Governors report to be necessary in those Islands. The amounts may seem small, except in the case of British Guiana. British Guiana is undoubtedly the most difficult spot at the present time. Jamaica and Trinidad are helping themselves as far as they can. For the present that seems to suffice. In Barbados, though wages have fallen, as the noble Lord said, the Governor reports that the cost of living is also lower than it was, and he does not tell us of any serious position there. The last communication that we had from him draws attention to the fact that no estates or sugar factories have been closed down, and that the Agricultural
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Bank is increasing its advances and, apparently, suffices for the moment. They are suffering not merely from low prices but from the effect of drought, which is serious, but the condition of the people which is at all times, I am sorry to say, very low, does not seem to be appreciably worse, and they have not found it necessary to start relief works.
In British Guiana undoubtedly the position is serious; but I have a telegram from the Governor in which he says that at present 1,150 men are actually employed on Government relief works, and a like number are on the register but not yet employed; that is to say, in the worst case we have something like 2,506 families or men upon our hands. The explanation is that sugar grinding and rice harvesting have now taken a large supply of temporary labour which would otherwise be unemployed, and is liable to be so later if some other employment is unavailable. The House of Commons has been asked to vote two grants, one of £112,000 for British Guiana and another of £50,000 for British Guiana, because of the anticipated difficulties there, and that will not be all if we get further bad news. That is the worst case. In the other sugar islands, as I say, small grants have been made and are being utilised wherever the necessity has arisen, but up to the present the shrinkage in the actual production of sugar does not seem to have, I will not say it has not, occurred anywhere, because no estates or factories have closed down in Barbados; and so, generally, that is the story. I admit that next year things may be worse, but we cannot tell. I would only say that if I had been in a position a year ago to say to your Lordships that the Sugar Preference would not be diminished for three years, I think my noble friend would have thought that a rather considerable concession. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has now seen his way to make the declaration that I have mentioned, but that is the only encouragement that I am in a position, unfortunately, to hold out in this matter. I think I have dealt with all the points as well as I can. I have certainly been frank. I have concealed nothing.
My noble friend moved for Papers. We have issued Papers very elaborately right down to the end of September.

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No doubt we can issue some more, but I think there ought to be a little interval. We cannot have White Papers every month or two. Perhaps the noble Lord will be content with my assurance that as soon as there is a proper bulk of Papers to be presented, they shall be presented. I do not want to resist the Motion, but I do not think that we ought to be asked to issue another White Paper right on the heels of the one that has just been issued.
LORD OLIVIER: My Lords, I do not know how far the noble Earl, Lord Plymouth, is satisfied with the reply on the fiscal point. I put down my Question before that interesting fiscal point arose. I am not quite sure what the noble Earl will understand by the reply with respect to that point; but from the practical point of view, and on behalf of my West Indian friends, I feel sure that, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer will not have any money to throw away during the next three years, there will not be any very active motion on his part to do away with the Duties. With that I think my West Indian friends will be satisfied, having regard to the other considerations that have been mentioned, and that with the Preference they will endeavour to go on, for whatever that Preference is worth.
There were several very interesting points which my noble friend went into in the course of his reply, and I should like to deal with one or two of them, although they are, perhaps, of a rather abstract nature. I spoke of the position as being due to mass over-production and dumping. My noble friend said that one must not say that mass overproduction is sinister. I did not say that it was sinister on the part of American financiers to try to collar the whole of the sugar trade of the world. But they did try to do it, and, though perhaps it was a proper operation from their point of view, it was a very sinister one for us and our operations. That is all I can say. My noble friend spoke of the Czecho-Slovakian and Continental dumping as being a sort of automatic and unhelped over-production, that these people produce this sugar and that they ought, of course, to sell it. If you examine the Continental sugar position you will see a most extraordinary series of figures. You will find, for instance,
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that Czecho-Slovakia, which produces little more than 1,000,000 tons of sugar, exports 600,000 tons. is that an accidental over-production, or the unwilling sending of sugar over the world? I think my noble friend is getting too innocent in his old age.
I think myself that certain financial interests, in the form of sugar cartels and so on, in Germany, have a financial interest in the way in which the sugar trade is manipulated. It is to somebody's advantage, it is to the interest of the sugar cartels in Germany or of somebody else to see that this overproduction goes on and that this surplus is dumped. That is what I call deliberate dumping. It is a deliberate policy. Indeed, I would say that it is a sinister policy of dumping. I do not think it is an accidental over-production because our sugar beet people have rushed in. It is a definite capitalist organisation and, if I were speaking in our old jargon, I should say it is a definite capitalist scheme for making money out of the public of the world. Seeing these things and acknowledging them, I ask why does my noble friend say: "We are Free Traders, and we must not interfere with these things"—the things which lie and I have been fighting against all our lives, saying that we must get control of the capitalist system and interfere with it. When the Americans are over-producing sugar in Cuba, and the European cartels are deliberately producing and dumping three times as much as they want and are selling it at one-third of the price simply for the sake of the financial interests, why should we sit quietly and allow it to go on? I think it is perfectly insane.
I withdraw my Motion for Papers because I do not think I shall get any more out of such Papers than I got out of the last lot. But I would remind Lord Elibank that my first remedy was not to increase the Preference, because I do not think that a tariff Preference is the best way of dealing with these evils. My first suggestion was an organised marketing system which, I think, is the proper way of dealing with the position. Having regard to the appeal of my noble friend, I withdraw my request for Papers.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

COLONIAL NAVAL DEFENCE BILL. [H.L.]
Amendment reported (according to Order).
Clause 3:
Expenses of Colonial vessels and naval forces while at disposal of His Majesty.
3.Nothing in this Act or any Order in Council made thereunder shall be taken to authorise the payment out of the revenues of the United Kingdom of any expenses incurred in equipping or maintaining any vessel, officers or men placed at the disposal of His Majesty under this Act, or in providing the pay, wages, pensions, grants or other emoluments of any such officers or men or of their wives, widows, children or other dependants, but any such expenses may be so paid, if, and so far as, the Commons House of Parliament hereafter think fit to make provision by Resolution for that purpose.
LORD PASSFIELD LORD PASSFIELD had given Notice of an Amendment to leave out "the Commons House of Parliament hereafter think fit to make provision by Resolution" and to insert "moneys may be provided by Parliament in any year."
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment, I hope, will meet the objection taken by the noble Viscount, Lord Bertie, and the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, yesterday. As I explained, or attempted to explain, this was a draftsman's complexity and ingenuity and I want to withdraw whatever the draftsman meant me to say yesterday. I am sure I said it very imperfectly. He has now—and I have accepted it—produced a draft which goes back to the old phrase. Whatever the draftsman was attempting to do, and I think I understand what he was attempting to do,
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would have been a good thing. At the same time, the phrase used was unfortunate, and I am very glad to go back to the old phrase, and to move the Amendment as printed, that "moneys may be provided by Parliament in any year" for that purpose. That I am told is the nearest way of getting back to the old phrase and it is the phrase to which your Lordships are accustomed. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 3, line 32, leave out from ("as") to ("for") in line 34, and insert ("moneys may be provided by Parliament in any year").—(Lord Passfield.)
VISCOUNT BERTIE OF THAME: My Lords, I desire to express my thanks to the noble Lord for having met the point which I raised yesterday. I cannot agree with him, however, that it would have been a good thing to leave it as it was. I think that would have formed a very bad precedent.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.

ABERGAVENNY AND DISTRICT ELECTRICITY ORDER, 1930.
Special Order in respect of the Borough of Abergavenny and part of the rural district of Abergavenny, in the County of Monmouth:
Laid before the House (pursuant to Act), and referred to the Special Orders Committee.
House adjourned at twenty minutes before six o'clock.