Lords Sitting of 30 July 1930

Preamble
The House met at half past three of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.

BOURNEMOUTH CORPORATION BILL.
BRISTOL CATTLE MARKET BILL.
BRISTOL CORPORATION (No. 2) BILL.
CARDIFF CORPORATION BILL.
MANCHESTER CORPORATION (GENERAL POWERS) (No. 2) BILL.
SOUTHEND-ON-SEA CORPORATION BILL.
Returned from the Commons, with the Amendments, agreed to.

BOSTON CORPORATION BILL. [H.L.]
  LONDON UNITED TRAMWAYS BILL. [H.L.]
    SOUTHPORT CORPORATION BILL. [H.L.]
    Returned from the Commons, agreed to, with Amendments.
HOUSING (No. 2) BILL.
Returned from the Commons with certain of the Amendments made by the Lords agreed to, one other Amendment agreed to with a consequential Amendment to the Bill, certain other Amendments disagreed to but Amendments made in lieu thereof, and certain other Amendments disagreed to, for which disagreement they assign Reasons.

PRIVATE BILL PROCEDURE.
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE): My Lords, I think it will be for the convenience of the House if I make a short announcement with respect to Private Bill procedure. You will probably notice that the House of Commons have made certain alterations in their Private Bill Standing Orders. A very large number of these points do not affect your Lordships' procedure, but there is an important

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alteration made in the time-table, with which I am entirely in agreement. In principle it amounts to advancing the dates on which Bills are deposited in Parliament with some consequential alterations in other dates. It is too late in the Session now to ask your Lordships to make similar alterations in your Standing Orders, but I wish to give notice that as soon as convenient after the opening of next Session I shall put down a Motion to effect a similar change of time-table in your Lordships' Standing Orders. This change will, of course, therefore apply to Bills which will be presented at the end of this year.

INDIA: ROUND-TABLE CONFERENCE.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: My Lords, before you proceed with the business of the day I wish to draw attention again to the Question raised yesterday in this House with reference to the Indian Round-Table Conference. I stated yesterday that the Government had determined that it would not appoint a representative of the Statutory Commission as a member of the Conference, but on examination of the observations made by the Prime Minister in another place yesterday I find that that statement was a little too definite, inasmuch as the Prime Minister made it quite clear that, although at the moment he was inclined to say that it would be undesirable to have the Commission represented on the Conference, the matter was still under consideration and negotiation. That was the phrase used. Therefore the Government had not definitely made up its mind. The purpose of my Question to-day is to ask His Majesty's Government to give effect to urgent representations, made both in this House and elsewhere, that the Chairman of the Statutory Commission should be appointed by the Government, with the assent of all political Parties, to be a member of the Round-Table Conference.
That it is of importance that a representative of the Statutory Commission should be present, is, I should have thought, undeniable. Our object in the Conference is, to use the Prime Minister's language in another place yesterday, in order "that the Government should have the benefit"—that is the Government and also all who are present—
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"of listening to the most thorough threshing out of all the problems that arise, and which will have to be dealt with by legislation." In order that there should be that thorough threshing out I submit that it is almost of vital importance that the Statutory Commission should be represented. It is not possible for any one, however familiar he may be with the Commission, who has not been present at the taking of the evidence and at the deliberations of the members of the Commission, and who has not heard all the reasons why they may have rejected one proposal and accepted another in preference, and who does not know all the considerations that have affected their minds in arriving at the conclusions embodied in the Report, in the recommendation that they have made to Parliament, adequately to represent the Commission at the Conference.
If the Conference meets without a representative of the Commission nobody will be in a position to put their view forward, and it is of even greater seriousness when it is borne in mind that representatives of India will have the advantage, if certain representatives come to the Conference, of presenting their Report and the Constitution which they have drafted, which has been in print for a long time and discussed in India, and even referred to by the Statutory Commission in its Final Report. The Constitution which is associated with the name of the Pandit Motilal Nehru was adopted by the Indian All-Parties Conference in 1928 "to determine the principles of a Constitution for India." It is a volume almost as large as the Report presented by the Simon Commission itself. Is it intended that the representatives of India—whose views we are all most anxious to hear—should have the advantage of presenting their own Report dealing with all the various considerations that have affected their minds in drawing up this Constitution, but that nevertheless the Report presented by a Commission appointed by all Parties in this Parliament should not be represented, and should not therefore have the same advantage? Does it not savour somewhat of an unfair discrimination in favour of the Indian Report and, as it would almost appear, of a slight to the Commission and even to Parliament if there is no representative of the Commission appointed?

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As the Government have not yet finally determined and are still considering the matter, I would urge them with all the power that I can bring to bear to give effect to the views which we are presenting, which I hope and believe will be supported by other Parties in Parliament, so that we may have the inestimable advantage, in order that we may thrash out every point and hear all the arguments pro and con, of having a representative of the Commission at the Conference. I would ask the Government, therefore, to give effect to these representations. No answer was given yesterday to the request I expressed. Of that I do not complain, because certainly I treated it as a closed matter, and I have understood hitherto that it was so; but now that we know that it is not, and that it is still under consideration, there is yet time for the Government to come to a conclusion which I cannot but think would be satisfactory to all Parties involved and also to the country.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, before the noble Earl answers might I add my voice—
THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (LORD PARMOOR): One moment. Really it is quite out of order to have a discussion of this kind to-day in addition to what we had yesterday. The request made to me was that a Question should be asked without a speech, and of course I assented to it. But really I do not think we ought to have a discussion.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: On the contrary, it is usual for a Question to be put at the time of private business, and always supplementary observations are permitted—of course not at undue length. I have seen it done over and over again in your Lordships' House. I would like to add my voice very urgently to the very much more well instructed voice of the noble and learned Marquess on this matter. I agree with him that in the speech delivered in another place there was a loop-hole left in the Prime Minister's observations, which leads us to hope that this matter may be reconsidered. After all, we have proceeded hitherto in respect of these Indian difficulties with the agreement of all Parties. All three Parties are acting together: so far as our road lies
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together, we hope to continue to act together. Whether that will be possible throughout of course remains to be seen. At any rate hitherto we have been able to act together. Here is a point upon which, as I understand from the noble and learned Marquess, the Liberal Party and certainly the Conservative Party feel very strongly.
I do not want to adopt any language disrespectful to the Government, but after all, the Parties which we represent are really a majority of the country. We really represent the country in this matter. I would, therefore, urge very respectfully upon the Government that they should think again as to this matter. Many of us welcomed the Round-Table Conference with great hope that it might be of use in solving this very difficult problem. If we could only bring representatives of India as it were face to face with British public opinion, and representatives of Great Britain face to face with Indian public opinion, an agreement might be arrived at. But surely that must be done, if it is to be done with any advantage, in the light of full knowledge. Knowledge is absolutely essential; light of every sort must be thrown upon the problem. The representatives from India will undoubtedly bring knowledge. But what will be the position of the representatives of this country? Most of those who sit at the table will, of course, have the general knowledge which all well-instructed Englishmen and Scotsmen have, but yet they will not have any special and particular knowledge. Therefore there will be, as it were, a great want.
There is in our midst a body of men—namely, the Commissioners—who know everything about the subject. Are we to be told that a representative of the Commission is not to be present in the Conference in order to give that knowledge which is so absolutely essential, and which, I am sorry to say, otherwise will be found to be lacking? I cannot understand that there can be a doubt that in a Conference of this kind the representatives of the Commission or a representative of the Commission—Sir John Simon himself of course if he would be willing to serve—should be there so that all the necessary information upon the intricacies of the problem which they alone know better than any other English-

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man living should be at the command of the Conference. I earnestly believe that this is a matter which is deserving of the consideration of the Government. After all, when the Round-Table Conference has sat, and if, as we hope, it succeeds, the whole matter will have to be laid before Parliament, and unless it comes with the seal of full knowledge it cannot have anything like the weight which it should have. Therefore on every ground I would urge the noble Earl to make the necessary representations to the Government to reconsider this point. I can assure him that upon this matter there is no difference of opinion, as far as I know, in any part of the Conservative Party or, as I believe, in any part of the Liberal Party—that is, among those who represent the majority of the country.
THE UNDER-SECRETARY or STATE FOR INDIA (EARL RUSSELL): My Lords, the Question has been put at a rather unusual length for a Private Notice Question, but my answer can be much briefer. The noble and learned Marquess spoke several times of the matter as still being considered. The matter is no longer under consideration. It has now been concluded, and I can read to your Lordships the answer which is being given by the Prime Minister in another place to a similar Question. This is the answer:—
"This question and those involved in it have been exhaustively considered by the Government in consultation with the Indian Government. The Statutory Commission has performed its task with a distinction which will secure for its Report a permanent place in our official political literature, and has presented its findings to Parliament. When the Conference we are now contemplating was proposed by the Chairman of the Commission with the consent of his colleagues, the Government alone was to have taken upon itself the burden of the negotiations. We have widened this so that Parliament in its varied composition might be represented. There the Government is certain it would be advisable to stop, and not add another section of delegates to the representation announced yesterday. The Government is confident that the representatives to be selected will be able to get from the Conference the
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fullest examination of every proposal brought before it, and every opportunity will be taken to secure that the most expert and well-informed advice, wherever it is to be found, will be available both for the Government and the Parliamentary group of representatives. The Government is convinced that a departure from this decision will not ease the task nor promote the success of the Conference."

WEST INDIAN SUGAR INDUSTRY.
LORD OLIVIER LORD OLIVIER rose to call attention to the conditions arising in British Colonies dependent on the production of sugar; to ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies to state definitely and to commend to this House the policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to those conditions; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is the fourth occasion on which the subject of the British West Indian sugar industry has been raised in your Lordships' House, but I make no apology to your Lordships for again raising the matter before Parliament is prorogued, because I am quite confident that the subject is one of very great interest to your Lordships on two accounts: (1), because it involves the prosperity, livelihood and social stability of large numbers of His Majesty's subjects; and (2), because it raises, in my opinion, very important questions of Imperial Colonial policy, as to which I desire to elicit from His Majesty's Government some statement as to what they mean when they say that they acknowledge their responsibility. I may possibly be a little lengthy, and I ask your indulgence, but I want to summarise the whole case as it appears to me as completely as I can, and for that purpose I shall have to read extracts from the Despatches of the noble Lord the Secretary of State of the Colonies, and also from pronouncements of the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
Your Lordships will remember that in February last, when we first approached the consideration of this subject, I stated that "if the present situation continues and no further relief is promised" to the Colonial sugar industry—

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"there must and will be considerable reduction of planting and cultivation after the crop now being taken off is completed. It is difficult, to see how any except a minority of the estates and planters can even carry on in the hope of better prices. If the Preference is annulled by the repeal of the Sugar Duties, without any countervailing assistance, the British West Indian sugar industry will be dismantled and come to an end, except for local supplies"—
and, I may add, for some special products such as certain grades of syrup and certain very fine yellow crystallised sugar—
"as rapidly as estates can be cropped and wound up."
That was the effect of the Report that my Commission made in reply to a reference by His Majesty's Government, in regard to which Mr. Snowden the Chancellor of the Exchequer had stated the purposes to be as follows:—
"We are seeing if it is possible to help in any way which will not merely enable theta to tide over their present difficulties but will put them in a financial and manufacturing position in which they will be able to stand world competition better in the future."
My Commission gave the Secretary of State exact information as to the means by which we considered that these purposes could be effected, the only means by which these producers might be able to tide over their present difficulties. I have not anywhere seen any criticism of the accuracy of our judgment on those conditions. On the contrary, confirmations of the tenor of our Report accumulate every day. The Secretary of State himself has not traversed any part of our presentation of the position, but has only either entirely ignored it or declared it impossible to adopt any fraction of the suggestions for help. The only alteration in the position since then is that the price of sugar has gone down by £2 12s. 6d. per ton. His Majesty's Government have given no pennyworth of assistance to the industry, but have simply stated that, if destitution through the unemployment of labourers occurs, they will give relief. The process which we assured His Majesty's Government was likely to take place, the probability which apparently they complacently ignored, is proceeding according to plan, and I want to give your Lordships a very brief summary of what is happening at present in the West Indian Colonies.
Let me take the Island of Antigua. This Island is the most difficult spot in the
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whole of the West Indies, in regard to its position in the sugar industry, and we pointed this out in our Report. We said that the Island of Antigua, although it was extremely well suited for the production of sugar and produced a very sweet and fine cane, the cultivation was good and it had about one of the best factories in the West Indies, had suffered very severely from drought and hurricane during the last two years, and the planters were on their beam ends. We said that unless the Government gave them some aid by financing them, they would not be able to carry on with the next crop. In regard, therefore, to Antigua, and Antigua alone, we asked His Majesty's Government for some definite financial assistance, such as was given, I may add, after the Report of the Commissioners of 1897, both to Antigua and Barbados. His Majesty's Government did not do so, and that which we and everybody else foresaw is naturally happening.
Let me give a very brief account of what is happening in Antigua. At most two-thirds of the labourers, and most of these for part time only, will find employment out of the crop in 1930. That, is to say, one-third of the population is thrown out of employment. Those employed will receive a rate of wages at least 25 per cent. less than the very much reduced rates Of last year, and about one-third will have no employment at all. That means that, even for those employed, highly-taxed imported foodstuffs in sufficient quantities to secure nutrition will be out of their reach and they will not have the physical strength to work full time. Industrial maintenance in Antigua is the only effective economic remedy. As an indication of the decline of wages, a well maintained estate, out of crop, in 1926 expended £53 a week. The same estate, cultivating fully in 1930, spent £30 a week. On every estate that diminution is found, owing to the difficulties in which the planters find themselves, for which we ask some temporary assistance to enable them to do what the Imperial Government profess to be willing to enable them to do—namely, to tide over.
Now I pass on to St. Kitts. Wages there have been reduced by 20 per cent. Both in Antigua and St. Kitts they have the advantage, as l said, of extremely efficient modern central sugar factories,

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and the proprietors of those factories are pursuing a liberal policy, and, although on the normal contract for cane production they would be paying something like £9 or £10 per ton for their cane, they are carrying on and paying £14 a ton in order to keep the planters going. If the cane supply drops out the factories will drop out as well. Moreover, they are arranging to give financial assistance to planters who have contracts with them. In Antigua only 50 per cent of the sugar acreage will be replanted with new plants. The rest will be carried on with what is already on the ground. In Barbados there has been a considerable loss on the crop—a loss of about 25s. a ton, but Barbados has had a stroke of good fortune. It has, however, been deserved. They have had record crops of cane, and a good extraction of sugar at the factories. They have also had the advantage of a good market for their speciality, refined syrups, and about one quarter of the estates have been able to make profits because of the good market for these refined syrups. The others, however, made losses.
Barbados has had a well merited stroke of good fortune. I say well merited, because in my Report I mention the public-spirited work that has been done for many years in Barbados by the Agricultural Department, which has been trying during last year to contend against one of the greatest pests of the sugar industry, the moth borer, and has now succeeded in finding a parasite, of which the Agricultural Department has distributed more than three millions. That has to some extent mitigated the evil from which the industry was suffering owing to this cause, and it shows that the Barbados planters are carrying on their business both scientifically and with success, and deserve any good fortune that may fall their way. The planters there are not so badly off as we feared they might be; still they have made a loss of round about 25s. a ton upon their crop, without providing any interest on capital, or anything for maintenance or improvements.
In British Guiana there has been a considerable reduction of cultivation. On one group of estates only in British Guiana there is a 20,000 ton reduction. The wages have been cut down, unemployment is increasing, and it is becoming very difficult, if not impossible, as
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it is also in Antigua, for the estate proprietors to consent any longer to do what they now do gratuitously—namely, maintain the public hospitals. In Antigua anybody employing contract labourers is bound to provide medical attendance. If the planter has to discharge his labourers, he is relieved from the obligation to provide medical attendance. In British Guiana, while there was coolie immigration, the estates had to maintain hospitals. After coolie immigration was suspended the obligation to do that ceased, but they have continued to maintain hospitals and provide medical attendance after discharging their labourers, although they have been making a loss of £2 to £3 a ton. They might continue to do that, but if the estate goes out of cultivation the hospital attached to it goes out of commission also.
The position in British Guiana is this, that every one of the principal concerns is carrying on at a loss. They are prepared, out of their liquid resources, to finance losses up to a certain amount, but when that limit is reached—and it will be reached by the end of next year—they will close down unless something is done to tide them over the present difficult position. Incidentally, I may say that the other day there was a Motion in another place asking that one recommendation of the Commission might be adopted—namely, that the British Preference might be equalised with the Canadian Preference, giving an addition of £1 a ton. If that had been done it would have made a difference on maintenance of about £20,000 or £30,000 to sugar production in the course of next year. The Chancellor of the Exchequer said it would not make any difference at all, but I will deal with that statement presently. In Mauritius wages have been cut down, and, unfortunately, their only alternative crop, hemp, is suffering from depression of price. I do not intend further to elaborate the statistics, but will only say generally that the precise development which the Commission reported would take place is taking place, and must inevitably continue to take place under present conditions.
I want to examine what is the Government's position in this matter, and I want a reply. As I have mentioned, the Government stated that they desired to tide over the industry, meaning that they

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saw some prospect, as everybody in the world does, that the price of sugar would not continue at its present ridiculous figure, but if it reverted to what I may call an economical world exchange price, independently of subsidies and dumping, then there was a prospect of part of the industry being able to carry on. And there is that prospect unquestionably. I say without hesitation that if world prices were regulated on free trade prices, and if the market were not depressed by the enormous overloading which is taking place at the present time, and also by dumping and subsidies, the West Indies could perfectly well carry on the industry, to a large extent at all events, upon economic lines.
The question of giving this small addition to the Preference of 1s. per cwt. was raised in another place and was discussed there. I want to call the attention of your Lordships, and particularly the Secretary of State for the Colonies, to some things which passed in that debate. Mr. Ormsby-Gore stated—in my opinion accurately—that the cost of this additional Preference would be about £700,000 a year. That is a figure which was supported by one of the best experts in the sugar trade in this country whom I consulted, and possibly Mr. Ormsby-Gore may have consulted him also. That would be the probable cost to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, on the other hand, said he regretted to have to say that that figure was a woeful under-estimate of the cost and that the cost would be more than double that figure—at least £1,500,000 a year, and that was excluding what would certainly happen—namely, the extension of the increased Preference to British-made beet sugar.
The Chancellor of the Exchequer had given those figures in the House of Commons before, although when he spoke before he said it was only £1,350,000. I challenged the accuracy of that at the time, and had some correspondence with the Chancellor of the Exchequer upon the subject. He protested his great astonishment that a man of my official experience should rush into print in that manner. I have examined the figures, and I adhere to my view that his statement is an over-estimate. I want to point out this. The Chancellor of the Exchequer said it would cost at least £1,500,000 a
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year, excluding what would certainly happen—namely, the extension of the increased Preference to British-made beet sugar. Apparently, one of those ministering angels who reside under the gallery sent a note to the Chancellor of the Exchequer and he corrected that figure saying: "I made a mistake; that £1,500,000 would include the Preference we should have to give to British-made sugar."
To begin with it is a little disconcerting when the Chancellor of the Exchequer gets up and makes a wild statement of that sort which he has to correct afterwards, even if there were any reasonable, arguable case for extending the Preference in order to equalise the conditions in the British beet-sugar industry. That industry gets a subsidy and a Preference from the Exchequer amounting altogether to £18 10 s. a ton on the approximate world market price of £8 10 s. and makes large profits by it. There is not the slightest arguable case for giving at the present time to the British beet-sugar industry a share in the Colonial Preference, which is given for the sake of our obligations to the Empire just as the subsidy to sugar beet is given to foster the home industry. Therefore I entirely traverse not only the Chancellor of the Exchequer's statement that the cost would be £1,500,000, but also his statement that there is the slightest justifiable ground for including sugar beet in that Preference. On the whole I think Mr. Ormsby-Gore's estimate of about £700,000 was probably reasonable. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, as I understood from him in correspondence, took account of the whole production, but Canada, at the present time takes more than half of the West Indian sugar production, and the whole of what goes to Canada is not coming to Britain because we increase the Preference, provided we do not increase it above the Canadian Preference.
I submit that that shows that the Chancellor of the Exchequer entered into this matter with a mind inadequately prepared, and I want to call your Lordships' attention to that as part of my case for asking for reconsideration of the whole matter. Then the Chancellor of the Exchequer went on to say:
"The world price is about 6s. 6d. a cwt. or £6 10 s. a ton"—
it is less than that now—

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"How can a Preference of 1s. a cwt., or £1 a ton, make up the difference between £13 a ton and £6 10 s. per ton?"
The Chancellor of the Exchequer had not taken the slightest trouble to see what were our recommendations. This 1s. a cwt. would help the industry to tide over because your Lordships will easily recognise that with the price of sugar standing at £10 a ton and the average cost being £11, a difference, of £1 a ton is all that is wanted to keep the industry afloat in the West Indies. But the Chancellor of the Exchequer assumed that the industry was down and out, that the Preference was gone and that what the Colonial sugar producers have to contend with is a price of £6 10 s. a ton. They do not. They have the Preference already. That argument was entirely irrelevant and I have proof that it is irrelevant, because I have information of cases where producers say that they are going to put out of cultivation two large estates because they cannot carry on at a loss of £2 or £1 10 s. They want the £1 a ton, because that would make an enormous difference in the stability and the prospects of the West Indian sugar industry.
Mr. Snowden, with inadequate information or not understanding his brief, entirely ignored that. He misled his supporters in the House of Commons by giving them a perfectly worthless argument. Then he said:—
"For the reasons which I have given—because of its cost and its ineffectiveness for doing anything material to help the Colonial industries in their present plight—I regret that I am unable to accept this proposal."
I have spoken to your Lordships about cost and ineffectiveness, and I shall return presently to the question of cost. Then, thirdly, the Chancellor of the Exchequer referred to the fact that they had made an offer of credit. He said:—
".…we took steps some time ago in order to enable next year's crop to be handled. We made arrangements for credits for that purpose."
We discussed this question of credit some time ago in your Lordships' House. The noble Lord the Secretary of State for the Colonies has had replies now from all the Governors, and I want him to lay those on the Table of the House. Every one of them told him that the credit scheme was not worth 2½d. to the West
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Indies or to anybody else in the world. If he will lay that correspondence on the Table that will be proved.
Yet months afterwards the Chancellor of the Exchequer gets up in the House of Commons and claims credit for having made a noble and generous offer, just as an inspired article in the Daily Herald claimed that the West Indies had been saved by a grant of £150,000, not one penny of which was ever going out of the Exchequer. That is the way the ease was put before the House of Commons. The noble Lord the Secretary of State for the Colonies has not put the case so misleadingly as it was put in the House of Commons, but he has put it as obscurely. I want to know definitely whether we are to understand that the Chancellor of the Exchequer in his statement really meant that it is the deliberate policy of His Majesty's Government to say: "We are going to regard the world price of sugar as £5 10 s. or £6 and we are not going to stir a finger to tide the West Indies over their trouble. We are going to let them drop on to that price of £5 10 s. or £6 and let them go wherever they please. Certainly we will try to provide some maintenance for their starving population." I want definitely to ask whether that is the policy, whether His Majesty's Government regard it as assured that within the next year or two years, before there is any chance for the world price to recover, that the West Indies shall drop out? Is that their considered policy?
If so, it is a very serious matter and it will interest a good many noble Lords who are interested not only in West Indian sugar production but also in British beet sugar production. It is perfectly obvious, if that is the policy of His Majesty's Government and they are going to rely for sugar on buying bankrupt stock from Cuba or wherever they can get it, that the British sugar industry is going out simultaneously with the West Indian. Sugar beet is a subject of interest to those of your Lordships who in this country are concerned with the agricultural side of the beet sugar industry. I want to interest them in that situation. To put the matter very briefly, the British beet sugar industry is a very much more expensive proposition than the West Indian sugar industry. Take the factories. The best factories in the West

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Indies can produce sugar at the rate of one ton of sugar from 6.9 tons of cane; that is almost exactly the average of what British factories do. Last year they produced a ton of sugar from 6.92 tons. The West Indian factories do a little better than that average, but not all do as well as that.
As regards the agricultural side of the matter, the West Indian planters have to be content with 14 s. a ton for cane costing five guineas for a ton of sugar, whereas the British farmer has be paid £2 11 s. 3d. a ton. That is to say, what costs the West Indian factories five guineas costs the British beet factory seventeen or eighteen guineas—at least three times as much. That of course is the agricultural position. Enthusiasts for beet cultivation always hoped that they would get more out of the cultivation by the farmers than they do. The yield per acre is very low. It is only 8⅔ tons per acre on the average, and the beet cultivators are continually saying that they ought to have eighteen or nineteen tons an acre; but they do not get it and that is the best they can do. So that British beet sugar cannot be produced nearly so cheaply as West Indian cane can be produced.
I want to interest the British beet industry in the present plight of the West Indies. I have referred to the complaints made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and by my noble friend Lord Passfield of what they call the "cost" of our proposal, and again I want to trouble your Lordships with some figures which I have written down for the sake of preciseness. I believe that they are accurate. The average open market price of raw sugar of the standard West Indian and Cuban quality—96 degrees standard—was in 1927, three years ago, £13 15 s. a ton. This is the average price from the brokers' circulars. Two years ago in 1928 it was £11 12 s. 6d. a ton. In 1929, last year, the average price was £9 Os. 9d. In December last, when my Commission drew up its figures, the price was £8 5s. a ton. The price to-day, or rather last Saturday, because I have not seen the prices since Saturday, was £5 12s. 6d. So that the price for British buyers of sugar has thus fallen in three years by £8 2s. 6d. a ton. Our consumption in 1929 was 2,180,000 tons. So that, in three years there has been a saving
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on our annual sugar bill at the rate of £17,712,500. In the last two years it has fallen £6 a ton, and the saving is at the rate of £13,000,000 a year. The difference between last year's average price and the price to-day is £3 8s. 3d. a ton, and the saving to our consumers is at the rate of £7,939,250, say £8,000,000 a year. Since last December, when we framed our Report, it has fallen £2 12 s. 6d. a ton, and the saving to our buyers is at the rate of £5,722,500 a year—since we made our recommendations.
We proposed that all our sugar should be handled through an import board giving a guaranteed price for British Colonial sugar. My noble friend Lord Pass field curtly dismissed that proposal in your Lordships' House on the ground that it would "cost several millions." I must protest against the word "cost." It would not have cost anything. It would have meant the sacrifice of foregoing a certain amount of this unnaturally increased cheapness of sugar by means of which sugar is now being sold at a price of about half that at which the best factories in Cuba could produce it. We should have sacrificed a certain amount of unnecessary and unnatural cheapness, but the sacrifice would have saved those about whom I am speaking. If the Government had adopted our maximum proposal for a guaranteed price to Colonial sugar the sacrifice of increased cheapness since we made our proposal would have been at the rate of £3,937,000 a year. That is to say, the net cost of our sugar would not have been increased at all, but would have been reduced by about £1,785,000 a year.
If we fake the average price for the whole of last year as a standard, the net reduction of cost, the clear gain now being enjoyed, even after accepting our proposal, as compared with last year, would be at the rate of about £4,000,000 a year— £4,001,750. Undoubtedly, if we were now buying all our sugar at the open market price of 1928, two years ago, without giving any Preference at all, it would be costing us £25,342,500 a year. If we were buying it to-day at the prices recommended by the Sugar Commission, and superseding the Preference, it would be costing us £18,825,000—a saving of £6,517,000 a year to our buyers since we reported, and the

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Exchequer would have saved the whole cost of the Preference which, on the same basis of calculation, would amount now to about £2,625,000, and the total reduction in cost since 1929 would have been £9,142,500.
The noble Lord talks about cost and about the great hardship to the wage-earning classes of having to pay more than they need for their sugar. We all sympathise with that view. We know that cheap sugar is a great boon, but in my opinion the extraordinary increase in the cheapness of sugar—and this is almost an echo of the words of the Royal Commission of 1897 of which the noble Lord, Lord Grey, and Sir David Barbour, both ardent Free Traders, were members—that increased cheapness is bought "at too high a price": at the cost of others of His Majesty's subjects, the West Indian and other producers of sugar. It is too high a cost to pay from the Imperial point of view, and I urge His Majesty's Government to revise and reconsider their view as to cost and to credit the rank and file of the Labour Party, to which I belong, and with whom I have talked on the subject, with a little of the generosity which I have found among them in my own conversations on the subject.
They would very gladly not allow the price of sugar go down if it would help their fellow workers in the West Indies and the other Colonies concerned that it should not go down. I appeal to His Majesty's Government not simply to regard this matter as a thing to be dealt with by a stern adherence to a fixed and immutable principle. I am told that if you put a hen in a circle of chalk and put its bill on the circle nothing on earth will induce that hen to move from that circle. His Majesty's Government seem to be actuated by that principle. Why should my noble friend adhere to that view and subordinate himself at the present time to that policy and say that this item of our Imperial trade equal to a million tons a year is to be sacrificed and scrapped, and that the workers employed in connection with it are to be thrown into destitution. Why should be adhere to that and say: "It costs too much; we must follow out the principle of this so-called Free Trade and adhere to the principle of cheap sugar"—of which your Lordships will remember
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he gave us a panegyric on the first occasion when he spoke on the subject— "this is the policy of His Majesty's Government on this matter"?
I have spoken of the destruction of trade. You would entirely destroy a British industry of 1,000,000 tons of sugar a year, worth, you may say, certainly £10,000,000 a year at the very least. You will entirely destroy about half of your West Indian trade. After all, your West Indian trade is worth in imports into Great Britain about £5,500,000 and exports from Great Britain nearly £7,000,000. You will destroy half of that by buying cheap sugar at 5s. 6d. cwt. or whatever it may be from Cuba. What are you going to get in the way of trade in return? I know there is an economic theory that wherever you buy your stuff you get trade in return. I doubt if you will get any return of trade from Cuba. As a matter of fact so far as this exchange of sugar is concerned, the Cuban crop is practically all held in the United States and I cannot believe, whatever you pay for your sugar to the United States of America, that you will be able to send any trade to Cuba. They do not take any of our trade. They bar it to-day. How are you going to get an increase of trade with America that would countervail that loss of your trade? You cannot possibly get trade in return when people are trying to bar, or have actually barred, your trade out. When you are dealing with your own people who are giving you a Preference, some trade goes in return, but there is inevitably a loss of trade as compared with the trade that previously existed.
I have a letter from the Principal of the Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture, a very valuable institution which is doing very good work in the West Indies and which was largely financed and founded by the sugar industry. The people of Trinidad gave a very large grant and the sugar machinery manufacturers in England gave a grant of £25,000 for the study of the technique of sugar production. If you destroy the sugar industry, you destroy a very large amount of the value of that institution because the only sugar growers you would then have to provide for will be those of Natal, who will go on being protected, and the

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Australians, who can look after themselves. There will be no other British sugar industry. How can you expect the Trinidad people and other people, who have given subsidies to that college to help their principal industry, to go on giving it subsidies? Of course they will not.
In this letter Mr. Evans, the Principal, says:—
"It is a pity Mr. Snowden and some of the others have not had the opportunity of seeing some of these Colonies. They would then more fully realise that the problem is a social and political one and only incidentally a sugar problem. People out here are very sore and there are local rumours about the abolition of the. Preference on British trade goods. If the Sugar Preference is not renewed next year I think you may take it as pretty certain that most of the Colonies—British Guiana and Barbados anyway—will remove the British Preference and that will mean the return of monopoly to United States goods."
The Trinidad Government is assisting the sugar planters to the tune of £2 a ton for the next two years. So is Jamaica. Barbados and British Guiana desire to do so but they have not the money. They have asked the British Government for the money. It has been refused.
"The people are very sore," says the letter, and it would interest my noble friend if I could show him some of the letters I have received on the subject. My noble friend may complain of my statement that he has done nothing to help the West Indies. He has promised us assistance from the Development Fund and the intention, I understood, was that assistance should be given from the Development Fund to the sugar planters to improve the conditions of the industry, such as transport, and to make a live and efficient industry out of what is now a struggling industry, so that they may contend with the world conditions. What do we find? We find the Chancellor of the Exchequer saying that his standpoint is that they cannot possibly contend with the world conditions with their cost of production, that their cost of production is £12 or £13 a ton and the world price is £5 10 s. or £6, and that they cannot contend with it. We can imagine the Colonies sending in an application to the Development Commission. Many of your Lord ships know the Development Commission and the Development Acts and they have
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sat upon the Public Accounts Committee, as I have done as a humble assistant adviser to that Committee.
Suppose you go to the Colonial Development Commission and say: "These West Indian people are in a very bad way and we want to spend a little money so that we may be able to give relief works; we would like some money for improving transport, for improving factories, making roads in order to tide them over." I do not know what the Public Accounts Committee would say to those Commissioners if they were to accede to any application for relief in the West Indies at the present time on those grounds. I have been informed by Colonial Governors that the Development Commission are taking the very proper and logical view of their duties that they will not give money for any eleemosynary purposes in order to keep an industry going that His Majesty's Government have declared cannot be kept going. If, for instance, Barbados say: "We want to improve our roads or light railways", they will ask: "What for?" Barbados will reply: "In order to improve the efficiency of our sugar industry." If Antigua ask for money for the same purpose, they will also say that they want to improve the efficiency of the sugar industry, which is their principal industry. The Development Commissioners will, very properly—I speak as an ex-Assistant Comptroller and Auditor—boggle at that.
My right hon. friend has been very liberal in telling the Colonial Governments that His Majesty's Government intend to help them through the Development Fund. I want to know what is the position about that. Is it the view of His Majesty's Government that the Colonial industry cannot survive? Are the Development Commissioners taking that view, or are they really sympathetically dealing with applications for aid for improving the sugar industry with a prospect—shared by His Majesty's Government—that that industry will survive? If His Majesty's Government do really share that prospect and believe it will survive, they are in a fool's paradise if they believe it can survive at the present time without more assistance than they are now giving. It can only survive if the Government will face the position set forth in my Commission's Report and as it has been aggravated since then by the great fall in the price of sugar.
We quite admit there are industrial difficulties in this country and that the West Indies are at the present time sharing in that depression, but, in this country, each industry supports the others and our workers do not starve because there is an Unemployment Insurance Fund and an established system of maintaining our workers. There is no such thing in the West Indies, nor does the law acknowledge any obligation to give able-bodied outdoor relief. You cannot deal with relations with British Colonies on the principle that they are to be treated as recipients of outdoor relief. They are individual satellites or associates of ours in the British Empire and we have a moral obligation to keep their communities in a healthy state of existence, just as we have an obligation on the part of the Government here to keep the community in a healthy state of existence, and therefore to assist this distressed industry. The Imperial Government cannot discharge its duties to those communities simply by saying, "We will relieve your populations in case of distress."
As I have laboured to prove, and as the Commission of 1897 also laboured to prove, in these Colonies, in Barbados, Antigua, St. Kitts and to a lesser degree in Trinidad, if the sugar industry goes out, you destroy the whole machinery of government, you render it impossible for men of enterprise and spirit to go out to those Colonies, and you discourage the progressive white element in those Colonies. You cannot discharge your duties to those Colonies in that way. You must preserve those Colonies as individuals. They are small and they may be insignificant, but, if a man is an individual member of your family, it is no justification to treat him badly and to undermine his constitution because he is a small man. He has just as much right as the bigger man, or the bigger community, to your fatherly care and your Imperial obligations.
I come to the question of relief work. I have had a great deal of experience of relief works after hurricanes and droughts in the West Indies, and if you think you can effectually from this country deal with the problem of relief by giving the population of the West Indies relief work or "doles", you are grievously mistaken. In the first place, it is almost
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impossible to find relief works that will at all touch the situation. I have had to deal with the question, fortunately, where relief works did touch the situation—in Jamaica, where we had the banana and the coffee industry, and where we wanted more roads. In Barbados and other places they have too many roads already. You cannot give employment through relief works, and are you going to distribute money by way of "doles"? You know very little of the population of the West Indies if you think it is not an even more disastrous expedient than the unemployment relief fund in this country, because all experience proves that the people who draw the money spend it, and their dependents, the women and children and old people, go on starving, just as they did before. You cannot deal with the illiterate and unorganised West Indian population by outdoor relief. It would create far more mischief than giving them land to work upon.
I have kept your Lordships far too long. There is a great deal more that I would like to say, but I hope I shall be followed and supported by other members of this House. I want the Government to reconsider the position in this matter. I have quoted the manlier in which the Chancellor of the Exchequer dealt with this subject in the House of Commons, and I ask your Lordships whether one is not entitled to appeal for reconsideration or a rehearing, on the ground of misdirection of the jury? The facts were not put before the House of Commons properly. The facts of the situation are much more serious than the Government have given any indication of recognising, and I urge them, as I am confident all their Governors and deputations from the West Indies have urged them, to reconsider the matter on the basis of their first programme, which was to help the industry to tide over a period of difficulty and distress. In view of the perfectly ridiculous price at which sugar now stands, and of the enormous profit which the British community is reaping through the lowering of the price of sugar, I urge that the Government should be liberal and give a grant, just as they gave a grant on the recommendation of the Commission of 1897.
What is required to keep the British sugar industry in the Colonies and in Great Britain going is to guarantee the maintenance of the present Preference.

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I can conceive no possible reason why the Chancellor of the Exchequer should have been so reluctant last year to tell the British West Indies what was going to be done. It cost them thousands and thousands of pounds, and I made a statement in my Report that great loss was actually imposed upon West Indian communities by that. I cannot understand the quite inexplicable reluctance of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. If duties are going to be increased, I can understand his silence, but if a Preference is going to be maintained I can see no practical administrative reason why it should not be stated. If it is not going to he maintained, let us be told and we know where we are. Secondly, let the Government add that moderate increase to equalise our Preference with the Canadian Preference. We can perfectly well afford it from the surplus got by cheapening sugar, and that will allow the West Indies to tide over. The weaker will no doubt go out, but not three-fourths of the planters, which must happen if present conditions continue.
Thirdly, I urge the Government to pay some attention to the recommendations of their Governors, and to assist those Colonies which are making efforts to assist themselves. We ask the Government to do what Mr. Chamberlain's Government did on the recommendation of the Commissioners of 1897. We have had immense profits from the reduction of the price of sugar, and we should give back a little of it to the West Indies. Let the Government give back generously some of the profit and they will escape the evil notoriety of having been the Labour Government which destroyed not only the British sugar industry but also a great part of the West Indian Colonies.
LORD STRICKLAND: My Lords, I feel that it is my public duty to address the House on this question, because I had the honour to be Governor of Antigua and to administer the grant under Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, to which reference has been made three times in the course of the noble Lord's speech. I will be very brief, and I regret that the views which I am bound to express may not be welcome to brother Governors in the West Indies. I feel that my noble friend the Secretary of State for the Colonies is being attacked in regard to his policy in regard to
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sugar in the West Indies in a manner which is not always just, and which is certainly unsound financially. I regret to have to say that the days of subsidies payable outside England are over. When Mr. Joseph Chamberlain saved, by a small subsidy to encourage central factories, the sugar industry in the lesser islands of the West Indies, and Antigua in particular where it had become unprofitable, conditions were very different. Since then we are subsidising a competing sugar industry in England. To subsidise a competitive sugar industry in England, and to continue to subsidise sugar industries elsewhere outside, appears to me to be arithmetically unsound. It is as if anyone were to back in a match two horses to win the race at the same odds.
I remember on the wharf at St. Kitts when governing the Leeward Islands seeing Muscavado sugar sold for £5 2s. 6d. a ton. Their machinery was then antiquated and wasteful. Putting in new machinery created wealth by an expedient that cannot be repeated. The British subsidy of £250,000, obtained from this Parliament by Mr. Joseph Chamberlain for the West Indian sugar industry, was parcelled out among the Governors of the West Indies leaving to each to do his best with it, and in Antigua I employed it in premiums to encourage the setting up of central factories, which central factories have been very successful and added to the productiveness of the industry for the time being sufficiently to get the planters out of their financial difficulties and give them many years of profit and prosperity. But it appears that what the planters now want is not the creation of new wealth by financial and mechanical expedients, but that the Secretary of State should do much that is not practical to keep up the price of sugar for their benefit above that which is commercially possible, to an indefinite extent, and at our expense. The one thing that can be clone for the West Indies to-day is to stabilise prices for a short period on sound banking lines. To stabilise prices might cost a little but it would do much good at comparatively small cost. To raise prices against the law of supply and demand is a different proposition; to call it "preference" does not make it sound.

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If there is to be any raising of price in defiance of the law of supply and demand, that involves a subsidy, and if a subsidy is to be given for manufacturing sugar let it be given to keep the balance of trade in favour of England, let it be given to help English landowners and English sugar factories. British landowners last year were in many cases, in fact, nothing but unpaid tax gatherers. This year by reason of the increase of taxation to 12 s. 6d. in the pound many of us have to pay for the privilege of facilitating the collection of taxes, and passing them on, before rents are received, to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. If landowners here are to do that, let us vote to pass on what is taken from us to brother landlords in England, not to brother landlords in the West Indies.
The real difficulty is that there are West Indian Islands and estates of which the productiveness has ceased to be competitive in the markets of the world. There are places in the West Indies—it would not be wise to mention names—which may still struggle on competitively; but to try and help indefinitely by subsidies—not by the creation of central factories—those which are beyond redemption, as well as those which might perhaps struggle on, is certainly bad finance, if not a hopeless task. In view of the very heavy taxation now payable in England, the defiance of political economy should not be carried any further. It is with great regret that the truth has to be told. The truth has to be told equally for landlords in England and landlords in the West Indies. The time has come when for many of us our heads are left but the land that cannot meet competition is taken by the tax gatherers.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (LORD PASSFIELD): My Lords, as no other noble Lord wishes to support Lord Olivier, I will endeavour to make such reply as I can to the very lengthy and detailed speech which he has made, and to which I listened with great attention and, I hope, some profit. But a large part of that speech, perhaps the greater part, was made up of an attack upon my right hon. friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and an attack upon him upon the figures. Really, I cannot at a moment's notice
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undertake to straighten out the figures either of my noble friend Lord Olivier or of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. I suggest to your Lordships that too much has been made of the apparent discrepancy between the two figures of what certain proposals would cost. Is it not clear that you must make various assumptions if you are attempting to work out that sum? It is perfectly clear that the Chancellor of the Exchequer made certain assumptions which differed materially from those which my noble friend himself made.
The Chancellor of the Exchequer assumed that an offer of increased Preference to Empire sugar would lead to a larger proportion of Empire sugar coming to this country than does under the existing Preference. I cannot say whether such an assumption was exactly justified, but it is not an unreasonable one. If the present Preference draws a certain proportion of Empire sugar, an enlarged Preference would probably draw a somewhat larger proportion of Empire sugar, and on that increased amount the Chancellor of the Exchequer would not only lose the increased Preference, but would also be at the cost of the existing Preference on that sugar, which otherwise would have come from foreign sources. That is only one assumption which has to be made on which apparently the Chancellor of the Exchequer differed from my noble friend. There are other assumptions which were made into which I do not want to go now, but I submit that probably the discrepancy lies in the difference between the assumptions made for making the calculations. But, whether that is so or not, surely the essence of the matter does not lie in the amount of the cost. The cost is considerable, and the cost, as my noble friend has attempted to show, is one which ought to be incurred.
LORD OLIVIER: I put the point definitely. The Chancellor of the Exchequer assumed that the Preference would be abolished, and that what the West Indies had to contend with was the price of £6 10 s. Does the noble Lord assume that sugar will remain at that price?
LORD PASSFIELD: That is not the point to which I was referring. The noble Lord in his speech dealt with this

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matter two or three times, and I think each time dealt with it somewhat differently. With regard to his last explanation, I certainly do not assume, and I do not know that I have ever assumed, or that His Majesty's Government have ever assumed, that the price of sugar is always going to be as low as the present price, or anything like it. Really, that is not a matter on which I can prophesy. I am not a speculator in sugar myself, I am glad to say, and, if I were, I do not know whether I should be inclined to be a "bull" on sugar at this moment. But I ant certainly not able to answer the question; I cannot say what the future price of sugar is going to be. The policy of the Government must necessarily be based on the present and existing circumstances. It cannot gamble on the future; it cannot assume that sugar is going to go up or go down; it can only have regard to the existing circumstances and what is reasonably and immediately in prospect. And it would not be accurate to say that the Government policy is founded upon an expected increase in the price of sugar or au expected decrease. Obviously, we ought not to speculate in that way.
Another part of my noble friend's attack—an attack, I think, upon the Chancellor of the Exchequer—very largely was that he was constantly assuming that the existing Preference is going to be abolished, or that at any rate the Chancellor of the Exchequer ought to say that it will not be abolished—never be abolished, I suppose. All I can say is that the Chancellor of the Exchequer has said definitely as long ago as July, 1929, and has repeated it several times, and I have said it here on his behalf, that so long as the duty remains he will not attempt to take off the Preference. But he has, very naturally I think, not been prepared to commit himself to the statement that the duty is going to be maintained for ever. I do not know whether my noble friend thinks he ought to have done that, but I cannot hold out any hope that we shall be able to induce the Chancellor of the Exchequer to say that he is never going to touch the Sugar Duty or any other duty. I doubt whether he ought to, but at any rate I do not believe this particular Chancellor of the Exchequer will do that, and he has gone pretty far in attempting to com-
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fort the West Indies on the point, by saying that unless the duty is removed the Preference will not be removed.
I think the Sugar Duty yields at this time something like £15,000,000 a year. I know no more than your Lordships what is the actual state of the Exchequer at this moment, but it would not be going too far to say that the prospects of there being £15,000,000 to spare at the next Budget do not appear to be at all rosy. And consequently I should not assume that it was likely that the Sugar Duty was going to be abolished at the next Budget or, for that matter, at the Budget after. But I know nothing about it, and there is no reason to assume, as I think the noble Lord several times did, that the Preference is going to be abolished next year or within the near future.
The noble Lord based a large part of his argument on the fact that, if the present low prices continued, if the existing Preference were abolished and if nothing were done to replace it, the sugar industry in the West. Indies and in Mauritius would come to an end. I am not prepared to say what would happen if all those circumstances took place. All I can say is that the Government are not in a position at this moment to act as if all those prognostications were going to be carried out to the letter in the near future. We are not prepared to act on that assumption. I should prefer to act in the light of the information we have, and it is really only causing additional trouble and apprehension for the noble Lord to go on talking as if the existing Preference were going to be abolished next year or the year after. I do not know that it is, and I should think it more reasonable to proceed on another hypothesis. At any rate, your Lordships will realise that I am not in a position to give any assurance that the Sugar Duty will not he abolished. All I can say is that personally it does not look to me as if it would be within the power of any Chancellor of the Exchequer to lose £15,000,000 of Revenue in the next Budget.
I hope the noble Lord, Lord Olivier, will forgive me if I do not follow him in all the various terms of his speech. I should like, for his sake, and I think for your Lordships' sake also, to try to give what I will call a positive answer to the noble Lord rather than mere debating points. I shall not satisfy him, I am

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afraid, but at the same time I want to say how the position stands. Naturally it has been a matter of very grave and almost continuous consideration. We have had the benefit of the presence in this country at the Colonial Office Conference of a number of the Governors of the sugar Colonies and of high officials from those Colonies from which the Governors were not able to come, and we have therefore obtained a great deal of information from them, and also as the result of recent telegrams, about the exact position of most of these Colonies.
Undoubtedly the position is grave. I do not want to exaggerate. There is a good deal of apprehension, but there is some actual trouble. In most of the sugar Colonies there are some estates—not many—that have thrown up the sponge, and there is a good deal of local organisation among them by which they are endeavouring to help themselves. Barbados, Jamaica, British Guiana and Mauritius are all turning to and endeavouring to see what can be done. There is already some unemployment but, I am glad to say, no very serious amount in any place. The worst, place in this respect is British Guiana, where there are some thousands of people out of work. Steps are being taken to deal with them and, needless to say, the action taken will not be dictated from Downing Street, but will be organised and administered by the local Governments in places where this is possible. Funds are being found, partly locally, where it has been possible, and partly from the Colonial Development Fund; and we shall very likely have to come upon the Exchequer also for something on the Estimates to maintain the administration of these Colonies. My noble friend made much of the fact that we could not let the administrations go down. I need hardly say that the Government have not the least intention of letting the local administrations go down. At any rate, so far as we can see, we shall he able, to keep them going.
I want to give some particulars regarding the Colonial Development Fund. I want to make it clear that, although there have been one or two applications from people engaged in the sugar industry for direct assistance, those applications from employers for aid to keep their enterprises going have not been
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acceded to—very properly, as I venture to think. But those responsible have already agreed to free grants, or loans free of interest, to an amount which, including all the West Indian Colonies, comes to £322,000.
EARL PEEL: Is that all from the Development Fund?
LORD PASSFIELD: Yes. That, of course, is for specific works of one kind and another which are not in any sense relief works. They are justified as works of utility which are required. They are not invented for the purpose of giving employment and, of course, some few of them do not give any employment at all. The bulk of them, however, have the advantage that they will supply wages to a certain number of the population. That is something. Other applications are before them and, I hope, will be acceded to. Then, as I have said, we have telegrams from a number of the sugar Colonies.
LORD OLIVIER: Have there been any grants for assistance in maintaining or improving the conditions in the sugar industry?
LORD PASSFIELD: No, if the noble Lord means any direct assistance to people engaged in the sugar industry.
LORD OLIVIER: If they desired to centralise the sugar factories in Barbados would they get a grant?
LORD PASSFIELD: I cannot say what would happen, but grants, as a matter of fact, have been given for roads, bridges, water supply and various health measures. Roads and bridges cannot be considered as directly contributing towards maintaining the sugar industry, and yet they are part of the means by which the sugar industry is carried on. I cannot be more precise than that. I have said quite frankly that they have refused to give grants to particular sugar firms for the maintenance or improvement of their industry. Whether they would make a grant to enable central factories to be substituted for a number of smaller ones I cannot say. They have not had this before them. We hope to pursue the policy of public assistance, either through the Development Fund or directly from Colonial funds, or possibly by a grant in aid.

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I want to add that all the Governors who have said anything on the subject have endorsed and welcomed the view laid down by the Colonial Office that they must at all costs avoid anything in the nature of out-relief, handed over the pay table because people are starving. They must contrive in seine way, if possible, to offer employment at wages. It is a little difficult to define exactly what relief works are, but I think your Lordships will realise that there is a difference between taking on a man at wages, even if the work would not have been undertaken but for the desire to take him on, and out-relief handed over the pay table to a man and his wife and children, There is another small thing. In a number of these Colonies there have been export duties levied on sugar when it is exported. It is obvious that when you are dealing with the market in its present state such export duties are a real deduction from the possibility of carrying on business without a loss or without a great loss, and we have told the Colonial Governments that to comtinue such export duties or any duties which press directly upon the sugar industry at the present time is a very bad policy, and we have asked them to obtain the removal of these duties and taxes at the earliest possible moment, even if they have to substitute some other duty which does not directly fall upon sugar for the taxes thus remitted.
I am not able to say anything more about the policy of His Majesty's Government. We are watching the situation. We are doing everything we can short of actually giving a subsidy to sugar production. We have not thought it wise to take that course. It would be in many ways the easiest thing to do, if it was not that it would mean a considerable cost, to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. When my noble friend says this country has made a large profit out of sugar by its cheapening, I would point out that the Chancellor of the Exchequer does not have that profit. It is the public which gets it, in so far as the fall in the wholesale prices has been realised in the retail trade. I think the House must understand that any increase of Preference, or any grant of a subsidy in any way whatever, does mean a direct addition to the expenditure of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. When the Government are constantly told that
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the one thing necessary for the revival of industry is that expenditure should be reduced and not increased, it is of course a little difficult to say that in this particular case there should be an item of £1,000,000 or £2,000,000 or £3,000,000 added to the Government expenditure to enable the sugar industry to conic nearer making both ends meet than it can do at the present time.
That is not the Government policy. The noble Lord asks that it should be reconsidered. I confess I can promise him that it will go on being considered, because we shall not get away from this question—we shall be bound to go on considering it—but I cannot believe that I shall be able to induce the Chancellor of the Exchequer either to guarantee the maintenance of the Preference or to increase it up to the Canadian level, or to assist—the Colonies my noble friend said, but he meant, of course, the planters. We can assist the Colonies, and I think we can assist the planters, but I do not think the Government will be able to do anything in the nature of giving a subsidy to the sugar industry. I think that is the only thing that I can actually say. I will only state generally that I think the situation may be going to be grave, but it is not so very serious at the present moment. The replies which we have from the Colonies concerned indicate that, whilst they will have to provide for a certain amount of distress and unemployment in the coming winter, it will be within their capacity to make the necessary provision for that, aided from the Development Fund and, possibly, by here and there a grant in aid.
What is going to happen if the position gets worse in a year's time I am not prepared now to say. We do not see any indication that more than the fringe of the sugar industry is at present going to be given up. Undoubtedly the fringe is being given up here and there, but I would like to say that in Antigua, for instance—one of the most difficult places—the central factory, which I am told covers two-thirds of the whole sugar production of the Island, has offered a loan of £20,000 to its planters—to the people who grow the cane—in order to enable them to go on. That seems to indicate that the central factory at any rate sees its way to go on,

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even at that cost, and I have no doubt that for the rest of the people in Antigua the Government would be able to make at any rate provision.
I ought to say one other word with regard to the effort the Government did make last year to help the people who were growing cane with credit from the banks. The noble Lord made great fun of that at the time. He has made great fun of it since. I give him the satisfaction of saying that he proved to be right, and that that particular effort was not necessary. As a matter of fact, I remember very definitely that we did not put it forward as being any help to the sugar industry or any solution of the, sugar problem, but we were informed very definitely that the banks were refusing credit to the little planters—credit actually necessary to enable them to go on with their planting, and, because we were informed of that fact, we did consult all the banks, and we said: "We do not want you to reduce your advances to an amount less than you gave before, and we are prepared, if you say that that may land you in any loss, to stand in with that loss." The banks accepted that, but the various Governments said it was not necessary, and it has proved apparently not to be necessary. It was a false alarm. The banks did their business in the way they had done it before, and the planting took place. We were to blame, if you like, for being misled by what turned out to be a false alarm, but I submit we were not to blame for making an effort to cope with the particular difficulty. It was a relatively small matter in the whole range of the problem.
EARL PEEL: May I ask the noble Lord, was no advantage then taken of so generous a Government offer?
LORD PASSFIELD: No advantage was taken, for they were able to do without it. In Mauritius they considered it very carefully, but found on the whole they could go on without it, and, that being so, it was obviously better that they should go on without it and that the banks should do the business. I own that the noble Lord has the laugh of us there, and all I can say is we acted on the information that there was going to be a restriction of credit. And may I say that part of the trouble in this West Indian problem is the prevalence of these
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rumours of coming calamity, and of the tremendous size of the calamity. The sting of death is most in apprehension. I think there is rather too much apprehension about this.
In conclusion, I am sorry to say I am not able to give the noble Lord the sort of assurance he wants that the Government is going, by subsidies or by buying the sugar at £15 a ton, to maintain the whole of the sugar industry. That is the position of the Government. We do acknowledge our responsibility to the people of the West Indies and Mauritius, and we are going as far as human effort can go—we are going in the least bad way we can find—to save them from any extreme destitution or distress. We are going to try to put them in the way of earning their living to the greatest extent possible. The noble Lord has not been very promising as to what he thinks can be done, but we are trying at any rate to see what can be done in that way, and no effort will be spared to do it. I can only say that I have the promise of the Chancellor of the Exchequer that whatever money is necessary on these lines he will give very favourable consideration to. But the moment is not yet. We have not needed the money, and when we do need it I have no doubt the Chancellor of the Exchequer will be prepared to come forward with an estimate in the House of Commons, and we shall be able to get what is absolutely necessary. I do not pretend that the picture is a pleasant one. I do not pretend that we can avert very serious calamity from the West Indies. This calamity has been impending for the last four years. No more than the late Government can we avert the calamity in any way that I can see practicable. All we can do is to be guided by the best information we can find in the Colonies and to steer as far as we can in such a way as to prevent the local administration, the hospitals and everything else going down, and as far as we can prevent the most severe distress coming on any of the population.
LORD OLIVIER: My Lords, I did not formally move for Papers, but I explained to my noble friend that I hoped he would lay Papers, especially the replies received to the Despatch asking the Governors for their views.
LORD PASSFIELD: I shall be very glad to see what Papers can be given.

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Some Papers can be given. It will not be possible to give such Papers as refer to the circumstances of particular firms or confidential matters of that kind and also it is not in accordance with the practice of the Colonial Development Fund that we should publish the actual applications made to that Fund. The Fund itself publishes periodical particulars of what it has done. Subject to those two exceptions, if the noble Lord will not mind certain omissions to preserve the anonymity of particular people mentioned, I shall be very glad to lay all the information possible.
LORD OLIVIER: My Lords, the noble Lord has given us as little comfort today as on previous occasions. He says that he sees a great calamity and does not see a way to do anything to avert it. Our complaint is that the Government are not prepared to take means to avert a calamity by tiding over the industry until prices have resumed a normal level. The present price of £5 10 s. a ton is a great deal less than the price at which any factory can produce. One little crumb of comfort I have elicited is about export duties. Last autumn the noble Lord referred to my colleague, Mr. Semple, and myself the question of these export duties and we strongly recommended that they should be taken off. They were put on in Antigua at, a time when Antigua was doing very well with its sugar industry. They have been kept on ever since. We pointed out that it was perfectly ridiculous to tax in this manner an industry which was not making a penny. About five weeks ago I enquired if the duties were still being levied and the people in Antigua said: "Yes, they were still being levied." I wrote to the noble Lord and said I was going to ask whether these export duties would be taken off, and I am very glad that now the noble Lord has had his attention called to the matter he has given directions. I suppose the difficulty was that the revenue from these duties could not be spared and that he could not get anything out of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to make good the loss of these duties. I hope he will get something now.
There is only one other point—a very small point—to which I want to refer. He said he was not sure that the
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increasing cheapness of sugar was getting through to the consumer. Nor am I. It seems to go to the wholesalers and refiners, and I would like to suggest, that a little extra levy might be put on the wholesalers and refiners—that they should make a sort of conscience money payment to the West Indies which the West Indies think is their due. Having had the noble Lord's assurance I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM VISCOUNT HAILSHAM had the following Notice on the Paper—To ask His Majesty's Government whether their attention has been directed to the amendments to the Covenant of the League of Nations proposed by the Committee appointed to bring the provisions of the Covenant into harmony with the Pact of Paris; whether His Majesty's Government are aware that the amendments proposed by the Committee go far beyond the purposes for which the Committee was appointed, and would (if adopted) materially alter the position and powers of the Council of the League and largely increase the liabilities of this country; whether His Majesty's Government will undertake to submit the proposed amendments to Parliament before giving them any acceptance or suppport on behalf of this country; and to move for Papers.
The noble and learned Viscount said: My Lords, I am sorry to have to ask your Lordships at this crowded period of the Session to consider the matter to which I am about to call attention. I do it only because it is a matter which gives me very considerable anxiety and because I have the best reason for knowing that that anxiety is shared by others whose authority and experience are far greater than my own. Unless some satisfactory assurance is given it is quite possible that before Parliament reassembles this country may find itself involved in entanglements and responsibilities not less formidable than those which were contained in that Protocol which was so emphatically condemned when it was laid before the judgment of the country in 1924.
The matter arises out of certain proposed amendments to the Covenant of the League of Nations. As your Lordships remember, under what is known as the Kellogg Pact—the Pact of Paris—the signatories to that Pact renounce war as an instrument of national policy. Under the earlier Covenant of the League of Nations the signatories to that Covenant agreed not to resort to war except in certain circumstances. There is, therefore, an inconsistency between the two obligations. The inconsistency is, I think, not a very serious one, because most of the signatories of the Covenant of the League of Nations are also signatories of the Pact of Paris, and in their case it will only involve that some wars would be a breach of their obligations under both agreements whereas others would only be a breach of their obligations under one agreement. However, the Assembly of the League of Nations in September last resolved that it was desirable that the Covenant should be amended to bring it into harmony with the Pact of Paris and a Committee was set up to recommend what amendments were necessary for that purpose.
The committee met, I think, for only one week, between February 25 and March 5. It seems to have carried out its business with remarkable celerity. But in that limited space of time it commenced by reaching a decision which I think was a most unfortunate one—namely, that it would not confine itself to bringing the two agreements into harmony, but that it was charged further with the duty of finding some alternative pacific means of settlement to replace the arbitrament of war, and that since war was to be renounced it was essential in the language of the Report itself that "its place must be taken by methods of pacific settlement in order to ensure the settlement of disputes." I shall show your Lordships in a few moments that having laid down that definition of its duties the Committee signally failed to perform its duties, because if its proposed amendments be accepted the result will be that a great many disputes will still have no pacific means of settlement provided, and therefore with regard to any particular dispute nobody in this world will know when the dispute breaks out whether it is one which is covered by a pacific means of settlement or not.
If I may, I would remind your Lordships of the present position in order to indicate what are the proposed alterations. The matter concerns three Articles of the Covenant—Article 12, Article 13 and Article 15. Since we are not taking a final decision on the merits of the proposed amendments, but only considering whether they are worthy to be submitted to Parliament before a decision is taken, I do not propose to develop all the possible criticisms that may be made but only to indicate one or two salient points arising particularly under Article 15. Under Article 12, as the Covenant now stands, the Members of the League agree that if a dispute arises between any two of their number they will submit the matter either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to inquiries by the Council—that is by the Council of the League—and that they will not resort to war for three months after the award or after the report by the Council. That obligation is altered, in view of the fact that war is now excluded altogether, into an agreement that they will in no case resort to war for the solution of their disputes. The embodiment of that Covenant has certain results in bringing in the provisions of Article 16, but I do not want to develop them now because I am anxious to confine myself to what I think are the most serious matters.
Article 13 is the one under which the Members of the League agree that they will submit any dispute which is suitable for arbitration or judicial settlement to that method of determination, and the principal alteration is one in language. Under the existing text when an award is made and is not carried out, the Council shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto. The amendment is that the Council shall propose what measures of all kinds shall be taken to give effect thereto. That, again, is a minor amendment designed, as the Report shows, to indicate that all the serious obligations of Article 16 can be invoked in order to enforce awards given under that Article. But that is not the main objection to the proposed amendments.
Article 15 is, in my submission to your Lordships, the most important alteration. Article 15 is that Article which provides

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what is to happen when the parties to a dispute have not submitted it to arbitration or to judicial settlement. Primarily, at any rate, it refers to those disputes which are not matters of legal difference at all but are matters of high political importance. Under the existing Covenant what happens is this. The Council of the League of Nations enquires and reports. If its report is one by a majority of the Council—that is to say, is not a unanimous report—then that report has no effect at all except, of course, the moral effect of showing what the majority of the Council think. If, on the other hand, the report is a unanimous one it still has no binding effect upon the parties. Your Lordships appreciate that these are disputes which are normally at any rate not matters of law but matters, it may be, of vital import to the disputants, and the Covenant was very careful to preserve the character of the League of Nations as not being a super-sovereign body imposed upon the Members of the League, but as merely a free combination of a number of independent sovereign States.
Accordingly, the Article as it stands to-day provides that where there is a unanimous report the Members of the League agree that they will not resort to war against any party which complies with the recommendations of the report. But it does not make the report a binding decision which either party is bound to accept or obey, and it does not impose upon any Member of the League any obligation to attempt to enforce the report which the Council has reached. Under the proposed amendments, wherever there is a majority report of the Council the position is to be left unchanged and it binds nobody. Probably in the great majority of cases, having regard to the kind of dispute which is likely to be dealt with under Article 15, that is what will happen and in all those cases the Committee gives no means of pacific settlement. It does nothing to provide a means of pacific settlement of these disputes. I think the Committee is right and I am not criticising it. I do not think it is right or in the least necessary, at any rate, that in the Covenant of the League there should be a means set up which the parties are bound to accept of enforcing a settlement of every dispute which may arise. Very
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often a great deal more can be done by leaving the matter to good sense and time to cure so long, of course, as it is understood that neither party can resort to force.
At any rate, that is what the Committee have done, and in all cases a majority report has no binding effect. But wherever there is a unanimous report the whole character of the functions of the Council and the whole effect of the report are being radically altered. Instead of being a document which binds nobody, which the disputants may or may not accept according to their will and pleasure, if it happens that the Council reaches a unanimous decision the parties are bound to obey that decision whatever it is. And not only are the parties bound to obey it, but every Member of the League is bound to adopt such measures as the Council recommends in order to enforce the obedience of any recalcitrant party. The report is quite definite in explaining that, although it has made this complete change, the Committee felt that the unanimous report was of so great an authority that it ought to prevail over the individual will of the States, and it would only take a final decision of the Council in cases where it was compelled to overcome the resistance of the States concerned. So that it is clear, as indeed the text shows, that the intention and effect of the proposed amendments are to provide that wherever there is a unanimous report by the Council on any dispute of whatever character, the parties are to be bound to accept it. If they do not the other Members of the League are bound to adopt coercive measures in order to compel their submission. That at once alters the position of the Council. It becomes a super-sovereign to which the hitherto sovereign States who are members of the Council are submitted.
So far as any disputes in which we ourselves are concerned are affected, your Lordships can readily appreciate how serious the consequences might be. For obvious reasons, I do not want to envisage in too much detail disputes which might arise; but your Lordships will remember that India, for instance, is a Member of the League of Nations. Egypt may easily become one, and the possibilities that this raises of the Council being called in to determine not a matter

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of law at all but some other matter of high policy in case of dispute arising, is one which I do not think many of us could contemplate with equanimity. Let us look at the disputes in which we are not directly involved. I will take only questions out of the past because, for obvious reasons, I do not want to suggest possible instances of friction between friendly nations in the future. Italy some years ago took possession of Corfu to bring pressure upon Greece. Italy and Greece are both Members of the League of Nations. If this Covenant had been amended, then the Council would have been bound to reach a unanimous report, if they could, and, if they did so, every nation of the League would have been bound to adopt the coercive measures which the Council chose to recommend in order to compel the submission by either of these two Powers to the decision which it had reached.
Again many American States are Members of the League. Not very long ago there was a dispute between two or those Members. If this Covenant, so amended as the Committee suggests, had been then in force, it would have been the duty of the Council to reach a unanimous decision and it would have been an obligation on every Member of the League to enforce that decision when once it was reached. When I remind your Lordships that the United States of America are not Members of the League and of the jealousy which the United States feel for the doctrine which they describe as the Monroe doctrine, it is not difficult to appreciate that that war, which all of us are accustomed to speak of as unthinkable, might easily be provoked by some unwise action by the Council of the League of Nations.
I can well understand that other nations may be quite content to accept these amendments because, whatever further obligation they put upon them, it is a very great advantage no doubt to the rest of the world if the British Navy can be used as a kind of policeman to enforce decisions which the Council of the League reaches and to enforce awards between two States with neither of whom we are directly concerned. It is natural enough that they should like to have our Navy as their weapon to enforce decisions against any recalcitrant State, but, when I look at it from the point of view
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of the interests of this country, then it seems to me that we are undertaking a very grave liability at the very time when we are reducing our capacity to discharge that liability. It will be said that Great Britain was represented at the Committee which has put forward these suggestions. It was represented by no less an authority than my noble and learned friend Lord Cecil.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: No. This was a Committee not of States but of individuals, and I was not representing the British Government on that Committee.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: I beg my noble friend's pardon. I did not mean to say he was there in a representative capacity, but that our country was represented by the presence upon that Committee of my noble friend. I am quite right in saying he was a member of the Committee and I am quite certain that, whether he went there as a representative of this country or in whatever capacity, he would bring to the discharge of his duties that great capacity which we have all learned to appreciate who have had the privilege of working with him. I am not speaking with any reservations at all when I say I have the very greatest admiration for his enthusiasm for the League of Nations. I hope also he will not think me discourteous when I suggest that it is just possible sometimes that his zeal may somewhat outrun his discretion.
It is not only I who am concerned about this. There is a body known as the Executive Committee of the League of Nations Union, which is certainly not lacking in enthusiasm for the League of Nations and all its works. Even that body, when it was called upon to consider these proposed amendments, thought it necessary to say that, although it generally approved them, it only did so on two conditions. The first was that none of the amendments should be made until a treaty for the reduction and limitation of armaments in pursuance of Article 8 of the Covenant has entered into force, a limitation of time which is at any rate postponing the amendments for a very considerable period. Secondly, that there should be a resolution of the Assembly to show that, in enforcing the powers of the Council under the Articles to which I have called attention, 11, 13

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and 15, the Council will not recommend any measure involving an act of war except against the party which has itself resorted to war. I quote that not as my opinion but as showing that even so enthusiastic a supporter of the League of Nations as the Executive Committee of that Union is unprepared to face the risk which in existing circumstances the acceptance of these amendments involves.
I am not asking your Lordships to-day—it would be unreasonable to do so—to pronounce a considered opinion upon the amendments which have probably not come to the attention of many members of this House until this afternoon. What I seek to do is to satisfy your Lordships, if I can, that the amendments are matters which raise questions of very grave importance for the future of this country and are amendments which ought not to be endorsed by this country until Parliament has had an opportunity of full discussion and of reaching a mature decision. That request is not met merely by saying: "Well, we shall approve the amendments, but of course they will not actually come into force until the Government action has been ratified by a vote of one or both Houses," because you do not in that event get what it is essential we should have—a free decision of Parliament on the merits. It will not, be possible to get that decision if the Government come down to the other House and say: "We have endorsed these amendments. This is our considered policy. We claim from you a vote of confidence in our action." There are some at any rate whose enthusiasm for the avoidance of a General Election is apt to outweigh their decision on the merits of any particular problem submitted for their consideration.
I do desire—and I ask your Lordships to say that it is right—that, before anything is done to commit this country in any way to approval of these amendments, the matter should be submitted to the unfettered judgment of Parliament. I think that would be right in respect of any Government, but I suggest to the noble Lords opposite that it is preeminently right in a case in which, as they themselves remind us from time to time, they represent only a minority of the nation and are anxious to regard Parliament as a Council of State and are yet in a position, as the Government of
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the day, to commit the country without the approval of the representatives of the country ever having been sought. I had hoped to ask, if this Motion had come earlier in the Session when I put it down, that an opportunity would be found for a debate before Prorogation, but that obviously is impossible to-day. Therefore, all I can ask, and do ask, to-day, is that the Government should undertake that they will do nothing at the forthcoming meeting in September at Geneva to commit this country to an acceptance of these amendments or to approval of these amendments, but that they shall take such steps as will ensure the postponement of a decision until Parliament has had an opportunity of expressing its unfettered judgment upon it. I am sorry to have taken so long but the matter is one which your Lordships will agree is of somewhat grave importance and, in the hope of eliciting some satisfactory assurance from the Government, I beg, to move the Motion standing in my name.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: My Lords, I have no wish to complain of the course my noble friend has taken. On the contrary, it is very desirable that all the proceedings connected with the League of Nations should be brought before Parliament and be explained as fully as it is possible to explain them. My complaint is not that too much attention is given to the matter in Parliament but that a good number of members of another place are perhaps not as familiar with the details of the League of Nations as is desirable in a matter of that importance.
I do not like speaking about myself, but may I explain exactly what is my position in this matter? I am not a member of the Government; I am not responsible for the policy that they pursue; but I have been very glad to do anything I can to assist the Government in connection with the League of Nations to the best of my ability. When the Assembly decided last September that thin matter should be examined by a Committee of the League, and the Council accordingly set up a Committee in which my name was included, I was very glad indeed to accept the duty of attending that Committee and assisting it as far as I was able to do, but I think it is important—that is why I ventured to in-

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terrupt my noble and learned friend—to make it quite clear that I was acting in an exclusively personal capacity. It was perfectly well understood, and reiterated over and over again in the proceedings of the Committee, that we were not a Government Committee in any respect, and that the Government were entirely free to take any action which they chose on receipt of the report of the Committee.
I do not want to be misunderstood. I approve of the conclusions in the report, and entirely support them. I think they were wise and judicious, and if it be proved that my discretion is not to be trusted in these matters, that is my misfortune. I can only represent to your Lordships the reasons which induced me to arrive at the conclusions I did, and it is for your Lordships to say whether you agree with those conclusions or not. My noble and learned friend in his Question makes three charges, and asks a question. He charges that the Committee went far beyond the purposes for which it was instituted. He charges that our decision materially alters the position of the Council, and it was on that point he most insisted. He charges also that, in consequence of that I suppose, it will increase the liability of this country. I will deal with those charges presently.
He also makes a request, and the request is that the Government shall not commit themselves at the coming Assembly at all, because they have not been in a position to take the opinion of Parliament upon the subject. I think that would be a very unusual position for any Government to adopt at the Assembly of the League of Nations. They go there as the executive of their various countries. The League of Nations is merely a means of negotiating great international matters, and at the Assembly they go there to negotiate these matters and express the views of their Governments upon these matters. In that respect it does not differ essentially from any other international conference, and of course the Government always goes to a conference with a perfectly free hand and does in fact commit itself, and commonly signs the document which issues from the conference without any reference to Parliament at all.
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My noble and learned friend, it seems to me, is enunciating quite a new doctrine, and a very serious change in the Constitution of this country, when he suggests that in a matter of this kind, in what is essentially an international negotiation, the Government should have its hands tied until it has previously asked the opinion of the two Houses of Parliament. I have the greatest possible respect for the two Houses of Parliament, but I have never thought it was right that they should discharge executive functions. Their business is first criticism and discussion, and secondly legislation, which is perhaps less important. Their business is not to direct the policy of the country, but to express their opinions and if necessary to turn out a Government which has not carried out what they think is a wise policy. Of course it is open to any member of either House to raise any question for discussion, and if he so desire to ask for the opinion of the House to which he belongs, but I deny that it is the duty of the Government to consult Parliament as to great executive acts until those executive acts have been completed. In old days, not so long ago, Parliament was not consulted before the ratification of a treaty. We have, I admit, made an innovation in the Constitution, and before the ratification of any important treaty Parliament or the House of Commons—there seems to be some dispute about which—has to be consulted. That is an innovation which has a certain convenience, but it is an innovation, and I hope the House will give no countenance to this novel doctrine that the Government is not entitled to discharge its executive duties up to the time when it has always been hitherto entitled to discharge them.
I pass from that particular proposal of my noble and learned friend to the charges which he makes. I trust your Lordships will forgive me if I venture to go into this with a little detail, because I am anxious to help your Lordships and have special means of information on this particular point. The matter arose in this way. At the Assembly last year the British Government brought before the Assembly a proposition that it was desirable to harmonise the Pact and the Covenant. That was supported by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secre-

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tary, and immediately received the warm support of all the principal nations assembled at Geneva. They all thought that it was an essentially undesirable thing that there should be two sets of international obligations into which Members of the League had entered, one setting in motion the machinery of the League, and the other the obligations under the Pact of Paris, which, as your Lordships know, has no machinery and no obligations behind it, beyond the moral obligations. Therefore, the Committee was set up and the plan which the Committee adopted, and which I think was the right one, was to try to insert the Pact into the Covenant. The effect of that would be, of course, to apply the machinery of the Covenant to the execution of the obligations of the Pact, and that will of course, if accepted, produce the result that there is only one document, which includes all the serious obligations of the Nations, and they will know with exact precision what their obligations are.
I am sure it is a most essential thing in all international affairs that you should know as far as possible, without ambiguity and uncertainty, what are your obligations. I believe that the great evils of the past, and many of the wars, have arisen because one did not know quite what the obligations of tile countries concerned were. Therefore, I am always strongly in favour of this policy, although the question of whether the actual time at which it was launched was right is another matter with which I do not wish to trouble your Lordships. There never was any doubt as to what the Committee was going to do in its main functions. The British Government proposed then and there specific amendments to the Covenant, and they were discussed by the Committee of the League; and in substance, as I think—I am not going to forget my noble and learned friend's contention about the Amendment to paragraph 6 of Article 15, though I do not agree with him: I am not going to try to evade that in any way—but in substance, as I shall contend, the proposals made by the British Government last September were those which were adopted by the Committee. There were certain changes which I shall explain to your Lordships in a moment, but in sub-
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stance that was what was done, and the broad object which was pursued was to take these obligations which we had entered into, and which we all desired to make a reality, from the Pact and put them into the Covenant, and say: "Now these obligations not to go to war are put on precisely the same footing as the other international obligations into which we have entered, also not to go to war." That was the broad principle, and I venture to think that was a perfectly sound principle, and one which ought to be adopted.
My noble friend objects—and he a little surprised me, I admit—that we have altered the consequences of the unanimous decision of the Council in a dispute submitted to it under Article 15. That was the main point that he presented. The argument that convinced me that we ought to do something of the kind, that we ought to proceed in that direction, was simply this, that it was a mistake to leave imperfect obligations hanging about, and as far as we could—we did not succeed altogether, as I shall have to explain in a moment—those obligations should be made clear and distinct. And I agree that that is right. My noble and learned friend seemed rather to suggest that there were a good many cases in which it would be desirable to leave an international deadlock without any means of settlement. I cannot think that is a good plan. It is quite true that, with respect to a very strong country, it may work pretty well at times. But I do not believe it is a good plan, taking the world over; and we must look at these matters not only as affecting our own convenience, but as affecting the peace of the world.
That is the really important thing, because, if the peace of the world is broken anywhere, it affects British interests at the most vital point. No one knows how far a breach of the peace may extend. The late War began with a quarrel in the extreme South-East corner of Europe, a quarrel which ex hypothesi no ore would have thought would involve the world; yet it spread and spread and spread until it involved not only practically the whole of Europe, but the greater part of America, and even of Asia. That is the characteristic of war, a characteristic perhaps more especially of modern war rather than of

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ancient war, but still the characteristic of war. Once it breaks out you do not know how far it is going to extend. And therefore in considering this subject I do beg your Lordships to look at it mainly, if not entirely, from this point of view. Do the provisions that we have recommended make the maintenance of peace more likely? That is the real test. If they do not, they are wrong; if they do, they are right. That is my submission to your Lordships. Now, that is why I do not like these deadlocks. It is quite true, you may have a deadlock lasting for many years, a dispute between two countries unsettled and hanging about. There was the dispute between us and France over the fisheries of Newfoundland, which lasted for nearly a century if I remember aright. But no one, I think, who has studied the diplomatic history of that period will doubt that it was a serious evil, and that every difference of opinion between us and France was more or less aggravated by this outlying and unsettled matter of dispute. It remains as a bit of poison which tends to make septic every wound in the international body politic.
For that reason I agreed, and still agree, that it was right to try, as far as we could, to provide for the settlement of disputes by pacific means. What is this great change that we are accused of having made in the functions of the Council? Under the Covenant as it stands the position is this. If there is a dispute between two parties which is likely to lead to a rupture of a dangerous character, And it comes before the Council under Article 15, then, if the Council makes a unanimous recommendation, which is in effect a unanimous decision as to what ought to be done in reference to that dispute, nobody is entitled to resist that decision by force of arms; and if they do, the whole apparatus of Article 16 applies. My noble friend says that that is not a decision, and that that does not involve the obligation on all parties to obey the decision. But just let him consider. In a number of cases it does involve a decision. Take the case of a dispute about a piece of territory. If the territory is given to one party, and, if it is already in his possession, the decision is final—absolutely final—because no one can take it from him without forcible action. If it is not in his possess-
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sion when the decision is made, I still think that, if he sends in officials to take over the territory—I am taking the Covenant as it stands—and they are resisted, that is resisting by force a decision of the Council, and involves all tile consequences of Article 16. That is my view very strongly as to the present position of the matter.
I think that the framers of the Covenant undoubtedly did mean that where the Council was unanimous its decision was to have, not complete but an incomplete force of a decision. I cannot say that I admire the particular provision that was made, because, as it seems to me, it leaves too much to the parties concerned. It leaves it a matter of doubt as to how far the party can go in trying to enforce the decision which he has obtained, and how far the other party is justified in resisting that decision. That is just the kind of ambiguity which seems to me likely to lead to trouble. I greatly prefer the idea that when you get to that decision it is not right for the Council to disinterest themselves in the matter. They ought to recommend what steps ought to be taken, and only those steps should be taken which are proper to the carrying out of the decision. There is nothing novel in it. They have got that power already under Article 13 with respect to any judicial decision that is given. It is their duty then to propose any step—the change in wording which we have made is a matter, I think, of no importance—but it is their business to propose any step.
What is it we have put into Article 15? My noble and learned friend, I think, did not read the actual words, but they are rather important. This is what we have said:—
"If a report by the Council is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof other than the representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League agree that they will comply with the recommendations of the Report. If the Council's recommendation is not carried out"—
what happens?—
"the Council shall propose suitable measures to give it effect."
The exact words which now apply—I doubt whether there is a verbatim change—in Article 13 with reference to a decision. They propose. That is what they are entitled to do. They cannot command. The Council never can com-

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mand, they can propose. It will represent no doubt a strong moral obligation on those who propose it to comply with their proposition. That will be so, whether you put these words in or not. Wherever the Council makes a proposal, there will be a strong moral obligation on all the Members of the League to comply. Here we say definitely that it is their business to propose it, and the importance of this is, not that it increases the power of the Council—I do not think it does—but that it does, so long as they comply with the terms of the Covenant, take it out of the power of individuals to take the law into their own hands. That is the real way, and the only way, in which you can establish a peaceful situation in the world.
I cannot help thinking that my noble and learned friend exaggerates enormously, if he will allow me to say so, the importance of the change that has been made in this respect. I do not think he had in his mind—perhaps I am wrong—the provisions of Article 11, as they now stand. Those provisions, I think, are much more valuable than those of Article 15. They have constantly been employed and they are much more likely to be employed. What does that Article say? It says:—
"Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may ho deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations."
No power could be more general and, as my noble and learned friend is doubtless aware, it was under that provision that measures were taken to prevent the Graeco-Bulgarian conflict. It has been employed on more than one occasion, and my noble and learned friend is probably aware that it has been recommended by the Assembly, and assented to by the British Government under the late Administration, that all sorts of measures short of actual war are to be open to the Council. That is the provision.
I cannot help thinking that the effect of the changes in Article 6 has been enormously exaggerated and, for the same reason, I am wholly unable to agree with my noble and learned friend that the general effect of what we have done is to increase the liabilities of this country. The general effect of what we
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have done has been, in my judgment, to increase the probability of the pacific settlement of disputes. That is the object to be aimed at. If disputes are settled pacifically, then no questions of sanctions or of war arise. The great thing is to keep your machinery for the pacific settlement of disputes as effective as you can.
I know the reply that is sometimes made, more or less openly. It is: "Why should we do than? We are very strong, we can settle our own disputes and, if anyone resists us, we can put pressure upon them to make them agree to our settlement." It is perfectly true that any agreement made by a strong Power that it will rely in future on pacific and not on warlike settlements does, to some extent, limit their action. But we have limited it absolutely by entering into the Pact of Paris. We have said quite definitely that vie will never resort to war—never!—in order to carry out a matter of national policy, and we have said quite specifically in the second Article that we will never seek to settle any dispute except by pacific means. We have abandoned that right, if it ever was a right that was worth having, and we have said that we are determined to settle everything by pacific means. The thing that is now really essential, as President Hoover has pointed out, is to provide the necessary machinery to make that general statement of our policy effective in the future and to carry out that policy.
My noble friend said: "You have not done that." He was quite right. We have left paragraph 7 of Article 15—that is to say we have left the case where the Council is not able to arrive at a unanimous decision. We have said that, in that case, all that we can recommend is that the Council will take every measure they can to bring about a peaceful settlement, and we have suggested, among other things, that they may consult the Court of Justice. That is all that we can do. But we also said in the report that we felt that this was a very unsatisfactory solution, and that the only really satisfactory solution was to establish a complete system of arbitration applying to all disputes. When I speak of arbitration, I am using the word in the widest sense. We recommended what was called a general act, not because it is a perfect instru-

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ment in itself, but because it does in fact provide for the complete settlement of all disputes.
That is the defence that I make to your Lordships. I think we have promoted the peaceful settlement of disputes, and I was a little sorry, if my noble and learned friend will forgive my saying so, that he thought it right to indulge in the old—I was going to say clap trap, but that would be a very unfair observation to make about anything that falls from my noble and learned friend—about the British Navy. After all, what is the function of the British Navy, laid dawn by every authority that has ever existed? The function of the British Navy is to preserve peace. That is the function of the British Navy. It is the only reason we keep it up, the only object we have in view—to preserve the peace of this country and of the world. It has constantly been used for that purpose. It was used the other day when they sent two ships to Alexandria because they thought there was a danger of a breach of the peace.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: To discharge our obligations.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: Certainly, but our obligation, our duty, our right and our interest is to preserve the peace all over the world. We have constantly used the Navy for that purpose, and I hope that we shall continue to use it for that purpose. The first business of the British Government in foreign affairs is to preserve peace, and I certainly think that we cannot use the Navy in a more economical way or in a way more in accordance with the interests of this country than in using it for the preservation of peace. That is the view that I take about the function of the British Navy.
I am sorry to have detained your Lordships, and I have only one further observation to make. My noble and learned friend was good enough to refer to a resolution of the Executive Committee of the League of Nations. As I was going to do the same, I am very glad that he did so. What does this resolution say? It says that the Committee—
"are of opinion that it is desirable so to amend the Covenant as to bring it into
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harmony with the Pact of Paris. They recognise that this can only be done by international agreement"—
that is to say, you cannot have it all your own way—
"and they support the proposed amendments"—
with a little exception which does not affect our discussion—
"….as a reasonable compromise on two conditions. In the first place, they think that no alteration in the existing provision, of the Covenant should be made until a treaty for the reduction and limitation of armaments in pursuance of Article 8 has entered into force; and in the second, that it should be made clear by a resolution of the Assembly that, while the Council must have discretion as to bow it should exercise its powers under Articles 11, 13 and 15, it should be understood that it will not recommend measures involving acts of war except against a party which has itself resorted to war. If these conditions are fulfilled, the Executive Committee, while recognising that the ambit of Article 16 will be in principle extended, yet are of opinion that the guarantees of peace will on the whole be increased."
I was a party to that resolution. I warmly support it and I think it is right. I think that no great changes in the relations of countries dealing with security ought to be made until we have disarmament established. I think that this is a very important principle.
I do not know at all what the Government will do, but I hope that they will act upon that principle, because, if I may venture to say so, I think, as I have always thought, that, while the Locarno Treaties were admirable in themselves, their one great difficulty was that they were not dependent upon the disarmament of the parties concerned. I want to say only one word more. That resolution which I have read was issued by a Committee, and on that Committee sat the following people: Lord Lothian, Mrs. Dugdale, Miss Courtney, who was a very well-known Pacifist; Mr. Hudson, who was a Conservative member of Parliament; Mr. Worsley, a well-known Liberal; Mr. Rennie Smith, a Labour Member of Parliament; Sir Thomas Inskip, Mr. Wynch, a Conservative; and Major Walter Elliot. They unanimously agreed to that resolution, which was presented to the Executive Committee and passed unanimously by them, so that if I have sinned I have at any rate sinned in fairly good company.
THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN: My Lords, I should like to support the proposition which has fallen from the mover of this Motion. It is of extreme importance that the amendments of the Covenant which have been proposed by this Committee should be brought before the full consideration of Parliament before they are adopted, and I am inclined to agree with my noble friend Lord Cecil, who has just spoken, that it is impossible for any Government to go to an international conference with its hands bound. At the same time, I think any Government attending an international conference or League of Nations meeting should make it clear that it is by no means confident that it can secure the ratification of an important treaty and should not arouse expectations in the fellow members of that conference that because it has given its assent, as usually happens in Great Britain, that assent is tantamount to ratification.
I do not propose to follow the legal arguments which the two noble Lords who have preceded me have gone into, but the amendments are after all of considerable importance. They introduce in the first place, for the first time, the principle of compulsory arbitration. I do not express any opinion as to whether compulsory arbitration is or is not a step which it is possible to take to-day in the defence of world peace, but it is a principle of enormous importance, and it should only be adopted, it seems to me, by Parliament after very mature consideration, and when Parliament has had a full opportunity of saying yes or no to any proposal which is made. In the second place, these amendments introduce the principle of coercion for policy. As I understand it, hitherto the League of Nations has rested on the very sound principle that it is an institution which brought the parties together and acted in a mediating capacity, but stood behind those mediatory activities in this sense, that they would take common coercive action against any nation which tried to settle a dispute by war in its own interests. That I think is a sound principle, and I stand here heartily behind Article 16—the coercive article in the League Covenant.
But this is introducing another principle, which is that coercion should be used for the decisions of the League
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when they are arrived at by unanimity. That is another very important principle which, in my view, should only be adopted after full deliberation by Parliament, and when you have made certain that the public opinion of the world has realised what you are doing, because in these international matters almost everything depends upon treaties having behind them the conscious and willing assent not merely of Governments or officials, but of public opinion. Then there is a third element in the amendments which I think is of considerable consequence. That is Article 16. While the amendments do not deal with Article 16 specifically, they alter the effect of Article 16 in a very important manner. Article 16 provides:—
"Should any member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13 and 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial, or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not."
That Article at present only comes into force as against a nation which does not submit its dispute to investigation by the League for a period of six months, and awaits a further three months before it resorts to war. If it goes through that procedure it is at the end of that time free to go to war, and the nations are not bound to take military action against it. Under the Article as amended the Members of the League of Nations will be content to take economic sanctions against it whenever any nation goes to war at any time under any circumstances. That, in my humble judgment, is a change of very considerable significance.
How are you to define what is a war? There is a considerable difference between saying you will take action against a nation which declines to submit to investigation, and saying that in any circumstances you bind yourself entirely to take these very strong measures against a nation which is guilty of a technical act of war. That also, I think, is a matter which requires most earnest consideration before it is actually

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adopted by any country, especially in view of the fact that the greatest Naval Power of the world is not a party to the League of Nations. It is a matter which I think must be considered not merely as part of the machinery of the League, but in relation to the world which is not wholly in membership of the League. Therefore I would urge upon the Government, if I may do so, that it is extremely important, in discussing this matter, they should make it clear that Parliament shall have a full and unfettered opportunity, as I am sure it will, of discussing this matter, and that, not being in a majority in this Parliament, they cannot assure fellow Members that the treaty will be ratified because it is assented to by them.
There is one other comment which has not yet been made in this House about the alterations. The alterations were made in order to bring the Covenant into line with the Pact of Paris. The Pact of Paris is already in effect, and all the Members of the League of Nations, except certain States in South America, have already renounced war. Therefore, by undertaking these particular obligations, they are doing nothing to add to the security against war. In so far as the Pact of Paris itself is concerned, they have renounced war, and they have no right to-day to exercise that residuary right to war which they did possess, and had possessed under the unamended power. They have renounced that power, and, therefore, by amending the Covenant, they do not add anything to the security against war so far as the Pact of Paris is concerned. The real significance of these amendments is in the additional changes which I have just mentioned—the introduction of the principle of compulsory arbitration, of coercion for policy, and of some extension of Article 16. Those are changes of real significance, the Pact of Paris already having done what the amendments purport to do in other respects.
One final word on the resolution of the League of Nations Union about disarmament. I am a party to that resolution, and I stand by it. The significance which I attach to disarmament is this. Just as people used to say that war was an instrument of policy, so I think that disarmament is the consequence of policy. You have in the League of Nations, you
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have in the Pact of Paris, you have in the Locarno Treaties, instruments of a novel character of great importance for solving the problems of Europe. If these instruments, which in my judgment are adequate to-day for that purpose, are working effectively the result will be seen in the reduction of armaments. If you are going to secure a reduction of armaments it will be because you have begun to bring some conciliation into the acute difficulties which now exist in Eastern Europe; because you will have begun to reduce the friction which now exists between France and Italy; because you have begun to bring some spirit of reconciliation into the Balkans. It was suggested only the other day that mattes in dispute between Italy and France should be brought before the League of Nations. That suggestion was bitterly resented in both countries, as I understand. How is it possible to conceive that you are going to solve these questions, which really affect the peace of the world, by introducing any element of compulsion? It seems to me that we are in these amendments pursuing the shadow rather than the reality.
The reality is that the nations of Europe should, if necessary, make such adjustments as are fair to treaties which are really unjust and begin to get into friendly relations with each other, and then disarm. If you make that step forward you may make these amendments something worth considering. If you do not do that, you are endangering, I think, the authority of the League of Nations by adding to its technical clauses. You must first change the spirit within, without which no peace can really exist. There is a well known quotation of Bacon which I would like to quote to your Lordships, because it seems to me to have a bearing on the question. Bacon wrote many years ago: "It is good not to try experiments in States except the necessity be urgent and the utility be evident."
LORD PARMOOR: My Lords, I think this is the first time that this House has had the pleasure and privilege of hearing a speech from the noble Marquess who has just spoken. Let me very heartily congratulate him, if I may, on behalf of the House, on the speech he has made. I am sure we shall hope that he will speak often, particularly on topics in connection with the League of Nations,

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because we know from what he has written and what he has done that he is really one of the great authorities on international matters. He urgently desires what most internationalists desire—that is, to promote in every possible way the peace of the world. It may be that there is difference of opinion as to the best way of promoting that peace. I am one of those who regard peace as never secure unless we get a measure of disarmament, which is one of the obligations of the Covenant of the League. But whatever difference of opinion we may have—I do not know that there is any difference of opinion on that point—I am sure we shall always welcome the contributions of the noble Marquess on this subject, and at any rate in principle I think we shall always substantially agree with him.
May I now go back from what he has said to the question asked me as representative of the Government as to what is the attitude of the Government towards the proposed amendments of the Covenant at Geneva? I think. I have put that question rightly. The answer, I think, has already been adumbrated by the noble Viscount, Lord Cecil. I think the answer is quite clear. So long as a Government is in power, so long as is entrusted with the safeguarding of our country and Empire, it must as a matter of primary duty perform the functions of Government and not be afraid to act up to its true and complete view of what the needs and interests of the Empire and the country may require. That has been a fundamental proposition as far as I know from the early stages of representative or any other government in this country. Executive powers are exercised by the Government as part of the Prerogative of the King. The function of Parliament, as has been pointed out, is an entirely different one. We could not, and ought not, to avoid our responsibilities at Geneva. But before ratification—which is the second step, making what we do at Geneva effective—we shall in this case, as we have in all other cases, consult the opinion of the House of Commons. Not only is that the modern method—before ratification, not before signature—
VISCOUNT BRENTFORD: Does the noble and learned Lord mean to lay that down at all times, that he will consult
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the House of Commons, not this House? It is a most important statement.
LORD PARMOOR: I should not have thought there was any reason to interrupt me on that point. There is this difference, a very great difference, that if the Government on a matter of this kind found itself not in accord with the House of Commons it would be contrary to constitutional usage to try to conduct further the government of the country. That is quite clear as a constitutional principle which has been known for a long time. That is not the case as far as this House is concerned. So far as this House is concerned, it has not the power of altering the Government which the House of Commons has, because no Government can proceed without the consent of the House of Commons on which it really depends for its daily life. There can be no doubt whatever on that point. I am sure that any one who has studied constitutional principles would—at least I hope any one would—agree with me. As an executive act as regards treaties—and this is in the character of a treaty—the Government has, in theory, absolute power. But as a matter of practice—and I think convenient practice, and practice in accordance with the reality of government as carried on in this country—treaties of this character are submitted before ratification to the House of Commons.
The reasons which make that right in regard to the House of Commons really do not apply to submitting such Resolutions to the House of Lords. It is no derogation of the position of this House at all. We are not the House of Commons, we have not got the power of the House of Commons. Certainly it has been the practice of the present Government to bring everything it possibly can before your Lordships' House, but to say that where no Act is required and where the question is simply one of ratification of a treaty, the Government should bring the matter before this House would be entirely out of accord with constitutional practice. We have no power in this House which would make a practice of that kind really effective. Therefore, the first answer I have to make to the noble and learned Viscount opposite is—but perhaps I had better read the words of his Question so as to make it quite complete. He asks—

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"whether His Majesty's Government will undertake to submit the proposed amendments to Parliament"—
I do not know whether he means both Houses there.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: Quite obviously. The meaning of the word "Parliament" is perfectly well known.
LORD PARMOOR: I am not disputing that, but it has been disputed even by the successors of the noble and learned Viscount in legal office.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: It is because I was so shocked by that knowledge that I thought I would make it quite clear.
LORD PARMOOR: The noble and Viscount is quite justified in his astonishment. It only shows, what astonishes some people, that the best lawyers are not in accord upon what ought to be a very simple constitutional question. If I may resume reading the Question:—
"—to submit the proposed amendments to Parliament before giving them any acceptance or support on behalf of this country."
We do not intend to submit any arrangement made at Geneva to this House. We do intend to submit it to the House of Commons before ratification. I do not know whether the noble Viscount will differ again on the legal point. That is the constitutional practice and constitutional duty at any rate in recent years.
Leaving that point, I want to go to the other point which the noble Viscount raised. I do not want to travel over the ground which the noble Viscount, Lord Cecil, has already so ably traversed. It is sufficient to say that I agree with him on his construction of the various Articles of the Covenant which he has already explained so clearly to your Lordships. Let me say what it is that we are about here. We are about bringing into correspondence the terms of the Pact and the terms of the Covenant. What are the terms of the Pact? They indicate really what is the necessity at the present time for the suggestions which are being made. We all know the first Article of the Pact. It is that:
"The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare, in the names of their respective peoples, that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another."
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The words there are extremely strong. They not only renounce it, but they "renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another." But that goes, admittedly and undoubtedly, beyond the terms of the Covenant.
There is, no doubt, the statement in the Preamble of the Covenant about renouncing resort to war. But when that Preamble is taken in connection with the subsequent Articles to which reference has already been made in this debate, it is seen that by no construction can it be said that the Covenant per se in all eases renounces war as an instrument of national policy in the relations of countries one with another. The first series of amendments proposed has the object of bringing the Covenant into correspondence with the Pact upon this point. We want the Covenant to say, as the Pact has said, that for the solution of international controversies countries shall renounce war as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another. I think it is sometimes said in too narrow a sense that you have conditions of war or conditions of peace. They do not spring up spontaneously. The conditions which lead to war and make war are the result of national policy. Just as in the past—end this has been the curse of Europe and other places—the organisation of international policy on a war basis has led to a number of cruel and devastating wars; so at any rate our view is (it is the view of the Government) that by organising a system based on peace and not a system based on war you will be able under the new national policy to avoid the risks of war which exist at the present time.
Really it comes back very largely in my opinion, to this. Do we want in all cases, or even not in all cases but as widely as possible, to have war renounced as a basis of international policy? I think that the one great advance in modern times has been the advance in that direction under the authority and assistance of the League. I should like to say a word further on that point which I do not think is always understood. The League constitutes an agreement, a very far-reaching agreement between the parties who have signed its terms. It is about the most solemn treaty that has

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ever been made in the history of mankind, so far as I know. The result is that we have given up, and have rightly given up, certain powers which we exercised by international right in the past, in order to enter into a relationship of mutual obligation that we might deal with one another, not on a war organisation but on the basis of a peace policy. That, I think, is one of the greatest advances that has ever been made in the history of mankind. Even as it stands it covers an enormously large field. I think the noble Viscount realises that. But it does not cover a quite wide enough field, and the object and purpose of the proposals we are now considering is that its character as assisting peace as in opposition to war can be further utilised and should be further utilised for the good of all mankind.
The second step, Article II of the Pact of Paris, is almost more important for our present purpose, and this is where, I think, I differ very particularly from the noble Viscount: It provides that when these disputes arise the solution "shall never be sought except by pacific means." No one has spoken mere strongly of the meaning of words of that kind than Mr. Baldwin and others on various occasions. I do not want to quote particular names because I do not think that anyone will get up now and deny the enormous importance of the Kellogg Pact, the Pact of Paris—that in future the solution of international difficulties shall never be sought except by pacific means. Is there any member of your Lordships' House who would controvert the value and importance of that proposition? The difficulty has been that although they can never be settled according to the terms of the Pact except by pacific means, no pacific means are indicated by which the policy of justice—which is what is meant by that pacific settlement—can be substituted for the policy of war.
The other amendments to which the noble Viscount, Lord Cecil, has referred are all to extend and extend largely, as the noble Marquess has pointed out, a method and scheme of pacific means by which these international difficulties can be solved without resort to war. I am one of those who feel strongly that unless you have a pacific means so as to get
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a just solution as between persons in disagreement you are only half way on your journey. It is a terrible mistake, in my view, merely to take the negative side. You must go beyond that. You must say: "You must not go to war when you can have the justice of an impartial decision which is open to you or to your adversary as the case may be, where the matter can be settled on the basis of the terms of justice." Justice, as I use the term, means the impartial decision of a third party. There is no other way of making certain you have a just result. I should like to ask the noble Viscount opposite whether he does not think that the pacific means to which reference is made in Article II of the Pact ought not to be formulated so that they can be used as a practical method if you are dealing with one another on a friendly and peace basis?
That is the whole matter. It has been pointed out by my noble friend Lord Cecil that there is nothing new in principle in these suggestions that have been made. What is new is that they extend over an area which has been often referred to as the "gap in the Covenant." Is that not right? What can be done by the Council, to width the noble Viscount referred, does not seem very terrible, on the one hand, but seems, on the other hand, a method of reaching a solution by pacific means. If the Council is unanimous then they can take such measures as they may deem necessary in order to bring about a solution of the difficulty. I have not the exact words by me, but I think those are they and they are exactly the same words that you find in Article 13 while you find very similar words in Article 11. Why not? Do we want international peace or not? Do you want disarmament in the terms of a covenant or not? If so, you must have security and how can you not have security when you not only negative the possibility of war, if you can, but also have a tribunal by which difficulties, instead of being settled by force, can be settled on the ordinary basis of justice?
That really, after all, is the whole matter. I understand the noble Viscount to say that there are areas in which he desires the war principle still to be maintained. That is wrong. For the good of mankind war should be limited in every possible way. I do not believe that

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under these resolutions, if they are carried, war would be a practical method likely to be resorted to in the future. I cannot say it is absolutely eliminated because to eliminate war you must have disarmament and must obey the obligations, the obligations of honour I would call them, which you have already assumed under Article 8 of the Covenant. I think that is the answer to the noble Viscount's third Question.
There are two other specific Questions. The first is—
"To ask His Majesty's Government whether their attention has been directed to the amendments to the Covenant of the League of Nations proposed by the Committee appointed to bring the provisions of the Covenant into harmony with the Pact of Paris."
Of course their attention has been so directed. They have been very carefully considered and my noble friend Lord Cecil has pointed out the extent to which they have been approved. Secondly, he asks—
"whether His Majesty's Government are aware that the amendments proposed by the Committee go far beyond the purposes for which the Committee was appointed."
We are certainly not aware of that. In my view they have not gone anywhere beyond the purpose for which the Committee was appointed—namely, reconciling the Pact and the Covenant.
The Question goes on:—
"and would (if adopted)"—
—these perhaps are more material words—
"materially alter the position and powers of the Council of the League and largely increase the liabilities of this country."
They would alter in the right way the position and powers of the League. I do not think, nor does the Government think, that they would largely increase the liabilities of this country. The more peace you can obtain, the more you can have the spread of a peaceful principle, the less are the liabilities of this country than when every international dispute was referred to the arbitrament of force. I cannot expect the noble Viscount will agree with me, but I hope I have answered his Questions and that he will appreciate that those, like Lord Cecil and others, who do not take his view are quite as sure and quite as anxious as he is, by the promotion of peace, to diminish the liabilities of this country in the
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direction of war, and to make us what we ought to be, the missionaries of peace in every part of the world.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, if my Motion has served no other useful purpose it has, at any rate, provoked a maiden speech from my noble friend Lord Lothian, to which I am sure everybody on this side of the House, equally with the other, has listened with pleasure, and we hope that he will join our debates more often in future. That, I am afraid, is the limit of the satisfaction which I am able to obtain from the debate. The noble Lord, Lord Cecil, and the noble Lord who has just spoken denounced the suggestion that Parliament ought to be consulted beforehand as being a dangerous innovation in our Constitution. We realise then what humbug the Prime Minister was talking when he said that, as a Minority Government, he desired that Parliament should assume the functions of a Council of State and should be called into consultation. We realise now that he was what would be called in another place "talking through his hat," and that what he really means is that the Government are going to act without consulting Parliament and then confront Parliament with the alternative of turning them out or else of accepting an act of which the House may profoundly disapprove. It would not cause me any compunction to turn them out at the earliest possible moment. Unfortunately, there may be those who see things in a contrary direction and it is very unfortunate that a course should be adopted by the Government which must have the result, and apparently is designed to have the result, of ensuring that Parliament shall pronounce, not on the merits of the proposal, but only on the merits of the Government.
The noble Lord who has just spoken said the question was: "Do we want to renounce war?" Of course that is not the question. We all want to avoid war. The question is whether these particular proposals are designed to avoid war or not. At any rate it is arguable that an amendment of the Covenant, the effect of which is to impose on every Member of the League an obligation to resort to war in circumstances in which it is not now bound, is not a means of avoiding war. It is a funny way of avoiding war by making a number of people solemnly agree that

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they will go to war under conditions under which they are not now bound to do so.
My noble friend Lord Cecil said one thing which a little surprised me when he said that under the existing provisions of Article 15, as he read them, all parties to a dispute were already bound to accept and comply with a unanimous report of the Council. I am surprised at that. Not only because it is not my reading of the Article, which is perhaps a matter of comparatively minor importance, but because I see stated in the report of the Committee of which the noble Lord was a distinguished member, dealing with this proposed amendment, that paragraph 6, on the other hand, gave some degree of force to a report of the Council which was unanimously adopted but the parties to the dispute were not obliged to comply with the report. I entirely agree with that view but, of course, it is the exact opposite of the view which the noble Viscount has stated to your Lordships' House. It only shows how important it is that the matter should be further considered before the nation and the country are committed to it.
The noble Lord opposite has said that he desired to see compulsory arbitration in all cases, which he refers to as synonymous with justice. I profoundly disagree with him. I think that arbitration in arbitral matters in matters of judicial decision is an eminently desirable thing; but I think that compulsory arbitration by a body of twelve representatives of nations, in matters which may have no judicial element in them at all—matters merely of policy—is a very dangerous innovation. And when we go further and we find that when this arbitration is embarked upon nobody can tell whether the result will be to produce a binding or non-binding report, then I do not think we get that degree of certainty to which the noble Lord attached importance. It is said that there were very distinguished members on the Executive Committee which gave the decision to which I have called attention. It is because the attention of some of those members of the Committee was drawn to the very
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grave consequences which these proposed amendments involve that I was invited to look into the matter, and it was with their approval and agreement that I made the Motion which I have brought before this House.
Then I was accused of talking claptrap about the Navy, because I pointed out that in my judgment, while it might be desirable for other people to use our Navy to enforce an award which they had obtained, it was not the function of cur Navy, and it was not a position in which I should desire our Navy to be placed. The noble Lord said that our Navy was intended to protect British interests, and that the preservation of the peace of the world is a British interest. Of course it is, but to use our Navy to involve us in quarrels with which we have no immediate concern is not in my opinion the best way to promote or preserve the peace of the world, especially when I remember the character of the disputes in which we may be involved. Then Lord Cecil reminded us how the last War broke out through a conflagration in a remote part of Europe, but one reason for others getting involved in it was the number of entangling agreements which involved other people who had no concern in the original trouble, and resulted in their being dragged into the conflict. Therefore I am not sure that it is an argument in favour of the amendments.
I do not desire to say anything more, except this, that the noble Lord has told your Lordships that if, and when, they have signified their approval of these amendments they are going to bring the question before the House of Commons, but do not intend to bring it before your Lordships' House. I do not desire to enter into the constitutional question there raised, but I would like to point out to noble Lords opposite that if they persist in that attitude there are other means by which the matter can be brought before this House, whether they wish it or not. Having made those observations, I have at least elicited some statement of the view of the Government, and I do not wish to persist in my Motion for Papers. I ask leave to withdraw my Motion.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

BENEFICES (TRANSFER OF RIGHTS OF PATRONAGE) MEASURE, 1930.
VISCOUNT BRENTFORD VISCOUNT BRENTFORD moved to resolve, That in accordance with the Church of England Assembly (Powers) Act, 1919, this House do direct that the Benefices (Transfer of Rights of Patronage) Measure, 1930, be presented to His Majesty for the Royal Assent. The noble Viscount said: My Lords, the Motion that I have to move you will perhaps realise would have been moved by the Archbishop had the most rev. Primate been able to be here, but as I happen to be a member of the Church Assembly I would like to ask you to assent to the Measure. It is a very small one, and it is in consequence of a previous Measure passed in 1923, limiting the sale of patronage of church livings. As your Lordships know, up to quite recently the patronage of livings could be sold like any other property. In 1923 a Measure was passed limiting the sale to the next two vacancies, after which the sale of a living is no longer permitted. One effect of that Measure seems to have been that there has been a rather more prolific trade in livings, doubtless because people have thought desirable to buy them and patrons have thought it desirable to sell them while they can do so.
That being so, the Church Assembly has considered whether the sale of livings should not be made a little more public. Of course the gravamen of this Measure is that at the present time the sale of a living can take place privately, and the people of the parish have no knowledge whatever who is going to buy the living, or what class of clergyman is likely to be appointed to the next vacancy. This Measure, therefore, proposes quite simply that if a patron desires to sell a living he shall notify to the Bishop his intention to do so. Secondly, he shall give the name and address of the proposed transferee, and also particulars of the terms of the proposed transfer. Then notice has to be given to the churchwardens and to the secretary of the parochial church council as to the proposed sale, and such notice shall give particulars of the proposed transfer and invite objections, if any, from the parochial church council.
There is no further restriction on the right of the patron to sell. The Bishop
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may communicate with the patron and persuade him not to sell to a particular person, or persuade him to leave the matter in his own hands, or to hand the living over to a diocesan trust, but there is no further restriction on the right of the patron. It is merely desired to make public the fact that the living is proposed to be sold, in order that the parochial church council should be able to express their views and place such influence upon the patron as they may properly do. In no other way is the right of the patron to deal with his property interfered with. It is desired very much that this Measure should get through before Parliament rises, and in those circumstances I beg to move the Motion in my name.
Moved to resolve, That in accordance with the Church of England Assembly (Powers) Act, 1919, this House do direct that the Benefices (Transfer of Rights of Patronage) Measure, 1930, be presented to His Majesty for the Royal Assent.—(Viscount Brentford.)
THE LORD BISHOP OF NORWICH: My Lords, I think it is proper that a word should be spoken from the Episcopal Bench in favour of this Measure, even if the main thing is to thank the noble Viscount for coming to the rescue of the Bishops when they are extremely busy in another direction. The noble Viscount has succinctly expressed the origin and intention of this little Measure. I have always considered that the Measure to which he referred, of a few years ago, was a remarkable testimony to the growth of public opinion in this country with reference to the duties of the Church. I think not many years ago it might have been thought improper for Parliament to assent to a Measure which made it impossible to sell art advowson after the next two vacancies. As the noble Viscount has already explained, it has led to a number of patrons using the opportunity, while they had it, of disposing of their property while it has monetary value. This Measure does nothing to prevent any such procedure, but it merely makes the proceedings public. Indeed, it has no sanction whatever, and any patron can proceed in his intention if he fails to be persuaded by the words of the Bishop, or intends to go through with it.

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The only criticism that might be made against the Measure is that it is hardly worth passing it if it really does nothing. But the truth is that, first of all, it makes it plain in the parishes that the parishioners are at least recognised in an advowson. At the present moment the parishioners may say: "No one knows, and no one cares what becomes of us." This little Measure encourages the parishioners to know that the Church at large does care at least to see and examine what is going on. The other thing that it does is this. It may have no sanction that can be enforced, but it does bring to bear public opinion upon the matter. Any transaction that was inherently undesirable, or any transaction of which the buyer or seller might be ashamed, would probably be checked if this Measure were in existence, because of the publicity that it gives to the whole transaction. I hope that your Lordships will see no objection to accepting this Measure.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

HOUSE OF LORDS OFFICES.
Order of the day read for the consideration of the Sixth Report from the Select Committee.
The Committee reported as follows:—
1. OFFICIAL RESIDENCE OF YEOMAN USHER OF THE BLACK ROD.
The Committee considered an application with regard to some change in the official residence of the Yeoman Usher of the Black Rod. The further consideration of the matter was adjourned.
2. CLERK IN THE LORD CHAMBERLAIN'S OFFICE.
The Committee sanctioned an increase of pay of £50 a year to Captain G. J. W. Townsend, M.B.E., Clerk in the office of the Lord Great Chamberlain, to date from the 1st of April, 1931.
3. APPOINTMENT OF JUNIOR CLERICAL ASSISTANT.
The Clerk of the Parliaments informed the Committee that he had appointed Miss A. N. Phipps to fill the vacancy caused by the resignation of Miss D. C. Hood.
4. FEE FUND.
The Clerk of the Parliaments submitted to the Committee a recommendation from the Treasury contained in a letter dated 3rd July, 1930, of which the relevant portion is as follows:—
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"As regards the Fee Fund, My Lords suggest for the consideration of the House of Lords Offices Committee that fees in future should be credited, as and when received, direct to the Vote as appropriation in aid in accordance with the normal procedure and that the pensions, etc., which under existing arrangements are paid from the Fee Fund, should be charged to and paid from a subhead of the Vote. The Fee Fund under this arrangement would cease to exist, the capital accumulation being surrendered to the Exchequer.
My Lords wish to make it clear that in suggesting the disappearance of the Fee Fund They are not proposing any alteration in the existing method of awarding pensions. These would continue to be awarded precisely as at present. The change would affect merely the procedure for payment, after an award has been made.
My Lords are aware that when a similar suggestion was put forward in 1869, objection was taken by the House of Lords Offices Committee on the ground that the Fee Fund arrangement affords some additional security in the matter of pensions. Whatever validity may have attached to this objection in 1869 would appear to My Lords to have long since passed away. It is relevant to point out that the change proposed would, in the matter of the provision of the necessary funds, place pensions, etc., on the same basis as salaries and remuneration. The latter are clearly of no less importance than pensions to the House of Lords Offices Committee and My Lords anticipate that the system which for upwards of half a century has proved satisfactory to the Committee in the matter of salaries and remuneration would prove equally satisfactory in the matter of pensions."
The Committee resolved that the Clerk of the Parliaments be authorised to take the necessary steps in consultation with the Treasury and Exchequer and Audit Department to give effect to the suggestions in Treasury Letter of 3rd July, 1930, on the subject of the Fee Fund and Security Monies.
THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE: My Lords, I beg to move that this Report be now considered and adopted.
Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.

PUBLIC WORKS FACILITIES BILL.
Order of the Day for the House to be put into Committee read.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly:
[The EARL OF DONOUGHMORE in the Chair.]
Clause 1:
Procedure for conferring on local authorities and statutory undertakers power to execute works.
1.—(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, any powers required by a local authority or by statutory undertakers for the purpose of enabling them to execute works which will contribute to the relief of unemployment may be conferred on them by an order made in accordance with the provisions of this section, and any such order may contain any provisions which might have been contained in a local Act.
(6) Where any such inquiry is directed to be held, the inquiry shall be held at such place as may be determined by the appropriate Minister by a tribunal consisting of one or more persons nominated by him (not being persons having any interest in the subject matter of the inquiry), and the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act, 1921, shall apply to the tribunal as if the tribunal had been established and that Act had been applied thereto in manner provided by that Act; and the tribunal shall, as soon as may be after holding the inquiry, make a report to the Minister recommending whether the order should be proceeded with and, if proceeded with, what modifications, if any, should, in the opinion of the tribunal, be made in the draft order.
The costs incurred by any tribunal in relation to any such inquiry with respect to a draft order (including the remuneration of any member of the tribunal) shall, save in so far as the whole or any part thereof may be ordered by the Minister to be paid by any person whose objection he adjudges, after considering the report, to have been frivolous, be paid by the local authority or statutory undertakers by whom the draft order was submitted to the Minister, and the Minister may certify the amount of the costs so payable by any person, authority or undertakers, and any sum so certified shall be a debt to the Crown from that person, authority or undertakers, as the case may be.
THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY OF THE MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT (LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE)THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY OF THE MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT (LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE) moved, in subsection (1), to leave out "an order made" and to insert "a scheme made, and confirmed by Parliament." The noble Lord said: On this first Amendment I perhaps might explain that it is felt there is a risk to the procedure under the Bill as it stands of its being confused with the procedure of Provisional Orders under the Public Health
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Act, 1875, and other Public General Acts. It is therefore proposed by this Amendment and later Amendments that a draft scheme should be submitted to the appropriate Minister instead of a draft order, and that the Confirmation Bill should be one to confirm a scheme instead of an order. A great number of Amendments are consequential on this change.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 10, leave out ("an order made") and insert the said words.—(Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE: There are now a number of Amendments which are consequential or drafting.
Amendments moved—
Page 1, line 12, leave out ("order") and insert ("scheme")
Page 1, line 16, leave out ("an order") and insert ("a scheme")
Page 2, line 2, leave out ("order") and insert ("scheme")
Page 2, line 10, leave out ("order") and insert ("scheme")
Page 2, line 15, leave out ("an order") and insert ("a scheme")
Page 2, line 18, leave out ("order") and insert ("scheme")
Page 2, line 26, leave out from ("section") to the end of the subsection and insert ("make the scheme and submit it for confirmation by Parliament")
Page 2, line 29, leave out ("An order") and insert ("A scheme")
Page 2, line 33, leave out ("order") and insert ("scheme")
Page 2, line 36, leave out ("an order") and insert ("a scheme")
Page 2, line 37, leave out ("laying the draft order before Parliament") and insert ("making the scheme")
Page 2, line 40, leave out ("order") and insert ("scheme")
Page 3, line 9, leave out ("order") and insert ("scheme")
Page 3, line 13, leave out ("order") and insert ("scheme")
Page 3, line 25, leave out from ("he") to ("his") in line 26, and insert ("submits the scheme for confirmation by Parliament, also lay before Parliament")
Page 3, line 30, leave out ("laying before Parliament any draft order") and insert ("making any scheme")
Page 3, line 32, leave out ("thereto") and insert ("to the draft thereof")
Page 3, line 33, leave out ("order") and insert ("scheme")
Page 3, line 34, leave out ("lay the draft order before Parliament") and insert ("make the scheme")
Page 3, line 39, leave out ("appropriate").—(Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede.)
On Question, Amendments agreed to.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM VISCOUNT HAILSHAM moved, in subsection (6), to leave out "one or more persons nominated by him," anti to insert "three persons, one of whom shall be a member of the House of Lords nominated by the Chairman of Committees of the House of Lords, and one a member of the House of Commons nominated by the Chairman of Ways and Means in the House of Commons, and one a person nominated by die Minister."
The noble and learned Viscount said: This is a little more than a drafting Amendment. It does makes a material difference. As your Lordships know, this Bill is designed to accelerate the procedure for starting certain works which it is thought will assist unemployment, and it provides that the Minister of Health may direct an inquiry, where there is an objection, and that that inquiry shall, in effect, be substituted for the Parliamentary procedure with which we are familiar. The proposal which I make is that, instead of the tribunal being a, tribunal consisting of such persons as the Minister chooses to appoint, there shall be some provision made which will ensure that the two Houses of Parliament shall have some voice in the selection of the tribunal—that it shall consist, in other words, of three person's, one off whom shall be nominated by the Chairman of Committees of your Lordships' House, one by the Chairman of Ways and Means in the House of Commons, and the third by the Minister.
I see two advantages in that proposal, first of all, that it ensures that persons representing this House and representing the other House shall take part in the inquiry, and therefore that the tribunal shall be one which must command public confidence; and secondly, that if at a later stage any question be raised in either House with regard to the inquiry or its conduct or the report which has been made, there shall be available to Parliament somebody who has taken part in the hearing of the inquiry, who will
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be able to inform your Lordships or the other place as to what has happened, and as to the reasons for the report which has been made. I think the alteration which I suggest is one which is in the public interest, and it will not involve any delay because I have a consequential Amendment later on to provide for the unlikely case of the two nominating Persons not being available at any moment; and the result will be that we shall get a tribunal which will not only command public confidence but which, we may be quite sure, will deserve public confidence.
Amendment moved—
Page 3, line 10, leave out from ("of") to end of line and insert the said new words.—(Viscount Hailsham.)
THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE: I hope your Lordships will allow me to say that this Amendment appeals to me. It seems to me a great improvement on the Bill. I do not wish to elaborate my reasons, because they are the same as those which have been expressed by the noble and learned Viscount. It does seem to me very important that these inquiries, though they cannot take place in a Parliamentary atmosphere, should at any rate take place in harmony with the customs of Parliamentary inquiries; and that can, of course, be secured by a member of your Lordships' House and a member of the House of Commons being present and taking part in them, and, of course, they will be independent people. If your Lordships were good enough to ask me I o undertake this duty, I should not, of course, send a Lancashire Peer down to Lancashire to take part in a Lancashire inquiry.
LORD PONSONBY of SHULBREDE: I quite recognise the importance of this Amendment, backed as it is by such authorities as the noble and learned Viscount and the Lord Chairman of Committees. But I think its merits are really rather superficial, and appear more in the wording than in the significance of the Amendment. The idea that Parliamentary control is introduced at this stage by the mere presence of a member of your Lordships' House and a member of the House of Commons appears to me to be entirely illusory. I am afraid such a Committee, apart from the inconvenience of setting it up in a

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Recess, apart from the inconvenience of finding sufficient members of the two Houses to serve on numberless inquiries, which might have to be held up and down the country, and the difficulty of getting them in the Recess, would in itself be extremely hampering to the Minister. I think, as the Bill stands, he has the advice of experts—the Parliamentary control comes in at a later stage—so that the Minister is by no means unfettered, but such a Committee as this, although it is recommended by such leading authorities, is, I am afraid, a suggestion which the Government cannot adopt.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: I confess to feeling a little disappointment at the answer which the noble Lord has given me. I cannot feel that the arguments which he has used are very conclusive, but I am very anxious that this Bill which, as the Government profess, is going to be a valuable assistance to enable them to grapple with unemployment, shall pass in the form which they think most useful for the purpose, and, although I confess that my reason is not convinced by the arguments which the noble Lord has put forward, I should not be disposed, unless the noble Earl, the Lord Chairman, who spoke in support of the Amendment, thinks otherwise, to press it.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM VISCOUNT HAILSHAM moved, in subsection (6) before "the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act, 1921," to insert "Section one of." The noble and learned Viscount said: This is a separate point and, I think, an important one. I gather that the Government are less unfavourable to this Amendment. Under the Bill as drafted it is provided that the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act, 1921, shall apply to the tribunal. That is an Act which is intended to apply all sorts of tribunals—
LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE: I accept this Amendment and the consequential Amendment which follows it.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: Then I will merely move.
Amendment moved—
Page 3, line 42, after ("and") insert ("Section one of").—(Viscount Hailsham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE: The three Amendments that stand next in my name are consequential.
Amendments moved—
Page 4, line 4, leave out ("order should be proceeded with and if proceeded with") and insert ("scheme should be made and if made")
Page 4, line 6, leave out ("order") and insert ("scheme")
Page 4, line 8, leave out ("order") and insert ("scheme").—(Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede.)
On Question, Amendments agreed to.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM VISCOUNT HAILSHAM had given Notice to move, in subsection (6), to leave out "he" ["whose objection he adjudges"], and to insert "the tribunal has reported and the Minister." The noble and learned Viscount said: I understand that the Government are willing to accept this Amendment. The point is that, instead of the Minister deciding whether the objection is frivolous, it is to be decided by the tribunal. I should like to move the Amendment in a slightly different form.
Amendment moved—
Page 4, line 12, leave out ("he adjudges, after considering the report") and insert ("is reported by the tribunal").—(Viscount Hailsham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE: My next Amendment is consequential.
Amendment moved—
Page 4, line 14, leave out ("order") and insert ("scheme").—(Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM VISCOUNT HAILSHAM had given Notice to move, after subsection (2), to insert the Hollowing new subsection:
"() The public shall be entitled to be present at any hearing by a tribunal of an inquiry under this section and any person appearing to the tribunal to be interested may appear in person or by counsel or solicitor."
The noble and learned Viscount said: This Amendment is consequential on the Amendment which has been accepted, but here again I should like, with your Lordships' permission, to move it in a slightly different form.
Amendment moved—
Page 4, line 19, at end insert the following new subsection:

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"() The public shall be entitled to be present at any hearing by a tribunal of an inquiry under this section and any person appearing to the tribunal to be interested may appear in person or by counsel, solicitor, or Parliamentary agent."—(Viscount Hailsham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE: The rest of my Amendments to this clause are consequential.
Amendments moved—
Page 4, line 21, leave out ("order") and insert ("scheme")
Page 4, line 22, leave out from ("report") to ("also") in line 24, and insert ("and making in the draft scheme such modifications, if any, as appear 1.o him to be necessary make the scheme in the terms of the draft and shall, if he submits the scheme for confirmation by Parliament,")
Page 4, line 26, leave out from the beginning to ("he") in line 27, and insert:
("(8) A scheme under this section shall be of no effect unless confirmed by Parliament, and if the Minister submits a scheme for such confirmation,")
Page 4, line 29, leave out ("order") and insert ("scheme")
Page 4, line 37, leave out ("order") and insert ("scheme")
Page 4, line 38, leave out ("order laid before") and insert ("scheme submitted to")
Page 4, line 40, leave out ("the") and insert ("any")
Page 4, line 40, leave out from ("undertakers") to ("and") in line 41, and insert ("having powers under the original scheme")
Page 4, line 43, leave out ("order") and insert ("scheme")
Page 4, line 44, leave out ("order") and insert ("scheme").—(Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede.)
On Question, Amendments agreed to.
Clause 1, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 2 agreed to.
Clause 3 [Provision as to land belonging to local authorities and public undertakings]:
LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE: I have a number of consequential Amendments to this clause.
Amendments moved—
Page 6, line 17, leave out ("order made") and insert ("scheme or order confirmed")
Page 6, line 19, after ("the") insert ("scheme or")
Page 6, line 22, after ("land") insert ("or of the approaches to any such bridge")
Page 6, line 22, after the second ("such") insert ("scheme or")
Page 6, line 23, at end insert ("scheme or")
Page 6, line 25, after ("any") insert ("scheme or")
Page 6, line 29, leave out ("is") and insert ("and the approaches thereto are").—(Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede.)
On Question, Amendments agreed to.
Clause 3, as amended, agreed to.
Clauses 4 and 5 agreed to.
Clause 6 [Interpretation]:
LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE: All my Amendments to this clause are consequential.
Amendments moved—
Page 7, line 32, at end insert ("scheme or")
Page 7, line 39, after ("the") insert ("scheme")
Page 8, line 16, after ("any") insert ("scheme or")
Page 8, line 21, leave out ("An order") and insert ("A scheme").—(Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede.)
On Question, Amendments agreed to.
Clause 6, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 7 [Application to Scotland]:
LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE: I have a number of drafting Amendments to this clause.
Amendments moved—
Page 8, line 33, after ("servitude") insert ("the expression 'local authority' means a county or town council")
Page 9, line 25, at end insert:
("(e) for any reference to a municipal corporation there shall be substituted a reference to a town council; for any reference to Section one hundred and five of the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882, there shall be substituted a reference to Section three hundred and fifteen of the Burgh Police (Scotland) Act, 1892; and for any reference to Section one hundred and sixteen of the Housing Act, 1925, and for any reference therein to the Minister of Health, there shall be substituted respectively a reference to Section ninety-six of the Housing (Scotland) Act, 1925, and a reference therein to the Scottish Board of Health.")
Page 9, line 26, after ("II") insert ("and paragraph 6 of Part. III.")
Page 9, line 35, after ("the") insert ("First").—(Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede.)
On Question, Amendments agreed to.
Clause 7, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 8 [Short title, extent, saving and duration]:
LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE: I have to move a drafting Amendment to this clause.
Amendment moved—
Page 10, line 8 ("any") insert ("scheme or").—(Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 8, as amended, agreed to.
First Schedule:

FIRST SCHEDULE.

  PART II.
  Procedure with Respect to the Making, Submission and Confirmation of Compulsory Purchase Orders.
  1. A compulsory purchase order shall be in the prescribed form and shall describe by reference to a map the land to winch it applies, and shall incorporate, subject to the modifications hereinafter mentioned and any necessary adaptations—
  (b) the Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act, 1919; and
  Provided that the Minister may direct with respect to any such order that the order shall not incorporate Sections one hundred and twenty-seven to one hundred and thirty-two of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845.

  PART III.
  Provisions with respect to the Validity and Date of Operation of Compulsory Purchase Orders.
  VISCOUNT HAILSHAM VISCOUNT HAILSHAM had given Notice to move, after sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph 1 of Part II, to insert:—
  "and
  (c) Where the order is made with respect only to a local authority, the Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act, 1910."
  The noble and learned Viscount said: This is an Amendment of some little importance. It proposes to alter the provisions in the second part of the First Schedule. Under the Bill as it stands, a compulsory purchase order shall incorporate, amongst other things, the Acquisition of Land (Assessment of compensation) Act, 1919. That sounds a very innocent proposal, but it is not quite so harmless as it sounds. This is a Bill which is designed, as I understand, to accelerate and simplify the procedure in starting these works and obtaining the necessary orders. It is not designed, or
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  does not purport to be designed, to alter the basis upon which property can be acquired. That is to say, it is not, as I understand it, one of the objects of the Bill to deprive people whose property is compulsorily taken of the compensation which they would otherwise get, if the ordinary procedure had been adopted.
  Your Lordships probably know that, where a statutory undertaking, such as a railway or any other undertaking carried on for profit, acquires land compulsorily, there has been for nearly a century a well-recognised principle under which a sum of 10 per cent. is given for the compulsory acquisition, and there are certain well-known principles as to what you may or may not take into account. In the case of a local authority, provision is made by the Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act, 1919, which does away with the 10 per cent. and very much limits the matters that may be taken into account in assessing compensation. There are certain provisions as to pot taking into account amenity values, and things of that kind which are taken into account ordinarily. As the Bill is drawn, this Act is to be applied to all these compulsory orders, with the effect that, wherever an order is made under this Bill, persons would get less compensation if the purchasing authority were not a local authority than if they went under the ordinary procedure, to a Select Committee.
  That seems unjust, and therefore I am asking your Lordships to amend the Schedule. I am sorry to say that I have to make a slight alteration. It is really not my fault, but I have been in communication with the Government draftsman and I shall propose it in the form in which he desires to put it. The reason of its being put in is that there are some statutory authorities which are not carried on for profit which already have the advantages of the Acquisition of Land Act. My purpose is to preserve the rights of people whose land is taken in exactly the same way as they are under this Act, but to leave the procedure only altered. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 11, leave out lines 29 and 30, and at the end of line 33 insert:
  ("and (c) in the following cases the Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act, 1919; that is to say, in the

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  case of an order made by a local authority or by a public authority within the meaning of that Act").—(Viscount Hailsham.)
  THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE: I think I ought in one sentence to remind your Lordships of what your practice has been for the last ten or eleven years. I confess at the time I was not enthusiastic about the Act of 1919, but it was accepted by Parliament because it was felt that public authorities not trading for profit were in a special position, and required and were entitled to this special treatment. But Parliament then took the view that bodies trading for profit ought to be no more favoured than anybody else, and that has been the attitude of Parliament ever since. I cannot remember any case where a company trading for profit has been specially favoured. I can remember several cases where they have asked that they should be so favoured, but I have consistently informed them that if the matter came before your Lordships I should advise you not to accept it, and I have been flattered to the extent of finding that when I have made that statement the matter has not been pressed before your Lordships.
  LORD CLWYD: As the noble Lord in charge of the Bill knows, I have had some consultation in reference to the effect of this Amendment. I thought the noble and learned Viscount was going to move it as it appears upon the Paper, and I was anxious in regard to the position of the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board. For instance, if the Amendment was passed in the form in which it appears on the Paper I was anxious to learn whether that undertaking would be prejudicially affected. I was of opinion that it would, but, having regard to what the noble and learned Viscount has said with respect to the amendment of his Amendment, I feel that I can rest assured that no difference will be made in regard to an undertaking of that character by the Amendment as it is now proposed.
  LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE: This again is an important point which has been raised by the noble and learned Viscount. I do not want to stress the argument that in several instances the Minister of Transport now makes orders authorising the compulsory purchase of land by a railway company. He has, for
  1102
  instance, applied to a railway company the provisions in the Schedule to the Development and Road Improvements Act of 1901, under which the owner of land is deprived of the 10 per cent. allowance for compulsory purchase. In several cases that has already been done. I only quote that to show that this is not a revolutionary proposal which has been surreptitiously introduced into what appears to be a harmless Bill. I would also remind your Lordships that considerable trouble has been taken with this Bill so as to get the approval of the various parties interested, not only railway companies, but various other statutory undertakers who are necessarily interested in this particular clause which, I may also remind your Lordships, has been passed through the House of Commons without any comment whatsoever.
  It is not a matter of favouring any particular company that is trading for profit. The object of this Bill is to expedite procedure, to make schemes for the relief of unemployment more numerous and more rapidly brought into execution, and there is no question that in this particular case, as the Bill stands, these various statutory undertakers will be more likely to be encouraged to go forward than if this Amendment is put in. Moreover, I should like to put this case to the noble Viscount. We desire to get simplicity and, so far as possible, uniformity. You might have a light railway, for instance, that was partly municipally-owned, and you might have a light railway that was not owned by a local authority but belonged to a company. It seems unreasonable that the light railway that belonged to a municipal authority should have an advantage over the other light railway. That is still more frequently the case with electricity undertakings. It seems rather unreasonable that an electricity undertaking that is municipalised should be in a preferential position to an electricity undertaking which is not.
  Your Lordships will excuse me if I look at this question not so much from the point of view of a landowner as from the point of view of the necessity of getting work for the unemployed, of the necessity of giving all assistance possible to these various great enterprises which

  1103
  are anxious to bring forward schemes. The Railway Rates Tribunal is responsible for fixing the rates of railways, and if any extra expense falls on the railways they must go before the Railway Rates Tribunal and the rates may be raised by that Tribunal. Although I quite appreciate the point which the noble and learned Viscount, with his usual lucidity, has brought before your Lordships, I must say that the Government, having got the Bill through in this form in the House of Commons without any sort of opposition, and having consulted so many interests concerned, and feeling that it is an agreed measure, cannot at this last moment withdraw from the position they have taken up. I regret therefore I cannot accept the Amendment.
  LORD STRACHIE: If the noble and learned Viscount had not put down his Amendment, I had been asked by the Central Landowners Association to put down a similar Amendment, and should have done so. I need not trouble your Lordships with any arguments, as the noble and learned Viscount has so fully and clearly, as he always does, put the matter before your Lordships. I should, however, like to say a few words in reply to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, who has just spoken. He said this Amendment would not expedite the purpose of the Bill. I cannot see any argument at all in that. What is the whole discussion between us? It is whether we are, or whether we are not, to do an injustice to landowners when land is taken compulsorily for the benefit of some private company by which its dividends will be increased at the expense of the landowner.
  I am aware that in cases where the national interest is concerned landowners do suffer by having their land taken away. On the other hand, I strongly object to the proposal of the Government by which a body trading for profit is to be able to buy its land compulsorily in order to increase its profits. The noble Lord talked about light railways. We know that light railways are not built now because the services are given much more cheaply by motor traffic. Then the question of electricity undertakings was introduced. An electricity supply company is simply a trading concern, and as far as I am aware most electricity companies are making very large profits at the present
  1104
  moment. The only argument that holds water—and I consider that a very leaky one—is that this will stop any one putting into force these facilities. It will do nothing of the kind. I only hope, as a matter of justice and fairness to landowners, who are suffering very heavily indeed—and not least from the Budget of the present Government—that the noble and learned Viscount will press the Amendment.
  VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: I said that I was unwilling to press a previous Amendment to a Division because I wanted to give the Government whatever powers, in reason, they asked for, but I really cannot accept the answer of the noble Lord opposite. He says the object is to expedite procedure. Nobody can suggest that procedure will be any quicker whether a man gets the compensation he is entitled to or something less. The argument really amounts to this, that it is hoped by putting in this provision that probably statutory undertakers would embark upon work which they otherwise would not undertake because they would be getting land cheaper than they would be entitled to get it without this Bill. That is not an argument which can be seriously put before this House. As to the arguments about simplicity and uniformity, whether light railways or electricity undertakings are concerned, the position will be the same. I am not asking that the law should be altered. I am merely asking that the law should not be altered, but that your Lordships should preserve the existing position and preserve to people the rights they now have, so that they should get exactly the same sum as they would get if the ordinary and more cumbersome procedure had been followed. If the Government will not accept the Amendment, I must ask your Lordships to insist upon it.
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: The next Amendment is consequential.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 12, line 2, after ("order") insert ("made with respect only to a local authority").—(Viscount Hailsham.)
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEY LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEY moved, in the proviso to paragraph 1 of Part II, to leave out "thirty-two" and insert "thirty-three." The noble Lord

  1105
  said: This is an Amendment put down on behalf of the London County Council, and I understand the Government are disposed to accept it. I do not know whether it is necessary in those circumstances to say more than that the London County Council, when promoting Bills under the existing practice of Parliament, have almost always succeeded in getting inserted in their Bills a clause excluding Section 133 of the Land Clauses Act. That is a section which deals with deficiency rating. It is a somewhat complicated matter and probably I need not trouble your Lordships by explaining it at this moment. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 12, line 3, leave out ("thirty-two") and insert ("thirty-three").—(Lord Stanley of Alderley.)
  LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE The Government will accept this Amendment.
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEY: The next Amendment is consequential. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 12, line 4, after ("1845") insert ("or any of those sections").—(Lord Stanley of Alderley.)
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE moved to add to Part III:
  "6. Until rules of court are made regulating the procedure on applications to the High Court under this Part of this Schedule, the following temporary rules shall have effect with respect thereto—

  (i) The application shall be made by an originating notice of motion to a Judge of the High Court selected for the purpose by the Lord Chancellor:

  (ii) The notice of motion shall state the grounds for the application, and the date mentioned in the notice for the hearing of the application shall be not less than eight days after the service of the notice:

  (iii) The notice of motion shall be served before the expiration of twenty-one days after the publication of the notice of confirmation of the order to which the application relates on the local authority or statutory undertakers by whom the order was made and on the Minister, and shall be entered at the Crown Office within the same period:

  (iv) The evidence upon the hearing of the application shall be by affidavit except in so far as the Court at the hearing may direct oral evidence to be given:

  1106

  (v) The ordinary practice and rules of the King's Bench Division shall apply so far as they are applicable, and are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act or of these temporary rules."

  The noble Lord said: This Bill comes into operation the moment it receives the Royal Assent, and the temporary rules contained in this Amendment will be effective until rules are made by the Rule Committee after the long vacation. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 14, line 39, at end insert the said new paragraph.—(Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede.)
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  First Schedule, as amended, agreed to.
  Second Schedule:
  LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE: There are two consequential Amendments to this Schedule. I beg to move.
  Amendments moved—
  Page 15, line 7, after ("bridge") insert ("and the approaches thereto").
  Page 15, line 15, after ("the") insert ("scheme or").—(Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede.)
  On Question, Amendments agreed to.
  Second Schedule, as amended, agreed to.
  House resumed.
  Then (Standing Order No. XXXIX having been suspended), Amendments reported, Bill read 3ª, with the Amendments, and passed, and returned to the Commons.

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE (No. 4) BILL.
The LORD CHANCELLOR The LORD CHANCELLOR acquainted the !louse that the Bill had been endorsed with a Certificate from the Speaker that it is a Money Bill within the meaning of the Parliament Act, 1911.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
EARL RUSSELL: My Lords, on the last occasion when I moved the Second Reading of a Bill of this sort—and regret to say that I again have to replace my noble friend Lord Arnold who is much more competent to deal with this subject—I was accused of making a speech which was very jejune. I am bound to say that I do not propose at this

1107
hour to trouble your Lordships with any long speech unless you desire it. I have material here for a good deal of discourse. The Bill is one with which, unfortunately, we are far too familiar. It gives power for another loan of £10,000,000 to the Unemployment Insurance Fund. The only figures that I think it is necessary to trouble your Lordships with are arithmetical calculations for what they are worth showing how long this further money will last. Of course, as your Lordships know, since I moved the last Bill, the fund has swollen in an extraordinary manner from week to week and conditions have become worse and worse. Assuming that the average number on the live register is 1,700,000, the average amount by which the weekly out-goings would exceed the revenue is £285,000, and the Fund would be exhausted by June, 1931. Assuming a figure of 1,900,000, the deficiency would be £445,000 a week and the Fund would be exhausted by March, 1931. I have many other figures, but I think perhaps your Lordships will not desire me to trouble you with them. I beg to move that the Bill be read a second time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2£.—(Earl Russell.)
THE MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY: My Lords, I hardly think your Lordships will desire me at this late hour to go very deeply into this question, but I am sorry that the noble Earl, in moving the Second Reading of this Bill, has merely treated it as if it were a customary measure to bring before your Lordships' House instead of something which is really of very grave importance.
EARL RUSSELL: Hear, hear.
THE MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY: This is the Unemployment Insurance (No. 4) Bill, and I have no doubt the noble Earl had the same speech to make which was made by myself some short time ago. I had the melancholy duty of performing the same task before the noble Earl, and I was made the target of an attack from the noble Lord, Lord Arnold, in a speech intended to show how a Socialist Government, when they came into power, would deal with unemployment in a manner far better than the way we were able to deal with it. The sad figures which the noble Earl has just touched upon have hardly realised the
1108
hopes which Lord Arnold put forward. It seems to me, as I am sure it must seem to your Lordships, that it is very unfortunate that the noble Earl in introducing the Bill gave us no indication as to the steps which His Majesty's Government are contemplating, if they are contemplating steps, to remedy the state of affairs which exists at the present moment. I do not know for how long legislation of this kind is contemplated or when the Government are proposing to deal with the whole of this subject from beginning to end. I have heard rumours that the Government are proposing to look into the matter. Surely, it is the duty of any Government to do everything in their power to put the insurance system on a sound and proper footing instead of mixing it up, as they do now, with permanent relief?
I was hoping that in the few remarks which the noble Earl addressed to your Lordships he would be able to say that the Government were dealing with this matter either by Royal Commission or Committee at some very early date. Instead of that I was only able to gather from him—I know that he did not want to delay the proceedings of the House—that this provision would carry us over a certain time and that probably by that time whatever Government was in power would have to introduce exactly the same Bill in probably the same speech. The Fund is increasing in bankruptcy and we have no indication from the Government as to how this money is to be paid and when in future it may, by some steps which can be taken, be brought into a solvent condition. This is a matter of very great importance. The system which we are employing now is a very dangerous one. It is to a very large extent demoralising the population of this country, and I should like to have heard from the Government that they had some plans in their mind or that they were proposing to take some steps to deal with this very dangerous situation. It is not for me to go into this matter or to make suggestions, but I earnestly press the Government to make up their minds in a short space of time. Probably they anticipate that they will not be sitting on that Bench and that we shall have to deal with the matter. But I feel that it is their duty while they are in power to deal with this matter as soon and as well as they can.
EARL RUSSELL: My Lords, I do not quite know what useful purpose is served by our both making the same speeches alternately. I did press the noble Marquess to know what his Government was going to do in this matter when the borrowings were very much smaller, and how long they contemplated that they would continue. I am sorry that I cannot give him any answer to-night because he did not tell me that he was going to raise this question. I am not, of course, any more than a spokesman for the Ministry of Labour and I do not know what plans are in contemplation. The noble Marquess must not think because I thought it wise not to detain your Lordships too long that I regard this as a light matter. I agree with him that it is a very serious matter and a very deplorable matter. Unfortunately, we are so familiar with it now and your Lordships are so familiar with all the facts connected with it, that I thought it hardly necessary to dwell on them. I cannot follow the noble Marquess into the discussion he has raised. We might perfectly well have a discussion which would last for some time, but I hardly think we can discuss it now at the fag end of this sitting. I think the noble Marquess will agree with me. If there are any more figures I can give him I shall be glad to do so.
THE MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY: My Lords, may I correct one thing which the noble Earl said? When I moved the same Bill I based the system we were then pursuing, which we did not agree with at all, on the fact that we were likely to see an improvement in trade. The advent of a Socialist Government destroyed our hopes entirely in that direction.
On Question, Bill read 2ª: Committee negatived.
Then (Standing Order No. XXXIX having been suspended), Bill read 3ª, and passed.

ROAD TRAFFIC BILL. [H.L.]
Order of the Day read for the consideration of Commons Reason for insisting on one of their Amendments.
EARL RUSSELL: My Lords, I beg to move that the Commons Reason be now considered.
Moved, That the Commons Reason be now considered.—(Earl Russell.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

LORDS AMENDMENT.
[The references are to Bill No. 72.]
After Clause 88, page 66, insert the following new clause:
Wages and conditions of employment of persons employed in connection with public service vehicles.
("(1) The wages paid by the holder of any road-service licence to persons employed by him in connection with the operation of a public service vehicle and the conditions of their employment shall not be less favourable to them than the wages which would be payable and the conditions which would have to be observed under a contract which complied with the requirement of any Resolution of the House of Commons for the time being in force applicable to contracts with Government departments.
(2) Any organisation representative of the persons engaged in the road transport industry may snake representations to the Commissioners to the effect that the wages paid to, or the conditions of employment of, any persons employed by the holder of any road-service licence are not in accordance with the requirements of the preceding subsection, and if the matter in dispute is not otherwise disposed of it shall be referred by the Minister of Labour to the Industrial Court for settlement.
(3) If it is decided by the Industrial Court that any person has been guilty of a breach of the provisions of this section he shall be liable to be dealt with in all respects as if he had failed to comply with a condition attached to his road service licence.")
The Commons insist on this Amendment for the following Reason:
Because on grounds of public safety, of efficiency and of fair competition between operators of public service vehicles it is necessary that fair wages and conditions of employment should obtain in the industry, and the application of the Fair Wages Resolution, which is generally understood and is already widely enforced, affords the most suitable and effective means of attaining this end.
EARL RUSSELL: My Lords, there is only one Amendment of those your Lordships made which the Commons have disagreed with and that is the one dealing with the Fair Wages Clause. I think I should like to read to your Lordships what was said by the late Minister of Transport, the Conservative Minister of Transport, on this clause in another place. He said:
"I am glad that the Minister has moved to disagree with the Lords in this respect. Undoubtedly, there has been in the past, and still is, a great deal of labour engaged

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in this transportation work which it underpaid, and this Amendment will not harm the good employer but simply bring up the bad employer.
The Amendment was unanimously agreed to in another place, and I am glad to learn that it is likely to be accepted in your Lordships' House to-night. I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.
Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.—(Earl Russell.)
VISCOUNT BRENTFORD: My Lords, it is true that my colleagues in another place agreed to accept this Amendment. I feel myself bound, of course, by the decision which they have arrived at,
1112
though I do not agree with them and I think the speech of the late Minister of Transport was entirely uncalled for and quite wrong.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.
EARL RUSSELL: My Lords, my noble and learned friend Lord Parmoor has asked me to say that it is proposed that the House shall meet at half-past three to-morrow and that the first business should be the Commons Amendments to the Lords Amendments to the Housing (No. 2) Bill.
House adjourned at eight o'clock.