Lords Sitting of 3 July 1930

Preamble
The House met at a quarter past four of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR On the Woolsack.
LAND DRAINAGE (OUSE) PROVISIONAL ORDER BILL.
Brought from the Commons; read 1ª; to be printed, and referred to the Examiners.
MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDER (FOLKESTONE WATER) BILL.
Brought from the Commons; read 1ª; to be printed, and referred to the Examiners.
ST. HELEN'S CORPORATION (TROLLEY VEHICLES) PROVISIONAL ORDER BILL.
Brought from the Commons; read 1ª; to be printed, and referred to the Examiners.
WOLVERHAMPTON CORPORATION (TROLLEY VEHICLES) PROVISIONAL ORDER BILL.
Brought from the Commons; read 1ª; to be printed, and referred to the Examiners.

PIER AND HARBOUR PROVISIONAL ORDERS (No. 2) BILL.
THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY OF THE MINISTRY of TRANSPORT (LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE): My Lords, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name upon the Order Paper.
Moved, That the Order made on the 25th day of March last, "That no Provisional Order Confirmation Bill brought from the House of Commons shall be read a second time after Tuesday the 24th day of June next," be dispensed with, and that the Bill be now read 2ª.—(Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede.)
On Question, Motion agreed to: Bill read 2ª accordingly, and committed.

CRIMINAL APPEAL (NORTHERN IRELAND) BILL. [H.L.]
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD SANKEY): My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a second time. In 1907, after a considerable public inquiry, a Court of Criminal Appeal was set up for England to which persons who had been convicted on indictment might appeal against either their sentence or their conviction or both. There have been one or two small amending Acts since then to deal with matters of procedure, but as a result of twenty years experience of that Act I think it may be said that it has really fulfilled a great public need. Whether that was so or not, in 1926 Scotland was very anxious to have a similar Appeal Court. They had the advantage of twenty years experience of the working of the English Act. One or two small Amendments were made in the Scottish Act, and it became law after being debated in your Lordships' House and in another place in 1926. The object of the present Bill is to provide a similar Court for Northern Ireland.
Your Lordships may ask, why does Northern Ireland not pass the Bill itself? The answer is that this is one of the reserved subjects under the Act setting up the Northern Ireland Parliament and an Act for this purpose has to be passed here and not in Northern Ireland. The Government of Northern Ireland have requested the Government here to introduce legislation for this purpose. We are assured that all Parties in the Parliament of Northern Ireland desire this Bill and it has been drafted in consultation with the authorities there and with the Chief Justice of Northern Ireland. The Bill follows the principle of the English Act and its amending, Acts except in regard to one or two minor details where it is thought that the Scottish Act is better. The Scottish Act was the result of twenty years' experience of the English Act. The position, therefore, is that the authorities of Northern Ireland ask that this Bill should be passed. It has been submitted to them and to the Chief Justice and at all stages they have been
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consulted. Therefore I think I am right in saying that the Bill is in accordance with their views and their suggestions.
On the matter of principle—which is the only thing with which I need trouble your Lordships on Second Reading—the position is that a similar Act has worked well in England, Scotland has followed the example of England, and now Northern Ireland desires to have an Act and would no doubt pass it in its own Parliament if it had the power to do so. In those circumstances I should hardly be justified in detaining your Lordships longer on this matter; but may I rapidly call attention to the clauses of the Bill? I do not think I need occupy your attention for more than a few moments. Clause 1 sets out the constitution of the Court of Criminal Appeal in Northern Ireland. There are one or two small differences there due to the fact that the number of Judges in Ireland is not so large as the number of Judges in England. The result of that may be seen in subsection (5) which provides that:—
"Where any appeal or matter before the court is heard by two Judges and those judges differ in opinion, it shall be re-heard by three Judges, and where any appeal or matter before the Court is heard by three Judges, it shall be determined according to the opinion of the majority of those Judges."
Fortunately, in England such a provision is not needed because we are able to follow the practice of always having a Court of not less than three Judges, and in one particular case we had a full Court, I think, of sixteen or seventeen Judges.
Another difference between the English Act and the Northern Ireland Bill is contained in Clause 3, subsection (3), which provides that:—
"On any appeal, whether against conviction or against sentence, the Court shall, if they think that a different sentence should have been passed, quash the sentence passed at the trial, and pass such other sentence warranted in law (whether more or less severe) in substitution therefor as they think ought to have been passed."
That follows the Scottish Act. In England, unless a person appeals against the sentence, there is no power given to the Court to alter it. With regard to Clause 6, your Lordships will observe that the provision for appeal to your Lordships' House is preserved and the decision of the Court is to be final subject to appeal to the House of Lords.

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There is no reference to the Director of Public Prosecutions as there is in the English Act because, as I understand it, that official does not exist in Northern Ireland and the right of appeal will be subject to the issue of a certificate by the Attorney-General.
I do not think I ought to go through the rest of the clauses of the Bill, because they simply deal with procedure, but your Lordships will observe that Clause 18 provides for the abolition of existing procedure in criminal appeals and that Clause 19 (1) provides that:—
"This Act shall apply in the case of all persons tried and convicted on indictment, who are sentenced after the thirty-first day of March, nineteen hundred and thirty-one, but shall not affect the rights as respects appeal of any person sentenced on or before that date."
I need hardly say that when we come to the Committee stage if any suggestion is received from Northern Ireland we shall be only too glad to consider it and if possible give effect to it, but as far as we know the Bill is entirely in accordance with the wishes of the Government of Northern Ireland and of the Chief Justice. I beg to move.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2ª.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
LORD CARSON: My Lords, I have been in communication with the Home Secretary for Northern Ireland, who indeed wrote to me to tell me what the position was in relation to this Bill. It is exactly as stated by the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor. Northern Ireland is, in fact, the only part of the United Kingdom which has not now got any Court of Criminal Appeal, and the Home Secretary, who has held that office ever since the new Government was set up there, has found on various occasions that it would have conduced, as he thought, to the interests of justice if there had been a Court of Criminal Appeal. So far as I am concerned, therefore, with the knowledge that I have I am glad to support the Bill. I also desire to thank the Government for so speedily acquiescing in the views of the Government of Northern Ireland and bringing in the Bill, and to thank the Lord Chancellor for his personal courtesy in allowing me to see the Memorandum upon the Bill as it was proposed.
On Question, Bill read 2ª and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

AIR TRANSPORT (SUBSIDY AGREEMENTS) BILL.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
THE SECRETARY of STATE FOR AIR (LORD THOMSON): My Lords, this is a certified Money Bill, but it may be of interest to your Lordships to hear a brief explanation. This Bill is introduced in order to give statutory authority to the Secretary of State for Air to enter into long-term agreements with regard to civil aviation. Several of these agreements have been made in the past and we anticipate making more in the near future; and it has been felt that it would be more in accordance with constitutional practice if statutory authority could be given to those agreements so as to make them binding upon all the parties concerned during their currency.
The situation up to date has been that the Secretary of State, as President of the Air Council, has made an agreement, a White Paper has been submitted to Parliament and opportunity has been afforded for discussing the financial details of the agreement in a debate on the Estimates. In future very much the same procedure will be followed, although statutory authority is now given to the Secretary of State. In other words both Houses of Parliament will, at the appropriate stage of the agreement that is being entered into and, in the case of the House of Commons, during a debate on the Estimates, be afforded a full opportunity for discussion of the subsidy policy in general and of its particular application to any new agreement. In those circumstances I beg to move that this Bill be now read a second time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2ª. (Lord Thomson.)
EARL STANHOPE: My Lords, I rise only to make a suggestion to the noble and gallant Lord opposite. I do not know whether under present legislation he has power to deal with low-flying aeroplanes. If he has not, I suggest to him that this might be an opportunity and that, by an Amendment on the next stage of the Bill, he might acquire powers

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for the Government to deal with aeroplanes that fly low. I have often seen aeroplanes flying near the place where I live which I have expected to crash into the North Downs on their way to and from the Continent. As we all know, there were two very unfortunate accidents of that kind in the course of last winter. I am aware that it may be said that the Government can deal only with British aeroplanes, which might, therefore, be placed at a disadvantage as compared with foreign aeroplanes which would be able to fly at any height they chose; but I submit that, if it were known that British aeroplanes always flew at a safe height, this might be a real advantage to British companies in getting more passengers rather than the reverse. I submit this as a suggestion.
LORD THOMSON: My Lords, I shall carefully note the suggestion made by the noble Earl. I am not sure that it would be appropriate to put a clause into this Bill, but I entirely agree with him that it is desirable to prevent low flying by aeroplanes, both in the interests of safety and in order to prevent aeroplanes becoming a nuisance. There are regulations already, but whether I can make them statutory or not is another question. I am really ignorant on the point.
On Question, Bill read 2ª, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

OVERSEAS TRADE BILL.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE: My Lords, this is a one-clause Bill for the prolongation of the time for which guarantees can be given under the Overseas Trade Acts, but perhaps, I should give some explanation of the Bill to your Lordships and of the scheme under which the Overseas Trade Department carries on the present arrangements. The Export Credits Department was set up in 1919, and the Overseas Trade Act, 1920, gave the Board of Trade the necessary powers. The maximum amount of credits outstanding was never to exceed £26,000,000, and that limit is still applied. The first scheme was called the "advances scheme." Advances were made to exporters for 60 per cent. of the
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actual costs of the goods exported. The scheme was not a success and substantial losses were incurred. The first guarantee scheme was introduced in 1921. The export credits scheme was; prolonged. It was decided to guarantee payments of hills instead of making advances against them. Guarantees were given by endorsement of the bills by letters of guarantee. Under this scheme guarantees for approximately £6,500,000 were given, and the ultimate loss was estimated at about £50,000.
In 1925 Mr. A. M. Samuel appointed a Credit Insurance Committee, presided over by Major Hills, to examine the whole question of credit insurance. The powers of the Board of Trade, which had been due to expire in September, 1926, were extended up to September, 1929. The present scheme differs from the earlier scheme in being very much simpler in operation and giving a much larger measure of insurance. While previous schemes were temporary schemes to meet crises, the present scheme is intended to develop new possibilities in the way of providing financial facilities for export trade. The purpose is to enable exporters to expand their export trade by guaranteeing them against the risk of loss through selling goods on credit overseas. It has a great stabilising influence upon trade and, through its effect on trade, upon employment also. In so far as the scheme enables traders to pass on to the Department a portion of their trade risks and to obtain financial facilities through their banks without pledging additional security, it is a very valuable means of enabling them to carry an increased turnover.
The Department's guarantees are given by means of contracts or insurance policies, guaranteeing the payment at maturity of a proportion, not exceeding 75 per cent., of bills of exchange drawn upon approved importers overseas. The names of such importers are inserted in a schedule attached to the contract, which also specifies the amount of the risk which the Department is prepared to undertake on each name. Payment is made immediately on default. The contract usually covets shipment over a period of six months from the date of the contract, and, in fact, all shipments must be within six months of the date of the contract. The cover provided enables exporters greatly to increase

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their turnover, since it relieves them of a large proportion of the risk of nonpayment of their bills. Moreover, under Contract B, which was introduced in November, 1928, the Department's guarantee is extended, if he so desires, to the exporter's bank. The bank is thus provided with a first-class security for advances in the shape of an unconditional guarantee of payment at maturity of the acceptances covered by the contract.
Perhaps I might give the results of the scheme during the last three years, since it was initiated. In the nine months ended March, 1927, the value of the contracts issued was £365,000; in the twelve months ended March, 1928, it was £2,455,000; in the twelve months ended March, 1929, it was £4,283,000; in the twelve months ended March of this year the figure reached £5,661,000; and in the last three months up to June £1,742,000: and there is every indication that as the scheme becomes more widely known there will be an increase in the volume of business. Of course, this is only the transactions under the schemes, not the general trade. The Estimates Committee of the House of Commons had the matter before them in 1928, and made certain recommendations, and the late Government duly appointed a Committee, consisting of Sir Otto Niemeyer (of the Bank of England), Chairman, Colonel Peel and Sir William Plender, to consider the question of the administration of the Department, and one of their recommendations was that the scheme should be extended to September 8, 1934. That recommendation has been adopted, with the date substituted of March 31, 1935, as being a more suitable date. They also recommended that commercial accounts on the lines which they laid down should be published, and that an Executive Committee with powers analogous to a board of directors should be appointed.
The Government have appointed an Executive Committee consisting of Colonel Peel, Mr. Caulcutt, a director of Barclay's Bank and the Deputy-Chairman of the statutory Advisory Committee, Sir E. Bain, K.B.E., a prominent insurance broker, and Mr. W. R. Blair, of the Co-operative Wholesale Society. The functions of the Executive Committee will be in the technical side of the De-
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partment's operations. It may be said that while they are given very full discretion they will not have unfettered control. It is necessary to preserve Treasury control and the necessary statutory requirements which are involved in the composition of the Department. The recommendation with regard to the publication of accounts is being undertaken, but it has not yet been possible to publish accounts in the way recommended for the year ended March 31, 1929. The appointment of the Executive Committee does not deprive the Department of the assistance of the Advisory Committee. The Advisory Committee consists of thirteen members, of which ex officio four are members of the Executive Committee. It will continue the province of the Advisory Committee to go through all the applications submitted, and sift them, confining themselves strictly to the commercial merits of the scheme, and in the event of their not being satisfied turning down such applications as they consider advisable. I have thought it necessary to give that short survey of the evolution of the present scheme, but there are other questions that are involved in the working of this guaranteed scheme, and the question of Russia comes in.
Whatever changes I may have experienced in coming to your Lordships' House from another place, I have not escaped the obligation of participating in discussions on Russia, which are generally liable to be rather acrimonious. I do not think, however, there is any need for bringing in to-day any of the political and controversial subjects, but the noble Viscount, Lord Brentford, has been good enough to intimate that he desires to raise the question of trading with Russia. I think, therefore, that it is as well if I touch upon that subject briefly. On August 1 last the present Government lifted what may be described as the ban against extending credits to Russia, and the increase in the amount of contracts since that time has been very considerable. Every scheme, whether it referred to Russia or any other country, is submitted to the Advisory Committee, and with the exception of three members the Advisory Committee is precisely the same Committee as existed when the last Government was in office. Therefore all the schemes with regard to Russia have

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been submitted and passed by the Advisory Committee. Gut of the total contracts issued since October 1, 1929, amounting to £5,180,000, business with Russia amounts to £2,260,000, and it seems probable that in the time to come there will be a considerable increase over 1929.
VISCOUNT ELIBANK: May I ask the noble Lord whether he can say that the Advisory Committee are satisfied that the risk in Russia is a good one?
LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE: Every one of the applications from traders for the export of their goods to Russia is submitted to the Advisory Committee, and is investigated by them just in the same way as any other contract, and is sifted on its purely commercial merits. I do not think the Advisory Committee take political considerations into account at all. It will be seen, therefore, that the lifting of the ban is not giving any privileges to Russia, but is merely removing an obstacle which hitherto has existed, and it is interesting to note that from July, 1926, to March, 1930, £122,000 has been paid out by the Department in respect of dishonoured bills, but not one penny of that in respect of transactions with Russia. The need in Russia for material and equipment for reconstruction is increasing. The manufactured articles that we can produce are very much needed in Russia, and now that this ban has been lifted it is probable that there will be a considerable increase in our trade with that country.
May I refer to one or two arguments that have been used in another place, and on the platform, very often, against facilitating trade with the Soviet Government? It has been argued very frequently that there is a trade balance in favour of Russia in this country, and that therefore it is undesirable that that balance should be increased, or that we should come to terms with them. It is perfectly true that there is a trade balance. The imports from Russia last year were £26,500,000, and the exports to Russia £6,500,000, so that there is a balance of £20,000,000. But that is the case with several other countries. It is the case with the Argentine to a far greater extent. It is the case with Denmark to a less extent, and with Sweden
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and Egypt. But in any case it is a misleading way of appreciating trade relations. Trade is not just an isolated set of transactions between one particular country and another, but it is multilateral and covers the whole ground; and therefore really there is no particular argument in claiming that we should not lift barriers 'between ourselves and Russia because there happens to be a trade balance in Russia's favour in this country.
Another argument that is very often brought forward in this connection is that the United States of America have a larger trade with Russia than we have, although they have never recognised the Soviet Government. It is perfectly true that they have a larger trade. The great part of it is due to the importation into Russia of raw cotton—raw material. But it is also rather interesting to note (and here one sees how politics do affect trade, especially with regard to Russia) the fluctuations which can be seen in the table of statistics of our trade with Russia, due to political differences: the original recognition by the Labour Government in 1924, which led to an increase of trade, the break of relations in 1927, which led to a decrease in trade, and the further renewal of relations recently, which has again led to an increase in trade. On each occasion the United States have benefited by that. For instance, in 1927, while the trade or the United Kingdom with Soviet Russia went down from £10,000,000 to £5,000,000, the United States trade with Russia went up from £14,500,000 to £19,000,000.
In that way one does see that the political controversies have from time to time affected trade relations; and I think that the lifting of this ban against guaranteeing trade transactions with Russia has been a step in the right direction. It has been fully justified. There have been no bad debts. I think that this last step is in keeping with the former steps which this Government have taken to draw Russia into the comity of nations, to get rid of the animosity which exists from time to time between the two countries because of a breach of amicable relations, and so to do a great deal to help trade and employment, and to ensure that there shall be no hostility or breach in international relations. I have done my best to be as mild as pos-

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sible and not to introduce any polemics or any note of hitter controversy, but I think that this Bill, which marks another stage in bringing the two countries together in an amicable arrangement and in fostering trade, and, it is to be hoped, in helping to some extent the grave question of unemployment, is a move most decidedly in the right direction. I beg to move.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2ª.—(Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede.)
VISCOUNT BRENTFORD: My Lords, you will be aware that this scheme is a scheme which has received the support of all Governments, and that a little more than a year ago a Bill of a similar character was moved from the Government Benches by my noble friend Lord Lucan on behalf of the Conservative Government. I need hardly say that I am not proposing to-day to object to the proposals in this Bill. For many years past we have endeavoured when we were in office to foster our trade, and we do believe that the arrangements which were made, through the different attempts under the export credits scheme, have been entirely successful. I notice that in a debate in another place a few weeks ago two of my hon. friends were acclaimed as godfathers of this scheme. If that is so, I must personally have been the grandfather, because I was Minister for Overseas Trade in 1923 when this scheme was in its infancy, and we did our very best to promote it.
I do not, therefore, intend in any way to object to the proposals in the scheme, but I do want to say a few words in regard to the latter part of the speech of the noble Lord. I did, in fact, give him notice that I was very anxious about the new proposals of the present Government to extend the export credits scheme to Russia, and he has attempted to answer in advance the arguments which he thought, and thought quite rightly, that I should put before your Lordships. I shall endeavour to be as mild as he was in his speech, for there is no reason why we should introduce strong language into our debates. But we are entitled on this side of the House to consider whether the proposals which the Government have made, in direct contradiction of the policy of their predecessors, in opening
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the export credits scheme to Russia, is likely to enure in the long run to the benefit of this country or not.
The noble Lord based his reasons largely upon the condition of unemployment in this country and the desirability of making every possible effort to increase our export trade and to re-open or extend the trade with Russia, which, admittedly, was, from the point of view of exports, very low indeed. That is the policy of the present Socialist Government. I remember that during the General Election they openly advocated the resumption of diplomatic relations with Russia very largely, if not entirely, on the grounds that it would increase the trade with Russia, and that unemployment would be diminished in consequence of that increased trade. In fact, according to many of their speeches, it was to be one of the principal methods of curing unemployment. May I call your Lordships' attention to the pre-War trade with Russia, when, of course, there were diplomatic relations? Either the figures have been forgotten or they cannot have been very thoroughly studied. Our pre-War trade with Russia was really a very minute portion of our international trade. If you take the year 1913, our imports from Russia were £40,250,000 representing just over 5 per cent, of our import trade. Exports were then £18,250,000, representing less than 3½ per cent. of our export trade. That was when there were the fullest possible diplomatic relations between Russia and ourselves.
Compare those figures with others I am about to give. In that same year our export trade to our own Dominions and Colonies was £209,000,000, a very different matter when dealing with unemployment from the miserable sum of £18,250,000 which was the amount of our exports to Russia before the War. After the War our trade with Russia declined rapidly, and in 1926, that is before the break with Russia, the import trade was only £24,000,000, then representing less than 2 per cent, of our total import trade. But our export trade to Russia in that year was under £6,000,000—to be exact, £5,856,000, or less than one per cent. of our export trade. So that really the scope which the noble Lord and his friends throughout the country have suggested for dealing with unemployment

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by the increase of our trade with Russia is, to say the least of it, very small indeed.
Then came the diplomatic break with Russia. I want to explain to your Lordships—because as Home Secretary at the time I have some responsibility in the matter—that the diplomatic break with Russia made no necessary break of any kind in trade with Russia. If Russia chose not to buy from us, that was not our fault. There was no obstacle whatever, in consequence of the diplomatic break with Russia, put in the way of any trade which any of our traders carried on with Russia. It was my duty to make all the arrangements that trailers in this country needed to enable intercourse between Russia and ourselves to take place, and I can state definitely to your Lordships that never once, acting as 'Home Secretary, did I place any embargo whatever upon any Russian coming into this country for purely trade purposes. There were often embargoes made upon men who desired to come into this country for purposes of propaganda and for other than legitimate trade purposes; but for trade purposes there never was the slightest embargo of any kind put upon any Russian who desired to come here to find out what we could export or what we could deal with in the country or to communicate with our merchants, bankers or manufacturers on questions of trade.
The difficulty then was the difficulty that there is to-day—the difficulty in regard to the finance of trade between Russia, and this country. I am dealing, of course, with exports. The finance of imports was easy enough. There was the credit of Great Britain and of our merchants or manufacturers who bought Russian products. But in regard to export there is one very remarkable instance that I can give and I am sure that your Lordships will not press me for the name of the manufacturer. I had an interview towards the end of my time as Home Secretary with one of the leading manufacturers of machinery who exported to Russia. He came to see me really to get the advice of the Minister as to continuing his trade with Russia. I asked him: "What were the terms of credit when you first began your trading?" He replied, "One year's credit and very satisfied we
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were." Then I said, "After two years what were the terms of credit?" "Two years credit," he replied. "What are the terms of credit to-day?" "Four years credit." In other words, the credit of Russia or the terms which Russia was prepared to give in regard to the purchase of English machinery were going steadily down from one year's credit to two years credit and then to four years credit. The answer which the Secretary of State was bound to make to a manufacturer asking that question was: "You are a business man, and you must decide whether you think that four years credit is good enough for you to undertake the business." As a matter of fact he did not conduct any further business in that export to Russia.
Now the trade going on is really quite as high as it was before the break or rather just before the break. But in the years 1925, 1926, and 1927 it had been going slowly hut steadily down hill. The noble Lord must not lead your Lordships to assume or to believe that there came a sudden break and that what was a valuable trade to this country was knocked on the head by the withdrawal of diplomatic relations. Our exports to Russia in the year 1925 were £6,250,000—I give round figures; in 1926, £5,750,000 and in 1927 £4,500,000. So that they were steadily on the down-grade then. It is true that after the break in 1927 they fell to £2,750,000, and that in 1929–30—I do not wish for a moment to mislead the House—after the Government came into office and diplomatic relations were resumed, there was an increase of trade, as the noble Lord said. I think it was a very natural thing that Russia should endeavour to increase her trade. But co-incident with or very soon after the resumption of diplomatic relations came the opening of this credit scheme to Russia, and I think your Lordships will find if it is very carefully examined that the increase of trade is due more to the removal of the ban and the opening of the export credit system to Russia than to any resumption of diplomatic relations.
The noble Lord chose to deal with the question of the United States of America which, he said, had consistently refused diplomatic relations with Russia. That is correct; but America does a far larger export trade with Russia than we do. The latest figures I could get show that the imports from Russia into Great

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Britain for the six months to the end of February of this year were just over £14,750,000. The imports from Russia into the United States were under £2,250,000. It is the other way round in regard to the exports and it is there that our trade fails. The exports during the same period from Great Britain to Russia were £4,000,000 but from the United States to Russia they were £13,750,000. America had, and has, that favourable trade balance which the noble Lord does not seem to think really matters.
All through these years—and this is the point I want to put to your Lordships—Russia has had a very favourable trade balance as against our country. I do not want to trouble your Lordships with a whole mass of figures, but I think the noble Lord will agree that there has been a favourable trade balance for Russia with this country of something like £20,000,000. The noble Lord is good enough to nod assent to that and to save me from inflicting a large number of figures upon your Lordships. But the Russian Government is the importer and the exporter. The noble Lord suggested that there was a more or less similar trade experience as regards this country with, I think he said, the Argentine, Egypt, and one or two other places.
LORD PONSONBY or SHULBREDE: Denmark.
VISCOUNT BRENTFORD: Yes. That may be perfectly true; but in this case he is dealing with the Russian Government itself. It is the Russian Government which has every year in this country a favourable trade balance of something like £20,000,000. If they want to buy anything from our country there are £20,000,000 cash at their disposal. Instead of using it to promote trade here and to purchase English manufactures they have used it either for transfer by bills of exchange to some other country, for paving their debts elsewhere or possibly—I hardly like to say this in case the noble Lord should be offended with me—for propaganda. But there is a balance and the noble Lord cannot get out of it. If Russia wants to buy here, is it necessary for us to employ our export credit system, not in respect of Russian merchants because the whole of the foreign trade of Russia is done by the Government? It is the Government's
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bills which we are backing. This is, of course, an insurance scheme. The noble Lord was good enough to explain that it means that a merchant here desiring to trade with the Russian Government and sell to the Russian Government has to take that Government's bills to the Export Credits Department and get finance to the tune of from 60 to 75 per cent. on those Bills.
It is a little difficult to understand why that is necessary. There is no other case that I know of under this export credit system where we are guaranteeing the financial stability of the Government of another nation. That is not insurance. That is a political question entirely. The noble Lord says that everyone of these schemes has gone before this Committee in which, of course, I have the utmost confidence. That Committee may be able to say, through the instrumentality of banks, through their knowledge of the credit system in the City of London, what is the financial stability of merchants. Every banker knows the credit of every individual merchant all over the world. They are all known and docketted and labelled in regard to their financial stability. But this is a question of the financial stability not of a merchant but of a Government. Therefore, that must be a question not for the pundits of the City of London but one in regard to which the Government itself must really be responsible and say: "We think" (I do not know whether they do, I suppose they do) "the credit of the Russian Government is so good that we are prepared to back their bills to the amount of 60 or 70 per cent."
That is a very great advance on anything that has yet been done in regard to Russia, and I cannot help telling the noble Lord, who spoke as though Russia had never defaulted at all and as if Russia was to be treated exactly the same as any other country or any other merchant who desired to take advantage of this export credit system, that we know in this country that Russia already owes vast sums of money to us. I wonder why they had not suggested using the export credit scheme to back those defaulting debts of Russia for the benefit of the English bondholder. One of the noble Lord's leaders, Mr. Snowden, put this matter rather clearly in writing in January of last year before the General Election.

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I want to call your Lordships' attention, and particularly that of the Government's representatives, to the remarks of their own colleague. Mr. Snowden wrote:—
"It is no use ignoring the fact that the repudiations of the pre-revolution debts and the confiscation of foreign property in Russia have created a feeling of distrust which will have to be removed before full confidence can be restored."
May I ask noble Lords opposite whether that feeling of distrust which was in the mind of Mr. Snowden has been removed, and whether they have got sufficient evidence to support them in backing the bills of this Russian Government? Mr. Snowden also stated:—
"It is hopeless for Russia to secure foreign credits, or to float an international loan, until the debts question has been arranged.…Russia's foreign trade is now less than half of the pre-War volume. It is only 11 per cent. of the total world trade, though its population is more than 10 per cent."
"It is hopeless for Russia to secure foreign credits … until the debts question has been arranged"!
LORD PONSONBY or SHULBREDE: May I ask what date that is?
VISCOUNT BRENTFORD: It was January 6, 1929, in an article which I am sure the noble Lord must have read in Reynolds's newspaper, a very remarkable article, written with all the imprimatur of a man who had been Chancellor of the Exchequer and was, if the Election was won, again going to be Chancellor of the Exchequer of Great Britain. It gave confidence to the traders of this country and to the taxpayers of this country that we should not embark on any credits for Russia until seine arrangement had been made in regard to their international loans. That is exactly what is now being done. We are granting credit to Russia; we are guaranteeing the payment by Russia of bills for English goods.
I do not quite know how far the Government intend to go. We have got certain figures which were given in another place three days ago. It is a very remarkable fact that a great change has taken place since the Government came into office in regard to the working of this export credit scheme. In the last three months—the months of March, April and May—the face value of exports to foreign countries other than
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Russia was £948,125, just under a million pounds sterling, and His Majesty's Government's liability under the insurance scheme for the bills they backed of foreign purchasers was something like 60 per cent. of that—£598,000. But when we come to Russia, the scheme for which has only just been opened, we find that in those same three months the contracts for exports to Russia were 30 per cent. more than to all the rest of the world—I mean the contracts under this particular scheme. The face value of the contracts with Russia was £1,502,000, and the liability of His Majesty's Government for three months only of this year is £901,000. Those are figures given in another place. It is a very serious change in the use of this otherwise excellent system of providing export credit for our merchants and manufacturers.
Now we find that Russia is taking, at all events during those three months—I suppose it is going on and will be fostered by His Majesty's Government—one and a half times the amount of credit which all the other merchants of the world are taking, and they are taking it in the form of short-term loans. There is no other word for it. If this goes on at the same rate—£1,500,000 for three months—the trade that will be guaranteed with Russia will be something like £6,000,000 a year, and the liability of His Majesty's Government will be something under £5,000,000 a year upon it. We have not got from the noble Lord opposite any statement as to what the terms of credit are in regard to these transactions with Russia. I know from my own experience in my previous office that Russia was trying to increase the length of credit, and one or two speakers on the Government side in the other House a few months ago advocated that we should give as long as five years credit to Russia on these trade transactions—five years credit, not to a merchant, but to a Government which is already in default, to a Government which already has a favourable trade balance in this country of £5,000,000 to £20,000,000 a year; and Russia, I take it, will go on exporting her raw materials to this country. It is desirable we should have them, and I do not object to that, but I do say that while we are purchasing goods from Russia, when they have that favourable trade balance, it is rather bad

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policy on the part of the Government to finance Russia to the extent of something like £5,000,000 a year.
In conclusion I want to ask the Government what would be the position of these bills guaranteed by the Government—bills of the Russian Government guaranteed by our Government—and discounted by the holders with banks or financial houses in the City of London if (I want to be as mild as possible) diplomatic relations should be again broken off with Russia. It is by no means certain from the speeches of the Foreign Secretary in another place that he is satisfied, or that His Majesty's Government are satisfied, with the way in which the Russian Government are carrying out their pledge in regard to propaganda. I do not want to deal with that now. I am only putting it to the noble Lord as quite a possibility that it may be necessary, even for his Government, to break off diplomatic relations with Russia; in fact, they have pledged themselves to do so unless they are satisfied in regard to propaganda in this country, and the Foreign Secretary told us that an inquiry is now being made by the Government. Suppose, as a result of that inquiry, diplomatic relations with Russia have to be broken off, where are you going to get your money? How are you going to get these bills paid? The English manufacturer is all right, the merchant is all right, the banker is all right, but the British Government and the British taxpayer will be called upon to meet these bills.
Does not the noble Lord think that they will be added to the accumulating hundreds of millions of Russian debt still unpaid? Does the noble Lord think if we did come to another break with Russia—Russia who has made all these defalcations from time to time—that Russia would be likely to come down and say: "You would like us to pay this money, would you not?" I think the noble Lord himself, as a business man, and I am quite sure the Chancellor of the Exchequer (who, I am certain, will not go back upon the statement he made in 1929) must have very serious qualms as to the result which will happen if diplomatic relations are broken off. I do not in any way oppose this Bill. I believe it is a good one. I think the scheme is a good one provided only that
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the Government would carry it out in the way it was carried out by the late Government for the purpose of increasing our export trade, by applying its benefits to merchants and purchasers in various parts of the world whom a commercial committee could reasonably guarantee, and not extend it to a Government—I am anxious not to say anything that would cause the noble Lord opposite to feel uncomfortable—a Government about which I at least cannot be expected to have confidence that, if relations are broken off, they will not do the same as they have already done and default to this country in respect of further large sums.
LORD DANESFORT: My Lords, the noble Lord who introduced this Bill said with a certain amount of satisfaction, and indeed with pride, that since the let of October of last year credits have been given under this export credit scheme to Russia in respect of contracts with Russia to the extent, I think he said, of £2,260,000. He said that those credits were sanctioned by the Executive Committee and he went on to make what appears to mF; a most astonishing statement. He said that in advising these credits the Executive Committee take no regard Whatsoever of political considerations. Surely the guaranteeing of the credit of a Government such as that of Soviet Russia is a case, if ever there was a case, when political considerations ought to be taken into account. That was proved, I think, by the noble Viscount, Lord Brentford. If the Executive Committee are not prepared to take political considerations—
LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE: May I correct the noble Lord? It is the Advisory Committee.
LORD DANESFORT: I am obliged to the noble Lord. It is my mistake. If the Advisory Committee are not prepared to take political considerations into account in sanctioning these credits, surely His Majesty's Government or the Treasury before they actually sanction the credits ought to take these considerations into account. May I ask His Majesty's Government whether, before sanctioning these credits, they made any attempt at a bargain with the Soviet Government? In cases of this sort, whatever may be the advantage or disadvantage to this country

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of these contracts—and the advantage seems to me to be small and possibly questionable—the advantage to Soviet Russia of getting these credits is undoubtedly immense. They are most anxious to get them. It is the way in which they see that they can buy goods from this country and perhaps the only way in which they can buy goods to any large extent because they get long terms of credit. What they are we do not know but perhaps the Government will tell us.
To get those terms of credit is a very great advantage to Soviet Russia. Would it not have been wise, would it not have been reasonable before granting those credits, to make some bargain, to go to Soviet Russia and say: "See how matters stand. You have repudiated all your obligations. You have robbed the inhabitants of this country who traded with Russia or had property there of hundreds of millions of money. You have refused to pay your debts to this country. You have"—perhaps it is hardly necessary to say this—"behaved in a manner in which no civilised Government has behaved before in the matter of its obligations both to private persons and public Governments, and you have made no suggestion whatever for liquidating those debts." We are told that negotiations are going on with a view to getting Soviet Russia to acknowledge their responsibilities and to pay at any rate some portion of those debts. If a statement which I read in the newspapers—I think it was only yesterday—is true, it seems extremely improbable that those negotiations will result in any satisfactory conclusion to this country. But be that as it may, surely it would be the wise and sensible course for this Government before granting these credits to try to make some terms with Soviet Russia as to the payment of these debts.
There is another course which I think ought to be taken which might help us. As the noble Viscount, Lord Brentford, has said, there is grave reason to suspect, and more than to suspect, to believe, that the Government of Soviet Russia are indulging at this moment in what they have always up to now indulged in—namely, most dangerous propaganda against this country. His Majesty's Government are so satisfied as
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to that that we are told that they are engaged in looking into the matter and in seeing whether propaganda by Soviet Russia is of such a nature as to justify our Government in breaking off diplomatic relations. Before making these credits, surely it would have been possible for us to say to Russia: "Unless you give us conclusive proof that you have stopped and intend to stop this propaganda, you shall have no credits." It seems to me that in this matter of credits to Soviet Russia, our Government have lost an opportunity which might have been of great value in getting concessions or guarantees from Soviet Russia which we have never been able to get yet. They have abandoned that opportunity for the sake of a very speculative advantage to our trade and in so doing I do not think they have reflected any great credit on their business capacity.
VISCOUNT ELIBANK: My Lords, I do not propose to detain the House very long, but there is one aspect of this question which has net been raised this afternoon and that is in connection with the purpose of the exports credits scheme so far as it concerns the class of goods exported under that scheme. I always understood that under that scheme it was intended that only British goods should be exported. This afternoon we have learned that 11,500,000 worth of goods have been exported to Russia under this scheme, and Mat £900,000 have been guaranteed by the Government for Russia. I have learned recently through the Press—and no doubt other noble Lords have done the same—that a transaction has taken place in which over £1,000,000 worth of sugar has been exported from this country to Russia by the refiners in this country and guaranteed to the extent of 75 per cent. by this Government. What does that sugar consist of? I am given to understand that that sugar was Cuban sugar, cane sugar imported into this country, refined in this country and now re-exported to Russia. That means that no more than 5 or 10 per cent. of the manufacture of that sugar is the result of British workmanship, but the British Government is actually guaranteeing some 60 or 70 per cent. of this sugar, not for Great Britain, not for the British Colonies but for Cuba, a dependency of the United States of America.

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I am not asserting that this is correct. I only know what has appeared in the Press. I am told that it is correct, and I think that it is due to your Lordships' House that in this debate we should hear from the noble Lord whether it is correct, whether that is the policy of the Exports Credits Department and whether that is to be the policy of the Department in the future. If it is to be, r cannot see why the taxpayers of this country should support the Department or, indeed, why we in this House should support the Second Reading of this Bill. Possibly the noble Lord has an explanation which is satisfactory, but I do venture to suggest to His Majesty's Government that if they are going to use this exports credit scheme for Russia, they should use it in connection with goods wholly or as far as possible manufactured in this country.
LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE: My Lords, the question raised by the noble Viscount is the subject of a Question that has been put upon the Paper by the noble Duke, the Duke of Atholl, for next Thursday, and it will be dealt with very fully on that occasion. I want to deal with some of the points raised by the noble Viscount, Lord Brentford, and the noble Lord behind him.
VISCOUNT EMBANK: May I interrupt the noble Lord for one moment? I cannot be satisfied with his answer. I am not suggesting for a moment that the particular point of Cuban sugar should be dealt with to-day, but on the question of policy I think we ought to be assured that His Majesty's Government do intend to use these export credits only for British goods and not for foreign goods.
LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE: I will come to that point in the course of my remarks. What I said referred only to the specific question of Cuban sugar, and I thought it would be discourteous to the noble Duke if we anticipated the debate which he desires to initiate next week. What surprised me most in the remarks of the noble Viscount, Lord Brentford, and the noble Lord, Lord Danesfort, was the distrust and displeasure which they evinced towards the action of the Advisory Committee. The whole of these transactions came before that Committee. His Majesty's Government have nothing
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whatever to do with them. Every application is made to the Advisory Committee and is either turned down or approved by that Committee, and very naturally every such transaction is investigated purely from a business point of view. It is not the function of the Advisory Committee to enter into political considerations. The Committee was set up by the late Government and, with the exception of three members, it is in personnel exactly the same as it was under the late Government. It really is a matter of surprise to me that the noble Viscount and the noble Lord behind him should attack the Advisory Committee in such unmeasured language for accepting the applications of traders who desire to do business with Russia.
VISCOUNT BRENTFORD: I am sure the noble Lord does not desire to impute to me what I did not say, and certainly did not mean. The Advisory Committee, it is true, was appointed by the late Government, but the Committee which we appointed was distinctly told that it was not to use these credits for trade with Russia. It is the noble Lord opposite and his colleagues who have given different instructions to the Advisory Committee. I did not complain of the action of the Advisory Committee; I complained of the action of the Government in giving these different instructions, and I pointed out that trade with a Government was not a proper subject for a commercial advisory committee to deal with, but must be the responsibility of noble Lords opposite.
LORD DANESFORT: May I add that I hope the noble Lord will not misunderstand me? I commented upon his statement that the Advisory Committee did not take political considerations into account, I presume under the authority or direction of His Majesty's Government. If that be so, I think it is most unfortunate, but, whether they do or do not take these considerations into account, what I was urging was that His Majesty's Government should take them into account.
LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE: I have no desire to misinterpret what either of the noble Lords has said, and I can appreciate the fact that their main line of attack is against the Government for having lifted the ban in August last against trade with Russia. The noble

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Viscount said that in any case our trade with Russia was very small and that it was not worth bothering about, but I think that in these days we must take into account even trade on small lines. I think that there is every reason to expect that the development of affairs in Russia and the enormous works of reconstruction that they are undertaking are likely to bring a larger volume of trade to this country than was previously the case.
The noble Viscount said that he placed no embargo whatever for trade purposes at the time of the breaking off of relations in 1927, but I think it is obvious that trade depends on confidence between nations, and that when there is no confidence, when there is a feeling that at any moment relations can be broken off, when there is a Party in power in this country which, in season and out of season, whether members of the Government or supporters of the Government., do nothing but abuse another Government, it is very natural that traders do not feel that confidence which makes them want to go forward and undertake transactions that they would otherwise undertake. Political considerations, especially in regard to Russia, do count, and it is that want of confidence which existed largely when the late Government were in power—and justifiably so, considering that they always took the first occasion to break off relations, that has been detrimental to the increase of trade with Russia.
The noble Viscount asked what is going to happen if diplomatic relations are again broken off, and the noble Lord, Lord Danesfort, bases his idea of the lifting of the ban against Russia on the lines that it should be part of the bargain that Russia should meet the debts and outlying agreements that have been the subject of negotiations before. I think these two transactions should be kept absolutely separate. Pre-War debts and the claims of bondholders and property owners in Russia that were the subject of negotiations in the Treaties of 1924 are still the subject of negotiations between the two Governments which are now being conducted by the Foreign Secretary. We may disagree very strongly with the policy of the Soviet Government of the repudiation of debts and the nationalisation of land without compensation, but, however that may be, even in 1924 they entered into an engage-
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meat by which they were prepared to negotiate on these questions, and those negotiations have been resumed under the present Government.
But we can detach that question completely from the narrow point of business arrangements between firms in this country and Russia, and I cannot see that there need be any mixing up of the two. I can only feel that the policy that is advocated by the noble Viscount and the noble Lord opposite would mean that you would again put down the ban against Russia, continue the embittered relations and place obstacles in the way of trade, merely because of your political detestation of the Soviet system of Government. That is not the policy of His Majesty's Government at present in power. The noble Viscount quite rightly opened his remarks by saying that our policy was in direct opposition to the policy of our predecessors.
The noble Viscount, Lord Elibank, asked a question about the extent to which our exports to Russia are purely of British origin, or are partly merchandise of a foreign or Colonial character. I could not give the figures showing the exact proportions. Imported merchandise of a foreign or Colonial origin does form part of our exports to Russia.. If they are re-exported from this country, and if they are in the shape of raw material which undergoes some process in this country before they are re-exported, they may be included in the scheme.
VISCOUNT EMBANK: Are we to understand that foreign and Colonial produce is classed in the same category?
LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE: Not necessarily in the same category. It depends upon what process they go through here before being re-exported.
VISCOUNT ELIBANK: My object was to try to point out that they were in different categories, and that the Government should regard them as in different categories.
VISCOUNT BRENTFORD: The noble Lord has not told us what is the length of credit with Russia.
LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE: It is rather difficult to say with any precision.
VISCOUNT BRENTFORD: You could in regard to contracts for the last three months.
LORD PONSONBY OF SHULBREDE: For the most part terms of six months to a year, and in fact in few cases, in regard to any country, is that term exceeded.
On Question, Bill read 2ª, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN (SCOTLAND) BILL.
Amendments reported (according to Order).

EAST AFRICA.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (LORD PASSFIELD)THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (LORD PASSFIELD) had given Notice of a Motion to resolve, That it is desirable that a Joint Committee of both House be appointed to consider the Reports on Closer Union in East Africa (Cmd. 3234 and Cmd. 3378), together with the statement of the conclusions of His Majesty's Government (Cmd. 3574), and to report thereon. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I had hoped to have invited your Lordships' House to decide upon the setting up of a Joint Committee to consider the Reports on Kenya and East Africa, but I owe a word of explanation to your Lordships for the Motion which I am formally moving. The Government have conic to the conclusion that, largely from the point of view of lack of time in another place, it is futile to attempt to set up a Joint Committee in this Session. It would have been of great advantage had we been able to get it set up, not in order really to do business, because time would not permit of that, but in order for it to decide its own procedure and give notice to those who wish to appear as witnesses that they would be ready to receive them in the following Session. Then they could ask to be re-appointed in the ensuing Session. That is not now possible, and but for another consideration I would not have brought the matter before your Lordships this afternoon.
Notice had already been given and I understood one or two noble Lords were prepared to speak on the Motion. Therefore I thought it more respectful to proceed formally with the Motion in order not to interfere with what has been
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arranged, and for practical purposes, in so far as possible, to give notice to those concerned what is the intention of the Government on the matter. If we had not brought the matter to your Lordships' notice in this way there would not nave been adequate notice to those overseas who wish to take part in the matter. I will not, at this hour, attempt to go into the matter. Your Lordships will be very familiar with the fact that the situation in East Africa has been under serious consideration by the late Government and the present Government for several years. We need not go any further back than the sending out of a Commission of Inquiry under Sir Hilton Young, which produced what I would venture to call a masterly Report, unfortunately of considerable length and complexity, upon the whole question. That Report, masterly as it seems to me to be, dealt with the question on so large a scale, and went so far into the future, that its recommendations did not meet, to put it mildly, with any universal assent.
I am not sure how far they met with the approval or the consent of the Government to which they were presented, but at any rate the Permanent Secretary of the Colonial Office, Sir Samuel Wilson, was sent out by my predecessor to discuss that Report with all the parties concerned in East Africa, not in order to commit the Government but in order to ascertain by personal contact what parts of the Report were commonly acceptable, and what parts presented serious difficulties in practice. That Report was not made until there had been a change of Government, and it has been one of my personal perplexities, almost ever since I took office, to discover what exactly was the right thing to do with regard to this complicated question.
The Government decided very early that they would ask both Houses of Parliament to appoint a Joint Committee to consider and practically pronounce judgment upon the matter, but the Government have not shirked their own responsibilities. They wished to bring before the Joint Committee, and they have reported to your Lordships' House, what their own conclusions are in this matter. The Government might have proceeded to carry out those conclusions, but out of respect to the opinion of very competent people, and very strongly felt feelings, it was considered desirable that

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we should go on with the proposal of a Joint Committee, in order, quite frankly, to see whether the conclusions of the Government could be improved upon, and in any case to get for the policy which may eventually come a sort of sanction higher than that at any rate of the present Government, and perhaps of any Government confined to one Party. It is better, especially in matters connected with native policy and constitutions, that we should go forward in any change with the united support, or a large measure of the united support, of all Parties as far as possible. Still die Government do not shrink from their responsibility, and they have put down their proposals in sufficient detail, which they are prepared to carry out and which they hope the Joint Committee will support them in carrying out.
In a few words let me say what those proposals are. The Government propose that there should be appointed a High Commissioner for the three principal territories of East Africa—Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika—and that this High Commissioner should have a dual function. On the one hand under Royal Instructions he should be there as representative of the Secretary of State to see what was going on, with regard especially to native policy, in all three territories, and be able to intervene with authority at the instance of the Secretary of State in various ways. One thing in particular it was impossible to arrive at—uniform regulations for so large a territory, so diverse a native population and so large a population. It is quite clear that there ought to be co-ordination of native policy, at any rate so far as concerns matters which cross the borders of the several territories. There is one large native population, the Masai, which is actually in two of these territories. It is very desirable that there should not be regulation of one kind in one part of the territory and regulation of another kind in another part. Then, further, all the arrangements connected with the regulation of native migration or native travelling require to be co-ordinated.
Those are only instances of things which need to be done. I mention that side of the High Commissioner's functions, his interference with regard to native policy on behalf of the Secretary of State, because that is a side to which very great importance was attached by
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Sir Hilton Young's Commission and to which very great importance is attached by many people in this country. On the other hand, the other side of his functions, which more particularly relates to his schemes for closer union, is of an entirely different character. A great many people thought it necessary, and the Government think it necessary, that various services of these three territories should actually be under common management, should actually be to a large extent amalgamated. It is absurd, it seems, that each of these three territories should have its own railway system pushing ahead otherwise than on a single co-ordinated plan. It is equally important that the other side of transport—not. only the lake traffic, but also the possibilities of motor traffic on the roads—should be coordinated and dealt with for the whole of the territories upon a common plan. Similarly, with regard to Customs. Great difficulty has already been experienced by the Customs being dealt with separately, as at present. Two of these territories are on the coast and have an opportunity of levying Customs Duties. The third one, Uganda, is an inland enclave, and questions must arise as to the equity of the Customs Duties which are levied on the coast, but are really ultimately borne by the people of Uganda. Various makeshift attempts have taken place to arrive at some better co-ordination, but it is recommended almost on all hands that the Customs regulations should be unified.
There are various other directions with which I will not trouble your Lordships in which union is desirable. It is proposed that the High Commissioner should, under an Order in Council or Letters Patent, himself administer as a Governor those transferred services, but he should do that with the support, the advice and assistance of a Council, which should represent all the three territories; and that involves consideration of the different tenures of those territories. Kenya is for the most part what is technically called a Colony; Uganda is not a Colony, it is a Protectorate; and Tanganyika is neither a Colony nor a Protectorate, but is held under Mandate from the League of Nations in effect. With regard to Tanganyika, therefore, we are bound by the terms of the Mandate, the basis of which is

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that it must be retained as a unit, and therefore no simple amalgamation of the territories is practicable unless there is some alteration of the terms of the Mandate. But the Mandate itself expressly gives power, under Article 10, for a joint administration, a union, of the economic services, and it is under that Article that the proposed union would take place. That involves considerable care to see that the terms are such as are in conformity with the spirit as well as the letter of the Mandate, and care has been taken to see that that is done.
I could give your Lordships a much better description of that by taking more time, but it is set forth very clearly in the White Paper. I must formally end by moving for the appointment of a Joint Committee to take these matters into consideration and report., but I want to say quite frankly that I only make that Motion in order to put myself in order, and in view of the circumstances that I have already stated I shall propose at the conclusion of the debate to ask leave to withdraw the Motion. But I do so because I wish to give notice to those who would come to the Joint Committee, and would seek to influence the Joint Committee by evidence—to give notice to them, as I can by this debate, that it is the intention of His Majesty's Government, as soon as the new Session opens in October or November next, to ask your Lordships to consent to appoint such a Joint Committee as I have described. Then, although it is for the Committee itself to settle its own procedure and I cannot therefore pledge the Committee to hear evidence orally, it win no doubt be willing to receive evidence, and I should certainty propose that it should hear any witnesses who wished to come before it from any of those territories or elsewhere. But, at any rate, by making this declaration I am able to give notice that the Joint Committee will be asked for, will probably be set up, and that it will almost certainly be willing to receive evidence from those who wish to criticise or comment upon the proposals committed to the Joint Committee. Now I formally move the Motion on the Paper, and thank your Lordships for your consideration.
Moved to resolve, That it is desirable that a Joint Committee of both Houses
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be appointed to consider the Reports on Closer Union in East Africa (Cmd. 3234 and Cmd. 3378), together with the statement of the conclusions of His Majesty's Government (Cmd. 3574), and to report thereon.—(Lord Passfield.)
LORD CRANWORTH: My Lords, I have listened with the greatest interest to the remarks of the noble Lord, but there are two things that I am not quite clear about. One is whether any further opportunity will be given to your Lordships' House to debate this most important matter, and the other is whether the Government intend to take action on the lines of their White Paper before or during the sitting of this Joint Committee of both Houses. I would wish to say now that, in spite of what the noble Lord has said, I much regret the decision taken by His Majesty's Government to set up this Committee, and my reasons for doing so are roughly three. In the first place, there have been several Committees in East Africa. There are only two mentioned in the Motion, and the noble Lord has only mentioned two. Prior to them, as he knows, there was the long and most interesting Report by another Committee presided over by Mr. Ormsby-Gore, and there have been almost innumerable other Committees sitting side by side on various points in that distressful country. And I am bound to say that each Committee in a smaller or greater degree according to its importance has added to the uncertainty of affairs in that country. It has lessened the confidence in that country, and in doing so it has lessened the trade and the prosperity of that country.
There is a proposal to add yet one more, and I regret it. I regret very much that the Government have not seen fit to adopt the alternative course—to adopt the recommendations of Sir Samuel Wilson and to proceed to put them into effect. I do not think a Joint Committee is the right method of dealing with this matter. East Africa is a vast and complicated country. I am not certain that the difficulties there are not greater than they are in India. Just consider the population for a moment. There is the white population, some of them British, others Dutch, others German,

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others Greek, and the Japanese are becoming an increasingly important section of the populace. We have the Arabs and the Swahili, and also a vast number of tribes and languages. I may call the attention of your Lordships to a fact with which all of you may not be familiar, that some of what are called native tribes have a very fair claim to the title of immigrants which is used in the White Paper perhaps rather contemptuously. The country has vast differences of level, of products and so on, and matters there are so complicated that for any person even to consider evidence and be able to give a good opinion on that evidence he must have a considerable knowledge of local circumstances or a vast deal of time to spare for the work. That, I think, has always been held to be the case by previous Governments and that is the reason why their Committees have always conducted their work on the spot so as to get local particulars.
The proposal of the Government is this. They are proposing to select from a very limited number of men a Committee of considerable sire; I believe I am right in saying that twenty is the number. If you are going to select twenty members from a very limited number it seems to me that you have two courses before you. You might be able to get just twenty members who would have sufficient knowledge to give an opinion, after hearing the evidence, which would be worthy of consideration. Unfortunately, those men have already heard again and again, twenty times, all the evidence that can be given, and I am afraid that in the vast majority of cases on what are the main issues their minds are definitely made up. If you do not follow that course you will have to select twenty people who, until they have spent months or years on the subject, will be forced to give an opinion on a matter in which they are, I will not say so remotely interested, but about which they are so ignorant that their opinion will not be of any appreciable value. I have thought the subject over carefully and I can only think of one man who seems an ideal member of that Committee and that is the noble Lord, Lord Lugard. I know of no other man who can so successfully combine know-
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ledge with an absolutely open mind. I regret, therefore, the course that has been taken.
There is one other reason. The work of Sir Samuel Wilson has been mentioned. I lived for many years in East Africa in one way and another and I know, as probably others of your Lordships know, that owing to the circumstances I have mentioned and, possibly, also to its elevation, this is a country in which unanimity of opinion upon any subject is extremely difficult to obtain. It is a country in which good will is none too easy to get. Even in this country that is a comparatively rare plant. I have known many who have attempted to get good will and some measure of agreement in East Africa, who have tried to obtain the sympathies of both sides for the common good, but no man has had the same measure of success as Sir Samuel Wilson had. I do not say that he satisfied everybody. The noble Lord knows as well as I do that that would be impossible; but he got a degree of agreement that was amazing. I regret most bitterly that the good will engendered by that splendid piece of work—I will not say has been thrown away but has been jeopardized to a marked degree by the proposals put forward in these Papers. I think it is a thousand pities.
I am prepared to speak for a very considerable time not only upon the White Paper itself but on the other document which is its twin brother and which I regard, I am sorry to say, as an unfortunate document. If your Lordships will allow me five minutes more I will confine myself to two points which I think are major points on the Paper concerning closer union. The first is this. It somewhat amazes me to find what great autocratic powers are to be put into the hands of one individual. It causes me astonishment. Those of your Lordships who have read—I have no doubt those who are here have done so—the White Paper in question will have noticed how extensive those powers are and what a complete control the nigh Commissioner will have over a variety of subjects. Indeed, it is rather difficult to see what powers outside of the powers of the High Commissioner are left to His Majesty's Government in those territories.

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Not only has he those powers, but he is untrammelled by anybody. He appoints his own Council. He dismisses his Council. If their opinions do not coincide with his they go. He is an absolute autocrat. Further than that, he is to have his own secret service from which he can send and is almost invited to send a secret agent to seek out things that may be wrong in territories administered by one of His Majesty's Governors. Surely that is a departure from the whole of our previous policy not only there but anywhere else, and I am bound to say that it surprises me. I know there are those who say that a benevolent autocrat or dictator is the finest form of government, but I hardly thought that this Government would put it forward. I do not know whether the High Commissioner will always be a benevolent despot. A despot he certainly will be; but will he always be benevolent?
I mention the other point with reluctance but I must mention it. It is the suggestion that the common roll shall replace the communal roll. Whoever drew up this Report and is responsible for it must have known when then put that in that they would destroy any chance there was of getting it accepted with the good will of the inhabitants. I am bound to say that it seems to me that those people were suffering some what from (shall we say?) self-confidence. Think of the people who had gone before them. Think of Sir Samuel Wilson, of the Hilton Young Commission, of the Ormsby-Gore Commission and of the present Secretary of State for the Dominions, Mr. J. H. Thomas. Think of all the Governors out there. Can a single one of those he found who ever suggested that the common roll is preferable to the communal roll? I do not think so. Therefore, the turning aside of those opinions with a gesture and no argument really seems to me a very strong step to take. It is a step that I regret.
When I was young I used occasionally to read stories of people in a sledge who were pursued by wolves and the family in the sledge would throw out one by one the less desirable members to satisfy the wolves so that others might escape. I suggest to your Lordships that in this case the Indians are the wolves and that you are sacrificing the fattest, the juiciest, and the youngest of your children in
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Kenya Colony to satisfy their hunger. I do not think, and I say it with all earnestness, that it has ever paid to sacrifice the loyal to the disloyal. We have had experience of it elsewhere and I venture to think it has never paid. I do not wish at this late hour to pursue this subject further. I trust an opportunity will be given later for it to be fully dealt with in your Lordships' House. I would venture to hope that when the Committee is set up it will have before it two great objects—first, to give fair play to every section of the population, and in doing so I would suggest that the paramountcy of any interest, white or black, should be expunged from their mind; and, secondly, to get back, so far as they have the power, the good will which has, I fear, been so rashly jeopardised.
THE EARL OF PLYMOUTH: My Lords, I do not wish to speak at any length this evening, but in view of the fact that such very important issues are at stake in the publications which have recently been made by the Government, I feel there are certain questions which cannot be allowed to pass without comment. The noble Lord in whose name this Motion stands has made it clear that it is not his intention to press it this evening. He is going to ask leave to withdraw it, but he has at the same time made it quite clear that the Government do not intend to go back upon their decision to set up a Joint Committee of both Houses to go into these very complicated questions of closer union in Eastern Africa. The noble Lord who sits behind me has expressed qualms as to the result of the setting up of this Committee. He complained that East Africa has been suffering from too many Committees in recent years, and that it would have been far better to have accepted Sir Samuel Wilson's recommendations than to have wasted any time—which he believes will be fruitlessly wasted—in setting up a further Committee. I do not intend to go into that to-night, but would only say this, that having gone as far as they have gone—that is, having gone so far as to issue an important Paper dealing with this matter of closer union—I do not think the Government could have taken any other course than to set up a Joint Committee of both Houses. Amongst the members of that Committee,

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I can assure the noble Lord, there will be found some who have a very intimate and close knowledge of affairs in East Africa. I say I do not think the Government could have taken any other course than set up this Committee to go into this question.
As the noble Lord has said, this Motion was preceded by the publication of two important documents. The first is a Memorandum on Native Policy, and the second the document under review to-day—a statement of their conclusions with regard to closer union in East Africa. I do not intend to say anything about the former. The noble Lord behind me has said that in his opinion it is a dangerous document. The Government themselves, however, do not believe that they are laying down any new principle so far as the native population is concerned. They believe that it is merely an elaboration of principles that have been laid down in the past by previous Secretaries of State for the guidance of those who are primarily concerned with administering native policy in East Africa. I think it is satisfactory to know, at any rate, that the Government believe and agree that our policy, in so far as this matter is concerned, is based upon sound principles. At all events, they make it quite clear that in their opinion what is far more important is the way in which the principles which they have laid down are going to be practically applied by the people on the spot, and with that view I think we shall all heartily agree.
I pass to the second Paper, the statement of their conclusions, and in respect of that I should like to offer some criticisms. As the noble Lord opposite, the Secretary of State, has told us, it is intended by these proposals to set up a High Commissioner for the territories of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika, with a Federal Council of twenty-five members, and his duties are to be divided into two categories. He is to have certain duties and powers in respect of native policy, and then he is to have duties in respect of certain transferred services which will be handed over to him. With regard to the first, the question of native policy, I should like to say quite frankly that in my opinion the Government proposals are open to the very gravest objection. Although there
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is no right to initiate legislation in the Federal Council with regard to native policy, at the same time the High Commissioner is to be given tremendous power.
I do not want to enumerate his powers as they are given in the White Paper but I cannot help bringing to your Lordships' attention one or two of them:—
"He shall make such criticism, suggestions and proposals to the Governors of the alcove-mentioned territories as he may think fit.
"He shall suggest or order local inquiries and investigations called for by complaints or reports of abuses.
"He may send one of his own officers to look into such complaints or reports of abuses, and the officer may report to him without publicity or formality."
That really is, it seems to me, a very strong order. It amounts to all intents and purposes to sending somebody spying into somebody else's territory. I think that is well nigh intolerable. Then:—
"He shall be empowered to require any of the Governors to initiate any legislation which he may, with the approval of the Secretary of State, deem necessary."
We cannot hide from ourselves that these are very big powers indeed, and I venture to say that they go a very great deal farther than any suggestions that were made in the Report of the Commission presided over by Sir Hilton Young.
That Commission suggested that the High Commissioner should have powers to inaugurate inquiries and joint discussions on questions of native policy, as had been previously indicated in the Report. Sir Samuel Wilson is even more definite on this subject. I would like to read a passage from his Report. With regard to the question of the general supervisory power of the proposed High Commissioner over the native policy of the three territories he said:—
"I found that there was general agreement with the views expressed by the Hilton Young Commission on the principles which should govern the relations between the natives and the other communities; but, as already indicated, I met no one in East Africa who was in favour of putting the general control of native policy directly under the control of a central authority."
Those are very strong words indeed; yet in spite of them the Government propose

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to hand over the complete control of native policy to the High Commissioner.
I speak with diffidence here, but I speak at the same time feeling quite certain that those who know East Africa, and the conditions there, know that the conditions in the various territories differ very greatly indeed, that what applies to one does not apply to the others, and that what might obtain in one does not obtain in the others. It does seem to me, therefore, that the Governor of the individual Colony is the one person who is probably qualified to speak with authority on the subject, and I think it would be wise to leave him very wide discretion indeed as to the handling of these questions without such direct interference from a central authority. In addition to that the High Commissioner is not responsible to any body, whereas the Governor is always liable to have to run the gauntlet of his Council if he has to initiate legislation on the subject, and that kind of point does weigh very heavily with public opinion or with a large section of public opinion in East Africa. I feel I must say, in concluding my remarks in so far as this question of native policy is concerned, that the proposals of the Government in their present form are, in my opinion, open to objection and very possibly fraught with considerable danger unless they are altered.
With regard to the second part of the High Commissioner's duties, they are those which concern services which are to be transferred to him. I hope and believe that in connection with this there will be less controversy, although there will naturally arise a very large number of points which require elucidation. There are a very large number of services to be transferred to the High Commissioner, including railways, ports and harbours, Customs, defence, posts, telegraphs, telephones and a number of others. I will confine my remarks to one or two of them. I should like to ask one or two questions with regard to Customs. I do not think it is quite clear whether the Government intend, if these proposals are put into operation, that the local Governors and Councils should have any further direct control in the matter of Customs at all. Will the High Commissioner and his Council have control over the administration only of this service or will they also have the power of fixing the
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actual duties in the various territories? It is, after all, a very serious matter as far as the territories are concerned, because as your Lordships are aware Customs form the largest part., or at any rate a very large part, of their revenue, and it may quite obviously be very awkward and very difficult for a Governor if the duties were fixed without consulting him, or rather over his head by a central authority, without his having any real voice in the matter.
Then there is the question of defence, and the same sort of question occurs to me here as in regard to the last subject. I am not quite clear whether the Government in their proposals mean that the High Commissioner should assume control of all defence, that is internal defence as well as external defence. In other words, is he to have control merely of the King's African Rifles or will he assume control as well of the reserve and the police force in the various territories? The police force, of course, strikes one as being essentially a domestic affair and one wonders whether it would be possible to unify the police service and in that way put it under a central authority. I should like to mention in passing the Kenya Defence Force and to ask whether it is the intention that the High Commissioner should take over responsibility for that force. It is a force which has proved itself, I think, very useful and very necessary, and I think we ought to realise that Kenya, in contrast with the other two territories, has a very real and acute problem of defence in so far as the Abyssinian frontier is concerned. Therefore they are very deeply interested in this question.
There are also various points with regard to the finance of the scheme. Clearly the setting up of a new organisation such as this High Commissioner with a staff of officials and his Council will cost money, and one asks oneself the question, where is this money coming from? At the present moment expenditure in the three territories is high and the balances are very small. I mist confess, I am unable to see where you are going to get a counterbalancing saving as a result of these measures to set off the extra expense which is entailed. In fact, the Government have not, in their White Paper, given us any in formation as to what all this will cost,

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and I think we ate entitled to have some estimate from the Government on this point.
In addition there are a number of other questions. I do not wish to weary your Lordships, but they are all of them more or less important. There is the very important question of the composition of tine suggested Federal Council. It is suggested by the Government that it should consist of twenty-five members in all. It seems to me that is a very large body, I should have thought a good deal too large probably. The official members will have to come very long distances—and, of course, the more there are of them the greater the expense entailed—and they will have to leave their very important work for considerable periods, Also it is very difficult to understand why the official majority on this Council is to be so large. As at present constituted, besides the High Commissioner and three of his officers, there are to be seven members from each of the territories, four official and three unofficial. I personally should have thought that an equal number of official and unofficial members front each territory, together with the High Commissioner and his chief adviser, would have been sufficient. I think your Lordships should understand that this large official majority on the Central Council is giving rise to very great suspicion in some quarters and it does seem to me that it is quite unnecessary.
There is one omission in connection with this White Paper which does strike one very forcibly. I should like to remind your Lordships that amongst other things the Commission over which Sir Hilton Young presided was asked to make recommendations as to associating more closely in the responsibility and trusteeship of government the immigrant communities domiciled in the country. As far as I can see, the Government have foreshadowed no proposals at all to give effect to that suggestion. I think that that is very unfortunate indeed. One thing that is required in Eastern Africa is the development of a community sense and clearly one of the best ways of producing that sense is to bring members of the immigrant communities into the Government. I think it is very regrettable that the Government have not made any proposals as far as I can see which might help to bring about that state of affairs.
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I must say a few words about, the Kenya Council itself. It is a matter which has loomed very large and is considered of great importance. It is not necessary for me to remind your Lordships that there has been in Kenya for some considerable time now a demand that the official majority on the Council should be replaced by an unofficial majority. The Government have apparently decided to leave the matter as it stands, to leave the official majority on the Kenya Council. I think in that connection it is only right and proper to point out that all Sir Samuel Wilson's suggestions were made on the assumption that the official majority was to go and that the unofficial majority was to take its place. I think he makes that perfectly clear. Sir Samuel Wilson says:—
"As regards (c), it is assumed in Kenya that the acceptance of the recommendation of the Hilton Young Commission concerning the abandonment of the official majority in the Kenya Legislative Council will be a sine qua non in any scheme of closer union that may he agreed to; and all my discussions with the European communities in Kenya were carried out on this assumption."
The Government have decided in exactly the opposite direction, and clearly that must modify all the views to which Sir Samuel Wilson refers in his Report.
In addition to that, the Government have taken this opportunity of making what I consider and what clearly my noble friend, Lord Cranworth, also considers a very disquieting statement with regard to political representation in Kenya. If your Lordships will hear with me for moment, I should just like to read out the passage to which I am referring. They say:—
"With regard to the franchise for the Legislative Council of Kenya, His Majesty's Government are of the opinion that the establishment of a common roll is the object to he aimed at and attained, with an equal franchise of a civilisation or education character open to all races."
And they go on to suggest that one of the first duties of the High Commissioner should be to enquire how this object can be most easily and quickly attained. We cannot get away from the fact that this statement has given rise to very great anxiety, not to say alarm, in that country. It is, as has already been pointed out, contrary to the views that have been expressed by those who have recently been studying the situation in

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Kenya and who are consequently qualified to speak with authority on the matter. I quite agree that it is possible to argue that in theory a common roll may be desirable, but surely we must realise that in practice a common roll in Kenya is entirely out of the question for years to come. Communal representation is really the only possible method at present, and I think it is a very great pity that the Government had not the courage to say so and, by saying so, to allay in some degree the very great anxiety that has been aroused.
As to the actual question of an unofficial as opposed to an official majority in the Council being granted, I think that this is clearly bound to depend to a large extent upon the circumstances that obtain. But one thing is quite clear, and that is that this demand for an unofficial majority on the Council has been very greatly increased by the proposals that have been published by the Government. I really do not think that, when we examine the matter, this is at all surprising. It clearly arises from the lack of any sense of security, which I think is rather natural. The white settlers in Kenya are frightened that the High Commissioner, with his great powers, may do something that is inimical to their interests. They are frightened that the High Commissioner's Federal Council, over which they would have practically no control and which will have a very large official majority, may likewise do something which will be very deleterious to their interests.
As I have said, I think the one feature that is really disappointing is the fact that no attempt has been made to realise the essential conception that the immigrant communities should be associated in the trusteeship in East Africa with the Government, and I think the great danger is that, if these proposals are put into operation as they now stand, they will throw the settlers back into a position in which their primary concern will be to do what they can to protect their own interests. I think that this would be a very deplorable and retrogade step. I trust your Lordships will forgive me for having delayed you for such a long time on this matter, but it is one of very great importance. I dare say that we shall have an opportunity of returning to it once again, but I am
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afraid I must make it clear that, although some measure of agreement may be found with regard to these proposals, I think that in their present form they are far from acceptable.
Loan LUGARD: My Lords, in the confident anticipation that in due course you will approve the Motion which I understand is still before the House—namely, that the Reports on East Africa and the conclusions of His Majesty's Government should be referred to a Joint Committee of both Houses, I think that, considering the late hour and the fact that these matters will be fully investigated by the Joint Committee, it would be inopportune at the present time to go into any detail as regards the conclusions which His Majesty's Government have formulated. The sole question, therefore, is whether or not it is advisable to set up a Joint Committee of both Houses. We have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Cranworth, that he has doubts whether a satisfactory Committee could be assembled. That, I think, has never been an obstacle hitherto in the setting up of Joint Committees of the two Houses. The object of the Committee would be to bring finally to a conclusion the controversies that have raged both in East Africa and in this country on the various subjects on which His Majesty's Government have now given their decision.
From the Report of the first Commission which was set up under Mr. Ormsby-Gore in 1923 up to the time of the Report of Sir Samuel Wilson, which has now been in the hands of the Government for exactly a year, a wonderful and, I think, very remarkable interest has been shown throughout the country in these problems of East Africa. The decisions to which the Joint Committee of both Houses will come will shape future policy not only in the East African territories which are more immediately concerned but also throughout the whole of tropical and sub-tropical Africa, and possibly also in other Dependencies. In the Kivu highlands the Belgians are faced with an identical problem of European colonisation on a large scale and, as I happen to know, they are watching very closely what decisions will be taken by this country.
It is not merely a question of the relations between the white and coloured

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races. It is much more than that. The issue involves the question of what is the best form of government for African races in all these large African Protectorates. The events that are passing to-day in India and in South Africa serve as a warning to us that the day must come when these subject races, as they become better educated, will demand some voice in the government of their country. In the normal evolution of representative government their vote would swamp that of the far more capable and politically experienced European community. It seems to me, therefore, that it is a matter of the most urgent importance for the European communities in East Africa and elsewhere to look to the future and consider whether Parliamentary institutions are in any way adapted to the government of these large African Protectorates. Foresight is not only necessary in regard to those countries in which there are European communities: it is equally necessary where they do not exist, lest we should find that the welfare of vast illiterate and primitive races has been entrusted to a small, inexperienced, politically-minded native minority.
The issues indeed upon which the Joint Committee will have to pronounce will involve an examination of the question what is the best form of government for natives in those countries which are populated by large numbers of subject races, for they are eager for education and quick to imitate European ideas, and we have seen that eventually they will claim some voice in the government of the country. Is it, then, possible to direct their aspirations into channels which will not conflict with the normal and legitimate development of the other communities in the country who are more capable and more able to develop representative institutions? We have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Cranworth, that the conclusions of His Majesty's Government are anything but welcome to the European residents in East Africa. It is because of these very divergent views that in my opinion the best possible method of dealing with them is to set up a Joint Committee of both Houses, which is the best possible way of declaring the national will and giving expression to the united voice of Parliament. It is a method which would be accepted by all communities alike, as
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a final expression of British policy as laid down by the united decision of the imperial Parliament.
THE LORD BISHOP OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I crave the indulgence which I believe it is customary to extend to all speakers who address your Lordships' house for the first time, and I promise that I will not detain your Lordships for more than a few minutes. I am moved to speak because I feel that it is difficult to exaggerate the importance of the question before us. It seems to me that here in the twentieth century we are called upon to deal with a subject which vas dealt with many years ago by Lord Durham. Our forefathers then had to face the question of the relations between the settlers in Canada and other parts of the world—other than the United States of America, which had been separated from us—with the Mother Country, anti Lord Durham produced a Report which was accepted by Parliament and the nation, and which has been the basis of the development of the British Colonies.
We are now faced with a problem even greater in magnitude, and it is the problem of the relations of the British Government with all the races under its jurisdiction. We are naturally anxious that the matter should be settled upon permanent and sound lines, and without any fear of that kind of partisan or sectional motive which might lead to the revocation in a future Parliament of what has been decided in this Parliament. May I say in a few words why, broadly speaking, I support the proposals of the Government? In the first place they put into practice the principle to which we have all given lip-service—the principle of trusteeship laid down in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. That is what the Government are trying to do in this crucial instance of Africa. All Africa is on the move, and whether we like it or not we have got to face the question of our relations with the native races. In what we are trying to do in Kenya we are bound to remember that Kenya must always be a black man's country. We must settle this question—indeed the Government, have committed themselves to settling this question—on the lines of Article 25 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

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Secondly I support the Government on this matter because they recognise that trusteeship involves more than the protection of the material interests of the natives. They recognise that it includes education and general advancement, that it includes progress, politically, socially and economically. When the noble Lord on the Front Opposition Bench spoke of the common roll as being not practical politics I should be inclined to agree with him, but the difficulty is perhaps that we are inclined to misunderstand one another. Nevertheless our desire to keep the door open for the full development of the native must govern our policy now and here, and meanwhile. For that reason I submit that Sir Samuel Wilson's proposal to separate the native case from that of the white population is unwise. The common services involve the native interests at every turn. Public works, for instance, affect the problem of native labour. You cannot shelve the native question. You have got to face it, and that is the weakness of Sir Samuel Wilson's Report.
I am glad to find that His Majesty's Government decline to devolve their responsibility. British tradition in a sense is on its trial. All over the world the natives are becoming more self-conscious. Native movements are appearing everywhere, perhaps led by unwise leaders and taking directions which are dangerous to true progress. The mere fact of the danger of these explosions creates two difficulties—on the one hand, where the white population is very small, the danger of a small white minority being actuated by a policy of fear; on the other hand, where the white population, as I think we may say in Kenya, is strong enough to be immune from that policy of fear, there is the danger which comes to everyone who is human to press his own interests as against the interests of the natives. For that reason I think it is no time for the home Government to devolve their responsibility.
Again the noble Earl, Lord Plymouth, spoke of the tremendous powers, as he seemed to consider them, which are given, according to the White Paper, to the High Commissioner. But surely those powers must be considered in relation to the Secretary of State. The High Commis-
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sioner has no power dissociated from the Secretary of State. He is a link between the territories and the Secretary of State, and his position is really a position of advice and criticism. All he can do is to hold up measures which in his opinion are deleterious to the welfare of the territories or the natives until the Secretary of State has pronounced an opinion. But what is the alternative to that? The alternative to that is that the power should rest definitely with this tiny white minority in these territories; and we know the saying, which is certainly true in this case, that no man is a good judge of his own case. And, therefore, surely we do want an impartial arbitral authority, such as the office of the High Commissioner would give, which will keep the balance even between all the various interests concerned.
Having said that, I do want to add that of course the white settlers have their rights. I feel very strongly that the white settlers were there, and sinking their capital in the country, long before the Versailles Treaty or the League of Nations Covenant was thought of, and they have rights that we have to consider. I cannot go further into that, but my impression is that the Joint Committee, when appointed, will be the safeguard of their interests. Every opportunity will be given to represent their interests, and certainly I for one hope that such a result will follow, and that there will be some unity of decision when this matter comes finally to a head. Certainly, as I said, the danger of anything like a sectional decision, or decision for expediency, will do far more harm than good, because it would only mean that what is once decided will be upset by another Government, and the issue is too great for any sort of decision of that kind. The only decision which can be permanent is a decision which is based on the Christian principles of justice, freedom and truth.
LORD PASSFIELD: My Lords, I think the discussion that has taken place not only justifies my action in bringing this somewhat unreal Motion forward—unreal in the circumstances—but also the Government proposal that this matter should be referred to a Joint Committee of both Houses. It is idle to pretend that we are agreed on the matter. The noble Lord, Lord Cranworth, deprecated

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the reference to a if Joint Committee. I wonder whether he would have preferred that the Government should have proceeded to a decision without any further reference. We are humbly coming forward, stating what our own conclusions are, but saying we want this to be examined by a Joint Committee, and, whatever may be the outcome, we want as far as possible, as the right rev. Prelate has said, to get at any rate the greatest common measure of unity that we can get in this complicated matter.
The noble Lord, Lord Cranworth, asked whether there will be further opportunity for debate. Certainly, at the first opportunity in the new Session, in October or November, I hope I shall be here to put down a similar Notice of Motion to the one to-day, which will give an opportunity for a debate on the whole matter. He also asked whether the Government will take action in the meantime. As regards getting out new Orders in Council or new Letters Patent, certainly not. The whole intention is to lay the matter before the Joint Committee, and, while the Government cannot of course abandon their own responsibility in the matter, certainly my intention would be to try to accept whatever decision the Joint Committee came to, at any rate on all but the most vital matters. Our hope is that we may get a decision from the Joint Committee which will represent genuinely the greatest common measure of agreement, and enable a policy to be laid down that will be let alone for Seine time to come.
Now I must apologise for the reference to "immigrant communities," but I think the noble Lord need not have taken offence at it. It shows how touchy people are in this matter of East Africa, because, as the noble Lord who followed, Lord Plymouth, quoted from the Conservative Government's references to the Hilton Young Commission, the words "immigrant communities" came in again and again. I find them also in the White Paper of 1927. So that it is not from any desire to be impolite or derogatory that the phrase is used in this White Paper. It has been a common phrase, common to both Parties for some time.
I will not take up time by answering all the questions put, but I will endeavour to give a little more information. With
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regard to tile Customs, the intention is that what would be transferred is not merely procedure or organisation, but actually the fixing of the Customs tariff. But of course that would not be done without the separate territories being given an opportunity to be there. As a matter of fact, the representation on the proposed Federal Council is deliberately designed so that not only the Government, but also, so to speak, the unofficial citizens of each territory should have a very effective say, and any three of them out of a Council of twenty-five will be able to hold up a decision of the Council and refer it to the Secretary of State. At the present time none of these territories has the power to settle its own Customs Duties. It is all subject to the Secretary of State's consent. Therefore they wilt have the same power to stop any hostile duty or any duty they do not like as they have at present.
Then with regard to defence, certainly that was a "shorthand" expression. The intention was to deal merely with the King's African Rifles and to unite them as a practical matter of military administration. It is better you should have a single force rather than three separate forces. You are able to concentrate your force much more nearly where it is required, and to the extent that is required, than would be the case if you had three separate forces. It is quite true there is one region, the Abyssinian frontier, which is a source of anxiety. It is exactly for that reason that this union is proposed, and is actually being carried out in practical operation, because that Abyssinian frontier is of interest not only to Kenya but to the other territories. Indeed, it is unfair that Kenya should bear the whole burden of the cost of it. Certainly there is no intention at present to amalgamate the police. I do not know whether it might not be done, but that is not included in the proposals.
The question of the cost has been raised. We can only roughly estimate the cost, but all the new expense is not estimated to come to more than £50,000 a year, and that is less then the economies which we believe can he secured by the union, and certainly is a very tiny percentage of the aggregate revenue of the three territories. The Federal Council has been complained of as being

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too large, but we must foresee that the division of opinion in this Federal Council will be geographical, that each of these territories will at any rate begin by standing up for itself, and it is thought desirable that you should have represented, not merely the official element, but also the unofficial element, and not one race exclusively. We really cannot contemplate that the whole of the representation on the Council would be monopolised by one race.
I will not go on any longer. I would only reply to the objection of the noble Earl, Lord Plymouth, that we are not associating the immigrant races with any part of the trusteeship. I suggest that the powers, both of the Federal Council and of the Legislative Council of Kenya necessarily imply that it is the Legislative Council of Kenya which is to a large extent administering, under the Secretary of State, the trusteeship. What is it acting for? It would not be suggested that the settlers there are sitting there as councillors for their own profit, dealing with these native matters. They are bound to be acting as trustees, and they are untrue to their trust if they are not. We are associating them not only with the Kenya Council but also in this Federal Council—
THE EARL OF PLYMOUTH: With an official majority?
LORD PASSFIELD: Yes, certainly with an official majority because it is of the nature of a trusteeship that it cannot he devolved. Nobody would suggest that the Government could devolve their trusteeship upon anybody else. If any of your Lordships is a trustee for wards or for children you know perfectly well that you may trust the administration of this, that or the other to your solicitor or your agent, but you cannot divest yourself in equity or in law of the trusteeship and say: "I have devolved it upon this man Who is a good man." You cannot devolve it. His Majesty's Government will never be able to devolve their trusteeship because that is of the very nature of trusteeship. You may associate people with it certainly, as you associate your solicitor or your agent or anyone with it; but you cannot devolve it, you cannot free yourself from the responsibility whatever you do. The right rev. Prelate who spoke incidentally referred
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to that point and I am grateful for the support. I venture to think that whatever decision the Joint Committee comes to, it will certainly not go back on that declaration of trusteeship, which does not date, I may remark, from the Treaty of Versailles or the League of Nations. It goes back really to the roots of English Colonial policy in Africa.
There is one other thing I must mention, and that is the reference to the common roll. Really this was a question which we were bound to refer to. We could not avoid it. When you consider the demands that are made not only by the Indians in Kenya but by the Government of India on behalf of the Indians, we could not evade the issue. And whatever may be thought of the opinion expressed as to the theoretical advantage of the common roll, I would ask noble Lords to remember that all that the Report proposes and all that the Government propose is an inquiry—to ask the High Commissioner to inquire what is the most practicable action in this direction that can be taken in the near future. Is there any noble Lord who would not be prepared to inquire what was the most practicable action that could he taken in this direction in the near future? That is all that the High Commissioner is going to report upon. Less than that we could not do. More than that perhaps it would have been rash to do. May I end by saying that as far as I am concerned and as far as His Majesty's Government are concerned, we hope that the Joint Committee will go into this whole question thoroughly and the Government, subject to ultimate reserves that must be made, will wish to carry out the decision that the Joint Committee may come to. I ask leave, in the circumstances that I have explained, to withdraw the Motion.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

WEST BROMWICH CORPORATION BILL. [H.L.]

  DARLINGTON CORPORATION BILL. [H.L.]
  Commons Amendments considered, and agreed to.
  House adjourned at five minutes past seven o'clock.