EGYPT: RESIGNATION OF LORD LLOYD. (Hansard, 25 July 1929)

§ LORD PARMOOR
Which year?

§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY
This year, three weeks ago, and yet upon July 3, as we know from what passed in another place last night, a telegram was sent to the High Commissioner in Egypt which, in the words of Mr. Henderson, the Home Secretary, "was of such a character that I think most people would have accepted it as an invitation to terminate their position." There appears to be, as I judge from what I read this morning in the Press, a strange misunderstanding that the initiative for this change came from Lord Lloyd, whereas it is quite evident from the answer I have just read, made by the Foreign Secretary in the other place, that the initiative came from His Majesty's Government. It was a provoked resignation. Let there be no mistake about that whatever—it was a provoked resignation. It was abrupt, and I wonder whether the Government realise that whatever you may do in home politics, when you are 278 dealing with these delicate questions of foreign and Imperial concern anything like an abrupt change of policy has the most sinister effect.
I speak of it as a change of policy, because we have before us this morning, printed in the Press, the terms in which Lord Lloyd's resignation was conveyed to the Government. He uses these words:— I had had every hope and desire to continue to serve under the new Administration "— this is an additional proof that the change did not come from him— but I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that my views are not likely to be in sufficient harmony with yours "— that is, with the Foreign Secretary's— to enable me conscientiously to discharge my duty to his Majesty's Government. In the true tradition of the public service, when he found that he was unable to please the Government in his policy, he naturally expressed himself as quite willing to resign, but that imports some change, and we want to know what that change is. Why did Mr. Henderson, the Foreign Secretary, consider it necessary to send that telegram? Why did Lord Lloyd, as the result of the conversations which have taken place between himself and the Secretary of State—why did he say that he was satisfied that he could no longer work in harmony with the new Government? There must be some change, and we want to know what it is. I would assure your Lordships that in addressing you upon this important matter I do not want to bring prominently forward any personal consideration as regards Lord Lloyd himself. Whatever view your Lordships may take of that, that is not the most important matter. It is true, of course, that Lord Lloyd is a most distinguished public servant—

NOBLE LORDS
Hear, hear!

§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY
—and that he has in many parts of the world borne testimony to the traditional policy of this country and served us loyally throughout. In Egypt itself he has performed his task in circumstances of the greatest difficulty. I would remind your Lordships that when he took over the position of High Commissioner he found Egypt in a condition of profound unrest. There were riots; there were murders; even so great and distinguished a servant of the State 279 as the Sirdar was assassinated. It was in that connection and in that position that he became High Commissioner. The position in Egypt is always very difficult. Our place there is very delicate and the contemporary history of Egypt is fraught with difficulty. They are treading the road of representative institutions, and we know, by sad experience, that representative institutions in oriental countries are beset with difficulties, and our position was specially delicate because, as your Lordships will remember, at the time of the granting of independence to Egypt there were four important reservations made—reservations which were the essential conditions without which there would have been no independence in Egypt at all. I am not sure that I am going to quote them in their proper order—that is a small matter—but they were the protection of minorities, the safeguarding of foreign interests, all questions connected with the Sudan and, finally, the security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt: that is to say, the safeguarding of the Canal itself and of all the posts and equipment and preparations which are necessary to protect the Canal.
In other words, there were committed to our charge the care of profound responsibilities—responsibilities to the Empire, responsibilities to foreign Powers and, indeed, the responsibilities which the possession of power always gives whatever the other conditions may be. These were the circumstances in which the independence of Egypt was granted. They are vital, these communications of which I have spoken, communications with India, with Australia, with New Zealand, and with South Africa, not a matter merely of national concern, not the kind of thing which can be decided in order to suit the exigencies of the policy of the Socialist Party, but things which go to the very heart of the safety of the Empire. These are the things which we have to regard in Egypt. Therefore, I am sure the Government will realise what a grave matter we consider it to be when a serious shock is given to the stability of that policy in Egypt. If the Secretary of State for Air had been here I would have reminded him that in addition to everything else I have said there is situate in Egypt one of the most important links in the chain of air communications which lie between this 280 country and our Possessions and Dominions in the Far East. All these things are the care, or ought to be the care, of the British Government.
I want to speak, I need not say, with great respect of the Government, and especially in this connection with respect of the Foreign Secretary, because I am aware—I have good personal reason to be aware—that the Foreign Secretary is familiar, not merely with ordinary foreign policy, but with these special responsibilities which rest upon his office. He has a great acquaintance with the Dominions beyond the Seas. He knows what sentiment is in New Zealand and in Australia. He is not ignorant. I confess I cannot help relying upon the Foreign Secretary to bring this great experience and knowledge which he possesses to bear upon these problems and these decisions. I should have been inclined to ask whether there was nobody even in the Foreign Office itself who would have reminded him of it. Was there nobody in the Foreign Office who could rise above the smaller Foreign Office problems to take a really Imperial view of these issues? Of course I am well aware that the Foreign Office is not very well equipped to realise all that the Secretary of State for the Dominions who sits opposite me has to realise. I am quite aware of that. I wish it were otherwise. Of course the administration of Egypt under the Foreign Office is an exceptional thing. It is the only kind of administration they possess and I am not quite sure that they are very well equipped for that purpose.
I say I should have been inclined to ask whether there was nobody who could have reminded the Foreign Secretary of those Imperial considerations, but really I come back to what I said before. I rely upon him himself. Cannot we hope that, freeing himself from any advice which is indifferent to these great considerations, he will bring to bear upon them his own knowledge of Imperial affairs? I come back, therefore, to the question in the Notice which I put upon the Paper: What is the nature of the change in the policy of His Majesty's Government which this provoked resignation of Lord Lloyd implies? That is what the country has an absolute right to know. We have great responsibilities. We do not interfere with the 281 Executive as long as we have confidence in their decisions, but when they come down with a great dramatic stroke of this kind, a dramatic stroke which re-sounds in every quarter of the globe, which is now the subject of conversation, I should think, in every bazaar in the East, then we have a right to know, we who are a self-governing country have a right to know, what has arisen which has led the Government to this position. And it is not only in this country that public opinion has a right to know. Did the Government—I see the Secretary of State sitting there—ask the Dominion of Australia or the Dominion of New Zealand whether they were prepared for a change in the foreign policy in respect of Egypt? He sits silent. I have no doubt no communication was made. But I tell him, and I tell the Government, that they cannot any longer, no Government can any longer, decide vital questions of foreign policy without communication with the Dominions overseas. They ought to have been aware of that before they provoked the resignation of Lord Lloyd.
This question, if I may say so, is a test of the capacity of the Socialist Government to rise to the height of being able to solve these great Imperial problems and to conduct the administration of the Empire. I earnestly hope that they will not be misled by the ignorant spirit of the hustings, the sort of things which are said at election time by ignorant Socialist candidates who have no knowledge of these great things. It is not that I despise members of the Socialist Party. They are as capable, as I know personally, of understanding and appreciating these great Imperial issues as any of ourselves, but they have not had the opportunity, most of them, for that purpose. It depends upon the Government that no mistake should be made. I earnestly hope that they will be governed by this consideration, and I put to them with every emphasis I can the Question which stands upon the Paper in my name: What is the reason for the change of attitude in His Majesty's Government which has provoked the resignation of Lord Lloyd? As regards Papers, the only Papers which were of importance at the present moment were Papers which 282 were published in The Times, and so I shall make no Motion. I put the Question.

§ LORD PARMOOR
My Lords, the noble Marquess has put to me questions which are undoubtedly of very great importance. I hope I shall be able to reply, categorically really, to the questions he has asked me, but I have to bear in mind that to-morrow in the House of Commons a fuller statement will be made, which I could not make, by the Foreign Secretary.

SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS
Why not?

§ LORD PARMOOR
You will see how much I can say to-day. I think it is perhaps the impatience of the other House that has troubled my noble friend Lord Brentford, but he will see when I come to it. You cannot make three statements at the same time, but he will see how far I think I can go. I am told that the noble Viscount is going to speak, and he will have an opportunity of criticising what I say, which, I think, is the more convenient course. As regards the history of this matter, I do not know how far it is advisable or how far we are entitled to go into it, but I should like to ask the noble Marquess this question—it will be sufficient for my purpose—whether, in making his speech and his attack, if I may so call it, on the present Government, he had in mind—I will not read it for I do not think I ought to do so; in these foreign matters one has to be careful—

§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY
Is the noble and learned Lord speaking of me?

§ LORD PARMOOR
Yes, you. Have you in mind the Despatch sent from the Foreign Office, from Sir Austen Chamberlain, to Lord Lloyd on May 28 of this year?

§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY
I believe I have thoroughly in mind that Despatch, but I would suggest to the noble and learned Lord that it is neither consonant with the practice of Parliament nor is it suitable to refer to a Despatch unless he is going to read it.

§ LORD PARMOOR
I think it is perfectly right that I should allude to the date alone. I do not propose to read it, because I think that on matters of foreign policy one has to be careful, and 283 I think I can answer the questions raised by the noble Marquess if he will give me time. I cannot say everything in one moment. I hope to give him a satisfactory answer.

§ THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD
Will the noble and learned Lord allow me to interrupt him? Surely he knows the elementary rule of Parliamentary practice, never neglected either in the House of Commons or in this House, that if a Paper is referred to in the course of debate by a Minister, that Paper must be laid?

§ LORD PARMOOR
I referred only to the date. Whether it should be laid or not will be decided. I am not going further into it to-day on any account, and the noble Marquess has said that he is not asking for Papers.

§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY
I think it is right to say, after what has passed, that I deny that that Despatch gives any right to the Government for the action that they have taken.

§ LORD PARMOOR
I am not going to rely on the Despatch.

§ LORD CARSON
Why do you refer to it?

§ LORD PARMOOR
I referred to it because I thought that it was a date which was of importance, and I asked the noble Marquess whether he had it in his mind. He replied in the affirmative. With that I was satisfied, and I do not intend to go any further. The noble Marquess has referred to the two letters, which passed between Lord Lloyd and the Foreign Secretary, to which I will refer by and by, but I do not think that his words "provoked resignation" are justified. I will come to the actual words of the letters later. What in effect has been suggested by the noble Marquess is that he gathers that we are changing the continuity of our policy as regards Egypt. I think that I am stating his point frankly. Perhaps this House will recollect that it fell to my lot in 1924 to make a speech on the question of Egypt and the Sudan. I represented the Foreign Minister at that time, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, and I made a speech to the effect that, so far as our Party was concerned, we had no intention other than to insist upon the four conditions to which the noble Marquess 284 has called attention. Never has there been any criticism of our insistence on those conditions, and never has there been any alteration whatever in the outlook of the Labour Party.
At the same time, if he will allow me to refresh his memory, the question of the Sudan was specifically raised, and I gave the undertaking then, on behalf of the Labour Party, that, so far as those undertakings were concerned which largely affected in many ways the inhabitants of the Sudan, they would be honourably observed and enforced by the Labour Party. Perhaps the noble Marquess may not have that occasion in his mind. I made rather a long speech on that occasion, and the matter was subsequently referred to on a good many occasions. What I want to say perfectly specifically is this, that as regards those four conditions and as regards the treatment of the Sudan, not only will there not be any change in what was our policy in 1924 in those matters and has been the policy of the Party opposite since that date, but I think I may say that we adhere to every statement that I then made and there is not the slightest doubt that, in reference to what I may call international or foreign matters, there will be no change as regards what the noble Marquess calls the continuity of our policy in Egypt.
Of course, on the other point of the internal affairs of Egypt, that is another matter. It has been known, and was stated in 1924 in negotiations at that time with Zaghlul, that we were desirous to make arrangements with Egypt which would allow them in substance, practically almost entirely, the rights of a self-governing community as regards their internal affairs. That is a policy which we have supported throughout—I do not think there has been any change in it—and which we shall certainly support in the future. I do not know that there is any great difference—I do not want to refer to documents by any means, or I shall arouse the noble Earl again—I do not know that in this respect there is any substantial difference between the Party opposite and ourselves. On matters of this kind, when you come to questions of procedure, you do get differences and always will get differences, but as regards the general object that we should come to an arrangement with Egypt so that in 285 all internal affairs the Egyptians should have the benefits and the privileges of a self-governing community, I thought that to a great extent that might be taken as a common purpose.
If it is not a common purpose, I have to say most distinctly that our view is, and always has been, that, preserving these four conditions and reserving absolutely and honourably the conditions in the Sudan, we have desired that arrangements should be made which would enable Egypt to become an independent and sovereign country as regards its internal affairs. I do not know whether the noble Marquess thinks that very wicked or not. I think it is absolutely right. There may be a change in continuity of policy in a sense, because it may be that the late Government determined to change the policy enunciated by Mr. MacDonald in 1924 as regards the internal affairs of Egypt. I am not going into that, and I should not like to go into differences upon questions of that sort. But if they did follow and desire to follow our policy in 1924, I can assure the noble Marquess that there is no change whatever, and that we desire now to carry to a successful conclusion the negotiations initiated by Mr. MacDonald in 1924. I think that, so far as the question of policy is concerned, I have answered the questions that the noble Marquess asked me.
There is another side of this question which I am rather sorry that he referred to, because he suggested that there had been something like discourtesy—I will not use a harder term—which brought about the "provoked resignation" of Lord Lloyd. I think that is an entire mistake, and I know and can say positively that no one connected with the Foreign Office, either Mr. Henderson or any one else, desired to do other than to treat Lord Lloyd with the most perfect courtesy and to acknowledge, as Mr. Henderson does in his letter, the services that he has rendered as High Commissioner in Egypt. Let me say here, so that there may be no mistake about it, that I am sure there is not a member of the present Government who does not feel the regret that was expressed, as I will read in a moment in Mr. Henderson's letter, that Lord Lloyd has found it conscientiously necessary, as I think he must have found it, to resign his position in Egypt, and surely it is perfectly easy to 286 understand. Suppose any one in Lord Lloyd's position, with all his ideas of what is right from a national standpoint, thinks he cannot carry out what we think is right to be done in the internal affairs of Egypt at the present time, is it otherwise than honourable on the part of Lord Lloyd and of Mr. Henderson that in those circumstances they both came to the same conclusion—namely, that the Agency, as it has been called (I should like to call it by some higher name), that the work of Lord Lloyd could not be conveniently carried on further at the present time? That is a matter which often happens. It would be a matter deeply to be regretted if there had been any discourtesy, but it appears to me there has been no discourtesy whatever, and no discourtesy, so far as I know, is suggested in Lord Lloyd's letter to Mr. Henderson.
There is one other matter that I would like to go back to. The noble Marquess is quite right in saying that Mr. Henderson, besides being Foreign Minister, has had an exceptional opportunity of seeing the international elements which necessarily constitute a most important part of our general foreign policy at the present time. I had the honour of being associated with him at Geneva in 1924, when many of these matters were discussed, and when, as noble Lords know, we thought that we had come to an international agreement of an important kind. Although continuity is often talked of, when we came back, although the 52 nations which were there were in absolute agreement upon the principles to be followed in order to bring about a world scheme of disarmament, those principles were not accepted by His Majesty's late Government, as is shown by the Despatch of 1926, which was read to the Council by the Foreign Secretary, Sir Austen Chamberlain.
I do not find fault with that. Of course it was a great disappointment to us, but if a Government thinks that some line of foreign policy is not in accordance with the real national interests, I say that they are bound in duty not to go on with that policy, whatever it may be, but to modify it in such direction as they think will best serve the best interests of this country and the highest interests of the world. I cannot imagine any Government going in a direction which they thought was not right. I do not think 287 that continuity ought ever to be used in that sense, when dealing with the practical steps to be taken in any particular case. Upon the other point raised by the noble Marquess, I am anxious to exonerate both the present Government and Mr. Henderson from any idea of what is called "provoked resignation." I do not know whether Lord Lloyd is in the House or not, but I would make it as clear as I possibly can that if Lord Lloyd has any view of that kind, it was certainly neither the intention of Mr. Henderson to provoke resignation, nor do I think that his words bear that out.
The noble Marquess pointed, quite rightly, to the two letters, and I would like to read them, in order to show most distinctly that the charge of "provoked resignation" is altogether, as I think, incorrect. I do not want to use a harsher term. Lord Lloyd's letter is as follows:— Dear Mr. Henderson,—Since my return from Egypt I have been thinking over in the light of my recent conversation with you the situation caused by the advent of a new Government in England, and the policy which I understand is to be pursued in regard to Egyptian affairs. I think it was the most courteous thing possible, if Lord Lloyd came over, that conversations should take place— I had had every hope and desire to continue to serve under the new Administration "— I do not think he could have served under a better Administration.

SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS
Hear, hear! (and laughter).

§ LORD PARMOOR
I am sorry that noble Lords opposite should differ from me, but let them differ. The letter continues:— but I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that my views are not likely to be in sufficient harmony with yours as to enable me conscientiously to discharge my duty to His Majesty's Government. I shall be grateful, therefore, if you would submit my resignation to His Majesty. What could be more proper than that letter? An administrator comes home from Egypt and, as is no doubt right, has a conversation at the Foreign Office, and says he thinks he had better resign.

§ LORD CARSON
Is it not a fact that prior to that there was a telegram from Mr. Henderson at the Foreign Office, 288 which Mr. Henderson himself said he had hoped would lead to Lord Lloyd's resignation?

§ LORD PARMOOR
It is quite right that Lord Carson should ask me that question, but I am sorry—

§ THE MARQUESS OF READING
Is it possible for the noble and learned Lord to inform us of the substance of that telegram? It forms a very important part in the debate.

§ LORD PARMOOR
I have not got it

A NOBLE LORD
Send a message for it. Telephone for it.

§ LORD PARMOOR
I am sure that noble Lords wish to be courteous. Perhaps I do not appreciate the meaning of it. I think, in a matter of this kind, we might listen to each other and not jeer. What is Mr. Henderson's answer?— Dear Lord Lloyd,—I have informed His Majesty's Government of your Lordship's decision to tender your resignation of the post of High Commissioner for Egypt and the Sudan, which you have occupied during the last four years. His Majesty's Government fully recognise the sincerity of the motives which have led you to place your resignation in their hands. In accepting it with regret, they desire to express their appreciation of the eminent services rendered by you in the high and responsible positions you have held in Egypt and elsewhere. What is there about provocation there? I am sorry I have not the telegram, but I have sent for it and will see if I can get it. I did not expect this debate to come on at the time it did as the noble Marquess knows. I have been in communication with the Foreign Office, but I have not yet received a copy of the telegram. That is how the position stands. As regards what I may call the international and foreign affairs associated with Egypt, there has certainly been no difference in our outlook. If I gather correctly from what the noble Marquess has said, there is no difference between our views and the views of the late Government. The four points are to be insisted upon, and we are prepared to carry out our duties to the Sudan. The question of internal affairs is a different matter.
Whatever the result may be I cannot help thinking that Lord Lloyd was not treated with the slightest discourtesy. I am sure none was intended. He had this 289 conference with the Foreign Minister and afterwards he thought that he ought conscientiously to resign. On a matter of this kind which involved this meeting, no doubt important, between Lord Lloyd and Mr. Henderson, it is not very easy for any one to say more than I have said because, of course, I am no more cognisant of a matter of that kind that any other member of your Lordships' House. And I would ask your Lordships to remember this—I am sure the noble Marquess will appreciate the importance of it—that to-morrow in another place the Minister immediately concerned, who has himself been a party to all these transactions which we are discussing to-day, is to give an explanation and I hope a full and satisfactory one. Whether it is so or not will, of course, have to be decided after the discussion has taken place. I hope I have made it clear, at any rate from my point of view—

SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS
No.

§ LORD PARMOOR
I know they say "No," that is a common thing to say; but I have made it clear from my point of view, I hope, that the suggestion of discourtesy or provocation to resign has no foundation unless it is to be found in the telegram. It would be the height of folly and impertinence to attempt to quote from a telegram I have not got, but as far as I have information I have given it quite frankly to your Lordships. I hope you will understand that we are entirely in favour of continuity of policy, the policy we look to being that of 1924; and the only difficulty that is likely to arise has nothing to do with the point to which the noble Marquess has referred, but would really be in connection with internal matters.

§ THE MARQUESS OF READING
My Lords, none of you would desire to produce embarrassment to the Government in the discussion of foreign affairs, and I am perfectly certain that the noble Marquess who has asked the Question to-day has the desire to elicit information to satisfy the public mind, and does not wish, as I am sure that the Party with which I am associated does not wish, in the public interest, to cause inconvenience to the Government. By that I mean, and it is well understood especially in relation to foreign affairs, that there may be matters which cannot be discussed at the 290 moment in this House, and that it may be undesirable in the public interest to consider various aspects of policy which we might like to consider, and I have no wish to press the Government to give any answer which would cause that public inconvenience.
Nevertheless I must confess that I am disappointed, very disappointed, at the reply which has been made by the noble and learned Lord. I came to this House to-day with a desire to know what had happened—a desire shared by every member of your Lordships' House and by the public; and for two reasons in the main. The first is that on the correspondence which is published the impression is distinctly created—and I challenge contradiction—that the cause of Lord Lloyd's resignation is a change of policy by the new Government in Egypt. That is most definitely stated in the letter and it is not refuted by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the, reply which he gives. Consequently we must assume that there is a change of policy and I am the more perplexed in listening to the explanations which have been given.
There is a second point to which the noble Marquess referred incidentally, but to which great importance must be attributed. Lord Lloyd is a distinguished public servant with a fine record of service behind him. I would agree with the noble Marquess that we are not so much concerned to-day with the person of Lord Lloyd as with the public service and the conditions of public service, and more particularly the circumstances which could lead to correspondence of the character published this morning. It is a matter which can hardly be passed over without attention, and which requires explanation, that a public servant with a great record should resign in these circumstances. I can speak from close acquaintance with the services he rendered as Governor of Bombay. I know the difficulties he had to meet. I would even say that we were not always agreed in the discussion, although in the end we arrived, of course, at conclusions which were satisfactory to both. But nevertheless there could not have been a more public-spirited Governor than Lord Lloyd in Bombay, one who had to encounter greater difficulties and who dealt with 291 them with greater satisfaction both to those of us in the Government of India and to the Government at home.
Well, it is a little startling to find that after this record, when he returns to this country and is appointed to this high and distinguished position in Egypt, which I think he has filled for close upon four years, almost simultaneously with the change of Government which took place the position seems to be forced upon him—I use the word advisedly—that he must resign. I can well understand circumstances in which it would not be possible for one holding that high post to continue in relations with a new Government, because as time developed it would be found that there were matters upon which they were not agreed. For myself I dislike entering into personal matters, but I would instance to your Lordships conditions which happened to myself when I was Viceroy of India when there were changes of Government. There were indeed five changes of Government during a period of three and a half years, and there were four changes in the position of Secretary of State during that time. I never found that there were any difficulties of this character. No doubt, if changes which were desired had been forced upon the Government of India, or if changes which I desired had been refused by the Government at home it might very well be that resignation would have been necessary.
But what puzzles me is why in the very short time which has elapsed, and in the light of the conditions and circumstances disclosed to us to-day, in so far as they have been disclosed, Lord Lloyd should feel bound to hand in his resignation and the Government to accept it. I can well understand that there are circumstances which would have made it necessary, as I have said, but I am still perplexed by what the noble and learned Lord has said to understand what the differences are. Am I right in this view, first, that as regards the four reservations and the Sudan there is no change of policy?

§ LORD PARMOOR
Yes.

§ THE MARQUESS OF READING
I am right in that assumption.

§ LORD PARMOOR
I think so.

§ THE MARQUESS OF READING
So I understood from others and it is true, 292 as the noble and learned Lord knows, if he will forgive me saying so. I think it is most unsatisfactory to us in this House, debating a matter of the gravest importance, in which we are not only entitled to take an interest but about which we are bound to enquire and ascertain what the position is, that the noble and learned Lord should tell us that he is not in a position to give information, but that we must wait until the Foreign Secretary states it in another place.

§ LORD PARMOOR
In reference to what the noble Marquess has said, may I say that on the question he is dealing with, the four conditions, I gave a distinct and positive answer. As regards matters which passed between Mr. Henderson and Lord Lloyd, I do not see how I possibly could.

§ THE MARQUESS OF READING
I am quite satisfied as regards the four reservations and the Sudan, if the answer is as I now understand it from what the noble and learned Lord has said.

§ LORD PARMOOR
I thought I made it clear.

§ THE MARQUESS OF READING
He said very distinctly that there is no change of policy in regard to the four reservations and the Sudan. I understood from what the noble and learned Lord said that he adhered to that view. My only reason for putting the question to him was that I was not sure that I heard some of the sentences that fell from him.

§ LORD PARMOOR
I am very sorry if there is any dispute at all. I tried to make it as clear as I possibly could. Of course, we have only had this question recently. I thought I had made it clear.

§ THE MARQUESS OF READING
I do not wish to prolong this part of the debate. We are rather seeking information at the moment—and what we understand from the Government is, as I understand the noble and learned Lord now, that there is no change of policy, and that it cannot be a change of policy either in relation to the four reservations or to the Sudan which has led to the resignation of Lord Lloyd. So far, at any rate, we are clear. Then we are left with the statement that in relation to the internal government of Egypt—and I should like the noble and learned Lord's attention because I want 293 to be accurate and to be quite sure that I understood him—there has been a change of policy.

§ LORD PARMOOR
I do not know what the noble Marquess calls a change of policy. I do not think there has been. There is, in one sense, a change of procedure. I think that the late Government always desired, as far as the internal policy of Egypt is concerned, after negotiation and arrangement, that it should have as much as possible the constitution of a self-governing community. I do not say about the methods followed. In that respect we probably go further. We have the same desire but a different way, no doubt, of proceeding.

§ THE MARQUESS OF READING
I understand now that there is no difference in matters of internal government save, perhaps, in a matter of procedure.

§ LORD PARMOOR
That may be all-important.

§ THE MARQUESS OF READING
I agree, it may be all-important. May I point out to the noble and learned Lord the difficulty under which we are now discussing this question? Your Lordships will observe the position we are in. We are seeking to ascertain whether there has been a change of policy which has led to the resignation of Lord Lloyd. We are told, first, that there is no change of policy as regards the four reservations and the Sudan; secondly, that there is no change of policy in regard to internal questions—would the noble and learned Lord mind giving me his attention? I am only anxious to have it in order that there should be no misconception between us about this.

§ LORD PARMOOR
I can assure the noble Marquess that I listened to him with all courtesy. I thought I had already twice answered the questions he put to me.

§ THE MARQUESS OF READING
I was summing up what I gathered from what the noble and learned Lord said, and I dealt with only two points. The third is that the only change of policy could be in procedure, which I quite agree may be an important matter.

§ LORD PARMOOR
All-important.

§ THE MARQUESS OF READING
I was then calling your Lordships' attention to the difficulty we are in. What is the change of procedure, what is the method, what is it that led to Lord Lloyd's resignation? It is not the two vital matters to which reference has been made—external affairs or internal affairs—but some method of procedure. Are we not to know what it is? The noble and learned Lord made reference to a document of May 28. Unfortunately, I have not got it and I have not seen it. I do not even know what the document is. It has not been laid on the Table of the House, and we are not able to deal with it. Apart from the technical rule, I gathered that the noble and learned Lord withdrew his observation with regard to it. Consequently, we have not got it.
There is one other document, again a document which I have not seen. It is dated July 3, and I gathered from the noble Marquess and again from an interposition from the noble and learned Lord, that the document was sent on July 3. That is, of course, the only document which, under this change of procedure, this change of policy, can have led to the resignation of Lord Lloyd. We have asked for that document. I have asked the noble and learned Lord to tell us the substance of it. We are left absolutely in the dark. We do not know what was in that document of July 3. The only thing we know is that Lord Lloyd came to this country soon after. I gathered from the Press that he arrived on Saturday last, that he then had a conversation with the Foreign Secretary and that, as the result of his conversation, he resigned. I submit to your Lordships that that is the most unsatisfactory condition in which we can debate a matter of this importance. I cannot think it is any excuse to say that the Minister responsible will make an explanation to-morrow in another place. After all this Notice was on the Paper to-day. An indication was given yesterday by the noble Marquess—

§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY
I told them at the adjournment.

§ THE MARQUESS OF READING
—that the Question would be raised; but the only document which, so far as I can gather, has any bearing on the point we are now discussing, is not before us, no 295 one on the Government side is in a position to tell us what is the substance of the document, or is able, so far as I am aware, to indicate the subject matter of it. We are left hung up on this matter and I suppose we shall have to wait until to-morrow for the information. I cannot but think that is most unsatisfactory. It does not enable one to understand what the noble and learned Lord referred to as the correspondence that passed. I do not wish to rely upon that especially after his admission, which, I am sure, was perfectly justified and well founded, that there was no intention of being discourteous. Nevertheless, the actual position and attitude of the Government, so far as I can understand it at present, leads to a very unpleasant feeling. I recollect that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made an answer, which seems a little bit difficult to reconcile with what was said by the noble and learned Lord. The Foreign Secretary said:— The telegram that I sent to Lord Lloyd was of such a character that I think most people would have accepted it as an invitation to terminate their position. That is tantamount to a dismissal. It is a matter of the utmost importance, more especially in relation to foreign affairs and to the East. I do not wish to refer to affairs in the East or to India, but I cannot conceive of anything more serious than to deal with one occupying that high place, who has done such distinguished service in the past, in a manner which really means that there is no option after the telegram that was sent and which we have not yet seen: "It must be left to you to take the only course open and send in your resignation!" I very much regret the Government have been unable to give us any better explanation, and, in particular, that the only document mentioned is still not available.

§ THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS AND THE COLONIES (LORD PASSFIELD)
My Lords, I have the greatest diffidence in intervening even for a few minutes upon this subject, because, as your Lordships know, I perhaps am unskilled in diplomatic niceties and the necessity of weighing every word in these matters. I shall only speak with reference to some words that fell from the noble Marquess [Lord Salisbury] about the very natural interest 296 which our Dominions and the Government of India take in a question of this kind. What the noble Marquess was, and is, anxious about, I think, was lest this Government, with the competence of which he did not express any very great opinion, should be proceeding in this matter without proper reference to the wishes and the anticipations of the Dominions and the Government of India. I should like to say to your Lordships, because it is a matter in which I necessarily have had to be concerned, that no step has been taken in this matter, as in other matters of like character, without as much communication and as far as practicable consultation with the Dominions and the Government of India on all questions of this nature. I must go on to explain, because I do not want your Lordships to imagine that the Dominions or the Government of India were consulted, or could have been consulted, about the step which Lord Lloyd has taken. Obviously time did not permit of even telegraphic communication, and, moreover, when a resignation is tendered, it is not possible to have any further consultation about it.
But I quite agree with the noble Marquess who has just spoken [the Marquess of Reading] as to the extremely inconvenient position in which this House finds itself in attempting to discuss the subject at this moment. Of course the debate was not of our seeking, and as it was not of our seeking the Government must not be blamed for the inconvenient position in which the House finds itself. In these matters information must be given, but it must be given with due regard to negotiations which are pending, and it must be given with due regard to the position of the Foreign Secretary, who could not speak to-day in another place, and will have to speak to-morrow. That, again, was not of our settlement. With regard to the action taken by Lord Lloyd and the reply of the Foreign Secretary, it is obviously not in my power to refer to the correspondence which preceded the action taken. Not only is there a technical difficulty in doing so, but, again, I am new at the matter. It must be obvious that in negotiations of this kind it is not possible to publish and to make known what has been proceeding until the negotiations have reached a 297 stage in which publication can be made without actually upsetting the work that is in progress.

§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY
To what negotiations is the noble Lord referring?

§ LORD PASSFIELD
The noble Marquess asks: "what negotiations?" I would remind him that it is a matter of fact of which he must be aware that there have been negotiations pending with the Egyptian Government on various matters for a long time, and it is not for me to make any statement about those negotiations or about the subject matter of them; and the noble Marquess is probably aware that if he wants to discover the ground of the reasons for this event that has happened he has to go a good deal further back than any telegram of the 3rd July, or of the correspondence that has been published. The noble Marquess will probably be aware—it will be within his memory—of the proceedings which have taken place, and it is not for me to dwell further upon them, or even to give the substance of them. They do not reflect any discredit, I need hardly say, upon Lord Lloyd and, if I may venture to say so, in my view they do not reflect any discredit upon His Majesty's late Government. But the matter did not begin with the General Election of May 30, or with the accession to office of the present Foreign Minister. As to the difficulty in answering whether there has been a change of policy, there is no difficulty with regard to the four major questions of reservation and the Sudan, no difficulty whatever with the general lines of policy which His Majesty's late Government and the preceding Government and the Government before that have always maintained with regard to our relations with Egypt.
It sometimes seems to be imagined that Egypt is a part of the British Empire, or that we are in Egypt under the conditions in which we are in India and in other places. But I should not like to say that it was the policy of His Majesty's late Government to take up that position. It is clear that the position in Egypt has not been satisfactory for a good many years, and successive Governments have endeavoured to get the relations put upon a more satisfactory footing, always maintaining to the fullest 298 extent the four reservations and the question of the Sudan, in which our position has been clear. I want to repeat what my noble friend has said, that with regard to those four major reservations and the Sudan, there has been, as far as I know, no change in policy by this Government as compared with the declared policy of successive previous Governments. I have heard individuals make utterances which were inconsistent with that policy, inconsistent with what successive Governments have always declared to be the basis of our position in Egypt, and the hopes and intentions with which the British Government carries on its relations with the Egyptian Government. Now it must be perfectly clear that with regard to those four major reservations, with regard to the Sudan, with regard to the repeated declarations of successive British Governments—I will not say for the last thirty years, but for a very long time—as to what is the basis of our position in Egypt and what the intentions of successive British Governments have always been stated to be with regard to the future relations with Egypt, there is no change of policy in the present Government from those repeated declarations of successive Governments in the past.
But have there not sometimes been in previous years recently, as well as before what can be called recently, individual acts and individual statements which are not consistent with that repeatedly declared policy of the British Government with regard to Egypt and with that repeatedly declared expectation and desire with regard to the future of Egypt? There comes in the difficulty of saying whether there is a change of policy or not. I say there is no change in comparison with the repeated public declarations of policy of the successive Governments which have preceded this Government. This Government, at any rate, intend to carry out that policy which has been so frequently repeated, so constantly reiterated. We are endeavouring to carry out that policy and we hope to bring about that relation with Egypt with regard to self-government which successive Governments have repeatedly declared, have repeatedly stated as the intention of the Government, and have constantly affirmed that they wish to do. We are proceeding on the same lines. When my noble friend referred to the 299 possibility of differences of procedure it is a question of taking one step after another and those steps cannot be described or cannot be given in detail so long as they are in process of negotiation.
I have ventured to say these things because I think it is desirable that there should be a very clear statement as to these statements about the supposed change of policy. But to come back to the immediate cause of this debate I do want to remind your Lordships once more that we cannot discover or infer the cause or causes of this present occurrence merely by enquiring what has happened during the last few weeks.

§ LORD CARSON
If the noble Lord will excuse me, may I ask if there is any difficulty in reading to us the telegram which was sent out to Lord Lloyd?

§ LORD PASSFIELD
We have not got the telegram.

§ LORD CARSON
Do they not keep copies of these things in the Foreign Office?

§ LORD PASSFIELD
I suppose they do keep them at the Foreign Office, but there is a certain distance between here and the Foreign Office.

§ LORD CARSON
That is a futile answer.

§ LORD PASSFIELD
I will not compete with the noble and learned Lord with regard to courtesy or amenities. I am inexperienced in the ways of this House, but I will endeavour to be courteous to the noble and learned Lord. I can only say that in due time, and with due regard to the difficulties which always arise with regard to the publication of documents relating to negotiations, I think it will be made manifest to your Lordships, as I have said, that the occurrence which we are discussing cannot be described, cannot be understood, and cannot properly be appreciated without reference to what preceded the coming into office of the present Foreign Secretary and cannot be dissociated from what actually did pass between His Majesty's Government and the High Commissioner in the time of the late Government.

§ THE MARQUESS OF READING
Would it be convenient, as there is going to be an adjournment, to have the telegram sent for? The Foreign Office is not far. We might have the telegram perhaps.

§ LORD PASSFIELD
I am sure the noble and learned Marquess will realise that if correspondence is to be produced all the correspondence must be produced.

§ VISCOUNT BRENTFORD
Does the noble Lord suggest that there is any other communication to Lord Lloyd—other than the telegram of July 3, before Lord Lloyd came to this country?

§ LORD PASSFIELD
Yes. I am not saying from whom that communication came. I do not think I should be warranted—

§ VISCOUNT BRENTFORD
I do not want the noble Lord to misunderstand. I want to know whether the present Government made any communication to Lord Lloyd other than the telegram which they will not produce.

§ LORD PASSFIELD
I am not aware of any, but my whole point is that you cannot understand this occurrence without reference to what passed before the present Government came into existence.

§ VISCOUNT BRENTFORD
We know that.

§ LORD PASSFIELD
The noble Viscount says "We know that." If the noble Viscount knows that I am sure his colleagues and the other noble Lords who are here will take note of the fact that there were previous communications, there was previous correspondence, there were relevant exchanges before there was a change of Government. That is the reason why it is very difficult for any one on this Bench at this moment to publish correspondence or produce correspondence, not our correspondence; not merely for technical reasons but because, as I have already explained, they do refer to negotiations, to action taken and proposals made, not only by ourselves, which it is not convenient at this moment in the public interest should be made known, I do not say to your Lordships, but made known to the world. It is because of that that we find ourselves to-day in the inconvenient position of not being able thoroughly to go into this matter, but I do ask your Lordships to believe that we have endeavoured as far as in us lay to state what can properly be stated at this moment, and if that is not sufficient to enable your Lordships to form an opinion and pronounce 301 judgment that is because this debate is taking place at a time which is inconvenient for that purpose.

§ LORD PARMOOR
My Lords, would it be convenient to your Lordships to adjourn now? I do not know whether you think we might take an adjournment until a quarter past two.

§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY
Could we not say half past two?

§ LORD PARMOOR
I think a quarter past two would be better in view of other events this afternoon.

§ VISCOUNT BRENTFORD
My Lords, I do not propose to take up much of the time of the House, but there are one or two questions arising out of the speech made by the noble Lord the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs and there are one or two further points that I think want clearing up as to what really happened in this unfortunate episode of the resignation or, as I am bound to say I should prefer to call it, the dismissal of Lord Lloyd. I want to call attention—because, until the noble Lord the Secretary of State for the Dominions dealt with the matter, it had not been referred to here—to the statement made by the Foreign Secretary in another place yesterday. He began by saying that this was the resignation of Lord Lloyd, and it was not until he was forced by supplementary Questions that he told us of the telegram which he had sent to Lord Lloyd, and he also stated that the intimation to Lord Lloyd before the latter left Egypt—that was, of course, the telegram of July 3—was based upon "my reading of the attitude that he had adopted towards the policy of the late Government." The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, speaking just before lunch, reiterated that statement that the resignation of Lord Lloyd was practically asked for, and I think that we on this side of the House must definitely agree that the telegram mentioned by the Foreign Secretary yesterday in another place was distinctly such a telegram—I accept the words of the Foreign Secretary—that no ordinary man could do other than treat it as a dismissal.
Everybody knows, of course, that in affairs of State Governments do not 302 summarily dismiss their high officers. They send such a letter or such a communication as leaves to the high officer in question the inevitable necessity of placing his resignation in the hands of the Government, and any man of honour would do what Lord Lloyd did on receiving such a telegram. He at once came over here in reply to the telegram and in subsequent conversation, as we know, placed his resignation in the hands of the Foreign Secretary. I want to speak quite definitely upon this point. I was, of course, a member of the last Cabinet. There were sitting on this Bench this morning three or four members of the last Cabinet. Lord Lloyd was, of course, in constant touch with the Cabinet, it was the duty of the Cabinet to see him from time to time when he came over to this country on his annual visit, and it was the duty of the High Commissioner to keep in close touch with the Foreign Secretary and with the Cabinet. I go so far as to say that in all matters involving policy, it was the duty of the High Commissioner, the man on the spot, to make advices to the Homo Government—advices, if necessary, in the shape of criticism of any proposals that might be put before him. A man occupying that high position would really not be doing his duty to his country unless he were perfectly frank to the Government at home, giving them the fullest expression of his opinion with regard to any suggestions of policy that they might make.
Having said so much, I now desire to state categorically on behalf of those of my colleagues who are here—and I am quite sure that I can say so on behalf of the late Government as a whole—that Lord Lloyd never disregarded any instructions sent to him by the Government, and that he had the fullest confidence of the Government up to the very end of our remaining in office. Up to the very last Cabinet meeting that was held Lord Lloyd, as High Commissioner in Egypt, had our fullest confidence. From time to time, he was expressly thanked by His Majesty's Government for the way in which he was carrying on the very grave and very difficult duties of that high office. I feel that I must say that because not merely was a suggestion made by the Foreign Secretary but by the Dominion Secretary in this House this afternoon. The suggestion was that 303 he was asked to resign because of the difficulties which he had with the late Government. May I say with the very greatest respect that that surely is a matter for the late Government. You have no right to dismiss an official of the late Government because you feel that he had difficulties with the late Government. That was a matter for us. If the difficulties were of such a nature that they could not be reconciled it was our duty to deal with the matter, and I feel sure that if we had had in our minds any idea that the High Commissioner was acting contrary to our ideas, our views or our policy, we should have known how to deal with him. We had no such idea and I suggest that it is not for the succeeding Government to dismiss him. They may dismiss him because they do not agree with his policy, but that is their responsibility and not ours.
Then I want to ask about this telegram of July 3. The new Government had been in office something under a month and they had apparently formed a conclusion that it was necessary or desirable in the interests of the policy which they desired to carry out that the High Commissioner in Egypt should be asked to resign. I could not quite make out from the speech of the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs whether there was any other correspondence with the High Commissioner, or whether the telegram was sent to him in the midst of his arduous duties as a sort of bombshell which, as the Foreign Secretary said yesterday, left him no option except to resign. I do not know whether during the interval for lunch the Government have been able to get that telegram from the Foreign Office. It cannot be so far away. The noble Lord who leads the House made play of the fact that the Foreign Office is some distance from here, but we have been adjourned for forty minutes, and if the Government wanted to get the information for the House, clearly they could have got that telegram. There are telephones to the Foreign Office. They have chosen to send a telegram to a high officer carrying out very arduous duties—a telegram of such a character as to enforce his resignation—and they will not, as at present advised, present it to the House. Of course it may be said that all will be made clear in another place. I recollect that not twenty-four hours ago 304 the noble and learned Lord made a speech against the proposal that the Secretary of State for India should be represented in this House. The Lord President said it was not at all necessary, because he and those sitting beside him were cognisant of the views of the Government upon all important questions, and were able and willing to give any necessary information. Within twenty-four hours the noble and learned Lord is either unable or unwilling to give the information which the House has asked for and which I think it has a right to demand.
Then I come to the four points. The noble Marquess above the gangway, if I may say so, forced the Government into the position that they agreed with these four points. The noble and learned Lord said so, but the noble Lord the Secretary of State for the Dominions said that although the policy would be the same, although they would pay lip service to the four points, there would be a change of method. I think we are entitled to know what that meant. Take the first of the four points—security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt. The late Government have interpreted that as requiring certain troops to be maintained in Egypt, and, above all, certain troops to be maintained in Cairo. I can quite understand the noble Lord being prepared to pay lip service to that, but is he going to alter the methods? Is there going to be a change in the methods which we thought to be essential for the maintenance of the security of the Empire communications? The noble Lord, Lord Parmoor, does not appear inclined to give us any definite information upon that point. As to how the methods are going to be changed, and in what direction the changes are to take place which will enable him to salve his conscience, he will not tell us, and I cannot put him in the "thumb-screw" and make him tell us; but I must confess, the Government having stated yesterday that they were able and willing to give all the information to which the House is entitled, I think this is a matter which the House is entitled to know. Yet the noble and learned Lord tells us that he either will not or cannot give us this information.
May I refer for a moment to the declaration which was made by the then Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George, in 305 1922, when these conditions were laid down? The then Prime Minister communicated them to the Dominions in an important Despatch through the Secretary of State for the Colonies, signed by the Prime Minister. It quite clearly laid down certain conditions, to which I should be glad to hear whether the present Government adhere. The Despatch stated:— This pronouncement, while recognising Egypt as an independent sovereign State, lays down the position which we claim in Egypt, vis-a-vis all other Powers, and enumerates the matters in which the maintenance of our special position is vital to Imperial security. Are we still to maintain, under proposals which we do not yet know, our special position in Egypt? The communication continues:— We propose to declare that the welfare and integrity of Egypt are necessary to the peace and safety of the British Empire, which will therefore always maintain as an essential British interest the special relations between itself and Egypt long recognised by other Governments. Those special relations between ourselves and Egypt: are they going to be altered?
The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs told us that he was in constant communication with the Dominions. I could not quite make out whether he meant to infer that he had communicated to the Dominions the views of the Government upon the alteration in policy; whether he, having of course in his mind this document of 1922, which was the official intimation to the Dominions of our position in Egypt, before assenting to the despatch of the telegram to the High Commissioner, which made his resignation inevitable, had communicated to the Dominions that there was such a change of policy on the part of His Majesty's Government as would necessitate their sending a telegram to the High Commissioner and in fact dismissing him.

§ LORD PASSFIELD
If the noble Viscount will allow me, what I said was that with regard to those four points and the Sudan the Government had made no change in policy and had no intention of making a change in policy; but I also said that with regard to the negotiations which are in progress and other matters the Dominions were taken fully into our confidence in 306 repeated telegrams from time to time. I cannot remember at what date various telegrams were sent. And I would like to add that on all these other matters, besides the four points and the Sudan, it is a matter of negotiation and nothing has yet been settled.

§ VISCOUNT BRENTFORD
This is perhaps the most important statement that has been made in the debate this afternoon. Then there are negotiations proceeding between His Majesty's Government and somebody in regard to the position in Egypt. With whom? We know, of course, that several important Ministers of Egypt are in this country at this moment. The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary of Egypt are here. Does the noble Lord really mean that these negotiations began before or after the dismissal of the High Commissioner? And was the dismissal of the High Commissioner almost an essential to the successful conduct of the negotiations?

§ LORD PASSFIELD
That is a matter of opinion, but as a matter of fact the resignation of Lord Lloyd had nothing whatever to do with the negotiations which are in progress.

§ VISCOUNT BRENTFORD
No, the resignation of Lord Lloyd is caused by a change of policy on the part of His Majesty's Government. Really, the noble and learned Marquess above the Gangway made that perfectly clear, but if it is disputed I do not want there to be any difference of opinion on this point. It was not merely that his views were not likely to be in sufficient harmony with those of the new Government, but Lord Lloyd in his letter, after referring to the conversation he had recently had with the Foreign Secretary, writes that he has been thinking over the situation caused by the advent of a new Government in England, and the policy which I understand is to be pursued in regard to Egyptian affairs. He could only have understood that from a conversation with the Foreign Secretary.

§ LORD PASSFIELD
I am not able to give any information as to his conversation with the Foreign Secretary, but it is quite clear that his conversation with the Foreign Secretary took place after the 307 particular telegram to which the noble Viscount refers, and if, as I understand it, Lord Lloyd has in view in his letter some conversation which he had had with the Foreign Secretary, the Foreign Secretary will in due course state his view of that. I cannot—I mean I physically cannot, because I do not know what took place. As far as I know negotiations are still going on. The noble Lord asks, with whom? Is it not clear that with regard to the internal government of Egypt—and the noble Viscount will know that the internal administration of Egypt is not in exactly what you would call a satisfactory position at this moment on constitutional and other grounds—is it not clear that these negotiations must necessarily be with the Government of Egypt and that they are not yet concluded?

§ VISCOUNT BRENTFORD
Of course, every question I ask of the noble Lord postpones the possibility of our getting to another form of entertainment without yielding us very much information. The noble Lord has a faculty for clouding the issue with a multitude of words, going back to the four points, but not in the least telling us what I aim trying to find out from him as to the negotiations pending with the Egyptian Government, although he is a member of the Cabinet. I cannot imagine that in an important matter of this kind the Foreign Secretary would carry on—may I say to the verge of a successful issue?—negotiations of the most vital importance not merely to Egypt but to our own country and the Imperial position without communicating full information regarding them to the Cabinet. The noble Lord comes and says he is not able to tell us what took place in these negotiations.

§ LORD PASSFIELD
The noble Viscount must not misquote. I said I did not know what had passed between the Foreign Secretary and Lord Lloyd at their interview. It is obvious that the noble Viscount is much better acquainted than I am with the proceedings of Cabinets, and he will realise that every member of the Cabinet knows a great deal more than he is at liberty to say.

§ VISCOUNT BRENTFORD
I do not want to waste the time of the House. I will only say that in my limited experience of Cabinets there could have been no such conversation with a Cabinet Minister and 308 no such telegram leading to the dismissal of a High Commissioner without their coming to the knowledge of the Cabinet as a whole. We have been talking in the dark. We have endeavoured to ascertain from the Government what was the cause of Lord Lloyd's dismissal, what negotiations are now in progress, and what is the change of policy which caused the resignation. To all of those questions we have had unsatisfactory replies, or none at all. I cannot go further than that. Whether we are going to have a full statement in another place to-morrow I do not know, but I do quite definitely say, particularly to the noble and learned Lord who leads the House after his speech yesterday, that the withholding of information from the House which the House has a right to receive does not conduce to improve the position of the House of Lords. I think I heard him complaining of the position of this House yesterday and the confidence or lack of confidence felt in it by the public. The noble and learned Lord has not helped to give it that position in the country which it has a right to have. So long as this House remains an effective portion of the Constitution we are entitled to demand information from the Government. The Leader of the Opposition, the noble and learned Marquess above the Gangway and myself have endeavoured to get some information from the Government, and we have lamentably failed because the Government have taken refuge in vague generalities and will not answer the simple questions which are put to them, which are matters of fact, and if they know the facts, as they ought to know them, they could quite easily answer them.

§ THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD
My Lords, I will only add a word, because I for some years had some responsibility in relation to the East and in the days of the Coalition I was closely associated with this Egyptian question, and was a member of the late Cabinet Committee which dealt with the Egyptian anxieties at the commencement of their period of office. I am, I think, then of surviving Ministers the one who has had a closer association with Egyptian politics than probably any one in this House. I desire to make two observations. In the first place, if matters are to 309 proceed harmoniously here, the noble and learned Lord who leads the House must really form, while he leads it, a wholly different conception of what the surviving rights and privileges of this House are. Having received adequate notice of matters which must have engaged the attention of his Cabinet, he cannot treat us in this way—" I can only make a very partial and perfunctory statement because a full statement will be made in another place to-morrow." The House of Lords even in its present condition has never been so treated by a Leader of the House.
The proper method for the noble and learned Lord to have pursued when he received notice on the adjournment yesterday of the intention of the noble Marquess who leads the Opposition, was to go round to his colleague, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and say: "The House of Lords will rightly require to be adequately informed to-morrow of the circumstances which have provoked this crisis. Give me the information." I was a member of a Cabinet for twelve years and I never knew things handled in any other way. The noble and learned Lord is a colleague, I suppose an equal colleague, of the Foreign Secretary. There is no secrecy, or ought to be no secrecy, between Cabinet colleagues. And that the noble and learned Lord should have come to this House to-day so ill-equipped, without one particle of the necessary and relevant information, is a scandal and an insult to this House. Is the telegram of July 3 here even now, may I ask?

§ LORD PARMOOR
It has been thoroughly explained.

§ THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD
It has not.

§ LORD PARMOOR
The noble Earl thinks it has not. It was thoroughly explained that we cannot produce this telegram at the present time. There are matters which cannot be produced in the circumstances because pf the public interest. I do not want to argue at all with the noble Earl. He can make what comment he likes.

§ LORD CARSON
Is it a question of economy?

§ THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD
The matter grows more astonishing with every explanation.

§ LORD PARMOOR
I am sure.

§ THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD
The noble and learned Lord is well entitled to be sure of it. He knows himself and he knows his colleagues. Let your Lordships consider the position to which we are reduced. The noble and learned Lord conceives himself to be entitled to refer to a telegram and to found some sort of argument upon it—

§ LORD PARMOOR
No.

§ THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD
—and then to say that it cannot be produced.

§ LORD PARMOOR
We never referred to it.

§ THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD
Does he not really see that this is the pivot in the whole resignation story, the one that produced the answer from Lord Lloyd? And then the noble Lord says that high considerations of public policy make it impossible for them to produce it. Then we are never to know the story. It is not to be told. We are to reach a decision with that story untold. Let me for the further Parliamentary education of the noble and learned Lord venture, as one who has had some official experience in this House, to give him a further piece of advice. Never again make the basis of a Parliamentary argument a document which, when challenged, you say you cannot lay upon the Table of the House. It was my duty some years ago to give very elementary instruction to the noble and learned Lord upon this point, and I thought I had convinced him of the impropriety of that practice and of the absolute right of the House to insist upon a document so used being placed upon the Table. But in the twenty years during which I have been in Parliament, I have never known a Minister attempt to make such an argumentative use of a document which he did not intend to produce as that which was made by the noble and learned Lord to-day.
I do not know whether your Lordships observed the full implications. I noticed them very closely. At the beginning of his speech the noble and learned Lord said: "I do not know whether the noble Marquess is aware of the Despatches that 311 were exchanged on such and such a day between Lord Lloyd and the late Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs." I pass by the inconceivable affront to your Lordships of a private conversation between the noble and learned Lord and the noble Marquess in relation to documents of which the House was not cognisant. I have never heard of such a thing in all the years in which I can remember Parliament in either House. What was the inference, the indispensable inference which the noble and learned Lord attempted to draw—that he thought there was something in that document which showed that differences of opinion had arisen between Sir Austen Chamberlain and Lord Lloyd which afforded some justification for the attitude of His Majesty's present Government. Does he really think it decent to conduct a Parliamentary argument in that way? If the noble and learned Lord relies upon a document, let us have none of these hole and corner presentations, let him read to Parliament the documents on which he relies and let him be sure that Parliament will get these documents if they have not obtained them from the noble and learned Lord to-day. They are relevant and vital documents.
There is some foundation for the view expressed in more than one quarter to-day that the issue here is larger than the personal issue of Lord Lloyd. But though that is true, the personal issue of Lord Lloyd is of immense importance because the position of every man in the public service in difficult, critical and, perhaps, dangerous situations is affected by a precedent of this character. I make it plain that in my opinion it is the duty of Parliament to investigate the circumstances in which a man of Lord Lloyd's extraordinary personal distinction, who still desired to remain in the public service in that particular duty, has received a message from the Foreign Secretary, which, in the honest admission of the Foreign Secretary himself, made it necessary that a man of self-respect should resign. Is not Parliament entitled to know something of those circumstances?
I heard with satisfaction from the noble and learned Lord the clear and unequivocal statement—it was the only clear and unequivocal statement which has been made from that Bench to-day—that the reservations are to be maintained in 312 their integrity and that no variation of established policy will be undertaken in the Sudan. Those two, therefore, I find it unnecessary to examine further. It was a reassurance which gave me great satisfaction. But the noble and learned Lord said that except in matters of procedure (I agree that he added "which might be all-important procedure ") there were not to be other changes of policy. Then cannot someone explain to us—someone, if I may venture to express a preference, who has not hitherto made any attempt to explain anything—cannot such a one, somebody fresh, explain to us whether or no Lord Lloyd was made aware of what this modification of procedure, which might be all-important, was?
Was that ever conveyed to Lord Lloyd? If it was conveyed to Lord Lloyd, presumably Lord Lloyd would know it. I ask this question not without some foundation to base myself upon. Is it not the fact that Lord Lloyd expressly asked the Foreign Secretary what changes of policy were contemplated, and that the Foreign Secretary said he could not discuss those questions with Lord Lloyd? If that be true—I do not as a rule ask questions without having some material to base myself upon—what becomes of the whole story which has been told us to-day from the Bench opposite? It has no contact with any relevant fact in the dispute. If, on the other hand, Lord Lloyd was made aware of the Government's policy, one would perhaps have expected that we should have been given to-day some evidence of his differing from the conclusions which the Government had reached. I, on the contrary, have some reasons for saying that negotiations of a formal character were actually taking place between His Majesty's Government and high personages who represent Egypt without any communication of any kind having been made to His Majesty's High Commissioner. If that be true nothing more scandalous ever took place.

SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS
Hear, hear!

§ THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD
Lord Lloyd had a responsibility to Parliament, to the King, and to the public, and that any Government, without keeping him closely informed until the very moment that he ceased to be Commissioner, should have undertaken negotiations is a proceeding 313 indecorous as, happily, it is unprecedented in our political history. I would make this further observation. Negotiations, as we now know definitely, are in progress. They are important negotiations. They may be, as the noble and learned Lord has told us, matters of procedure of all-reaching importance. The nebulousness of the language which the noble and learned Lord invariably employs leads me to some confusion as to what he really means. I find it difficult, in any precision of phrase, to envisage a mere act of procedure which is of all-reaching importance. If it is of all-reaching importance upon matters of high political consequence it is not a mere matter of procedure. But what I want to know is this—and this is the important point in the debate—are these negotiations to reach a conclusion without Parliament being informed? Are we to separate to-morrow—the House of Commons to separate, your Lordships to separate—and are we to find that behind the backs of Parliament—

A NOBLE LORD
And the High Commissioner.

§ THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD
Well, the High Commissioner has gone—are we to find that behind the backs of Parliament this agreement has been reached? What stage of these negotiations has been arrived at? I do not ask the noble and learned Lord—I am too familiar with these things—to tell us what has been discussed, but are they approaching any finality? I hope a rumour which has reached me that a document has actually been signed is untrue. It would, indeed, be incredible. But when is a conclusion likely to be reached, and is Parliament to have the opportunity of criticising it before it is signed? Is the noble and learned Lord possessed of any information upon that point, because it is one of vital importance?
I would remind the noble and learned Lord that in the days of the Coalition we were frequently compelled, and rightly compelled, when Parliament separated at critical moments to keep the machinery open by which in case of a grave necessity, Parliament might be re-summoned. I affirm boldly that this is such an occasion. If a Government which, after all, is a minority Government, which represents a section of public opinion in the country, which though considerable, 314 gives it no right to make bold and novel experiments in the fabric of the Empire—if it is the purpose of this Government to do that in the absence of Parliament, I say, without hesitation—although I am no longer in official politics, I still have a duty as a citizen and a member of this House—I would use the whole of my influence, whatever the consequences, to put them out of power if they attempted so monstrous a usurpation of the rights and privileges of Parliament.
The noble and learned Lord may smile. It would be a very easy matter on any point upon which the Liberal Party agreed with us to take such a step. It is not a matter for hilarity. I observe that the sense of humour of our new recruit is apparently highly developed. I am glad to have excited it and contributed to it. I would point out to him that this is not really a very comical matter, and he will discover, when he has had much more experience of Government, that an attempt of this kind to carry these negotiations through and present Parliament with an accomplished fact is one which will not be successful as long as the House of Commons and this House retain the powers which, they have heretofore exercised, and so long as the political conditions which maintain are the conditions which maintain to-day. That we shall obtain answers to these questions here to-day is of course extremely improbable. I hope that the House of Commons will be more fortunate, and I hope again that whatever debates may take place under the leadership of the House by the noble and learned Lord we shall never have such excuses put forward again for the reticence in giving information to which we are entitled which has been exhibited by the noble and learned Lord.