HL Deb 11 July 1928 vol 71 cc963-86

LORD DANESFORT had the following Notice on the Paper:—To ask His Majesty's Government whether their attention has been called to the explosion of poisonous gas which recently occurred on Stolzenberg's premises in Germany; what is the business carried on by this firm in and since 1920; when, where, and by whom was this poisonous gas manufactured and stored, and when and how did it come into the possession of Stolzenberg's firm and for what purpose; how much of this gas was destroyed in the explosion and how much remained on the premises unexploded; have the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles been complied with which provide for the surrender by Germany for destruction of the then existing war-material, including poisonous gases, and which specifically prohibit the manufacture, importation and use of poisonous gases in Germany; have these provisions been altered since the Treaty, and, if so, when and how; what powers of examination and control over the manufacture, storage and use of poisonous gases in Germany are possessed by the ex-Allied Powers and are these powers being exercised: whether any effective schemes for repelling air-raids on a large scale accompanied by the discharge of poisonous gases have been prepared and worked out by His Majesty's Government; and to move for Papers.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I rise to ask the Question standing on the Paper in my name. Towards the end of May last the public of this country were shocked by the announcement of a serious explosion of poisonous gas, known as phosgene gas, at Stolzenberg's factory in Hamburg. Many of us were aware that the Treaty of Versailles had absolutely prohibited the manufacture, storage and use of poisonous gas in Germany, and the inquiry naturally arises as to how and when the poisonous gas in question got into the possession of Stolzenberg, and for what purpose it was stored by them. A certain amount of official information has been given since the date of the explosion, but before I refer to it I would like to call your attention to the main provisions of the Treaty of Versailles on this subject of poisonous gas. Article 169 says this:— Within two months from the coming into force of the present Treaty German arms, munitions and war material, including anti-aircraft material, existing in Germany in excess of the quantities allowed, must be surrendered to the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to be destroyed or rendered useless. I should explain that the Treaty allowed certain specified amounts of arms, munitions, and so on to be retained by Germany, but there was no provision in the Treaty for permitting the retention of any poisonous gas, and the result was that these poisonous gases, according to the Treaty, should have been destroyed at once. Then there is Article 171, which says:— The use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids, materials or devices being prohibited, their manufacture and importation are strictly forbidden in Germany. That is an absolute prohibition of the manufacture, storage and use of these poisonous gases. Since the explosion occurred we have had statements made both in Germany and in this country which show that the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles have been very widely modified and the situation so created is, I think, a very serious one.

In the first place, there was an official German report on the explosion, which was published by Wolff's Telegraphic Bureau on June 1 last, and secondly there was an important answer given by the Foreign Office representative in the House of Commons on June 11. Let me refer first to the German report. It says that this phosgene gas at Stolzenberg's premises was part of the German war material surrendered at the end of the War under the Treaty, and it was sold by a Bureau de liquidation to Stolzenberg's for commercial purposes. But the report contains two rather significant statements. In the first place, it says that it could not be definitely ascertained whether the gas so sold was expressly exempted from destruction at the time. In other words, they are not able to tell us whether there was any authority for the exemption of this gas from destruction. Secondly, they tell us that the Hamburg Senate had ordered the destruction of the remainder of Stolzenberg's socks. Upon that two questions arise, which I have put on the Paper. The first is: By what authority, if any, was this phosgene gas exempted from destruction? The second is: What is the business of the Stolzenberg firm, and for what industrial purposes did they want to get this poisonous gas into their possession?

So much for the German report. I turn to the answer given by the Foreign Office. It appears from that answer that correspondence has for some time been passing on the subject of the manufacture and use in Germany of poisonous gases between the ex-Allied Powers and the German Government., and also between the German Chargé d'Affaires in Paris and the Conference of Ambassadors, and the answer states that the net result of that correspondence is that, while the manufacture, storage, import and export of phosgene gas for war purposes is prohibited in Germany, the manufacture of phosgene gas for industrial purposes is permitted, but is confined to three named factories, and it is not to exceed in amount nine tons a day, or, in other words, 3,285 tons a year. There is, as far as I know—certainly the Foreign Office did not tell us—no restriction whatever on the import of phosgene gas for industrial purposes, although there is this restriction on manufacture. Perhaps the Government will be able to tell us whether there is any restriction upon the import of phosgene. These are somewhat alarming facts, especially if it be the case, as I understand it is, that our Government have no power whatever of inspection or examination to see that those provisions limiting the amount of gas which can be manufactured and stored are observed. I venture to ask whether the Government have any such power of inspection or examination to see that those provisions are complied with.

There are other and even more serious matters which arise out of that Foreign Office answer. The answer referred to Articles 1, 2, 3 and 8 of a German law known as the Law on War Material, July 27, 1927, and if any of your Lordships desire to see that law it will be found printed in extenso in the Board of Trade journal of May 17 of this year. That law is a very lengthy one and exceedingly ingeniously framed, but I can give a short summary of its provisions as regards poisonous gases. By Articles 1, 2 and 3 of that law the manufacture, storage, and sale of poisonous gases in Germany and the import and export of such gases into and from Germany is absolutely prohibited. But when you come to see how that prohibition is qualified there is rather a remarkable result. This prohibition only applies to poisonous gases intended for war purposes. Your Lordships will observe that the words are not "capable of being used for war purposes," but if it were desired to show that this provision of the law is being broken you would have to show that the poisonous gas is actually intended for war purposes, which would be difficult, if not altogether impossible. And even as regards poisonous gases intended for industrial purposes there is only one gas on which there is any restriction, and that is phosgene, and the manufacture of phosgene is confined in amount.

It may be said—I am not sure whether it is true, but I have heard it said—that the only gases useful for war purposes as well as for industrial purposes are chlorine and phosgene, and it would be impossible to place restrictions on the manufacture of chlorine gas, because it is an article of such very wide use in commerce. If that statement is correct I suggest that the proper, and indeed the only, effective form of restriction would be to prohibit absolutely the manufacture, storage and import into Germany of all poisonous gases, with the exception of phosgene and chlorine, and to limit the manufacture and import of phosgene. I throw out that suggestion for the consideration of the Government in case they have occasion to revise the rules under which poisonous gases are permitted in Germany. I have looked further into that German law, and there is one article of it which is not referred to in the Foreign Office answer, and so far as I know has never been called attention to in this country. That is of very serious import. I refer to Article 6. The effect of that Article is to enact that the provisions of Article 2 of the law which prohibits the manufacture, storage and sale of war material for home use are not applicable to orders given by German official Departments.

What does that mean? On the face of it, it suggests that the German official Departments can give orders for the manufacture, storage and use of poisonous gases to an unlimited amount and in any place they like, whether such gases are intended for industrial purposes or not. If that is the real meaning, and I confess that I cannot see any other meaning, it gives rise to very serious considerations. It means that, whereas by the Treaty of Versailles the manufacture, storage and sale of poisonous gases were absolutely prohibited, and very properly so, considering what we suffered in the War from the production by Germany of such gases, they have passed a law, I hope without the assent of His Majesty's Government,—perhaps we shall hear that—which allows German official Departments to order, manufacture, store and use poisonous gases to any extent that they think proper. I hope that His Majesty's Government will be able to clear up that point and to say whether that interpretation is correct. I shall be only too glad to hear that it is incorrect, but if it is correct it seems to me that steps should be taken to see that both this country and other ex-Allied Powers should protest against such a law being accepted in Germany or anywhere else.

Such are some of the considerations that arise from the recent explosion in Germany, but there are far larger considerations involved than those that have arisen out of the Stolzenberg explosion. We all earnestly hope that the determination of the nations of the world to eliminate all possibility of war in the future as a means of settling international disputes may have its full and complete effect, but we cannot, I think, shut our eyes to the appalling consequences that would ensue if, in spite of our hopes, war should break out and poisonous gases in large quantities should be discharged from the air on centres of population. I believe that it is no exaggeration to say that if a nation had a great fleet of aeroplanes, constructed it may be for commercial purposes, and a great store of poisonous gases, they could by a swift and sudden stroke within a few hours destroy the lives of millions of the civil population of the country that was the object of attack. No doubt the country attacked would be able to a certain extent, by the use of anti-aircraft guns and opposing aeroplanes, to act in its own defence, and in the case of our country we are well assured that there are no more skilful, courageous and splendid airmen than we have and no better men in the world. But, if the attacking force came in sufficiently great numbers and with little or no warning, the wholesale destruction of human life would be inevitable. Reprisals might be made, and probably would be made, but the effect of those reprisals would only be to add to the sum total of human destruction and populous cities would become cities of the dead.

Those considerations lead me to ask the Government two questions. The first relates to the world at large, and the other specially concerns the safety of this country. The first question that I would ask His Majesty's Government is this: Have His Majesty's Government taken, or are they taking, in concert with the other nations of the world who are Members of the League of Nations, steps to prohibit absolutely the use of poisonous gases in war? So far as I know, this has not been before the League of Nations, but I venture to suggest that as a precaution—I do not say that it is a complete one—it is vitally important, if we can, to induce the League of Nations to prohibit absolutely and entirely the use of poisonous gases in war. That is one question. The other is this: Have His Majesty's Government worked out any scheme for repelling air raids in this country on a large scale, accompanied by the discharge of poisonous gases? I need hardly say that I do not anticipate that His Majesty's Government would disclose those steps. It would be extremely unwise and improper to ask them to do so, and naturally they would not comply. But I venture to ask His Majesty's Government most seriously whether this point has been considered by the Committee of Imperial Defence or by the Cabinet as a whole, and whether adequate schemes are being worked out. The other part of my Notice is a Motion for Papers, and the Papers that I ask for comprise the correspondence that is referred to in the Foreign Office statement in the House of Commons on June 11—namely, the correspondence between the different Governments for the purpose of limiting and defining the use of poisonous gases within the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. I beg to move.

THE EARL OF HALSBURY

My Lords, even at this late hour I do not apologise for saying one or two words upon a subject which. I believe to be the most important of any of the subjects that face us. It is a subject about which I know something. During the last years of the War, first under the Ministry of Viscount Rothermere and later under Lord Weir, it was my duty to consider the plans of operations for the bombardment of Germany, and consequently the technical side of questions regarding air raids came before me very acutely. This accident at Hamburg has in fact shown what may be done by the escape of poison gas in a town, and the first thing that occurred to me when I saw the account of it was how extremely fortunate Hamburg had been. The gas escaped at the edge of the town, a breeze sprang up which carried it away from the town and later, apparently, rain fell and helped to damp it down. If I may, I should like to remind your Lordships of the affair by a very few extracts from the accounts in The Times.

On May 22 the following account appeared:— Meanwhile the gas continued to move south. Passing through the streets and over a tract of land much used by holiday makers, it reached the open country, leaving a trail of victims in its wake. Its effects are stated to have been felt up to six miles away. Many cattle were overcome by it and have since had to be slaughtered. … The danger, however, is not over, for phosgene, which is heavier than air, keeps to the ground level, and there are many 'pockets' of gas still hanging about in the district. The best thing that could happen now would be a heavy fall of rain, which would neutralise it, but a change of wind might redistribute it and produce fresh disaster. Then came the later communiqué of the 23rd May:— It is realised that if the wind had been blowing from another direction and there had been no rain a very serious disaster would have occurred. The experiences of the affected area are widely described in the Press as a foretaste of the fate of civilian populations in the next war, and the occasion is used as propaganda, on the one hand for pacifism, and on the other hand for the movement, of Nationalist origin, in favour of militarism and civil defence measures on a large scale against gas attacks by hostile aircraft. That is a short resumé of what happened in Hamburg. That was extremely fortunate for Hamburg. But what would have happened if it had taken place in the centre of the town? If in another war—if we are to have another war—a bomb of gas is dropped in a centre of this kind what is to happen if a breeze does spring up? The only difference in effect of a breeze is that it will blow it from one street into the next leaving a trail of dead and gassed people as it goes.

Very few people have considered what a very deadly thing this is. I will take as an example an area with which we are all familiar. I am not going to give my own figures. Take a triangle composed of the centre of London, from Chalk Farm in the north to Clapham on the south and the docks in the east. That triangle really contains most of what is important in London. It contains the most densely populated areas and the most important areas. The total amount of phosgene gas to produce a lethal atmosphere over the whole of that area up to forty feet is under 2,000 tons. From the war figures, 2,000 tons was a negligible amount for an enemy to be able to put in. That amount could be put in by enemy aircraft at the present time. Much more so on the Continent than here you have civilian aircraft very largely increased, and the principal difference between the civilian passenger aircraft of modern construction and the bombing machines is the cargo. You have merely got to put on a machine-gun, take out the passengers, take out the luggage and put in bombs, and you have a bomber. I saw in the newspapers three or four days ago a record of a machine which had flown from Brussels to Cologne and took, besides her own pilot, fifteen passengers and 2,000 lbs. of luggage freight. Convert that into bombs and you see that it would not require a very great number of aeroplanes to come over with 2,000 tons of gas and scatter it over London. It is a terrible and horrible thought that this danger might be hanging over us. In season and out of season I have preached it ever since the end of the War. In France, M. Michelin has done it with more effect, and in Belgium M. Brifaud, I think, has probably convinced the Belgians. Apparently we still remain unconvinced.

Up till now I have been dealing only with phosgene gas. Phosgene gas for the purposes of war is as out-of-date as the blunderbuss. Let me read something to show the sort of gas they are going to use. I am going to refer to the more modern gases, those which have been brought up-to-date. The gases which I have in mind are gases whose base is arsenic and they are brought over in liquid form so that they do not have to have any specially strong containers. They are blown up into a fine smoke by a small amount of high explosive. This is what is said about them:— In man, slight and transitory nasal irritation is appreciable after an exposure of five minutes to as little as one part of diphenylchloroarsine in 200 million parts of air, and as the concentration is increased the irritation shows itself sooner and in rapidly - increasing severity. Marked symptoms are produced by exposure to one part of diphenylchloroarsine in fifty million parts of air, and it may be stated in general that this concentration forms the limit of tolerance of ordinary individuals for an exposure lasting five minutes. … The Germans state that diphenylcyanoarsine is an even more powerful irritant than diphenylchloroarsine. These substances are generally used to cause such sensory irritation that the victim is unable to tolerate a respirator, and they are therefore often followed by an attack of asphyxiant gases. There you have the modern gas. Translate those figures into the ones I gave you—2,000 tons to a concentration of one in a million. It comes down to only forty tons of this new gas.

It will be answered: "Oh yes, but you are assuming that each bomb is most carefully spread in mathematical precision all over the area." I agree. But double, treble, and multiply by ten, and you still have only something in the nature of 400 tons to do the thing ten times over. It is not a matter only of people who are going necessarily to be killed. Even a bad attack of gassing would not be very pleasant. A remarkable feature of the severe gases is the intense mental distress which accompanies the symptoms. Even slight cases feel and look miserable until the irritation passes off, and the picture of utter dejection and hopeless misery furnished by severe cases has no counter-part in any other type of gas poisoning. Occasionally the physical depression results in the temporary loss of mental control and men have been known to act as though driven mad by their pain and misery. That is a danger which is menacing us now. Think of it in other terms. How does it compare with the raids with which we are familiar and the use of high explosive? Consider one type of bomb we were using. We knew pretty well what the result of it was going to be. We know better now because a Commission went over to Germany to find out exactly what our bombs did. We had guessed pretty well what they had done from what we knew the Germans had done to us.

Take the bomb I have in mind—one of our largest bombs. Assume that it dropped in Piccadilly Circus and that it made a direct hit on the Criterion. It would probably have demolished that building. Everybody in the building would probably have been killed, and a few outside might have been killed or hurt. The danger from destruction would then have been over. If the bomb dropped in Piccadilly Circus and did not hit any building the casualties would be far fewer. Even so, once the explosion had occurred the danger would be over. Consider that same bomb filled with this poison gas that I have just been talking about. You would get an atmosphere which would kill every man, woman and child in an area from Regent's Park to the Thames. The figures I have given are not exaggerated. I would to God that they were, but they are not. The book I have been reading from is not a book picked up casually anywhere. It is a book published by our War Office as the Manual of Medical Aspects of Chemical Warfare. It is published at 9d. and I would suggest that it should be given away. If every adult in this country were to read that, you might have such a wave of indignant and righteous horror that people would do anything to make some agreement which would put these things under international control and prevent their use in future warfare. That is one suggestion I put forward.

What else can we do to prevent this? Let us see what we can do. The noble Lord who asked this Question pointed out that the Treaty of Versailles prevented the making and storage of these gases. He has pointed out that German legislation has modified that. I am sorry to say that in my view it does not make a bit of difference what Treaties you have, or what regulations you have, because I do not think that they matter at all. As a chemist it occurred to me that it would be perfectly impossible that these two gases could not be made, and made in large quantities, at the last moment, but in order to be quite certain I wrote to one of our biggest industrial chemists, a very highly technical man, who also has the advantage of knowing the actual works that there are in Germany, their capacity, and how they work. I mentioned to him three of them, not because I believe for a moment they are carrying on any sinister brewing of poison gases—on the contrary—but because they are perhaps the three best known firms, and are of the highest integrity. They are Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik, of Ludwigshaven, Meister Lucius, of Hoechst, and Bayer, of Leverkusen.

I wrote to him and I asked him if in his opinion, knowing these works, it would be possible for these people to manufacture these poison gases if they switched over from their ordinary legitimate work to their manufacture. This is the answer I got:— From what I can gather, the two 'gases,' diphenylchloroarsine and diphenyl-cyanoarsine could be produced in large quantities very readily, since the reagents necessary for their production are amongst the commonest used in manufacturing chemistry—namely, aniline, sodium nitrite, sodium arsenite, sodium bisulphite, sulphur dioxide and sodium or potassium cyanide. The plant that is used for this manufacture is similar to that used in the coupling stage of the manufacture of azo dyes, and, in addition, tiled lined iron vats are mentioned as necessary, but these are usually readily available in a dyestuff factory. It would appear that the production of these two bodies is not a tedious process, but probably a matter of two or three days from the beginning of the diazotisation of aniline to the isolation of the final product would be ample. If we assumed that the three firms which you mention would be prepared to discontinue their ordinary manufacture of azo dyestuffs and turn the whole of their resources on to the manufacture of these two 'gases,' it would seem to me that in a week they would be able to produce 100 tons a day of the diphenylchloroarsine. From this the diphenylcyanoarsine is obtained in apparently theoretical yield by treating with sodium or potassium cyanide. If that is true, or if anything like it is true, that in a week's time they could produce 100 tons a day when all they need theoretically for London is 40 tons, what is the good of having people who are going round to inspect and to see how much they have? It is like telling a man he may keep fire and oil, but that he must not keep boiling oil. He does not boil it until he wants it hot. They are not going to turn over their works until the last moment, but if they were ever evilly disposed they might do so and in a week's time would be turning out 100 tons a day of these gases. I do not think you are going to get much further with that.

There is another possibility, and that is reprisals. It is poor consolation that the only answer we can find to the destruction of half civilisation is that we should be able to destroy the other half. Surely there must be something better than that. The matter does not end there as far as reprisals are concerned. When one is considering a bombardment of Germany one of the first things to take into account is the question as to how easy it is to get into Germany and how easy it is for Germany to get to us. We are not in a position for reprisals. Geographically we are wrong. We have got our big centres, London and some of our big ports, right on the edge of our frontier because we are a very small island. Germany has her centres well inside her territory. The result is that the Germans would be in a better position to bombard London from the edge of German territory than we should ever be to bombard German centres from the edge of English territory. Even when we were operating as far up as Nancy and Belfort-Verdun in French territory we were at a disadvantage with regard to Germany. I do not say now, and I do not suggest now, that Germany is anything but a friendly country, but one has to look to what may happen in the future. Is there anything to prevent Germany taking a half-way aerodrome somewhere in Belgium? If she did so, she would be in a position to bomb us and we should be in a very poor position to bomb her.

And the matter does not end there. Germany has far more machines than we have. We have not got the machines. It is idle to take merely the so-called war machines and say there is a certain number of them in Germany and a certain number of them here. Civilian machines count just as much. They can be converted, and the effect is that Germany is in a very much better position than we are. What else can we do to stop it? What else has been suggested to stop it? Defence squadrons of scouts. They are useless. The War proved that a determined attack could always get through. There may be casualties, but the attack will get through. Furthermore, the manœuvres over London last year, if any further proof were wanted, have shown that. I seem to be in rather good company when I make that statement, because I read in The Times last week—on July 6—this:— Sir Samuel Hoare, Secretary of State for Air, speaking on 'Disarmament and the Church' at the Anglo-Catholic Anniversary Congress at the Albert Hall yesterday, emphasised the ineffectiveness of the League of Nations machinery to deal with a sudden mobilisation of an air arm in cases of future international disputes. He said that while in each successive year since 1925 we had reduced the amount of Air Estimates, the other principal Powers of the world had steadily increased their expenditure on air armaments. In France, for example, the figure for 1928 was some 45 per cent. greater than that for 1925, while corresponding increases in the cases of Italy and the United States were 56 per cent. and 33 per cent. respectively. He was convinced that a general guarantee that depended for much of its success upon a period of delay would, by itself, be insufficient to deal with a sudden air attack delivered at a nation's heart. It has been proved over and over again that scouts cannot keep out a determined bombing squadron.

Furthermore, nobody would suggest in these days if it came to a question of war that there would be one solitary raid. You cannot keep the scout up in the air the whole time. He has to come down for petrol. I do not say that this is a fact, but I should think it was doubtful unless the scout was up in the air and the enemy attacking force was signalled before they crossed the coast, that he would ever be able to reach them at all before they got to London. Coming at the height of modern bombers, I very much doubt whether he would ever have the time to do it. That certainly would never keep them out. So we are back in the position that here is a hideous danger and there seem to me to be only two possible ways out. One is to give it the greatest publicity that you can all over the world so as to get people to realise the danger that they are in, and get them to come together and say that they will not have this hideous danger again in their midst. That seems to me at present to be probably the most practicable and the most lasting suggestion. In the meantime there are other suggestions. There must be many, of course, and I cannot believe that there is no answer to this danger. Having written a good deal about it I have received a very great number of suggestions, some of which seem to have a certain degree of possibility of success. But I do not know to whom to send them. Officials seem to take no interest in them. It seems to me that there might be got together a body of people with really big scientific brains to try to tackle this enormous question, to take an interest in it and to see whether some solution cannot be found. But it must be done now. If you ask any expert he will agree with me that at this present moment London is at the mercy of any nation that is close enough and is evilly disposed enough to come and obliterate it. London could be absolutely and completely obliterated. Therefore, we must do something now, "or it may fall we have slain our sons as our fathers we have betrayed."

LORD RAYLEIGH

My Lords, I associate myself entirely with what the noble Earl, Lord Halsbury, has said about the impracticability of preventing the manufacture of these noxious substances in Germany or, indeed, in any other country. The chemical processes involved are simple. Take, for instance, the mustard gas which was the most noxious of the gases used during the War, and, perhaps, the most noxious gas in the strict sense of the term which could be produced even now. The materials required for producing it are chlorine, which is made from a solution of ordinary salt; sulphur, which we dig out of the ground just as it is; and ethylene gas which we can readily produce from alcohol. Those substances have merely to be worked up in a very simple way with which I will not trouble your Lordships, and you have mustard gas, the most deadly, perhaps, of the purely gaseous substances, as it might be used in an attack on Landon. It is evident that you cannot prevent the Germans from having salt. It is evident that you cannot prevent them having sulphur. It is evident that you cannot prevent them having alcohol. It seems to me, therefore, to be worse than futile to attack the problem by way of prohibitive regulations.

Is it possible or desirable, then, to do anything? I want for a moment to remind your Lord ships of an incident in the War at an early stage which I think it is instructive to recall in this connection. You will remember that there was no protection of our harbours against the attack of submarines. I ventured to ask a highly-placed naval officer who was in power at the Admiralty—naturally, I shall not mention his name—why nothing of the kind had been done and the answer he gave was that for his part he had not regarded the effective range and number of submarines to be such that they could, from the German bases, reach our harbours. Therefore, the time for doing anything was not ripe and the attention of himself and his colleagues was concentrated on other matters. The result was that they did nothing. What happened when the sincerity of that conviction was really put to the proof? The moment war broke out I think I shall not be exaggerating when I say that our naval officers in command of and responsible for the safety of our ships were at once in what I might call colloquially a "blue funk" when they were in harbour. That danger which had appeared so remote in time of peace immediately and without anything fresh having happened, or without any new light on the matter being available, became at once actual and formidable. I think that is an analogous case.

We shall probably be told by the noble Marquess who replies for the Government—at least what I have learned from conversations I have had rather leaves me with the view—that the gloomy apprehensions of the noble Lord are really not well founded and that the time is not ripe for such steps as he has suggested to be taken; but, as in the case of submarine attack, you are more likely to be impressed by a threat when it has actually materialised than you are when it is only in remote prospect. What, then, can we do now? It seems to me that one of the things we can do is to make preparation in case of need for evacuating London. People will say, of course, that you cannot evacuate London, the dimensions of the problem are so gigantic. I want to point out that when the attack actually occurs, if it does occur, London will be evacuated, possible or impossible. People will flock out of London. The only question as it seems to me is as to whether they will flock out of London irregularly, trampling upon one another and starving, perhaps, in the country when they get there for lack of any systematic method of supplying their needs; or whether they will flock out of London in a comparatively orderly and effective manner, such as might be secured if proper plans for mobilising them out of London were worked out now. That, I venture to think, is a suggestion which is not impracticable and which involves in the main only paper work as to how to make the best use of the available resources for getting the people out of London in the greatest possible numbers and in the smallest possible time, and how to provide some means of keeping their bodies and souls together when they are got out of London. That is my first suggestion.

My second suggestion, for what it may be worth is that something should be done for making gas proof the more vital buildings which are necessary for carrying out administration. This, again, may not be a very expensive or difficult matter and I submit that it should be done now. There is no doubt that if these buildings were carefully secured against the entrance of poison gas, at any rate a very considerable breathing space in every sense of the word would be obtained and the danger would not be so immediate of all administrative work being suddenly cut off at the centre as would otherwise be the case.

My third suggestion is relevant to the point made by my noble friend who last spoke—namely, the use of these arsenical gases which are far more poisonous than the truly gaseous substances which were in use during the War. These arsenical gases are not gases in the true sense of the word but are rather of the nature of finely divided smoke, consisting of solid particles. It has been discovered, and the fact is used in industry, that such smoke may be aggregated with almost miraculous rapidity. The process was discovered in the first instance by Sir Oliver Lodge and has since been developed by him and his assistants in connection with various industrial processes. It consists in suspending highly electrified conductors in the air to be cleared. The theory of the process does not here concern us, but the fact is, and here is the important point, that the smoke aggregates very rapidly and settles down on the conductors which are discharging into the surrounding air. It seems to me that vital areas might to a certain extent be protected in that way. I do not suppose that casual ideas of that kind, thrown out here, are of any value, beyond mere suggestions to be developed, and it is only in that sense that I have put them before your Lordships. Another suggestion, which is due to my noble friend who has just spoken, is that it might be possible to some extent to suck these gases away through the sewers of London, which might be adapted for that purpose. Of course that raises technical questions far beyond anything which can be discussed here, and I merely mention it as a vague idea, in the same sense as I have mentioned my previous suggestion. Those are the only remarks with which I would trouble your Lordships this evening, but I associate myself with what was said before about this being a question of extreme gravity, even although the whole thing may not be quite so bad as the most extreme pictures would suggest.

LORD THOMSON

My Lords, I only rise to associate myself with the remarks which have fallen from the noble Lord opposite in many particulars. The part to which I would refer more particularly is the question of Air policy, to which I have devoted a certain amount of study. I agree with practically everything that was said by the noble Earl, and by the last speaker. I think, however, that while they have painted a true picture they did not do quite sufficient justice to the deterrent effect of an Air Force in this country for the purpose of defence. The very horrors that they have described are sufficient to prevent any hostile power from lightly attacking a country possessing an efficient Air Force. It is upon that line that I am sure the Air Ministry will always work—namely, the provision of an adequate Air Force to act as a deterrent; but I will admit that that is not a very satisfactory state of affairs. I agree with the description given of all the horrors, but although the suggestions made by the two noble Lords are very ingenious, I think it will be agreed that they are not likely to be very effective. I certainly think, however, that any steps which are considered practicable should be studied early on, and that work should start at once, but in my view the suggestion which fell from Lord Halsbury is the only one at all practicable—namely, that we should give full publicity to this state of affairs and let everyone know the facts, and then we may excite public opinion sufficiently to render possible some sort of international agreement to make these horrors impossible.

THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY)

My Lords, I am sorry that my reply to this Question has to be made at so late an hour, but I shall try not to detain you at any great length. I say this because a good many of the speeches dealt with topics which do not arise directly out of the Question on the Paper, but have, in the manner which prevails and perhaps happily prevails in your Lordships' House, wandered over a very wide field. My noble friends behind me have dealt with certain subjects of the very greatest importance, which they themselves recognise, and which deserve a very careful reply. I am not prepared at this moment to deal with all the topics which Lord Halsbury and Lord Rayleigh have raised. After all, one ought to be very careful in what one says upon topics of that description. There is much truth in what the noble Earl, Lord Halsbury, said. There are great dangers. The horrors which he depicted are not without foundation, but there are other dangers. There are dangers of over-alarming the public mind and even of panic. I do not think there is any occasion for panic or for over-alarming the public mind, and I think it would be a very unfortunate thing if any words fell from me which would lead to that conclusion. I might even say that Lord Halsbury might reflect upon that consideration when he speaks on these occasions, because every word spoken by responsible men and men of knowledge like himself in this House, cannot be without very grave effect outside.

I therefore do not propose to deal with that part of the debate. I will only say this, that I think any one who listened to Lord Rayleigh, who speaks from a position of great scientific knowledge on these subjects, must recognise that although the last word of science has not been said in the attack, so also the last word of science has not been said in the defence, and there may be many methods to mitigate the possible severity of the attack which have not yet been discovered or perhaps, if discovered, may not be dealt with. Therefore, although I do not of course criticise those speeches, yet I would ask to be excused from replying to them in detail without the advantage of that careful consideration beforehand which would be due, considering the importance of the issues which they raise. The noble Lord who has just sat down will, I am sure, support me when I say that these things are well known in the Service offices of this country, and that even the citation which Lord Halsbury himself made of the Secretary of State for Air's speech, shows how acutely sensitive the responsible Government Departments are to these very considerations. They are matters, of course—I was going to say of hourly consideration—of constant consideration. They are matters which are always before their eyes and no praise is due to them for that, because of course it is their duty and what they are there for.

I turn then, if I may, to the Question on the Paper, and I am going to give an answer to every one of the Questions—the best answer I can—but I would say to begin with that there is a limitation on my capacity for giving full answers, in that all these subjects to which the noble Lord refers are at the present moment the subject of diplomatic discussion with the French Government, and while that discussion is going on it is impossible to speak positively or quite freely. I am sure my noble friend, understanding these things, will recognise that that is the case. Therefore he will excuse me if in any particular I do not go so fully into the matter as he would wish. Before I actually approach his Questions I will make one further general remark. My noble friend knows, because he quoted it, that there has been a report upon this explosion made by the German Government. That has been published, and the noble Lord is aware of what was contained in the report. Now, I deprecate the sort of air of suspicion which some of those who deal with these topics adopt towards the German Government. I do not think that is right. Of course, it is our business to see that the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles are fulfilled, but we must treat the German Government, which is a friendly Government now, as a Government of good faith and good will, and we must accept prima facie, of course, their assurances and the reports which they present to their own Parliament. I see no reason why we should not.

I have one last general observation to make. As things stand, these matters of the German armaments and the obligations upon Germany under the Treaty have passed from the direct control of the Allied and Associated Powers to the League of Nations itself under the powers of Article 213 of the Treaty of Versailles; and, therefore, although of course, as a Member of the League of Nations, we have both the right and the obligation to play our own part, the matter is no longer in the condition in which it was a few years ago. Then there was the Commission of Control in Germany, which was furnished by the Allies: now that is no longer the case. That control has disappeared, and, in conformity with Article 213 of the Treaty of Versailles, the supervision of the Articles providing for German disarmament has passed away from the Allies to the League of Nations itself. It is only through that great organisation, and by the machinery which that organisation provides that the matter can be approached.

LORD DANESFORT

May I ask whether the League of Nations have any machinery for exercising that supervision under Article 213?

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

I wish my noble friend and colleague, the Chancellor of the Duchy, were still here; he would have replied at once to that question. I do not know whether they have actual machinery, but, of course, they have the capacity for creating that machinery at any moment, and very likely they have the actual machinery itself. Now I will answer the noble Lord's specific Questions. The first Question is whether the attention of His Majesty's Government has been called to the explosion of poisonous gas which recently occurred on Stolzenberg's premises. The answer is: Yee. The second Question is— What is the business carried on by this firm in and since 1920? The answer is: The firm of Stolzenberg does not appear to have started business until 1923, but it has since then been engaged in the manufacture and sale of chemical products. It was mentioned in the spring of 1927 in the British and German Press and in the Reichstag in connection with the establishment of a poison gas factory at Trotzk in Soviet Russia in 1923. Certain other alleged activities of this firm are at present the subject of diplomatic correspondence between His Majesty's Government and the French Government.

The third Question is:— When, where, and by whom was this poisonous gas manufactured and stored, and when, and how, did it come into the possession of Stolzenberg's firm and for what purpose? The answer is: According to an official report published by Wolff's Telegraphic Bureau (of which a translation was sent to my noble friend) all the phosgene stored on Stolzenberg's premises in Hamburg came originally from war stocks belonging to the old Army. The exact circumstances in which it may have passed into Stolzenberg's possession are unknown. The sale of certain war stocks of phosgene appears at one time to have been authorised by the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control, but the archives of that body are stored in Paris, and the question whether or not any part of the war stocks in question can have passed legitimately into the possession of the Stolzenberg firm is at present the subject of diplomatic correspondence between His Majesty's Government and the French Government.

The fourth Question is:— How much of this gas was destroyed in the explosion, and how much remained on the premises unexploded? The answer is: According to the official report the container which exploded held 10,400 litres of liquid phosgene. At the moment when the report was issued (that is to say, on June 1, twelve days after the explosion) the stores on the Stolzenberg premises were said to consist of two containers, holding 10,000 kilogrammes each, and 3,000 steel bottles, with, in all, 55,000 kilogrammes of phosgene.

The fifth Question is:— Have the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles been complied with which provide for the surrender by Germany for destruction of the then existing war material, including poisonous gases, and which specifically prohibit the manufacture, importation and use of poisonous gases in Germany? Answer: The Commission of Control was withdrawn at the beginning of 1927 because the ex-Allied Governments were satisfied that these provisions, among others, had been executed by the German Government. This question is at present the subject of diplomatic correspondence between His Majesty's Government and the French Government.

The sixth Question is:— Have these provisions been altered since the Treaty, and, if so, when and how? Answer: Inasmuch as certain chemical products utilisable as poison gas are normally used in the ordinary course of industrial production, the German War Material Law, in which the Treaty stipulations have been elaborated and defined by agreement between the ex-Allied Governments and the German Government, permits the manufacture of these products in specified quantities and circumstances.

The seventh Question is:— What powers of examination and control over the manufacture, storage and use of poisonous gases in Germany are possessed by the ex-Allied Powers, and are these powers being exercised? Answer: No such powers are now possessed by the ex-Allied Governments, the investigation of alleged breaches of the disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles having passed to the Council of the League of Nations on January 21, 1927.

The eighth Question is:— Whether any effective scheme for repelling air raids on a large scale, accompanied by the discharge of poisonous gases, has been prepared and worked out by His Majesty's Government? Answer: The development of this organisation is, of course, a matter which is engaging the continuous attention of the Air Ministry and War Office, and the noble Lord will be aware that a considerably increased provision has been made during the last few years for the defence of this country against air attack. Little more than five years ago there were only five squadrons of the Royal Air Force available for this purpose. As a result of the scheme of expansion approved in 1923, which will ultimately provide a total of 52 squadrons, that number has already risen to 31. Considerable progress has also been made in the provision and training of anti-aircraft units on the ground, such as guns and searchlights. Finally, a great advance has been made in securing the most effective co-ordination of our available resources by concentrating in a single Command under an Air Officer Commanding in Chief responsibility for the whole system of air defence.

In addition to the Questions that appeared upon the Paper, my noble friend has favoured my advisers with a further supplementary Question—namely, What is the effect of the German Law on War Material of July 27, 1927, in respect of Clause 6? The answer is that the effect is not so wide as my noble friend suggests. The effect of these passages is merely to give the German Government the necessary facilities for arming the German Forces to the extent laid down in the Treaty of Versailles and subsequent agreements with the Military Commission of Control. Obviously, for instance, it would be absurd if orders given by the German Ministry of Defence were not to be excepted from the operation of Clause 2 of the War Material Law, which states that "war material must neither be manufactured, stored or sold for home use." If you allow certain forces under the Treaty, they must be permitted to arm them.

LORD DANESFORT

I do not want to interrupt my noble friend, but does that mean that the German Government can manufacture and store poisonous gases which are for war purposes?

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

It means that they are strictly limited in respect of all armaments under the Treaty of Versailles and by agreements of the Powers, and that the very limited forces which the Germans are permitted have been allowed to be armed, which is not unreasonable. My noble friend finally asks for Papers to be laid. I understand that the Papers that he wants are those referred to in the correspondence mentioned in the reply given by my right hon. friend Mr. Locker-Lampson to Sir William Davison in the House of Commons on June 11—that is to say, the exchange of Notes between the German Chargé d'Affaires at Paris and the Conference of Ambassadors.

LORD DANESFORT

I added the correspondence referred to in that answer between the ex-Allied Powers and the German Government. If that has already been published—

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

I am not quite sure. The text has not, I believe, been published, and in that case I see no reason why the Papers should not be published if they interest the noble Lord. I think that I have now dealt with all the topics raised. I apologise to your Lordships for having detained you at such length at this hour. The matter is of very great importance, and I certainly do not complain of my noble friend having raised it.

LORD DANESFORT

I have to thank the noble Marquess very much for his very clear statement in answer to my Questions. I think there is only one point that he did not really answer, and that is the question, which was not on the Paper, whether the British Government would do their best with the League of Nations to get recorded an absolute prohibition of poisonous gases in wartime. I do not press the noble Marquess at the moment, but that is a point which I trust the British Government will bear in mind. After what the noble Marquess has said, I beg leave to withdraw my Motion for Papers.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

House adjourned at five minutes past seven o'clock.