§ LORD O'HAGAN rose to call attention to the recent announcements of the War Office as to economies to be effected in respect of the Territorial Army; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, in rising to move the Motion that stands in my name I wish to bring two points to the consideration of your Lordships. The first is the manner in which the gross reductions in the Territorial Forces have been introduced and the second is the effect that the reductions are likely to have on the Territorial Army. In bringing this matter before your Lordships, I am encouraged to do so because I do not suppose that there is any assembly in this country which is more fitted to consider a matter of this sort. No fewer than 120 of your Lordships are directly connected with the administration of the Territorial Army in all parts of the country.
§ The duties which are placed upon these associations by the Act passed during the occupancy of the office of Secretary of State for War by the noble and learned Viscount opposite were far-reaching and numerous. They were entrusted with responsibility for administration, of course, and also with 596 the organisation of the units, and with the duty of recruiting the personnel. And, among other things, it was also laid down that it should be the duty of the Territorial Association to render advice and assistance to the Army Council. I venture to think that, in view of the unusual importance of the steps being taken by the War Office with regard to the Territorial Army this year, and in view of the fact that the reductions proposed are the largest which have ever been attempted since the termination of the War, that function of the Territorial Association should have been made use of by the Secretary of State for War. It is true that in another place the Secretary of State said he did consult the Council of Territorial Associations, and that he also went on to explain more than once that he had no intention, nor was it the desire of the Army Council in any way to slight or ignore the county associations.
§ I am quite sure that my noble friend, who will reply on the debate, will acquit me of desiring to impute to him any lack of sympathy with or appreciation of the efforts made by the associations, because we know with what sympathy he has worked in his present office in the interests of the Territorial Army. At the same time there is this point, which I think we should consider. The Secretary of State stated that they, referring to the Council of the Territorial Army associations, were consulted last July. In view of the very great amount of feeling expressed on this matter, in the public Press and elsewhere, I think it well to refer to what actually occurred, and I should like to follow the same line as was followed by the Secretary of State in another place.
§ In view of the economies which it was realised last year it was necessary to make, he tells us that he called together at the War Office a Committee to go into the subject, and that he invited to that Committee the Vice-Chairman of the Council of Territorial Associations. That would appear on the face of it to be a formal consultation, but later on in the debate we see that it was made perfectly clear by the Secretary of State that the Vice-Chairman was invited, not in his representative but in his individual and personal capacity, and my noble friend, 597 I think, will have some difficulty in persuading me, or any one connected with the administration of the Territorial Army, that the Vice-Chairman of the Council either welcomed or approved the withdrawal of the bounty on that occasion. However, it appears that the result of the inquiries of that Committee were before the Secretary of State in February of this year, and immediately a scheme was drawn up to put them into effect. On February 9 the decisions of the War Office were conveyed to the Vice-Chairman of the Council and by him communicated to the Council itself. I should like to point out here that it was only some two hours before the Council met that the Vice-Chairman was informed of the decisions that the War Office had arrived at on the matter, and I use the word "decisions" advisedly, because it was made perfectly clear by the Vice-Chairman at the time, and subsequently, that they were decisions and neither proposals nor suggestions.
§ I will quote what the Vice-Chairman himself said on that occasion. When this was announced to the Council there was some feeling of disquiet as to what would be the result of the proposed reductions, and it was decided to appoint a small committee to go into the matter and make alternative suggestions. Later in the discussion the Vice-Chairman himself said, with reference to the proposed committee, that he was obliged to point out that it appeared to him that these were decisions at which the War Department had arrived, and he was afraid he could not hold out much hope that there was likely to be any material alteration, and so on. The committee appointed by the Council sat for four days, and as the result of continuous work elaborated alternative suggestions, with a view to economies effective for one year, and suggested further that it would be advisable that a committee should be appointed at which War Office experts should assist in arriving at further economies which might be necessary for the future.
§ On February 21 the Committee was invited to the War Office—and here I should like to say at once that in a matter of this sort the decision and responsibility must, of course, rest with the War Office. The War Office is the body which is obviously properly responsible for deciding whether 598 this or that cut should be effected. At that meeting it was pointed out by the Secretary of State that it was necessary for him to look beyond the coming year, and therefore the proposals of the Committee could not be accepted. He pointed out that if the Council accepted the proposed abolition of the bounty he was prepared to withdraw, for the present at any rate, the proposal with regard to the reduction of establishments. At the same time he welcomed the proposal that a further committee should be set up which should co-operate in the way I have indicated with War Office experts. On leaving that meeting the impression of the Vice-Chairman was that it was an absolute decision of the War Office that the bounty must go, but he also formed the impression that no action would be taken until after the emergency meeting of the Council, which was to take place on March 1. What really happened was that on February 23 a postal telegram was sent to the county associations on the matter, and an Army Order was issued abolishing the bounty on and from March 1.
§
Your Lordships are aware that this led to protests from a great many of the county associations; it is not too much to say from practically all of them; and I should like, if I may, to read a paragraph from the pretest sent by the Lord-Lieutenant of Essex, my noble friend Lord Lambourne, who unfortunately is unable to be here to-day owing to illness, but who otherwise would have been prepared to support me to-day. Speaking on behalf of the Essex Territorial Association, he said:
It regrets that the system adopted by the War Department to effect the required economies should be by the abolition of the bounties. The Association consider this as an objectionable method because the incidence of contributions is made to fall on the Territorial soldier almost entirely, and therefore is liable to produce a very bad effect on the efficiency of the Territorial Army.
Your Lordships will also have seen the protests that have appeared in the Press from the chairmen of various county associations, and the letter from the noble Earl, Lord Dartmouth, whose knowledge on this matter, I suppose, is practically unequalled, not to speak of that very important article in The Times something like a week ago. But we are told by the Secretary of State that the choice is
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between a Territorial Army properly equipped with ammunition and stores, and a Territorial Army short-staffed with ammunition and equipment. I cannot help wondering in this connection what would have been the effect on the procedure and the result with regard to the cutting down of the Estimates if the Director-General of the Territorial Army had been a member of the Army Council.
§ What I should like to ask my noble friend is this: Why was it that, when this matter was being discussed last year, it was not found possible to consult Territorial Associations through the Council in a way which would really have acquainted the War Office with the feelings and views of those whose responsibility it was to administer this Force?—a course such as that which apparently at the present time the Secretary of State welcomes in the suggestions put forward by a committee of the Council. I cannot help feeling—and I hope your Lordships will agree with me—that the way in which the whole of this affair has been conducted is both stupid and ill-conceived, and that the resentment felt up and down the country has been fully justified.
§ We are told that the money to be found for the Territorial Army is £3,452,000, but that the real cost of the Territorial Army is some £4,752,000, and that the difference of £1,300,000 odd represents the value of war stores, equipment, and ammunition, which were accumulated during the period of the Great War, and that, as these have been used up, other means have to be found for replacing them. I do not know whether it occurs to your Lordships, as it occurs to me, and I think to others, when we see these figures, that at any rate this country at the present time has got a very cheap Second Line, and the price that we are paying for the insurance represented by the Territorial Force is not a very high one. Why should this onus of reductions be placed so overwhelming a degree on the shoulders of the ranks of the Territorial Army? It is true that if economies are to be effected and you are not to do it in this way there must be alternatives found, but my noble friend will know, as I do, that other avenues have been suggested. Further economies could be made under the Vote for training, in the proposal for the guarantee, and the suggestions as to 600 standing camps, and a great deal more saving could be effected on travelling expenses and transport. Then there is the other proposal, which I understand is no longer absolutely vetoed by the military advisers, of a reduced period for the training camps, in view of the circumstances of the time—the proposal that that period should be reduced either to one week or to one week and two weeks in alternate years. That would in itself effect a very material economy.
§ The withdrawal of the bounty came as a bombshell both to members of the associations generally and to the Territorial Force itself. The pre-War function of the Territorial Army, as we know, was that of home defence. Those who wished to serve abroad could put their names down and be enrolled in what was called the Special Service section, but I should like to call attention here to one inaccuracy in what has been put before the House of Commons. It is not accurate to say that there was no bonus before the War. There was a bonus of £1 given to those who had completed 15 days' training with the necessary musketry course and the requisite number of drills; and, with regard to the Special Service section, there was what was called a retaining fee of 10s., which I suppose one may look upon almost as a bonus, for men joining that section. The bounty in very many cases makes just the difference to many an individual. It goes considerably towards paying expenses in camp, it also enables a young man very often to pay for a holiday for his wife, and it is naturally a help for Christmas. In many ways it is quite a consideration to those who join the Territorial Force.
§ With one point which has been made in regard to the abolition of the bounty I should like to deal. It has been said that if the bounty is abolished the men who will come into the Territorial Army will be of a better type than the men we get at present. Some of us have had experience of the men joining the Territorial Army since the War, and speaking, I will not say for all, but for many of the units in Essex, I can say that the greatest care has been taken in enlisting men, and one of the commanding officers did not go too far when he said that we have never had a better type than now. One criticism of the withdrawal of the bounty is its possible effect 601 on recruiting. That it will have an immediate effect is very probable; in fact, evidence has been brought before me that it has already had an effect; but I have no doubt that in time we can look to men coming and joining the Territorial Army when the bounty is completely abolished. It is not on that score that I appeal so much to-day to my noble friend as on the score of efficiency.
§ Before dealing with that I should like my noble friend's attention to another consideration which has been put forward by the Secretary of State. He said that it would not be possible in a week, or a month, or two months, to see what the effect of the abolition was going to be. If, in view of all the fears that have been expressed on the part of those who know something of the matter, we are going to wait for a period and then leave it open whether or not we will either restore the bounty or put something in its place, I think, without elaborating it, it is obvious that that is a very inept way of dealing with the matter.
§ It is from the point of view of the effect upon the efficiency of the Territorial Army that I would urge my noble friend and the War Office to go further into the matter. After all, to-day, the Territorial Army is the Second Line. There is no Militia; there is no Special Reserve. The liability for service abroad is taken on by men joining the Territorial Army. The seriousness with which the Force is considered is emphasised by the very agreement which the men enter into when they join the Force, under which it is understood that they are under no liability for the Army, to be treated as if the Force were a drafting machine for the Regular Army. Further, it has been more than once explained that one function of the Territorial Army will be, in the event of war breaking out, to be used as the machinery by which expansion will take place.
§ It is obvious that, if that is the case and if that is the intention, it is essential that you should have a very highly-trained body of non-commissioned officers and men so that your expansion can take place in a proper manner. To-day the technical training of the Territorial Army is very considerable, far more so than it was before the War. As the Secretary of State has emphasised, the increased severity of training, due to 602 modern mechanical and other developments, means that educated men are required for a number of purposes, such as working internal-combustion engines and electrical instruments, making the mathematical calculations necessary for gun laying, and so forth. It is important to secure for this purpose a number of skilled and trained keen men, who in civilian life would be drawing a salary of between £4 and £5 a week.
§ The proportion of specialists is very much greater than it was before the War. I wish your Lordships had had opportunities, as I have had, of seeing, in connection with the signallers, the elaborate and expensive apparatus with which they have had to deal. Take again the case of another new unit, the Antiaircraft (Searchlight) Royal Engineers. I understand that the equipment for a group approaches in value something like £77,000. Those facts will give an indication of the sort of equipment, knowledge and standard that it is necessary for those men to have in order to be efficient as Territorials. Besides that, we know how difficult it is at some times to get men down to do their musketry course at the ranges. At the present time I understand it is not an uncommon thing for keen non-commissioned officers to do an average of something like 100 drills a year.
§ I would urge upon my noble friend that the bounty is really a form of recognition of efficiency. The post-War Territorial takes on a greater liability than was taken on by the Territorial before the War. He is asked for a higher standard of efficiency, and he is asked to do even harder work. I would therefore most strongly urge upon my noble friend and upon the War Office that they should look upon this matter from this angle in particular. I understand that a deputation waited upon the Secretary of State yesterday. We do not know, and naturally were not informed, of what passed. I hope and trust that the considerations brought forward and the serious representations made in this and the other House will lead them to see if it is not possible for something to be done to give some recognition for efficiency, something on the lines I have indicated. I appeal to them if they are going to deal with this matter, not to 603 wait, as the Secretary of State suggested. If you are going to do this thing, do it now.
§ The issues which have been raised by this Motion go even beyond the question of bounty itself. You have appealed to the people of the country to raise and to help the Territorial Army. Parliament has placed a great responsibility upon the county associations. You have gone to the length of even asking the representative of His Majesty in every county to accept the duties of president of the association. Is it right or is it wise, when you are considering taking steps that may have such far-reaching effects upon the future of the Territorial Army, the future Second Line Army of the country, that you should treat in the way I have indicated the county associations of this country?
§ VISCOUNT HALDANEMy Lords, I never listen to the noble Lord who has just addressed us without having a keen sense of the close interest he has taken in his subject and the assiduity with which he has pursued it in detail. His speech to-day was an illustration of how much this question means to us. If I propose to say something in addition to what he has said to-day, it is by way of supporting his thesis. I am not one of those who think that the Secretary of State for War has in these days an easy time over the Territorial Forces. He appears to be between two fires. There are the economists who say: "Here is an opportunity of cutting down," and the Regular soldiers who say: "Yes, here is an opportunity to economise; cut down on the expense of the Territorials and not on the expenditure of the Regular Army." The consequence is that the Territorials become a sort of common target at which you may shoot very easily.
But that is not the true point. What is the function of the Territorial Army? I had something to do with calling it into existence twenty years ago. I remember still the functions that were then defined, and I am not aware that these functions have been departed from since. The Territorial Army was not meant to be a mere addition to existing things. It was meant to be part of the Regular Army, the Army of the country. It was meant to be a force which should not be merely supplementary 604 to the Regular Force but should to some extent take its place. If you had been compelled to rely upon the Regular Army, the pure Regular Army, for your home defence, you might have been put in a very difficult position.
We knew in those days a good deal about the probable plans, according to which the Germans, if war broke out, would come against this country. They would not try to come overseas. If they did that, they would have ignored the British Navy and we know for certain now that they never seriously thought of attempting an invasion overseas. But they did think of the Channel ports and they did think of getting possession of those ports and then, with their submarines, airships and long-range guns, of making the Channel so bare of our ships that they could invade. For that purpose it was necessary to leave the Regular Army as free as possible to go against any German force trying to seize these Channel ports, and that might involve the whole Regular Force that we had being sent across the Channel. If that was so it was obvious we could not be without home defence, and the home defence was that other part of the Army of the country, the Territorial Force, which was to take its place and be ready after a brief period from the outbreak of War.
That being so, the Territorial Force, organised as it was on exactly the same pattern as the Regular Army and consisting of fourteen Divisions and fourteen Cavalry or Yeomanry Divisions (which were to be self-contained), was kept at as high a state of vitality as it could be kept by Parliament and was administered in a different way from the Regular Army. It was essential that it should be administered in a different way. You could not get an army of civilians coming in on the grounds of patriotism to remain as they did unless they were constantly looked after by those who were interested locally, by those who were of great authority in the counties from which they came and who could act as associations in undertaking the administration of the Force.
At that time it had become essential to separate command and training from administration and that was done with the Regular Army. It was the outcome of the Esher Committee Report. It was also a result of the Esher Committee that 605 the War Office got three great administrative branches, which were under the Army Council no doubt, but which worked out their own problems independently. There was the Quartermaster-General, the Master-General of Ordnance and also he who was as much an administrator as any one else, the Adjutant-General. These three administrative departments were alongside the General Staff, which had never to interfere in administration and did not interfere to any material extent, at any rate, in those days. The General Staff had for its business to think and it had to think for the Territorial Force just as much as it had to think for the Regular Army, but it did not interfere with the administration. The administration of the Territorial Force was not under the Adjutant-General, not under the Quartermaster-General and not under the Master-General of Ordnance, but was under the associations and the associations were special administrative bodies formed for that very purpose, not touching command and training but looking after the general administrative supply of the Territorial rmy.
It was, of course, essential that some things should be got from the Regular Army. Take for instance field artillery. That was supplied, as the new guns were made for the Regular Army, by transforming and fitting up the old guns. Quite excellent field artillery, which had been inherited in the early years of 1900, was converted into quick-firing artillery at a very low cost. The Territorial Force got that for their field artillery, but they got it at cost from the Master-General of the Ordnance in whose custody it was. They got other things from the Quartermaster-General. But when they had got all these things, the administration of them was transferred to the county associations and the county associations were, therefore, in the very closest contact with the working of the Force. They consulted, no doubt, with the General Staff, but they consulted with the General Staff through the Generals commanding the Territorial Divisions who had staffs which were in communication with the staff at headquarters.
I have alluded to that for the purpose of bringing out not only how great a fact it was, but how necessary a fact it was that administration should be in the 606 hands of a Territorial Association. It was in the hands of the Territorial Association, and not only so, but an immense amount of business was done in the early days between the two branches of the Army—between the War Office and the Territorial Association. I am speaking from memory, but I remember well almost each week spending a couple of nights at least, sometimes more, in the train going from one association headquarters to another in order to raise the force and inspire the associations. I took with me always some highly competent member of the War Office Staff and we gave them all the information and all the help we could. We conferred with them, not occasionally, not in the sort of conference of which we have heard to-day, but we lived more or less with them, we were either with them or they with us always.
It has been said that you might make matters better if the Director-General of the Territorial Force, who is in the Adjutant-General's Department, were put on the Army Council. It might be a useful thing. On the whole I am in favour of it. But do not imagine that you are going to solve your problem by that. There is only one way you can solve your problem and that is by restoring the old system under which the associations lived in close contact with the War Office. Why do they not live in closer contact with the War Office? I will tell your Lordships. It is for a reason that goes back to my time. The regular soldiers never had quite full faith in the Territorial Army. They said: "Oh, the training is too short and you cannot make soldiers that way. You can get no right or proper soldiers unless they are filled with the Regular Army spirit and live under Regular Army conditions." The War proved that not to be true. So far as the Territorial Force is concerned they did magnificently.
It was a superstition which I should have hoped we had got rid of by this time, but I am afraid there is still a good deal of this feeling, that if we could only get rid of the Territorial Force we could add another Division or two to the Regular Army. I do not think the Regular Army is too big to-day for the tasks which may be thrust upon it at any time. I do not think it is too big considering the enormous variety of the duties which it 607 may have to undertake in different parts of the world. I think that it is essential and vital that you should get a Territorial Force for home defence and if necessary for the expansion and relief of the Regular Army. If that is to be so, then we must get rid altogether of the old notion that there is something inferior in being a Territorial as compared with a Regular. We must get rid of that spirit which has always been there and which makes it difficult for the Territorial associations to get the interest of the War Office to the full extent to which they ought to have it, and to get that close and constant consultation which is a necessity of the situation.
I am not reproaching the Regular soldiers, far from it, some of them have done splendidly in their dealings with the Territorials. All of them, I think, loyally accept the principle, but it is one thing to accept the scripture and it is another thing to be permeated with the spirit of its words. I cannot think that the War Office has ever been thoroughly permeated with the spirit of the gospel of territorialism. What you have to do, if you are to get things right, is to bring about far closer and more frequent communication between the War Office and the Territorial associations. The Secretary of State and the Generals must go down to the provinces—they must not merely rely on seeing deputations in London—and be constantly addressing meetings, as Ministers do, and addressing them in Manchester, in Liverpool, in Scotland, in Newcastle, wherever they are required. We ought to see in the newspapers reports of the speeches of the Secretary of State for War week by week.
Not only is that so, but it necessitates an understanding of how the Territorial Force ought to be treated. It was badly treated in 1914. The illustrious Regular Generals who were responsible for the situation did not realise quite the nature of the Force with which they had to deal. The Sixth Division—if my memory serves me—was ordered away to India. It went with magnificent patriotism and what some of its members suffered there has never been recorded. But that ought not to have been done. It was quite right to ask the Territorial Divisions to undertake duties, but at that time the idea was too much: "Ah! India, a 608 remote place, let's send a Territorial Division there and get rid of the necessity of finding opportunity for its operations in France." Then, again, I think another Division was sent to Malta, and the Territorials, after having been drawn on and having responded with the utmost patriotism on the part of both officers and men to the demands made on them—demands which would have been quite rightly made if it had been a case of necessity, which it was not—were further maltreated.
Instead of accepting the Territorial organisations, the authorities of those days created a New Army which was to supplement and take the place of the Territorial Army, with the result that the Territorials were naturally very much disheartened and the associations found themselves with nothing to do. There was no body so well fitted as the county associations for raising troops at that time. We could have doubled the Territorial Force in a few weeks. But they were not asked to assist in raising new regiments. That was left to mayors and all sorts of other people in different parts of the country. We all of us went about taking our part in making an appeal to the mayors to raise troops, but we used to ask ourselves why we were not appealing to the county associations. Lord Kitchener was a magnificent personality, whose courage and presence inspired the country, but he knew nothing of the organisation of the Army as it had been worked out in those days. He knew nothing of the Territorial Force. The result was that he came over here rather under the impression that we had no organisation at all and that it was necessary to create things de novo. That was the cause, I think, of a good deal of the trouble there was in those days.
The relevance of it is that we have got to get rid of that to-day. We have got to bring back the close relations which, I will not say enduringly or very regularly, but which at any rate to some extent at one time existed between the War Office and the Territorial associations. The only way of doing that is to live with the Territorial associations in a way you have not been doing. I know that many letters have been addressed to them and received from them also, but that is not enough. I think they 609 should be represented in some fashion on the Army Council. That is a matter of great importance. I think they should have their means of expressing themselves inside the War Office. They should have their room there and their representative in that room. I think they should be visited far more frequently than they are at present. I think you should make it plain to them that you do rely on them for an integral part of the defence of this country and of the Empire. If these things are scientifically and systematically done, if they are done ex animo, then a good deal of the grievances of which Lord O'Hagan has spoken to-night will disappear and you will be able by consultation not only to get the associations on your side but to get the public on your side in supporting them.
THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (THE EARL OF ONSLOW)My Lords, I am very much obliged to my noble friend for having raised this question because it gives me an opportunity of explaining the policy of the Government in regard to the economies in the Territorial Army to which the Motion refers. Your Lordships will remember that, last year, economies in the Territorial Army to the extent of some £160,000 were carried out. That was decided upon at the last moment. We were forced to make an overhead cut of £160,000 absolutely at the last moment, and indeed the items of which that £160,000 was made up were only allocated after the Estimates had been passed through the House of Commons. A cut of that kind, an overhead cut of £160,000, could only be regarded in the nature of a provisional cut. It could not be repeated, obviously, in toto, another year. That was impossible.
We had not until recently—relatively speaking recently—any certain knowledge as to whether or not a cut in the Territorial Army Estimates for this year would be necessary, though of course it was not improbable in view of the general state of the country's finances. Therefore, in order to take every precaution, my right hon. friend the Secretary of State set up a Committee, of which I had the honour of being Chairman last year, to go into every possible aspect of Territorial finance and to consider 610 every economy, possible or impossible, every economy ridiculous or absurd as it might seem, any kind of economy, and to report thereon. We met last July, and as my noble friend Lord O'Hagan said, we had the advantage of the presence of the Vice-Chairman of the Council of the Territorial Association. My noble friend has, I think, made it clear by quoting the Secretary of State's speech regarding the presence of the Vice-Chairman at that Committee's meeting that he was there only in a personal capacity, and of course he is not in any way responsible for any decision which the Government have reached subsequently. I want to have that clear.
Our duty was to report on all possible economies and we had another duty, which was to put them in order—I will not say order of merit, because none of these economies have any merit from the Territorial point of view, but in the order in which they might be considered least undesirable. I think that is the best method of expressing the duty with which we were charged. As I say, we did not know whether any of them would be necessary. As your Lordships will probably remember, the last debate in this House on the Territorial question was raised by my noble friend Lord Templemore. I told your Lordships then that no decision had been made. In fact, the decision that reductions would have to be made was not taken until much later, until the closing days of last year.
When the question as to whether a reduction should be made or not was decided upon, the state of affairs was that there were two alternatives. One was to make no reduction at all in the Territorial Estimates, in which case the £160,000 would have had to be replaced in toto, or all but the amount in respect of the reduction of the Field Park companies which had been disbanded. We should then have been faced with an Estimate rather larger than in the year before last. In addition, we should have had to provide within the next four years a further sum of more than £1,000,000. That would have grown by natural accretion, consequent on the extension of the Territorial Army and a growth in strength up to establishment which, I trust, in spite of the setbacks and the pessimistic reports that we hear, may still continue. 611 And there is another reason why expenditure on the Territorial Army would have grown considerably. The stores concerned have been largely drawn from stocks left over from the War. At the end of this year those stocks will have begun to run out, and further provision will have to be made, so that next year the expense of the Territorial Army must grow automatically, and money must naturally be found to meet it.
It was decided, therefore, at the end of last year that, in order to help in reducing the Army Estimate this year and to meet additional expenditure in future years, some financial adjustment was immediately necessary. That being the case we had alternatives before us each of which would bring in a considerable sum of money. I ought to say that we did not fail to examine the possibilities of taking comparatively small items and seeing whether they could be reduced or abolished in order to obtain the money that was necessary. Unfortunately, we were unable to do so. Let me mention some of the smaller items that we felt that we could deal with. They were the continued reduction of the Field Park companies, a continued reduction of £11,000 for horse hire, which was included in the reductions of last year, and also a reduction of £8,000 on General Officers' training grants. We also considered if it were possible to disband—though we did this very reluctantly for there were grave disadvantages—seven casualty clearing stations, two veterinary hospitals and two veterinary evacuation stations. Those items seemed to be the absolute maximum in the way of smaller economies. There was the alternative, of course, of disbanding certain units not included in divisional formations, but we felt that there was the very gravest objection to such a course. It was rejected, and I think that its rejection will be approved by your Lordships and by all who are interested in the Territorial Army.
To come back to the situation that confronted us, we had before us three possible alternatives. The first was the telescoping of two or more Divisions. This would have brought in a very considerable sum of money. If, for example, we had telescoped the two London Divisions, we should have saved £114,000 a year. This, of course, would involve a 612 reduction of units. I think that your Lordships would regard both the telescoping of Divisions and the reduction of units as in every way undesirable and lamentable. Such, at any rate, was the very strong view of the Army Council, the reason being that if you disband units—it is true that we have had to do this in the case of technical units, though I do not disguise that we deeply regretted the necessity—if you disband fighting units, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to revive them if you desire to do so. That is not the only objection. As your Lordships know, and as the noble Viscount knows very well (for I think it was he that did it), the whole country is divided into recruiting areas and, if you pick out one unit, you make a hole in the recruiting area and upset the whole system of recruiting all through the adjacent areas. That is one of the great disadvantages of disbanding units, and accordingly we rejected the proposal altogether.
Then we came to the other alternatives: the abolition of the bounty and the reduction of establishments. I do not hesitate to say that both those alternatives involved very grave drawbacks. I wish to emphasise that point. But if you compare those drawbacks with those of the disbanding of units they are relatively less grave. For example, you can reduce establishments and raise them again; if you abolish the bounty it is possible to re-establish it or, if you diminish it, it is possible to increase it again. This is far easier than to revive units that have been disbanded. As I have said before, although we knew at the end of last year that reductions would have to fall upon the Army Estimates, we did not know until very recently the amount of reduction that the financial position would require. If greater sacrifices had been demanded from the Army, we might have been forced to adopt not only the abolition of the bounty but also other and less desirable schemes. If you compare the effect of reducing establishments with the abolition of the bounty, it will be seen that by reducing establishments you save £140,000 on the first year and £73,000 a year in future years, the larger sum in the first year being accounted for by the withdrawal of surplus clothing. The abolition of the bounty gives a smaller sum in the first year—namely, £64,000—but in following 613 years the economy increases and eventually, on present strength, a saving of £332,000 is reached.
To go on with my story, in the early days of February my right hon friend came to his decision in regard to the economies that he considered to be possible, after eliminating those that were impossible. These were, in addition to the smaller economies that I have mentioned, the abolition of the bounty and the reduction or establishments. On February 9 there was a meeting of the Council of the Territorial Association, and on that morning the Vice-Chairman of the Council came to see me. On the authority of the Secretary of State, he was informed of these proposals and was asked to bring them before the Council. I do not know if I misunderstood my noble friend, but I should like to give the whole story as it occurred. If he meant that this was put forward as an inevitable decision, he was not quite correct, but if he meant that it was a decision at which the War Office had definitely arrived, he was quite right.
I will explain exactly what happened. The abolition of the bounty and the reduction of establishments were conveyed to the Vice-Chairman as decisions. My noble friend correctly says they were not suggestions really, but decisions. The War Office could not find any more suitable scheme for effecting reductions, and those decisions were communicated in that way to the county associations by the Vice-Chairman of the Council. What I would like to say, however, is that if my noble friend thinks those decisions were in the nature of irrevocable decisions he is not correct, and I will prove it. For example, one of them was never carried out—the reduction of establishments. The War Office was able to give way on it. If we had had any alternative, if our exhaustive examination had been insufficient, if we had omitted to find some other possible solution, I am sure we should have been only too glad to accept and carry out a suitable alternative, and to have allowed the bounty to continue.
On February 9 the Council met, as my noble friend has told you, and the War Office proposals or decisions were duly communicated to the Council by the Vice-Chairman. My noble friend has told us that those proposals, or decisions, were 614 received with great disfavour by the Council of the Territorial Association. I do not wonder. I can only say that the disfavour with which the Council received them was only equal to the disfavour with which they were viewed by the unfortunate Army Council which had to make them. It was, however, a decision between reductions and some savings or no reductions at all. The Council set up a committee to consider the proposals and make counter-suggestions. They did so, and a deputation met my right hon. friend. They made counter-proposals, and we discussed them at length. They objected very strongly indeed to the abolition of the bounty and the reduction of establishments. They also objected to the abolition of the grants for painting of guns and for the medical examination of recruits—two small grants.
At any rate, we were able to meet them to a certain extent by giving way on the painting of guns, the payment for medical examination of recruits, and the reduction of establishments. Then we had to go into the question of the counterproposals of the Committee—proposals to make economies which would render unnecessary the abolition of the bounty. As I have said, if those proposals had met the case we should have been only too glad, but they did not. That was the unfortunate part of it. One proposal was that £124,000 should be taken from the clothing reserve; but we were bound to point out that that was in the nature of a capital item and could not apply to annual expenditure. Another proposal was to make an over-all cut of 6 per cent., on all the Territorial grants. That, however, would have a very unequal effect upon different associations, and possibly might kill some of the poorer associations, Then it was also estimated by the Council that this would result in a saving of £90,000, but from the calculations made by the financial staff of the War Office we were informed that the saving would not reach so high a figure. Both these proposals also had the disadvantage that they were only operative for this year, and that not only would they not provide anything for future years, but it seems to me it would hardly be denied that in all probability they would throw additional expenditure on the Vote in future years.
615 We could not accept these proposals. They did not meet the case and I do not think they were really financially sound. So, after due consideration, we came back to this, that the original decision of the War Office was the right one, and we were obliged to adhere to our own decision, or proposal, whichever you like to call it. We have heard very much in other places, in the other House and in the Press as to the effect of the abolition of the bounty. Varying views have been expressed. There has been the view expressed that actually it would result beneficially and do good. Other criticisms have gone right away to the other end of the scale, and it is said that it will ruin the Territorial Army. I cannot attempt to prophesy what the ultimate effect will be, but from what has been told me I gather that, although possibly, and it may be said probably, the abolition of the bounty may produce a set-back in recruiting at the outset, in time matters will right themselves. We can only wait and see—a phrase which has been used before.
I should like, however, to say that if the abolition of the bounty really has that disastrous effect upon recruiting which the more extreme pessimists predict, then we must take steps to counter act it. I should like to assure your Lord ships that we will not let the Territorial Army down. We have been urged to examine every possible way in which some compensation might be given for the abolition of the bounty. I cannot at the present moment make any statement on that subject. Yesterday we received a deputation from the Council of Territorial Associations, and had a very interesting talk on this and kindred matters. A short statement has been issued to the Press, but it would be premature to make any statement now, except that we are going into all those matters very carefully indeed, and that if we can do anything to meet the wishes so generally expressed without placing undue burdens upon our financial resources, we shall endeavour to do it. I should like to say that we rely, and the deputation yesterday showed we did not rely in vain, upon the assistance so readily proferred by the Territorial associations, and upon their advice in the direction of what can be usefully done.
My noble friend referred to a committee which it has been decided to set 616 up. We shall welcome their co-operation in every way. I should like to say here that if the Territorial associations or my noble friend consider that my right hon. friend, or the Army Council, or the Government, or anybody else desire to ignore or to put a slight upon the administration of the Territorial Army or upon the Territorial associations, it is quite incorrect to suppose so, and they are labouring under a complete misapprehension. That would be the very last thing which my right hon. friend or the Army Council would have any intention or desire of doing. I say with absolute conviction, so far as I personally am concerned, and so far as all my colleagues are concerned I am sure, we are deeply conscious of the obligation we lie under to the Territorial associations generally and especially for the very ready and cordial assistance which they render to the War Office in this extremely difficult task.
There has been some mention of the fact that the Territorial associations were not consulted separately. I would point out that really to consult each association separately on very difficult points of detail is not practical politics. I will deal with that at a little more length shortly. In consulting the Council of Territorial Associations before my right hon. friend came to his final and definite decision he was following the usual course. The Council of Associations represents every association in the country, except that of the County of London, and I understand that the Council of Associations invited the County of London to be represented on the committee set up to make counter proposals to the War Office decisions and to consider them, with every opportunity of expressing their views thereon. I believe that to be the case.
I have heard another complaint—a complaint with which I certainly have some sympathy—that the Council were given very little time to consider what the War Office had got to say and to put forward counter-suggestions. I am very sorry indeed, and so is my right hon. friend, who has expressed his regret fully in another place, that the time at the disposal of the Council was not longer than it was. But, honestly, I do not see how that could be helped. It was not until February 8 that the amount of the economies which we should be forced to ask from the Territorial Army was known— 617 I mean we did not know what we should be likely to have to economise; as noble Lords know, the amount, for example, was overstated by £140,000. It has been suggested that we should have consulted the Council before that. Would it really have served any useful purpose to have said: "Will you please suggest some great economies? We do not know how much they will be, we do not know whether we shall want any economies at all; but will you take it into consideration, and see what suggestions you can make?"
The same pressure happens every year when the Estimates are prepared. I have considerable experience, and I know there is always bound to be a rush at the end of January or the beginning of February. The Departments are then considering the various items, balancing one against the other, reckoning up their commitments, and trying to put the whole of their financial position for the year into a form for final consideration by the Government. I have been connected with Government Departments, in and out of them—mostly in them—for the last twenty-six years, and I have been connected not only with the War Office, but with other spending Departments, the Admiralty, the Board of Education, the Ministry of Health, and so on, and my experience is that at this time of the year you always have the same pressure and the same rush. I am afraid you cannot blame anybody for it; it is one of those things inherent in our financial system, and I really do not see how it can be altered in any way. There must at some time or other be a pressure when the annual Estimates are made up. We are very sorry indeed that we could only give twelve days for consideration to the Council. If it had been possible we should have been glad to give them more. The pressure was even greater last year; we were not able to allocate our final economies until the Estimates actually passed the House of Commons; and last year we followed the same course and consulted the Council of Associations.
I have explained that from our point of view it was impossible to take any other course, if reductions were to be made in the Territorial Army, than the course we did take. But noble Lords may say that if the Army Estimates were to 618 be reduced at all then the reductions should fall upon some other part of the Votes. The total Army Vote for effective services, excluding the Territorial Vote, this year was £28,245,000. That is the only Vote on which you could make any economies. The Votes for non-effective services were £7,997,000, and of course those you could not touch. But, as your Lordships are aware, very heavy cuts have been made in other Votes, besides the Territorial Vote. It really is impossible, I think, to see how one could have effected the economies in the Army Votes which the situation required unless we asked the Territorial Army to render assistance. Not only so, but I do not see how it would have been possible to provide, as we have to provide, for the increased cost of the Territorial Army in future years unless some financial reorganisation had taken place this year.
There is another point in regard to this. Vote 2, which is the Vote in which the cost of the Territorial Army is shown, gives the amount of money exclusively spent on the Territorial Army. But other Votes, in which the Territorial Army is not specifically mentioned, have their bearing on the Territorial Army; for example, there is the question of research. If the Army is to be of any use at all it must be kept up-to-date, and we can only keep it up-to-date by constant experiment and research. If we should ever, unfortunately, be compelled to resort again to mobilisation, not only the Regular Army but the whole Army would be equipped in exactly the same manner, and unless, by research, we keep up with modern times and make no considerable cuts in the money devoted to research, we cannot keep either the Territorial Army or the Regular Army up-to-date, as it ought to be kept up-to-date. As my noble friend said just now, our aim has been to maintain the Territorial Army properly equipped with ammunition and stores, and to prevent it from being starved of ammunition and modern equipment. In order to do that, we have been obliged to ask for a sacrifice from those men who are already making greater sacrifices for their country than they made before the War. We do it with the utmost reluctance, and the method by which we have been forced to do it we deeply deplore. We know that it may have an adverse effect. But in our judgment—and the Government take 619 the sole and entire responsibility for their decision—the manner in which the economy has been effected was the least undesirable one of the various proposals that have been put forward.
There has been a complaint that the commanding officers were given very little time in which to tell their men with a view to re-engagement before the bounty was actually abolished. I sympathise very strongly with those who feel aggrieved, and I quite realise that those who have been hit feel that they have been hardly used. But, if we consider the point for a moment, it will be seen that, if you are to cut the bounty off, it is obvious that the fairest way to do it is to cut it off without warning; because, if warning were given, it would really be unfair between man and man. One man, for instance, who is able to make an immediate decision, will say: "I will go and re-engage at once"; another man may say: "I cannot tell for another six weeks or so whether I shall be in this country—I may be going abroad," and he will be cut out of the bounty, though he may be equally-deserving with the other man. Any decision of this kind must cause hardship whichever way the decision is carried out. We took, rightly or wrongly, the course which we thought would bring about the least hardship. I trust we were right in doing so, although we recognise that hardships have been caused to certain people, whom we much regret should be put in any difficulty whatever.
I would like to touch upon one point, because there seems to have been some ambiguity as to what happened when the deputation met the Secretary of State on February 21, in regard to the notice given for the termination of the bounty. I was present at that meeting together with another member of the Army Council. The counter-proposals of the County Territorial Associations were discussed and, when they proved to be inadequate, my right hon. friend said there was no alternative but to adhere to his own decision in regard to the abolition of the bounty. My recollection is that a member of the deputation asked the Secretary of State when he proposed to announce it and that my right hon. friend, according to my recollection, said, "Now," and he added, "If you have bad 620 news to announce the sooner you announce it the better." I saw a member of the deputation and asked him what his recollection was. We both agreed, but he interpreted the word "now" as meaning after the meeting of the Council on March 1. I think that is the reason why this misunderstanding has arisen. I do not think there is any difference of opinion as to what occurred but only a difference of interpretation as to what "now" meant. I hope he will not think that we did anything which we did not fully inform the deputation was going to be done.
In your Lordships' House there are perhaps more people connected with the Territorial Army than in any other body of men in this country. There are the Lords-Lieutenant, the officers on the Active List of the Territorial Army and—perhaps the most numerous of all—those who have held Commissions in the Territorial Army and who are now retired. I should like to make one observation to your Lordships who are so conversant with the affairs of the Territorial Army. I have explained the reluctance and regret with which we have had to take the step I have described, and I realise, of course, that this step is one which is viewed with reluctance and regret by the Territorial Army. I want to urge one thing upon this House and upon all those who are connected with the Territorial Army. There is no intention or suggestion on the part of the Secretary of State, or the Army Council, or the Government, or the War Office, or the Regular Army that the value of the Territorial Army is not recognised. Everyone of us feels deeply the debt of gratitude under which the country lies towards the Territorial Army. But, if the Territorial Army gets the impression that these economies, which unfortunately are necessary, connote any disparagement of the Territorial Army, I am sure members of the Territorial Army will be gravely mistaken. The economies are promoted by dire necessity and by no sense of disparagement towards the Territorial Army.
I do not want to compare the sacrifices which have been asked of the Territorial Army with those asked of the Regular Army. That, I think, has been referred to elsewhere, but, if the Territorial Army really nourishes a grievance or a grudge in this matter, I am afraid that that will 621 cause serious harm and injury to the interests of the country at large, to the Territorial Army itself, and to everyone of us. We ask the Territorial Army to do something and I would ask your Lordships to assist. We have to face a time of financial stress and we have to ask all good citizens, not only the Territorial Army but everyone, to help the Government and the country to face it. In 1914 we had to face great dangers abroad and no body of men came forward so readily and faced those dangers as the Territorial Army. Now we have to face not great dangers but great inconveniences at home, because there is nothing so disagreeable and inconvenient as questions of financial economy. I would ask the Territorial Army to recognise that, in asking them to make these economies, we are doing so with the utmost reluctance and not to regard our action as being a slight upon them. Let them not think that we are disparaging them in any way. This is only done in the interests of the country as a whole. I would ask them further to help us to carry out this task, disagreeable as I know it is both to them and to us.
If a state of affairs should again arise in which the Territorial Army should be required in its military capacity to face it, I am sure we could rely upon them to meet it in exactly the same patriotic manner as they did in 1914. I ask them to look upon these very disagreeable and very disturbing economies, as I know they are, which we have been reluctantly forced to make, in the same way and to let them do as little harm and damage to the Territorial Army as possible. We know what the country owes to the Territorial Army and I can give your Lordships this assurance, as I have given it before, that we shall not let the Territorial Army down.
§ LORD COTTESLOEMy Lords, two questions have emerged from the debate which my noble friend behind me has initiated. One is the financial question, which has been dealt with at length by the noble Earl who represents the War Office in this House. Stress was laid upon the subject by the noble and learned Viscount opposite, who may be called the father of the Territorial Army. He alluded to the Esher Committee. I myself at all events had some part, as a member of that Committee, in bringing 622 to birth the child for which the noble and learned Viscount was responsible. Now Lord Haldane has truly pointed out that the spirit of the Force is what is important. It does not really go upon a financial basis. The amount of pay given, which may be enough to induce the professional soldier to enlist because the Army provides him with a career and a livelihood, is no great inducement to the civilian, who depends upon his own earnings during the rest of the year to maintain his home. You cannot get a temporary cook for the same wages as you pay a permanent cook.
The important thing in the Territorial Force is the feeling of team work and the club aspect of regimental life. Men come together year after year in camp, falling into their old place among their old friends, whom they do not see from one training to another. Now that is one form of co-operation, the individual co-operation of the patriotic citizen, and, although finance is not the first consideration, still you can starve the most willing horse.
Terms of service have to be rectified from time to time as circumstances alter, but it shakes confidence if terms are varied without full notice and without full consultation. What is the position of the Territorial associations? They undertook the duty of administration on certain terms. There were two parties to that bargain. They were one. They cannot carry out to their own satisfaction their duties if the terms on which they work are arbitrarily varied. The gist of the trouble which has led to this delay was foreseen long ago by the Territorial associations. A year ago the associations by a tour de force found £160,000 out of their own funds to stave off certain requirements which might have proved in their opinion disastrous. That could not be repeated. But that having been done, the natural consequence was, in the view of the associations, that the War Office was asked to consult them and to give them notice in future so that the associations might know what was coming.
Perhaps I may be allowed to quote a few lines from a letter which Lord Derby, the Chairman of the Council of Territorial Associations, wrote to the Secretary of State on July 12, 1926. That 623 letter has already been alluded to. This is one paragraph from it:—
I am instructed to urge that the future policy of the Government with regard to the Territorial Army should be disclosed at the earliest possible moment, because this Council cannot contemplate the possibility of finding themselves in the difficult position in which they were placed in February last.It may be that it was in consequence of that letter that the Financial Committee at the War Office was set up which considered at that date the question of Territorial finance, and if that Committee did, as I suppose, explore every avenue of Territorial finance with a view to future estimates, it surely was hardly necessary that that letter (though it was acknowledged) should never be answered, and that we should be told that the hurry in the Estimates at the last moment was such that it was impossible to consult the Territorial associations until within a few days of the announcement which the Secretary of State was going to make in the House.That letter, as I have said, was not answered. The only effect of it, apart from the calling of the Vice-Chairman of the Council of the Territorial Associations before the War Office Committee, was that—the letter being dated July 12—on February 9 the Vice-Chairman was authorised to announce decisions to the Council of the Territorial Associations. That was not, I think, endeavouring to meet the associations in their desire that the future policy should be disclosed at the earliest possible moment. They were anxious to be consulted; they were ready to make what suggestions they could; but nobody can effectively make financial suggestions to the War Office who does not know a good deal of the interior financial arrangements of that office.
Estimates as between the Regular Army and the Territorial Army are matters upon which no outsider can dogmatise. Is it possible that large savings might still be made in the administration of the Regular Army? I have heard that suggested, but I would not venture to put forward any concrete proposal. It is natural, obviously, that some representatives of the War Office should feel that in military effectiveness they get better value from the money spent on the Regular Army. That, I suppose, is the case, but it must not be forgotten not 624 only that the object of the Territorial Army is to produce some degree of military effectiveness but that it is of great indirect value. It is the only military organisation behind the Regular Army and it is the Regular Army's basis of expansion if expansion should be necessary. Surely it is dangerous to do anything for financial reasons alone that may endanger the confidence and the stability of that organisation.
What is wanted is that the associations should be in better touch with the War Office. I think that has appeared explicitly or otherwise in every speech that has been made. I am no believer in putting the Director-General of the Territorial Army upon the Army Council. Those conversant, as I have some reason to be, with the internal organisation of the War Office can see, I think, that that would not be a very effective step, but, while it is admitted that the War Office have a far greater sympathy than in old days that I can remember for Volunteers or for Territorials, it is absolutely necessary for the working of this system that there should be not only sympathy but confidence between the War Office and the associations.
I have the honour to be a member of an organisation very closely analogous to the Council of the County Territorial Associations and that is the County Councils Association which, as many of your Lordships know, meets constantly in London and focusses the opinion of the county councils of the country upon all kinds of points with which they have to deal. That body has existed for thirty-five years. It was established probably with some doubt and trepidation as to its future, but its position now is such that it has the closest and most friendly relations with the various Departments dealing with local government. That body is consulted by Ministers when they draft Bills and before they issue orders. And why? In order to avoid the difficulties which will arise in administration if the point of view of those who are responsible for administration is not considered at a very early stage.
I would ask whether some such footing cannot be reached between the War Office and the Council of County Territorial Associations. It is perfectly true, as the noble Earl has reminded us, that you cannot 625 at very short notice communicate with every association individually, but when you have an organisation on which they are practically all represented—or all but one—and which focusses their opinion, surely it is worth while to make good use of that organisation, which is co-operating with, and is out for the same object as the War Office, and which is entirely friendly to the aims and the objects of the War Office in organising and maintaining the Territorial Army. It is that kind of understanding which I hope to see in future and which I believe would go a very long way to remedy such difficulties as those which have arisen on the present occasion.
§ EARL FORTESCUEMy Lords, every one pays lip service to economy with the reservation that neither he nor any Department with which he is connected shall be inconvenienced. But it is obviously right that the Territorial Force should bear a proportion of the necessary reduction in the Estimates. I listened attentively to the speech of my noble friend the Earl of Onslow and I am afraid I must say that I was not convinced by it, either that reduction of the bounty is the wisest reduction that can be made or that the manner in which it was announced was the most considerate to the Territorial Army. I wish that my noble friend had been able to give a more cordial echo to what Viscount Haldane said as to the need of sympathy between the War Office and the Territorial Associations.
§ EARL FORTESCUEI am glad to have elicited that from my noble friend. I entirely agree with Lord Cottesloe that what is desirable is that the same relations should prevail between the War Office and the Council of Territorial Associations as prevail between the Ministry of Health and the Home Office and the Association of County Councils. There has been talk of liaison committees. I have been on one or two advisory committees at the War Office and my experience has been that the matters referred to us were generally trivial and that they did not always take our advice even on those matters. If I understood aright it is proposed to review the whole position of the Territorial Army with a 626 view, perhaps, to reductions or rearrangements. As everybody knows, the Territorial Army occupies a different position now from what it did before the War. It is now the only Second Line and it is to be the recognised vehicle for expansion. I am not quite satisfied that it is in a satisfactory condition to fulfil those functions. It is only eighty per cent. of establishment and establishment is one-third below the strength required for war. In the event of mobilisation every battalion, every battery and every unit will have to be duplicated and perhaps triplicated.
I am not satisfied—though it is a matter for experts rather than for a layman—that a force which is not much more than one-third of the strength at which it would have to be in war is an adequate or satisfactory second line. On the other hand it is over-strong for a mere cadre and contains many thousands of men who can never be more than rank and file, who can never, if I may use the expression, be more than "hewers of wood and drawers of water." I have no doubt whatever that if there was mobilisation the old Territorial officers and men would come back in great numbers, but even then training would be required and those of us who were concerned during the War in raising new units know how much difficulty there was about instructors. The need for instructors will be even greater in the future than in the past because the number of experts and technical men is still greater than it was then. I am afraid the effect of abolishing the bounty will be to discourage just the men who are specially wanted.
If the condition of the Force is reviewed I hope that some consideration will be given to the question of whether it might not be wiser, while maintaining the full number of units, to reduce the mere numbers of the Territorial Force and to concentrate on the provision of a full and well-trained staff of officers, noncommissioned officers, technical men and experts, so that, on mobilisation not only should there be plenty of men in each unit to train the new recruits but also that they should be in a position to detail at any rate a nucleus for building up the Second Line, or rather Third Line units which would inevitably be required. I do hope if anything of that sort is ever done, that the War Office will really take 627 the Territorial Association into counsel as to the best methods by which it can be done, as to the classes and the number of classes and courses which you can ask men to do and as to the conditions under which they can be invited to attend. I also hope they will not forget another thing, which nearly all Government Departments habitually do forget, and that is that a system which may suit London and Lancashire is not necessarily suitable to Cornwall or Aberdeenshire.
LORD DENMANMy Lords, as the hour is getting late and I understand that two or three other noble Lords desire to speak I hope the noble Earl will agree to the debate being adjourned. I suggest that it should be adjourned until Thursday next.
THE EARL OF ONSLOWI am quite ready to agree to that if it will suit the convenience of noble Lords. I think there are certain other questions down for next Thursday, but you can never tell how quickly things may go. If it does not come on then perhaps the noble Lord will suggest a later date.
§ Moved, That the debate be adjourned until Thursday next.—(Lord Denman.)
§ On Question, Motion agreed to and debate adjourned accordingly.
§ House adjourned at half past seven o'clock.