§ THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY)My Lords, as is known to the House, His Majesty's Government thought it necessary that they should have an opportunity of conferring verbally with the British Delegates in order that we might have a full understanding of the position reached in the Geneva negotiations and be enabled to take a decision on certain points referred to us by the Delegates. These questions have been fully discussed with our colleagues during the last few days and the Delegates are to-day returning to Geneva to continue the Conference, which we trust will reach a successful conclusion. In these circumstances it would be improper for me to make at this stage any detailed exposition of the British proposals, or to comment on the proposals of the other Powers. The statement which I am going to read is therefore designed only to remove a misunderstanding which, if it continued uncorrected, could not but impede the prospects of success.
The Conference on Naval Disarmament now sitting at Geneva have discussed many important points in technical Committees and plenary Conferences, but, in spite of the efforts of our Delegates at Geneva, serious misapprehension of the aims of His Majesty's Government still prevails in some quarters. His Majesty's Government has even been charged with the desire to destroy that equality of sea power as between the United States of America and the British Empire which the Washington Conference contemplated—a suspicion for which there is no foundation. The invitation of the President of the United States of America to take part in a Disarmament Conference was understood by His Majesty's Government to be based on his desire to develop the policy of the 934 Washington Conference by diminishing yet further naval expenditure while maintaining national security. With this two-fold end His Majesty's Government are in complete agreement, and they desire to measure the merits of every proposal by the degree to which it furthers this twofold end.
It is on this principle that they have proposed to diminish the size and armament of battleships, while leaving unaltered the numbers fixed at Washington. It is for this reason also that they suggest limitation in the number and armament of large fighting cruisers on principles similar to those adopted at Washington for battleships. This proposal, like the first, would greatly diminish national expenditure without endangering national safety. The questions connected with small cruisers are of a more complicated character. The strength of fleets can be stated in figures and compared with precision. Their primary function is to fight other fleets and, speaking broadly, they can easily be compared with each other. No such simple way of looking at the subject is possible in the case of small cruisers employed for police purposes in times of peace, and necessary for the protection of the lines of communication in time of war. Geographical considerations cannot be rationally ignored. It can hardly be denied, as was clearly stated by us when accepting the President's invitation, that such vessels are of vital necessity to an Empire, whose widely scattered parts are divided from each other by seas and oceans; whose most populous parts are dependent for their daily bread on sea-borne trade; and which would perish if it failed to protect its external trade.
It has to be noted further that the sea routes on which Britain depends for her existence lie largely in narrow waters bordered by other States. This is not the case with the United States of America, whose most important lines of communication lie either on land within her own frontiers, by sea along her own coasts, or in the great oceans. These circumstances received due consideration at Washington in 1922 and have not lost any of their importance. But it is hardly necessary to say that His Majesty's Government, while urging the special difficulties due to Britain's geo- 935 graphical position, are far from claiming the least right to dictate any small cruiser policy to other Powers. They accept the general principles which, as they understand them, underlie the President's policy that no maritime Power should maintain a larger navy than is required for its own security.
To translate this into figures is, for the reasons already given, far more difficult in the case of small cruisers than in the case of the larger types of surface vessels. Anything resembling the quasi-permanent formula adopted at Washington for battleships is quite inapplicable to vessels designed for purposes which not only may, but must, vary with the geographical and economic position of the several Powers concerned. It becomes even more inapplicable when strength is estimated in terms of gross tonnage, without reference to numbers or armament. Two nations each possessing a hundred thousand tons of battleships may be regarded without serious error as being (so far) equal in fighting power. No such statement can reasonably be made about two nations one of which has ten cruisers of 10,000 tons, while the other has twenty cruisers of 5,000 tons. It all depends upon circumstances; though naval experts would probably agree that, if it came to fighting, the more numerous but smaller vessels would stand but a poor chance against their more powerful but less numerous opponents. If so, the country which for any reason was obliged to distribute its available tonnage among smaller units would be at a permanent disadvantage compared with one which was able to adopt a different scheme. There would be nominal parity but real inequality.
This is, of course, merely an illustration. But it suffices to explain why, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, no provisions open to this kind of criticism should be given the international authority already possessed by those parts of the Treaty of Washington which deal with strength and numbers. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government there need be no difficulty in arriving at a temporary arrangement about the immediate future of cruiser building. But the British Empire cannot be asked to give to any such temporary arrangement the appearance of an immutable principle, which might be treated as a precedent. 936 Any other course would inevitably be interpreted in the future as involving the formal surrender by the British Empire of maritime equality, a consummation which His Majesty's Government are well assured is no part of the President's policy.
§ VISCOUNT HALDANEMy Lords, I did not know that the noble Marquess was going to make this statement, and I am very glad that I was present to hear it. It is, as I think, a valuable statement. I do not think it adds much to what we had conjectured was taking place, but it is very clear and it lays down a principle distinctly. I have no occasion at the present moment to make any observation upon that principle. It is an important one and when the time comes we ought to be in a position to discuss it, but discuss it at present we cannot for two reasons. One is that we have not the detailed information and the second is that it is very dangerous to discuss it at this stage for fear of giving rise to misunderstanding.
I do not desire to be understood to convey that I, as at present advised, in any way dissent from what the noble Marquess has stated, but it is a matter which one would like to consider, and when Parliament reassembles and we have a great deal more material we shall be, I hope, in a position to have a debate upon it in this House. Meantime I would only say that it is too late to have such a debate, and I see nothing in the principles stated which should preclude the Government from going on with negotiation upon that basis. No doubt it will give rise to discussion, no doubt it will give rise to criticism and to differences of opinion, but on the broad principle so laid down I see no reason why it should not be possible for the Government finally, though it may be slowly, to come to some agreement which will solve this very difficult question.