ROYAL NAVAL ENGINEER OFFICERS.

HL Deb 14 July 1926 vol 64 cc1062-90

THE DUKE OF NORTHUMBERLAND rose to call attention to the alteration in the status of Royal Naval Engineer Officers effected by Admiralty Fleet Order 3241/25; and to move for Papers. The noble Duke said: My Lords, I have ventured to bring this question to the attention of the House because, in the opinion of those best able to judge—that is, I believe, the whole engineering profession—it will have, to say the least of it, an unfortunate effect upon the engineering branch of the Navy and very adversely affect the number and quality of those willing to come forward and specialise in naval engineering. So serious was the effect of this Fleet Order considered to be that all the great engineering societies, representing the engineering profession—the Institution of Civil Engineers, the Institution of Naval Architects, the Institution of Electrical Engineers, the North East Coast Institution of Engineers and Shipbuilders and the Institution of Marine Engineers—representing 40,000 professional engineers, decided, when the Order came out, that they would draw up a memorandum of protest, which was submitted to the First Lord of the Admiralty, and a deputation was sent to represent their case to him. That shows what the opinion of the engineering profession was with regard to the effect that this Order would have.

In order that your Lordships may appreciate exactly what this Order does and what its effect will be, it will be necessary to go very briefly into the history of this question. In 1902 a system was established for the common entry and training of all naval officers, whether deck officers or engineering officers. The object of that scheme was to amalgamate the two branches of the Service, to provide for interchangeability of duties, and under that scheme there was no reason why an engineer officer, if he had sufficient ability, should not eventually rise to the command of a ship. It aimed at doing away with all distinction between the executive and non-executive branches of the Navy—doing away with all distinction between deck officer and naval engineer. It did away with all difference in uniform and all difference with regard to the title of their rank. Prior to the initiation of that scheme engineer officers did not belong to the executive branch of the Navy. They had to prefix their titles with the word "Engineer"—Engineer Commander, and so on—and to wear a purple stripe upon their sleeve. The old engineer officers who were serving prior to the inauguration of that scheme were not affected by it. It only affected officers who entered after the scheme came into force.

That scheme went on being gradually developed until 1915, when during the War a further development took place consisting of the creation of a new branch of the Navy called the military branch, which included not only deck officers but all engineering officers. The old officers who had been serving prior to 1902, equally with all new officers, came under that scheme. The formation of that branch was due to the recognition of the great importance of engineering in a modern fleet and was a recognition of the immense services which had been performed by the engineering branch of the Navy during the War. Between 1915 and 1921 the whole of the scheme for the amalgamation of these two branches was scrapped altogether and a complete separation was effected between the two branches. The only thing which remained was the system of common entry. They all went in under the system of common entry, but officers who wanted to specialise in engineering had to do so on being rated midshipmen, and having once specialised in engineering they could not thenceforth revert to deck duties.

Although this 1902 scheme may be said to have been completely scrapped and abolished, yet one thing did remain, and that was the military branch which had been created in 1915. Owing to the formation of that branch, engineer officers held an executive Commission. Now an executive Commission is a very real thing and differs very materially from a non-executive Commission. An officer who has an executive Commission is commanded in that Commission "to take charge and command." If, on the other hand, he belongs to the non-executive branch of the Navy he is ordered "to discharge the duties of"—whatever it may be; "and be obedient to such as command," which your Lordships will see is a very considerable difference. There was one other thing which remained, and that was that the engineering officer still retained the same uniform as the deck officer, and there was no distinction between them in that respect.

Such was the situation at the end of last year, when the Fleet Order referred to in my Motion was issued. Now that Fleet Order abolished the last vestige of the improved status which the engineer officer was to obtain under the 1902 scheme. It abolished the military branch altogether and it relegated the engineer officer to the non-executive branch of the Navy. It emphasised this difference and this distinction between the deck officer and the engineer by re-imposing the purple stripe which had been done away with for the express purpose of placing the engineer on an equality of status with the deck officer. I have not come here to-day to express any opinion whatever in regard to the 1902 scheme, which aimed at the amalgamation of the engineering branch of the Navy with that of the deck officers. Not only have I no desire to express any opinion upon it, but I am quite incompetent to do so. It is a very technical question, and I think it has been generally admitted, even by engineers, that that scheme went too far and that it was wrong to suppose that it could ever be sound for an engineer officer to rise to the command of a ship.

But we are not discussing this afternoon the merits of the 1902 scheme. Let us assume for the purposes of argument that the Admiralty were right in scrapping that scheme altogether. If we admit that, was it necessary to issue this Fleet Order and to abolish what was really of only sentimental or moral value for the engineering branch of the Navy? If you grant certain privileges to a certain category of persons and you find yourself compelled subsequently to take away those privileges, the process can never be agreeable. If you have to do that, at least you should try to ensure that as few privileges are taken away as may be necessary, and also that you should give the least offence in doing so and consider the feelings of those whom, unfortunately, you have to deprive of those privileges. No protest was made by the naval engineers against the scrapping of the 1902 scheme. I do not mean to say that there was not a certain amount of soreness. They could not possibly be expected to like it, but I think they realised that the Admiralty at any rate had a case. They might or might not agree with the case, but at any rate there were strong arguments for doing what was done.

But an entirely new situation has been created by the issue of this Fleet Order. It has created a storm in engineering circles simply because the reason for it is not understood, and no serious argument has been produced to justify it. Prior to the issue of this Order there was, as I say, a certain soreness in engineering circles, partly due to the fact that the 1002 scheme had been abolished, but also to certain other grievances, or alleged grievances, which they have, such as, for instance, the fact that they were not represented on the Board of Admiralty, and they had very restricted disciplinary powers. The extent of punishment which an engineer officer can give to the men in his own department is very small indeed. They were ineligible to sit on Courts Martial, and they considered that there were certain shore billets to which they should be appointed, and to which, whether they were entitled to them or not, they never had been appointed.

I only mention these grievances—not because I wish to discuss their merits, but merely because I wish to point out to the House that there was this feeling of soreness prior to the issue of this Order and that, therefore, it was all the more necessary for the Admiralty to go gently and not to create more resentment than was absolutely necessary in the interests of the Service. The protests to which I have already referred on the part of all the great engineering societies was made because it was felt that the Admiralty's attitude had been unreasonable. A deputation was sent to the First Lord of the Admiralty, but it obtained no satisfaction. The answer given to them, and also given subsequently in another place, was, in effect, that all this was a fuss about nothing, the status of the naval engineer had not been really affected by this Order at all and that, in short, the whole grievance was merely imaginary. There may or not be a serious argument for the issue of this Fleet Order, but it is impossible to take this particular argument seriously. It is perfectly true that the career of the engineer officer who is serving at the present moment is not vitally affected by this Order. He had already been deprived of any possibility of exercising executive command on board ship, at least, in so far as fighting the ship was concerned, but the moral effect of this Order is very serious indeed.

It abolishes a distinction which was granted expressly for War services and which was a recognition, not only of the services which had been rendered by the engineering branch of the Navy but also the importance in general of engineering in a modern battle fleet. One argument of the Admiralty is that the engineer has not been any more affected by this Order than the deck officer, because the military branch is abolished for everybody and therefore the deck officer ceases to belong to the military branch in the same way that the engineer officer ceases to belong to it. It is impossible to take this argument seriously either. Everybody knows that the officer whose duty it is to fight and to navigate the ship must belong to the military branch. It does not matter whether you call it the military branch or not: everybody knows that his duty is to fight the ship. It is perfectly clear that the engineer officer's duty is not primarily to fight the ship; therefore the formation of a military branch was a compliment to the engineer, but was not a compliment to the deck officer. If you abolish the military branch you take away a compliment which you have given to the engineer officer and, of course, you do not affect the deck officer in any way.

Moreover, there is, as I say, a very vital difference in the wording of the Commission which is given to the engineer officer from the Commission which is given to the deck officer and the distinction has been further emphasised by re-imposing the purple stripe. The contention of the Admiralty in regard to the purple stripe is that it is only the same thing as the difference betwen two regiments one of which wears green facings and the other yellow. One really cannot take that seriously. If that was the case, why was the purple stripe done away with at all? It was done away with in order to effect equality of status as between the deck officer and the engineer. If you re-impose the purple stripe it is equally clear that you do away with that equality of status. It does not matter what facings two different regiments wear. Everybody knows that they exist to fight. The case is entirely different between the two branches of the Naval Service one of which does not exist primarily for the purpose of fighting and the other does.

The effect of all this has been that very great resentment has been aroused. We are told that it is only a matter of sentiment, but there are two answers to that. In the first place parents have sent their sons into the engineering branch under the implied contract that they will have a certain privileged status, and how greatly they resent the change is shown by the numerous letters which have appeared in the Press during the last few months. That those letters have had an effect on public opinion is also shown by the attitude of the majority of the Press in regard to this question. The best judges hold that the number and quality of those who are willing to specialise in engineering will be very seriously prejudiced. In the second place, it is a very dangerous matter to rule out sentiment in regard to matters of this kind. Are we seriously asked to believe that the sentimental value of belonging to the military branch of the Navy is worth nothing at all? But, as a matter of fact, the Admiralty argument defeats itself. If all this is a fuss about nothing, and these changes do not make any difference to anybody, why do it?

Why do a thing which creates great resentment, even if it is unreasonably, in the minds of a large number of persons unless you gain an advantage by doing it? So far as I can make out, we only lose by it and gain nothing at all. The only argument which can be taken at all seriously—and it has very little weight—is that it regularises the position and makes quite clear the separation between the deck officer and the engineer officer. That distinction had already been made because, as I say, the 1902 scheme had been scrapped altogether. Now in order to make it even more clear and to emphasise the distinction, they have abolished the military branch and reimposed the purple stripe. Surely that is a red tape argument. If the division between the duties of these two branches of the Service was perfectly clear and it was understood by everybody before this Order was issued that the privileges which the engineering officer retained were merely of moral value, why should you regularise the position by abolishing certain distinctions which certainly did nobody any harm and which the engineering branch of the Navy greatly valued?

The effect of doing something which is not understood and for which you can provide no satisfactory explanation is, of course, that people jump to the conclusion that you have an ulterior motive which you are not ready to admit. This has led to most serious charges, with which I need hardly say I do not associate myself, against the Admiralty—charges of professional jealousy and of a wish to relegate the engineering branch of the Navy to a definitely inferior position to that of the deck officer. As I say, I feel sure that there is nothing whatever in those charges; it is unthinkable that the Board of Admiralty should be actuated by any such motives. Unless they can explain their purpose in issuing this Order, however, it is inevitable that such charges should be made.

But other charges have been made as to which there would appear to be some ground for thinking that they have weight. One is that a new electrical branch has been formed, a branch of electrical engineers which is not to belong to the engineering department of the Navy at all, but is to work under the torpedo lieutenants without having any military or executive status. What the engineering profession is saying is this: You could not have formed this new branch at all, and you could not have put it under the torpedo lieutenants, unless you had abolished its status as an executive branch. Up to the present time the engineering officer has not been under the command of any executive officer junior to the commanding officer of the ship. Under this new scheme he will be, and what is said is that this Fleet Order was issued and the executive status was done away with on purpose to place this new branch of engineering officers under, the command of junior deck officers. As I say, this is the first time in the history of naval engineering that engineer officers have been held responsible to any executive officer junior to the commanding officer of the vessel. Whether that be one of the reasons which induced the Admiralty to take this action or whether it is not, the fact remains that it has had a very serious effect on the engineering branch of the Navy and that no compensating advantage has been gained.

A most unfortunate situation has been created, which will only be rendered worse by belittling it and calling it a "fuss about nothing." It is hardly likely that the whole engineering profession would have adopted the attitude it has adopted unless it had some good reasons for doing so. They feel that whatever reasons the Admiralty have for taking this step, it has been unnecessary. The distinction between the duties of the two branches of the Service was completely clear before the Order was issued and it would seem that there was no reason for the Order at all. There was, on the other hand, every reason to "let sleeping dogs lie." As it is the dogs have been very effectually aroused and are not likely to be pacified unless one of two things happen. Either the Admiralty should give some satisfactory explanation which will be convincing of the step they have taken, or, if they cannot do that, they should reconsider the attitude they have adopted in regard to this matter.

THE DUKE OF MONTROSE

My Lords, in rising to address your Lordships' House for the first time, I must claim your indulgence and express my regret that I find myself in collision with the noble Duke who has just spoken. My credentials are the fact that for over twenty years I have served with the Navy as a volunteer ashore and afloat in peace and in war. I cannot believe that this Admiralty Fleet Order which has caused all this trouble was issued without thought, or in wanton wickedness on the part of the Lords of the Admiralty. I feel sure that this Order was issued as the result of careful deliberation and experience gained in the Great War.

It so happens that from about the year 1902 to 1905 I knew the late Lord Fisher very well indeed, and, if I may say so, he used to treat me as he treated his famous waste-paper basket—as a sort of convenient receptacle in which he could throw his ideas to mature. I often discussed with him this question of the common entry into the Navy of those destined to become engineers or to become executive officers, with the idea of the interchangeability of service. I could never follow him, for the reason that any one who was in close touch from 1902 to 1905 with the development of modern engineering and gunnery must have seen that it was impossible for any officer to master more than one subject. At that time we were bringing into the naval service the internal combustion engine, we were developing high-pressure steam and we were introducing the submarine. At that time, under the wonderful inventive genius of Sir Percy Scott, we were bringing in as regards gunnery the deflection teacher, the dotter, the spotter, and the control tower. It would be impossible for any officer at the same time to be a fully trained engineer and an executive officer with duties above deck. It would take him all his time to master one subject, let alone two, and the experiences of the War have shown us that once an engineer—always an engineer, without any hope of executive command afloat. How could it be otherwise, my Lords? An officer in executive command is an officer whose duties lie above deck and on the bridge. The duties of an engineer lie below deck in the engine room. How could he ever become qualified to command a ship or exercise executive authority above deck?

During the War I had some experience of a Russian cruiser which was commanded by an executive committee. She went to sea one day. She was in collision twice. She turned round once in the Irish channel and she ended on the rocks—where she ought to be. She lies there to-day, as a monument, to all seamen, of muddle-headed command and dual executive authority. As regards this purple stripe, I never can see how it can be undignified to wear a purple stripe. It is, after all, a sign and symbol of a very important category of the naval Service. Everybody to-day realises the importance of engineering and the purple stripe has been the honoured badge of engineering in our own Navy and in every Navy in the world almost for two generations, and of the mercantile marine also. The purple has been worn by Kings and Emperors and why is it not good enough to be worn by a naval engineer? There are snobs in every walk of life. Only last year there were people in this City who took to wearing "Oxford bags," thinking that they would be taken for Oxford "Blues." They deceived nobody and the purple stripe deceives nobody. We all know and respect the engineer and it is inconceivable to imagine that any officer of the Navy would refuse to pace the quarter-deck with another officer simply because he wears or does not wear a purple stripe. To suggest anything to the contrary is to cast a grave reflection on the gentlemanly instincts of our officers in the Navy.

There is some justification for the contention that the naval engineer should be more recognised in the matter of, say, being a Sea Lord on the Board of the Admiralty. I think, in view of the great importance of engineering to-day, that it would be a graceful gesture to appoint a naval engineer as a Sea Lord at the Admiralty. I also think that naval engineers should be given executive command in certain naval establishments ashore and such positions as superintendents of naval construction. At present the superintendent of naval construction in the Clyde area is an executive officer and fully 90 per cent. of the work is engineering. Why should such a post not be given to a naval engineer? I feel that if appointments to naval engineers could be favourably considered from that point of view this Admiralty Order ought to stand. There is no room for two executive authorities in a ship. I think the purple stripe will assist in administration and in distinguishing the proper authority of an engineer in his own department. It will make clear as daylight now, once and for all, that there is no more room for two executive authorities in a ship at sea to-day than there was for two Kings of Jericho in the days of old.

VISCOUNT CHELMSFORD

My Lords, I feel bound to say a word on this matter because it arose during my time as First Lord of the Admiralty. We had it under consideration, but it was not ripe for decision when I was there and so I left a note for my successor which I handed to him when he took over office from me. It arose in my time in this way. One officer under the common entry scheme, a Lieutenant Commander (E.), was becoming ripe for promotion and the question was raised whether he should be promoted Commander (E.) or an Engineer Commander. That was not decided in my time because the appointment was not to come forward till about October, but I felt quite emphatically that any change of the title in the case of that particular officer would have involved a breach of faith to him and to those m like position with him. I may say that, so far as that narrow question on which this whole matter came forward is concerned, my successor at the Admiralty took the same view as I did and insisted that the person in question should be promoted a Commander (E.) and not an Engineer Commander.

But outside this narrow question there came up this wider issue which appears in the Motion of the noble Duke—that is, the position of the engineering branch vis-a-vis the executive branch. When my successor passed this Order, of which the noble Duke complains, perhaps I ought to have raised this question in your Lordships' House because I disagreed with what he had done, but no one who has been responsible at the Admiralty and knows the feelings which are aroused over this question would lightly raise a matter of this sort unless he thought that something was going to come out of it; so I purposely refrained from bringing the matter forward. When the noble Duke brings it forward in this Motion to-day, however, I feel bound to express the views that I entertained when I was responsible for the Admiralty. I am not going into a long history of this question, nor into the technicalities of which the noble Duke has given us so lucid a summary. To my mind the whole question really boils down to a question of social status—social status, as between the engineering branch and the executive branch.

Your Lordships know, when a question of social status is raised, the difficulty and delicacy of dealing with it. What, to an outsider, appears a very small matter looms very large indeed to the man who is affected by it. One is apt to say, "Oh, what docs it matter, this question of social status?" But if the people who are affected themselves say that it does matter to them, I think we must treat their protest with the greatest respect. The engineers, on their side, say: "Here is a great and important branch of the Navy and, by admission, a branch of growing importance and we attach value to this badge, which approximates in its character to, and is, indeed, the same as, that of the executive branch. This has been deliberately given to us in the past and we attach value to it. What have we done that this should be taken away from us?" This, of course, is not purely unilateral, because the executive branch, on their side, have felt very strongly in regard to the terms of Captain and Admiral being given to men who have not obtained those ranks in the executive branches and they feel, equally strongly, that it derogates from the importance of their position, of their rank and of their social status if similar titles are given to another branch which, in their opinion, does not stand quite on the same footing as the military branch.

I have great sympathy with what was said by the noble Duke who has just sat down when he alluded to this matter. We have to remember that the engineer's view is not represented on the Board of Admiralty itself and so, when I had this brought up before me, I felt, as the engineer's case was not represented by an Engineer Lord on the Board of Admiralty, especially responsible for seeing that the engineer's point of view was safeguarded. As I told your Lordships just now, when I left I handed a note, which was a purely private note and in no sense official, to my right hon. friend Mr. Bridgeman, who is now First Lord of the Admiralty. I find that I said this to him with regard to this wider aspect of the question. I find I used a proverb which the noble Duke in moving this Motion has already used. I said— I would have said, 'Let sleeping dogs lie.' There is no acute demand for any change at the present moment and I do not propose to stir up trouble by introducing any change in the present (admittedly illogical) system; a system which is at all events working. No crisis had arisen, except this one case as to whether an officer should or should not be promoted Commander (E).

My noble friend Lord Selborne, who I hope will speak presently on this subject, was responsible for the scheme of 1902 and he will be able to tell us—as I have no doubt he will—that that scheme was due to the real grievances which the engineering profession felt at what appeared to them to be the lower status of engineers in the Admiralty, and that he had to take steps to meet that feeling of grievance. For my own part, I felt that it was most necessary not to arouse any new feeling of grievance, nor any agitation on that question, and I purposely, so long as I was there, refused to raise this question at all. If it had come up for decision I should have taken the line which I have shown I should have taken in the note which I left for my successor. It is most important that there should be harmony in the Navy and most important that this branch of naval officers, the engineering branch, should not feel under any grievance with regard to status. Therefore I support the noble Duke in the observations he has made on this question.

THE EARL OF SELBORNE

My Lords, I have taken no part in this controversy, but now that it has been raised in your Lordship's House, like my noble friend who has just spoken I feel I cannot properly keep silent. The two noble Dukes who have already addressed your Lordships have alluded to the history of this question, but they will permit me to say that they have not recited that history absolutely correctly. I think it is very pertinent to the just consideration of this question that your Lordships should be reminded of what led up to the Orders of 1902 and what was, as a matter of fact, effected by those Orders.

Before I come to that I want your Lordships to remember that the present engineering officers of the Navy may be roughly divided into three classes. There are the old naval engineering officers who were naval engineering officers before 1902. They were, as has been stated by my noble friend the Duke of Northumberland, given status in the military branch of the Navy on January 1, 1915, as a reward for War service, a privilege that they prized quite beyond anything that your Lordships, as civilians, can fully understand. Then there are the young officers who entered under the 1902 scheme and who had always been classified with tin executive officers of the Navy until this Order, to which my noble friend is drawing attention, was issued. In 1922 there was a modification of that scheme, and naval officers who had become engineers under that modification of 1922 were expressly promised in that modification that they should remain in the military branch. Therefore you have these three classes of officers, all of whom they think have a real grievance arising out of the recent Admiralty Order.

The scheme of 1902 is generally known as the Selborne-Fisher scheme, but it would be much more correct to call it the Selborne-Kerr-Fisher scheme, because Admiral of the Fleet Lord Walter Kerr, who I am glad to say is still with us to-day, was the First Sea Lord. Lord Fisher was Second Sea Lord. Lord Walter Kerr was an officer of the old school who never would dream of agree- ing to a change on mere grounds of theory. He would never agree unless he thought an important change was essential to the good of the Service. I think a great deal too much stress has been laid on Lord Fisher's name in this matter. Lord Walter Kerr was just as responsible for the scheme as Lord Fisher, but Lord Fisher, as the Second Sea Lord, was the particular member of the Board of Admiralty who had the work of administering the scheme. Under that scheme there was to be a common entry for all the officers of the Navy, and they were to specialise when they reached the rank of Lieutenant, and decide whether they would become engineer officers or not. It is true that there was a hope expressed, and we entertained the hope, that subsequently there would be a certain measure of interchangeability between the executive officers and the engineering officers, but we never felt any certainty on that subject and it is a complete mistake on the part of the Duke of Montrose to think that interchangeability was an essential and permanent part of the scheme.

I can prove that by reading to your Lordships an extract from a letter, which I wrote myself to a correspondent on January 12, 1903, and which was printed in The Times. What I said then was: As regards interchangeability between the executive and engineering branches, only time and experience can answer the questions raised by this matter, and the Board in framing the present scheme had to be prepared for either event. Their object is to leave future Boards unfettered to act in this matter for the greatest advantage of the Service. Your Lordships will see, therefore, that it was not regarded as a settled matter in the scheme of 1902. There was a hope that a certain measure of interchangeability would be possible, and the matter was left to experience and to future Boards of Admiralty to decide. Then came the experience of the War, and it was on the experience of the War, I imagine, that the Fleet Order of 1922 was issued, making specialisation at the stage of midshipman instead of at the stage of Lieutenant and also finally closing the door to future interchangeability. I make no criticism of that.

It is, I am sorry to say, more than twenty years since I left the Board of Admiralty, and of course those who had the experience of the War were the men who had to decide. But I cannot help drawing your Lordships' attention to this fact in answer to what my noble friend the Duke of Montrose has said. There was another great Navy that made a corresponding change in 1902, and that was the Navy of the United States of America. In that case there was no scheme of slow development. They issued an Order that on a certain date—I think it was January 1, 1902—every engineer and deck officer should be interchangeable. They fought the Great War with complete interchangeability, and that interchangeability remains to the present day. I do not question the decision of the Board of Admiralty, but it is going too far to say as the noble Duke said, that it was a perfectly impossible system to work.

I want to remind your Lordships of the genesis of the Selborne-Kerr-Fisher scheme. When I had the honour of going to the Board of Admiralty in October, 1900, I found the Navy profoundly divided into two camps. Do not let me be misunderstood. The same perfectly harmonious and friendly relations existed between the officers of a cruiser or battleship, in the ward-room or the gun-room, that exist to-day. The engineer officer and the executive officer were the same great friends and shipmates as they are to-day. But the whole engineering branch of the Navy was organised in protest against what they believed to be unfair and unjust treatment. The whole of the engineering interests of the country were organised in a very formidable way behind the engineering branch of the Navy. All the engineering societies and, if I recollect rightly, even the trade unions were engaging in political agitation, and the result of this upon the harmony of the Service was very serious. There was a danger for the first time of a serious cleavage between the offices of the Navy, and nobody felt that more than Lord Walter Kerr, who was steeped to the lips in the love and tradition of the Service.

The Selborne-Kerr-Fisher scheme was a scheme designed once more to restore harmony to the Navy and to get rid of this feeling of resentment which arose from the fact that the engineer officers, rightly or wrongly, considered them- selves in a position of inferior status to the executive officers. They felt the importance of the engines of a battleship. Lord Fisher called a battleship nothing more than a box of machinery, but the importance of the machinery was increasing year by year. Yet in the year 1902 the status of engineer officers was almost exactly the same as it had been when the first engine was put into an old ship fifty years before. I ask your Lordships to take it from me that the condition of affairs was such as to cause the greatest anxiety to all naval officers who loved their Service.

The Selborne-Kerr-Fisher scheme may have been good or bad, but it had, at all events, the merit of stopping the agitation absolutely. The agitation died down and the division of the Service into two camps gradually disappeared. I do not say that the engineer officers were wholly satisfied, but they were sufficiently satisfied to feel that the Board of Admiralty had been sympathetic to them and that the position of the naval engineer officer of the future would be quite different from his position in the past. In that respect, at any rate, the scheme absolutely succeeded, and the final crown was put upon it when the Board of Admiralty, during the War, on January 1, 1915, included the old engineer officers in the military branch. From that moment I believe that there was not a single thought of discontent or of grievance in the mind of a single engineer officer of the Navy.

Then came the very important alteration of the scheme in 1922. I do not think that the naval engineer officers liked it, but they did not resent it greatly. They felt that the Board of Admiralty must, after all, judge according to the experience of the War, and no agitation arose after that alteration. It was not until what I cannot but call the most unfortunate Fleet Order of last year, to which my noble friend the Duke of Northumberland has called attention, that the old sore was re-opened. The whole of that old wound has been reopened, as the noble Duke has pointed out; and for what reason? My right hon. friend the First Lord of the Admiralty, according to the reports of his answers to Questions in the House of Commons and to his speeches, has said that it was done for the sake of simplification and for convenience, and that the very last thing that the Board of Admiralty thought of was injuring the position of the naval engineer officer. I do not doubt that for a single moment. I think he went further—my noble friend Lord Stanhope will correct me if I am wrong—and said that, if he had thought for a moment that it would have that effect, he would never have consented to it. I do not know if your Lordships have read the letter from Engineer Rear-Admiral Sheen in The Times of June 1, where he recapitulates the point of view of the engineer officer. I have seen no answer to that.

Now I come to the extraordinary argument of my right hon. friend the First Lord of the Admiralty that the abolition of the military branch was just as much a grievance to the Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean as to the naval engineer officer, because in both cases they had been previously included in the military branch and, if it was a grievance to the naval engineer officer that the military branch should be abolished, it was also a grievance to the Commander-in-Chief. That will really not stand examination, and I will tell your Lordships why. Any one who knows what I may call Service language in these matters and the line of thought of all those who live in what the newspapers call naval circles knows that the two terms "military" and "executive" mean almost exactly the same thing and are of equal honour. Accordingly, while it is no loss to the Commander-in-Chief, who retains the term "executive," to lose the additional term "military," it is in their opinion a very great grievance of the naval engineer officers, who never have been included and are not included in the term "executive," that they should be deprived of inclusion in the military branch.

Naturally I was not consulted about this. I can say quite truthfully that if anybody had told me of the Order that the Admiralty were going to issue I could have told them to a hairsbreadth what was going to happen, thanks to my experience of twenty years ago. The pity of it is that there is nobody now at the Admiralty, either among the naval officers or among the Parliamentary officers, who has any knowledge of the state of affairs in 1902.

I have very little more to say, but I cannot altogether avoid alluding to the question of the purple stripe. It is not a point upon which I lay the greatest stress, but I do wish to point out to your Lordships that it involves a double-edged argument. The naval engineer officer asks why, if a purple stripe is absolutely necessary for him to show that he is an engineer officer, no stripe is necessary to show who is the navigating officer, me gunnery officer, or the torpedo officer. I do not quite know what answer can he given to that question.

I come now to the probable effect of this Order and what, after all, is the most important thing for the country—namely, the future of the naval engineer officer. That is a matter of immense importance. At the present moment those officers are drawn from three sources: the officers of common entry at Dartmouth, the officers drawn from the public schools, who are also in a certain sense, common entries, and officers promoted from the lower deck. Surely, all these three classes of naval engineer officers, growing up as they do now in the traditions of the Service, will harmoniously combine with the executive officers, no matter what they may think as a class of their treatment. I ask the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, do they really believe they will in the future get enough officers from the common entry or public schools to meet their needs? Will they get a large enough proportion of officers from those two sources? It is of the utmost importance that the Navy should draw a sufficient number of officers from those two sources. I do not know. I greatly doubt it, although I most devoutly hope that I am wrong, but if there is a failure from those two sources, and the Board of Admiralty is forced to go outside and bring in engineer officers who have graduated in another school and have not grown up in the traditions of the Navy, then I do foresee future grievous trouble. Therefore I am forced to the conclusion that while the abolition of the military branch may do great ha mi it cannot possibly do good.

LORD OLIVIER

My Lords, I would not have intervened in the debate on this Motion had it not been that I was strongly asked by engineer officers in the Navy to take up their case in support of the noble Duke, and their case was put before me in some detail. The details have been referred to already, and there only remains to my mind to say this. The feeling in the minds of the engineer officers on this matter, apart from the practical considerations which have been alluded to, is this: We were promised certain things when we made our election. We accepted loyally and without complaint the decision of 1922 to exclude us from executive command, and there is no complaint at the present time upon that ground. But this later Order has gone further, and not only put upon us a certain change in social status—as the noble Viscount, Lord Chelmsford, said—but has put upon us a certain change of status and consideration in the eyes of our own men. Our authority over our men on board has been diminished. We are no longer allowed to sit upon Courts-Martial. We have this purple stripe imposed upon us. Those, very briefly, are the symbols of the complaint of those officers. All of these things they were promised in addition to executive command, and guaranteed when they entered the Service, and surely they should retain them. On the other point which the noble Duke, the Duke of Montrose, has referred to, the question of a seat upon the Board of Admiralty and the question of professional commands in the case of constructive works, they also feel strongly, but that is a matter of the loaves and fishes about which I do not think they will contend so energetically as they do contend about the question of diminished status and authority in the Service.

THE CIVIL LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (EARL STANHOPE)

My Lords, the difficulty in discussing a question such as the Duke of Northumberland has brought before the House is that it involves the use of terms which have a meaning to those who have been in the Service different from the meaning which is conveyed to those who have not been in the Service. Indeed, I might go further and say that the same terms very often mean a different thing in the different Fighting Services. I should be ashamed to confess to your Lordships how little I really knew about the Navy when I first became Civil Lord of the Admiralty. I knew a little about the Army, but I am afraid I knew practically nothing about the Navy. It had this advantage, however, that I was able to approach this engineering question and other questions with a perfectly unbiased mind. I might say that, if anything, I should have been inclined to take the side of the engineers, because an ancestor of mine, some 130 years ago, assured your Lordships that some members of your Lordships' House would live to see the day when vessels moved by steam and not by sail, and he was the first person who endeavoured to put engines into His Majesty's ships. I am bound to say, however, after having gone into this question thoroughly, that I concurred absolutely in the decision of the whole of the Board of Admiralty that the change which was brought about by the Fleet Order of last November was necessary and desirable.

Now this Fleet Order has been the cause of a good deal of misunderstanding both in the Press and elsewhere, and it has been exaggerated, as the noble Duke behind me has said, into being an expression of a great change of policy. It is nothing of the kind. This Admiralty Order does not affect the rank, title or powers of engineer officers. It does very little more than regularise the situation already existing. I am quite aware that Lord Selborne will say: "Very well, then, why was it issued?" and I will try to show to your Lordships the reasons why the Board felt that such an Order as this was necessary. The Selborne scheme for common entry and for one branch of the Service, which was instituted in 1902, was extended by the Douglas Committee in 1906, and the Douglas Committee went further than my noble friend, and decided that there should be only one branch for the whole Navy, and that every boy when he entered the Service should have the right—in fact, be positively ordered—to go into the engine room one day and take up deck duties the next.

THE EARL OF SELBORNE

The noble Earl will remember that I was no longer at the Admiralty.

EARL STANHOPE

Quite so. I am not imputing that to my noble friend. I think from his interruption he will agree with me that, so far from that being a compliment to the profession of engineering, it was exactly the reverse, because it implied that engineering was so simple a matter that it could be taken up for a year or two, and wedged in among the many things which a naval officer has to learn. Successive Boards of Admiralty have expressed the conviction that engineering is a man's whole life's work, and that it is impossible for any ordinary man to learn enough of engineering to be a capable naval engineer officer and at the same time be capable of taking on deck duties. There is a further reason why the Selborne scheme had to come to an end, and that was that it failed to produce from Dartmouth the number of volunteers required for the engineering profession.

The situation prior to the issue of this recent Fleet Order was this: As noble Lords have already told the House, there were three methods of entry into the engineering branch of the Navy. First of all, there were the older officers who wore already members of the Service before the Selborne scheme was instituted. They all bore the double title—Engineer Vice-Admiral, Engineer Captain, and so on, and all wore the purple stripe. The second branch were boys who came in through Dartmouth, the seniors of whom have now reached the rank of Commander. This class of officer did not have the same title as the senior class, but instead of being called Engineer Commander, Engineer Lieutenant and so on, they were described as Commanders (E.), Lieutenants (E.) Thirdly, there were the officers who were promoted from the lower deck. They had the double title, similar to the senior officers, of Engineer Lieutenant - Commander and Engineer Lieutenant, and they also wore the purple stripe. All these officers belonged to the so-called military branch, but, with certain exceptions, none of them exercised military command, and that is where the question of terms, to which I referred at the beginning of my remarks, comes in.

Now what is the definition of "Command" and of "Military Command"? "Military Command," I may point out, was held by deck officers, "Command" was held by engineer officers and by others. The definition of "Military Command" is this:— The general authority vested in officers.….to command one or more ships or boats or to direct any work or undertaking which requires the co-operation of different branches of the Service. The definition of "Command" is this:— The authority vested in officers and ratings over their subordinates within their own departments. The House will see that this so-called military branch consisted of deck officers who had the power of military command, and of engineer officers who had not the power of military command, but had the power of command. That, in itself, was an anomaly, and it was still further increased by the fact that there were other officers on board ship who did not belong to the military branch, but who also had the power of command, such as accountants, instructors, and so on.

The result of talking of "military branch" and "military command" has been this. I believe that the general public feel that unless an officer belongs to a military branch he is a non-combatant. That is obviously absurd. Every officer on board ship is a combatant, except the chaplain and the surgeon, and, as a matter of fact, the Navy as a whole objects, very strongly to the term non-combatant, because every officer on board ship undergoes the same dangers and faces the same risks. Actually, if you go into the statistics of casualties in the last War I believe I am correct in saying—though I am not quite certain about it—that the greatest percentage of casualties among officers serving on board ship at sea was susstained by chaplains, the next by doctors, and lastly, in exactly the same percentage, by engineer and executive officers.

The recent Fleet Order sweeps away this anomalous military branch, which, as I pointed out, is divided into those who held military command and those who did not, and it has divided all officers into categories according to their duties; that is to say, executive officers, who are all those who undertake duties on deck, and engineer officers, who undertake duties in regard to the engine room, accountant officers, medical officers, instructor officers, and so on. The division will not in the smallest degree affect either the status or the powers of the officers in question. The powers of practically all engineer officers will remain exactly as they were before the introduction of that Fleet Order. Some individuals have suggested that if an officer does not belong to a military branch he cannot hold military rank—again, these terms which muddle people outside the Service! I do not know what people mean by military rank as regards the Navy, but I do know this, that as regards naval rank the fact that an engineer officer will no longer belong to the military branch will not have the smallest effect in regard to his rank, either relatively to other officers in the Navy or in regard to officers in the Army or the Air Force. He will remain exactly where he was before.

Your Lordships may say that officers in the engineering branch who hold executive rank and the right to revert to deck duties have had that right taken away. The story goes back rather further than my noble friend Lord Selborne intimated. In 1918 an Admiralty Fleet Order was issued by which officers in the engineering branch, that is to say officers (E), were given the option on attaining seven and a half to nine years' seniority as Lieutenant either to revert to deck duty acid to give up all further work and promotion on the engineering side, or to remain on the engineering side for the remainder of their service and to give up the power of military command. Therefore, in December, 1918, that division was made, and if an officer chose to go on with the engineering side he automatically relinquished the power of military command. If an officer decided to revert to deck duties he, of course, had to stand for promotion by selection with other officers who throughout their service, or the greater part of it, had been doing deck duties.

Your Lordships will see that an officer who has spent the whole of his service in the engine room probably had a very small chance of promotion for his capabilities as a seaman when he was in competition with other officers who had been doing nothing else but study seamanship and acquire the knowledge necessary for deck duties. Finally, in 1920, a further Fleet Order was issued by which the eligibility to revert to deck duties was withdrawn from that date. Of the officers who had the right to exercise the option of reversion under the 1918 Fleet Order, 245 have definitely adopted engineering as their career, and only three have retained the option of reverting to deck duties and retained the right to military command. I think your Lordships will agree that the Board of Admiralty of the day were justified in abolishing the reversion, when those who exercised it had already sunk to such small numbers.

Now I turn to the purple stripe. As has already been pointed out, officers who entered the engineering branch prior to the introduction of the Selborne scheme all wear the purple stripe, and so also do all officers who were promoted from the lower deck in the engineering branch. The only officers who did not wear the purple stripe were those who entered the naval engineering profession through Dartmouth, or by the scheme of special entry. I think the noble Viscount Lord Chelms ford talked about the "badge" of engineering. That is exactly what the engineering branch did not get, because your Lordships will see that all the senior officers in the Service, those who held all the important positions in the War in the engineering branch of the Navy, wore the purple stripe; all those officers promoted from the lower deck wore the purple stripe and the others did not. Therefore you had, in peace, the branch dressed differently and described differently—either described as Engineer Commanders or Engineer Lieutenants, or as Lieutenants (E). I think your Lordships will agree that if the engineering profession is really to be recognised in the Navy as a profession—which the Board of Admiralty wishes it to be recognised as, vital to the Service and vital to the safety of this country—it is a right and it is a recognition of that service that they should bear some distinguishing mark to show that they have the honour of belonging to that Service.

To talk about the royal purple stripe being a degradation, or anything of that kind, is obviously absurd and ridiculous, unless you are going to take the line, which personally I am not going to take, that engineer officers hope that in time, as the senior officers disappear from the Service—that is to say, the engineer officers of the old-time scheme—there will be left only those who came in under the Selborne scheme and who did not wear the purple stripe, and that they will then be differentiated from those promoted from the lower deck and will he in a different class because they are dressed differently. No executive officer desires for one moment to have any differentiation in uniform between the ranker officer and the deck officer, and it would be a libel to think that the engineer officer desires to have anything of the same kind. I am aware that it may be asked: Why have the purple stripe at all? Why should not all officers in the Navy be dressed in identical uniforms?

Other branches already have different uniforms, and I submit to your Lordships that it is absolutely essential that an officer should be distinguished instantaneously and with the greatest ease by the uniform he wears. A man no more wants to go up to a deck officer and report to him that a steam-pipe has burst than to go to an engineering officer and report to him that a boat has capsized. In these days of great ships where you may have a crew of 1,200 and very nearly 100 officers, it is obviously impossible that everybody on board should know every officer by sight. It is also obvious that it is desirable that when anybody comes on board a ship from another ship or from the shore, he should be able to realise whether he is talking to a deck officer or to an engineer officer, so that he may deliver his message and get on with his business with the utmost rapidity and efficiency.

I do not know whether my noble friend Lord Selborne remembers the days when he used to inspect ships. If so, he will recollect that the officers were lined up on deck according to the clothes they wore. First of all there was the Captain of the ship, then the Commander, then the Lieutenant-Commander, and so on. Then you came to the Lieutenants. I suppose it would hardly have come into operation during the time he was First Lord of the Admiralty, but later on you would find among the Lieutenants the Lieutenant (E) who was engaged in the engine room. Further along the line you came to the Engineer Commander, the Engineer Lieutenant-Commander, and the other officers of the engine room who were placed in another part of the line because they wore the purple stripe, whereas the Lieutenant (E) did not wear it and was put in another place. That is illogical and absurd. Surely, the right thing to do is to put each branch together, to dress them similarly and to give them the same power.

Future Boards of Admiralty may take an entirely different line, but in due course of time the whole of the engineering branch of the Navy will have the same titles. Those promoted from the lower deck from the beginning of this year will be called Lieutenant (E) and Lieutenant-Commander (E) in the same way as the boys who enter the Navy, through Dartmouth. Everyone admits, I think, that only one officer can command a ship and he must be an officer who, by his training, is an expert in, manœuvring and navigating her, who is trained to handle her and to make the best use of her speed, her guns, her torpedoes, and of every weapon and capability she possesses. It is a matter of opinion whether the expert user or the expert maintainer is the more important of the two. To turn for one moment from the Navy, every one of your Lordships, I know, has heard of the Martini rifle and of the Lee-Enfield rifle, but how many of your Lordships would be able to name the expert user who won the King's Prize at Bisley last year? I should think the number would be very small indeed.

So far as the Navy is concerned, the recent Fleet Order makes no difference. Boys who enter Dartmouth from the same school go through the same course together at Dartmouth. They serve at sea for eight months together and then one becomes an executive officer and the other becomes an engineering officer. Similarly, in the case of the special entries, all boys go through the same examination, and their position in the Navy or the Army or the Air Force, and whether they take the duties of engineering depends on their position on the examination list and the choice they make. It is obviously absurd to say that because an officer belongs to one branch or the other of the Navy—having so much in common and having been at the same school—there can be any possible differentiation or change in status because one wears a purple stripe and the other does not.

My noble friend the Duke of Northumberland raised the question of electrical engineering officers and suggested that one of the reasons for this Order might be that as there was to be an electrical branch of engineers it would be impossible for them to serve under the torpedo officer unless some Order of this kind was instituted. I am afraid that my noble friend knows very little more about the Navy than I did when I first went to the Admiralty, because, of course, this Order will not make the smallest difference. The electrical officer will have the power of command but not of military command, and he will laky over from the torpedo officer, who, amongst, other duties, has until now had the duty of running the electrical apparatus on board ship, those particular electrical duties and will be responsible directly under the Captain for the maintenance of all electrical work on board the ship. The Fleet Order does not make the smallest difference with regard to him and will not affect him either in one way or the other.

All this Order really does is to regularise a situation which, as I think your Lordships will agree from the letters which have appeared in the Press, is very little understood by the public. Several noble Lords have said that this Order will affect very seriously and very adversely the number and quality of the boys who will ask to go into the engineering branch of the Navy. These, of course, are early days to speak of the matter. This Order was only issued in November, 1925, and therefore one cannot take what has happened in the interval as any indication of what is going to happen hereafter; but so far from its having adversely affected the number of boys coming into the engineering branch, if I wished to make a debating point I should say it has increased the number by something between 400 and 500 per cent. Actually the numbers that come in from the Dartmouth are small and of course it is only a small increase, but there has been a very distinct increase in the two terms that have gone into the Navy since the Order was issued, and the increase by special entry is also very satisfactory. Therefore, so far the quality and number of the boys who desire to go into the engineering branch of the Navy have not been affected adversely.

I have tried to show that the Board of Admiralty had no sinister motive in making this Order. I have tried to show also that to have one branch of the Navy dressed in different forms of uniform and called by different titles is derogatory to that branch of the Navy and derogatory to the position which it represents, that, so far from our having tried to impose a slight on engineering, we felt that in dressing the officers of the engineering branch in a similar way we recognised them as a vitally necessary part of the Navy, and that we trusted they would become as proud of their connection with the engineering branch of the Navy as with any other branch of that great Service. We have ensured that there shall be no question but that the command of a ship or a shore operation shall devolve upon a deck officer. The executive branch was very nearly called the executive line in order to show that it was the necessary chain of command. We have tried to provide that officers doing similar duties should be similarly dressed, and we left the rank, the responsibility and the status exactly where they were before. The last thing the Board of Admiralty, or any member of it, wished to do was to impose the smallest slight on the engineering branch of the Navy, and I trust I have succeeded in convincing your Lordships that neither in intention nor in fact does the Order do anything of the kind.

THE DUKE OF NORTHUMBERLAND

My Lords, I have no desire to persist in my Motion. I am sorry that my noble friend was not able to give an answer that would be considered more satisfactory by the engineering profession, I am sure that the Admiralty will be compelled by force of circumstances to change their attitude because this agitation is not going to die down but to increase. I think the debate in your Lordships' House this afternoon may possibly hasten that change of attitude. I beg to withdraw the Motion.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.