Lords Sitting of 24 March 1925

Preamble
The House met at a quarter past four of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.

LICENSING (SCOTLAND) AMENDMENT BILL. [H.L.]
VISCOUNT NOVAR: My Lords, I beg leave to introduce a Bill to amend the law relating to licensing in Scotland, and to move that it be read a first time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 1a.—(Viscount Novar.)
On Question, Bill read 1a; and to be printed.

LAW AGENTS (SCOTLAND) BILL. [H.L.]
LORD DUNEDIN: My Lords, I beg leave to introduce a Bill to amend the law relating to law agents in Scotland, and to move that it be read a first time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 1a.—(Lord Dunedin.)
On Question, Bill read 1a; and to be printed.

PERFORMING ANIMALS (No. 2) BILL.
Brought from the Commons; read 1a; and to be printed.
PROTECTION OF BIRDS BILL.
Brought from the Commons; read 1a; and to be printed.

LEGITIMACY BILL. [H.L.]
THE EARL OF MIDLETON: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Lord Chancellor a Question of which I have given him private notice—namely, whether the Legitimacy Bill, which nearly a fortnight ago was set down for to-day, was postponed last evening, without any public notice, until Thursday; whether the noble and learned Viscount is aware that Peers have been summoned for the purpose of debating that measure, and

621
that it causes grave inconvenience that it should be postponed without notice; and whether he will undertake that, so far as Government Bills are concerned, such postponements shall be announced, and not simply be put on the Paper on the chance that Peers may discover them in the morning?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT CAVE): My Lords, I regret that the noble Earl and his friends should have been caused any inconvenience. I was not aware that any Peers had been specially summoned with reference to the debate on the Legitimacy Bill, and the cause of the postponement can, I think, be made quite clear to the House. For reasons which your Lordships all know, no Bills were taken yesterday, and the British Sugar (Subsidy) Bill was therefore adjourned until to-day. The passage of that Bill, for public reasons, is a pressing matter, and if your Lordships approve, the Bill should become law this week. I was sure that if the Second Reading of that Bill was taken and the Question in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Parmoor and the various other items which appear on the Paper were also taken, your Lordships would not have time conveniently to dispose of the Amendments on the Legitimacy Bill. Might I say for the general information of your Lordships that there will be time on Thursday to deal with the Committee stage of that Bill, and it is for that reason only that I asked that the Bill might be postponed? I think it is for the general convenience of the House that it should be postponed.
LORD BANBURY OF SOUTHAM: My Lords, I should like to ask the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack whether he would acquiesce in the request of my noble friend that in future if a Bill is postponed, the fact shall be announced as it is in another place and not be left to appear on the Order Paper?
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY): Perhaps your Lordships will permit me to reply to that observation of my noble friend? I will take care that the convenience of noble Lords is always consulted in these matters, so far as I possibly can. The Lord Chancellor has already explained that the circumstances of this last week were very exceptional, and I am afraid I
622
must admit that I, unfortunately, and not through my own fault, was partly the cause of the confusion into which the business of the House was thrown. There were certain matters which ought to have been taken but were postponed entirely for my convenience, for which I express my thanks to the House. I will see that in future your Lordships receive due notice.

MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDER CONFIRMATION (BLACKPOOL ORDER) BILL. [H.L.]
Commons Amendments considered and agreed to.

ADVERTISEMENTS REGULATION BILL. [H.L.]
Amendment reported (according to Order).
Clause 1:
Extended powers of making by-laws.
(2) In Section two of the principal Act the words "or to disfigure the natural beauty of a landscape" are hereby repealed without prejudice to the validity of any by-law in force and valid at the passing of this Act.
EARL DE LA WARR EARL DE LA WARR moved to leave out subsection (2). The noble Earl said: My Lords, this Amendment is in accordance with that which I moved on the Committee stage. I have adjusted it to agree with certain suggestions of the noble Lord opposite. I gather that it has the approval of the Billposters' Association. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, lines 20 to 24, leave out subsection (2).—(Earl De La Warr.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
EARL DE LA WARR EARL DE LA WARR moved, after subsection (2), to insert the following new subsection: "In the principal Act and in this Act the expression 'advertisements' includes any structure or apparatus erected or intended only for the display of advertisements." The noble Earl said: My Lords, I beg to move the Amendment which stands in my name on the Paper.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 24, at end insert the said new subsection.—(Earl De La Warr.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 3 (Delegation of powers by county councils to rural district councils):
EARL OF DE LA WARE EARL OF DE LA WARE moved, at the end of the clause, to insert the following new subsection: "In the application of this Act to Scotland the expression 'district committee' shall be substituted for 'rural district council'." The noble Earl said: I beg to move the Amendment which I have placed on the Paper.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 39, at end insert the said new subsection.—(Earl De La Warr.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.

TOWN PLANNING BILL. [H.L.]
Read 3a (according to Order): Amendments proposed by the Joint Committee on Consolidation Bills agreed to: Bill passed, and sent to the Commons.

HOUSING BILL. [H.L.]
Order of the Day for the Third Reading read.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I beg to move that the Bill be read a third time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 3a.—(The Marquess of Salisbury.)
LORD HUNSDON OF HUNSDON LORD HUNSDON OF HUNSDON, who had on the Paper an Amendment to move, after paragraph (a) of subsection (5) of Clause 90 (Loans to public utility societies), to insert: "Provided that the Public Works Loans Commissioners shall, in any such case, require in addition to a mortgage of any land or dwellings a further security of such value as they may think fit," said: My Lords, my reason for placing this Amendment on the Paper is that I happen to be Chairman of the Public Works Loans Commissioners who make advances under these Acts. In their opinion a matter has been introduced into this Consolidation Bill which has no place in any of the existing Acts. Therefore, although the Bill is of no particular interest to the Commissioners, it was my duty to give information to your Lordships upon the point. The public Works Loans Commissioners are a body of men who make these advances and whose duty it is to
624
make themselves fully acquainted with all the provisions of these Acts. As your Lordships will observe, this is an entirely legal matter. I wrote, therefore, to the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor and placed my views before him, and before proceeding with this Amendment I should very much like to hear what his views are on the matter.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords the point which the noble Lord very courteously raised with me was that as the Consolidation Committee had framed the Bill it was not entirely in agreement with the law as it exists. I made inquiries and I found that the Consolidation Committee had considered the matter very carefully last year when a similar Bill was introduced into Parliament, and again this year. They had also taken expert evidence on the point, and in their considered opinion the Bill as it now comes before your Lordships represents the law as it stands. I have also considered the point, and I am bound to say that, although the question raised by the noble Lord was no doubt one that might fairly be mentioned to your Lordships, I think the Committee have come to the right conclusion. That being so, I hope the noble Lord will not move the Amendment which he has placed on the Paper.
LORD HUNSDON OF HUNSDON: In those circumstances, my Lords, I shall not move the Amendments of which I gave Notice.
On Question, Bill read 3a.
Amendments proposed by the Joint Committee on Consolidation Bills agreed to.
Bill passed, and sent to the Commons.

TOWN PLANNLNG (SCOTLAND) BILL. [H.L.]
Read 3a (according to Order).
LORD BALFOUR OF BURLEIGH: My Lords, I beg to move that the Bill do now pass.
Moved, That the Bill be passed.—(Lord Balfour of Burleigh.)
LORD MUIR MACKENZIE: Is not the noble Lord going to move that the Amendments be agreed to?
LORD BALFOUR OF BURLEIGH: I understood there were no Amendments on this Bill. We have an Amendment on the Housing (Scotland) Bill, but not on the Town-Planning Bill.
LORD MUIR MACKENZIE: I beg the noble Lord's pardon; that is so.
On Question, Bill passed; and sent to the Commons.

HOUSING (SCOTLAND) BILL. [H.L.]
Read 3a (according to Order).
LORD BALFOUR OF BURLEIGH: I beg to move that the Amendments proposed by the Joint Committee on Consolidation Bills be agreed to.
Moved, That the Amendments proposed by the Joint Committee on Consolidation Bills be agreed to.—(Lord Balfour of Burleigh.)
LORD BANBURY OF SOUTHAM: Could we not know what the Amendments are?
LORD BALFOUR OF BURLEIGH: They are purely drafting Amendments.
LORD BANBURY OF SOUTHAM: Nobody seems to know what they are. It seems to be a curious way of doing business, but I am prepared to accept the statement of the noble Lord.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I do not think my noble friend really understands what the procedure of the Committee on Consolidation Bills is. It is to take the Bill as committed to them, and to see if it exactly corresponds with the existing law. That was the intention of the Consolidation Committee originally. Therefore these Amendments are, of necessity, nothing but drafting Amendments. They are to draft the Consolidation Bill in order that it shall exactly agree with the Bills that it consolidates. I hope my noble friend will see that no serious invasion of our liberties is being attempted under the guise of a Consolidation Bill.
LORD BANBURY OF SOUTHAM: My Lords, I have always been suspicious of Consolidation Bills in the other House. I think it is necessary that we should know something about them lest some new
626
provision should be introduced; but, of course, I accept the statement of my noble friend.
LORD MUIR MACKENZIE: My Lords, I should like to be allowed to state that the Amendments and the reasons for any possible difference of opinion upon the subject are in the form of a Report, and are already on the Table, so that the noble Lord, if he is interested in the matter, could have seen them.
On Question, Amendments agreed to.
Bill passed, and sent to the Commons.

BOROUGH COUNCILLORS (ALTERATION OF NUMBER) BILL.
Read 3a (according to Order), with Amendment and returned to the Commons.

TRADE FACILITIES BILL.
Order of the Day for the Second Heading read.
THE EARL OF CLARENDON: My Lords, in moving the Second Reading of this Bill, I think I need only observe that so far as the principle of the Bill is concerned, it was fully discussed on the introduction of the parent Act in 1921, and the principle is agreed. The guarantees that are made in this Bill are only effective after consultation with a special Committee appointed by the Treasury, which has the responsibility of considering all the guarantees that are brought before it. If a loan is guaranteed it is specified that all the articles purchased shall be of British manufacture, and any contravention of this agreement is reported to the Treasury. The effect of such guarantees as have been entered into is that work has been performed which otherwise would not have been carried out at all. It is difficult to estimate accurately the number of men who have been given employment, but in the opinion of the Committee it is not far short of the mark to say that something like 100,000 men have been given employment by means of the work which has been undertaken as the result of these guarantees. I think I need only say, in conclusion, that the account of those guarantees will be laid

627
before Parliament one year after the close of the present financial year. I beg to move.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(The Earl of Clarendon.)
LORD ARNOLD: My Lords, I do not think your Lordships would desire or expect that there should be any protracted discussion on this Bill. I will therefore try to emulate the noble Earl in his brevity. There are, however, one or two observations that I would like to make about it. There is no new feature in the Bill this year, and it is true that the Trade Facilities Acts have, I think, fulfilled the expectations which were originally formed of them. They have found a good deal of work, and have been of help in every way to industry. It is also true, and very satisfactory—I think I am right in saying—that the losses which have been incurred under these guarantees so far are quite small. I remember last year that the actual loss which had been incurred amounted to only £4,000. I believe that since then there have been one or two further losses, but probably I should be right in saying that the total does not amount to more than between £100,000 and £200,000. It is true that is not a small sum—I see my noble friend Lord Banbury listening intently—but at the same time I think he will agree that it is not a very large sum in proportion to the total transactions.
I must express regret that the reception which was given in another place to one or two points which were urged was not more favourable. There was a demand for a full inquiry into the working of the Acts, and we did not get very much encouragement for that. Then there was a very urgent demand pressed from more than one quarter of the House that in view of the large measure of assistance from the public credit which was given to various concerns there should be, for the taxpayers, some share in the assets. That, I am sorry to say was absolutely refused by the Government, though I venture to think the balance of argument really was strongly against the position the Government took up. Your Lordships might well be concerned with the effect which these Bills may have, or may be adjudged to have, upon the Government credit as a whole.
628
Personally, I think the effect must be very small. There is all the difference in the world between borrowing for productive and for unproductive purposes. Every guarantee under these Acts is for an enterprise which may be termed productive, and actual assets are created.
I feel that it could well be argued that thereby the wealth of the country is increased, and therefore that its credit is increased, because, in the last resort, credit really depends upon taxable capacity. I think it may be argued that these various enterprises have increased the taxable capacity of the country, and, therefore, rather than diminishing credit, they have actually added to it. But there is the further point—which again I must state carefully, because I notice that my noble friend Lord Banbury is listening—that statistically these guarantees, quite apart from the fact that there are assets behind them, in proportion to our total national indebtedness cannot be accounted as of much consequence; as a matter of fact, they amount to somewhere about 1 per cent. of our total National Debt. I therefore feel that their effect on the credit of the country cannot be appreciable. I will not say anything more, because there is other business on the Paper, and this is a Money Bill which I am sure does not require long discussion.
On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

BRITISH SUGAR (SUBSIDY) BILL.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY OF THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES (LORD BLEDISLOE): My Lords, in submitting for your consideration the Second Reading of this Bill I desire to crave your Lordships' indulgence, partly because, although I am no longer new to Parliamentary life, I have never before had the conduct of any Bill through either House of Parliament, and partly because the passage of this Bill through your Lordships' House—a Bill which I know is of exceptional interest to many of your Lordships—is bound to be unduly rapid in order to enable it to receive the Royal Assent

629
before the end of the current financial year, and thus to secure for the benefit of producers and manufacturers of beet sugar the subsidy which it provides as from the first of October last.
I regard it as a special privilege to be allowed to submit this Bill for the sympathetic consideration of your Lordships. Convinced as I have always been of the truth of the saying of the late Lord Beaconsfield, that the nation which neglects its agriculture is bound to decay, I have for many years past ventured to criticise, possibly with temerity but always with sincerity of conviction, the apathy, the ignorance, the superficiality and, worse than all, the vacillation with which successive Governments of various political complexions have handled the agricultural problem in this country. But I recognise that in this Bill we have the first really constructive effort, for at least a generation, to place British agriculture upon a sounder footing, to ensure an ever-increasing home production of a most essential food necessity—probably second only in importance to that of bread—of which until recently none at all was raised on our own soil, and at the same time to provide lucrative employment both for agricultural workers and artisans in rural districts, especially during the winter months when unemployment, according to recent experience, has been so serious.
But this Bill has, from my point of view, a further merit which I desire to emphasise. I have long been convinced that there will be no real security for our rural industry unless and until there is some definite measure of agreement amongst all political Parties as to the fundamental principles and aims of a national agricultural policy which will ensure, on the part of successive Governments, continuity of administration according to a definite and well understood plan. His Majesty's Government lay no claim to the parentage of this measure. It rests entirely with the Labour Party, and we rejoice that it does so, because we hope it is a foretaste of that work of sympathetic collaboration between all political Parties, and also, I hope, between all sections of the agricultural community, by which alone a national agricultural policy can be successfully evolved and a sense of stability on the
630
part of our rural population secured for the future. May I also say that the Labour Party have not been slow to recognise the national peril of a decadent and unproductive agriculture, and I for my part desire to thank them for their attitude towards our most fundamental industry, although unconvinced by some of the remedies they propose for its betterment.
A distinguished member of this House whom I am sorry to say I do not see present to-day, the noble Earl, Lord Denbigh, is the great pioneer of sugar beet industry in this country. I believe he began experiments on a part of his estate at least a quarter of a century ago. The late Lord Ailwyn was also keenly interested in the industry, and amongst other enthusiasts in this House are the Earl of Selborne, Viscount Ullswater and Lord Ernie. May I be allowed to make special reference to two persons whose persistent efforts have been largely responsible for the introduction of the present Bill? I refer to Colonel Courthope, the Member of Parliament for the Rye Division of Sussex, and Mr. Alfred Wood, the, most persistent and indefatigable secretary of the British Sugar Beet Society, a post which he has occupied for many years.
Your Lordships may be interested in the figures of consumption of sugar per head of the population in different parts of the world. The United States of America and the United Kingdom have a far larger per capita consumption of sugar than any other nation of the world, and, as I learned when I was Chairman of the Royal Commission on Sugar Supplies during the war, the consumption of sugar seems to vary to some extent according to climate and according to the prosperity, for the time being, of particular countries. Thus the United Kingdom consumption has fallen per capita from 77 lbs. before the war, to 74 lbs. last year. The United States consumption has risen from 80 lbs. in 1910 or 1911, to 103 lbs. last year. This, no doubt, is partly due to Prohibition, which, as your Lordships are aware, has the effect of negativing, or perhaps more accurately, reducing, the consumption of liquor, and that, for certain physiological reasons, tends to increase the proportion of sugar consumed. Germany, France and Italy are all much behind the United Kingdom and the United States in the

631
consumption of sugar. Germany's present consumption is 45 lbs. per head of population; curiously enough, a marked increase on her consumption before the war. Germany's per capita consumption is well within half that of the United States before the war, and exactly half of the present consumption in the United Kingdom. The consumption in France is now 47 lbs. as compared with 34 lbs. per head of population before the war, and that of Italy, which was only 10 lbs. before the war, has since increased to 18 lbs. The United States consumption is, in fact, eight times as large as that of Italy per head of the population.
But we are, at any rate, the second largest consumers of sugar in the world, and up to recently we have done nothing whatever to supply our own requirements. The present annual consumption of sugar in this country is over 1,500,000 tons. In 1913 677,000 tons of unrefined beet sugar and 920,000 tons of refined sugar cane and beet, were imported into this country. The beet sugar was imported from the Continent and the cane sugar from other parts of the world, but the bulk of the beet sugar came from Germany and Austria. The British overseas supplies are quite adequate, together with our own production, to supply all our national needs. Germany, as your Lordships are aware, has a very highly developed sugar beet industry which was assisted by the State for many years before the war, and it brought the naturally poor sandy soil of North Prussia into a highly cultivated condition, which was largely instrumental in enabling Germany during the war to withstand so long the Allies' blockade.
From the point of view of the farmer there are many advantages in growing sugar beet. The sugar beet industry is, in fact, an agricultural asset of the first importance. Experiments have long ago shown that excellent sugar beet can be grown successfully upon our own soil. The sugar content is, on the average, equal to that of roots grown on the Continent—that is to say, nearly 17 per cent. I wish that we could say the same with regard to the yield per acre. On the Continent, and particularly in Holland, a yield is expected of at least twelve tons to the acre. So far, we have not in this country passed an average of nine tons
632
to the acre, but we have a long way to travel in the matter of experience, which Continental countries have, of course, been gaining for many years. Apart from the value of the sugar itself, sugar beet is a very valuable cleaning crop. It increases the value of all other crops with which it is grown in rotation. In Germany, it is estimated to increase the yield of rotation wheat by no less than 15 per cent. By introducing such a cleaning crop into our own agricultural rotation, the minimum figure at which cereals can be grown in that rotation would be substantially lowered. The double advantage of an increased yield and a lower cost of production per acre will undoubtedly encourage and develop arable cultivation.
But there are further advantages from the farmer's point of view in growing beet. Beet slices, which are a by-product of the beet sugar factories, are very valuable as a cattle food and are known to enhance the milking qualities of dairy cattle. Again, the tops which are removed before the roots pass to the factory, and which are deemed to be alone worth about 30 s. per acre, are an excellent food for sheep and pigs. All those who are acquainted with agriculture in Scandinavia will realise to what extent the Danes and the Southern Swedes feed their pigs, which are so competitive with ours in our own bacon markets, upon the tops of the sugar beet. It has been erroneously stated that the cultivation of sugar beet would supplant wheat. That is obviously not the fact, for it only takes the place of the ordinary root crop in the four-course or other rotation. On the other hand, it makes the production of wheat more profitable and economical. In fact, it tends, as has been found in other countries, to intensify wheat production rather than to diminish it
The sugar beet industry is, of course, primarily, but not exclusively, a rural industry. Labour on the farm should be increased as the result of inaugurating this new British crop, by about ten men for every hundred acres of beet grown. If only one-quarter of the sugar imported into this country at present were produced here, about 400,000 acres of beet could be grown upon British soil and, in addition, about 600 men would be employed regularly in each sugar beet factory during the winter months—that is, from October to February—when the

633
demand for agricultural labour is at its lowest ebb. This should provide a useful outlet for any unemployed agricultural labour that there may be in the winter months. In addition, there are, of course. Subsidiary industries which are necessarily set in motion by the establishment of a new factory industry, notably those connected with the building, equipment and operation of the factories. Consequently, the firm establishment of the sugar beet industry in this country ought to lead to increased employment in many different directions. I need not remind your Lordships of the evidence in our possession as to the beet sugar industry which is contained in the Report of the Agricultural Policy Sub-Committee over which the noble Earl, Lord Selborne, presided. They emphasised in the strongest possible way the national importance of the sugar beet crop and the tendency which it is bound to bring about to develop intensive arable cultivation and the maintenance of a larger population in our rural areas.
I think I ought to remind your Lordships that the cultivation of sugar beet has been attempted for some time past in this country, though with scant success. As long ago as 1835 experiments were made in sugar beet growing in the United Kingdom, and in 1853 a small factory was actually established in Ireland. It operated for only two years. The first factory to be erected in England was erected in 1870 at Lavenham in Suffolk. This also was unsuccessful. In 1898 began the recent movement for the serious development of sugar beet as a new agricultural industry in the United Kingdom. The Central Chamber of Agriculture and the National Sugar Beet Association made great efforts in that year, and since, to enlighten public opinion as to the desirability of growing this crop. These two bodies, together with the Board of Agriculture and the Beet Sugar Pioneers' Association. carried out numerous and very instructive experiments in its cultivation in various parts of the country.
No tangible results were achieved for many years, because the farmer would not grow beet until he saw a factory actually in being, and the capitalist would not build a factory until he was quite sure that there would be a regular supply of
634
beet in order to furnish it. The first factory erected in recent years was that at Cantley in Norfolk. This failed for a time, simply because a regular supply of sugar beet was not forthcoming. The factory was started by the Anglo-Netherland Sugar Corporation, and had the advantage of the best Dutch experience in order to give it a start. But neither our farmers nor their workers fully understood the handling of the crop, and for that reason the factory had to cease work for a period of five years. I am glad to say that for the last five years it has again been in operation and now promises to be a commercial success.
In 1913 a society was formed under the auspices of the Development Commissioners to administer a grant of £11,000 from the Development Fund for educational and organisation purposes in connection with the development of this crop. In 1915 the British Sugar Beet Society came into existence with the object of forming a company which would acquire an estate capable of providing the minimum quantity of beet required to keep the factory working. That factory is now in existence, though it has had a somewhat chequered career. It is established at Kelham in Nottinghamshire, and was completed in 1921. Unfortunately, it was erected at a time when building and equipment were at their highest cost and, as your Lordships are no doubt aware, although a large amount of Government money was forthcoming in order partially to finance it, the capital has had to be drastically written down, and for a time it was thought possible that the factory might have to be closed. It is, however, now in operation and promises to be a commercial success.
Three years ago, in 1922, the Government carefully considered the whole question of encouraging the raising of sugar at home, and in view of the urgent representations of agriculturists they remitted the Excise Duty, amounting to 19 s. 5d. per cwt., on home-produced sugar. This gave a much needed assistance to the industry, and may I say, in passing, that without some financial assistance, at any rate for a period of years, it would not be possible for a new industry of this kind to establish itself on a permanent basis. Even in Holland, a Free Trade country like our own, the industry

635
received State assistance for many years before it became self-supporting. There is, I believe, no country where the sugar beet industry has been successful in establishing itself without State help in its initial stages. This seems to be some justification for the Government policy. I know that the noble Earl opposite, Lord Beauchamp, has put down a Motion for the rejection of this Bill. No doubt he is going to base himself mainly, if not wholly, upon adherence to the strict principles of Free Trade. Well, I have only just lately referred to my John Stuart Mill, and I am interested to learn, from an excerpt which I have in my hand, that he at any rate in relation to a nascent—baby—industry of this country, was quite prepared to extend such assistance as is now proposed towards its support in its early stages.
The difficulty in which we found ourselves last year was occasioned by the Government's decision to reduce the Customs Duty from 25 s. 8d. to 11 s. 8d. per cwt. This raised the whole question of the future of the industry in this country. The late Government, with the cordial support of the Conservative Party, decided to grant a subsidy on home-produced sugar for a period of years, and it is simply to implement this undertaking that the Bill now before the House has been prepared.
This brings me to the actual proposals of the Bill. Subsection (I) of Clause I provides that a subsidy shall be payable for a period of ten years from October 1, 1924, on a diminishing scale, set out in the First Schedule to the Bill, on sugar and molasses manufactured in Great Britain from home-grown beet. For refined sugar of a polarisation exceeding 98 degrees the subsidy will be at the rate of 19 s. 6d. per cwt. for the four years from 1924–25 to 1927–28 inclusive, at the rate of 13 s. per cwt. for the three following years, and at the rate of 6s. 6d. per cwt. for the three final years. For sugar of lower degrees of polarisation and for molasses, a subsidy on a descending scale will be payable at rates calculated on the basis of the scale which is already applied for the purpose of Customs Duty. These rates are set out in the First Schedule to the Bill, and probably it is not necessary for me to refer to them in detail.
To ensure that the main object of the Bill is achieved—namely, the assistance
636
of the agricultural industry—it is provided in subsection 2 (a) of Clause 1, in conjunction with the Second Schedule, that the subsidy shall not be payable unless the price paid for the beet is not less than 44 s. per ton in respect of beets grown in the years 1924 to 1927. The House will note that the price of 44 s. per ton is only a minimum price, and only operates for the first of three periods, and your Lordships will probably be interested to know that in consequence of successful negotiations conducted by the National Farmers' Union with the various beet sugar factories already operating or about to operate, prices considerably in excess of this sum have been guaranteed—namely, on a three years' contract 49 s for the first year of the factory, and 54 s. for the two succeeding years. At those rates I think we are all agreed there is prospect, with favourable climatic and soil conditions, of making a commercial success of the production of sugar beet. The House will observe that the minimum rate in the Bill applies to beet of 15½ per cent. sugar content, and that the minimum price varies with the sugar content in every case. It is therefore of great importance to the farmer to increase the sugar content as much as possible. As I have already said, in all favourable localities sugar beet of higher contents than this can quite easily be grown, and in fact is being grown in my district up to 18 per cent.
One difficulty, of course, is that all the seed so far has had to be obtained from abroad, but efforts are being made under the auspices of the Royal Agricultural Society, with the assistance of the Ministry of Agriculture, to persuade seed producers in this country to produce as good seed as is being provided from abroad, which will be specially suitable for British conditions.
It may be asked what guarantee the farmers have of fair prices after 1927, in view of the fact that the Second Schedule to the Bill only provides for minimum prices for the first four years of the subsidy. The reply is, that the factories cannot exist unless the farmers are willing to grow beet. Farmers are, therefore, in a position to exact favourable terms from the factories.
Subsection 2 (b) of Clause I provides that the subsidy will only be paid if not less than 75 per cent. of the plant and

637
machinery installed in the sugar factory was wholly manufactured in Great Britain. This provision is intended to ensure that the industry shall be, as far as possible, on a British basis. It was not possible to provide that the whole of the machinery should be manufactured in this country, as sugar beet factory machinery is highly specialised, and in some cases—for example, that of pulp-driers—it has been found quite impossible to obtain them from British manufacturers. Unfortunately, there are certain plans and designs connected with some of this machinery which we are not in a position to copy, except at a prohibitive price, because they are covered by Continental patents. We hope that in time, as the sugar beet industry becomes established, far more than 75 per cent. of the machinery will be British-made. The Ministry of Agriculture has, you will notice, in certain cases the power to direct that the provision relative to the 75 per cent. shall not, in fact, apply, and has already granted a dispensation in two cases. These are cases where binding contracts Lave already been entered into by existing factories, or by the owners of contemplated factories, who obtain machinery from Holland, and, of course, it would not have been possible for them to proceed with the erection or equipment of their factories if this dispensation had not been given.
Clause 2 provides that companies to which the subsidy is paid must send annually to the Ministry of Agriculture a proper statement of their accounts, and I am sure your Lordships will agree that, where public money is being devoted to such a purpose, it is only right that some sort of financial return should be available, either for Parliament or for the responsible Minister to see. It is interesting to notice that this clause is specially supported by the sugar beet companies, no doubt because at the end of the ten years they have it in mind, if it turns out from their accounts that this is not a profitable industry, that the subsidy may be renewed for a further period.
Clause 3, which establishes quite a new principle, so far as I am aware, in this country, provides that workmen employed in connection with the manufacture of sugar and molasses in respect of which a subsidy is payable shall be paid wages on
638
the basis of the Fair Wage Clause which is applicable to contracts of Government Departments. This principle is very familiar now to Parliament, and, so far as I know, has always operated smoothly and beneficially. The Fair Wage Clause, however, will not apply in cases where the wages are paid at a rate which has been agreed upon by a joint industrial council in any particular factory, representing, of course, both the employers and the employed in that business. The House will doubtless agree that these provisions are reasonable, in view of the fact that a subsidy is being granted out of State funds to this industry. If any dispute on the subject of wages arises it is to be referred under Clause 3 by the Minister of Agriculture to the Industrial Court for settlement.
I am proposing, on the Committed stage of the Bill, to invite the House to insert an Amendment providing that the wages settled by the Industrial Court shall be recoverable by the workman, if necessary, by a legal process. As your Lordships are aware, under the existing system under which these Courts operate, although the Courts may arrive at a particular figure the workmen have no power to claim that figure as a matter of right. We propose to go further, and we are, as I say, embarking upon a new principle in this respect as regards this particular industry, by empowering the workmen to claim their adjudicated wages by legal process.
Clause 4 provides for the re-imposition of the Excise Duty, from which sugar manufactured from home-grown beet is at present exempt. The Excise Duty amounts, at the moment, to 9s. 8⅔d. The net cost of the subsidy to the Exchequer, after allowing for the Excise Duty, will therefore be 9s. 9⅓d. per cwt., representing, it is estimated, about £530,000 per annum in respect of the three factories which are now operating. It is only fair to tell the House that the sugar refineries have raised some objections to the methods by which the subsidy is calculated, first of all on the ground that the adoption of the Customs scale for the subsidy gives a definite bias to the manufacture by the new factories of white sugar, as distinguished from raw sugar; and also because the Government proposals will mean establishing in this

639
country a new industry at the expense of an old one.
I hope it may not be necessary for us to re-discuss in this House this passing controversy between the refiners and the promoters of these new factories. If it is, it is quite possible, I think, to persuade your Lordships of the fairness of the treatment of the refiners. If there be any doubt about it, it is interesting to note that the chief sugar refiners in this country are themselves embarking upon one of these new factories, which indicates a possibly delayed, but none the less sincere, sympathy with the movement which we are inaugurating. In order not to weary your Lordships I am deliberately avoiding entering into this controversy, but I am quite prepared to do so, if desired. I may remind your Lordships that the output of the seven factories which are now in esse or are being erected will, it is estimated, provide no more than 3 per cent. of the whole of the sugar which is being consumed, and being increasingly consumed, in this country. So, after all, a large amount of the sugar is bound to be provided in the future from the same sources as in the past.
There is one point to which I ought to refer, and that is that the present process of manufacture of sugar is a continuous process, from the pulping or crushing of the beet right away through to the production of highly-refined white sugar. We believe that to be the right process now to encourage in this country, and that there is no particular advantage to be gained by producing the raw sugar in one factory and refining it in another. That, at any rate, is not the view of our chief competitors on the Continent, for wherever they put up a sugar plant nowadays they invariably provide for the continuous process.
As your Lordships know, in the eighteenth century the agriculture of this country was revolutionised, to the immense advantage of the nation, by the system of rotation cropping, of which the pioneers were successively the second Viscount Townshend and Coke of Norfolk, first Earl of Leicester. Is it too much to anticipate that we are on the eve of another beneficial and pacific agricultural revolution, of which the noble Earl, Lord Denbigh, will rank throughout the ages as the far-sighted pioneer? At any rate, it is in that hope
640
and belief that I confidently submit this Bill to your Lordships' consideration. I trust that it will pass without opposition.
LORD BANBURY OF SOUTHAM: May I ask, Is not this a Money Bill?
LORD BLEDISLOE: That is a matter for the Speaker of the House of Commons, and not for me.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(Lord Bledisloe.)
THE EARL OF BEAUCHAMP THE EARL OF BEAUCHAMP had given Notice to move, as an Amendment, That the Bill be read 2a this day six months. The noble Earl said: My Lords, I cannot help feeling that your Lordships' House has some small ground of complaint against His Majesty's Government for not having allowed this Bill to reach this House at an earlier stage. It was only on Thursday last that it was read a first time, and we understand that a Royal Commission is necessary in the course of the present week in order that it shall receive the Royal Assent. It is a Bill of considerable importance, and I think it would have been much better if your Lordships' House had been allowed a somewhat longer period in which to consider it.
May I congratulate the noble Lord who moved the Second Reading of the Bill upon the satisfaction he must feel in piloting it through your Lordships' House. For many years he has been interested in this matter, and therefore it may be a special pleasure to him that it has fallen to his lot to take charge of the Bill in this House. I am sorry, however, to disappoint him in the ground of my objection to this measure. It is on no abstract or theoretical ground that I ask your Lordships to give it a Second Reading six months from to-day. It is on the purely businesslike ground that this is a grant of public money to private companies on what, in my opinion, are unbusinesslike terms. There is no suggestion in the Bill for repayment such as that suggested by the Development Commissioners. After all, it is no new idea that public money should be granted for the assistance of the sugar beet industry. When the question was considered by the Development Commissioners they recommended that the sugar beet companies should pay interest at the rate of 5 per

641
cent. upon the money which was lent to them, and I think it would have been very much better had a provision of that kind appeared in the present Bill.
It is perfectly true that the beginning of all these sugar mille is a very expensive business. Kelham cost at the beginning, I think, a million of money to which the Government contributed a considerable amount. Fifteen shillings in the £ was written off the value of their shares. When Cantley was started in 1912 it met with continuous bad fortune until two years ago, when it began to turn the corner. Last year it made a profit of £146,000, while this year there is some hope that, according to an estimate which has been made, the profit will be £200,000. In those circumstances, it would have been possible to ask these people who are going to benefit by a grant of public money to do something to pay it back, if only by way of interest.
In view of the fact that the profits at Cantley were so large last year and are expected to be still larger this year, this is a matter which might safely have been left to private enterprise. Investors of capital would have been attracted by the possibilities of making such large profits, even had it been some years before they recouped themselves. But so far as these factories are concerned, I am bound to call your Lordships' attention to the fact that in the past it was very largely a case of foreign capital having been invested. Mr. Johann Petrus van Rossum was largely concerned in the Cantley factory, and it is the same with the other factories which belong to the same company. I am all in favour of foreign capital coming into this country to help in the employment of British workmen; but I am not in favour of inviting foreign capital to come into this country and then giving it large subsidies. At Cantley there is a Dutchman in charge of the factory and Dutch machinery is used. At Ipswich it is said that Hungarians are employed.
I think, too, that the forecast of the noble Lord himself as to the employment which would be given by this scheme was somewhat optimistic. I understood him to say that there would be 400 men—or was it 600?—employed at each factory. If you multiply whichever figure is the
642
correct one by six or ten factories the resultant employment will bear a very small relation to the amount of unemployment in the country. There is also this point, that in agricultural areas and in those districts where factories are likely to be built there is not so much unemployment as there is in the towns. Generally speaking, it is within the knowledge of your Lordships that the agricultural labourer is employed all the year round. The point in this case is that agricultural labourers who are already employed will be given this amount of casual labour—because it is only casual labour—during the time they are working on these roots, and that does not really afford any very great hope that there will le a large reduction in unemployment generally. As against that, we have to remember the number of men who are now working in the refineries and who may lose work in consequence of the erection of these other factories.
There is a long history connected with this matter with which I shall not burden your Lordships, but it is interesting to remember that this is a considerable reversal of the policy initiated by Mr. Joseph Chamberlain at the time of the Brussels Sugar Convention. People went over from this country to represent the Government of the day and to induce other countries to discontinue their bounties, to persuade them that their bounties were uneconomic and that it was much better for them not to put bounties on the sugar grown in their countries. At that time the anxiety was for the refiners who were to be found chiefly in Glasgow. This is a very considerable reversal of that policy, and I am not sure that it is an improvement upon it. We have always heard from noble Lords opposite of their anxiety to tax the foreigner. I have always thought that in the matter of sugar bounties we went a considerable distance towards taxing the foreigner in order to get cheap goods here from him. Foreigners raised money by their ordinary taxation, and then gave it in the form of bounties to growers of sugar. The people in those foreign countries had to find the money to pay those taxes and, having grown the sugar and having refined it—some of it was not refined but sent over here in its raw state—it was sent here a great deal more

643
cheaply and we could get our sugar cheap because the foreigner received a bounty on the sugar he grew. That seems to me to be the only way in which we may really hope to tax the foreigner effectively.
The noble Lord explained to your Lordships the figures which related to the subsidy. It is a rather complicated matter, and I hope your Lordships will permit me to repeat those figures. The subsidy is to be 19 s. 6d. per cwt. From that we must take away the Excise Duty which is now payable on the sugar and amounts to 9s. 9¾d. To that we have to add a Customs Duty of 11 s. 8d. and the advantage which they get by the preference of 1s. 11 d. That makes a total of 21 s. 5d. a cwt. As far as I can see, sugar of a somewhat similar character to that which is likely to be turned out by these factories is now being sold in the London market at 32 s. 4d. a cwt. In those circumstances I thing the scale is very generous indeed, because, in addition, we have to remember that these factories are able also to sell the feeding stuffs to which the noble Lord referred and which are said to be very valuable for the stock of this country. The companies, therefore, will not only get the subsidy but the advantage of the feeding stuffs and they certainly ought to be able to pay some interest on the money advanced to them by the State at no great distance of time from now. I understand that the amount is to be £500,000 this year, and next year they expect to deal with a great deal more. Even when we have subtracted the amount of Excise Duty the burden on the Exchequer is likely to amount to something like £2,000,000 or £3,000,000. The more successful they are in growing sugar the worse it is for the taxpayer.
The reason I invite your Lordships to reject this Bill is based on grounds of economy. During the last few days there has been a discussion in this House upon the increse in the Air Force. We know that the Navy Estimates are larger, and I think the last Bill mentioned in your Lordships' House to-night entailed a loss of something like £200,000. These things go on, and it becomes more and more impossible for the Chancellor of the Exchequer to give that relief to industry by a reduction of taxation which is the desire of every member of your Lordships' House. We all want to see a
644
reduction of taxation, and it can only be done by the most rigid economy and by refusing to grant these large sums of public money in this way. But if we do make these grants of public money, the least we can do is to ask for a return on the capital that we invest. I would further point out the difficulty that this Bill raises to a further reduction of the Sugar Duty—an aim which certainly was the object of a good many members of your Lordships' House. We should like to see the Sugar Duty reduced, not only because of the constant use of sugar as an article of domestic consumption, but also because of its use as a raw material. It is a necessary ingredient in a number of articles which used to be made on a large scale in this country, and the more we can have of it in this country, and the cheaper it is, the better it must be for our trade, because there will be more people employed in making these secondary things. But the institution of this subsidy makes it more difficult than it was before to consider the question of further reducing the Sugar Duty.
Agriculture is not the first interest considered in this matter; indeed, it was only comparatively lately that the agricultural interest, represented by the National Farmers' Union, took a very deep interest in this subject. It was only in 1922 that they first began to press this matter upon His Majesty's Government. But if it had been a question of agriculture chiefly, I think His Majesty's Government might have found means to subsidise the raw material only, and not to penalise these manufacturers, the refiners, who are now working in Glasgow. It is quite evident that assistance to raw sugar is one thing, and the subsidy which is being given on manufactured sugar is another thing, because the latter assists the manufacturers of sugar as well as the producers of the raw material. This is just one section of agriculture which is being assisted.
In this House we are constantly hearing complaints of the present depressed condition of agriculture. I think we have some right to comment upon that fact. Even the Tariff Commission which was set up by Mr. Chamberlain declared against the taxation of wheat, on the ground that it was selecting one product of the agricultural community and giving special treatment

645
to it, which amounted to favouritism, and was not going to help other sections of agriculture. This is oven more the case. There are far fewer people engaged in growing sugar beet than in growing wheat, and it is to this small section of agriculture that this assistance is going to be given. We may expect other interests to come forward and ask for similar treatment in the future. I know that my friends amongst the hop growers will not be backward in pressing upon a sympathetic Minister and Parliamentary Secretary of the Ministry of Agriculture their claims to be assisted by subsidies or by some other means of the same kind.
The noble Lord challenged me upon the point as to whether in my opinion this was Protection or not, and he quoted a sentence from John Stuart Mill. Far be it from me to enter into any competition on a matter of that kind with so great an authority. I would say what I have ventured to say in many places before, that if you want to assist any industry subsidies are certainly a very great deal better than tariffs. With subsidies you see exactly the amount of money that is being spent by the country in assisting industry; the money goes direct to that industry, and does not percolate through into the pockets of other people. In those circumstances subsidy is a great deal better than tariff. If, on the one hand, you are to have a low subsidy and no Excise Duty, and on the other a high subsidy and payment of Excise Duty, which is the scheme" under this Bill, comparing the two the first alternative is certainly very near indeed to a system of Protection. I incline to think that is perhaps the reason why this Bill was introduced by the late Government.
I was reading that Protectionist newspaper the Scotsman on August 21 last, and I found that they said this:
"Whether protection should be afforded by subsidies or by a tariff is a point mainly of tactics. A Socialist Party will probably prefer the method of subsidies since it can be plausibly argued that a subsidy will not increase prices. But a subsidy is a concealed tax on the whole community; and taxation is unquestionably an important element in cost of production. It is illusory therefore to suppose that the effect of a subsidy will be different from that of a tariff, so far as concerns prices."
That, I suppose, explains why this Bill was originally proposed by the Government to which the noble Lords sitting on
646
the Bench below me belonged last year. Indeed, I remember that their proposals were brought forward at a somewhat interesting moment in the electoral history of that Government. There was certainly one by-election pending at that time, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer made haste to announce his conversion to the system of a subsidy to sugar. I am glad to think, whether it was connected with that by-election or not, that the result did not meet with the success which His Majesty's then Government expected, for the bribe offered to the electorate was refused.
I think that this marks another step in that unfortunate direction in which, as it seems to me, the Labour Party is tending. It is not on those grounds that I am asking your Lordships to give this Bill a Second Reading this day six months hence. It is because His Majesty's Government, as it seems to me, have not sufficient control over the business in return for the money which they put into it. I should have preferred, if there was to be a grant of public money, that it should be granted either under the Trade Facilities Acts, or under the Development Commission, and I hope your Lordships will agree to my Amendment.
Amendment moved—
Leave out ("now") and at the end of the Motion insert ("this day six months").—(Earl Beauchamp.)
LORD ARNOLD: My Lords, I desire to give to this Bill general support qualified by certain criticisms. It follows that I oppose the Amendment moved by the noble Earl who spoke last. Quite frankly I do not understand his Amendment; at least, I cannot quite understand how it is consistently put down upon the Paper when only as recently as last Thursday the noble Earl informed your Lordships that this is a Bill to which there seemed to be offered no opposition. His next act is to put down a Motion on the Paper for its rejection. That seems to me a somewhat mystifying procedure. However, I leave that aspect of the matter for the moment, and I will deal with the economic points of the noble Earl as I proceed. The main provisions of this Bill have been very fully explained by the noble Lord who moved the Second Reading in an interesting speech, and I shall be mainly occupied, in the brief observations which I have to make, in stating—because

647
there seems still to be some misconception about the matter—the position of the Labour Party in regard to this subject. I am happy to think that I can do it within the space of a few minutes.
First, in regard to the history of this subsidy. The noble Lord who moved the Second Reading outlined the facts broadly, but I think it is necessary to stress one or two details, because I do not think they are sufficiently appreciated When the Labour Party came into office the sugar beet industry enjoyed protection, because the Import Duty on sugar at that time was 25 s. 8d. per cwt., and there was no Excise Duty. In fact, the Excise Duty had been removed in 1922 with the express purpose of encouraging this industry. As a result, certain things had been done; capital expenditure had been incurred. Consequently it would have been impossible for the Labour Party, even if they had desired, and they did not so desire, to throw this industry over. To have done that would have meant considerable unemployment and loss. The noble Earl, in stressing the cost of this Bill, looked at the matter entirely on the debit side. He entirely left out of account the fact that in return for the subsidy you have a considerable saving in unemployment pay, a substantial advantage to agriculture, and undoubtedly valuable educational experience of which much may be expected in the future.
The next step in the history of this subsidy is the reduction made by the Labour Government in the Sugar Duty last year, a very big reduction, because the Sugar Duty was cut down from 25 s. 8d. per cwt. to 11 s. 8d.—a larger reduction in that Duty than was ever made by any Government in one year. It is clear that the protective assistance given to the industry was largely reduced, and the Labour Government was determined to reimpose an Excise Duty, and it did reimpose that Duty. In that respect—I should be very glad to have the noble Earl's attention on this point—it bettered the example of the last Liberal Government of which he was a member, because that Government refused to put on an Excise Duty although pressed to do so. That is the position. I say that the Labour Government was more virtuous in this matter, so far as Free Trade is concerned,
648
than the last Liberal Government of which the noble Earl was a member. I was not surprised therefore, though I confess I had no idea what reasons he was going to advance, when he did not dwell at great length upon the protective aspect of this matter.
It came about that an entirely new-position had to be faced by the late Labour Government, and it was then decided to proceed by means of a subsidy along the lines of the present measure. I maintain that such a proceeding is not inconsistent with Free Trade and that it cannot rightly be represented as inconsistent with Free Trade. I am not going into a disquisition of the difference between a tariff and a subsidy, although it is a very tempting theme and a great deal can be said about it. But this measure is supported by strong Free Traders, and even such a rigid Cobdenite as Mr. Francis Acland, last year in the House of Commons encouraged the idea of a temporary subsidy for the purpose of assisting the sugar beet industry. As the noble Lord who moved the Second Reading has pointed out, there is not a single country in Europe where this industry is now in being where it has not been necessary for a limited period in the early stages to give some form of State assistance. Unless you do so the industry can never be founded. There are certain circumstances in which a temporary subsidy is a vital necessity, and I can quote no less an authority than the noble Earl, Lord Oxford, himself as approving the subsidising of an industry under certain conditions and circumstances.
THE EARL OF OXFORD AND ASQUITH: Under certain conditions.
LORD ARNOLD: I am glad to find there is no difference between us, and I hope that in future we shall hear nothing more about the Labour Party having departed from the strict path of Free Trade. I maintain that in the circumstances, having regard to the position of the Labour Government when they came into office and their determination to re-impose an Excise Duty, which they did, they had no other course than to proceed by way of a subsidy. There is only one further point on which I desire to say but a few words because the ground has been

649
more than covered by the noble Lord who moved the Second Reading of the Bill. I should like to thank him, and the Government, for having accepted an Amendment in regard to the Fair Wage Clause, moved by the Labour Party in another place. In connection with that clause there is a further Amendment which was held over for reconsideration by the Minister of Agriculture, and I hope that when we reach the Committee stage we may come to an agreement on that matter.
Before I sit down I wish to say something about a provision in the Bill on which the noble Lord dwelt at considerable length. It is in regard to the provision that at least 75 per cent. of the plant and machinery installed in the factory for the manufacture of sugar and molasses shall be wholly manufactured in Great Britain. It is, of course, quite true that a very plausible case can be made out in that connection, but I believe it is open to very grave objections. I am not going into the fiscal argument and considerations more suited to a general discussion of that character. I will content myself with putting the practical point, that this clause will mean, I am afraid, that the industry will not have so good a chance as it ought to have, and as it could have, if this prevision were not inserted in the Bill. I do not think that the 25 per cent. which is left for purchase abroad is by any means sufficient to ensure that the industry will have the best chance. To say that is not to reflect in the least on the British manufacturer or the industry. These sugar beet industries abroad have been established for many years and the plant and machinery for them is made there with all the advantages which come from long practical experience and experiment. We are not yet in that position in this country. We may come to it some day, and I hope and believe we shall, but I do not think the time has come when a provision like that should be inserted in this Bill, because it will handicap seriously, possibly fatally, this experiment.
It is quite true that there is a qualification to which the noble Lord referred—namely, that in certain circumstances the Minister can practically contract out of this provision. I was a little disappointed to hear that this qualification
650
had been put in chiefly for the purpose of dealing with one or two past happenings. I hoped it meant that the authors of it were themselves very unhappy about it and felt that it was necessary to insert it in order to meet the position which would arise in the future. The words of this qualification are:—
".! shall not apply in the case of any factory in respect of which the Minister thinks fit for any special reason to direct that they shall not apply.!"
That is one of the widest discretions I have ever seen in an Act of Parliament, and it is rather an astonishing proceeding to put in a provision and then put in also a discretion which makes the provision nugatory. I do not think the statement of the noble Lord was at all satisfactory on that point. I regret that this provision remains in the Bill. If the qualification is put in I think it would be better to delete the provision altogether.
Let me say this in conclusion, that although we are obliged to offer criticisms on certain points, nevertheless the main structure of this Bill is, as the noble Lord has stated—I should like to express my appreciation of what he said about the action of the Labour Government in this matter—the same as that for which the late Administration was responsible. We wish every success to the industry which this Bill is designed to assist.
LORD HARRIS: My Lords, I should like, if I may, to detain your Lordships for a very few moments on this interesting subject, though certainly not with the intention of supporting my noble friend, the noble Earl opposite, in his Motion to read the Bill a second time this day six months, nor yet of finding a solution for the evident differences that exist between the two Parties opposite, both here and elsewhere. I am only too thankful when I find a Ministry of Agriculture that is really desirous of helping agriculture to some extent. But I venture to offer one word of warning to your Lordships from a practical point of view, and I am tempted to do so because I remember very well that, during the war, when my noble friend Lord Selborne was equally enthusiatic as is the noble Lord on the Front Bench below me now concerning a scheme for the establishment of farm colonies, I pointed out from a practical

651
point of view that it was going to be a failure; and, as your Lordships know, it was an almost total failure.
As regards this experiment, I am not speaking from my own experience, but I have had the opportunity of consulting a very eminent agriculturist who has been pursuing this subject for twenty years or more, and who, to assist in the matter, has himself grown sugar beet. He does not show the enthusiastic confidence displayed by my noble friend below me. I cannot help thinking that my noble friend has absorbed some of the enthusiasm of my noble friend Lord Denbigh, whom, in the same breath, I will congratulate upon his success, after many years of struggle and disappointment, in securing the assistance of the Government. There are several snags which this boat must either drive down or get round. In the first place, though I believe that on the Continent sugar beet is not grown more than once in five years, let us estimate that it can be grown once in four years. Then I am told that a well equipped factory will require the supply from something like 4,000 acres a year. That means that the factory must be able to depend upon at least 16,000 acres. Now 16,000 acres of sugar beet arable is a pretty big area. A great deal of that area will not be at a very convenient distance from the factory, and this will increase the cost of transport If you sum up in your own mind, thinking of any area of country that you well know, how many other kinds of cultivation are already going on and well established and are not likely to be interfered with, you can see over what a very large area indeed the 16,000 acres will have to be spread. That is one of the difficulties, and the noble Lord below me has not attempted to touch upon it.
Then, when the beet is grown, it has to be treated in rotation—that is to say, the factory cannot deal with, say, 80,000 tons all at once, but that quantity has to be divided in rotation. Since the roots have to be pulled at the same time, a certain proportion of them will have to wait for treatment. I do not know how that is going to affect the sugar content. It may have no material effect or, on the other hand, it may; but at any rate, the farmer who depends upon the sugar content has to wait until his particular crop has been treated, and he may have
652
to wait a very considerable time. Again, there are a number of competing industries in the particular area in which these experiments have been carried out, and will continue to be carried out to some extent. You are on some of the very best potato land in England, worth £5 an acre, I am told. Some of these farmers are not going to give up growing potatoes merely to experiment with beet, and you may depend upon it that the area that will have to be included for each of these factories will be extremely large. I do not think that this has been taken into calculation.
As regards labour, I have always understood, and I am supported by my informant, that one of the reasons of success abroad has been the extremely cheap female labour that has been employed. This is imported labour. My noble friend below me held out hopes that ten men more, I think, per 100 acres were likely to be employed on the farm. Does he mean all the year round? This crop has to be rushed in, and when it is ready it has to be rushed out again. You will want a great deal of casual labour that is not upon the farm. You will have to get it from the towns. I sincerely hope that ten more men per acre are going to be employed, but this is going to put up the cost of cultivation very considerably. This is not cheap labour, and I doubt very much if the labour which you are going to get from the towns, whether male or female, is going to be anything like so economical as the labour which has been employed abroad and has been one of the factors in making the cultivation of sugar beet so successful there.
These are only two or three of the difficulties that have to be dealt with. For a good number of years past I have had to consider questions into which chemistry enters. You can prove anything by laboratory experiment, and so far there has been very little more than laboratory experiment in this matter. There is no question that we can grow beet, there is no question that some of it will contain the necessary sugar content and there is no question that it can be treated. I think that the difficulty you are going to meet will arise from the agricultural point of view, both as regards area and as regards labour. But I would no more think of opposing the Second Reading of this

653
Bill than of opposing any other offer of assistance for agriculture that might be made by the Government, and I sincerely hope that this experiment may prove a great success.
LORD BLEDISLOE: My Lords, I thought just now that my noble friend Lord Harris was proposing to some extent to damn our Bill with faint praise, and it was a relief to me when he ended his interesting speech by stating that he proposed to support the Second Reading. I would venture to say to him that most of his neighbours amongst the farmers in East Anglia are definitely enthusiastic about the inauguration of this industry.
LORD HARRIS: Not in East Kent.
LORD BLEDISLOE: East Kent? I beg the noble Lord's pardon. At any rate, in those areas where there is a sugar beet factory or the prospect of one, I understand that the enthusiasm amongst farmers is considerable, and there appears to be no prospect, upon any information that we have, that so important a crop as the potato crop is likely to be in any way displaced to make way for sugar beet. The noble Lord will not expect me to enter into the different conditions which govern the production of different crops, but I think I should be able to convince him that the conditions differ to such an extent that one crop is not likely to displace the other.
I should like to thank the House for the reception, on the whole favourable, which has been given to this Bill. I am afraid that if I tried for many hours to convince my noble friend Lord Beauchamp as to the desirability of this Bill, at any rate from a Free Trader's point of view, I should fail most signally, but I should like to say to him that, so far as a loan is concerned as against an out and out subsidy, it would have been quite impossible to have persuaded the gentlemen who are now putting their money into these new factories to come forward if we had simply provided a loan, even at a low rate of interest, instead of that which may be regarded as the gift of a subsidy. I think I am right in saying that in all those countries where the sugar beet industry has been developed so
654
successfully there has been a similar attitude taken up by the Government of the country, in providing financial assistance; and I am bound to say that, as I read John Stuart Mill and other eminent economists, there is no suggestion in their remarks upon this subject that a loan should be substituted for definite financial assistance on the part of the Government. The only other point mentioned by the noble Lord, to which I should like to refer, is that the sugar beet industry provides employment outdoors at one period of the year and in the factories during the other part of the year. In fact, it is seasonable employment of very high value, tending to change casual and ill-paid employment into regular and well-paid employment.
So far as Lord Arnold's criticisms are concerned, I do not think there is very much between us, but I would like to suggest to him that a large amount of this machinery which might be obtained from abroad, for the equipment of these factories, is undoubtedly produced by low-priced labour, and there is a strong feeling among those who desire to develop their factories in this direction, and among the workmen employed in those factories, that they should not be subjected to the unfair competition of goods produced abroad by lower wages than are paid in this country. After these remarks I trust your Lordships will allow this Bill to pass its Second Reading. So far as Lord Arnold is concerned, I will do my best to meet his more persuasive arguments in Committee.
THE EARL OF BEAUCHAMP: Perhaps your Lordships will allow me, in asking leave to withdraw my Motion for the rejection of this Bill, to thank the noble Lord for the answer which he has given me. I will not pretend that I am completely satisfied with the answer he has given, but probably if I spoke as long as he contemplated speaking to me, he would be as little convinced as I am. We had perhaps better be content to leave the matter there, and I ask leave to withdraw my Motion.
Amendment for the rejection of the Bill, by leave, withdrawn.
On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

THE GENEVA PROTOCOL.
LORD PARMOOR LORD PARMOOR rose to ask His Majesty's Government whether they can give information on the matters brought forward at the recent meeting of the Council of the League of Nations; and to move for Papers. The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, the Question that I have put upon the Paper primarily raises a matter which is much discussed at the present time—namely, the question of the Protocol—but having been asked on behalf of the Government to explain what points I desired to call attention to in my Question, I supplied them with full notes of the speech that I was going to make, and therefore they know, adequately I hope, what are the points which I am going to raise. My notes were originally given to the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, whose illness I regret. I believe that the noble Viscount on the Woolsack will answer my Questions.
The Protocol is not a British document in any sense. It is an international document of wide-reaching importance, the whole basis of which is in accordance with the terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations, to comply with which all signatory States have already come under binding treaty obligations. The Protocol really embodies what I will call the No-More-War, or Peace, policy, a policy in which a common measure of right and justice shall be guaranteed to all peoples alike, irrespective of the power or force which they may have at their command. In other words, it is a policy of equality for all countries, whether great or small. It was unanimously adopted as a reasonable and peaceful proposal by all the States represented at the Fifth Assembly of the League at the Geneva meeting last autumn. The present Government have rejected it root and branch, as I understand, on the wide ground that a policy based on trust and not on fear represents, tinder present conditions, an impracticable idealism. This view I think was further enforced in connection with the Navy Estimates and the speech made on Saturday by the First Lord of the Admiralty.
Sound advice, in my view, was given to this House by the noble Marquess, Lord Lansdowne, speaking in 1918, when he
656
made a notable speech in favour of the whole League principle. He said:—
"My impression is that the democracies of the world are sick of the burden of heavy armaments, and that if there were found means of reasonably assuring international peace you would find that disarmament would follow almost automatically."
I think there is no doubt that that is the feeling in the world at the present time, and that to a large extent it was the basis of the unanimous approval given to the principle of the Protocol at Geneva. In fact, it was known that modern industrialism and war are really in their essence inconsistent. However, on the present occasion, as there is no question of amendment or improvement, I do not propose to discuss any matter of detail.
I think that the authority which there is behind the Protocol has not been appreciated. I have read several times the statement made by Mr. Chamberlain at Geneva, but I do not find any reference to the great weight of international authority and assent that stands behind the Protocol. It was directly initiated by the Prime Ministers of France and Great Britain, acting in friendly co-operation and in respect of a common international policy. It was supported in an Assembly of exceptional authority. I do not want to dwell unduly upon this, but the speakers in favour were four actual Prime Ministers and two ex-Prime Ministers, four Foreign Secretaries and two ex-Foreign Secretaries, in addition to the leading representatives of the Latin-American Republics, a very important body in connection with the League, a ruling Prince of one of the Native States in India, and the leader of one of the great Parties in the Australian Parliament. It was after these speeches, which no doubt were all delivered in a common plea, that the resolution proposed by the Prime Minister of Great Britain and seconded by the Prime Minister of France was unanimously adopted. That is a very remarkable position in international affairs. In other words, the Geneva Protocol has a unique authority for everyone who regards the League and League policy as an essential condition in the government of modern international life.
In the case of Great Britain the Protocol denoted the culminating point

657
of a considered policy of friendly international co-operation. It followed the success of the London Conference. And may I say here that the position of the British Delegates, of whom I had the honour to be one, has been misunderstood or misrepresented? The British Delegates were not irresponsible agents. They were the accredited representatives at the Assembly of the British Government. They acted throughout in accordance with instructions received, and were in constant communication with the Foreign Office and the Foreign Minister. If it were in accordance with principle—perhaps the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack will answer this question—I wish that all these communications could be made public as part of the Papers dealing with this great question. There should be no room for mistake in a matter of this kind, because all the allegations made on the basis that the British Delegation were an irresponsible, instead of accredited, body have really no foundation whatever. The rejection of the Protocol, indeed, apart for the moment from the question of whether it is right or wrong, is the complete reversal of a carefully planned foreign policy.
Then the whole status and constitution of the Assembly of the League of Nations has not been adequately appreciated. Not only the British, but all the Delegations—and I think there were fifty-six countries originally represented—were representative Delegations, and I know that in many cases they were in direct communication with their home Governments. To the Assembly so constituted and to the Governments which they represented, the peace policy in the Protocol was not only not an unpractical idealism, but was greeted with enthusiasm as a real practical solution. Naturally, the small States were most insistent. To them the principle of the Protocol denoted the only possible basis of equality in an international community, in which right could be substituted for force as the governing principle.
There is one further misconception which I feel bound to correct. The League has no direct executive authority to interfere with the sovereignty of the constituent States—none whatever. So far as I know, no such authority has ever been claimed within the terms either of
658
the Covenant or of the Protocol. Certain rhetorical and inaccurate statements of this character have no foundation, and should be known really to have no foundation by everyone who has studied the Covenant of the League and the basis on which the League has been established. I do not doubt—I think it has been very rightly stated by Mr. Chamberlain on behalf of the Government—that the issue raised by the statement read at Geneva is fundamental. It goes to the whole root of the League and League policy. The autocratic rejection of the Protocol will tend to imperil the whole future influence of the League. The League was founded on the basis of the influence of trust and confidence. I think trust and confidence are essential if international intercourse is to go forward on a League basis. The Protocol is rejected on the ground that a dominating influence is feared, and that we must distrust the plighted word of other countries. When I say "other countries" I presume it means the plighted word of all countries, although, on behalf of my own, I repudiate such a suggestion in the the strongest possible terms.
The speeches of the two Prime Ministers insisted throughout on the importance of a peace policy, and on the inseparable and inter-linked connection between arbitration, security, and disarmament. Of course, the whole goal of the Protocol is not perhaps properly expressed as "disarmament," but as the reduction of armaments to the level to which countries and States which are signatories of the Covenant have already undertaken to reduce them. I should like to quote a short passage from the speech of M. Herriot, the French Prime Minister, because that is sufficient without further emphasis on my part. M. Herriot said this—
"Arbitration, security, disarmament—the three words are, we hold, closely interconnected. Without real international solidarity we shall, we believe, never attain that international community which we passionately desire, which we are resolved to create, to perpetuate, to organise, conformably with the laws which govern life and being. Without international solidarity"—
I will ask your Lordships to mark these words—
"there will never be international peace. Through international solidarity alone shall we attain disarmament, which is our goal."
So much has been said about the attitude of the Dominions, to which I shall have to refer shortly, that while I am on this part of my subject I should like also to quote the opinion of Sir Robert Borden, who was the Conservative Prime Minister of Canada during the war, and the representative of Canada during the peace proceedings in Paris. He says this—
"I regard the Protocol as a brave and earnest attempt to bring about that general disarmament which is so necessary for the future peace of the world. The proposal to couple disarmament and compulsory arbitration, including in that expression the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice, seems reasonable and feasible."
I adopt those words entirely. They are admirably expressed, and represent the true view of the Protocol. He says—
"There is much force in the view that the two"—
that is, arbitration and disarmament—
"must go hand in hand."
Again, the whole matter may be taken as summed up in the last paragraph of the resolution proposed by the Prime Minister of Great Britain, seconded by the Prime Minister of France and accepted with enthusiasm by the whole Assembly of the League at Geneva. It is impossible for me to convey to your Lordships the enthusiasm with which this resolution was accepted and endorsed. This paragraph expressed their desire to strengthen the security of the nations of the world by settling by pacific means all disputes which might arise between States. Then it rightly says that the goal is disarmament—a matter to which too little attention has been paid in the criticism directed against the Protocol.
Upon that point, might I call your Lordships' attention to Article 21 of the Protocol which shows clearly what was the opinion of those who framed and supported it? The Protocol was never intended to be regarded as a document complete in itself. It was never intended to be criticised in connection with the existing condition of armaments. On the contrary, the provision I shall read makes it clear that the whole Protocol becomes null and void unless at a world conference a reduction of armaments is carried out on the basis of the obligations already undertaken by the signatory States of the Covenant in Article 8. These are the actual words—
660
"If within such period after the adoption of the plan for the reduction of armaments as shall he fixed by the said Conference"—
that is the world conference—
"the plan has not been carried out, the Council shall make a declaration to that effect; this declaration shall render the present Protocol null and void."
I do not believe it is fair to attempt to criticise the Protocol at the present moment on the lines suggested in Mr. Chamberlain's statement. No one supported the Protocol on that basis. Everyone who supported it supported it as a document opening the gates to a general reduction of armaments, and it was especially provided that if that general reduction of armaments was not carried out the Protocol itself should become null and void.
How does this matter stand in regard to a league or society or, as Mazzini would have called it, an association of nations? I think that the Covenant of the League or society implies that the signatory States have agreed to the principle of an international community cooperating in friendly intercourse and on a peace basis. I know perfectly well—I do not shut my eyes to the fact—that this position is criticised; but I would suggest that, so far as Great Britain is concerned, and so far as all the signatories to the Covenant are concerned, they cannot overthrow that position without at the same time treating with scant respect treaty obligations of a very solemn character which they have actually undertaken. The primary duty (it is in the first paragraph of the Covenant) which we and other signatories have undertaken is this—
".! to promote international cooperation and to achieve international peace and security"—
how?—
"by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war."
This is not the expression of an idealism but of a practical duty imposed on nations undertaking treaty obligations in a solemn manner. The subsequent clauses are to carry out the obligations thus undertaken, and it is sought to carry them out in the great majority of cases by referring disputes to what might be called a third party decision so as to avoid resort to war.
Everyone who has studied such a league from the time of Grotius knows that the

661
whole basis of what is regarded as the international community is a community which should be constituted on the same basis of law and order as has been already accepted in all civilised communities. It is not wonderful that, in order to make a regulation of this kind complete, the terms and provisions of the Covenant have been found to require adjustment. May I remind your Lordships of the provisions of Article 1 of the Protocol? It is not necessary to read more than a word or two in order to put the matter in the shortest possible manner:—
"The signatory States undertake to make every effort in their power to secure the introduction into the Covenant of amendments on the lines of the provisions contained in the following articles."
Immediately on my return from Geneva I received a letter from the Secretariat asking me to appoint a representative of Great Britain for this purpose—the object being that by reducing the Protocol and the Covenant to one document all the misrepresentations and difficulties which have occurred might be put on one side. I suggested the appointment of one of the most highly qualified international lawyers in this country. Of course I do not mention his name. He said he was prepared to serve, and negotiations had proceeded to a certain point when the late Government fell.
No one would recognise more fully than the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack the importance of a draft of this kind showing clearly how far the Covenant would have to be amended in order to comply with the Protocol. I want to ask him whether any further advance has been made in order that this information should be obtained. It is admitted by everyone that the first adjustment in the Protocol is the universal application of a judicial or third party decision. The objective, of course, is peace. That is the reason for this provision. It is only in this way that peace can be so assured as to give that security which a country like France desires.
The real question then is, should the League forward the constitution of an international community on a peace basis as a barrier against future war? That is the design and object of the Protocol If the answer is in the affirmative, then the British Government is in the unenviable position of opposing proposals unanimously accepted at Geneva as a
662
sufficient basis for calling a world conference on disarmament, or rather on the reduction of armaments to the level fixed by the terms of the Covenant itself. If I may use language which comes from the United States, whose attitude I think has been much misunderstood, the principle of compulsory arbitration, with disarmament, is a foothold, and the only foothold, that will raise the world out of the war morass. Criticism of the provision for compulsory arbitration in the Protocol underlies practically much of the statement prepared by Mr. Chamberlain. He says that the objection of the British Government to universal and compulsory arbitration might easily outweigh its theoretical advantages. That is a very vague and inconclusive criticism. There is much more than theoretical advantage in universal arbitration or court decision. It is a practical advantage of a far-reaching character, and of infinite importance.
It is nothing less than the relegation of questions from the realm of force to the realm of right. It places all nations, small and great, on a basis of equality, it provides for conciliation and justice, and creates a desire to do justice as well as to claim justice. It formulates means of righting wrongs between nations without resorting to the greater wrong of warfare. Through preliminary conciliation it gives a means of explaining away misunderstanding—a most important provision. It invites co-operation, in the place of controversy, and unites higher forms under the guise of an international court, and points the way to the gradual building up of a recognised system of international law. This law, if I might quote from the admirable speech given in this House by the late Lord Parker, should become the common law of nations, and provide for the same measure of peace and security among the nations as the great system of common law has provided for peace between individuals of the same nationality. And no country has been more blessed in the direction of peace and order, under the provisions of this great common law, than our country of Great Britain.
Secondly, and I can deal with this quite shortly, the Protocol was criticised on the ground that it sharpens the sanctions. I purposely use the actual

663
words in the statement. I need not remind your Lordships how often it has been pointed out that the sanction clause in the Protocol is, in terms, limited to the sanctions mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 16 of the Covenant. If the arguments on this point of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Buckmaster, and of Sir Frederick Pollock are not considered to be convincing, I can add nothing to strengthen them. The sanctions are not sharpened by the Protocol in any way. If they are sharpened at all it is by reason of another factor—namely, that unfortunately a certain number of countries have not yet become members of the League. In one sense no doubt it may be said that new responsibilities are created, but in reality they are reduced a hundredfold if the new policy is accepted. I agree with M. Briand's statement that the Protocol has erected an almost insuperable barrier to future warfare. If this is true, all minor criticisms sink into insignificance. No one disputes that security from war is the keynote of a progressive peace policy, and if this is secured under what M. Briand calls an insuperable barrier against war—and that was the general view at Geneva—then criticism such as we find on minor details carries little or no weight. You must recollect that so far as security is a matter of French national opinion—and they are the persons to judge—they have given their answer in the Assembly at Geneva. There the security offered by the Protocol was accepted by the Delegations of all the States as a sufficient basis for the summoning of a world conference on disarmament.
I often doubt whether it is necessary to go into a number of wide arguments upon this point. The security of the Protocol was only required to be sufficient to enable a world conference to be called with the assent of all the assembled nations at Geneva. The Protocol is only a step on the road to disarmament, and is there any man of any knowledge or experience in international affairs who will say for a moment that he doubts the security of the Protocol, at least so far as it is necessary to form the foundation for the calling of a world conference on disarmament? There can be, I think, but one answer to that question. I know that in discussions of this kind a retreat
664
is often found in vague expressions, but the practical thing is this. The world conference was to be called almost at once. It was to have been called this summer; but perhaps that was too soon. But can it be suggested by any one cognisant of international affairs that the Protocol did not give security sufficient for that purpose? If the disarmament conference had failed, the Protocol itself would have become null and void.
I would wish to say one or two words especially on the question of disarmament. The initiative on disarmament under Article 8 of the Covenant is placed upon the Council of the League. I am sorry that the noble Viscount, Lord Cecil, is not here to-night. He was himself the originator of an immense amount of this work, and he deserves every credit for the splendid way in which he worked in connection with the League of Nations. But after five years of constant research—five years of groping in the dark in some directions at least—a scheme was suggested which the whole Assembly was ready to adopt and accept. What is the answer? If you are to be guided by the League policy, they say, we are ready, on the basis of the Protocol, to go forward into a world conference on disarmament which, after all, is the goal of all persons who desire an ultimate peace settlement.
I do not desire to go into matters connected with another Question, as to German disarmament, which I have on the Paper, but on this point it is not only the Protocol which I should like your Lordships to bear in mind, but also two Treaty provisions to which attention must be called in order to make my point quite clear. In that part of the Treaty of Versailles which deals with German disarmament we find these words as the first heading:—
"In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations. Germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and air clauses which follow."
There never was the idea of what I may call unilateral disarmament. The inducement to Germany to disarm was properly stated in the forefront of the clauses which deal with German disarmament as the initiation of the limitation of the armaments of all nations. And to make this quite clear—your Lordships may have it in mind, but unfortunately it is not always

665
referred to—there was the answer given by the Allied Powers at Paris to the objections raised to the Treaty of Versailles by Germany. Consider what this means on the question of disarmament and our honour in carrying it forward?
"The Allied and Associated Powers have already pointed out to the German Delegates that the Covenant of the League of Nations provides.!"
I will not read the whole of the words again—for the reduction of armaments.
"They recognise that the acceptance by Germany of the terms laid down for her own disarmament"—
Will do what?—
"will facilitate and hasten the accomplishment of a general reduction of armaments; and they intend to open negotiations immediately with a view to the eventual adoption of a scheme of such general reduction."
Those words were spoken more than five years ago, and they must appeal to every one as an honourable obligation. For five years attempts have been made to fulfil that obligation and now, for the first time, you have a unanimous Report of the League with the Protocol as the basis for going forward in the direction of disarmament.
What has been the attitude of Great Britain? Every other country assented, and Great Britain also assented at the time, but there has been a change of Government. Is this country, not as a matter of detailed consideration, but as a root and branch objection to the Protocol to close the door, the only door which so far has been opened, to carrying out our honourable obligation, honourably undertaken, that at the first possible moment we would take our part in a scheme for the general reduction of armaments? There is one other point. Here I agree in one sense with what Mr. Chamberlain says, though I entirely disagree with the inference, that so long as you have these armaments you will have fear by one country of another. I recollect that Viscount Grey of Fallodon stated that in his view, partly as regards present fear and partly as regards future fear, he attributed the war mainly to the huge over-grown armaments in Europe. I recollect, too, that the Earl of Oxford and Asquith, speaking on the same subject in Dublin, referred to conditions in which there would be stimulated naval and military activity so that no one felt secure. And now we have Mr. Chamber-
666
lain himself saying that many countries—I do not know to which countries he refers—are in fear of brute force, and, therefore, require brute force for their defence.
The very object of the Protocol is to get rid of that brute force. Is it to be said that brute force is an essential condition in the progress of mankind at the present moment? I do not believe any one will attempt to substantiate a statement of that kind. If it is not, it is of the utmost importance to get rid of it: if it is not, surely Great Britain should not stand in the way of carrying out an obligation honourably undertaken in the Treaty and further confirmed in the passages I have read—namely, that the disarmament of Germany was to be followed at the first possible moment by a general disarmament of other countries.
There are one or two other points, not of detail but of general consideration, on which I must say a word. I am sorry to have to do so at this late hour owing to other matters having received the attention of your Lordships. I must say a word as to the attitude of the Dominions and India towards the Protocol. It is probably known to your Lordships that the British Delegates to the Assembly were Delegates of the British Empire, a rather curious difference because to the Council they are only the Delegates of Great Britain. But, in addition to that, several of the Dominions had independent representations. Canada, New Zealand, Australia, South Africa, Ireland and India were all represented by their Delegates at Geneva as accredited agents of their Governments for the time being. There was not a step we took at Geneva without consultation with them, there was not a movement in which they were not in direct touch with us, and I know perfectly well from my own experience and knowledge that they were in constant communication with their own Governments. If you are to take the opinion as it was expressed through accredited representatives at Geneva, the Dominions and India were fully in accord and expressed their accord by voting for the terms of the Protocol.
I have no doubt that, as in this country and elsewhere, there is a measure of divided opinion. But consider the case

667
of India. The Indian representative was Lord Hardinge, an ex-Viceroy, twice head of the Foreign Office and Ambassador to Russia and at Paris. Could you have a more experienced exponent of international questions or a person more able to represent the realities of Indian opinion? He was a convinced supporter of the Protocol, and not only that, his assistance was of vital importance to the whole British Delegation. We rejoiced to have assistance of that kind; and if you were to analyse the Protocol you would find in many directions critical amendments which we introduced at the instance of the Dominions or of India. One other illustration. Australia had, as its first delegate, Sir Littleton Groom, the Attorney-General. He, as a delegate, was in constant communication with his Government and took a prominent part in forming the Protocol. He was the Chairman of the first Commission to which was delegated the most important part of the work. I do not know—I do not wish to dwell too much upon this—how many hours I spent talking over difficult questions with Sir Littleton Groom.
But how does the matter stand? If you have these Dominion and Indian representatives at Geneva, if you realise that they are acting under instructions from their Governments, as they were, if you bear in mind that they are accredited agents, not irresponsible bodies, what more can be done as regards the ascertainment of the true Dominion or Indian opinion than to be guided by them, accepting and considering all the suggestions that they make? We finally rejoiced to find that they were in accord with us and were able, at the vote, to support the whole of the Protocol. I have already referred to the opinion of Sir Robert Borden, and will not do so again, but I must add that if the Protocol were represented to the Dominions in the same light as it was represented in the statement of Mr. Chamberlain at Geneva, I cannot imagine any of them giving other than a negative answer.
There is one point upon which I want the noble and learned Viscount to give me an answer. Will he lay upon the Table, or supply publicly in whatever may be the right form, all the negotiations which have passed between the present Government
668
and the Dominions and India upon this point? It is no good merely seeing the answer to a letter. That brings nothing to one's mind. It all depends upon what the question is that was asked and the way in which the matter was brought to their notice.
I must refer also quite shortly to one or two other points, because so much weight has been laid upon them. It is said, quite truly, that some countries are not yet members of the League. That difficulty was present to our minds and it is for that reason that disarmament was relegated to a world conference, where America and Germany and Russia would have the same weight and the same opportunity of expressing their opinions as any other countries. But I should like to say that, when what was called the Treaty of Mutual Assurance was turned down by Germany, Germany proposed a No-War policy almost in terms the same as that which is contained in the Protocol at the present moment—in principle precisely the same—and it was while we were discussing the Protocol and when we knew that this was the opinion of Germany, that Germany made advances, which unfortunately could not be brought to fruition, towards joining the League.
In the same way, take the views of America. If there are two principles which you will find advocated in America they are compulsory arbitration and disarmament. Take the opinion expressed by Mr. Taft, ex-President, or the opinions expressed on the Republican side, or the opinions of Mr. Wilson, of Mr. Davis, or of any of the very numerous religious bodies in America. The one object at which they have always aimed is a No-More-War policy based on compulsory arbitration and disarmament. I have here quotations from America, but having regard to the hour I must ask your Lordships to accept that which I have stated.
There is a further curious incident. It is said that the Protocol stereotypes conditions. There is not a word in the Protocol to support a claim of that sort. Care is taken that there shall be no stereotyping of conditions. But I can go behind a mere matter of words. I am one of those who believe that the conditions left by the so-called Peace Treaties will require revision. There are

669
only two ways in which we can nave revision: first of all by war, which would be an unthinkable evil, and secondly by assent. If you want assent and agreement, you will get it by encouraging the spirit of assent and agreement upon which the whole arrangement proposed by the Protocol is based.
One word only concerning what is known as the Japanese Amendment. I want to make this point quite clear. It is a matter in which I took a very large personal part, in co-operation with Sir Cecil Hurst. The terms ultimately adopted were settled by him and me, and if the document is still in existence it will be found that the draft was drawn by my pencil. This is what was said by Sir Cecil Hurst himself at Geneva, and disposes for ever, I think, of the difficulties of what is called the Japanese Amendment. He said:—
"It is the understanding of the British Delegation in accepting this amendment"—
that is the amendment actually in the Protocol at the present moment—
"that the text now adopted, which it is proposed to add to Article 5, safeguards the right of the Council to take such action as it may deem wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations in accordance with the existing provisions of Article 11 of the Covenant. We accept it because we believe that it does not confer new powers or functions upon either the Council or the Assembly. Those powers are already defined by the Covenant as it exists to-day and we do not add to them by this text."
Everybody knows the eminence of Sir Cecil Hurst. He is also a master of language, and that language expresses our view with admirable clearness, and at the same time disposes of all the objections which were raised, either through misunderstanding or misrepresentation, to what is known as the Japanese Amendment.
We were told, directly and indirectly, by mysterious paragraphs in newspapers and by all the ordinary sources of misinformation, that the Protocol would be buried at Geneva. Well, the burial service ended in a fiasco. The Protocol lives and is to be reconsidered at the next Assembly at Geneva. Whether we are party to it or not, and whether the Assembly will go on with or without us, is a matter for future consideration. I have said more than once that there is nothing sacrosanct in the details of these provisions. On the contrary, I feel quite
670
sure that the document is capable of amendment and improvement. But in the interests of humanity and of everything that is included in the Christian doctrine of brotherhood and fellowship, I urge that if is a fatal error at this stage to condemn the Protocol root and branch. It is an honest attempt, worked out by men who gave, perhaps I may say, twenty-three hours out of the twenty-four for some weeks to start on its course a No-War policy, backed by the unanimous acceptance of the accredited Delegations at Geneva, not acting irresponsibly—that must be put on one side entirely—but acting as the accredited agents of their Governments and carrying out the instructions with which their Governments had entrusted them.
That seems to me to be how the position stands to-day. I wish well of any proposal which may possibly found a peace policy, and lead to the result of abolishing war in the future, but I do say this, that here you have the Protocol unanimously adopted, and whatever adaptation or alteration you may desire, or whatever you may consider possible in the direction of other pacts, I believe that the fundamental propositions in the Protocol are sound, and that if we are to have normal peace in the future it can only be by the institution of an international community, between the members of which disputes shall be settled under a system of law and order and without recourse to the barbarous arbitrament of war.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, no one can complain of the action of the noble and learned Lord in bringing this Question before the House. He took an active and responsible part in the preparation of the Protocol, and it is not surprising that, when it was rejected by His Majesty's present advisers, he should be disappointed, and should take an early opportunity of explaining to Parliament the arguments which weigh with him against that rejection. The noble Lord has indulged in some wide generalities about international solidarity, and matters of that kind, with which I do not propose, to-night, to deal. The field is far too wide for me to enter upon it at this hour, and indeed I shall have somewhat to compress what I have to say about the more concrete points which the noble and learned Lord has made in his speech.

671
I must, however, make one preliminary observation before I endeavour to come to grips with the facts. Some parts of the speech of the noble and learned Lord appeared to mo to suggest that this country, or this Government, is in some way opposed to the principle of arbitration. If the noble and learned Lord, or any one, suggests that, I am sure there is no justification for it. This country, and indeed every Government of this country in turn, has set an example in the matter of arbitration from the day of the "Alabama." case and through subsequent years.
LORD PARMOOR: Universal arbitration!
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: And we have in that matter the best possible record of an evident desire to promote the principle of voluntary arbitration. In the second place, I think my noble friend rather suggested that we were opposed to, or at all events were obstructing, the reduction of armaments. If he suggests that, again I think he is wholly without justification. The Conference at Washington, at which the force in which this country has the greatest possible interest—I mean the Navy—was primarily concerned, and at which the British representatives, including the noble Earl, Lord Balfour—who is absent from his place to-night for a reason which we well know—took a decisive part, is fresh in the memory of all of us.
LORD PARMOOR: If I may interrupt for a moment, what I said was not what the noble and learned Lord suggested, but I was on the question of a world conference.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I was coming to that. A conference on disarmament does not depend in the least upon the adoption of the Protocol. An Article of the Covenant itself contemplates constant efforts by the League and the Council of the League for the reduction of armaments, and it is as much open to the Council to call such a conference together as it would have been if the Protocol had been adopted. It is quite true that there is an Article in the Protocol to the effect that if a conference on disarmament is held, and does not arrive at a satisfactory conclusion, the Council of the League shall declare the Protocol void, but how much
672
simpler it is for the Council of the League first to call a conference on the reduction of armaments, and then proceed to consider whether something in the nature of a Protocol is possible.
We are represented, or at all events the Foreign Secretary is represented, as having said something at Geneva in opposition to the Covenant itself. There is no foundation for any such statement. We are bound by the Covenant. We fully adhere to it. It is not we but the noble and learned Lord and his friends who seek to alter it, and to introduce into it, by means of the Protocol, a number of clauses most of which were fully considered when the Covenant was being initiated, and deliberately rejected. Yet they are revived to-day in the hope of putting them into the Covenant. If, as the noble Lord appeared to suggest in the introduction of his speech, there was nothing in the Protocol which made any great change in the Covenant, I do not think the noble and learned Lord would be so urgent in pressing it upon our attention; but in fact I think I shall be able to show that the Protocol does make serious and substantial changes in the nature and effect of the Covenant itself.
Now let me put aside all exaggerated language and ask, as simply as I can: What was the duty of the Government, when they came into office, with regard to the Protocol? This document was, as the noble and learned Lord has said, adopted by the unanimous vote of the Fifth Assembly, but it was adopted not as an operative instrument, binding upon any Power represented at that Assembly, but as a draft or provisional document for consideration by each Government at home. In fact, I think I am right in saying that the noble Lord, and his colleagues, had instructions from the late Government not to sign the Protocol, in order that it might be open for full consideration when it came over to this country.
LORD PARMOOR: There was no question, of course, of my ever signing it, but so far as the Assembly went the acceptance was complete.
The LORD CHANCELLOR: Will the noble Lord allow me to continue? I am assuming that a general vote of the

673
Assembly was cast for the adoption of the Protocol as a draft or provisional instrument. But, however that may he, it is quite plain that Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and his colleagues must have examined this document when it came home, and, if they found it unsuitable to the policy of this country, they must have rejected it, just as they examined and rejected last year the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, which had, in the same manner, been adopted at Geneva. The destiny of this country depended, I think, on the Government in power, whatever it might be, taking the right course on this matter, and I think our duty was absolutely clear.
First, it was surely the duty of the Government to consult our military and naval and air experts, as to the effect which the Protocol would have upon the defence of this country and of our Empire. For, after all, in spite of the generalities of the noble Lord, we have to consider the interests and the safety of our own land. I am somewhat surprised that no such consultation took place at the time when the Protocol was being negotiated. That doubtless would have been done by the late Government, had they remained in power, before they advised the ratification of the Protocol. At all events, we did, through the Committee of Imperial Defence, consult our experts, and they all of them condemned the Protocol, and their reasoning and their representations convinced us that the effect of this document would be to diminish the effectiveness for defence of our naval and military forces and, before long, to compel an increase, and not a reduction, of those forces. Were we to disregard their advice?
Secondly, it was our duty to consult the Governments of the responsible Dominions. The noble Lord has said—and, of course, I take it as absolutely true—that the representatives of the Dominions who were present at the Assembly of the League were favourable to the adoption of the Protocol. But, after all, they had no power whatever to hind their Governments at home, and I doubt whether they had time to obtain full instructions from their Governments. At all events they, like the other delegates present, only approved the Protocol as an instrument to be submitted to the Governments of the States concerned for
674
adoption or for rejection, as the case might be. The noble Lord says: What more could be done? Well, what more could be done was this. We could consult the Governments themselves, and we did so, and, speaking broadly, with only one exception, I think—that of the Irish Free State—all the Dominion Governments disapproved the Protocol and advised that we should not accept or ratify it. Again, were we to disregard advice and opinion of that kind?
We did more. We considered, as we were bound to consider, the Protocol itself, clause by clause. Time does not allow me to attempt a detailed criticism of the several clauses of this instrument, but I should like to call the attention of the House to a few of its features. First, Articles 2 to 6 introduced the principle of compulsory arbitration—compulsory arbitration, as the noble Lord pointed out, on all points, even on the point whether the subject-matter of a dispute was, or was not, a matter of domestic concern; compulsory arbitration either through the Permanent Court of International Justice or through arbitrators selected, in default of agreement, by the Council of the League. That principle of compulsory arbitration is new in a document of this kind, and has always been rejected, not only by this country, but by the United States, which has always been favourable to arbitration as a principle. Indeed, I think I am right in saying it was condemned only last year in this House in a speech made by the noble Lord's Leader, the noble and learned Viscount who leads the Labour Party here. I am, and I think most of us are, strongly in favour of arbitration on all points which are suitable for arbitration.
But there are some matters—matters affecting the honour and the existence of a country—which are not suitable to be dealt with in that way, and which, I believe, no great Power, except under great pressure of circumstances, would agree to submit in all cases to arbitration. I do not think it would be safe for this country to give up its freedom by-agreeing in advance to submit all disputes which may arise to the arbitration either of the Council of the League or of persons selected by that Council.
Let me refer your Lordships to Article 7 of the Protocol, which provides

675
that in the event of a dispute between any of the Signatory States, they will not, pending arbitration,
"make any increase of their armaments or effectives which might modify the position established by the Conference for the Reduction of Armaments,.! nor will they take any measure of military, naval, air, industrial or economic mobilisation, nor, in general, any action of a nature likely to extend the dispute or render it more acute."
Just see what that means. It means that if one Power is the aggressor and the other is in danger of attack, and if the aggressor so disposes his forces that he can make an immediate attack on the other and unprepared Power, the danger of war is there, but you forbid the attacked party, even though not the aggressor in fact, to make any preparation for defence, to move a company of troops or a ship, to get ready to resist the aggression which is threatened. Under that Article the Power whose liberty is in danger, which is liable to immediate attack, cannot move a man or a ship without becoming, under the provisions of this document, the aggressor in the dispute, and open to all the severe sanctions which are provided in it.
Take another point. Take our own Empire. Our ships are scattered over the seas. This means that if we have a dispute with any Power we cannot move a ship to the point of danger. We must leave them perhaps days or weeks away in point of time, and we cannot even take the elementary measures which, time after time, we have taken. I do not wonder that this was severely criticised by the experts whom it was our duty to consult.
Now consider the later clauses of the Protocol, especially those following Article 13. In my view the document multiplies the occasions for dispute and for the use of what are called the sanctions—sanctions which, as I think I shall be able to show in a moment, may even lead to war. In this document there are new offences—failure to arbitrate, movement of troops, and many more things which, of themselves, are treated as breaches of the Covenant and as bringing into operation these sanctions. So we would have not less but more occasions on which sanctions may be brought into operation and, when they are brought into operation, this document greatly intensifies the conflict which will arise.
676
The Covenant rested, not wholly but mainly, on what are called economic and financial sanctions. But even the Covenant went very far, because Article 16 provides that—
"Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles XII, XIII, or XV, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and"—
mark this—
"the prevention of all financial, commercial, or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not."
So that we are to prevent intercourse between the Covenant-breaking State and neutral countries. The Article goes on to state—
"It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the Covenants of the League."
So that even the Covenant itself contemplated in terms the use of armed forces.
But the Protocol goes considerably further. Article 10 provides that:—
"Every State which resorts to war in violation of the undertakings contained in the Covenant or in the present Protocol is an aggressor."
Article 11 provides—
"As soon as the Council has called upon the signatory States to apply sanctions, as provided in the last paragraph of Article 10 of the present Protocol, the obligations of the said States, in regard to the sanctions of all kinds mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 16 of the Covenant"—
I agree that refers to Article 16, including the naval and military sanctions in Article 16—
"will immediately become operative in order that such sanctions may forthwith be employed against the aggressor.
"Those obligations shall be interpreted as obliging each of the signatory States to co-operate loyally and effectively in support of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and in resistance to any act of aggression, in the degree which its geographical position and its particular situation as regards armaments allow."

677
Your Lordships will see what that means in the next paragraph—
"In accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 16 of the Covenant the signatory States give a joint and several undertaking to come to the assistance of the State attacked or threatened, and to give each other mutual support by means of facilities and reciprocal exchanges as regards the provision of raw materials and supplies of every kind, opening of credits, transport and transit, and for this purpose to take all measures in their power to preserve the safety of communications by land and sea of the attacked or threatened State."
If that does not mean war against the country attacked and neutral States I do not know what war means
Take, next, Article 13 which makes the thing as clear as it can be. We are told there are none but economic sanctions in the Covenant but the terms of this Article are these—
"In view of the contingent military, naval and air sanctions provided for by Article 16 of the Covenant and by Article 11 of the present Protocol, the Council shall be entitled to receive undertakings from States determining in advance the military, naval and air forces which they would be able to bring into action immediately to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations in regard to sanctions which result from the Covenant and the present Protocol.
"Furthermore, as soon as the Council has called upon the signatory States to apply sanctions, as provided in the last paragraph of Article 10 above, the said States may, in accordance with any agreements which they may previously have con-eluded, bring to the assistance of a particular State, which is the victim of aggression, their military, naval and air forces."
I challenge contradiction of the statement that these Articles show an intention to call upon and require the signatory States to come to the assistance of the League, by means of their naval, military and air forces, and that the result of so doing must needs be to put this country, or any country signatory to the Covenant which is called upon to attack in that way, in a state of war, not only with the State which is deemed to have offended, but with all those, other neutral States which do not choose to break off intercourse with that State. I see in those Articles a great danger, a real danger that the result of them may be not peace, but war.
Remember that there are signatory States all over the world. You may have a dispute breaking out in Eastern Europe,
678
or in the Far East, or in South America, or even between the United States, not a member of the League, and some other Power. It may be the view of the Council of the League that one of the States engaged in the dispute is wrong and the other is right, and. we shall be compelled under this Protocol to accept that decision, although we have but one seat on the Council, and by that means we may be involved in hostilities of the most serious nature. Further, that may happen without the sanction of Parliament. It is rather strange that the Party of the noble and learned Lord, which claims to be a democratic Party, should propose to enter into an undertaking the effect of which, if it is signed, would be to withdraw from Parliament the power to declare or not to declare war, as the case may be.
There is only one other article in the Protocol to which I should like to draw attention; that is Article 14, which is in these terms:—
"The Council shall alone be competent to declare that the application of sanctions shall cease and normal conditions be re-established."
In other words, we cannot put an end to a state of war except with the sanction of the Council of the League. I call that a monstrous provision, because it withdraws from the Government of this country and from Parliament the right to be free in making peace.
Is there not some ground here for thinking that this document, if assented to by this country, would not really ensure peace, but might be a means of bringing about war? In support of that view I would like to read what was said by M. van Karnebeek, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs. In a recent speech he is reported to have said:
"His own preference had always been for the development of the League of Nations in such a way that the coercive element should not become the axis round which the whole system would revolve. The system of the Protocol was a move in the direction of force, and His Excellency feared that, if the League was to derive its authority from coercion, the strength and prestige which it derive from the consciousness of justice, which should be its principal foundation, might perhaps be weakened."
The fact is this Protocol, as has been said, marks the parting of the ways.
I have always been a supporter of the Loague of Nations as a body which, by mediation and by peaceful means, might,

679
time after time, prevent the breaking out of war, and I sincerely believe that in that direction it has already done excellent work. But if you are going to abandon that view of the League of Nations, and to exalt it into a body that can bring in armed forces, and by those armed forces seek to compel peace, then you are entering upon a road the end of which you cannot foresee.
If that was our view of the Protocol, it was surely right that we should not keep the other States in suspense as to the action which this country would take. It would not have been a wise and right course for us to delay any announcement, or to endeavour to tinker with an instrument which, in its essence, we felt we were bound to reject. Nor do I think it would have been any good to proceed with the appointment, to which my noble friend referred, of a member on the proposed Committee which was to amend the Covenant by reference to a document which we did not propose to accept. I am sure we did the right thing in saying at once, and clearly, that we could not approve the Protocol, and would seek some other road to attain the object. That was the view which Mr. Chamberlain took at Geneva.
I think too little attention may have been paid to the concluding sentence of the declaration which was made by the Foreign Secretary at Geneva. He pointed out, as an alternative to the adoption of the Protocol, the possibility of the conclusion, in concert with our Allies, of one of those regional arrangements which are contemplated by the Covenant itself—arrangements of a purely defensive character, entered into and worked in harmony with the League. I have no time, nor is this the occasion, on which to develop that suggestion, but I have ventured to call your Lordships' attention to what the Foreign Secretary said in that connection. For myself I cherish an earnest hope that it may be the duty of this Government not to pledge this country to police the world, but, by some prudent and well-considered step, taken nearer home and within the range of our resources, to make some progress towards establishing a feeling of real security. With regard to Papers, I have only to say that I am afraid there are no Papers which can, in accordance with precedent
680
and the interests of the public, be laid at the present time. I hope that the noble Lord will be satisfied with my assurance on that point, and will not press for Papers.
LORD PARMOOR: My Lords, of course I will not press the Motion for the production of Papers after what the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack has stated, but I should like to say one or two words in reference to what he said about the detailed provisions of the Protocol. I said at the outset that I did not propose to go into the detailed provisions and I only propose to say a word upon them at the present moment. While we were at Geneva we had a special representative sent to us from the Navy. We met the objections. Mr. Henderson, my colleague, explained more fully than I did, because he took the leading part in the Commission, why their views as regards Articles 7 and 8 were not justified. I have always felt as regards Articles 7 and 8 that, if they are capable of the interpretation which has been suggested, they ought certainly to be modified in the sense of it being made quite clear that they could not have any such interpretation.
The idea that the League, or the Council of the League, has armed forces at its disposal is quite a fallacy, if I may say so with respect to the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack. It was made quite clear, I think, in what I stated that any suggestion of an executive force being at the disposal of the League or the Council of the League was a complete misunderstanding. What, in fact, is done is something very different indeed. It is this. Members of the League undertake to support the Covenant of the League in reference to which they have undertaken obligations. What is called the economic section and the military section both exist in the Covenant, and exist at the present moment. All those fears which the noble and learned Viscount has suggested are fears which arise in connection with obligations that we have already undertaken, in terms, in the provisions of the Covenant itself, and what we desired to do in the Protocol was to reduce those commitments to a minimum.
When the noble and learned Viscount says they go direct to the question of

681
disarmament, well and good. If that could be done, I should be an ardent supporter, but I do not think it can be done. It can only be done through the medium of the League and on the terms and conditions to which the Assembly itself has assented. That, of course, is the method of the Protocol. I do not want to go into other matters, except this: that it surely is a fundamental error, having regard to the terms of the Covenant, to suggest that a scheme, the objective of which is disarmament, will increase the risk of war or the size of armaments. Those are the two points to which the noble and learned Viscount referred. I do not wish to reargue this
682
question at this time of night. The matter has been well put by Lord Buckmaster and Sir Frederick Pollock when they said that the fears expressed are entirely unfounded. I hope it will never be thought that these difficulties, if they arise at all, arise from the Protocol. They are fundamentally existent in the conditions of the Covenant itself. I thank the Lord Chancellor for the very courteous reply he has given me, and I hope that as the matter is better understood opinion will rally strongly in favour of the Protocol.
House adjourned at twenty minutes before eight o'clock.