HL Deb 11 March 1925 vol 60 cc459-75

THE DUKE OF SUTHERLAND rose to ask His Majesty's Government if they are satisfied with the present rate of increase of the Air Force as laid down by the Secretary of State for Air in 1923, in view of the fact that it will take twenty years at the present rate to bring our Air Force to the level of the French Air Force, or whether they are relying on a World Disarmament Conference at a future date to make any further increase unnecessary; and to move for Papers.

The noble Duke said: My Lords, in rising to put this Question to-day I should like to make it perfectly clear that there is no intention whatever on my part of making any criticism of the Air Ministry or the work they have done during the last four or five months they have been in office. On the other hand, I cannot speak too highly of the admirable way in which the Secretary of State for Air and the Under-Secretary for Air have steered their way through numerous difficulties and pitfalls during their short term of renewed office. At the same time, there are so many aspects and so many angles from which we must regard the complicated position of this country in regard to air matters that the more those questions are considered from every side the better, and the more chance we have of clearly foreseeing the future and providing against those great dangers and emergencies which we hope may never arise.

The Secretary of State for Air, in another place only a few days ago, in his interesting speech on the Air Estimates told us that we were in a minority to the French Air Force of one to three, and I should like to make it clear and plain here and now that I quote the French Air Force only because it is the largest Air Force in the world, and not because I believe that, by any remote contingency, could we ever pick a quarrel with our old friends, our dear neighbours and our firm Allies, the French nation. The strength of the French Army Air Force at the present moment is—In France itself, 106 squadrons; and overseas in the French Dependencies, 26 squadrons. In addition to this, they have five naval air squadrons, four of which are stationed in home waters, and also a small Colonial Air Service.

Their total strength at the present moment, both in France and overseas, is 140 squadrons, of which 110 are in France and 30 overseas. In addition to this there are other squadrons in course of formation, the number of which is unknown. Your Lordships may be aware that there are nine aeroplanes in a French squadron instead of twelve, as in our own, and consequently the total number of machines ready for service in France at the present moment is, so far as I can judge, 990, and the total number of machines overseas is 270. Looking at the financial side of the French Air Force, we find that their Budget for Air Services has been constantly increasing during the last three years. In 1922 the French Budget of expenditure on the Air Force was 211,000,000 francs; in 1923–4, they were spending 313,000,000 francs; and last year, 1924–5, they spent no less than 442,000,000 francs. Your Lordships will see, therefore, that there has been a constantly increasing expenditure during the last three years.

Let us compare, for a moment, the French Air Force with our own Air Force —as to which the Secretary of State for Air has already told us that we are in a minority of three to one. In our own Air Force at the end of this year, I understand that we shall have 26 squadrons on a war footing for home defence, and, as I have mentioned, each of our squadrons is composed of twelve machines instead of nine, as in the French Air Force. Our total force for home defence, therefore, at the end of this year will be 312 machines, compared with the 990 machines of the French Army Air Service. I know that it has been said in some quarters, and possibly with truth, that the quality of our pilots and machines is very high and compares favourably with the quality of the pilots and machines of other nations; none the less the disparity in numbers is a very large one, and I personally think that it is a very grave one. It will take us a considerable number of years to build up to the French programme at the present rate of expansion—that is to say, if the French do not increase their programme; I do not know whether they will or not. I calculate that at the present rate it will take until 1936 to get up to 40 regular air squadrons, which will not even then, after eleven years, amount to half the present French Air Force as it exists to-day.

This means that we cannot reach a one-Power standard for many years, although the one-Power standard was laid down by the Conservative Government in 1923 as an essential and ultimate aim. Only last year, when in Opposition, the Conservative Party moved Resolutions in both Houses demanding that we should be provided with a Home Defence Air Force of sufficient strength to give adequate protection against aerial attack by the strongest Air Force within striking distance of these shores. I submit that 312 aeroplanes could not give adequate protection against a force of 990 machines, whatever might be the quality of the pilots or the machines. Nor does this Force of 312 machines look to me like coming for many years up to the one-Power standard laid down originally as the aim of the Conservative Government. It will take at least eleven years at the present rate of increase before we have even forty squadrons.

To my mind, therefore, there are three distinct courses open to His Majesty's Government, upon one of which they must decide in the near future. The first course would be the acceleration of the building and training programme of the present Air Force so as to bring us level with the French Air Force at an earlier date. If this course is adopted by His Majesty's Government extra expense will naturally be involved, but I hope that this would be saved by economies in other Services. It has been said in certain quarters that the acceleration of the expansion scheme of the Air Force is difficult, if not impossible, owing to the time that it takes to train pilots and mechanics, to build machines and otherwise to hurry on a scheme of this kind. This is undoubtedly a difficulty, and the French nation have a great advantage, over us in this respect, on account of conscription and the possession of conscript Armies upon which they can draw at any time and at small cost for all the needs of their Air Service. It is a significant fact, however, that during the war, in a sudden grave emergency, it was found possible to increase the Air Force at a much greater rate than at the present day. At the end of the war, for instance, the Royal Air Force had over 22,000 machines in hand, and at that time the country was producing no fewer than 90 aeroplanes a day. I believe, therefore, that the acceleration of the expansion programme is quite possible, even in face of the difficulties which I have mentioned.

There is a second course before His Majesty's Government, and that is to establish a permanent Security Pact with France, covering our aerial security, while we on our side, with our Navy, could secure the position of France on the seas and guarantee her support in the event of invasion from the East. That course would have the objectionable feature of making us dependent upon another Power, however friendly that Power may be, for our aerial strength and other difficulties may arise in this direction and in regard to this course. It may be necessary that other countries should be included in such a Pact, and I shall say no more on this point because, as your Lordships know, the Foreign Secretary is at the present moment in Geneva. I can only add that we all wish him every possible success.

There is one further course that His Majesty's Government might adopt, and that is the course of a World Disarmament Conference, which must include America and would probably be held at Washington. I know that there are difficulties in regard to this course, also. We have the difficulties of including the aerial arm in a disarmament scheme, because it is very difficult, as your Lordships know, to differentiate between civil passenger machines and machines that might be converted into a military bombing type. In fact, it is almost impossible to prevent ships being built for passenger carrying which might ultimately be converted into bombing machines in time of war. I know there is that difficulty, but nevertheless I believe that some way could be found to surmount it with the good will of all concerned, and without damaging to any extent civil aviation, which is a very important factor. It is not for me to say which of these three courses the Government might or should adopt. A Disarmament Conference at Washington, if successful, would have the advantage of reducing the terrible burden on the taxpayer that these large armaments must always imply and are at the present moment implying. Whether these courses are possible or not, or whichever course His Majesty's Government may find themselves in a position to pursue, I do think that the British public do not fully realise how our position strategically has altered during the last few years. From an air point of view the English Channel no longer exists, and we have, instead, become a Continental nation. We must therefore order ourselves aerially as a Continental nation must.

While other nations continue to arm we must also arm, and we must have an Air Force commensurate with our position as the headquarters of a great Empire. If other nations agree to disarm we can do the same; or, if this is not possible, an alliance with other European nations may become a possible solution. In any case, and whatever happens, we must pay for our Air Force per machine and per man more than other countries which have conscription, and, therefore, if we are forced in proportion to other countries to increase our Air Force as they increase theirs, we must find some way of reducing the cost of other forces in this country that are not so essential, under modern conditions, to our very life and existence as a great State. Bombing on a large scale was only in its infancy during the last few months of the war. Systematic bombing, brought up to date, would make life in crowded industrial centres of this little island unthinkable and impossible. It might even, under conceivable conditions, force a premature and humiliating peace on the Government through the panic pressure of a terror-stricken populace. I beg to move.

THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY)

My Lords, in the first place may I express to my noble friend the noble Duke, our grateful thanks for the kind words which he has spoken of my colleagues who are at the Air Ministry at the present moment. I do not know that it is always very becoming for one colleague to utter eulogies of another, but I think I may say that I share fully the admiration which my noble friend has expressed for the work of my right hon. friend and his Air Board during the last few months, and indeed during other months when e was in office before. I welcome the observations from my noble friend, because I am aware that he has special knowledge of this subject. He has himself been at the Air Ministry, and therefore, when he speaks to your Lordships, he speaks as one who knows about the subject which he is discussing.

My noble friend has expressed, as I think he has before expressed to your Lordships' House, his apprehension at the position of the British Air Force at the present moment, and I will not go so far—by no means—as to say that it is yet satisfactory. At the same time, I think my noble friend and the House ought to take account of the progress made during the last two years. That has been very considerable, and I am not quite sure from the figures which he gave whether my noble friend has appreciated the full significance of the progress which has been made. In August, 1922, for home defence purposes, we had only three squadrons. That was the condition of destitution in which this country stood in respect of its defending Air Force—three squadrons, perhaps of twelve machines each, or thirty-six machines in all. At that time there was authorised, but not built, an addition of fifteen squadrons, and since that date those fifteen squadrons have been made good, so that instead of having three squadrons at the present moment, we have eighteen squadrons. The programme of the financial year 1925–26 will add eight more squadrons to the eighteen, making twenty-six in all.

I pause for a moment to remind your Lordships of the standard at which we are aiming. That standard is contained in words which I think the noble Duke quoted, or partly quoted, and which form part of a statement made by the present Prime Minister—it was not a Party pronouncement; it was a pronouncement which I believe was welcomed in every part of the House. I pause to remind your Lordships, parenthetically, how important a standard is. You must work to something. It is no good saying: "We will just increase the Air Force; we will do our best," or some vague phrase of that kind. You must work to a standard; otherwise your Ministers and Air officers do not know what they are about. So we have a standard and hero it is:— In addition to meeting the essential air power requirement" of the Navy, Army, Indian and Overseas commitments, British air power must include a Home Defence Air Force of sufficient strength adequately to protect us against air attack by the strongest Air Force within striking distance of this country. That was the standard, and immediately afterwards followed words interpreting that standard in figures:— In the first instance the Home Defence Force should consist of fifty-two squadrons, to be created with as little delay as possible. As I have just pointed out, we shall have achieved by the end of the current financial year twenty-six squadrons; that is, exactly half the standard at which we pre provisionally aiming. That is a very considerable advance upon three squadrons. I think your Lordships ought to realise that a great deal has already been done.

What of the immediate future beyond the present financial year? I think my noble friend there took much too gloomy a view. And I would like to remind your Lordships that in the making of these preparations, building the machines, creating the personnel, events move much more rapidly towards the close of the period than they do at the beginning. As the thing develops it develops increasingly fast, so that the last part of the programme of fifty-two squadrons will be carried out in a much shorter time than the first part—that is, the twenty-six squadrons. We have a confident hope that the fifty-two squadrons will be created by the end of 1929; that is to say, in four years, or between four and five years, from now. That is a very considerable achievement, and I think my noble friend will agree that any one listening to his speech would not have realised that we were likely to make such progress as that.

I would like your Lordships to remember that a squadron is not quite a precise term. It has different meanings in different countries. The French squadrons, for example, are nine machines strong; British squadrons are twelve machines strong. Therefore, when I say fifty-two squadrons, I mean something over 600 machines. That will be the strength, as we hope and believe, of the Home Defence Air Force by the end of 1929. I hope your Lordships will believe that the preparations which the Ministry are making are not confined merely to the creation of these squadrons. All the necessary equipment on the ground, the necessary stations, aerodromes, etc., have of course been contemplated at the same moment. And even in the present year large sums of money are being taken in the Estimates in order to provide stations and also to develop the training establishment at Halton, so important for the perfection of the skilled mechanics. That is a very large effort, and I am always afraid when I am discussing these matters that in precisely the proportion in which I comfort the heart of the noble Duke I may alarm the susceptibilities of the economists who sit on the opposite side of the House. I shall be very glad, therefore, if your Lordships would realise that, whilst we are making this great effort, we are not blind to the necessity of making whatever economies are possible in the circumstances.

I am especially interested in one development which is going on at this moment—namely, the creation of a certain number of the squadrons which I have mentioned upon a non-Regular basis. There are to be Special Reserve squadrons, and there are to be Auxiliary Force squadrons. The phrase must not be interpreted too literally, but they correspond in a certain degree to the conditions of service with which we have been familiar in the Special Reserve and Territorial Force infantry for so many years; that is to say, that alongside of the Regular squadrons there are to be a certain number which will have personnel serving upon a Militia engagement, or upon a Territorial Force engagement, as the case may be. It is only a beginning. We hope, to start with, to make two Special Reserve squadrons and four Auxiliary Force squadrons. Besides that every effort will be made to use civilian personnel where it can be employed. There are a good many non-technical departments in the Regular squadrons which can be manned by civilians, and this will involve, I hope, a considerable economy.

I have described to your Lordships the strength and certain conditions of the Home Defence Air Force. I quoted the words:— British air power must include a Home Defence Air Force of sufficient strength adequately to protect us against air attack by the strongest Air Force within striking distance of this country. That is the standard. My noble friend who has just sat down has spoken of our great friend and Ally, the French Republic, with, I think, a very proper respect, and, if one has to speak of France in this connection, it is only because she has the strongest Air Force within striking distance of this country. Really, it is hardly necessary to say that there can never be, as between ourselves and our French friends, any idea of friction. We have no aggressive designs, indeed, in any part of the world, but certainly not against these intimate Allies. Your Lord ships will remember that a few nights ago we were discussing the question of Singapore, and my noble friend Lord Balfour pointed out how very absurd it was to contemplate any aggression as between this country and Japan on the sea, and I need not say it is even more ludicrous to contemplate any aggression as between this country and the United States on the sea. And yet, when we are talking of the Navy, and the necessary equipment and bases of the Navy, we have to mention the parts of the world where these things become material; otherwise we should have no standard to which to work. It is in exactly the same way that we speak of France when we are talking of the Air Force and in no other way than that; it is merely because she furnishes the strongest example of an Air Force within striking distance of this country.

Let me look, for a moment, at the French provision, because it formed the subject of a large part of my noble friend's speech and, indeed, of the terms of his Motion. What is the French strength at this moment? If you take their first-line independent Air Force alone, that which corresponds to our Home Defence Force, they have in Europe 600 first-line machines in that independent Air Force. My noble friend quoted larger figures, but he was misled I think, because he counted all the machines which he mentioned as if they were all fighting machines. That is not the case. If you take the fighting and bombing machines alone of the independent Air Force in France you will find that they have 600 machines.

I do not want to over-state the case. If I left exactly as they are those figures of 600 machines in France and twelve times fifty-two machines in England, your Lordships might imagine that we expected actually to have achieved equality in 1920 as between the two countries. That would not be an accurate conclusion, and I think my noble friend is aware of that. He pointed out that in addition to the independent Air Force in either country there are machines which are attached in either case to the Army and the Navy—what are called Army co-operation machines, or Navy co-operation machines. If you take the Army and Navy co-operation machines in the case of France and the Army and Navy co-operation machines in the case of our own country, you will find that the French have, or will have even in 1929, a very considerable superiority in numbers.

As a matter of fact, it does not follow because you have Army co-operation machines that those machines will be available to act with your Home Defence Air Force. They have their Army duties. It may be that they will be entirely occupied with their Army duties; but, undoubtedly, if you want a true picture of the state of the case you must take into account not only the Home Defence Air Force but the co-operating machines. I admit that in point of pure numbers the French would still have a very considerable superiority. Therefore, I do not want your Lordships to think that the Government, even on their programme, are aiming an inch further than they are bound to aim if they are to achieve anything like their object.

Moreover, there are other small considerations. It may be that the other Powers will add to their Air Forces, and that when we achieve our end in 1929 we shall find that they are stronger than they are now. There is no immediate prospect of it, but that might be the case. It must be remembered also that not only have we fewer in numbers but some of our squadrons are serving upon a non-Regular basis, as I have already pointed out to your Lordships. At the same time, I think, and the Air Ministry are of the same opinion, that when we have achieved the programme which is to be completed by 1929, taking all the circumstances of the case into consideration, though we shall not have achieved anything like parity with the strongest Air Power, yet the Force we shall have as a Home Defence Force will be of sufficient strength adequately to protect us. It will not be more than sufficient, but just sufficient.

It will not be anything extravagant, nothing which we might be expected to aim at were we a military Power, but just about sufficient adequately to protect us. That is our limited, sober aim, and that is the end which we believe we shall achieve. I think, therefore, your Lordships may rest assured that the rather gloomy picture which the noble Duke painted is not to be entirely accepted, and that, though by 1029 we shall have transformed entirely the very sinister situation which existed in 1922, we shall not have done more than just enough adequately to protect us against the strongest Air Power within striking distance of this country.

Having painted his rather gloomy picture, my noble friend went on to discuss various ways in which a remedy could be applied, and he mentioned, among other things, a Disarmament Conference. After what I have said perhaps it is not necessary for me to go any further, but I think I should leave a wrong impression if I were not to say what I have said previously from this box—that there is no country in the world more anxious to limit armaments than this country. Anything that we can do to limit armaments, whether they be upon the ground—in the Army, that is—or in the air, we shall only be too ready to agree to. I am sure your Lordships will not expect me to say anything about the negotiations which are in progress at this moment. They are matters of international discussion while I am speaking. But if it does not happen now, whenever we get an opportunity of agreeing to international arrangements under which armaments may be limited, this Government will be the first to embrace it. I hope that your Lordships will consider that I have done something to reassure the House about the condition of our Air Force.

LORD GORELL

My Lords, I am sure we shall all agree at any rate with one statement which fell from the noble Marquess in reply to the noble Duke—that the position could not be regarded as other than unsatisfactory. That is a word which has different meanings in different minds, and I do not know that what he said can remain other than rather unsatisfactory to this side of the House. As the noble Marquess justly said, the noble Duke drew a "gloomy picture." But it is not a new picture, and though I listened with great attention to the speech of the noble Duke, I do not think anything fell from him which had not been the subject of more than one debate in your Lordships' House in the last two or three years. When I lead the Question which the noble Duke had placed upon the Paper, I confess I was not altogether clear as to the object he had in mind and, having listened to his speech, I remained in some considerable doubt. It seemed that the noble Duke was pressing that this country should immediately raise its Air Force to the strength of the French Air Force; but he did not specifically say so; indeed, he kept rather clear throughout the whole of his speech of any indication as to what he himself would have wished.

THE DUKE OF SUTHERLAND

I think I made it quite clear that the Government should take one of three courses—(1) accelerate our building and training programme; (2) establish a permanent mutual Security Pact with France; or (3) there should be a World Disarmament Conference.

LORD GORELL

The noble Duke also specifically said that he was not going to say what his view was as to which of those three courses should be taken, and the noble Marquess, in replying, also left it lather uncertain as to what his view was; in fact, it seemed that the noble Marquess found himself somewhat in the same difficulty as that with which he twitted me as being in two years ago. It is a difficulty which must always confront any one who speaks on this subject, the difficulty of balancing the two feet with equal strenth upon the two pillars of defence and economy. The noble Marquess stated that what he was going to say as to the increase of the Air Force, though it might give satisfaction from the point of view of defence, would not give satisfaction to those who sit on these Benches in respect of economy. The noble Marquess, in fact, devoted his speech to the question of defence and to the measures which have been taken to increase the Air Force. I do not think, except in the respect of the latest explanation of those figures that he gave, that he was able to add anything new to what was understood when the increase was first announced, and the whole of his speech was based upon the presumption that there would be no corresponding increase in the Air Forces of other countries; or if there was, that then this country would once again have to follow in their step.

There are two or three aspects of this matter. If that is the correct interpretation of the noble Marquess's speech, we are once again face to face with that race of armaments to which, when the subject was debated two years ago, the noble Viscount, Lord Grey of Fallodon, referred in most moving terms that must be within the recollection of those of your Lordships who heard them. The noble Viscount then asked the same question as the noble Earl, the Earl of Oxford and Asquith, asked the other day in another connection—namely, in what direction this country, and indeed the world, was tending. The noble Marquess, in emphasising the increase which the Government is giving to the Air Force, hardly dealt with that side of the question at all. He referred, very briefly and vaguely towards the conclusion of his speech, to the sincere desire of this Government to limit armaments, and said that he had no more to say upon that subject. But that is exactly the position which was taken by the Conservative Government two years ago, when this question was debated and a Motion was moved. Although the increase then projected of the Air Force was recognised as being necessary, never the less there was great feeling that some step must be taken to bring the consciousness of the world to the fact that all nations were going in again for a race of armaments which, as has been said over and over again, and was justly referred to by the noble Duke, are of a kind very much more deadly than anything hitherto known in the history of civilisation. One need not mention again the certainty that raids and bombing will be continuous in future wars, or dwell on the terrors of future air war.

Merely to be told, as we have been told so often on this question, that this country is very anxious to limit armaments, and that no country is more anxious, does not carry the question one degree further than it was. I must remind the noble Marquess that on the occasion, two years ago, when I moved a Resolution asking the Government to take steps to bring about consideration as to how far air armaments should be limited, he at once objected to the inclusion of the words "immediate steps," saying that it was unfair to press the Conservative Government of that day so strictly as to include such a word as "immediate." I thereupon offered, in the hope of gaining general agreement, to alter the word "immediate" to the words "at the earliest opportunity." The noble Marquess would not even have those words, and therefore, when a Government declares itself most anxious to limit armaments and at the same time rejects a Motion asking it to take into consideration haw air armaments can be best limited at the earliest opportunity, one is entitled to feel that we are still only in the region of words. If the noble Marquess sincerely and truly means, as one has no doubt he does, that no country is more anxious than this to go into the question of limitation of armaments, why cannot this country take the initiative? Why must we always wait until the Government decides that a favourable opportunity is created elsewhere? Everyone knows how extraordinarily difficult it is to limit air armaments without at the same time putting obstacles in the way of the development of civil aviation. I think most of us agree that in the development of civil aviation there is yet one more chain of intercommunication which will have the effect of improving knowledge, promoting intercourse, and encouraging peace.

At the same time, there are avenues which it is well worth exploring to see how far air armaments can be limited, and one of those avenues is that just touched upon by the noble Duke. I refer to the question of the pilots. It was stated by the Italian representative on the sub-committee of the Washington Conference that this suggestion was well worth being looked into to see how far, by international agreement, some arrangement could be made by which a limitation was placed upon the training of war pilots. I had hoped, as that had already been brought up in a Question in your Lordships' House, that we might have heard something more definite from the noble Marquess upon it. And there are many other avenues which might have been explored; instead of which we have an account only of the steps which are being taken to increase the Air Force. That alone cannot be satisfactory to us, and I doubt even whether it can be more satisfactory to the noble Duke, because the whole of his speech was outlining the three to one minority, and I am far from clear that the increase which has been mentioned by the noble Marquess will have the effect of wiping that disparity out of the way. I am afraid, therefore, from my point of view at any rate, that I can only regard the two speeches which have been delivered as disappointing. We are no further than we were, and we have to content ourselves with merely vague assurances that the Government is still looking at this question, and will take steps when and if opportunity occurs.

EARL BEAUCHAMP

My Lords, I think those of your Lordships who still remain in the House will agree that we have had a very interesting little discussion on the question of the Air Forces of this country. I congratulate the noble Marquess upon the steps which he has been able to take to reassure the various sections of opinion in this country. For those who are unable to sleep at night when they think of the inadequate forces at the disposal of this country in the matter of the air, what he has said as to the increase will certainly be very reassuring. On the other hand, what he has said as to the anxiety of the Government to do what they can to secure general disarmament in the future is also very reassuring to those who think like myself on this subject. It would be obviously unfair to press him on that point, and the noble Lord who has just spoken will forgive me for saying that, in view of the delicate negotiations which are now taking place at Geneva, it would be unfair to expect the noble Marquess to say more on that subject to-night. I hope that in the course of the next few years, and the sooner the better, there will be an opportunity for the noble Marquess and his Government to act on the lines he has laid down this evening.

The noble Marquess was good enough to refer to those who, like myself, are anxious for economy. I noticed that, quite rightly, he seemed to pay special attention to the Benches from which I have just risen when speaking on this point. The noble Marquess would have been placing your Lordships under a still greater debt of gratitude if he had been able to give us some estimate as to the cost of the increases to which he referred. He gave us the number of machines that were to be added but we did not hear, and we should have been most interested to hear, what the cost is to be. At this time of the year, as Budget day comes nearer, we naturally begin to feel a little more anxious for economy than we are later in the year. I could have wished that there was some hope of the Government setting a very firm limit to the amount of money that is to be spent on the defensive Forces of this country; that they could have said that if more money is to be spent on one arm of the Services then less money must be spent on another; and that the total amount to be spent on the Forces of this country must not go beyond a certain specified and constant amount.

I hope I shall not go beyond what is fitting in following the reference the noble Marquess made to the Air Forces of France. We have every sympathy with France in the great difficulties with which she is confronted. We also are confronted with very great difficulties. We have a large mass of unemployment; and our Air Force is a very small one. We are also faced with the fact that we owe large sums of money to other countries. It is much to our credit that we preferred to pay our debts rather than increase at an undue rate the aerial forces of this country; and I hope we shall have our reward. I cannot refrain from saying that I wish other countries could have followed our example in that respect; that they might have thought it more important to pay their debts rather than increase their Forces at a time when the whole world is anxious for peace of a permanent character. I confess that the expenditure which is foreshadowed by the programme outlined by the noble Marquess seems to me to be very considerable. I deplore it, but I suppose, after all, it is no greater than we should have had had there been no change of Government. The Air Estimates of last year were considerably in excess of those of the year before, and in those circumstances the noble Marquess is more than justified in looking to these Benches as being the only Benches on which a real desire for economy still exists.

THE DUKE OF SUTHERLAND

My Lords, I only desire to say that I am much relieved to hear from the noble Marquess that the Air Force of this country is expected to reach fifty-two squadrons by the year 1929. I am glad indeed that my picture is not such a gloomy one as I imagined it to be. I thank the noble Marquess very much.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.