HL Deb 03 March 1925 vol 60 cc361-76

LORD PARMOOR had given Notice to ask His Majesty's Government whether they can give further information on the subject of the Geneva Protocol in addition to that contained in the answer of the Leader of the House on December 10th of last year. The noble Lord said: My Lords, the Protocol, to which I only wish to refer incidentally on the present occasion, is intended to enable obligations contained in the Treaty to be carried out by both parties. I am sure the noble Marquess the Leader of the House will bear in mind, and I dare say the noble Earl will bear in mind, that there are not only obligations in the Treaty on what I may call the defeated countries—that is, Germany, Bulgaria, Hungary and Austria—but that, by Article. 8, there is a corresponding obligation that all countries within the limits of that Article shall agree if possible, or shall assent, to a reduction in armaments. Therefore, for five years now, one of the main objects of the League and of the Council of the League has been to bring about conditions which will make that disarmament possible. The question which arises, and always will arise in connection with disarmament, is whether a sufficient security has been obtained as regards the normal conditions of peace to allow the provisions of Article 8 to become operative.

I want to direct my Question to two points. When this matter was discussed some time ago in this House the noble Marquess said that the Government were not prepared to give an answer, on two grounds. I think I cover the matters touched on in his answer, but if in any way I have limited them I will at once accept the correction. The first thing was that there had not been time to consider the provisions contained in the Protocol itself. Since that date there have been three months for consideration. It never occurred to me that the Protocol as a document was difficult to interpret or to understand, but since that time there has been ample discussion, and no doubt the noble Marquess is aware of the accurate and careful analysis made by that great international lawyer and jurist, Sir Frederick Pollock. I do not think that he approached the Protocol originally in any specially friendly spirit, but he makes a masterly and accurate analysis, showing what the Protocol does and what little basis there is for many of the suggestions made as to what it is supposed that the Protocol might do. If I might refer to one passage from his analysis it will show what I mean. He says— The risk of a British Fleet or a French Army, not to speak of contingents from the Dominions, being ordered about under some foreign command is fabulous, and not less so because the fable has been accepted by some persons who ought to have known better. We shall see that the Protocol is careful to observe this fundamental denial of any quasi-federal executive power in the Council. I merely quote that because I do not desire to go into matters of that sort in any wide terms on the present occasion.

The other matter which, I admit, does raise considerable difficulty, is the attitude of the Dominions and Dependencies. It seems to be forgotten when this matter is discussed that at every stage in formulating the Protocol the representatives of the Dominions and of India at Geneva were fully consulted, and in many respects their advice was adopted. I do not want to press the matter too far, and also I am cognisant of the fact that, not only as regards the Protocol but as regards the general Imperial relationship between the Mother Country and her Dominions and Dependencies, there are questions pending at the present time which, in the interests of everybody, should, if possible, be finally dealt with on a satisfactory basis.

I should like to say one or two words on some information which has come to me. I have lately been in the East. Eastern opinion appeared to be all in one direction—in favour of the Protocol. I should like to say a word about Australia's attitude, and I will quote from a statement made by Mr. Duncan Hall, who is said to have written the best book which has yet appeared on the constitutional position between a Colony and the Mother Country. What does he state? The outstanding fact is that there is no decisive opinion in Australia on the Protocol. Sensational headlines in a section of the Press, and alarmist statements by an eminent politician with an axe to grind created considerable uneasiness in the early stages of the discussion. But the arrival of full information from Geneva, including the final text of the Protocol, and reassuring statements by responsible persons based on a study of these data, have done much to check apprehension. He ends with these words:— Already one can say with some confidence that the current is setting towards ratification. I do not desire to place too much weight on any one opinion, however well founded, but I think it is a great mistake to approach the Protocol with the idea that there is anything contained in it which either created alarm in our Dominions or which, on the other hand, is other than favourable to them in the security which it gives for the normal conditions of peace.

There are two other extracts to which I should like to refer. The former Conservative Prime Minister of Canada, Sir Robert Borden—I am sure he is an authority whom we should recognise in this country—declared at a meeting of the Canadian League of Nations that he gave his support to the Protocol. That is a very important matter. I admit that it is very difficult to speak with certainty on questions of this kind. In the same way it was argued by Sir Francis Ball at a meeting in New Zealand, over which he presided, that the Protocol should be subjected to some amendment before ratification. No one objects to that; I have often said that the question of amendment should be left open. That meeting carried unanimously a resolution urging that the Protocol be ratified. So that whatever the balance of ultimate opinion in those places may be, and it is as difficult to gauge as the final opinion in our own country, there is a large body of responsible opinion in Canada, Australia and New Zealand, to which I have referred, undoubtedly in favour of the ratification of the principle of the Protocol; and one would expect it to be so. The Protocol is a document which appears to me to be favourable in an extraordinary degree to our Colonial possessions.

There is one more word that I should like to say about Australia. The Chairman of the First Commission which had to deal with very important matters in framing the actual terms of the Protocol, was Sir Littleton Groom. Sir Littleton Groom, who is Attorney-General of the Federal Government of Australia, after full consideration and communication with his Government, assented to the terms of the Protocol and said that he thought they were favourable in regard to the position in Australia. I have not heard that he has said anything since which is out of accord with the opinion he then expressed. I was in intimate association with him for a series of weeks on this point, I saw him every day and every evening, and I feel certain that his mature consideration, on behalf of the Federal Government of Australia, was in favour of the terms of the Protocol, to which he finally gave his assent.

I cannot help recalling another fact in reference to New Zealand. I have quoted the opinion of Sir Francis Bell, but the representative of New Zealand in Geneva was Sir James Allen. When we were discussing the Protocol in its earlier stages—it was necessarily altered and revised many times—there were points in it to which objection was taken on behalf of the Government of New Zealand. Telegraphic communications took place between Sir James Allen and his Government, and Sir James told us in very frank terms that as the Protocol then stood he thought he could not give his assent to it on behalf of New Zealand. Those matters were dealt with. The objections raised by Sir James Allen were met, and after they had been met, he told us in terms, after communicating with his Government, that they were prepared to accept the terms of the Protocol as then arranged; and when the time came he gave his vote, of course, in favour of the acceptance of those terms as they were brought before the Assembly at Geneva.

It seems to be forgotten how much intercommunication there was between the Mother Country and the Dominions and India upon this point. India was specially represented by Lord Hardinge of Penshurst us well as by a very well-known military expert in India, Major-General the Maharajah of Bikaner. I do not think you could have had two more representative members of the delegation or two gentlemen more conversant with conditions in India, and both of them gave their assent to the terms of the Protocol. I do not want to go so far back at the moment, but your Lordships may recollect that when Lord Hardinge returned to this country he sent to the newspapers a warning against the misapprehensions as to some matters which had been sent home, and gave his adhesion to the terms of the Protocol as it existed at that time.

May I turn now to another point, because it will be the shortest way of dealing with this question, and will show how matters stand. I hold in my hand the Report by the right hon. Austen Chamberlain on the Thirty-second Session of the Council of the League of Nations, as to which, I think, a very important point arises, and I hope that the noble Marquess will be able to give me an answer in regard to it. Mr. Chamberlain made it clear that he was merely asking for an adjournment of the last Council meeting as a matter of procedure, and that he was giving no opinion whatever as to the merits of the Protocol either one way or the other. That is entirely in accord with what the noble Marquess said in answer to me. These are the actual words of the Report— In asking for a delay, he wished it to be clear that ho made no declaration and gave no indication of what the ultimate decision of the British Government would be. Therefore, so far as the last Council meeting is concerned, the matter was left at large.

But M. Briand is reported as having made a statement. I admit that I give great weight to M. Briand's statement not only because of his personal knowledge and ripe experience, but because I have the same feeling as that expressed by the noble Earl, that every possible attention, within the limits, of course, of what is right and just to others, on the question of security should be given to the French representatives. The remarkable fact is that at the Assembly itself M. Briand accepted the Protocol as satisfying the French desire for security (which is the main point that we ought to fix in their favour) and there and then said that he would accept the Protocol—I do not think there is ratification in France—on behalf of the French Government as a great document and a great proposal which, in his view, would give the security which all France desired and which would erect an almost insuperable barrier to warfare in future.

What did M. Briand say at the Council meeting? I take this from the Report which has been issued— The French delegate said that it was easily understandable that the British Government should ask for the adjournment of this question, purely for reasons of procedure. There we are all on common ground. The question before the Council at that moment was, therefore, only one of procedure, and concerned the mere adjournment of the question on the agenda of that Session. Then he said something which, to my mind, is very important— The work, however, which had been undertaken had not been discontinued … The Council had undertaken that work on a mandate from the Assembly and not on its own initiative. It had to do it because it had been ordered by the Council to do it, and I want to know what the work was which had been undertaken and had not been discontinued. I ask that question for this reason in particular. When I came back from Geneva I was asked, through the ordinary sources, to nominate a member of the Drafting Committee which, under Article 3 of the Protocol, was to indicate clearly how far the Protocol would introduce amendments in the provisions of the original Covenant.

I nominated a person—of course, I do not give his name—with special knowledge in international matters, a special jurist and draftsman; there can be no question whatever of his capacity for nomination. But before that nomination was made effective the change of Government was brought about, and I want to know whether, in accordance with the request then made, an English representative, a draftsman and international lawyer, has been carrying out this work. It is extremely important. I am afraid that I have read the Protocol so often that it seems to me to be a very easy document to interpret, but it is also, apparently, an easy document to misinterpret. But if you can once have the amendments introduced, by a proper drafting committee, into the Covenant itself—that was the desire of the Council—then it would be clear to everyone whether, and in what respect, there was any difference between the two documents, and the era of speculation—unfortunate speculation, I think—would be closed.

Then M. Briand goes on to say this: And it was contemplated that in March next "— I think the Council meet next Monday. but I am not sure; the noble Viscount would know that— the Council would be able to take up, with a certainty of achieving positive and practical results, the discussion which it thought might be held in the present Session. Is our representative, who I understand will be the Foreign Minister, going to stand aloof, or is he going to take the part and the influence which Great Britain ought to exercise in the work which has "a certainty of achieving positive and practical results"? That is a very concrete question. Are we going to stand aloof? I think there can be no greater misfortune than that Great Britain should stand aloof from a great project of this kind.

It is not that the project itself is so important in one sense, but it is the step, and the only step, which has been at present devised in order to bring about a great world Conference on Disarmament. Are we going to help towards a world Conference on Disarmament, or not? It does not seem to me that the details of the Protocol are of importance for this purpose. If there is a world Conference I have no doubt it will have to be adjusted and reconsidered; because, unless at the world Conference a project of disarmament is generally accepted, the whole matter becomes null and void. Is there any other way of carrying out the obligations of Article 8 of the Covenant except through the process of a world Conference? And if there is to be a world Conference ought it not to be carried out through the agency of the League of Nations? If this opportunity is lost—it has been a very difficult matter to bring about—when is an opportunity likely to recur in which the Prime Ministers of France and England were jointly concerned, to which they gave their joint consent, and which was afterwards adopted in principle by the forty-nine nations at the Assembly of Geneva?

The opinions of other countries, again, may be a question of difference in different cases; but I should like to quote one because I think it very much concerns that which was said by the noble Earl this evening. The opinion I am going to quote is that of the Foreign Minister of Poland, Remarks have been made at different times as regards the attitude of Poland towards the League of Nations. I want to bear my testimony that its attitude has always been a loyal one, and the very great difficulties which have arisen on every Council I have attended at the League—the noble Viscount, no doubt, met with the same difficulties—on the questions of nationality and minority between Poland and Germany have been met on both sides in a spirit of compromise and good feeling, and a very difficult matter has been practically finally settled.

The Foreign Minister of Poland declared that though the form of the Geneva Protocol might undergo many modifications, it was quite impossible that its spirit of general solidarity and its desire to see difficulties settled by arbitration should cease to exert an influence. Why should it cease to exert an influence? If the League of Nations means anything it means that countries, instead of determining their own rights in an isolated spirit, should be prepared to submit them to a common tribunal and, therefore, a common settlement. He goes on to say that Poland held, on the contrary, that the Treaty policy was universal solidarity to safeguard the Treaties, and he believed that if all the States pledged themselves to combined intervention against a nation infringing the peace, there would be no more war. Then he said, with reference to the guarantee of peace to which reference was made by the noble Lord, that to guarantee peace on the English Channel—that was, a guarantee, or pact, between England and France—while leaving the whole of the rest of the world at the mercy of events would mean, he thought, not peace but war. He could hardly believe that any nation could be brought to sign such a document.

That is only one illustration. I do not suppose it would be right to refer to matters of private information, but I am bound to admit that I think I am entitled to say that I find on every side, as regards communications made to me, with comparatively very few exceptions indeed, a unanimous feeling in support of that which was done and sanctioned at the last meeting of the Assembly in Geneva. I do not, of course, suggest for one moment that a scheme of this kind is perfect; nor do I suggest that there may not be ample grounds—I believe I see by the newspapers that it has been raised by the Committee of Imperial Defence—on matters of that kind where amendments should be allowed and accepted. Those are really infinitely small points in comparison with the general scheme that there shall be no more war as far as human prevision can foresee.

Perhaps I may be allowed, as one does not know what information has been obtained—at any rate, no information has been asked especially from those who were at Geneva—to give a short illustration from the Navy. Unfortunately, as I think, we were not given much assistance, during our discussion of the Protocol, by the Service Departments of this country. But late in the day a very eminent representative of the Navy was sent specially from the Admiralty and he came to see me at Geneva. I have not the slightest doubt that he was sent as a man of the highest authority. He raised three points. Two of them are met by special provisions in the Protocol as it stands, and the third point was not met because it was too late; the Committee had already adjourned. The first of the points was to make it quite clear that in the adoption of the Supreme Court provision was made that there should be no interference with the principles of naval warfare adopted by British Prize Courts. If you look at Article 3 you will see that this is provided for in terms. Whether it was necessary to provide for it in terms is another matter. I thought it was not; but it was possible to do it and we put it in. Another point is met by Article 10. It was feared by the Navy that if they were called upon to co-operate under a League of Nations action they might not have belligerent rights. I think the supposition was superfine, but if you look at Article 10 you will find we were enabled to put in words to satisfy them that belligerent rights can be exercised under these conditions.

The only other matter has to do with Article 7, and I want to say a word or two about it. I think Article 7 is somewhat unfortunately drafted. It was intended to do nothing more than this—to maintain the status quo during the hearing of an arbitration before the Courts. Just the same sort of provision was inserted for this purpose in the Treaty of Lausanne. There has been some difficulty as regards Iraq in seeing that such a provision is properly maintained; but it is quite clear if you are to have a procedure by arbitration, or court of conciliation, that while that procedure is going on you must have a provision that the status quo shall be maintained. When the matter came before the Assembly I made a statement in public, as I had promised the naval representative I would, and said that in my opinion this was nothing more than a status quo clause; and if it is a status quo clause it is what no one would dissent from. If it can be construed, as I understand it is said to be construed, as a general interference with mobilisation, then, of course, it ought to be altered. No one suggested that, no one thought of it, and the only reason why a matter of that kind was not made quite clear was because it was not until the Sunday that this eminent naval authority raised it, not until after the Committee which dealt with this matter had dissipated. It was therefore not from any want of desire to make the matter clear but because it was impossible to deal with it. That was fully explained at the time.

Those were the only three points raised. I do not suggest that further consideration may not have raised other points of difficulty, but these were the only three points raised. Two of them are dealt with specifically, and as regards the third it was stated that we believed the fear of the Navy was not well founded. It was certainly not the desire of any man, not the desire of any of my colleagues or myself, that these wide powers should be inferred from the words we had used. But how is one to deal with these, suggestions which come, from the various Services? I want to deal with them; we want to deal with them; and we have tried to deal with them. The noble Marquess opposite knows that if any one wants to bring about a constructive scheme of this kind he naturally desires that difficulties of this kind should be met; they should be brought into the open. Let us understand what they are and then those who are responsible for the Protocol will be prepared to give their assistance within all reasonable limits; but you must have limits.

There is the question whether the Protocol is to apply to countries outside the League of Nations. The answer to that, of course, is quite clear. You cannot determine that finally until you have had a world Conference. The Protocol is not a final thing for conditions as they exist now. It is only a step towards a world Conference, and at that Conference every country, whether in the League of Nations or not, will have a full opportunity to see what arrangements can be come to. If they are generally accepted then of course the Protocol falls through; you cannot have greater safeguards than that. But if before the time comes for seeing how far security and disarmament can be connected you create difficulties, I might almost say invent difficulties, I do not see how any scheme of this kind can be fairly considered. If the security is to be less the measure of disarmament will be less. That is the simple proposition which we had in our minds. We desire that the measure of security should be as wide as possible. That is the right principle.

The obligation we have already under taken as signatories to the Treaty of Versailles, in which the original Covenant is contained, is that we will bring about these conditions of mutual disarmament. One can hardly think that Germany will take any other attitude than that of saying: "We will carry out our obligations but all the other countries should carry out theirs." When I was at Geneva on the last occasion we appointed a Commission with the assent of all the other bodies, and particularly of France and Italy, to take over the question of disarmament at the right moment in Germany, Bulgaria, Austria and Hungary. It was a Commission appointed for that very purpose. I do not know whether the right moment has come or not, but when it comes you will have the question of disarmament settled so far as the defeatist countries are concerned, and if you allow the Protocol to go forward there is a great chance that you will have a system of disarmament all round. I am not going to prophesy as to the measure of success, but let us try it. Suppose it fails; we shall have taken our part. And if it succeeds it will be the greatest triumph in the cause of peace that can possibly be imagined, having regard to conditions in Europe at the present time. I do not want to detain your Lordships longer now and I will ask the Question which stands in my name.

THE MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON

My Lords, I saw the Question of the noble and learned Lord on the Paper for the first time yesterday, and if he had informed me in advance of his intention to put it upon the Paper, or had consulted me as to the propriety of doing so, I should have advised him to wait, because it would have been in my power at a later date to make a much fuller exposition of the case than it is possible for me to do now.

LORD PARMOOR

Might I interrupt the noble Marquess for one moment? As soon as I could, I communicated with him and suggested a later date, but he asked me to bring it on at the earlier date.

THE MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON

Oh, no! That is not quite the case. The noble Lord communicated with me this morning and asked me whether, as there was important business in the earlier stages of our proceedings to-day, he might postpone this Question until Thursday. On Thursday I happen to have an engagement in the country which renders it impossible for me to be here, and therefore I urged my noble friend, if he desired to take the discussion this week, to have it this afternoon. But when I spoke of postponement, I meant a postponement of ten days or a fortnight from now, and I feel that it would have been better in the interests of my noble and learned friend himself had he postponed his Question. Indeed, the fact that no one expects any serious debate to take place upon this subject is evident from the state of the House. The attendance is by no means proportionate to the great importance of the issue of the Protocol, and I am certain that, at this late hour and with this small House, I shall hardly be expected to do more than deal in a sentence or two with the matter. Nor, indeed, do I feel justified in doing so, because, after all, the Question on the Paper is merely this. The noble Lord asks His Majesty's Government whether they can give further information on the subject of the Geneva Protocol in addition to that contained in the answer that I gave on December 10 last year.

The noble and learned Lord himself has taken advantage of the occasion to deliver a long and eloquent speech in which he has, with truly parental enthusiasm, examined, explained and defended the Protocol, as he is perfectly entitled, of course, in the right place, to do. But that is not what he asks me to do. What he asks me to do is to say what has happened, or whether I have any further information to give as to what has happened, since December Inst, and that is the Question to which, with your Lordships' permission, I will reply.

I think that when I spoke in December I mentioned the fact that the examination of the Protocol had just been referred to the Committee of Imperial Defence, of which I have the honour to act as Chairman. The reference had been made by the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary of the late Government, and that reference was confirmed by Mr. Chamberlain when he took over the Foreign Office last year. I was astonished to hear the noble Lord sneak of the Protocol as a document easy of comprehension, easy of explanation, easy of discussion, easy of decision. I should have said that in every single respect those epithets were wholly wide of the mark. I should have said that the Protocol, as drawn up at Geneva, apart from its great importance which no one can deny, is a document of the most complex character, exceedingly difficult to understand, raising issues of the most momentous description and incapable, except by a grave dereliction of public duty, of being examined or settled in a short space of time.

As a matter of fact what has been done? For three months without cessation, week by week, the Committee of Imperial Defence, or Committees of that body, have been sitting and subjecting this document to the most exhaustive scrutiny and examination. The noble Lord in one portion of his remarks complained of the inadequate assistance that, on the whole, he had received from the Service Departments. Any deficiency that occurred on their part then has been more than made up, I can assure your Lordships, by their paper eloquence since. We have had from them an almost unlimited series of papers upon almost every aspect of this case, and this is a case that concerns not only every Department of Government, not the Service Departments only, not the Foreign Office only, not only the Colonial Office, the Treasury and the Board of Trade, but it embraces in its vast compass the whole of the interests of the Empire.

The noble Lord spoke with enthusiasm about the opinion of certain gentlemen or bodies, some of them of importance, in the various Dominions and India, as being favourable to the Protocol. It was our duty, of course, to consult the Dominions officially, and we did so, and so far from treating the matter as easy of understanding or easy of solution several of the most important of them have not given us their reasoned opinion yet. We have had provisional replies from some among their number. The noble Lord, for instance, referred to India, and I might mention that the reply of the Government of India, after full consideration by them, reached us only last week, and a detailed examination of this document by some of the most important of the Dominions, which, as I say, has been promised and a forecast of which we have received, has not yet reached us. I am bound to say that, although I doubt not that the noble Lord has quoted the actual sentiments of those persons to whom he referred, they must be singularly out of touch with their Governments if he thinks that their opinions reflect the general attitude of the Governments to which I have referred.

Then as regards our own proceedings. As I have said, almost daily, certainly sometimes two or three times a week, we have been examining this question since December. Our examination is now drawing to a close, and I have no doubt that something more will be heard about the matter at the forthcoming meeting at Geneva to which the noble Lord has referred, and at which our Government will be represented by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. As soon as the examination has been completed there will be no delay whatever in placing before the public or before Parliament the conclusions at which we have arrived and the reasons for them. I hope that that may take place within a very short distance of time, very likely within ten days or a fortnight from now. Your Lordships will remember that, with regard to the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, which was a somewhat analogous case to this, though in a minor sphere, the procedure adopted by the late Government was to lay the reply of their Foreign Minister, Mr. Eamsay MacDonald, in the form of a Parliamentary Paper. So far as I remember it was laid in the middle of the month of July last year, and in the latter part of the month, I think in the third week of the month, the noble Lord himself gave a full exposition of the views of the Government and a defence of their letter. I suggest that this is the procedure that we had better adopt in the present case, that your Lordships should wait for the Papers which will shortly be laid before you, and which will be by no means lacking in information, and that then we should have in your Lordships' House the full debate and discussion which the importance of the subject will demand.

House adjourned at ten minutes past seven o'clock.