Lords Sitting of 8 July 1925

Preamble
The House met at a quarter before four of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
VISCOUNT ALLENBY.
Field-Marshal Sir Edmund Henry Hynman Allenby, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., having been created VISCOUNT ALLENBY of Megiddo, and of Felixstowe in the County of Suffolk—Was (in the usual manner) introduced.
William, LORD BISHOP OF MANCHESTER—Was (in the usual manner) introduced.
LORD DORCHESTER.
Dudley Massey BARON DORCHESTER of Dorchester, in the County of Oxford, having succeeded to the title on the death of his mother, Henrietta Anne, Baroness Dorchester, by virtue of a special limitation in the Patent, dated the 2nd August, 1899, in the 63rd year of the reign of Her late Majesty Queen Victoria—Was (in the usual manner) introduced.
MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDERS CONFIRMATION (No. 4) BILL. [H.L.]
Read 3a (according to Order) and passed, and sent to the Commons.

MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDERS CONFIRMATION (No. 8) BILL. [H.L.]
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY): My Lords, the Motion standing in my name is in rather an unusual form. It appears that in these Provisional Orders are included various parts, and in respect of two there is no opposition. The remainder is opposed. It appears that if the Bill is not divided into two parts there is a chance that the unopposed Bills would not get through. In these circumstances it seems to be wise to divide the Bill into two parts. I beg to move.
Moved:—
That the Bill be divided into two parts, viz.:
Ministry of Health Provisional Orders Confirmation (No. 8) Bill [H.L.]; and
Ministry of Health Provisional Orders Confirmation (Bournemouth and Lyme Regis Orders) Bill [H.L.],
—(The Marquess of Salisbury.)
On Question, Motion agreed to, and Bill divided accordingly.
Moved, That the Report of the Examiners on the Ministry of Health Provisional Orders Confirmation (No.8) Bill [H.L.] be held to apply also to the Ministry of Health Provisional Orders Confirmation (Bournemouth and Lyme Regis Orders) Bill [H.L.].—(The Marquess of Salisbury.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

THE CASE OF MAJOR ADAM.
THE DUKE OF NORTHUMBERLAND THE DUKE OF NORTHUMBERLAND rose to call attention to the treatment of Major Adam, late 5th Lancers, by the Army Council; to ask whether the War Office will conduct an Inquiry into all the circumstances of the case; and to move for Papers. The noble Duke said: My Lords, the subject of this Motion is, I am afraid, a very old story, but my excuse for bringing it to the attention of the House is that it is a story which has a very unsatisfactory conclusion. As it has received great publicity and formed the subject of a libel action, as it has affected and continues to affect the reputation not only of an individual but of the Army Council, and as the officer has written a book in which he makes the most serious charges against other officers and against the Army Council, it seems to be a matter which is worth the consideration of your Lordships.
The case presented to the world by this officer, Major Adam, formerly of the 5th Lancers and at one time a, Member of Parliament for Woolwich, is that he had a promising military and political career ruined by the action of the Army Council, and his final appeal, one of many appeals, to that body for a revision of his case was summarily rejected last autumn. It is to be hoped that the War Office can satisfactorily explain to this House the principles which have guided them in the conduct of this case. If they cannot it
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seems desirable in the public interest that they should undertake an inquiry into all the circumstances.
I should like to make it clear that I am not making any charges against the Army Council or against anybody else, because I am not in a position to do so, having only heard one side of the case. All I am going to do this afternoon is to give the ease which Major Adam has presented to the world, which has been accepted by a considerable section of the Press, and which is believed in by a great many people in this country. If the War Office can show that the facts which I am going to give are untrue, and if they can explain satisfactorily the principles which have guided them in the conduct of this case, I shall have no more to say, because I have no desire to press this Motion. It seems clearly desirable that such charges as those made by Major Adam should not remain without reply. If his statements are true, they disclose a most serious situation, and suggest that he has suffered a very great injustice. If they are untrue, their falsity ought to be exposed, and Major Adam himself ought to be exposed.
The following is a very brief summary of the main facts of the case. I will try to be as concise as possible. In 1906 Major Adam was serving in the 5th Lancers at Aldershot. He had at that time a distinguished career behind him, and an equally distinguished career in prospect. He was a graduate of the Staff College, had seen considerable war service, was proficient in foreign languages, and had received uniformly favourable reports from his commanding officers. His General Officer commanding at Aldershot informed him in writing that he would not be recommended for promotion in consequence of an unfavourable report. The report referred to had, he declares, never been shown to him, and this involved a breach of the King's Regulations, for, according to the King's Regulations, if there is in a report anything unfavourable to an officer, reflecting in any way upon his conduct, either professional or otherwise, that report is bound to be shown to him. He declares that this report was not shown to him. He at once applied to see it, and after some delay, it was shown to him. It was a report of the Brigade Commander, which stated that his com-

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manding officer had given him chance after chance, and found him quite impossible. His commanding officer was unable or unwilling to explain this report. Major Adam appealed to the War Office officially. What happened to this appeal is unknown, and he has never been able to find out. A few days later a War Office letter was forwarded to him by the General Officer commanding at Aldershot, intimating that the Army Council, after full consideration of his case, had decided to call upon him to resign his Commission. The words used were to the effect that the King had no further use for his services. That expression is employed only in cases where an officer has done something of a discreditable nature.
There are two points which seem to be worth noting in this connection. This decision of the Army Council was not apparently based upon the report which Major Adam had seen, although it had not been shown to him when it should have been shown to him, but upon another report which he had never seen at all. The report which he had seen had at that time not reached the War Office, so that they could not possibly have acted upon it. They acted upon a report of the General Officer commanding at Aldershot, which had never been shown to him, and has not since been shown to him. Accordingly, this letter was sent in direct violation of the King's Regulations, which require that such a report should be shown to the officer concerned. In the second place, the King's Regulations require that before an officer is asked to resign his Commission unfavourable reports should have been rendered in two successive years. That was not carried out in this case, for there is only a single report against him.
Upon his receiving this communication Major Adam at once interviewed the Brigadier who was responsible for the report. The latter expressed unbounded astonishment and dismay, and the very next morning went up to the War Office himself, and not only succeeded in inducing the Army Council to withdraw their threat, but actually persuaded them to give Major Adam a post on the General Staff at Whitehall. He was further assured by the Brigadier that his report should have no deleterious effect upon his career. This procedure seems a most
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remarkable one. An officer holding a high command reports that one of the officers under his command is quite impossible, and the War Office declare that he is unfit to hold a Commission, but the very day after having come to that decision, they give him an appointment on the General Staff, which is generally regarded as the goal of every ambitious officer.
One year after this surprising and inexplicable occurrence—that is, in October, 1909—another hardly less mysterious incident occurred. Major Adam received an official communication informing him that, on account of further unfavourable reports, the Army Council had decided to place five officers of the 5th Lancers on half-pay. One of these officers was Major Adam. As he had not been serving with his regiment for the past year, but had been at the War Office, it is difficult to see how any further report could have been unfavourable to him, but if there were any such report, it should obviously have been shown to him. He declares that it was not shown to him, nor were the other reports which reflected upon the remaining four officers shown to them. Beside, he had been distinctly led to believe that the only unfavourable report which he had ever seen had been cancelled. Accordingly, he applied officially to see these reports on his conduct.
At this point the mystery which surrounds this very mysterious case deepens perceptibly. He was sent for by the Chief of the General Staff, whose private secretary informed him that his request to see these reports was quite reasonable and justifiable, but if he insisted on seeing them he would be deprived of his Staff appointment. In these circumstances, of course, he had no choice but to acquiesce under protest, and to withdraw his application to see them. Major Adam continued to retain his Staff appointment at the War Office until 1909, when he stood for Parliament as Unionist candidate for Woolwich and was returned at the General Election in January, 1910. He was therefore seconded from the Service, in order to fulfil his Parliamentary duties. All applications to the War Office for reconsideration of his case having failed, he decided to raise the question in Parliament of the unfair treatment of himself

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and his brother officers, by being placed on half-pay without being shown the evidence against them.
To cut a long story short, he accused the Brigadier who had reported on these officers of wilful and deliberate misstatements of facts, and, before doing so, he informed that officer and the Secretary of State of the action that he was going to take. The Secretary of State promised Parliament that the case would be investigated. As a matter of fact, it appears never to have been investigated at all. All that happened was that Major Adam was invited to submit in writing the evidence upon which he had based his accusation. He not unnaturally replied that the subject could not be adequately dealt with by correspondence, and he requested a full inquiry and a personal examination of everybody concerned. Upon this the War Office published in the Press a letter which they had written to the Brigadier, whom Major Adam had accused, and who had himself asked for a Court of Inquiry, as, indeed, he was bound to do, since his character had been very severely reflected upon in public. In this letter they informed the Brigadier that they had investigated the case, and were satisfied that his conduct had been in all respects correct and fair, and—this is an important point—at the end of their letter they drew special attention to the fact that Major Adam had been called upon to retire from the Service some years before, and had been given another chance only owing to the Brigadier's intervention.
I confess that this action seems to be both unjust and futile. It seriously injured Major Adam, and it injured the Army Council hardly less. It will be noted that if Major Adam's account is true the letter gives a most misleading interpretation of the events of 1906, and, while it casts the gravest reflection upon him, it fails to explain what train of reasoning had led the War Office to discover that an officer who was unfit to wear His Majesty's uniform on Monday was eminently qualified for an important Staff appointment on Tuesday. It seems most unfortunate that the War Office failed to hold this inquiry, which they had promised both to Major Adam and to the Brigadier whom he had accused, and who had asked for it. But, instead
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of carrying out their promise, they seem to have endeavoured to defend the accused by casting reflections upon the character of the accuser.
After this Major Adam was unable to obtain further consideration of the case in Parliament, as he lost his seat at the next General Election, which occurred about a year later; and he lost his seat largely owing to the capital that his political opponents were able to make out of the War Office letter, which, they naturally concluded, involved something discreditable against his character. Having lost his seat, he tried to secure employment on the Staff, but was informed that the Army Council had decided that an officer who had behaved as he had in Parliament could not be re-employed. He was also informed by the War Office that they knew the whole story, and therefore they were not prepared to employ him again. This was a somewhat cryptic remark, which evidently had a sinister meaning.
It will be observed that he had thus not only been deprived of his political career by the Army Council's public attack upon him, but he was now to be deprived of his military career too because in his capacity as a Member of Parliament he had ventured to question the procedure of the military authorities in regard to the system of confidential reports. All attempts to elicit from the War Office the reasons why he had been placed on half-pay continued to meet with evasive answers, and therefore, in order to clear his character, he at last asked whether he could issue a public statement himself in the Press in the same way as the War Office had issued theirs. This request, which seems to have been only a fair one, was refused.
After further attempts to obtain satisfaction Major Adam at last abandoned all efforts to obtain satisfaction by these methods, and in 1914 decided to bring an action for libel against the Army Council. That action resulted in a verdict for £2,000 damages, and the disclosures at the trial of the manner in which the confidential reports were rendered and the conduct of the Army Council in publishing the nature of those reports, without investigating the case, or allowing Major Adam to be hoard in his defence, created a public sensation, and called for scathing comments by the Judge who heard the case. The War

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Office did not deny the libel, but pleaded privilege, and on that ground took the case to the Court of Appeal, where the verdict was reversed, and the decision of the Court of Appeal was upheld in the House of Lords. Thus Major Adam again failed to obtain satisfaction from the Army Council, who evaded responsibility on the narrow legal ground of privilege. The rest of the story may be very briefly told. When the War broke out, in spite of his qualifications as a Staff College graduate and his knowledge of foreign languages and Staff experience, he was only given a few unimportant jobs at home. He continued to appeal for a revision of his case, with the same lack of success, and finally, in 1917, his health having broken down, he was required to retire from the Service. He continued to press the War Office for a revision of his case, the last appeal being made in October last, and met with the same refusal. During the whole period since 1910 the reflection cast by the War Office on his character has not ceased to prejudice his chance of standing for Parliament.
Such are the facts of the case, as given by Major Adam and not by me. He asserts positively that there is a great deal behind all this, and there would seem to be some reason for his assertion. It is rather difficult, for instance, to suppose that in 1906 the Army Council would have ordered an officer who seems to have had such an unimpeachable professional record to resign his Commission on the strength of a single unfavourable report which, as a matter of fact, had not reached them when they sent in the order. Moreover, the terms of the order would seem to preclude any possibility of that order having been given on account of his military record. The whole attitude of the War Office seems to indicate that they acted upon information which reflected on his character apart from his military capacity. Major Adam asserts that they had such information, that it was false, and that it was deliberately and maliciously given to them, and he is prepared to give evidence proving that they had this information, that they imparted it to others, and that it is false, and I have seen that evidence. Moreover, he has written a book in which he sets out in black and white certain definite charges against a former officer of the
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5th Lancers whom he mentions by name, and who was the commanding officer of that regiment, and he declares that this officer, who was commanding the regiment in 1906, deliberately supplied false information to the Brigadier and that the whole of the report of the Brigadier and General Officer at Aldershot is based upon that information. His charge against the Brigadier is that he acted recklessly and ignorantly and without due regard to the consequences of his action, and his accusation against the commanding officer is that he acted maliciously and out of personal enmity. Those were the charges made in 1914. They were never answered. The Brigadier had died by that time, but the commanding officer was and is still alive. If the charges be true that officer has been grossly libelled, yet never in 1914, or since, has he ventured to defend himself against charges so injurious to his character, so far as I know. If all these charges are false then Major Adam should clearly he shown up. Obviously it is desirable in the public interest to prevent an ex-officer publishing defamatory statements about his former superior officers and the Army Council.
The conclusion of the whole matter, as presented by Major Adam, is this. He has seen his military career wrecked, his political career lost to him, and his character as a gentleman impugned. His health is seriously affected, and all this is, he claims, owing to the action of the Army Council, and the question is by what principle has the Army Council been guided. Let us suppose what seems difficult to believe, that their action has been based solely on Major Adam's military record. In that case, if his story is true, he seems to have suffered serious injustice at their hands. In the first place, the King's Regulations, as I have shown, have been violated, because he was originally condemned upon one report, instead of upon two reports received in successive years, and also because the confidential reports upon which he was then and subsequently judged have not been shown to him; secondly, and more important still, because, while ostensibly judging him on his military record, they have gone out of their way to impugn his private character also. On the other hand, supposing the War Office have been in-

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fluenced, as he claims they have been, and as there seems some reason to suppose they have been, by other alleged facts which have nothing to do with his military capacity, in that case the injustice seems to be graver still, for they have given other reasons than the true ones for the action which they have taken, and have denied him any opportunity of clearing his character from the real charges or from the stigma they have gratuitously placed upon it.
I submit, my Lords, that the time has come when this mystery should be cleared up and the War Office should disclose to Major Adam all the information upon which they have acted, whether in the form of confidential reports or of other communications which reflect in any way upon his character as an officer or as a gentleman, and give him full opportunity of being heard in his own defence. As the matter stands at present the only conclusions which the public can draw are these. On the one side is an officer whose private and public characters have been impugned, and all he asks is that the facts against him should be made known to him, and that he should have art opportunity of defending himself. On the other side is a body which has already been unable to defend itself against a charge of gross unfairness, made in a Court of Justice, but which nevertheless, if his story is true, has wrapped itself in a cloud of mystery, and given him none of the information upon which he has been judged. The conclusion which the public are likely to reach is that a man who only asks that his public and private life should be subjected to full inquiry is not likely to have anything to hide—not so much as a body which refuses to give any explanation of its conduct. This conclusion may be unjust, and if the noble Earl who is going to reply can show that the facts which I have given, and which are not my facts, but those which Major Adam has given—if he can show that those facts are untrue, and can satisfactorily explain the principles which have actuated the War Office throughout the case, I have no more to say, and I shall have no desire to press my Motion. I do submit, however, that, as the facts stand at present, and as far as they are known to the public, some explanation is required. I beg to move.
VISCOUNT ALLENBY: My Lords, in venturing to address your Lordships for the first time I hope that I shall be granted the indulgence of the House. I am very desirous of supporting the Motion made by the noble Duke. I am Colonel of the 5th Lancers, and when I was Lieutenant-Colonel commanding the Regiment Major Adam was an officer serving under my command, and my reports on him were uniformly good. I left the regiment before the episodes referred to occurred, and my knowledge of them is only through hearsay, through reading the newspapers, and through conversations with Major Adam, who has from time to Lime spoken to me and written to me about them. I naturally feel that, having made good reports on him while commanding the regiment, I must be interested in the case as Colonel of the regiment at the present moment. I support most heartily the Motion made by the noble Duke.
VISCOUNT HALDANE: My Lords, it is always a pleasure to hear a noble Lord speak for the first time in this House, and it is a special pleasure to hear the noble and gallant Viscount, and I trust we shall often hear him on subsequent occasions. I also listened with great attention to the speech of the noble Duke, couched in terms of great moderation, in which he intimated that if the facts which he alleged were disproved in a satisfactory fashion he would be satisfied. I have risen at this moment for a very particular reason. I was Secretary of State throughout the period with which these events are concerned. I entered on my duties with no desire to deal with the case of any officer in a perfunctory fashion, but to apply to any such case the principles which a lawyer would carry out in weighing evidence. I did apply those principles in the case of Major Adam. I was intimately concerned with the case of Major Adam, and I was responsible for every step taken in it, and I took no step and was party to no step without carefully investigating the circumstances. I saw Major Adam, I saw the members of the Army Council, and I saw the officers concerned in the decision, and I was satisfied, and more than satisfied, with the decision which was come to. The noble and gallant Viscount tells us that he was in command of the 5th Lancers. So he was, but at an

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earlier period than the period to which these events relate. As to whether there were confidential reports which came under the notice of Major Adam at that period I will say nothing. I leave it to the noble Earl who represents the War Office.
I am going to confine myself to what happened from 1906 to 1910, when I was responsible. This case was raised in the House of Commons. I was Secretary of State at the time, and I answered fully Major Adam's case, and I believe to the satisfaction of the House of Commons, which decided accordingly. We have nothing to do with that here. We are dealing with a case brought up by the noble Duke. I ask your Lordships' attention to one or two circumstances. I am not going to ask the House to rely on my word, but I am going to ask them to rely on documents. I am also going to rely on the decision given by the Law Courts and by your Lordships' House, in which the whole case was disposed of in such a way as to decide the case raised by the noble Duke. The noble Duke will not desire to challenge a decision on law and facts by this House.
The year 1906 was a crucial year for the Army. It had been determined that the Expeditionary Force, then in the making, should be brought up to the highest state of efficiency possible. It was desired to make it fit to hold its own in the field against any foreign nation against whom it might he brought, and the instructions to General French, who was then Commander-in-Chief at Aldershot, were to see that that was done with the two Divisions he was training there, and also with the cavalry regiments which he was training at Aldershot at the time. One of the means of securing efficiency, and one of the most important means, is to make it clear that you have efficient leaders, and particularly cavalry leaders, because Cavalry is a delicate arm and requires good leadership at least as much as any other arm in the field. Those were the broad instructions given to the Commander-in-Chief, and he proceeded to carry them out.
In the summer of 1906, Lieut.-Colonel Graham, who was commanding the 5th Lancers, became very uneasy about the state of his regiment. He thought that certain of his officers were not fit to lead a cavalry regiment in the field, and he
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Consulted his Brigadier-General Scobell, afterwards Major-General Scobell, one of the most careful and honourable officers in the Army. The powers of the Army Council were quite clear. Under the Royal Warrant the King, who is advised by the Secretary of State and the Army Council, may remove an officer at any time, and he may remove him without giving any reason. There is no question of confidential reports. The first consideration is efficiency—that there must be officers fit to lead in the field. That must be paramount, and that is a principle very carefully applied. The regiments are inspected annually, and also specially, and, if the reports are adverse, the King's Regulations declare that these reports are to be communicated as soon as possible.
That was the state of the law of the Army when Lieut.-Colonel Graham entered upon his investigation. He consulted his Brigadier, and he and his Brigadier made the most close and careful inspection of the 5th Lancers in its training, and they drew up a report which was very unfavourable to the capacity of certain of the officers in that regiment for the performance of their duties, and particularly of the duties which they might be required to perform in war. That report, made by Lieut.-Colonel Graham and Brigadier-General Scobell in conjunction, was made in October, 1906, and was referred to afterwards as the combined report. It was communicated to Major Adam, and the purport of it was that he was unfit to be a cavalry leader in the field. The Army Council, naturally concerned with this, directed General French to make a special report, and General French did make a special report in very scathing terms. I do not know that there is any reason why I should not tell your Lordships what that report was. It is a long time ago, and I tell it the more willingly because, as I shall show in a moment, it was communicated at once to Major Adam.
General French's report is dated November 3, 1906, and I think I had better read it to your Lordships as it came. It is addressed to the Secretary, 'War Office, London:—
"SIR,
I have the honour to bring to the notice of the Army Council that Major W. A. Adam, 5th Lancers, although he possesses

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some exceptional qualities fitting him for employment on intelligence work, none of them are such as are necessary in a good Cavalry leader in the Field. So much is this the case that the Officer commanding the Regiment has found it necessary to relieve him in the command of the Service Squadron by a junior Officer, relegating him to the command of the Reserve squadron."—
That was an arrangement which it was within the power of the officer commanding the regiment to make.
"I can in no way consider such a state of affairs satisfactory, and although I consider Major Adam to be an officer of ability and fitted for employment in the Intelligence Department as an Interpreter or in some kindred employment"—
Major Adam had a very good knowledge of languages—
"I do not consider that he will ever become an efficient Squadron Commander in the Field, an opinion shared by Major-General H. Scobell, C.B., Commanding the 1st Cavalry Brigade, and Lieutenant-Colonel H. Graham, D.S.O., the Officer Commanding the Regiment.
"In these circumstances, I wish to place on record my opinion as above expressed, so that if it is decided to leave him where he is, which might involve at some time his having to take Command in the Field, it may be clearly understood that I "—
General French—
"cannot hold myself responsible for any vagaries the may commit."
Now the noble Duke has suggested that this report was not shown to Major Adam, and I do not doubt for a moment that the noble Duke is acting on information which seemed to him, from the way it was given, reliable. Unfortunately for that view, it has been judicially found, not by the military authorities but by this House sitting in its judicial capacity, that it is not true. Major Adam denied, as apparently he has denied it now, that he was shown that report, and the noble Duke states that he did not see it at once. Not only did he see the combined report made by the Commanding Officer and by his Brigadier—I have myself verified the endorsement showing that he saw it—but he saw, and saw at once, within a very few days, the report made by General French. In the witness box in the action to which I shall presently allude he denied that he had seen it. Unfortunately, the tribunal did not agree with the evidence he gave.
The case was very fully dealt with in your Lordship's House. Major Adam brought an action against the Secretary
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of the Army Council under circumstances to which I will come in a moment. That was tried before a jury, which the noble Duke says found in Major Adam's favour on the point of privilege; but on the facts Major Adam went, into the box, General French went into the box, and various people went into the box, and the evidence was sifted. When it came up to your Lordship's House it was dealt with, and this is what Lord Dunedin, who was one of the Judges, said upon the point as to whether the retort which I have read—a very damaging report—was shown to Major Adam. Major Adam said that it was not, but this is what Lord Dunedin says:—
"And that that report was communicated to the plaintiff, notwithstanding the denial in the box, is, I think, proved (a) by the evidence of General French; (b) by the expression used in the plaintiff's letter of March 25, 1911, in which he speaks of the communication of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief at Aldershot, which I hold in my hand, and requested him to apply for the (Colonel Graham's) report to be sent to me to read'; and (c) by the fact that in his, letter of December 9, 1906,"—
which was a few days after the General's report had been sent in—
"he begs for reconsideration of the decision announced in that letter and makes no complaint of the non-communication of the report therein contained."
In face of that it is a good deal for anybody to try to argue in this House that the Commander-in-Chief's report upon him was not communicated to Major Adam almost at once on its being made. Indeed, the endorsement which I have seen on the document would put that out of the question on other grounds. I was myself satisfied at the time that he had seen it, and I make this broad statement at this stage. It is with these two reports that, we are concerned. It is said that they resulted in injustice. It is said that they were influenced, or that at least the decision of the Army Council was influenced, by private gossip about Major Adam to which they had listened. I can only say, firstly, that these two reports themselves would be amply sufficient to entitle the Army Council to take the step it did and, secondly, as far as I have been able to find out, no question of private gossip about Major Adam's affairs or anything else was ever entertained by the Army Council, or ever came before them. What the Army Council said, in view of these two reports, was that Major

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Adam must resign, and they called upon him to do so.
Now I come to the next step. Had that decision, a decision which was clearly within the powers of the Army Council under the Royal Warrant, a decision which was amply justified by the two reports they had before them—the reports which Major Adam had seen—been acted upon that would have been the end of Major Adam; but, perhaps unfortunately, Major-General Scobell was a kindly man, as everybody who knew him remembers (he is now, alas, dead), and he went up to London and said: "Give this poor fellow another chance. He cannot be employed in the field, but he knows languages. He has been at the Staff College, and he might be suitable for employment in one of the branches of the Intelligence Department of the General Staff." That was done. The Army Council did not insist upon his resignation, but they put him upon half-pay, and he was employed in the War Office until 1909 in the capacity I have spoken of, and not on duty in the field. They never doubted the rightness of their decision not to allow him to continue as a cavalry leader, but they gave him this kind of employment, and he continued to have it until he sat for Woolwich, and then under the Army Regulations he went on half-pay in order to do so.
Then he goes to the House of Commons and there he makes a speech. Major-General Scobell was away in South Africa, but was on his way home and, notwithstanding that General Scobell had been his benefactor, certainly to this extent that he had saved him from dismissal and from being called on to resign, and had done everything in his power successfully to get him employment of another kind, Major Adam said this in his speech in the House of Commons—it is very important, to note the words because much followed upon them:—
"Major-General Scobell is on his way home at the present time from South Africa. He arrives in England at the end of this week and I hope when lie sees the report of this "—
that is the speech Major Adam was making in the House of Commons—
"in the paper, as I intend he shall do, he will appreciate the meaning of the words 'wilful and deliberate mis-statement of facts.'"
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That is what he charged Major-General Scobell with.
"I have tried to make it clear, and I hope he will turn up that paragraph in the King's Regulations which compels an officer in a case like this"—
that is to say, charged with conduct unworthy of an officer and a gentleman—
"to refer the matter to his superior authority, the superior authority in this case being the Army Council."
After the matter had been gone into, this is what the Lord Chancellor said in your Lordships' House about that passage:
"This speech must have conveyed to everyone who heard it or read the report the impression that Major-General Scobell was charged with conduct unworthy of an officer and a gentleman within the meaning of the King's Regulations. It is impossible to suppose that Major Adam did not intend to convey this impression. At the trial, however, he stated that he did not impute such unworthy conduct to Major-General Scobell, and that he said what he did merely in order that Major-General Scobell might demand an inquiry to clear himself, in course of which Major Adam believed information might be obtained with regard to the attack upon him which he believed was in the general report."
The Lord Chancellor continued:
"I abstain from commenting on Major Adam's conduct in making, for such an indirect purpose, an unfounded attack upon General Scobell, who had rendered Major Adam great service at the time of his removal."
So much for that, but the Army-Council naturally was very angry at what was said in the House.
It was suggested that what was said in the House was privileged, but Major-General Scobell, feeling his character was impugned, appealed to the Army Council, and the Army Council made an investigation. It was a very careful and full investigation, and as a result they replied to Major-General Scobell's request for an inquiry into his conduct, and they told him they had investigated the facts fully, that there was no reflection on him at all, that he need not be in the slightest degree under a misgiving about what he had done, and that it was the more surprising that Major Adam should have done this when he was under great obligations to Major General Scobell. On that Major Adam brought an action against the Army Council for libel. I am not sure that I was named in the writ. I may have been,

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because I was one of the Army Council who had sanctioned the vindication of Major-General Scobell. But the action was brought at any rate against the Secretary of the Army Council, and in the first instance Major Adam got from the jury—juries are emotional—damages, but when the case vent to the Court of Appeal the Court of Appeal said obviously this was a privileged communication, it was not a case in which the facts had not been gone into, in which the case had not been tried, but, they said, on the ground of privilege alone the action failed.
Then Major Adam appealed to the House of Lords, and your Lordships' House dismissed his appeal, using the language which I have spoken of, and finding that the confidential reports, of which he complained that they had not been communicated to him, had been shown to him at once. In that state of things I ask your Lordships to accept the decision of this House, and also the finding which I have stated, that all the confidential reports complained of had teen communicated to Major Adam, and to disregard what he suggests now. The case had been investigated twice, once by the War Office very fully, and again by this House, and in no case vas any reflection ever made on Major Adam's private character, further than this, that it was considered an unworthy thing to have attacked Major-General Scobell as he did in the House of Commons. For the rest, my connection with the case ceases at this time. I made a statement in the House of Commons to the same effect as I am making here. I ceased to be Secretary of State in 1911, when a subsequent event in this matter occurred with which the noble Earl who represents the War Office now may think fit to deal. I do not know whether he will or not, but at any rate I have put before your Lordships to the best of my ability what I have to say on the matter. I will only add this. I am quite sure the noble Duke only took action because he was thoroughly convinced of what he had been told was the truth, and, if I am right, then it is obvious some of the things he was told were not the truth.
THE DUKE OF NORTHUMBERLAND: I particularly said that I did not know what the truth was.
VISCOUNT HALDANE: I know. I am saying that the noble Duke acted with great discretion in warning your Lordships' House that he only went on what he had been told. I have given some further information to the House, and, for the rest, I leave the matter to the noble Earl opposite.
THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (THE EARL OF ONSLOW): My Lords, I need hardly say that I should be very glad indeed to give all the particulars that I can to my noble friend in regard to this question. The Army Council have nothing whatever to conceal. All they desire is to be absolutely fair to everybody concerned in this matter, not only to Major Adam, but, to others who may have been concerned in this case, especially to those, who are no longer among us and who are not able therefore to give any further information on the subject. As your Lordships are aware, these who were most intimately concerned in the case have passed away. I think we are very much indebted to the noble and learned Viscount who was Secretary of State for War at the time when the incident took place for the information which he has given to your Lordships to-day. The records of the War Office exist, but the noble and learned Viscount's recollection of the case is far more intimate, and his knowledge, therefore, is much greater than mine can be, for I can only obtain my information from the minutes and papers at the War Office. Some of the observations which I have to make in reply to my noble friend may repeat some of those made by the noble and learned Viscount, but I will endeavour to deal as briefly as I can with this case. I should like to add that I am sure your Lordships were very glad to hear the speech of the noble and gallant Viscount (Lord Allenby) to-day, and you will unite with him in the desire he expressed that every information shall be given in regard to this case. I will endeavour, therefore, to satisfy those who have put these questions to me.
My noble friend was good enough to let me know the various points he was going to raise, so that I have been able to go completely into them, and to get the considered reply of the Army Council on the matter. The noble and learned Viscount referred in his

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speech to the incidents in June, 1906; therefore I need not discuss them at any length. I should like to say that in June the commanding officer of Major Adam's regiment asked for permission to remove him from the command of a service squadron on the ground that he was unsuitable. A copy of this letter was given to Major Adam, and he took occasion to see the Brigade. Commander on the subject. Then we have heard from the noble and learned Viscount of the adverse report of October—the combined report—and also the further report—the special report—which was furnished to the Army Council by the General Officer-Commanding, Sir John French. I was glad to hear what the noble and learned Viscount said about the communication of the report of October—the combined report—to Major Adam, because there seems to be some doubt as to when it was communicated. The Lord Chancellor in his judgment said it was not shown to Major Adam before being sent in as it ought to have been by the King's Regulations, but it was shown to him some weeks later, about December 6, 1906. It would seem that was not the case. It was shown to him, or at any rate was received at the War Office and acted upon, before the report of Sir John French, which was dated I think November 3. In any ease the action which was taken was upon the report of Sir John French written on November 3, and communicated to Major Adam on November 8.
On November 26 Major Adam was given an interview by the Military Secretary. At this interview he was informed that, although his confidential reports until recently were not adverse in the technical meaning of the word, according to paragraph 214 of the King's Regulations, yet many of them were not altogether favourable. On December 1 Sir John French was informed that it had been decided that Major Adam should be called upon to retire from the Service, and the letter was communicated to Major Adam. Later, as the noble and learned Viscount has informed your Lordships, it was decided to give Major Adam a further trial on probation in the office of the Chief of the General Staff. I want to make it clear that it was on probation in the first instance. Major Adam accepted this appointment. He served for some time on probation, and in August, 1907, he was appointed
1116
General Staff Officer, third grade, under the Director of Military Operations. My noble friend in his letter to me said that Major Adam was under the impression that the adverse report which had been made about him had been cancelled. I should like to say that this matter has been investigated and there is no record in the War Office of anything which could have led Major Adam to suppose that the adverse reports had been cancelled. The noble Duke has said that there was a suspicion that there was something behind this action of the Army Council. As the noble and learned Viscount opposite has said, so far as I can see there is absolutely nothing to justify any such supposition, and in order to make that matter quite clear to your Lordships I should like to read an extract from the judgment of Lord Justice Buckley in the Court of Appeal. Lord Justice Buckley said this:—
"So far as I can see no imputation ever has been, or is now, made against either the character or the capacity of the Major except in respect of his efficiency as a leader of cavalry in the field."
I hope this statement, combined with what the noble and learned Viscount has said, will show that it is not accurate to say that only one adverse report was seen by Major Adam. The letter of his commanding officer of June, 1906, was seen by him the adverse report of October, 1906, was seen by him; and the special report of November, 1906, was also seen by him. In addition, the annual report of his commanding officer, rendered in 1907 after he had left the Aldershot Command and become a General Staff Officer in the War Office, which stated that there was nothing to add to what was said in previous reports, was also communicated to Major Adam.
The next point put by the noble Duke is that on December 1, 1906, Major Adam was ordered to resign his Commission before any official report had reached the War Office. I think this has been explained by the noble and learned Viscount, and it seems perfectly clear from what I have already told your Lordships that the official report had been carefully considered by the Army Council before any action was taken. Then the noble Duke alludes to the fact of Major Adam being placed on half pay in 1907. Perhaps I may be allowed to mention the facts as they took place. In the

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first place I should like to quote a communiqué issued by the War Office to the Press on November 30, 1907, which ran as follows:—
"We are informed by the War Office that the recent action of the Army Council in placing five officers of the 5th (Royal Irish) Lancers on half-pay was not due to any cause detrimental to the character of those officers. Though they were not considered suitable to retain their positions as officers in this Cavalry Regiment, their services can be, and in three cases are being, utilised in other appointments. The Regiment is not inefficient to take the field."
Major Adam was one of the three officers whose services at that time were being utilised in another appointment, in the Intelligence Department of the War Office. Automatically he went on half pay when he was struck off the strength of his regiment, before this communiqué was issued, but he went automatically on full pay on the following day, so that he did not really go on half-pay at all. He did not actually go on half-pay until 1910, when he became a Member of Parliament.
The noble Duke also pointed out that in January, 1910, the Army Council refused to promote Major Adam, although recommended by his General. The circumstances are these. Major Adam was no longer on the regimental list, and there was therefore no vacancy for him to fill. It is quite true that his immediate chief wrote in 1910, in answer to the question "Do you recommend him for promotion?"—"Yes, when passed for promotion." But Major Adam had not qualified for promotion, as he did not pass the "tactical fitness examination," which was necessary for the promotion to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. I need not go into the question of the libel action brought by Major Adam against the Secretary of the Army Council, because that has been dealt with by the noble and learned Viscount.
I should like now to come to the year 1911. In that year the noble Duke says that Major Adam was refused employment, although he was recommended by the Adjutant-General. I have looked into this matter very carefully, and there appears to be no trace of any refusal to employ Major Adam in 1911, or of any such recommendation by the Adjutant-General that he should be employed. Now I come to the year 1914, when the War broke out. In October, 1914, Major Adam
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was given a Commission in the King's Own Scottish Borderers. He went to the Aldershot Training Centre, and there he again was the subject of an adverse report by the General Officer Commnding; and this report was duly communicated to him. In regard to these reports I must tell your Lordships that from 1904 it was compulsory that any officer should be shown adverse confidential reports. They are read to him by the Commanding Officer, or in his absence they are sent to him in writing. In 1913 it became compulsory that any and all confidential reports should be shown to officers and initialled by them. This report was duly communicated to Major Adam.
In May, 1915, he reported as sick. He was "medically boarded" and went on sick leave. He was again "boarded" in June, August, and November and December of 1915. In August the board, and subsequent boards of that year, found him unfit for general service but fit for service at home. I cannot find any record that he joined his reserve battalion; his battalion by that time had gone overseas. In January, 1916, he was found fit for general service by a medical board, and on February 14, he was ordered to proceed overseas to join his battalion. He replied to the orders in a long letter addressed to the Secretary of State, who was then Lord Kitchener, in which he referred again to his grievances, and stated that he could not comply with the orders of the Adjutant-General to join his battalion in France at the seat of war. The Secretary of State replied to this letter on February 18, to the effect that his orders to join his regiment answered his demand for a redress of his grievances.
Inquiries show that on February 26 he had not obeyed orders and embarked to join his regiment in France, so further orders, on February 27, or rather, on the evening of February 26, were sent to him to embark on the 27th, and were handed to him by a Staff Officer of the Adjutant-General's Department, and a receipt was obtained for them. That Staff Officer had an interview with Major Adam, and at the interview he explained to him that he had received a certificate from his doctor stating that he was unfit to proceed overseas, and that he had forwarded a request for a further board. That was in order. A board was held in

1119
March, and certified that Major Adam was unfit for any service whatever, and was suffering from neurasthenia. This took place on March 2, 1916. No term could be placed on his disability, and on January 1st, 1917, he was placed on retired pay. That is the reason why Major Adam was gazetted out of the Army.
The noble Duke says that between 1911 and 1924 the Army Council have repeatedly rejected appeals for a reconsideration of the case. I should like to explain this point. In 1911 Major Adam exercised his right under Section 42 of the Army Act to appeal to His Majesty the King. The result of that appeal was that His Majesty, on the advice of the Secretary of State, was not pleased to issue special instructions in regard thereto. Although it is a custom that an officer should exercise this right only once in respect of any one complaint, Major Adam was allowed to make a second appeal in 1915, after the outbreak of the War, but again, on the advice of the Secretary of State, His Majesty was not pleased to issue any special instructions. Then, in 1916, Major Adam was informed that the Army Council definitely and finally refused to re-open his case.
I should like to come to one point which, I think, requires a certain amount of explanation, because it is a point upon which, I believe, considerable stress has been laid by Major Adam. On October 18, 1907, the following letter was sent to the General Officer Commanding, Northern Command:—
"I am commanded by the Army Council to inform you that in consequence of further unfavourable reports concerning the following officers it has been decided to recommend for His Majesty's approval that these officers should he placed on half-pay under the provisions of the Dispensing Warrant."
Then follows a list of the names of the officers, among whom Major Adam's name is included. The use of the words "further unfavourable reports" has perhaps been understood as conveying the impression—I think it conveyed that impression to the mind of my noble friend—that between the report of General French, dated November 3, 1906, and October 18, 1907, reports had been received by the War Office in regard to Major Adam which had not been shown to him. The records of the War Office show that this is not the case. A report
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on the efficiency of the 5th Lancers had been received at the War Office, but it contained no mention of Major Adam. It was referred to Sir John French for his observations, and he made a report to the Army Council on the subject. There is only one reference in that report to Major Adam, and that reference was not an adverse report on Major Adam. Sir John simply referred the Army Council to the adverse report made by him upon Major Adam, dated November 3, 1906, which, as I have already stated, had been shown to Major Adam.
As regards another point to which my noble friend has drawn your Lordships' attention, the statement that Major Adam's military career has been ruined, I should like to point out that he served in the War Office on the General Staff for two years, as a General Staff Officer, 3rd grade, from 1906 to 1910, and that he only left the War Office in order to enter the House of Commons. When the War broke out in 1914 he was given a Commission and had every opportunity of serving at home. He did serve at home and, had it been possible—it was not possible, for he was prevented by ill health—he could have served with his regiment on active service abroad. It appears to me, therefore, that Major Adam had ample opportunity, both by service on the Staff in time of peace and with his regiment in time of war, to prove his military value.
As regards the alleged aspersions on Major Adam's private character, I do not think that I can do better than refer again to the statement of Lord Justice Buckley, of which I have already quoted one or two lines. After the words which I have quoted, Lord Justice Buckley went on to say:
"Secondly, that the grievance under which he has conceived himself to lie has rested principally upon a misapprehension upon his part. He has attributed the action which the Army Council have taken to the effect of the report or reports made by Major-General Scobell upon information supplied by Colonel Graham. In his evidence it is rather of the latter than of the former that he has complained as being the person who made on him reports that have been to his prejudice. He has forgotten or ignored that, as is plain from the evidence of Sir John French, the action of the Army Council was based upon reports made by that distinguished officer, reports based, not on information derived from others, but from Sir John French's own observation."

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As I have said, Lord Justice Buckley prefaced those remarks with the words which I have quoted.
My noble friend says that Major Adam made an appeal to the Was Office in October, 1924, stating that the Army Council had been misled by false information deliberately given to them, and requesting the revision of his case. I can only say that both this letter from Major Adam and the memorandum which accompanied it received very careful consideration indeed, but that the Army Council were unable to agree that it afforded ground for re-opening the case. The matter has been thoroughly threshed out three times before the Courts—your Lordships' House, the Court of Appeal and the court of first instance—and has been considered by the present Army Council, and by successive Army Councils since the time of the noble and learned Viscount opposite. The record of the War Office shows that all the adverse reports on Major Adam have been shown to him in accordance with the King's Regulations. I may say that, if Major Adam wishes to see them again, there will be no objection to his doing so, but I am unable to quote from them textually or to give any undertaking to allow their publication, as the maintenance of the confidential nature of these reports has always been adhered to by the Army Council. I apologise for taking up so much of your Lordships' time, but I have desired to give as full an answer as I could to the Question that has been put to me.
THE DUKE OF NORTHUMBERLAND: My Lords, I am very much obliged to my noble friend for promising to allow Major Adam to see all the confidential reports in the War Office. I think that is really all that the War Office could be expected to do in the circumstances, and it certainly meets the requirements of my Motion, which I have no desire to press. I should, however, like to point out, with regard to the point which the noble and learned Viscount opposite raised, that all these reports upon Major Adam—that is to say, the report of Major-General Scobell and that of Sir John French—were presumably dependent upon information which they derived from his commanding officer, and not from their own personal observations.
VISCOUNT HALDANE: General French inspected the regiment personally, and so did Major-General Scobell.
THE DUKE OF NORTHUMBERLAND: There was an earlier report from General French in the year 1905, in which he commented very favourably upon Major Adam's conduct and the leading of his squadron.
VISCOUNT HALDANE: General French?
THE DUKE OF NORTHUMBERLAND: I have not the information with me, but it is stated in Major Adam's book. In any case, with regard to that which the noble and learned Viscount said about his accusations against Major-General Scobell, if we assume—I do not assume it at all—that his story is true, and that his commanding officer was his personal enemy, Major-General Scobell had, without questioning him or finding out the truth, received verbal information which seriously damaged Major Adam's character, and had forwarded it to the War Office.
VISCOUNT HALDANE: There is not a tittle of evidence of that.
THE DUKE OF NORTHUMBERLAND: That may be but that is Major Adam's case. As I have said, I have no desire whatever to press this matter any further. There is one point, however, which is of some importance. General French's report, which the noble and learned Viscount opposite produced, is now heard for the first, time. It was not produced at the trial nor during the libel action.
VISCOUNT HALDANE: No, but Major Adam saw it.
THE DUKE OF NORTHUMBERLAND: He states that he held it in his hand, but was not allowed to read it.
VISCOUNT HALDANE: It was shown to him.
THE DUKE OF NORTHUMBERLAND: It was not allowed to be produced in evidence.
VISCOUNT HALDANE: No, I do not think that there is any evidence of it.
THE DUKE OF NORTHUMBERLAND: I have no desire to take up the time of the House any further. I am much obliged to the noble Earl for having met my request so fully.
THE EARL OF ONSLOW: I should like to say just one word. My noble friend spoke of all the confidential reports at the War Office. That I think is rather a large order, and I think I ought to limit it to the confidential reports in the War Office which we say Major Adam has already seen and was entitled to see.
THE DUKE OF NORTHUMBERLAND: I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn

UGANDA RAILWAY CONGESTION.
LORD HINDLIP LORD HINDLIP rose to ask his Majesty's Government what steps they propose to take to relieve the very serious state of traffic congestion on the Uganda Railway at the Port of Kilindini and Lake Ports in Kenya and Uganda; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, it is some time since I drew your Lordships' attention to matters appertaining either to East Africa or to Uganda, and I take up the time of your Lordships this afternoon only to draw your attention to the state of congestion on the lines of railway operated by the railway administration of those territories, and the congestion at the various steamer ports. There exists to-day a state of things which is extremely serious, and which, if the situation is not relieved very quickly, may have far-reaching and disastrous results both in those countries and here. It is a state of affairs which is causing considerable loss to all sections of the community in Africa, both black and white, and to all sections of the community in this country who are interested, either directly or indirectly, in the trade of those countries.
It is, I am afraid, rather more than twenty years since I first became connected with those two countries, and at various intervals, almost in cycles, we have been confronted by this kind of thing in increasing volume, and these crises and congestions are usually due either to Government action or inaction, or inaction after action. They encourage large production, or they encourage an influx of settlers, or make provision to build a branch line. They then fold their hands and go to sleep, and placidly let someone else watch the trend of events. Suddenly their plans come to
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fruition. Settlers arrive, production increases suddenly, or railway material for building of the line arrives. The administration is caught napping, and chaos results. Sudden demands are made for engines, rolling stock, trains, and provisions of all sorts and kinds. Panic measures, both locally and at home, are resorted to, and much money is wasted. Everyone is discouraged, and trade falls.
I notice in the report of the general manager of the Uganda Railway for the year ending December, 1924, that he says:—
"It appears to be almost forgotten that less than two years ago the production and trade of the two territories did not warrant, and in ally case the financial position did not permit of, commitments to large capital betterments, renewals of lines, rolling stock, etc."
I do not know what profit the railway made in 1922, but in 1923 it made a profit of £400,000, and in 1924 of £700,000. I think they are rather difficult to please. That statement, in my view, gives the whole case away. It is an example of the mentality of officials. They ignore cause and effect altogether. One of the causes of our troubles in East Africa and Uganda after the War was Mr. Chamberlain's Budget in this country, and the terrific taxation at the same time imposed by the local administration, both in Kenya and Uganda. The buying power in this country was killed, and also the buying power of the natives in Kenya and Uganda. I remember calling attention to this in this House some years ago, and I remember telling how, in consequence of the taxation, those who would otherwise have bought Manchester goods had reverted to the wearing of skins. The result of the taxation was that production fell very badly. Then the taxation was reduced and encouragement given to production. Production increased very rapidly and very largely and, as exports increased, so imports increased too. This never seems to have occurred to the official mind, which never thinks ahead. They never seem to have realised what the effect of very high taxation would be nor what the reduction of taxation would bring about.
Following upon the statement of the general manager of the Uganda Railway, let me refer very shortly to what we think will happen in the future. The

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congestion to-day is apparent, but what that congestion will be if remedies are not quickly applied I would hardly like to say. Let me take four staple products of the country. There are 60,000 acres of coffee planted, but only 20,000 acres in bearing. If no more coffee trees are planted, in three or four years' time the crop ought to be trebled. In 1924 the crop of sisal was 11,000 tons. In four years' time it is expected to be 33,000 tons. Maize in 1924 was 52,000 tons, and in 1925, 75,000 tons. By 1927 it is expected that 100,000 tons will be produced. As to cotton from Uganda, where the congestion is worse than anywhere else, the crop in 1923 was 00,000 bales, in 1924 137,000 bales, in 1925 165,000 bales, valued at nearly £5,000,000, and in 1930, according to official or semiofficial figures, the crop is expected to be 250,000 bales. With regard to these figures the Administration or the Colonial Office have no excuse for saying, "We did not know what to expect." If you take the cotton crop in Uganda, the whole thing is arranged by the Government themselves. They make the arrangements and give out the cotton seed. They know perfectly well how many acres of sisal are planted, and how many acres of coffee, and it is very easy for them to arrive at an intelligent anticipation as to the amount that will be produced, and which they will have to move next year.
May I come now to the various seats of trouble which I have mentioned in my Question? I propose to deal very shortly with the port of Kilindini, because I feel quite confident that the Colonial Office will shelter itself behind a body in London called the Joint East African Board, to whom the question of the working of the port was referred many months ago, and I do not think that the board have yet sent in a report on the subject. The present conditions are very bad. These is no proper control. The wharves belong to the Government and two lighterage companies are allowed to use them and make whatever charges they like, and in fact I have been given a letter this afternoon by a gentleman who has just returned from East Africa and who told me that the lighterage charged for a few hundred yards is as much as 50 per cent. of the entire freight from England.
As regards the congestion al the port of Kilindini probably the most exasper-
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ated man who has anything to do with it is the manager of the Uganda Railway who, I gather, is fairly powerless in the matter and is rather between the devil and the deep sea. I believe that, according to his report last year, he has put forward some very sensible proposals himself, and I trust that the Government will quickly come to a very definite conclusion as to how to deal with matters at Kilindini. The general manager says in the report that it is quite impossible to deal adequately with the traffic at this port until the deep sea piers are finished. I think that is perfectly correct. As regards the Uganda main line itself, in this ease the general manager is master of his own house and I do not think that I can comment very much on this part of the line, as things are fairly satisfactory Incidentally, however, the general manager alludes to the shortage of trucks: and to engines and trucks that have to be used for carting materials for branch lines and coal, and are thus diverted from their proper use. He says also:—
"We are very short of marine officers, pier masters, works inspectors, locomotive firemen and other grades, and particularly short of engine drivers."
If the general manager confesses that he is short of all these men one can imagine that there is probably some congestion on the Uganda Railway.
I will leave East Africa now and come to Uganda, where the congestion is worse and probably more felt than anywhere else. You might hardly credit it, but in the old days before the Uganda Railway was built it used to take a caravan of porters, walking with loads on their heads, some four and a-half months to walk from the ocean port of Kilindini to Uganda. The railway has now been built a good many years and steamers are on the lakes, but I can produce instances where goods coming from Kilindini have taken from four to five months to reach their destinations, or a greater time than they did when they were carried on the heads of porters in the days when no railway was ever thought of. The congestion in Uganda is so bad that, unless something is quickly done, the whole future of this country must be jeopardised, and we shall be very lucky if we escape without some disaster.
I find it very difficult to credit a fact, which I believe is a fact, that there is no traffic manager in Uganda at all, and

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no senior railway official. On Lake Chioga, where most of the extremely valuable cotton crop originates, there is not, I believe, a single European railway official. There are none but Asiatics. There is an Asiatic clerk who is in turn station master, pier master, booking clerk, and general clerk, and, in addition to that, has to superintend all the native labour round the pier, the railway station, and the wharf. Your Lordships can imagine the chaos that exists under those conditions. I dare say this is due to economy. Your Lordships would be the last persons to dispute the need for economy and the first persons to welcome any sigin of economy from this or any other Government, but here is a case where economy has run mad and loss to every section of the community is being piled up through it. The case for the Administration is the alleged shortage of labour, but I am assured from all sides by private individuals and by correspondence from over there that it is not so much shortage of labour as the inefficient way in which the available labour is handled.
I would like to deal now with the question of facilities in Uganda at terminals and lake ports where the cotton crops have to come. The railway, as I have said, is already in a prosperous condition, and in the last two years made over £1,000,000 profit. They provide practically no terminal facilities for these goods and cotton frequently has to lie about, as the general manager admits, in mud or dust, exposed to all weathers, and in some places not even protected by tarpaulins. In addition to that, ports have been suddenly closed to traffic with practically no warning, and cotton which may have come 100 miles by road to be loaded on the steamer has to remain in the mud or to be taken back home. Tororo coffee from the Tororo district has to conic over 200 miles. That is hardly the way for a Government, that in every ministerial speech talks about exploring new markets, to treat those who make markets.
Let me quote two cables received from Uganda recently, from persons I do not know, and with whom I have nothing to do:
"June 15. Booking from Lake Chioga ports, Busoga Railway, Jinga Pier has been suspended indefinitely. Steamer sailing
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from Kilindini has not been filled owing to congested state of Uganda Railway. Fifty per cent, of labour wasted owing to absence of supervision."
"June 27. Lake Chioga ports again closed. Namasagali port choked, bales cotton in transit unprotected."
This is a letter from the general manager of the same company on May 19:
"Kampala Station is a sight calculated to make one weep, if they had goods lying there. Bales of lint and bags of cotton seed are lying all mixed up, thousands of them all unprotected in the open on grass. At Port Bell there are thousands of bales there in the open but very good dunnage is provided, and I believe an effort is being made to get the stuff moved."
I must apologise for all this detail but it is necessary to give these examples in order to show your Lordships what has happened. I want to give your Lordships one more example of what happens there. It was obviously evident to the general manager of the Uganda Railway in the early part of 1923 that considerably snore steamer facilities would be necessary on Lake Chioga in the present year, 1925. In his report last year I find this:
"On April 6, 1923, the local Administration asked for a new steamer for Lake Chioga. The order was not placed' by the Crown Agents till January 16, 1924,"
after nine months of deep thought and cogitation—
"then the contractors took twelve months to make and ship the hull, and this steamer will not be ready to take the water till two years and three months after the purchase was asked for."
I am sure your Lordships will not require me to make any comment upon that.
I could go on, but I have taken up a sufficient amount of your Lordships' time. I hope I have given your Lordships enough incidents and details to show what the state of congestion is at the moment and what a very serious consideration it is for the future. I hope that the Government will take steps, and take them very quickly, not only to relieve the congestion which exists now, but to provide for the very much more serious congestion which will arise next year and the year after unless they exercise a very great deal more forethought and have a great deal more vision than they have shown for many years. I beg to move.
LORD BUCKMASTER: My Lords, I desire to say but few words in support of the request of the noble Lord that steps should be taken to improve these transport facilities. I think it was Burke who said that the first instrument of civilisation was the plough. Had he lived to-day I think he would have said that it was the railway. One thing at any rate is certain—that you cannot properly develop the almost illimitable resources of these large areas that we hold in Africa unless an efficient transport service is established and maintained. In this case the railway is already there. The complaint of the noble Lord is that owing to the clumsiness or inefficiency of the people in control of that railway it is being inadequately worked. That really is a very grave reproach upon those who are in any way responsible for the management of this railway system.
When the question of Kenya was last before your Lordships' House I called attention to the fact that there was a large and, I thought, a very serious diminution in the native products', and I was very anxious indeed that the Government should give me an assurance that no steps were being taken to hinder the development of native industries. It appeared to me that the real way to develop a country such as the countries we hold there is to encourage the natives in their work by all the means in our power, and not necessarily to subjugate them for the purpose of developing our own industries. The matters to which the noble Lord has called attention this afternoon may throw some light upon the facts and figures to which I then referred, and this diminution of native products may at any rate be largely associated with this apparent failure of the systems of transport for bringing them down to the port. And, if only for that reason, I would earnestly urge the Government to do all in their power to remove this hindrance to the free development of proper trade in these areas, end by that means not only help to establish the prosperity of the country, but to do what I think is our duty—take the most important of all steps for the development of the civilisation of the native races.
LORD ASKWITH: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Hindlip, has brought some very important matters before your Lordships' House, and in view of the number
1130
of letters and reports that I have received I should like to make a few remarks upon the subject. It is more than a generation since the late Sir William Harcourt rather reluctantly consented to the provision of funds for the building of the Uganda Railway, which lie afterwards enthusiastically supported. That railway has been the means of moving towards a solution of the great problem in these tropical countries of how to move raw products from the interior to the coast, and how to bring from the coast into the interior the manufactured articles required there. It is obvious from the instances of man-carriage given by my noble friend that man-carriage cannot be really useful in a large country. It has been estimated that it requires forty men to carry a ton of produce and that it would require 2,000 men to convey 100 tons per month for 100 miles. Apart from the difficulty of collecting-these men, the difficulty of the marches and even of having to carry their wages with them, it is obvious that no great country could develop on those lines, and that Uganda owes all its prosperity to the fact that a railway was constructed for it.
Yet now the condition of affairs, of which my noble friend has given certain instances, is as bad as it can be. Here is an instance which was sent 'by Lloyd's Agent at Kampala. One thousand brass lamps, each packed in a cardboard container, the latter being again packed in wooden cases, were despatched by the railway from the port of Kilindini on February 24 and arrived at Kampala on May 13, the time occupied in transit, being 78 days. On being handed over by the railway department to the consignees at Kampala, the cases were found to be soaked with water, the cardboard containers were wet and mouldy and 868 lamps out of 1,000 were rusted through and permanently damaged to the extent of more than two-thirds of their value. Lloyd's Agent reports that this damage has been caused by the long delay in transit and by exposure at intermediate points unprotected from the weather. How can trade continue to be carried on in such conditions as those or in the uncertainty that arises under such bad management?
Although this is so important in the case of ordinary merchandise what I am particularly interested in is cotton, to which, had he been able to be here to-day,

1131
my noble friend Lord Emmott would have referred. Lancashire wants cheap cotton as badly as it can want it, and the production of cotton in Uganda has been increasing to a very large extent. Some of it is sent to India and some to Japan, but most of it comes to this country. The noble Lord mentioned that the quantity had risen from 90,000 hales in 1922 to 165,000 bales in 1924, worth £5,000,000. This year it will be still more. That cotton is picked in April, it is ginned and baled by June, but it is estimated that it cannot be got out of the country until January or February next. Consider, my Lords, what an enormous expense that entails. There is the interest upon the money which is locked up in the cotton; there is the warehousing and the insurance, and, worse than that, the market has been lost. That, as my noble friend Lord Buckmaster very appositely remarked, ultimately falls back upon the native and he is not encouraged to grow next year, or to take an interest in cotton when he cannot make a proper profit out of it.
That is endorsed in an extraordinary way by a message received only a few days ago from the Chairman of the Uganda Company, in which he states that up to date his company have been able to ship only 500 bales out of the 7,500 which they bought from the natives this season. He adds that some thousands of his company's bales are in the hands of the lake and railway authorities, theoretically in transit, but that losses by damage and delay are piling up in a most horrible degree. I would suggest for the consideration of the Government that they should send out more officers, men who were called in the old days on the railways "traffic hustlers," men of some skill who could manage to get this traffic through. These men, in the second place, should be selected with much greater speed than has usually been the custom, by the Crown Agents for the Colonies. Thirdly, at Kilindini, consideration should be given to the question whether there could not be created deep sea wharves in order to prevent this dreadful cost for lighterage. It seems almost like roguery to make charges for carrying goods a few hundred yards which are 50 per cent, of the actual carriage the whole way from East Africa to London. Surely this waste could be
1132
put down to a certain extent. In view of the fact that recommendations have been made by many speakers throughout the country lately, and in particular by Sir Alfred Mond and Mr. J. H. Thomas, that credits should be given for railway and transport assistance in the oversea Dominions, my noble friend's Motion might well be agreed to, and any Papers he moves for supplied. I trust that the Government will accede to the suggestions that he has made.
THE EARL OF CLARENDON: My Lords, in reply to the Question raised by my noble friend, it is quite true that various complaints have been received in regard to the congestion on the Uganda Railway system, but the Secretary of State has refrained from burdening the general manager of the railway at a time of admitted pressure with interrogations on this question. He has, however, confined himself to making it quite clear to the general manager of the railway that he is at liberty to make all arrangements which he considers necessary in order to relieve the pressure of traffic within the next working year. The position is, or has been, the subject of investigation by three different bodies, the Inter-Colonial Railway Council in Kenya and Uganda, the Uganda Traffic Control Board, and a sub-committee appointed by the Government of Uganda. The Secretary of State will see that he is furnished at the earliest possible opportunity with reports of these investigations, and when he has received them, together with any comments that may be made by the general manager of the railway, he will see whether it is possible to lay Papers. I should like to request my noble friend not to press this afternoon his Motion for Papers for the simple reason that my right hon. friend the Secretary of State has not only not seen these Papers, but his information, or such information as he has, is yet totally incomplete with regard to Kilindini.
It is quite true there has been occasional congestion. There is undoubtedly a lack of space for dealing with the traffic, and the delay in building two new deep water berths has, at the moment of increasing traffic, necessarily made the position one of some anxiety. There has been a great strain both on the existing Government wharf and also on the

1133
private port at a place which I think is called M'baraki, but the wharfage companies and the railway seem, so far as we can judge, to have handled what I might call an astonishing amount of traffic with a considerable; amount of success. It appears that in May the position gave cause for considerable anxiety to the shipping companies, and the general manager undertook a trip to the coast in order to arrange emergency measures. It was not, however, necessary to put into effect those emergency measures, and at a later date, when the manager again visited the coast, he found the position at the port was satisfactory. I might inform your Lordships at this stage that the new Government wharf will, it is anticipated, be partly available next month.
With regard to the congestion in Uganda, there seems to be very little doubt, in view of the fact that there was a large buying capacity amongst the natives of Uganda, that the various import houses rushed goods up country on a scale which was entirely without precedent, and without apparently, so far as we know, any consideration being given to the immediate capacity of Uganda for absorbing the goods themselves. Fortunately, not all the goods imported were despatched to Uganda, but the amount that was sent was sufficient to overtax the handling facilities at the port of Kisumu on Lake Victoria, and, after the warehouses were filled, it became impossible even to unload the trucks as they arrived. This in its turn naturally created an artificial scarcity of trucks, and has contributed, amongst other things, to delay the speedy despatch of the downward traffic when the cotton season opened. At the same time, although this congestion was almost entirely due to a temporary scarcity of labour at the Port of Kisumu, the fact remains that in the early months of the year the import traffic was 45 per cent, in excess of that carried in the same period of last year, while up to the middle of May the amount of cotton carried to the coast was 30 per cent. in excess of last year's figure. The railway has made every possible effort to accept cotton offered for shipment from the Uganda stations and the ports, and it is notable that the amount of cotton which left Uganda in the first quarter
1134
of this year was actually 50 per cent. more than the amount in the highest previous first quarter.
It is, therefore, necessary to look, as in the case of the import traffic, for some special reason to account for the fact that, while the railway has been doing much more work than ever before, there should still be cause for complaint that the cotton is not handled promptly. As I have already said, it is impossible to form any judgment upon this matter until the reports to which I have referred, and which the Secretary of State is intending to ask for, have been received, bat it is evident that the conditions are not accounted for by the increased volume in the cotton crop of this year. That increase is roughly some 25 per cent., and however satisfactory that may be, it does not account for the fact that a 50 per cent, increase in the cotton carried has been inadequate.
One suggestion that has been made is that cotton ginners, who do not possess sufficient reserve funds, found it necessary to raise sums of money at the earliest possible moment, and in order to do this they rushed their goods down to the railway in order to obtain consignment notes which they were able to negotiate at the banks. It is obvious that demands of this kind could very easily be extended, and if this practice is resorted to the railways might be asked to carry in a very limited time the whole of the year's cotton crop. It is obvious that it would be impossible to run the railway on these lines. Normally the presentation of cotton for transport continues throughout the entire year. In 1924 it is known that certain ginneries were actually working full time, even in the month of October. It would also appear that the rush has been due to the favourable prices which prevailed upon the Liverpool market, and there is some indication that ginners who normally ship their goods to India, and have no special reasons for requiring early transport, are among those who complain of the delay they have experienced in getting their goods to Liverpool.
So far as any detailed representations of delay are concerned they appear to relate, first, to file congestion at the Kampala station and its port on Lake Victoria, and, secondly, to a temporary limitation of traffic on the Busoga Rail-

1135
way. As regards the former case it appears to have been short lived, and there never was any serious breakdown. But the matter seems to have been somewhat exaggerated in communications which have been made to this country, particularly with regard to the allegations in respect of the damage which the cotton has suffered through exposure to the weather. It appears that the cotton which has so suffered is largely, or entirely, cotton of which the railway has not accepted delivery, and that any damage was due to the exporters sending their cotton to the station or port without any previous knowledge that the railway was in a position to accept it and deal with it.
In this connection the only practicable suggestion which has been made to the Secretary of State for the immediate improvement of this position is that where shedding acommodation is not available the railway should provide proper dunnage and tarpaulins. This suggestion has been laid before the general manager of the railway, and he has replied that cotton in the hands of the railway, with very few exceptions, has been properly stacked and effectively dunnaged. This is not the case with cotton which is not yet in the hands of the railway. He states that apart from accidental fires, which occurred in the month of March, cotton this season has suffered very little damage while in the possession of the railway authorities themselves. The general manager adds that during the last eighteen months the railway has spent a sum of £6,200 in the provision of tarpaulins, and he does not consider that extended facilities should be provided, as in his opinion they would only encourage the bad features of handling conditions in Uganda, such as the failure of many ginning companies to provide adequate protection for the valuable cotton which is in their hands.
As regards cotton going to Lake Victoria over the Busoga Railway, the general manager has temporarily limited the quantity of cotton to be held at the pier at Jinja, where the stacks were becoming so unwieldy as to delay steamers and create labour troubles. He reports that good results have been obtained from this course. I do not think it is necessary to state that the general manager is constantly giving the most
1136
careful consideration he can to any measures that can be adopted for improving the conditions, and I should like to make it clear that my right hon. friend the Secretary of State has entire confidence in the general manager's administration of the railway and has every hope that, apart from the largely artificial conditions which have prevailed during the last few months, the future handling of the Uganda cotton will give no reasonable grounds for complaint, especially when the arrangements now in progress for increasing the available facilities are complete. Trucks have been, and are being, poured into East Africa at a rate which is only limited by the facilities existing at the railway workshops at Nairobi where these trucks are assembled and erected, and this will continue for some time to come. The facilities on Lake Victoria are being increased by the provision of a new tug and lighters, which will shortly be at work, and it is hoped that by making every effort the rails of the new extension of the Uasin Gishu Railway into Uganda will reach Tororo on the Kenya-Uganda border by January next. The extension to the River Nile is not to be contemplated until a year later, but the relief to the cotton traffic will begin as soon as the line is open up to Tororo. In view of what I have said we anticipate that there should be no difficulty in handling the Uganda traffic in future years, although the fact does remain, and I must lay stress upon it, that if the amount of traffic offered to the railway during any given period is in quantities which no previous experience gives them reason to expect in that period, it is obvious that there will be temporary difficulties in handling it.
Before I conclude there is one matter which my noble friend mentioned at the conclusion of his speech upon which I must say a word or two. I refer to the ship, the building and construction of which occupied twenty-seven months. The interval from the time when the Colony's exact requirements were known to the due date of delivery in this country was eight months. The delays after the contract was placed were beyond the control of the Government. The difficulties to which I have referred were the following; a railway strike, a shipyard lockout, the failure of a cylinder cast-

1137
ing, the contractors' trouble with their joiners and trouble with a boiler. The Crown Agents made every endeavour to expedite delivery, but the vessel was not ready for shipment in sections until January, 1925.
If I understood the noble Lord's argument aright, I think he claimed that, if this particular ship had been operating where it was meant to operate, the congestion of traffic would have been largely ameliorated, but my information is that this steamer, if it had been ready, would have been operating on Lake Chioga, and therefore, in view of what I stated in answer to his question with regard to the Busoga Railway and the closing a the Port of Jinja, I fear that the traffic situation, insteal of being ameliorated, would have been one of greater congestion than ever. In conclusion, I am afraid that I have no further information to give your Lordships, nor have I any information upon the point which my noble friend Lord Askwith raised with regard to the consignment of brass lamps, but I will bring both this question and the other points raised by my noble friend Lord Hindlip to the consideration of my right hon. friend the Secretary of State for the Colonies at the earliest possible moment.
LORD HINDLIP: My Lords, I have every reason, I think, to be very grateful to my noble friend for the reply which he has given me this afternoon, and I certainly have no wish to press for Papers. I wish only to say in reply, speaking both personally and for those with whom I am connected, that we have as much confidence in the general manager of the Uganda Railway as has the Secretary of State for the Colonies. We have every possible confidence in this gentleman. With regard to the remark of the noble Earl regarding rushing goods into Uganda, I believe that they are perfectly true, but I understand that they were unfortunately German goods. With regard to the noble Earl's remark concerning cotton, I am afraid we shall not be able to satisfy him. We do not keep cotton to look at. The ginners naturally want to get their cotton to London or Liverpool as quickly as they can, especially before the next American crop comes in. Perhaps the Colonial Office have not quite appreciated that point. The noble Earl referred to the steamer. I do not know where the
1138
general manager intended to put it, but he stated in his report that this vessel, which had so long been urgently required to deal with the cotton traffic, would not be ready.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

SHIPPING FACILITIES TO WEST INDIES.
LORD LAMINGTON LORD LAMINGTON had given Notice to ask His Majesty's Government whether they propose to take into consideration, either in consultation with the Imperial Economic Committee or otherwise, methods of improving the shipping communications between this country and the West Indies, and also the inter-communication between the Wrest Indian Islands themselves. The noble Lord said: My Lords, the Question that I have upon the Paper deals with another part of our Imperial Dominions than that with which the debate to which we have just listened concerned itself. This question is by no means a new one, but it has been giving great anxiety to those who are responsible for the administration of our Colonies for several years past, and time does not seem to have provided any solution. I venture to say that communications with the West Indies to-day are no better, if they are not actually worse, than they were twenty years ago. Personally I have no solution to offer, and what I have to say is rather by way of suggestion than a concrete plan. Only personal experience can bring home to one how great is the lack of communication, not so much with the West Indies, as between the different islands which form that group. I had the good fortune to be a member of the Empire Parliamentary Association delegation which went out this year. My noble friend Lord Newton was also a member. We found, when we got there, that if we wanted to extend our visit to the islands the difficulties were almost insurmountable, except by way of some chance steamer. My noble friend behind me, Lord Burnham, has had previous occasion to visit the West Indies, and has made himself thoroughly acquainted with conditions there, and I hope that he will bear out the points that I propose to lay before your Lordships.
It is to be remarked that Mr. Wood, who was then Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, made a tour of the

1139
West Indies in 1921–22, accompanied by Mr. Ormsby-Gore, and in his Report he stated that they could not have visited all the different islands—broadly speaking, the Lesser Antilles—had it not been that the Government were good enough to provide a vessel for them, so that they could go to each individual island. That bears out my contention that intercommunication between the islands is very difficult indeed. I do not propose to go into all the many ramifications of this question. That would take far too much of your Lordships' time, and without a large scale map it would be very difficult to elaborate or to define exactly what needs to be done. I will take only the more salient points in connection with this question of communications.
First of all, with regard to communications with the chief island of all, Jamaica, I do not think that there is very serious cause for complaint concerning the lack of transport from this country. There is a fortnightly boat of Elders and Fyffes' Line, and there are occasional boats crossing the southern portion of the Caribbean Sea in the direction of Bermuda. There is also a boat every three weeks, run by the Leyland Line, and communications are possible by Canada, the United States and round the Bahamas to Jamaica—a very roundabout and expensive route, but still a means of arriving at Jamaica. Accordingly, I do not want to lay stress upon lack of communications in this direction, except to say that I think it might be possible to establish an arrangement that was recommended by the West Indian Shipping Committee, which reported in 1919. The Report said, in Paragraph (47), sub-paragraph (9):—
"If direct communication between Jamaica and the United Kingdom could be secured by some service proceeding through the Panama Canal, a small subsidy would be worth paying for the purpose of securing such communication."
I think that this would be a possible undertaking, and not a very costly one.
I have so far referred only to passenger communications, but, as regards cargo going from Jamaica to the United Kingdom, the position is very different indeed. The Elders and Fyffes boats, which carry on the main traffic with a fortnightly service, are all for the pur-
1140
pose of carrying bananas, and the banana trade requires such special fittings that other forms of cargo cannot be taken, as, for some reason or other, it does some harm to the fittings that have been established. Consequently practically no cargo at all goes out by those boats to Jamaica, and there is only an occasional cargo boat—I am not sure whether the Leyland Line run one or not—that goes there, with the result, among other things, that, in the first place, the Jamaican people feel themselves entirely in the hands of the great American fruit company that carries on its properties in Jamaica for the purpose of supplying bananas to the United States and to Canada, because the bananas of Jamaica do not for the most part come to this country. Those which do come from Central America. They are taken by boats, which call at Kingston but have filled up before arriving there.
The Jamaican people therefore feel that they wish to have a more independent service for the purpose of marketing their own fruit in this country, and not a service or organisation which may be in any way controlled by the United States. I think that their fears in this regard are vain, but at the same time they do feel that the trade is controlled by American companies. One result is that of the total shipping that cleared in Jamaica in 1923, four million odd tons, 1,760,000 tons alone were British. All the rest was foreign tonnage. This illustrates how the greater proportion of the cargo that goes to Jamaica comes from Canada or the United States, and very little is taken direct from this country to Jamaica. These trade figures are also shown by the imports into Jamaica for 1923. The total imports were 5,200,000 odd tons, and of these only 1,500,000 tons came from the United Kingdom. Of the remainder, no doubt a million came from other Colonies, probably almost entirely from Canada. Therefore about half the trade was of an Imperial character, and the other half was entirely foreign. The export figures are pretty much on the same lines. Out of the total exports of 4,200,000 tons, only 1,240,000 tons were to the United Kingdom, 600,000 tons going to other Colonies. That is not altogether a satisfactory state of things, and certainly you can appreciate that people

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living in Jamaica would rather have a closer service or services with the United Kingdom.
Leaving Jamaica and going to the southern portion of the Caribbean Sea—Barbados, Trinidad, and British Guiana—communication with this country is really not bad. They have Dutch and French services, and the Harrison Line runs a service every three weeks to Barbados and Trinidad, and there are other fairly reasonable services connecting with British Guina. There is no reason to complain of that, but it is different when the Windward and Leeward Islands come under consideration. Being at Barbados last February, I found a couple who had been waiting there a month to get, I think, to Antigua. There was no communication directly whatever, except by a boat which comes from Canada every three weeks to the Leeward and Windward Isles and on to Barbados.
One suggestion—apart from having a small subsidy for ships going through the Panama Canal—is that there should be some means of linking up services which come direct from Europe to Barbados or Trinidad—some communication established by which people in the Leeward and Windward Islands could have a regular service to Jamaica, etc., without any very long wait. That, I think, might afford a fairly satisfactory solution of the difficulty, at any rate for the present. At the present moment Jamaica is altogether cut off from the other portions of the West Indies. There is no communication, except chance communication, and you would have greater cohesion among the scattered portions of the Empire if the Government were to subsidise or set up some line of steamers connecting Barbados and Jamaica with these other islands. I am no great believer in subsidies in ordinary circumstances, but the circumstances of these Islands are so peculiar, and there is so much hardship inflicted upon the inhabitants of these Islands, that I think the Government might well do something.
In this connection it rather surprised me to read in The Times of yesterday that the Prime Minister, in reply to a Question in another place, stated that he was advised
"that the existing facilities for the conveyance of mails to the West Indies were adequate. He saw no reason, therefore, to
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make a special contract involving payment of a subsidy."
That may be quite true for such places as Barbados, Trinidad, and Jamaica, but I do not think it is at all applicable to those people who live in the Windward or Leeward Islands. Surely something should be done to bring them into closer touch with the rest of the Empire.
In bringing forward this Question I am animated by a desire, having been out there this last winter, to try to do something to bring these Islands into closer touch with the rest of the West Indian Islands. There is a feeling out there that in the past the Colonial Office have neglected them, and that their aspirations and their wants have not been duly considered. I am sure that that is a wrong idea, and that it is only because of the great difficulties of the situation that more has not been done. As Mr. Wood says in his report, one object of his going out there in 1921 was to bring home to the people there the idea that there was sympathy felt with them, and that it wag most desirable that a better understanding should be obtained of what they wanted done for them. He said:
"The occasion was therefore regarded as a new departure by the Colonial Office, deliberately conceived with the object of pro-mooting a closer touch between those responsible in the United Kingdom for the administration of the Colonies and their inhabitants."
And he goes on to say how his visit was everywhere much appreciated. I think I may say the same thing with regard to the visit undertaken by Lord Burnham and the Imperial Parliamentary Association.
Mr. Wood says:
"It is impossible to begin any report on the West Indian Colonies without reference to what for any visitor must be the outstanding characteristic of them all. Diverse as they are in almost every other respect, there is no difference in the matter of loyalty to the Throne and to the person of His Majesty the King."
Then he adds:
"The effect of it is constantly to direct the gaze of the West Indian communities towards Britain and towards the visible symbol of unity that the person of the Sovereign affords. The worth of such an influence in maintaining imperial solidarity and in counteracting the possible growth of other tendencies can hardly be placed too high, and it is well that citizens of the United Kingdom should appreciate it."

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He said that the other tendencies were, of course, that the connection with the United States had become so very strong by way of trade, even all the money transactions being in dollars, that there might be some risk that their feelings might be diverted so as to desire a closer alliance with the United States of America. I do not believe that for a moment. Nothing is so strong as the desire that they should remain a component part of our Empire. I only wish that those who live in this country would realise what wonderful possessions they have in the West Indies which are full of historic and romantic interest, with miles of the finest scenery. If people, instead of going to the Mediterranean or Monte Carlo for the winter, were to go a little further and spend a holiday in the West Indies, they would have an enjoyable time and get a warm welcome from the inhabitants.
VISCOUNT BURNHAM: My Lords, I am sure the West Indies will be very grateful to my noble friend Lord Lamington for having drawn your Lordships' attention to their long-standing but ever urgent grievance, and to the lamentable, and I do not hesitate to say disgraceful, state of their sea communications. I cannot help being a little pleased to think that the peoples of our Colonies are not able as yet to take advantage of any medium of seeing the super-select state of your Lordships' House when these matters are under discussion. It seems to me that the House of Lords never functions to greater advantage than when it constitutes itself virtually representative of our Colonies and Dependencies, the interests of which cannot be considered in another place, and whose grievances are scarcely heard in Parliament. This afternoon my noble friend has drawn attention to what is, of course, the great question in all the Caribbean Sea. I suppose that in future these matters will be referred to the Standing Committee which has just been set up at the Colonial Office to deal with the affairs of Colonies and Protectorates. I am far from saying that that is a bad step: I conceive it to be a very good one. On the other hand, these Government Committees are sometimes the most ingenious agents for procrastination that our Constitution allows of. I am a little anxious whether we shall be told on all
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occasions that such a question as this is under the consideration of the Standing Committee of the Colonial Office. If it is, I hope that they will get through with their public business in such a way that the West Indian Colonies will not have to wait another quarter of a century before any attention is paid to their sea services, and, in fact, their communications as a whole.
My noble friend has dealt with several aspects of the question. Like the conventional sermon, it divides itself into three parts, the communications we have with the premier Colony of Jamaica, the communications with the other Colonies of the West Indies, British Guiana and British Honduras, and the inter-island communications between themselves. I do not intend to trouble your Lordships with the last matter, because it is at this moment being considered at a conference at Ottawa, at which all the West Indian Colonies as well as British Honduras are represented, and which is to determine the nature of the contract which, after October, will obtain for the conveyance of goods and passengers as between Canada and the West Indies The service at present runs from Halifax and St. John to St. Kitts, and down the Islands to British Guiana, whilst another service visits the Bahamas, Jamaica and British Honduras. This is capable of great improvement. Considerable fault is found with the Canadian service to the West Indies, which is said to provide no refrigerating plant and not to make the most of the arrangement by which mutual preference is given between Canada and the West Indies, which has resulted in a considerable consumption of West Indian sugar in Canada. It is to be settled whether the contract is to be renewed with the Canadian Royal Mail Line or with the Canadian Merchant Marine. However, that is out of our hands. I would like your Lordships to realise that for communications as between themselves the West Indies are almost entirely dependent upon Canadian goodwill and Canadian self-interest.
The main point to which I wish to draw your Lordships' attention this afternoon is the state of our communications with Jamaica. It is quite true, as my noble friend has stated, that Elders and Fyffes, which are really part of the huge

1145
American Combine of the United Fruit Company, do provide a passenger service which more or less satisfies the needs of that Island. On the other hand, the complaint is made that, though the passenger traffic is not so good as it used to be—and I am afraid that in regard to our Colonies that is often the complaint—still the goods traffic is very largely left unprovided for. No cargo is taken out from this country in return for the bananas which are sent here, though, as my noble friend says, they are not produced in the Island of Jamaica, but almost entirely on the mainland.
There is something much more than that in the complaint which the West Indies make to your Lordships' House. The whole of the immediate development of Jamaica, so far as transport goes, looks as if it would eventually pass to the United States. What my noble friend said about the loyalty of the West Indian Colonies is profoundly true. Their loyalties are wholly British, but their interests are becoming more and more American. Parliament here and the Government will soon have to decide whether, in fact if not in form, the West Indian Islands will have to remain part of the British Empire. Bananas, of course, have been in a sense the salvation of Jamaica, and it would be ungrateful and unfair to deny the debt of gratitude which Jamaica owes to the United Fruit Company. Those who have experience, and none has so great an experience here as the noble Lord who sits on the Front Bench opposite, will, I am sure, be aware of the manner in which the lands of Jamaica have been reclaimed and cultivated to the best advantage by the United Fruit Company, and of the fact that bananas came into play to prevent the bankruptcy of the Island when the sugar trade had largely failed owing partly, no doubt, to the indifference of this country.
On the other hand, when there is a monopoly of transport, as there is today, for the main crop of the Island—because that might almost be said of bananas now—there is always the danger that independence and enterprise outside it are wholly crushed out of existence. That is what is happening in Jamaica now. Banana growers outside the United Fruit Company cannot get their goods out of the Island or, if that is a slight exaggeration, can only
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send them to the United States. They cannot get them home. Their wish is to find a market in this country for the fruit they produce; but they have no means of doing so. They are, in fact, precluded from any chance of doing it by the disabilities and difficulties under which they suffer. I saw in the paper only yesterday that there is a commercial crisis in Jamaica at this moment because of the low prices paid for bananas, which are sold at 2s. 6d. a bunch, whereas the price when they are taken to the market is 12 s. 6d. That shows what a wide gap there is between the reward which goes to the growers and the huge profit which must go to the trader and the middleman.
Your Lordships are asked to consider whether a good case has not been made out for assisting Jamaica to help herself by opening up possibilities of transport other than those afforded by the United Fruit Company, and to the home market rather than exclusively to North America. For the moment that is the most important subject which has to be considered in connection with the West Indies, and I have no wish to direct your attention to any other. Whether this new Economic Committee is in being or not, I hope that if it is a proper matter of expenditure or at least of guarantee, the Government will provide some means of transport for those who are being crushed under the heel of a great American monopoly which, though in its way beneficent, absolutely does away with anything and anybody outside its own path. There is a very strong feeling, which I fear is largely justified, in spite of the protest of the noble Earl below me when it was mentioned by my noble friend Lord Lamington, that in spite of their historic claim upon our imagination and our gratitude, the West Indies have been sorely neglected, especially during the last half century. They have been treated as a negligible quantity in the immensely varied organisation of the British Empire. If anything comes of the Motion made by my noble friend this afternoon regarding one of their grievances, something, I think, will have been done. I wish, however, to state most emphatically that the sea communications with the whole of our Colonies there are most discreditable to this country, and if those sea communications are not amended and

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improved it will end in their drifting towards an American connection which, I suppose, no one would deplore more than your Lordships.
LORD OLIVIER: My Lords, I should like to join the noble Viscount in congratulating the West Indies upon having obtained, in the person of the noble Lord who made this Motion, and I hope also in the person of the noble Lord who is now talking to him, two further recruits in the ventilation of their interests in this country, which was so fully done just now by the noble Viscount, Lord Burnham, in a speech full of knowledge and understanding.
This is a question with which I have been concerned for many years, and I look back with very great regret to what I might call the palmy days of West Indian communications. When I went into the Colonial Office rather more than forty years ago there was a reasonable and a rational service of communication with the West Indies under the contract with the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company. That company received a subsidy of £80,000 a year, and for that they sent a main line of steamers direct to Barbados; from Barbados they radiated three lines of steamers, one to the Leeward Islands, one to Trinidad and the Lesser Windward Islands, and a third down to Demerara; while the main line steamers went on to Jamaica. From Jamaica a small steamer went on to British Honduras. That was a connected, and logical and, I think one may say, Imperially conceived service of traffic for our connection with the West Indies. On the return journey the process was reversed. They converged, and all the traffic and mails and passengers passed from one part of that system to another with, I think, the least possible difficulty, once a fortnight. That was an admirable and a quite satisfactory service.
But the traffic of the West Indies went down. The sugar industry fell into decay. The banana industry had not yet revived, and the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company passed into the hands of a very efficient business manager, well known in your Lordships' House and in the Empire as one of the most able of our traffic steamer managers at the present time. When my noble friend, who was then Sir Owen Phillips and is
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now Lord Kylsant, took over the chairmanship of the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company he found that he could not continue to carry out this philanthropic enterprise, as it then was, and, forced by economic circumstances, he had progressively to reduce the facilities which the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company gave, first to Jamaica and then to the other Islands. The Post Office, as the noble Lord has said, found that by making ship contracts and simply paying for ship's letters they could increasingly get them conveyed to the West Indies without any fixed contract. The result of that was that Jamaica was entirely dissociated from direct communication with the other Colonies and, indeed, very largely from this country until communication was again improved by the contracts entered into with Sir Alfred Jones, who founded the banana shipping connection between Jamaica and this country.
As both noble Lords have said, that has increasingly resulted in the fact that though Jamaica can get a good passenger service, she cannot and does not get a good goods service because, quite apart from the fact that Elders and Fyffes' steamers are not well constructed for the carriage of freight, and have to do their business too quickly to bother themselves very much with it, there is also the fact, which has been pointed out to your Lordships, that they are part of that very large American combine the United Fruit Company, which itself is a company interested in the conveyance of American goods and in the American export trade, and is not at all likely to go out of its way to do anything to encourage trade between this country and America.
Further than that, when I went to Jamaica we were still enjoying the benefits, such as they were, of the contract which the Imperial Government had made with Sir Alfred Jones, and we were still paying a subsidy, although the management of that line had passed from Sir Alfred Jones and Elder, Dempsters into the hands of Elders & Fyffes, who were a sub-department of the United Fruit Company. From that time the Jamaica shippers complained increasingly that they could not get shipment for their goods, and that they could not get shipment for their fruit. And, whereas Jamaica produces admirable oranges and

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other citrus fruits, the development of citrus fruit production in Jamaica was and is still very gravely hindered, if not crippled, by the fact that they could get no shipment for their fruit, except through the hands of the United Fruit Company. That is the position in Jamaica.
The position of the other West Indies has been spoken of by my noble friend Viscount Burnham and, as he says, we are at the present moment looking forward with considerable anxiety to the outcome of the conference to which he referred to ascertain whether the present contract will be renewed. The contract at present is in the hands of the Canadian branch of the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company, and I am not at all confident that that company will be prepared to renew it, because the very energetic noble Lord who presides over the affairs of that company, according to my experience, rather prefers to build large ships and get a handsome profit upon them to building small ships and ranking a moderate loss, which is what he complains, is generally the case with his ventures in these more modest fields of enterprise.
In dealing with these problems as Governor of Jamaica and otherwise, I have been more and more forced to the belief that the only substantial way of helping ourselves out of the difficulty was to get an improved and increasing connection with the Dominion of Canada. When I was in Jamaica we really had some rather promising negotiations with Sir Thomas Shaughnessy, as he then was, of the Canadian Pacific Company, which was considering the question of developing trade through the Panama Canal, and at the same time of linking up that service with a line on to England. It is, I think, in the improvement of our Canadian trade, and in the improvement of our shipping facilities between the West Indies and Canada, which has proved very beneficial to the West Indian trade with Canada and also to Jamaica; it is on that basis and looking to the substantial economic facts of the case that we must hope for an improvement in conditions. I am afraid it is too late in the day to expect that this Government will do what possibly the French Government or any other more enterprising Socialistic
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Government might do. It is too late to expect that the Post Office will any longer pay handsome subsidies to companies for a collective service when they can get their letters by a non-collective service. It is too much to expect also that the Chancellor of the Exchequer will be more disposed than he has been for 30 or 40 years past to spend any money whatever on maintaining steam communication with the West Indian Dominions. At the same time, we recognise, as both noble Lords have said, that any idea of developing the solidarity of our West Indian Dominions, which we are constantly urged to do by the Chamber of Agriculture and commercial conferences and so on, is continually rendered futile by the extraordinary and maddening difficulties of inter-communication with the Islands. I heartily support the appeal of the noble Lord and the noble Viscount to His Majesty's Government to do all they can to help the West Indies in this matter, and to bring to a satisfactory conclusion the negotiations that are now proceeding in Canada.
LORD NEWTON: My Lords, when we talk about the indifference and want of interest shown in this country to the West Indies it is sincerely to be hoped no inhabitant of the West Indies is present this afternoon, otherwise, judging by the appearance of this House, he might get it into his head that that indifference was even greater than we are generally credited with showing. I only rose for the purpose of saying that I was in Jamaica for some time in the past winter, and, like everyone else, I could not help being struck with the intense want of inter-communication between the Islands. It only requires a single sentence from me to put the matter before your Lordships. It sounds almost incredible, but I believe it to be the fact, that if you wish to write from Kingston in Jamaica to Barbados the quickest way is to send the letter via England. That ought to demonstrate to everybody what the conditions are, and I do not think it necessary to add any further comments.
THE EARL OF CLARENDON: My Lords, the Question which my noble friend, Lord Lamington, has addressed to His Majesty's Government divides itself really into two parts. The first part deals with the question of a direct

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service between the West Indies and this country, and the second part with the question of inter-communication between the Islands themselves. Dealing with the first part, I should like to say that His Majesty's Government are quite aware that the shipping communications between this country and the West Indies are not altogether satisfactory. From time to time the Imperial Shipping Committee have carefully investigated applications which have been made to them by the West Indian Islands with regard to a direct service between this country and those Islands, but in practically every case, I am informed, the trade was really not sufficient, in the opinion of the Committee, to justify them taking any steps in the matter.
The real difficulty, I think, is stated in the Report of the West Indian Shipping Committee, which was published as a Parliamentary Paper, I think in 1919. In that Paper, I believe, it is made quite clear that the real difficulty is one of maintaining a regular service between widely scattered communities which only provide an amount of passenger and freight traffic limited in extent, and subject to marked seasonal fluctuations. I need hardly say that His Majesty's Government is ready at all times to consider any practical proposals that may be put forward by the West Indian Colonies, some, I think I may rightly say, of our most loyal Colonies, in order to improve the communications between this country and those Islands. I cannot refrain from adding this further remark, that in view of what I have just said I cannot but feel there will be no question of any alteration in the happy relations which exist between this country and those Islands. The Report of the Imperial Economic Committee has not yet been received in this country, and we do not yet know whether in that. Report this Committee will make any recommendations upon this particular subject, but I can assure your Lordships of this fact, that, if they do make any recommendations, those recommendations will receive the most full and careful consideration at the hands of His Majesty's Government.
With regard to inter-communication between the West Indian Colonies themselves, this is very largely dependent upon the Royal Mail Steam Packet Co., which operates between Canada and, I believe, the eastern groups of Islands, and also
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upon a service which was instituted as a result of the Canada-West Indies Trade Agreement of 1920, made between Canada, the Bahamas, Jamaica and British Honduras. As was pointed out by my noble friend Lord Burnham, one of the principal duties of the conference which is now sitting will be to review this agreement of 1920, and it will also be their duty to review the question of an adequate mail passenger and freight service between the Islands, as well as any other subjects of mutual interest. Pending the result of the deliberations of this Conference, at which, I may say, His Majesty's Government is represented, I am afraid I cannot usefully add anything further at this moment on this particular aspect of the question.
LORD LAMINGTON: My Lords, may I be allowed to say one word. I thank the noble Earl for having answered me sc fully and kindly, but my chief point is that while there may be sufficient direct communication, or rather a fair amount of direct communication, between these Islands and Great Britain, the lesser isles are practically cut off altogether. I want a service from Barbados which will satisfy the people living in this particular part of the Carribean Sea.

FORMER ENEMY ALIENS (DISABILITIES REMOVAL) BILL.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
THE FIRST COMMISSIONER OF WORKS (VISCOUNT PEEL): My Lords, the object of this Bill is to remove certain disabilities on foreign enemy aliens resulting from the legislation passed during the War. The Anglo-German Commercial Treaty, signed on December 2, 1924, was based on the application of the most-favoured-nation principle, and, to secure that British subjects and companies shall enjoy this treatment in Germany, the Germans, naturally, put forward a claim that we should not treat German citizens and German companies differently from the subjects and citizens of other foreign countries. The particular disabilities which are alluded to in the Schedule refer to seamen, traders in non-ferrous metals, and banking companies. Of course, while these special

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disabilities are removed by this Bill, these German seamen and others, while falling under the disabilities laid down by The Aliens' Restriction (Amendment) Act, 1919, will be treated in no ways differently from other aliens. Although this legislation was really directed principally against the Germans, it has been thought right to apply this Bill generally to other enemy aliens, Austrians, Turks and others, and there is nothing in the Bill to limit the right of the Government to introduce general legislation against all aliens, provided that it does not discriminate specially against German aliens.
There is very little I have to say as to the restrictions on traders in nonferrous metals and banking companies, because in both cases the legislation provided that the limitations should only last for some five years, although in one case Parliament will decide whether the limitations should be carried further. The only point on which there might be some criticism is with regard to seamen, and on that question I understand that the Seamen's Union, representing about nine unions, are satisfied with this legislation and, indeed, consider that it would be an advantage in many ways for a British ship to be able to have a certain number of these German seamen on board. In the emigrant trade from Germany to America I understand that Germans are unwilling to go on board these ships unless the stewards can talk their own language.
That is, briefly, the general object of this Bill I should like to add this as regards Austria. Before the Commercial Treaty with Austria was ratified, the Austrian Government raised the question, and the Treaty was only ratified after Austria had been assured that the Bill to be introduced in pursuance of the Anglo-German Treaty would be so framed as to secure the removal of disabilities from Austrians at the same time. I beg to move
Moved, That the Bill he now read 2a.—(Viscount Peel.)
EARL BEAUCHAMP: My Lords, I do not rise to oppose the passage of this Bill nor to make a long speech in its support I propose to do something
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which is a great deal less tactful than either. I cannot refrain from saying that the main Act which it is sought to repeal by this Bill was moved in the year 1918, and that on that occasion I moved that it should be read a second time that day six months. It is therefore with no small sense of pleasure that I see the Government are now repealing that Act. The noble Viscount will forgive me if I say that it would have been some satisfaction to me if he had told the House a little more about the way in which that Act of Parliament has operated. I suppose that in private life there is nobody we dislike more than the person who says, "I told you so." It is the same also in public life; yet I cannot avoid saying that the criticisms which were passed in 1918, when the original Bill, called the Non-Ferrous Metal Industry Act, was passed, have been to some extent justified.
At that moment we were frightened by a number of bogies, and I should like to know how far the expectations that harm would be done to the non-ferrous metal industry in this country have or have not been justified. On that occasion a speech was made by a noble Lord whom we all respected, the late Lord Balfour of Burleigh, in which there was a considerable passage dealing with the way in which the Australian trade would be adversely affected unless that Act was passed. I should like to have heard from the noble Viscount whether the Government has been able to assure itself that Australia will not be affected by the repeal of that Act; and whether Australia is satisfied with the repeal of that Act. I believe it will be found that they are satisfied with its repeal; that the expectations which were held out in 1918 have not been justified; that the Act was never needed in order to carry out the restrictions which noble Lords opposite wished at that time to impose upon the conduct of this industry; and that it is desirable now that this Act of Parliament should be repealed. I content myself with saying that I am heartily glad that this Act is now to be repealed. I am sorry to think it was ever necessary to pass it.
VISCOUNT PEEL: Just one sentence in reply to the speech of the noble Earl and his question as to the success or non-success of the Non-Ferrous Metal Industry Act, 1918. Five years was laid

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down as a period, as the noble Earl knows, with the idea that during that time British trade in these metals would be able to organise itself. The five years have now elapsed, and I understand that the Board of Trade consider that during that time this object has been attained, and that this British industry has been
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able to organise itself upon a satisfactory footing.
On Question, Bill read 2a; and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.
House adjourned at twenty minutes past seven o'clock.