HL Deb 09 December 1925 vol 62 cc1277-306

Order of the Day for the House to be put into Committee read.

Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

House in Committee accordingly:

[The EARL OF DONOUGHMORE in the Chair.]

Clause 1:

Probation officers.

(2) The probation committee of a probation area may pay such sums by way of salary or remuneration to the probation officers appointed for the area and to any persons, not being probation officers, named in probation orders made by any court of summary jurisdiction sitting within the area or by any court of assize or quarter sessions in respect of persons who have been committed for trial by examining justices sitting within the area, and such sums on account of expenses incurred by those officers and persons in the performance of their duties, as may be agreed upon between the committee and the local authority liable to defray that salary, or, failing agreement, as may be determined by the Secretary of State with the approval of the Treasury.

LORD DESBOROUGH moved, in subsection (2), after "duties, as," to insert "subject to the provisions of this Part of this Act with respect to scales of salaries, remuneration and expenses." The noble Lord said: I think this and the following amendments to Clause 1 are practically drafting. The Home Office is advised that as the Bill stands there is a possible inconsistency between Clause 1 (2) as amended and Clause 8, and the Amendment on the Paper is required to make the situation quite clear.

Amendment moved— Page 2, line 2, after ("as") insert ("subject to the provisions of this Part of this Act with respect to scales of salaries, remuneration and expenses").—(Lord Desborough.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Amendments moved—

Page 2, line 4, leave out ("defray that salary") and insert ("make the payment")

Page 2, line 4, leave out ("as")

Page 2, lines 5 and 6, leave out ("with the approval of the Treasury").—(Lord Desborough.)

On Question, Amendments agreed to.

Clause 1, as amended, agreed to.

Clauses 2 to 10 agreed to.

Clause 11:

Venue in indictable offences.

11.—(1) A person charged with any indictable offence may be proceeded against, indicted, tried and punished in any county or place in which he was apprehended, or is in custody on a charge for the offence, or has appeared in answer to a summons lawfully issued charging the offence, as if the offence had been committed in that county or place, and the offence shall, for all purposes incidental to or consequential on the prosecution, trial or punishment thereof, be deemed to have been committed in that county or place:

Provided that, if at any time it appears to any examining justices during the course of any proceedings taken against any person before them in pursuance of this subsection that the accused would suffer hardship if he were indicted and tried in the county or place aforesaid, the examining justices shall forthwith (but without prejudice to their powers under Section twenty-two of the Indictable Offences Act, 1848), cease to proceed further in the matter under this subsection.

EARL RUSSELL moved, at the beginning of subsection (1), after "A person charged with any indictable offence," to insert "committed in England or Wales." The noble Earl said: You may remember that on the Second Reading I raised a question on this clause, whether the language was not so wide as to include the possibility of trying offences committed anywhere, and the noble Viscount on the Woolsack was good enough to state that he would consider it. I have put down an Amendment intended to meet the point, but if the noble and learned Viscount has considered the matter I should be glad to know what is his view.

Amendment moved— Page 9, line 41, after ("offence") insert ("committed in England or Wales").—(Earl Russell.)

THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT CAVE)

I am much obliged to the noble Earl for the manner in which he has put this point. I am quite satisfied that under no conditions could an offence committed out of England and Wales, not now triable in our Courts, be tried under this Bill, which in no way extends the jurisdiction of our Criminal Courts. If this Amendment were inserted it might create uncertainty as to the other clauses of the Bill.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

LORD PHILLIMORE moved, in the proviso to subsection (1) after "justices," where that word first occurs, to insert "or to a Judge of the High Court of Justice." The noble and learned Lord said: On the Second Reading I pointed out that it seemed possible, under the clause as it stood, that a man might be tried in a place where there would be great difficulty for him to get his witnesses, and far away from the place where the crime was supposed to have been committed. I could not at the moment see any particular object in the clause. The Lord Chancellor explained that the object was to save occasionally transporting people from one place to another, and so that a man might be tried where he was arrested. I can see possibly some small advantage from the point of money and of convenience if that is done, and I do not want to interfere in any way with the action of the Executive or the police in such matters, but I do still think there is a danger that in times of stress or excitement, or with a justice who is not very discreet, the clause might be worked to the disadvantage of a prisoner. I have accordingly suggested that there should be a power of appealing from the discretion of a justice to a Judge of the High Court of Justice, just as there is at this moment a power of appealing, in matters of bail, where undue bail has been asked for or bail has been refused, to a Judge of the High Court of Justice sitting in Chambers. Probably it is very rarely that the power would be used, but the existence of that power would have a steadying effect upon the police and justices, and when it is required to be used it can be done very simply. I am in great hopes that the Government will see their way to accept this Amendment.

Amendment moved— Page 10, line 10, after ("justices") insert ("or to a Judge of the High Court of Justice").—(Lord Phillimore.)

LORD PARMOOR

I do not like this proviso at all, and in a subsequent Amendment I have tried to introduce words which I think might, or ought to, limit its application. I think it would tell hardly, particularly in the case of poor prisoners. I certainly hope that the Amendment of the noble Lord will be accepted.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I am afraid that if effect could be given to this Amendment it would have to be re-drafted so as to give a clear power of appeal. But, in any case, I hope that the Amendment will not be pressed. The whole object of the proviso is to assist and expedite the administration of justice. The main part of the clause is to the effect that if a man is apprehended in a particular county, or a summons is issued against him in that county, and he appears, then the hearing may, if the examining justices think it right, take place in that county. That, of course, is to save the transport of people from place to place, to facilitate a quick hearing, and to enable the hearing to take place in most cases where the offender is found. The proviso makes it clear that if the justices think that any hardship would accrue to the accused by reason of their taking that course then they shall not proceed.

I agree that that leaves the discretion with them, but I have always found—and I am sure the noble Lord has always found—that magistrates are careful in using their powers. I think that this discretion may be trusted to them, and I feel some difficulty in imagining a case where, in sonic small charge, the prisoner during the course of the proceedings—for that is the expression—would be allowed to delay the whole matter until he went to a High Court Judge and asked the opinion of that Judge upon the question of the more convenient jurisdiction. If the noble Lord presses it I will certainly think it over once more between now and the Report stage, but my present view is that it would only complicate matters and minimise the value of the clause.

LORD PHILLIMORE

I am afraid that I have not made my point clear. The earlier part of the clause enables the justices to enter into the examination of a prisoner at the place where he is arrested, though the crime may have been committed far away. If the charge is a charge against a man residing in some particular part of the country but happening to be arrested in another part, it may be very difficult for him, particularly if he is a poor man, to get the local witnesses who are required. No doubt the proviso is prepared in order to meet that case. But what I want the proviso to say is Provided that if at any time it appears to any examining justices or to a Judge of the High Court of Justice during the course of any proceedings … that the accused will suffer hardship, then he should obtain the benefit of the proviso. I do feel that it is not right that a single justice should be given the power to determine the venue where a man is to be tried, it being a non-natural venue.

I do not myself see the objection to the form of the words I have proposed, but I am perfectly prepared to accept any other Amendment. I hope that the Government will see their way to allow this power of appeal. It is not only in small cases that it would apply. These may be very serious charges indeed—charges of serious sexual offences, and you might easily have a charge of murder tried under this clause. I hope the Government will allow the natural and simple course of an appeal being taken to a High Court Judge who would decide the matter summarily and at once, at no serious expense or trouble to anybody. I think there ought to be some concession on this point.

EARL RUSSELL

A strong point is that made by the noble Lord about the non-natural venue. I do not much like this change in the law at all, and I do not see any particular reason given in the clause why it should take place. It is quite a new theory that you try a man where you happen to catch him, and if you are going to do that it is surely not for the purposes of justice, but for the purposes of administrative convenience. If it is to be done it should be surrounded with all possible safeguards.

LORD PARMOOR

If it is a question of drafting there should be no difficulty about it.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I will consider it very seriously.

LORD PHILLIMORE

I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

LORD PARMOOR moved, in the proviso in subsection (1), after "hardship," to insert "or be put to additional expense." The noble Lord said: This is an Amendment on the same proviso. The clause is not to be put into operation if at any time it appears to any examining justices during the course of any proceedings taken against any person before them in pursuance of this subsection that the accused would suffer hardship … in the circumstances specified. That appears to me to be a very wide expression, and I desire to protect a poor person who has been charged with a criminal offence against his being put to any additional expense. I know from my own experience in Quarter Sessions that that is a very important point. It may be said that the amount of expense is small, but I do not think that answers my objection. I do not think the prisoner ought to be put to any additional expense. Directly you raise the question of the amount of additional expense you give the whole discretion to the justices.

Amendment moved— Page 10, line 12, after ("hardship") insert ("or be put to additional expense").—(Lord Parmoor.)

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I really do not think this Amendment is necessary. The effect of it would be that if it would cost the accused an extra shilling to be tried in one Court rather than the other the whole machinery of the clause is to fall to the ground. Surely, if any substantial extra expense should be caused that would be "hardship," which a magistrate would be willing to consider, but to say that if it caused any extra expense the whole thing should go would I submit, be somewhat absurd. This Amendment comes rather badly from my noble friend, because in the Bill as his Government introduced it the clause was only operative if there were "undue hardship" caused to the prisoner. So he appears to consider a certain amount of hardship to be due to the prisoner.

LORD PARMOOR

I do not want to go into personal matters, but I happened to be away at Geneva at the particular time, and there were many matters that I should have objected to. It is quite true that the word "undue" has now been eliminated, because I put down originally an Amendment to take out the word "undue." But it has been very properly eliminated. I do feel, however, on the question of expense, that no expense in a matter of this kind should be put on a poor prisoner by a change of venue from what I might call the natural venue to a place where he might be separated from the surroundings with which he is conversant. However, I do not wish to put the House to the trouble of dividing and, as the noble and learned Viscount does not see his way to accept my words, I will not press them.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 11 agreed to.

Clause 12:

Provisions as to taking of depositions and caution to and statement of accused on proceedings before examining justices.

The evidence which may be given by the accused or his witnesses under this section shall be such evidence only as is material for the purpose of enabling the justices to determine whether the accused ought or ought not to be committed for trial, and, if so committed, for what offence.

LORD PARMOOR moved to omit this paragraph from subsection (5). The noble Lord said: The words I propose to omit are: The evidence which may be given by the accused or his witneses under this section"— that is the section we are considering and which deals with the change of venue— shall be such evidence only as is material for the purpose of enabling the justices to determine whether the accused ought or ought not to be committed for trial, and, if so committed, for what offence. That is to say, that the whole case cannot be heard but only a portion of it, for the purpose of enabling the justices to determine whether the accused ought or ought not to be committed for trial. I suggest that it is impossible to determine that point without hearing the whole ease. One of the most material witnesses at the end of the case is the person charged, if he desires to make his own statement. I very much object to the notion that at this period and for this purpose any individual charged with an offence should not be at liberty to put forward his whole case for the defence, but that he should be limited to one particular only. I am moving that the whole paragraph be left out.

Amendment moved— Page 12, line 23, leave out lines 23 to 28.—(Lord Parmoor.)

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I do not wonder that the noble and learned Lord desired an explanation of this paragraph because, to those who are less familiar than he with the practice of petty sessional courts, it seems rather strange The fact is that this is a consolidating Bill and it is intended to give effect to the practice as it obtains to-day. This paragraph represents the practice to-day, which has been determined by the Courts to be the proper practice. That is really the case. The justices have to consider whether they will commit the accused for trial or not, and they are carefully warned by everyone that it is not their business to try the case but that when they come to the conclusion that there Should be a committal for trial it is better, not only for the prosecution but for the accused, that the evidence should not proceed further than is necessary to determine that point. So it has been held that they have the right, indeed they have often been told it is their duty, not to try the whole case out.

Take a case of criminal libel. The magistrates may say that the case ought really to be tried. But the accused may say: "No, I want to justify the libel here in this petty sessional court. I want to call all my witnesses and prove that the libel was true." You may have a trial going on for days on an issue which the magistrates really have to right to determine when all the evidence is over. If they have made up their minds that they ought to commit, it is better that they should say so and let the evidence be directed entirely to the question as to whether there shall or shall not be a committal for trial and not to the other question, which in that case will not arise in that Court, as to whether there should be a conviction. I am told, and I believe it is true, that this represents the practice to-day. If so, I do not think that noble Lords mould wish to alter it.

EARL RUSSELL

Is that a quite exhaustive description of what might happen? Criminal libel, of course, is a very peculiar thing and there is no doubt that you cannot justify it before the magistrate. But supposing you are charged with an ordinary felony or theft and your defence is not so much to traverse the evidence of the prosecution as something in the nature of an alibi: that is a thing your may be allowed to put forward and which must be put forward in the police court.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

Certainly.

EARL RUSSELL

Because it is not evidence as to whether there is a prima facie case made out against you, which is rather a point for committal. It is evidence, that, where there is a prima facie case made nit, there is a complete answer which, if the justices believe, disposes of it then and there.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

Clearly in that case such a course would be followed.

EARL RUSSELL

I am not sure that it could be under this. Is it necessary to put this paragraph in? Will not the rules of evidence govern the matter without there being any thing statutory about it?

LORD PHILLIMORE

I think the Lord Chancellor is right and I think it is for the advantage of the accused. The magistrate is not to try the case and, therefore, it is not necessary for the accused to produce all his witnesses. One of the most telling arguments against the defence is: "Why did you not raise it before?" It is a very fair argument against the prisoner that he has a chance of making his statement before the magistrates and has not done so. It is a little hard upon him if, when he brings some witnesses to the trial which he was not conveniently able to bring before, it is said to him: "You could have brought these witnesses before the magistrates but you did not," and, therefore, they are discredited. I think it is to the advantage of the prisoner or the person accused teat he should not be able to bring his whole case forward before the magistrates because it will save him from having the reflection made upon him later that he has not done it. I think most people accustomed to defending prisoners would tell your Lordships' House that on the whole this provision is for the benefit of the prisoner.

LORD PARMOOR

I am sorry I cannot agree with Lord Phillimore and with the Lord Chancellor. The comments which Lord Phillimore has mentioned are undoubtedly made. But I have sat very often in petty sessions and Quarter Sessions, and I know of no such practice as that referred to by the Lord Chancellor. Let me take an illustration—I am not quite certain that I have it accurately and I should be very sorry if it were not accurate. But take the Poor Prisoners Act under which a prisoner asks and ought to be allowed to have counsel to defend him. He is not entitled to it unless he has already disclosed at the preliminary inquiry what is the nature of his defence.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

He must disclose it, but he need not prove it.

LORD PARMOOR

Yes; but that is a very fine distinction, if I may so put it, to ask any magistrate to make, and it may put the accused in a very serious position indeed, because it will be said at once that disclosure was made as to the nature of the defence but no evidence was given which supported it in any way. So far as the Poor Prisoners Act is concerned, I think that would reduce it to a nullity. I am sorry to say that I take the other view and, if necessary, I shall have to ask your Lordships to divide.

LORD CHARNWOOD

I am very reluctant to interpose, but looking at it, like Lord Phillimore, from the point of view of the poor prisoner and assuming, unlike Lord Phillimore, that I happened to be innocent, it is surely a great advantage to me when I come to be tried that I should tell, through myself and my witnesses, precisely the story I told in the first instance before the magistrates. Upon that ground I hope that the interests of the innocent prisoner in this respect will be preserved.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I do not want to have a Division at this early stage, and as the noble and learned Lord feels strongly about this I will think this over before the Report stage and, perhaps, the noble and learned Lord will put it down again.

EARL RUSSELL

Will not the Lord Chancellor accept it now?

LORD PARMOOR

I do not want to controvert the Lord Chancellor. I know there are difficulties about a Division and I do not want to be obstructive in any case. But might I ask that this paragraph should be deleted now? I am willing to consider before the Report stage any matter he brings forward. That, surely, is the proper course.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I do not like taking things out of a Bill and putting them in again, and as I have behind me the experience of Lord Phillimore I could not do that to-day.

LORD PARMOOR

I do not want to go to a Division, but I am afraid in that case I shall have to do so.

EARL RUSSELL

What do you expect an honest prisoner to do? You expect a man who is wrongly accused to disclose his whole defence the moment he comes before the magistrates. He says: "I am an innocent man, and I am wrongfully accused. What I actually did say was so and so, and I told my story at the earliest possible moment." You could have no stronger testimony in his favour when he comes to trial than that. I hope the noble and learned Viscount will accept this Amendment.

LORD PHILLIMORE

I think noble Lords are under a misconception. This does not prevent a prisoner from stating fully what his case is, and swearing to it. It does not prevent a prisoner from calling witnesses. It only says that the magistrates are not, after a certain point, to be compelled to hear all the witnesses out, and to try out the case. I can assure the noble Lord, as the learned Lord Chancellor has said—and my experience as a Judge in the Crown Court confirms it—that it is to the advantage of the accused.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

I am very reluctant to intervene in the debate, which I have very imperfectly heard, and which is being conducted by noble and learned Lords, in whose profession I have great confidence but no great capacity to mingle. I should venture to think that the offer which has been made by my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor is one which ought to be accepted. He has said that in consequence of the observations which have been made by noble and learned Lords he is quite willing to consider this question between now and Report. I have heard that offer made thousands of times, and I suggest to the noble and learned Lord that it should be accepted. It is not an easy thing for a Leader of the House in this particular period of the year and at this period of the evening to get through public business, and if the result of a Division were to show—I do not think it will show—that there were not sufficient noble Lords present to carry on the business, then I do not think that would be in the interests of all concerned. Although I am responsible for the Bill being put clown for this evening, I do not think it was my fault that it was postponed till the later stages of our proceedings. Your Lordships are all aware that the Irish-Bill came upon us like a thunderclap, and had to be dealt with. In these circumstances I would ask noble Lords opposite to try to co-operate, with us in carrying on the business. It will be a very reasonable thing to allow this matter—a delicate matter of Quarter Sessions procedure—to stand over until the next stage of the Bill, and I rather hope that will be done.

LORD PARMOOR

I appreciate the nature of the appeal which has been made by the noble Marquess, and I am not unprepared to assent to it as regards my Amendment. On the other hand, sometimes leaving these matters over for consideration is a convenient way of getting rid of them. I am speaking quite frankly. To my mind this is a very important matter regarding the fair trial of prisoners. —an extremely important matter. I am sorry that I differ from my noble friend Lord Phillimore, and from the learned Lord Chancellor but if the Lord Chancellor assures us on this aide of the House that this matter will have attention, I am willing to come and talk it over with him, but if the standing of it over is merely a method of getting rid of an immediate difficulty then I do not agree. Having regard to what the noble Marquess the Leader of the House has said I shall not press my Amendment further if the learned Lord Chancellor will understand that I really want to have it considered.

EARL RUSSELL

Before the noble and learned Viscount replies may I say another word? This is, of course, a very important Bill, and the Committee stage is a very important stage. It is not in the least the fault of the noble Marquess, or of anybody, that there is a very thin House for it, but it is very unfortunate. I have an Amendment later about which there will be very diverse opinions in the House, and upon which it would be rather absurd to take a Division in a House of this size. If this is put off, will the noble and learned Lord see that on Third Reading we have some sort of guarantee that it will be taken earlier in the evening and in a full House?

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

It is only to Report stage and not to. Third Reading that this is put off. I think I may be allowed to say that when I ask for time to consider a point I do consider it. I have had the honour of conducting many Bills through this and the other House, and I make it a point, if I think there is a real matter to be dealt with, of dealing with it, on my own Amendment if need be, on Report, or at any rate giving an Amendment of any noble Lord full consideration. I recognise that this Amendment has received considerable support, and I will consider it with the utmost desire to arrive at the best decision in the public interest.

EARL RUSSELL

Can the noble and learned Viscount make any promise that the other stages will be taken at a rather more reasonable hour?

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

We do not expect another Irish Bill in this House. On the Report stage I shall certainly ask my noble friend to put down this Bill as the first important Order.

LORD PARMOOR

In those circumstances I withdraw my Amendment for future consideration.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 12 agreed to.

Clause 13 agreed to.

Clause 14 [Power of justices to commit to, and of court to direct re-trial at, convenient assizes or quarter sessions]:

LORD PARMOOR had an Amendment on the Paper to add to paragraph (b) of the proviso to subsection (1), "or be put to additional expense." The noble Lord said: These are the same words as I proposed for insertion before, and I assume that the learned Lord Chancellor takes the same view with regard to them therefore will not move again.

Clause 14 agreed to.

Clauses 15 to 18 agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved, after Clause 18, to insert the following new clause:—

Power to dispense with grand jury at quarter sessions where all persons committed have pleaded guilty.

".—(1) If by the fifth day preceding the day appointed for holding any quarter sessions no persons have been committed for trial at the sessions except persons in respect of whom a certificate has been transmitted in pursuance of Section four of the Administration of Justice Act, 1920, stating that they have pleaded guilty or admitted the truth of the charge, there shall be deemed to be no business requiring the attendance of grand jurors at that sessions, and the provisions of the Assizes and Quarter Sessions Act, 1908, shall apply accordingly.

"(2) In any case to which this section applies an indictment against any person for the offence in respect of which he was committed for trial may be presented to the court without having been found by a grand jury, and where an indictment is so presented it shall be proceeded with in the same manner as it would have been proceeded with before the commencement of this Act, and all enactments and rules of law relating to procedure in connection with indictable offences shall have effect accordingly.

"(3) An indictment against any person presented to a court of quarter sessions in pursuance of this section may contain, in addition to the counts for the offences specified in the caption of the depositions, any further counts founded on facts or evidence disclosed in any examination or deposition taken before a justice in the presence of the accused.

"A court of quarter sessions may in any case direct any such further counts as aforesaid to be added to any indictment presented to the court.

"(4) Rules may be made under the Indictments Act, 1915, for carrying this section into effect, and in particular for modifying, so far as is necessary for the purpose of this section, any enactment, including any statutory form, and for applying with the necessary modifications the provisions of Section three of the Indictable Offences Act, 1848, relating to certificates of an indictment having been found."

The noble and learned Viscount said: This is an Amendment to which I referred in debate on the Second Reading of the Bill. The other House has, after debate struck out from the Bill the clause which would have abolished grand juries at Quarter Sessions. I, of course, accept that decision, but I would like to take this opportunity of dealing with a small part of that subject. I can put the point in a few minutes. The Administration of Justice Act, 1920, provides that when a defendant pleads guilty before examining justices the clerk to the justices shall forward a certificate to that effect to the clerk of the court of trial, and the grand jury at the court of trial shall, on production of the certificate, return a true without hearing any witnesses. In other words, where the defendant has pleaded guilty at petty sessions and is sent for trial, the grand jury have no function at all to perform except to look at the document to see that it is a certificate that the accused has pleaded guilty, and then to find a true bill.

It does seem to me an outrage to ask twenty-three grand jurymen—with necessary allowance for absentees, usually you summon twice the necessary number of grand jurymen—it does seem to me an outrage to have forty or fifty grand jurymen, most of them busy men, made to come to Quarter Sessions, possibly in some cases from the other end of the county, for the sole purpose of looking at a piece of paper and seeing that the defendant has pleaded guilty and then formally finding a true bill. Some noble Lords may say that never happens. But it does happen. I heard a very distinguished Chairman of Quarter Sessions only a few days ago say that in the last four years it has happened three times in his court. If it happens as often as that in other courts, there may be many cases where this waste of time occurs, and. I hope your Lordships will agree to this. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 18, line 13, at end insert the said new clause.—(The Lord Chancellor.)

LORD PARMOOR

I have been a consistent supporter of maintaining the principle of grand juries at Quarter Sessions, and I have addressed your Lordships on more than one occasion on the principles of the maintenance of grand juries at Quarter Sessions. I have also myself proposed a clause in order to ensure that they should be so maintained. The present position has been put quite fairly and frankly by the learned Lord Chancellor. On an open vote in another place, where the Whips were taken off, by a considerable majority an Amendment was accepted which re-introduced the principle of summoning grand juries for Quarter Sessions exactly on the same footing as for Assizes. I have heard the Lord Chancellor more than once—and I am not saying this in any antagonistic sense—call attention to the possible loss of time. I do not take that view at all. If there is one matter on which the people of this country are ready to give services for national purposes of the most serious kind it is to assist in the administration of justice. It is said that jurors have to suffer a good deal by reason of the public duty they undertake; but it is a great public duty, and a duty which they are willing to perform and to which they do not take the objection one might anticipate.

I desire that there should be no distinction between Assizes and Quarter Sessions. At Quarter Sessions, if this Bill passes, you will have cases of a very serious kind, and why should the poorer class of prisoner who is probably worse defended at Quarter Sessions than at Assizes be deprived of any advantage of this kind? I will give instances. I have known cases of prisoners who have pleaded guilty, and I have pointed out to the grand jury that, although the prisoner appears to have pleaded guilty, it may well have been under a, misapprehension. I have not the same regard for justices as the Lord Chancellor has, although they do their business extremely well; but on more than one occasion I have pointed out to the grand jury that although the prisoner appears to have pleaded guilty they must take an independent view—

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I have not made my point quite clear apparently. In the case covered by this Amendment they cannot do that. They must find the prisoner guilty, and therefore it is useless to talk to the grand jury about what magistrates may have done.

LORD PARMOOR

In a case where a prisoner has pleaded guilty the grand jury may consider the matter.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

No they cannot.

LORD PARMOOR

There is no reason why they should not.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

The Act of 1920 says they shall not.

LORD PARMOOR

I looked carefully at the Act of 1920 because that is the Act which excuses jurors from coming to Quarter Sessions under certain conditions.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

Oh no, that is another Act.

LORD PARMOOR

I think it is the Act of 1920.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

No, it is not.

LORD PARMOOR

I am not dealing with the 1908 Act but with the Act of 1920. I think it is possible the Lord Chancellor may have in his mind the Act of 1908 which is referred to in his Amendment.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I think we are at cross-purposes. The Act of 1920 provides that where an accused has pleaded guilty at petty sessions and is sent for trial the grand jury, on a certificate of that plea being produced to them, must find a true bill, and cannot throw it out. That is the Act to which I refer. This Amendment provides that when that happens, and it is made clear five days before the Quarter Sessions that there is no other case in the list, then the case shall come under the Act of 1908 and the grand jury need not attend at all.

LORD PARMOOR

In connection with that there is a provision for dispensing with the grand jury in certain cases. I want to get the principle quite clear. I do not look upon the grand jury as being summoned for criminal purposes only, but as part of our whole jury system which I regard as increasingly important. What does the next part of this Amendment mean in which it says: In any case to which this section applies an indictment against any person for the offence in respect of which he was committed for trial may be presented to the court without having been found by a grand jury. There you contemplate the very provision I refer to. You contemplate the case where a prisoner is tried by Quarter Sessions and has pleaded guilty, his case not having been before the grand jury. If the Lord Chancellor is able to convince me I am wrong I am open to conviction; but those are the words. There is a direct contemplation of a prisoner being tried at Quarter Sessions without his case having been before the grand jury.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

He has pleaded guilty.

LORD PARMOOR

Is it the case that this clause only applies to cases where the prisoner has pleaded guilty?

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

Most certainly. If the noble and learned Lord would do me the honour of reading the subsection he will see that the whole clause applies to cases where the man has pleaded guilty and the function of the grand jury is purely nominal.

LORD PHILLIMORE

I am anxious to save grand juries at Quarter Sessions, and being anxious to keep grand juries at Quarter Sessions I support the Lord Chancellor. The only chance of keeping grand juries at Quarter Sessions is to avoid their being summoned in cases where the man has already pleaded guilty, and where it is known that the grand jury can have nothing to do.

LORD PARMOOR

I do not want to interfere with business, and therefore for the reasons which have been given I do not propose to divide against this new clause.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 19:

Court of quarter sessions on appeal to state case on point of law.

(3) If a court of quarter sessions is of opinion that an application under this section is frivolous, it may refuse to state a case, and where the court does so it shall, if the applicant so requires, cause the clerk of the peace to deliver to him a certificate of the refusal, and the reasons for the refusal shall be stated in the certificate:

Provided that the court shall not refuse to state a case where the application is made by or on behalf of the Attorney-General.

LORD PARMOOR moved to omit the proviso in subsection (3). The noble and learned Lord said: I do not want the Attorney-General in matters of this kind to have any preferential position. I do not want any distinction made in his favour. I think it is extremely hard on prisoners generally that special privileges should be granted to the Attorney-General that are not in accordance with the ordinary criminal procedure, and I therefore move that the words: Provided that the Court shall not refuse to state a case where the application is made by or on behalf of the Attorney-General be omitted. I presume that they apply to almost any case, because application might be made on behalf of the Public Prosecutor, for instance, and would then come under the words "by or on behalf of the Attorney-General." It is very unlikely that at Quarter Sessions an application would be made by the Attorney-General himself, it would be made on his behalf. I object very much to any privilege of this kind being given to the Attorney-General, and I therefore move that the words of this proviso be omitted.

Amendment moved— Page 19, line 7, leave out lines 7 to 9.—(Lord Parmoor.)

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I think that the noble and learned Lord is under a misapprehension. In very few cases does the Attorney-General appear at Quarter Sessions, either in person or through some counsel who represents him. It is only in such cases that this proviso would apply. It would not apply to ordinary cases of prosecutions at Quarter Sessions. Let me add that this proviso is not new. It is the rule and statutory as regards the stating of cases at petty sessions and is found in an Act of 1857, which relates to the dealing by justices with cases out of session. There, too, they have to state a, case if the Attorney-General asks for it. After all, the Attorney-General is a public officer who acts in the public interest and it is only in the public interest that he will require a case to be stated, although the justices might be unwilling to do so. It does seem a pity that in this new provision, which for the first time makes it compulsory upon the justices to state a case if required, there should be a clause which makes it impossible for the Attorney-General, if he thinks fit, to get a case stated. I put it, not for a moment on the grounds of privilege for an individual—

LORD PARMOOR

Oh, no, it is the system.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I put it on the grounds of the public interest that where the Attorney-General thinks that a real point of importance is raised he should be entitled to call upon the Court to state a case.

LORD OLIVIER

I should like a little more elucidation, if I may say so, from the noble and learned Viscount. This refusal can be made only if the application is frivolous. Is it part of our constitutional theory that the Attorney-General cannot make a frivolous application?

LORD PHILLIMORE

Really these objections are traversing the whole of the principles on which our procedure rests. The Attorney-General is an officer of justice and as such has always had certain duties, certain liabilities, certain responsibilities and certain privileges given to him, and to say that the justices should be able, when the Attorney-General applies for a case to be stated, to say that his application is frivolous is really to turn matters topsy-turvy.

LORD PARMOOR

I think the noble and learned Lord is quite wrong there. It is not a privilege which the Attorney-General has at the present time. The Lord Chancellor has pointed out quite rightly that it is a privilege which he has before the magistrates—

LORD PHILLIMORE

The noble Lord must forgive me. I was not dealing with this specific point but with the whole class of procedure. He may not have the privilege now, but it is analogous to the privileges that he has.

LORD PARMOOR

I do not want to get into controversy with the noble and learned Lord, but, as a matter of fact, that is the very point. Are we to extend in this direction the privileges which in certain other directions the Attorney-General now possesses? I am not expressing the view that the Attorney-General is likely to act unreasonably. What we are dealing with here are the methods of trial, and what I have in mind is the position of the prisoner. It seems to me that in every clause of this Bill you are bringing in an official element, and one thing that we want preserved is the independence of our Courts from official interference, whether from the Attorney-General or any other official. In those circumstances, why should not the Court of Quarter Sessions be entitled to deal with the Attorney-General or any one who acts on his behalf as they would with counsel in any other case Here we have a provision that, unless the application is frivolous, the Court is to grant a case for the opinion of a superior Court. I agree with the noble Lord beside me that the only outstanding case is the frivolous one. I do not want merely to deal with words, but I do object most strongly to any special privilege of any kind being given to what is really the official element: and the Attorney-General is rather more than an official in this case, because he so often represents the Public Prosecutor. I hope that we shall keep our criminal jurisdiction quite free from any special privilege given to the Attorney-General.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

May I make an appeal to the noble Lord? This clause gives to every one the right to have a case stated—

LORD PARMOOR

Provided it is not frivolous.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I was going on to say that the exception is that, if the magistrates think the application frivolous, they can refuse to state a case. The proviso does assume, as the noble Lord opposite suggested, that the Attorney-General is not likely to make a frivolous application. It is founded on that view. It is only if the noble Lord thinks that the Attorney-General is likely to make a frivolous application that his Amendment has any value at all. I am acting in this matter to a great extent on behalf of the Home Office, who promoted this Bill in the other House. They, I know, attach importance to keeping the practice in Quarter Sessions in this respect the same as in petty sessions, and therefore I do not like to give way. I hope that the noble Lord will not press his point, at all events to-night.

LORD PARMOOR

I admit that there is a great difficulty, as has been pointed out, and that it is impossible for the House under present conditions really to deal effectively with Amendments which are, in my opinion, Amendments of great importance. You cannot have Amendments of greater importance than those which deal with the administration of justice. Of course, there may be differences of opinion, and, if this House thinks after consideration that the difficulties which I raise are not real difficulties or are not difficulties which ought to be met by Amendments, there would be an end of the matter. But really it is reducing the Committee stage of an extremely important measure, dealing with the liberty of the subject, to a farce to go on under the condition that there can be no Division without stopping all the business of the House. I personally shall move no farther Amendments. It is utterly useless to proceed with Amendments in conditions of that kind. I move no further Amendments because, in any opinion, it is an utter farce.

THE LORD CHAIRMAN

Do I understand that the noble Lord presses this Amendment?

LORD PARMOOR

I will not press it. It is no use.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 19 agreed to.

Clauses 20 and 21 agreed to.

Clause 22:

Amendment of County of Hertford Acts, 1874 and 1878.

(3) Every court held under this section shall be a court of quarter sessions for the whole county of Hertford, and shall have power to hear, determine, and dispose of all business accordingly, including any business pending in either of the two divisions of the said county at the date on which this section comes into operation.

(6) This section shall come into operation on the first day of August, nineteen hundred and twenty-five.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I have two Amendments of a formal character on this clause. It is proposed that the clause should come into operation on June 1 next, with most other parts of the Bill and, that being so, certain words are not needed here.

Amendments moved—

Page 20, leave out line 40 and insert ("commencement, of this Act")

Page 21, lines 18 and 19, leave out subsection (6).—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendments agreed to.

Clause 22, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 23 [Summary trial of indictable offences]:

LORD PARMOOR

, who had on the Paper an Amendment to omit paragraph (b) of the proviso in subsection (1), said: I shall not move the Amendment at this stage, but will do so on the Report stage.

Clause 23 agreed to.

Clauses 24 to 30 agreed to.

Clause 31 [Form of documents in criminal proceedings before justice]:

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

The Amendments to this clause are really drafting Amendments which explain themselves.

Amendments moved—

Page 26, leave out lines 30 to 33.

Page 26, line 34, leave out ("Notwithstanding anything in this section")

Page 26, line 38, leave out ("this Act") and insert ("anything in this section continue to").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendments agreed to.

Clause 31, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 32 [Procedure on charge of offence against corporation]:

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

The Amendments to this clause are drafting, and they follow upon the decision in the other House on the clause relating to grand juries at Quarter Sessions.

Amendments moved—

Page 27, lines 4 and 5, leave out ("to present to the court of")

Page 27, line 11, after ("which") insert ("in the case of an adult")

Page 27, line 39, after ("assizes'') insert ("or Quarter Sessions")

Page 27, line 41, leave out from the beginning to ("the") in line 42.—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendments agreed to.

Clause 32, as amended, agreed to.

Clauses 33, 34 and 35 agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved, after Clause 35, to insert the following new clause:— (1) If any person receives, detains or has in his possession any document to which this section applies as a pledge or a security for a debt or with a view to obtaining payment from the person entitled thereto of a debt due either to himself or to any other person, he shall be liable, on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding twenty pounds, or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or to both such fine and imprisonment. (2) This section applies to certificates or official documents evidencing or issued in connection with the right of persons to pensions or allowances payable out of any grant which may be made out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom in pursuance of any Act for civil non-effective services.

The noble and learned Viscount said: I am in your Lordships' hands about proceeding further with this Bill now, but I want proper time to move this Amendment. The effect of the new clause which I am proposing is to put documents relating to Civil Service pensions on the same footing as those relating to Army and Navy pensions. As your Lordships know, no one is allowed to advance money on a pension paper relating to Army and Navy pensions. The object, of course, is to protect people against pledging their livelihood, so far as it depends upon a State pension, in advance. There are Acts securing that in the case of an Army or Navy pension, but no such legal provision exists in the case of Civil Service pensions, and I desire by this Amendment to put Civil Service pensions on the same footing. It follows the same wording as the sections which deal with the Army and Navy, and I think the effect of this clause is to put Civil Service pensions on the same footing.

Amendment moved— Page 29, line 36, at end, insert the said new clause.—(The Lord Chancellor.)

LORD OLIVIER

It is a provision with which I am very familiar in its present application, and being in receipt of a Civil Service pension I very -sympathetically agree to the new clause.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clauses 36 to 40 agreed to.

VISCOUNT ULLSWATER moved, after Clause 40, to insert the following new clause:— So much of section fifteen of the Theatres Act, 1843 (which enacts a penalty for acting plays before they have been allowed or after they have been disallowed, by the Lord Chamberlain) as provides that the licence (if any) of a theatre in which an offence under that section is committed shall became absolutely void shall cease to have effect, but the Court dealing with any such case may, in their discretion, in addition to imposing a Pecuniary penalty under that section, order that the licence, if any, of the theatre in which the offence was committed shall become void or shall be suspended for any specified period.

The noble Viscount said: This is a matter which need not occupy your lordships' attention at any length. It is a very minor amendment of the Theatres Act, 1843, which provides that wherever a play is given, or words are spoken, or songs introduced, and so forth, which have not received the licence of the Lord Chamberlain, the persons introducing them are to be liable to conviction and punishment, but the manager of the theatre in which these unlicensed performances are given is subject to the very severe penalty of losing his licence for the theatre altogether. The result has been, as often happens where the punishment does not fit the crime but is excessive, that in several cases where a manager has been summoned before the magistrates for a violation of the Act of 1843, the punishment has seemed to the magistrates to be so severe that they have declined to convict. They had no other alternative except to deprive him of his livelihood by depriving him of his licence.

The clause which I have the honour of submitting to your Lordships gives the magistrates a discretion. The punishment of the offender who has sung the song or spoken the words of the play will remain the same as under the old Act, but the magistrates will have discretion in the case of the manager who has permitted the unlicensed performance to take place. They may either fine him pecuniarily, or suspend his licence for such time as may seem good to them, or withdraw his licence altogether. I may say that the various managers interested in this matter held a meeting not long ago, at which representatives of the Society of West End Theatrical Managers, the Theatrical Managers' Association, the Entertainments Protection Association, and the managers' section of the Stage Guild passed a resolution asking that this Section 15 of the Theatres Act, 1843, should be amended in the direction indicated.

Amendment moved— Page 32, line 10, at end, insert the said new clause.—(Viscount Ullswater.)

THE EARL OF CROMER

At this late hour I hesitate to occupy your Lordships' time, but as I have the privilege of presiding over the Department mainly responsible for administering the Theatres Act of 1843, I would ask leave to say a few words in support of the Amendment. Experience shows that the question of unlicensed material being produced in theatres is more apt to occur in the provinces than in theatres under the Lord Chamberlain's jurisdiction in London. In former days, when companies in the provinces and theatres in the provinces mainly produced stock plays, the question of producing an unlicensed play hardly ever arose. Recently, however, since the introduction of the touring system and the form of entertainment known as revues, various cases have been brought to notice of unlicensed material having been produced.

The result of that has been that on three recent occasions prosecutions have been instituted with the endeavour to put a stop to this offence. In the last three instances the magistrates before whom these eases have come have declined to record a conviction, because of the penalty which would have attached, as my noble friend has explained, of the theatre licence being withdrawn. Therefore I would recommend to your Lordships' favourable consideration the question of an amendment on these lines, in order that when unlicensed material is brought to notice, and when prosecutions are instituted, an opportunity may be given to uphold the law and at the same time to redress what is certainly a grievance which the theatre managers had every intention of bringing to the notice of the Home Secretary, as my noble friend mentioned just now. That step on their part would be no longer necessary if your Lordships admit the justice of this Amendment, and recommend it for favourable consideration in another place.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I think this would effect a very valuable amendment of the Theatres Act.. Under the law as it stands, if the magistrates convict, the licence is automatically forfeited. That means a very serious loss to the owner of the licence. That is not only a hardship upon some people who have committed an offence without properly realising all the facts, but it leads to the acquittal of people who ought to be convicted. I was afraid it might be the case that sometimes magistrates, knowing that the effect of conviction is to forfeit the licence without any discretion or their part, might be very unwilling to convict even where the evidence rather Pointed in that direction, and what the noble Earl who has such knowledge of these matters has just said proves that in his experience that has actually happened, That is a most undesirable result and I am sure your Lordships would be right in accepting this Amendment.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 41 agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved, after Clause 41, to insert the following new clause:—

Power to release on bail before charge is accepted.

". The section substituted by Section twenty-two of the Criminal Justice Administration Act, 1914, for Section thirty-eight of the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879, shall have effect as though the following subsection were added thereto:

(2) If, on a person being so taken into custody as aforesaid, it appears to the superintendent, inspector or other officer aforesaid that the enquiry into the case cannot be completed forthwith, he may discharge the said person on his entering into a recognizance., with or without sureties for a reasonable amount, to appear at such police station and at such time as is named in the recognizance, sinless he previously receives notice in writing from the officer of police in charge of that police station that his attendance is not required, and any such recognizance may be enforced as if it were a recognizance conditioned for the appearance of the said person before the court of summary jurisdiction for the place in which the police station named in the recognizance is situate.

The noble and learned Viscount said: This is the clause which was promised in another place with a view to giving effect to one of the recommendations arising out of Mr. Rawlinson's report in connection with what was known as the Sheppard case. It became evident in that case that where a person was taken to a police station with a view to his being charged with an offence the police had no power to grant bail until they actually had charged him with the offence. Now it does sometimes happen that the police want to make further inquiry before lodging a formal charge and it is desirable that they should have time to do that, because it is a pity that a charge should be actually made unless the police intend to go on with it and that the man should be brought before a court simply for the purpose of being discharged. As things now stand the police do not like to delay making the charge because they have to keep the man in custody in the meantime and they cannot allow him to go away on bail. The effect of this clause would be that, even before they make the charge, the police may, if they are satisfied that the man is a responsible person and would come again, or on his finding proper securities, grant him bail, binding him over to appear either at that police station where he is or at some other convenient police station which is a suitable one for the purpose of the charge.

Amendment moved— Page 32, line 19, at end insert the said new clause.—(The Lord Chancellor.)

LORD OLIVIER

I see in subsection (2) the words: he may discharge the said person on his entering into a recognizance, with or without sureties for a reasonable amount, to appear at such police station and at such time as is named in the recognizance, unless he previously receives notice in writing from the officer of police in charge of that police station that his attendance is not required. It does not say that he is to be required to appear somewhere else.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

Yes, the clause states that he may be bound over "to appear at such police station and at such time as is named in the recognizance." I think those words "as is named in the recognizance" apply to "such police station" as well as to "such time."

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clauses 42 to 44 agreed to.

Clause 45:

Short title, interpretation, extent, repeal and commencement.

45.—(1) This Act may be cited as the Criminal Justice Act, 1925.

(2) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires—

(3) This Act shall not extend to Scotland or Northern Ireland.

(4) The enactments set out in the Third Schedule to this Act are hereby repealed to the extent specified in the third column of that Schedule.

(5) This Act shall, save as therein otherwise expressly provided, come into operation on the first day of January, nineteen hundred and twenty-six.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved to add to subsection (3): "and references therein to warrants issued shall not be construed as including warrants issued elsewhere than in England or Wales." The noble and learned Viscount said: This is proposed for the purpose of making clear that the "warrants law-fully issued," referred to in Clause 30, refer only to warrants issued in England and Wales. Some doubts have been expressed.

Amendment moved— Page 34, line 12, at end insert the said words.—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved, in subsection (5), to leave out "shall, save as therein otherwise expressly provided" and insert "except Part I thereof shall"; and to leave out "January" and insert "June"; and, at the end of the clause, to insert "and Part I of this Act shall come into operation on the first day of July nineteen hundred and twenty-six." The noble and learned Viscount said: All these three Amendments deal with the time when the Act will come into operation. The proposal is that the Act as a whole shall be in force as from June 1 next, except that the probation part shall not operate until July 1. July 1 is the natural date for the purpose, and will give time for the probation rules to be drawn up.

Amendments moved—

Page 34, line 16, leave out from ("Act") to ("come") in line 17, and insert ("except Part I thereof shall")

Page 34, line 17, leave out ("January") and insert ("June")

Page 34, line 18, at end insert ("and Part I of this Act shall come into operation on the first day of July, nineteen hundred and twenty-six'').—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendments agreed to.

Clause 45, as amended, agreed to.

First Schedule: