Lords Sitting of 25 June 1924

Preamble
The House met at a quarter before four of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.

THAMES CONSERVANCY BILL.
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE): My Lords, I beg to make the Motion standing in my name.
Moved, That the Order made on the 10th day of April last, "That no Private Bill brought from the House of Commons shall be read a second time after Tuesday the 17th day of June next," be dispensed with, and that the Bill be now read 2a.—(The Earl of Donoughmore.)
On Question, Motion agreed to, and Bill read 2a accordingly.

LANARKSHIRE HYDRO-ELECTRIC POWER BILL. [H.L.]
Read 3a, and passed, and sent to the Commons.
LONDON ELECTRICITY SUPPLY (No. 2) BILL. [H.L.]
Read 3a, and passed, and sent to the Commons.
NORTH METROPOLITAN ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY COMPANY BILL. [H.L.]
Read 3a, and passed, and sent to the Commons.
LONDON ELECTRICITY SUPPLY (No. 1) BILL. [H.L.]
Read 3a and passed, and sent to the Commons.
COUNTY OF LONDON ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY BILL. [H.L.]
Read 3a, and passed, and sent to the Commons.
CITY OF LONDON (VARIOUS POWERS) BILL.
Read 3a, with the Amendments, and passed, and returned to the Commons.

PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT (AMENDMENT) BILL. [H.L.]
LORD LAMBOURNE: My Lords, I beg leave to ask your permission to bring in a short Bill of two clauses, which is really an amendment to the Corruption Act, 1906. The Bill has for its object the doing away with the fiat of the Attorney-General. I beg to move that it be read a first time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 1a.—(Lord Lambourne.)
On Question, Bill read 1a, and to be printed.

EGYPT AND THE SUDAN.
LORD RAGLAN LORD RAGLAN rose to ask His Majesty's Government whether they can give any indication of their general policy with regard to Egypt and the Sudan, and whether they intend to consult Parliament before deciding on any change in the status of the latter country. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I put down the first part of the Question which stands in my name less in the hope of getting any information out of the Government than with the object of drawing attention to an aspect of the Sudan question which is seldom, if ever, alluded to, either in the Press or in Parliament. I refer to the Southern Sudan. I served for five years in the Southern Sudan. During that period there were many occasions on which I did not see another white man for weeks at a time, and I had occasion to visit places which no white man had ever visited before. That experience is not, of course, unique, but it qualifies me I think to address to your Lordships a few words on this subject.
The Southern Sudan differs considerably from the Northern Sudan. The Northern Sudan consists largely of desert, but the Southern Sudan is a country of forests and swamps and mountains. The Northern Sudan is populated largely by Mahomedan Arabs, while the Southern Sudan is populated entirely by pagan negroes These negroes speak their own languages, or variety of languages, and observe thir own customs. These

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languages have an affinity with the languages spoken in Uganda, the Congo and elsewhere, but have not the least connection with Arabic. The population of this southern region is considerably more than half the total population. The people of this region had some fifty years' experience of Egyptian rule. That rule was almost entirely one of robbery and murder. Whole districts were depopulated and whole tribes exterminated, and every year thousands of these negroes were sent down to Cairo as slaves. No one who knows anything about the question doubts that if this area were again to be handed back to Egypt the same thing would happen. Since before the dawn of history Egyptians have kept slaves, traded in slaves and raided the Sudan for slaves, and it would be quite fallacious to suppose that, because their activities in this respect have been checked by the British Government for forty years, there is any change in their habits and ideas. They still regard the pagan negroes as a people really outside the pale of humanity.
To give your Lordships an example of the attitude of the present-day educated Egyptian to the question of slavery, let me mention that up to recently, when it was stopped by the Sudan Government, it was a common practice among Egyptian officers and officials employed in the Sudan to marry negro girls, take them back to Cairo, there divorce them and sell them for slaves. They followed a similar practice with regard to negro servant boys. Your Lordships may know that there is still a considerable demand for eunuchs in Egypt, but, owing to the activities of the British Government, the supply is not equal to the demand. The condition of these unfortunate negroes has so far improved that I remember reading in the Egyptian Press about five years ago of the eunuchs of Cairo holding a mass meeting and deciding to form a trade union. I do not suggest for a moment that it is the intention of His Majesty's Government to hand over the unfortunate people in the south of the Sudan to the tender mercies of the Egyptians, but I think so much nonsense is talked, chiefly by supporters of the Government, about the tyranny of British rule in the East that these considerations should be borne in mind.
I now turn to the second part of my Question which raises a wider issue; it is whether the Government should have, the power to dispose of portions of the British Empire without first consulting Parliament. I expect that the reply of the Government will be that the Treaty made with Egypt will be submitted to Parliament for ratification. Ratification by Parliament is, to my mind, little more than a farce. Your Lordships know what happens. A conference is summoned, secret negotiations take place, and eventually a Treaty is signed, sealed and delivered. The Conference breaks up, some of the provisions of the Treaty are carried into effect. When the Treaty has become almost a matter of history it is submitted to Parliament for ratification and Parliament has no alternative except to ratify it. On any question which affects the future of any portion of the British Empire Parliament should be consulted before the Treaty is signed.
VISCOUNT GREY OF FALLODON: My Lords, I had intended to put down a Notice very much like that of the noble Lord, but with the addition of the words "and Iraq." I do not propose to move that as an Amendment now, because I do not want to go into details. At the same time, I hope your Lordships will allow me to explain why I think the three questions are really inter-dependent. I did not put my Notice on the Paper because, with the Zaghlul Mission approaching and with the discussions which must ensue, it might possibly be inconvenient to the Government to make a statement on this subject on the very eve of the Conference. They might find it difficult to make a definite statement without prejudicing the Conference from the beginning. But as the question has been raised, and without pressing the Government to make a definite statement, it is perhaps desirable that some of us who have formed definite views on the matter should state them as a contribution, for what they are worth, to the discussions on the subject. I do not know that my views represent the views of the Liberal Party, or even of the Liberal Party in this House. I have not discussed them with others, but as they are very definite I should like to put them before the Government for their consideration, for what they may be worth, in comparison with other views, which no doubt will differ from mine.

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First, with regard to Egypt: I realise that what has been done in Egypt cannot be undone. I deplore it. I have been told by people who have been in Egypt lately, and who know what is going on, that practically all the working administration which was set up by Lord Cromer, which we thought was so good and of which we were so proud, has absolutely gone, or is going. It is an instance of the difficulty of getting what we think is good to take root amongst peoples whose sense of values is different from our own. You get little success in these matters by applying the time-honoured counsel of doing unto others as you would be done by. We set up there a sort of administration in finance and justice which we should like to have ourselves. It is not what they would like, and if you want to please people who have a different sense of values you must not do unto others as you would be done by, but you must do unto them as they would be done by, which is quite a different thing in many cases.
I think there might have been a much better settlement in Egypt, better for us and better for Egypt, if the Report of the Milner Commission had been acted upon. It did a great deal of laborious, able and tactful work, and if the Report had been acted upon a much better settlement would have been made. That opportunity passed and now we are face to face with what has happened. We ought to recognise that what has happened is just this: that the administration so admirably set up by Lord Cromer is now undone. In the next place, we must recognise that having gone so far as this it is no good now trying to go back. I do not suggest to His Majesty's Government that, so far as the administration of Egypt is concerned, they should try to undo that which has been done. I think it is very much better, now that things have gone so far, that we should not attempt to retain a say in Egyptian administration which would only be irritating and could not be effective. We could not make a good job of it after that which has happened.
There is, of course, one exception to this and that is the Canal. The Canal was not made by Egyptians; it was made by Frenchmen, it is owned by British and French capital, and it is an international waterway. I hope that in the
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discussions which are to take place with the Egyptian Prime Minister it will be made perfectly clear that, however much the administration of Egypt is to be left to Egyptians, the right of protecting, safeguarding and administering the Canal does not pass to the Egyptian Government but remains in its present position.
If the Egyptians are to have their own way in Egypt, and we admit that now that things have gone so far they cannot be changed, I hope His Majesty's Government will be equally definite upon another point. I refer to the Sudan, where nothing of this kind has yet happened. We should give the Egyptians fairly to understand that we are not going to abandon the work which we have begun in that region. The Sudan was lost to Egypt because of the inefficiency of Egyptian Government. We all remember the tragic circumstances in which the Sudanese rose and turned the Egyptian Government out. Egypt would never have had a finger in the Sudan again if it had not been for us. It was purely British strategy and British control, force and enterprise which recovered the Sudan. Otherwise, Egypt would never have recovered it at all. I hope, therefore, that the British Government will make it quite clear in these negotiations that the question of the Sudan is now a question between the British and the Sudanese and one in which the Egyptian Government has no say at all. Just as we are going to be perfectly definite that we cannot go back upon that which has been done as regards Egypt, we should be equally definite with the statement that we are going on with the work which we are doing in the Sudan, and that we mean to retain our position there.
There must, of course, be one exception and that is the question of the Nile waters, in which, of course, Egypt is greatly interested, as everybody must admit. While we continue the administration of the Sudan without giving Egypt any say in it, I quite agree that as regards the Nile waters there is a case for a joint Commission to ensure that Egypt does not starve the Sudan of water and that the Sudan does not starve Egypt of water. On that point I think the Egyptian Government ought to be met. If there is difficulty in forming a thoroughly impartial Commission we might take some advantage of the precedents

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which have recently been set—and very admirably set—in which Americans have been asked to take the chair on European Commissions in more than one instance and in which the result has been most successful. I throw that out only as a suggestion. While being perfectly definite about retaining the administration of the Sudan, we must admit that as regards the Nile waters the Egyptian Government ought to be met. I think the best way of meeting it is to keep the point clear of the general question of the administration of the Sudan, and that a joint Commission should deal with this subject, and this subject alone.
This, at any rate, is a perfectly clear and definite policy. If His Majesty's Government hold that view, I would suggest that the sooner they express it, if not in public, at least to the Egyptian Prime Minister, the better. My impression is that the feeling which Egyptians have developed from that which has happened in Egypt is that we are on the run. That is why they are going so far as to say that until we withdraw from the Sudan they will have no discussion at all. I think that if we are going to stop at all on the road, we should make it clear at the earliest possible moment what our intentions are. The policy which I have described is one which is perfectly within our compass, provided we do not undertake too great responsibilities elsewhere. We have been in the Sudan for a long time. I believe the most valuable development in that region, from the commercial point of view, is in the growing of cotton. This development certainly will not continue if the British control and administration should go.
In any case, it is a region where we know that we have done very good work. The state of the country before we went there was appalling, and I do not suppose there has been any instance in history of so tremendous a change from conditions which were excessively bad to something which was, at any rate, tolerable. The tribute paid fourteen years ago by the late Mr. Roosevelt, when he had been through the Sudan, was really the greatest tribute ever paid by a distinguished member of one country to the work done by another. That being so, if we are going to undertake vast responsibilities in a neighbouring part of the world, re-
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sponsibilities which may be beyond our strength, we shall get into trouble there, and then it will not be possible to make good our words about the Sudan. To make good our words, we must keep it perfectly clear that we are not going to undertake some new and greater responsibility which may involve us in such difficulties that we cannot discharge the responsibilities which we already have.
It is for this reason that one links the question of Iraq with Egypt and the Sudan. We went to Iraq during the war for purely strategic reasons. I was a member of the Government which went there, and I know that it was done for purely strategic reasons. After the war was over, I maintain that we were left with no obligation at all to Mesopotamia or Iraq, except to give independence to the Arabs, and with the cessation of the war the strategical reasons had disappeared. We stayed there. I wonder whether anybody can really say why we did stay there. We spent many millions fighting the Arabs to whom we had promised independence. We cannot have stayed there for strategical reasons; it must have been for political reasons, or some other reasons different from the reasons which took us there.
My feeling has been that, in all this question of responsibility in that region of the East since the Armistice, we have been drifting. At the very moment when the Government were apparently feeling that they were not strong enough to maintain the administration of Egypt, they were assuming enormous new responsibilities in another region. This can only have been done because people were thinking and living from hand to mouth, and doing what seemed most convenient in different places without any general line of policy. I cannot imagine anything more inconsistent, while we were giving up our responsibility in Egypt, than to go and undertake these enormous new responsibilities in Mesopotamia. I cannot say that which I should have said on this point a little while ago, when it was my hope that the Assembly at Iraq would refuse to ratify the Treaty. They never liked the Treaty or the Mandate, and had the Assembly refused to recognise the Treaty I hoped that the Government would say that they could not go on with the Mandate against the wishes of the population. If any other European Power wishes to have the Mandate for Meso-

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potamia and Iraq against the wishes of a hostile population, all I can say is, so much the worse for them if they attempt to undertake it. But for us I would gladly have been free of all responsibility, except that of giving independence to the Arabs, unless, of course, the Arabs wish us to stay there.
Now, the Assembly at Iraq has ratified the Treaty, and we have undertaken the Mandate, and I recognise that we are not as free as we should have been had the Treaty not been ratified. I do not press His Majesty's Government for a statement now, but I would urgently press upon them that if they are going to be perfectly definite about the Sudan they should go carefully into the question of what military responsibility we are involved in by our Mandate for Iraq. I know that there are a number of people who use all the ordinary phrases about our having responsibilities in Mesopotamia to develop the country and that it would be pusillanimous to leave it now, but we have had these phrases used often and have then done the very thing for which we have had to introduce other words than "pusillanimous" and "responsibility." If that be so, I think His Majesty's Government ought to be prepared—they may not be able to do it immediately, but some time—to let us know definitely, in what responsibilities we are involved by the Treaty and the Mandate.
I am ready to listen to any arguments provided the Government will begin with some statement of facts showing us what is the magnitude of our responsibility, and, if they are going to defend Mosul, showing us on what your force must be based and telling us how many men it will take to defend that sort of situation against any probable attack which you may have made against you. If they begin with those figures I am prepared to go on with the discussion, but without that information it is not, in my opinion, worth while going on with the discussion. There is one thing which I should like to say about this responsibility. It is not my own idea, but was given to me by a very distinguished soldier. He said: "Do not let us flatter ourselves that we can hold these Oriental places by an Air Force. Indiscriminate reprisals from the air do much to undermine our prestige. That is not the way by which British
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prestige is to be maintained, but it is the way in which it is undermined." It is said that since the coming of our Air Power we can hold places that we could not hold before, but I believe that that is contrary to the best military opinion.
I have pressed upon the Government certain definite views, and I hope that the noble Lord who will speak on behalf of the Government will give us all the information he can to-day, and the more definite he can be about the Sudan the better. I hope the Government will give us all the information they can as to their views and policy to-day. If they cannot give us as much information to-day as they think might be given later, I hope that on some later date we may have another debate, and that the Government will give us a clearly-thought-out outline of policy on these three points closely connected on which, I think, we have hitherto been drifting and have got into trouble. Let them think out their policy and then announce it.
THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (LORD PARMOOR): My Lords, the noble Viscount, whose authority on these subjects is second to none, has made a very important declaration on these questions of foreign policy this afternoon. I will endeavour as far as I can to answer his questions, although, as he has pointed out, the points which he has raised with regard to Mesopotamia do not arise directly out of the Question put down by Lord Raglan. I should like to say, too, before coming to the answer, that His Majesty's Government realise the importance of Lord Raglan's views upon these questions, because, as he has stated, he has himself spent much time in the Sudan district.
Perhaps, having regard to the emphasis placed upon the various parts of the Question, I may begin with the Sudan. It is a matter of the first importance. Now I want to say, in absolutely definite language, that His Majesty's Government is not going to abandon the Sudan in any sense whatever. It recognises the obligations which have been taken towards the Sudanese and, as the noble Viscount pointed out, it regards those obligations as of a character which this Government could not abandon without a very serious loss of its prestige in all these Eastern districts. The work done

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in the Sudan has been referred to more than once, and I should like to make one or two quotations in order to emphasise the statement which I have made, I hope in a quite definite manner. I intend my language to be quite definite, so that there can be no doubt hereafter.
The Prime Minister, in another place, when asked a Question in reference to Egypt and the Sudan, made this answer. As regards Egypt I will come back to it, but I am speaking now with reference to the Sudan:—
"No useful purpose will be served by a discussion in this House of the difficult and delicate questions outstanding with Egypt, in advance of negotiations being undertaken in pursuance of the policy already approved by Parliament.
The question is: What is the policy which has already been approved by Parliament, and in pursuance of which these negotiations are being undertaken? I will divide that policy under two heads. The first is, as the noble Viscount has pointed out, that there is no going back at this stage on the policy towards Egypt itself, which has been adopted for a considerable time and by successive Governments. That, as he recognised, is quite impossible.
When we come to the question of the Sudan entirely different questions arise, and I have taken the trouble to see exactly what was said on this point when the matter was discussed in another place on February 28, 1922. This was the statement made by the then Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George. He said:
"I now come to the Sudan, which is very important to the British Empire … His Majesty's Government will never allow the progress which has already been made, and the greater promise of future years, to be jeopardised."
I emphasise this point and say that the same view is upheld by the present Government. Then Mr. Lloyd George went on to say, on another matter to which the noble Viscount called attention:—
"Nor can His Majesty's Government agree to any change in the status of that country which would in the slightest degree diminish the security for the many millions of British capital which are already invested in its development—to the great advantage of the Sudan."
Those statements were made on these questions of policy in February, 1922,
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and they were referred to in the answer which I have read, which was given by the Prime Minister in another place.
There is another matter with regard to the Sudan to which the noble Lord, Lord Raglan, referred; that is, the question of any change in status without the authority of Parliament. I cannot, on the present occasion, go into the question whether Parliamentary procedure on matters of this kind is on the whole satisfactory or not. But I can say quite definitely, and without any hesitation, that no change of status in the Sudan will be allowed or carried through without the authority of Parliament, and Parliament shall have the opportunity of expressing its view before it is too late. We recognise the responsibility of this country towards the inhabitants. May I use the actual words which have been supplied to me from the Foreign Office, for I want to be very accurate on a constitutional point of this kind—"And in view of the fact" (referring to this status) "that any agreement arrived at will be submitted to Parliament …" that is any agreement affecting the status of the Sudan. I do not think I can say anything more with regard to Egypt and the Sudan because I have made the position quite clear, and when a position is made clear there is no use in adding further words.
As regards the negotiations with Egypt to which the noble Viscount has referred it is impossible to say anything at the present time because the negotiations are shortly to be begun and, of course, it would be impossible to give any definite account of the direction which they are likely to take.
The noble Viscount also referred to the very important question of Iraq, although it was not mentioned in the Question on the Paper. The policy towards Iraq, or Mesopotamia, was begun long before the present Government came into power. The present Government has merely carried on the policy of continuity, which we are often told should be pursued in matters of this kind. The Treaty proposed by His Majesty's Government was accepted a few weeks ago by the Iraq Constituent Assembly, who adopted it by a majority of 38 votes to 26. It will be submitted to Parliament in the ordinary course, and will not be ratified before it has been so submitted. If it is approved and ratified, the ordinary course will be

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followed. The intention would then be to obtain League approval of what is called the "draft instrument," of which the effect is to convert the Treaty into the form of a Mandate under the control of the League. If this is done the Treaty or Mandate remains in force for four years as a maximum, or until such time as Iraq becomes a Member of the League. I think the noble Viscount will agree with me that the time for detailed discussion of this matter will be when the actual Treaty is before Parliament. I should be glad to give him any information in my power, but I do not think that it is possible at the present time to go into further details. I want to end by emphasising in the strongest terms that so fat-as the Sudan is concerned it is definitely decided that there will be no abandonment of our position by the British Government and no abandonment of the obligations which we have undertaken towards the Sudanese themselves.
THE MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON: My Lords, I am sorry not to have been in the House in the opening stages of what has clearly been a very important discussion. I was obliged to be elsewhere. When I came into the House my noble friend was speaking about Egypt, and he had reached that point in his speech in which he was arguing, on the one hand, that in any discussions that are likely to take place with Egypt, having gone so far as we have gone, it would be a mistake to boggle about any matters that would involve, or might involve, interference in the Egyptian administration. That, I think, is a commonplace which we all accept. From that he went on to say that there were two reservations which he desired to make, and to which—and he spoke with the general assent of the House—he attached supreme importance. The first was with regard to the Sudan, the second was with regard to the Canal.
As regards the Sudan, he based his case upon the historical facts of the recovery of the Sudan, for the most part by British troops and under British generalship, and further upon the enormous improvement that has taken place in the condition of the Sudan and its people under the administration that has existed during the last twenty years. In that we entirely concur, and any idea of wiping that out, or handing back the Sudan to Egyptian administration, would be
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abhorrent to every one of us. I think he might have put the case even more strongly than he did, because to my mind the governing factor in the question of the Sudan is not so much what we have done, or what return we are entitled to for our sacrifices, but what is the sentiment and desire of the Sudanese people themselves. Everybody who has come in contact with representative Sudanese knows that the one thing that fills them with dismay is the idea of being handed back to Egypt. And therefore we are pursuing no Imperial policy of our own; we are acting in strict accordance with the sentiments of the population itself if we continue the form of administration which at present exists.
In one respect I think my noble friend Lord Grey a little under-stated the case from one point of view or overstated it from another. He said that the Egyptian Government had no interest or stake in the matter at all excepting so far as the water was concerned. That is not quite the case, because he will recollect from his experience of the Foreign Office that they supply the garrison and pay for the garrison, and that the Sudan would be bankrupt at this moment if it were not for the financial expenditure undertaken by Egypt. If you go to the point of saying that Egypt has no connection with the Sudan at all except that of water, and you eliminate Egypt from any voice or share in the administration at all, the Sudan would be quite unable, in the existing conditions, to pay its own way. It means that this country would be obliged to accept an obligation that might amount to over a million pounds a year. I do not think the noble Viscount could have anticipated that. In dealing with Egyptian interests in the Sudan the fact must not be forgotten that they are, for the most part, the paymasters at the present moment.
As regards the Sudan, I am sure that this House has listened with the greatest satisfaction to the clear, unequivocal, uncompromising and thoroughly satisfactory statement that we have just heard from the noble Lord, Lord Parmoor, and it was satisfactory in two respects. In the first place, he told us that the present Government adhere to the attitude and abide by the pledges, which in themselves were unequivocal, made by their

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predecessors. Those pledges have not only been given by Mr. Lloyd George in the passage quoted by the noble Lord; they have been reiterated in quite recent times by Lord Allenby who, in the course of his visits to the Sudan, has given the most emphatic assurance to the people of that country that they shall not be restored to a form of government which they detest. I was glad also to hear from my noble friend Lord Parmoor that he gave an assurance equally emphatic and equally satisfactory that no arrangement will be made with regard to the Sudan without being previously submitted to not merely the discussion but the assent of Parliament. That was, I think, his assurance, which we accept with much satisfaction.
Now may I point out to my noble friend Lord Grey that the two points to which he attaches such natural and proper importance are two of the four points that were reserved by the late Government when they made the arrangement in February, 1922? The four points that were reserved for future discussion were, (1) the Sudan, (2) the protection of foreign interests, which is a matter, of course, in which the foreign countries concerned will look after their own interests and as to which no arrangement can be made to which they are not parties. The third question was the defence of Egypt, and the fourth was the security of Imperial communications; that is another way of putting the question of the Canal. Therefore, the very points which my noble friend Lord Grey urged the Government to bear in mind are the points which were reserved as of supreme importance by the late Government for future discussion.
In the concluding part of his speech, the noble Viscount, Lord Grey, went on to speak about British policy with regard to Iraq. Here, if he will allow me to say so, I think he spoke without full knowledge of the situation and the manner in which it has developed during the past year. He began by saying that he was one of those who had all along questioned the wisdom of the assumption of extensive British responsibilities in that quarter. His memory will, perhaps, carry him back to a date at which, at a meeting of the War Council or Committee of which he and I were members, I was the only man who opposed going to Baghdad at all, being rather timidly and tentatively followed by Lord Kitchener.
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Therefore, my hands are clean upon the matter, and certainly, in all that I have had to do with Iraq since, I have never desired for one moment to assume responsibilities that we could avoid, to extend responsibilities already existing, or to mark out or map out that part of the world as an arena of British rule or Empire in the future.
The noble Viscount asked: Why did you go there or why, having gone there, did you stay there? The answer is twofold and is absolutely clear. The reason why, when the war was over, we could not retire at once was that the very Arab administration which we had sought to set up would have collapsed at once. Do remember this: the Arabs, after centuries of subjection to the Turks, had developed no power or capacity for self-government. They had not the men; they had not the traditions; they had not the machinery. Your house of cards, when you set it up, would have disappeared at the touch of a finger, unless you had, for the time being at any rate, devoted your energies to giving it strength. And if the first reason was loyalty to our pledges to the Arabs, the second was this: that the Arab administration being essentially weak and unstable, the result of our disappearance would have been that the Turks would have been back at once. I do not hesitate to say that within six months they would have been back in the whole country, and the object for which you fought that portion of the war would have been sacrificed. Those are the reasons, briefly put, why we were compelled to stay in Mesopotamia.
Now the noble Viscount has referred to the Treaty and seems to have some sort of idea that this Treaty, which was ratified the other day at Baghdad by a certain majority, is in itself a continuance and, perhaps, even an extension of our responsibility. It is the very reverse. The Treaty in question, which was suggested by us only a few months ago, is a means of diminishing our responsibility and handing it over, and of creating an Arab State. I am, perhaps, more familiar with it than any one in this House, because I was largely responsible for the circumstances under which it was proposed and set up. And when the noble Viscount says that we shall want in this House a clear explanation of what the Treaty involves, what the military responsibilities are that are entailed, and

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so on, let him read the Treaty. They are there entirely. The whole object of the Treaty, instead of this indefinite continuance of our rule which, under the form previously proposed, was to have lasted for twenty years, is to terminate it in four, and if Iraq can be admitted to the League of Nations at an earlier date, in a less period than four years. The actual nature of our military responsibility and of our financial responsibility diminishes every year. It is clearly stated in the terms of the Treaty, and the whole object has been to accelerate the moment at which, under the auspices of the League of Nations, Iraq will be able to stand alone.
Then the noble Viscount said: "Why did you ever accept a Mandate for Mesopotamia?" The answer to that is found in the history of the last six or eight years. It is too late to ask that question now. The policy of Mandates was deliberately accepted by all the Powers at Paris. The policy of dividing Mandates among different Powers—France to take Syria, Britain to take Mesopotamia and Palestine, Mandates of a different character in other parts of Africa and the world, and so on was all most, carefully worked out years ago, and if anybody wanted to object to our taking the Mandate for Mesopotamia the time to have done it would have been in the year 1920 when the Mandates were given. I cannot recollect a single critical or hostile voice in this country. The policy of Mandates was one of universal acceptance.
Now what do we want to do? The whole object of the recent transactions has been to escape, the onerous responsibility of the Mandate by transferring it to the League of Nations. I should have thought that no man in England would have more welcomed the present line of policy than the noble Viscount, Lord Grey, because the idea was that this Treaty if it be concluded is only to last for four years. It is, as described by the noble Lord, to be referred to the League of Nations, and, assuming that Iraq has shown a capacity to govern itself and actual signs of setting up a stable Government, the State of Iraq will itself become a Member of the League of Nations. Then the responsibility of the future arrangements will be shared by the body at Geneva. The whole of this
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matter is, perhaps, a little widely removed from the discussion which has been raised by the Question on the Paper, and I have only been tempted to pursue it because the noble Viscount raised the question himself and, if he will allow me to say so, because he is not fully aware of the meaning of the actual steps that have been taken or of the policy that lies before us. Certainly there was no desire on the part of the late Government to extend their responsibilities in that direction. Rather did we desire to curtail them. As regards the subject on the Paper, I have only to express again my complete satisfaction so far as it goes with the statement we have received from the noble Lord.

IRISH FREE STATE AND THE UNITED STATES.
THE EARL OF SELBORNE THE EARL OF SELBORNE had given Notice to ask His Majesty's Government—

1. Whether the statement in The Times of 8th May is correct that a Minister representing the Irish Free State will shortly be appointed to Washington, and that His Majesty's Government has raised no objection to such an appointment;

2. Under what clause of the Irish Treaty will this appointment be made;

3. What stops His Majesty's Government propose to take to harmonise the representations of the British Ambassador and of the Free State Minister in respect of matters which concern both Great Britain and Ireland or the whole British Empire;

and to move for Papers.
The noble Earl said: My Lords, I have three Questions on the Paper, and I will not detain your Lordships long in ex plaining why I have given this Notice. The first Question admits of a perfectly simple answer—"whether the statement in The Times of 8th May is correct that a Minister representing the Irish Free State will shortly be appointed to Washington, and that His Majesty's Government has raised no objection to such an appointment." The second Question is:—"Under what clause of the Irish Treaty will this appointment be made." I suppose the answer to that Question will be a reference by my noble friend who leads the House——
LORD PARMOOR: If not inconvenient might I say to the noble Earl that the Colonial Office, represented by Lord Arnold, will answer the first two Questions? The third must be answered from the Foreign Office.
THE EARL OF SELBOBNE: The answer by His Majesty's Government will be a reference to that clause of the Treaty in which the status of the Irish Free State is defined as being the same as the status of the Dominion of Canada. I think I am correct in saying that there certainly is no Article in the Treaty which directly deals with the appointment of a Minister at Washington or elsewhere. I think I am also correct in saying that the Dominion of Canada has not appointed any Minister at Washington, and, there fore, if the Irish Free State is now about to appoint a Minister at Washington, it is doing something which no Dominion has yet done.
That leads me to a brief consideration of the circumstances under which it could be said that the right to appoint a Minister at Washington is comprised within the ambit of the constitutional status of the Dominion of Canada. The information which Parliament has on this subject is very meagre. A11 we know about it is derived, I think, from an answer given by Mr. Bonar Law in the House of Commons, and by some words that fell from my noble friend Lord Long in this House when we were dealing with the Act of Parliament which embodied the Treaty.
My noble friend Lord Long will correct me if I unintentionally make a misstatement. I think the Imperial Conference which took place at the time of the late Government but one never came to any resolution at all on the subject of the appointment of Dominion Ministers at Washington. There was no resolution of the Conference. There was no definition by the Conference of the circumstances under which a Minister could be so appointed, but an arrangement—I am afraid a vague arrangement—of rather an informal character was come to between His Majesty's Government and the Dominion of Canada that the Dominion Government should, if they chose, appoint a Minister at Washington. It followed from that, as I think General Smuts has said in South Africa, that if
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the Dominion of Canada could appoint a Minister Plenipotentiary at Washington it was open to any other Dominion to appoint a Minister Plenipotentiary at Washington, or at any other capital.
That consideration leads me to my third Question, which really is the point to which I wish particularly to draw the attention of His Majesty's Government:
"What steps His Majesty's Government propose to take to harmonise the representations of the British Ambassador and of the Free State Minister in respect of matters which concern both Great Britain and Ireland or the whole British Empire."
The first question that arises is: For what purpose will the Irish Free State appoint a Minister at Washington? Is that purpose to be carefully defined as the interest of purely Irish concerns, or, I should rather say, of Irish concerns so far as they relate to those counties of Ireland that are within the Government of the Free State? Obviously, not the whole of Ireland is concerned, but only that part of Ireland which is within the Free State. If the Minister is to be appointed to deal with purely Irish concerns, and no other, has the definition of "a purely Irish concern" been thought out, and if thought out has it been agreed to by the Free State Government? Because if that is the idea, then surely everything—and we all wish to avoid future friction—depends upon an accurate definition, and one which is an agreed definition.
But if that is not the idea, if the idea is that the Mission of the Free State Minister should be less circumscribed, then I do ask the House and His Majesty's Government to consider all that is involved. A question may very well concern Ireland and Great Britain, or Canada and Great Britain, or Ireland and the whole Empire, or Canada and the whole Empire, and when once the possibility is suggested of more than one Minister at the same capital dealing independently with a common subject, the extraordinary difficulty and danger of the arrangement at once becomes manifest. There is no need to impute for one single moment an intention on the part of any Minister, or any Government, to create trouble. I do not suggest that for a moment, but I do say that without previous consultation and agreement it is perfectly impossible for two individuals, much less for two Governments, to

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approach a difficult question from the same angle, or to give expression to the same opinion through a third party.
This appointment is a precedent which may be followed, and we are, I think, bound to consider the full extent of development to which this precedent may lead us. It might conceivably lead to six or seven (if India had the same privilege) Ministers Plenipotentiary, in addition to a British Ambassador, being present in the five or six great capitals of the world. Let us consider a less enlarged extension of the precedent. Let us suppose that at the time of the American Civil War there had been in Washington, in addition to a British Ambassador, several Ministers Plenipotentiary drawn from the different Dominions of the Empire. Dangerous and difficult as our relations with America at that time were, is it not quite manifest that the difficulty would have been multiplied, and the dangers enlarged to a degree which one almost, trembles to think of? Yet, if that kind of situation would have existed at the time of the American Civil War, what right have we to flatter ourselves that no situation of similar difficulty or similar danger can ever in the future recur at Washington or some other capital?
Therefore, the point I want to emphasise with all the earnestness in my power is that His Majesty's Government should use the whole of their influence, not to allow this development, or experiment as I really must call it, to be launched haphazard. It should only be done: deliberately and after a complete and mutual understanding between the Dominions—not one Dominion, not the Irish. Free State only, but between all the Dominions of the British Empire—and His Majesty's Government as to how these dangers are to be avoided, bow the action of their Ministers is to be harmonized with the action of His Majesty's Government. Above all, there should be, by mutual agreement, an exact limitation of the action and responsibility of each representative. If these precautions are neglected I do not think it requires any foresight to see that when a real crisis arises, and you have several Ministers and Ambassadors taking their instructions from several different Governments which are not in organised communication and which have not arrived at a common agreement beforehand, disaster must ensue. I beg to move.
THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (LORD ARNOLD): My Lords, the noble Earl has put down on the Paper three specific Questions regarding the representation of the Irish Free State at Washington. In my reply I shall confine myself to the first two of these Questions, and the third, which falls more naturally within the purview of the Foreign Office, will be dealt with by my noble and learned friend, the Lord President of the Council.
The noble Earl's first Question is whether it is correct that a Minister representing the Irish Free State will shortly be, appointed to Washington, and that His Majesty's Government has raised no objection to such an appointment. I am not yet in a position to say that the Irish Free State will be represented by a Minister at Washington, inasmuch as the views of the, United States Government on this proposal have not yet been ascertained; but His Majesty's Government have instructed the British Ambassador at Washington to inform the United States Government that they have come to the conclusion it is desirable that the conduct of matters at Washington exclusively relating to the Irish Free State should be confided to a Minister Plenipotentiary accredited to the United States, and they trust that this proposal will be found acceptable to the United States Government.
The noble Earl's second Question is under what clause of the Irish Treaty will this appointment be made. I am not prepared to admit that it is necessary that every development in the constitutional relations between the Irish Free State and this country should be specifically provided for in the Treaty; it is sufficient that any such development should not be contrary to the Treaty; but in fact this proposal is by implication clearly covered by Article 2 of the Treaty which provides that the position of the Irish Free State in relation to the Imperial Parliament and Government and otherwise shall be that of the Dominion of Canada. It will be within the recollection of your Lordships that on May 10, 1920, the then Lord Privy Seal, Mr. Bonar Law, announced in another place that an arrangement had been concluded between the British and Canadian Governments to provide more complete representation at Washington of Canadian interests

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than had hitherto existed, and that it had been accordingly agreed that His Majesty, on the advice of His Canadian Ministers, should appoint a Minister Plenipotentiary who would have charge of Canadian affairs and would at all times be the ordinary channel of communication with the United States Government in matters of purely Canadian concern, acting upon instructions from, and reporting direct to, the Canadian Government. The principle of distinctive representation at Washington having been agreed to in 1920 in the case of Canada, it must clearly, under the terms of Article 2 of the Treaty, be regarded as inherent in the constitutional status of the Irish Free State; and even had His Majesty's Government not been convinced that the appointment of such a Minister was desirable in itself, they would have felt bound, in view of the Canadian precedent and the terms of the Treaty, to agree to make proposals to the United States Government in the sense desired by the Government of the Irish Free State.
But I should, as I have already suggested, be unwilling that your Lordships should suppose that this proposal has been made to the United States Government solely as an automatic result of the Treaty and without consideration of its intrinsic merits. The proposal for the distinctive representation of Canada at Washington was made in consideration of the great and special importance of Canadian interests in the United States: and this consideration applies with almost equal force to the case of the Irish Free State. It is true that the Canadian Government has not yet availed itself of the arrangement made in 1920, but this does not affect the principle. The direct and particular interests of the Irish Free State in the United States are such that His Majesty's Government concur with the Government of the Irish Free State in thinking that these interests can be most conveniently handled by a Minister of their own. It is clearly understood that the powers of the Irish Free State Minister are strictly limited to matters and interests relating exclusively to the Irish Free State.
LORD PARMOOR: My Lords, it will probably be convenient if I reply to the, third Question asked by the noble Earl. It is one of great importance as
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regards our diplomatic relations in the future and I have been asked to answer it directly on behalf of the Foreign Office. I appreciate the difficulties to which the noble Earl has referred, but I hope I shall be able to show by the answer that they have been provided against to a great extent. You can have no absolute provision against all possible complications, but in this case every possible provision will be made and I do not think any difficulty will, in fact, arise. The noble Earl's third Question is:—
"What steps His Majesty's Government propose to take to harmonise the representations of the British Ambassador and of the Free State Minister in respect of matters which concern both Great Britain and Ireland or the whole British Empire."
My noble friend who has just spoken has indicated in his reply that the powers of the Irish Free State Minister will be confined strictly to matters relating exclusively to the Irish Free State.
I desire to explain a little more fully, on behalf of the Foreign Office, the arrangements which it is proposed to make if the United States Government agree to the proposals made to them by His Majesty's Government in this matter and agrees to accept a Minister Plenipotentiary at Washington representing the interests of the Irish Free State, As the noble Lord has already pointed out, that step has not yet been taken on behalf of the United States. If, then, the United States Government concur in the proposals, the Irish Free State Minister will receive his credentials in the usual manner from His Majesty, his letter of appointment being issued by the Free State Government, Both documents will make it clear that his appointment is for the purpose of dealing with matters especially affecting the Irish Free State, The principle of the Resolution of the Imperial Conference of 1923 as to the negotiation, signature and ratification of Treaties, and in particular of that part of the Resolution which relates to the conduct of matters affecting more than one part of the Empire, will apply-generally to all questions with which the Minister deals. If any doubt should arise whether any particular question exclusively concerned the Free State, the point would, if possible, be settled by consultation between the Free State Minister and the Ambassador, and, if the matter could not be settled by such consultation, it

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would be referred by the Ambassador and the Minister to their respective Governments.
In order to meet the possibility that any particular question might in its initial stages be exclusively of concern to the Free State and might subsequently prove to be of concern to other parts of the Empire, explicit instructions will be issued by the Free State Government to the Minister that he is to keep in close touch with the Ambassador, and corresponding instructions will be issued to the Ambassador by His Majesty's Government.
These arrangements are designed with the view of limiting the representative of the Free State to Irish questions only, and have been agreed as the result of personal consultation between the representatives of His Majesty's Government and Mr. Fitzgerald, the Minister for External Affairs of the Irish Free State, who has recently been in London for the purpose of such consultation.
Before I sit down I should wish to refer to a matter which has already been touched upon by my noble friend, Lord Arnold—namely, the effect which this proposal will have upon the very important principle of the diplomatic unity of the Empire. In the instructions issued to His Majesty's Ambassador it has been made clear that these proposals do not denote any departure from this principle. While, on the one hand, it should be understood that the Irish Free State Minister will take his instructions solely from his own Government, so that the Minister will not be under the control of the Ambassador nor will the Ambassador be responsible for what is done by the Minister, on the other hand, the Minister will not be concerned with Imperial questions. His Majesty's Government are confident that this appointment will strengthen cordial relations with the United States without in any way impairing the principle, to which His Majesty's Government attach the greatest importance, of the diplomatic unity of the whole of the British Empire.
THE MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON: My Lords, I speak with some anxiety upon a departure which, in the form in which it has been announced to us, is obviously one of first class importance, and may have long and resounding
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effects in the history of the British Empire. I say I speak with some anxiety, because until I came down to the House I had no idea of the exact form which the reply of the Government was going to take, and because I had not anticipated that it would take the particular form which we have just heard. It is true, as has been pointed out, that the Government in dealing with this matter did not come to a ground that was wholly unoccupied or uncompromised by the action of their predecessors. It is true that in May, 1920—I think that was the date—Mr. Bonar Law announced, on behalf of the then Government, that His Majesty's Government had agreed to the appointment of a Canadian Minister at Washington.
I recall the circumstances under which that decision was arrived at. It was pointed out that the relations of the Dominion of Canada with Washington differed wholly, both in kind and degree, from those of any other Dominion in the British Empire; that the territories of the two Powers were co-terminous for over three thousand miles; that questions relating to trade, to industry, to fisheries, to property, and so on, were continually and daily arising between the two Governments; that hitherto they had been treated by a special Canadian Commissioner stationed at Washington, but that an enhancement of his status would facilitate the satisfactory conduct of affairs between the two Governments. Those were the views that were very strongly pressed upon the Government here by the Canadian Government. They were very strongly endorsed by the then Secretary of State for the Colonies, who, if I remember rightly, was Lord Milner. I hope I am not stating a secret that I ought not to reveal if I say that they were viewed with great apprehension by the Foreign Office, and that it was only with extreme reluctance that the Foreign Office, in view of the sort of considerations that have been, suggested by Lord Selborne this afternoon, acquiesced in this proposal.
But what happened then? The proposal having been agreed to, it fell to the ground almost immediately, and for these reasons. In the first place, the Canadian Government itself began to doubt the wisdom of taking advantage of the prerogative which it had scoured;

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secondly, it found—I believe that tentative advances were made—great difficulty in securing a proper person to accept the appointment; and in the third place, the attitude of the United States Government, to which I will turn in a moment, was itself doubtful. A further difficulty occurred which had a very wide Imperial bearing, and that was that, when this matter came up to be discussed at the Imperial Conference in London, we found that the Prime Ministers of the other Dominions had the strongest objection to anything of the sort. I recall that Mr. Bruce, on behalf of the Commonwealth of Australia, said that Australia wanted nothing of the kind. Mr. Massey, whose strong Imperial views are very well known, objected even more emphatically than Mr. Bruce, and there was therefore a general feeling that although this concession had been made to Canada—whether wisely or unwisely, it is too late to discuss now—it was one that, in view of the reluctance of Canada itself and in view of the plainly expressed antagonism of the other Dominions, it was desirable not to pursue.
That was the situation of affairs when His Majesty's present advisers took office, and that was the situation which confronted us until we received the statement of the two noble Lords this afternoon. We have heard from them firstly, that they are in agreement with the policy; secondly, that they have communicated that expression of their views to the Government of the Irish Free State; and, thirdly, that they have gone so far as to make a representation to the American Government that they are prepared, subject to the consent of the latter, to make such an appointment. In those circumstances, I think the United States Government may find it a little difficult, whatever their feelings may be, to disagree. However, I can offer no opinion about that, because the sequel remains to be seen.
What is the justification that is offered? We were told by the noble Lords that they felt that the interests of Ireland in America differed from those of other Dominions of the Crown, and apparently could be regarded as having a certain substantial identity with those of Canada. Is that so? It is true that there are many Irish emigrants to the United States, and that the Irish population there is very
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large and, I believe, politically very inconvenient. It is true also that questions of property and inheritance may arise, but I do not think there is any real substantial identity between the degree of interest which Canada has in the United States and the degree of interest which the Irish Free State will have in the United States.
Then we come to the actual procedure to be adopted. The noble Lord told us that if the Americans accept the suggestion, the future Minister Plenipotentiary is to receive his credentials from His Majesty's Government, and a letter of appointment from the Irish Free State. Then, assuming his appointment, he goes out there, and what is he to do? What is the limit of his power? Here, both noble Lords repeated the same sentence, which is that he is to be qualified to have the right to deal with matters exclusively relating to the Irish Free State. How is it possible to arrive at, or even if you accept, to adhere to, any such definition?
Let me give your Lordships one case which occurs to me. Let us suppose that the Minister Plenipotentiary desires to conclude a commercial Treaty, involving new trading arrangements, with the United States. The moment a question of that sort is raised, although the Irish Minister Plenipotentiary may look at it from the point of view of the Irish Free State, the interests of every part of the British Empire become involved. The matter ceases to be a domestic and becomes an Imperial matter, and the only solution which we get of a difficulty of that sort is that we are told that a consultation is to take place between the Minister Plenipotentiary and the Ambassador, and that in the event of that resulting in nothing the matter is to be referred to His Majesty's Government. I think your Lordships will find that this attempt to build a wall between matters exclusively affecting the Irish Free State and matters outside that boundary will be one exceedingly difficult to maintain.
Another aspect of the case occurs to me, which I think was hinted at by my noble friend, and that is the personal relations that will exist between the Minister Plenipotentiary for the Irish Free State and His Majesty's Ambassador. The noble Lord said that these gentlemen will, he is confident, get along quite well, and in so far as two British

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officials of high position and status are put, side by side to serve the Empire we may rely upon each doing his best in that direction. I can well conceive, however, a case, as policy develops, where the representative of the Irish Free State may, under instructions from his Government, be pursuing a policy quite different from that which commends itself to Great Britain. I can imagine political matters where you may have a situation in which your Ambassador at Washington and. the Irish Minister Plenipotentiary, in the same building or near each other, may be pursuing opposite policies, fraught with friction and possibly danger to the common interest. That difficulty is not solved by saying that the Minister is not under the control of the Ambassador and the Ambassador is not responsible for the Minister. On the contrary, those words demonstrate the gravity of the case which I am putting, and indicate the sort of situation that may conceivably arise.
The only other point I desire to take is that raised by my noble friend. Here is a matter which obviously cannot and ought, not to be decided in the interests, or from the point of view, of one Dominion only. You have Ireland pressing for this concession and, I think, under the terms of Article 2 saying, not unnaturally, that as they were put upon the same status—Dominion status—as Canada, they are entitled to demand the same privilege as in May, 1920, was conceded to Canada although not taken advantage of by her. Is it wise to conclude this arrangement with Ireland only? I must confess I should have thought that this was emphatically a matter for the Imperial Conference—for Imperial unity and for an Imperial plan—that you should have said to the Dominion Representatives: "We are rather compromised by what we did with regard to Canada in 1920, although Canada has not taken advantage of it, and here is Ireland demanding the same privilege now. We, realise that that raises a question of great importance to all of you. Whether you want to take advantage of it or not you may be driven, when the first representative goes there, to do the same. Public, opinion in your Parliament or country may demand that you shall not be put into a position inferior to that of the Irish Free State."
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That being the ease, I should have thought that no agreement ought to have been arrived at until you had put the whole ease before the Prime Ministers of the other Dominions and endeavoured to settle the case not piecemeal, as yon are doing, but on a general and Imperial plan. Those are the observations that occur to me to make on the spur of the moment, in reply to the statement that has just been made, and I am bound to say that they lead me to view the situation that you are about to create with no small apprehension as to its consequences in the future.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT HALDANE): My Lords, I have listened closely to the speech of the noble Marquess, and in the one or two observations which I should like to make in reply I may say that I have been a little, perplexed in following his argument to know precisely what he was aiming at—what was his policy. I gather that he does not deny to a Dominion with full Dominion status the right to claim to appoint a diplomatic representative at Washington. In fact, that right, as he has told us, his Government conceded in the case of Canada. It is immaterial that advantage was not taken of it. I am far from reproaching the noble Marquess for having taken part in that decision. On the contrary. I think it was an inevitable decision. It is impossible to govern these Dominions otherwise than in accordance with their own will and their own wishes. They may go out oil it, but within the Empire they have a status which leaves them very large rights indeed.
The whole obscurity of this ease arises from the impossibility of giving a definite meaning to the expression "Dominion status." I have had, I suppose, in the course of my legal work, as much opportunity as anybody of having to realise-the vagueness of this phrase "Dominion status." We all know that in the case of Canada, for instance, she cannot legislate in excess of the powers delegated to her. But then these powers are very wide, and they have enabled her to build up a system of government in respect of which she is entitled to claim that she is perfectly free, morally and in reality, and that if she wishes to have a diplomatic representative in Washington she

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can claim to have one. If you come to ask how the powers are to be defined, then you are up against an insoluble question. The noble Marquess did not try to give a definition. The noble Earl, Lord Selborne, asked for a definition, but it was a request with which it was impossible to comply, because the thing is indefinable.
What the result will be of appointing a diplomatic representative depends upon Dominion status. It does not follow that because Dominion status cannot be defined, therefore things will happen which go over the line and imperil the unity of the Empire. The unity of the Empire is kept on the basis of freedom. It is because we give freedom to the Dominions to manage their own affairs that we hold them together, and that they hold together with us. There is an understanding, an unwritten understanding, which cannot be reduced to writing, but which depends on common purposes and common ends, which solve our problems for us in practice. It is on that that you rely in this case. I know—I have seen—how often small questions arise owing to the very vagueness of this unwritten Imperial Constitution. But I have also seen how these things solve themselves because there are ends and objects so potent that they mould the whole, and the details adjust themselves to the requirements of facts.
In the case of Ireland it was answered to Lord Selborne—who, to do him justice, did not press the point—that it is not under the provisions of the Treaty that this request was acceded to. It was for this reason—that Ireland has been given Dominion status, a status analagous to that of Canada. It is quite true that Australia and New Zealand have not asked for the recognition of diplomatic representation on their part at Washington. But they might do so, and, if they did so, I could see myself no answer to their request. It is involved in the possession of Dominion status. That was established by the noble Marquess himself when he, or rather the Government to which he belonged, acceded to the request of Canada, and the same principle will apply to Australia or New Zealand. The question has not arisen because they had not sufficient interest in the matter. In the case of the Irish Free
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State it has arisen. The Irish Free State has taken the view—and it is for them to take the view, and not for us to criticise it—that they want a diplomatic representative at Washington. Ireland has special relations with the United States, and if the presence of a diplomatic representative will facilitate those relations, and make them even better than they are at the present time, then we may all be thankful.
I have not forgotten the time of our unfortunate relations with Ireland, when the so-called Treaty was the result of the compromise that was made between the old attitude towards Ireland and the new attitude embodied in the Act of 1922. We are all thankful to have got away from the conditions of civil war, and back to a state of things which is, at least, very much better than the old condition of things. Doubtless, there may be friction between the Imperial representative and the Irish representative. I should hope not. It is a matter depending upon the tact of both sides, and if there are untactful representatives there may be friction; if, on the other hand, they are wise men, there ought not to be. But as for asking for any precise definition of anything such as Lord Selborne asked for, it is to ask for something which is wholly inconsistent with the unwritten Constitution which is the Constitution of the Empire—a Constitution which precludes the giving of precise definition. Therefore, your Lordships are again up against the old conflict of policy, with which the noble Marquess himself had to deal, and which ended in his being compelled to accede to the Canadian request. It is no use saying that Canada has a special position, owing to its long frontier with the United States. Ireland has relations with America of a different kind.
LORD CARSON: Southern Ireland.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Well, I mean the Irish Free State. The rest they leave to be managed by the Imperial Government, But the Irish Free State has questions of its own kind which it has to deal with, and those questions, I think, inevitably will have to be dealt with according to the common plan and the common pattern which governs us in our relations with the Dominions.
THE EARL OF SELBORNE: My Lords, I do not intend to press my Motion for Papers. I would only like to say, in conclusion, that I associate myself entirely with the criticisms made by my noble friend Lord Curzon, and I ask the House to note the real gist of the Lord Chancellor's speech. He prophesies that there will be no friction or trouble, and that there is no danger of friction or trouble. All I have got to say is that in my judgment his opinion is in direct conflict with the whole teaching of history.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I did not say so.
THE EARL OF SELBORNE: Without careful preliminary precautions for the prevention of misunderstanding, the prevention of international offence, I say the danger is very real. I do not agree with the noble and learned Viscount that no definitions are possible. I admit the accuracy of his statement that, within the very vague and unwritten Constitution of the British Empire, logical definitions, such as you would find in the French Code, are not possible, but it is a long way from admitting that to admitting also that no understandings binding on reasonable people are possible. The noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack never attempted to deal with the point so clearly and emphatically made by the noble Marquess, Lord Curzon, that this was a question which did not affect Great Britain and the Irish Free State only but affected all the Dominions of the whole Empire. I join emphatically in the protest that I think the noble Marquess, Lord Curzon, meant to register, that such a matter should have been settled or should be in danger of being settled between two parties only in a partnership where at least seven are involved.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

PACIFIC CABLE BOARD BILL.
Read 3a (according to Order).
Clause 1:
Extension of powers of Pacific Cable Board.
1.—(1) The Pacific Cable Board may, subject to the approval of each of the Governments represented on the Board, undertake as agents for and at the expense of the Governments of any parts of His Majesty's Dominions any work in connection with telegraphic communication, whether by means of cables or by means of wireless telegraphy, within their existing sphere of operations in the Pacific and Caribbean areas.
Provided that the accounts of any work so undertaken shall be kept separate and distinct from all other accounts of the Board.
LORD ARNOLD LORD ARNOLD moved, in subsection (1), to leave out "in the Pacific and Caribbean areas" and insert "and within the Caribbean area." The noble Lord said: My Lords, it is not necessary for me to say more than a word or two about this Amendment. When the original Amendment was inserted in Committee at the instance of the noble Lord, Lord Banbury of Southam, he was good enough to agree that the wording should be subject to review. The words have now been reviewed and slightly changed, and the noble Lord is also good enough to agree to this change. Therefore, I do not think I need say more in moving the Amendment which stands in my name.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 12, leave out from ("operations") to the end of line 13, and insert ("and within the Caribbean area").—(Lord Arnold.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD ARNOLD: My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill do now pass.
Moved, That the Bill do now pass.—(Lord Arnold.)
On Question, Bill passed, with the Amendments, and returned to the Commons.
House adjourned at twenty minutes before six o'clock.