HL Deb 23 July 1924 vol 58 cc905-13
LORD RAGLAN

My Lords, I wish to ask His Majesty's Government whether they can make any statement with regard to the question of retaining a British garrison in Egypt. The case for the retention of a British garrison in Egypt, and especially in Cairo, falls into two parts. There is, first, the defence of the Suez Canal, and secondly, there is the protection of foreign interests in Egypt. It has been suggested that while withdrawing our forces in Egypt to the Canal zone, we can still adequately fulfil both those obligations. I shall endeavour to convince your Lordships that that is a complete fallacy.

It is unnecessary for me to enlarge on the importance of the Suez Canal. It is practically the main artery of the British Empire, and if it were cut the British Empire might very well bleed to death. There are many difficulties in the way of defending the Suez Canal from the Canal bank. There is, first, the political difficulty. The Suez Canal zone is part of Egypt. The towns on the Suez Canal, Port Said, Ismailia and Suez, are Egyptian towns just as Cairo and Alexandria are Egyptian towns. If the Suez Canal zone were to be cut off from Egypt it would at once become Egypt Irredenta and it would then afford a fertile ground for political agitation. This might, not have mattered much so long as everything was quiet, but in the event of war or of any disturbance it might lead to serious trouble.

We come next to the strategical aspect of the matter and we must endeavour to imagine what would be the position of the British Army spread out along the Canal bank in face of a hostile Army which might cither be the Egyptian Army or the Army of whatever Power succeeded us in Egypt—as some Power will almost certainly do if we evacuate that country. The British Army will have a foreign Army on its front, 150 miles of desert in its rear, and probably be in the midst of a hostile, population. It may very well be able to repel, or even to defeat, the hostile Army, but it is almost inconceivable that it will be able adequately to guard a hundred miles of the Canal against attacks by land, by water, and by air.

The next question is that of the water supply. The whole water supply of the Canal zone comes along what is known as the Sweet Water Canal, which leaves the Nile near Cairo. I am informed that a gang of competent navvies could break this canal in about four hours. Of course, it is not the ease that this would lead to the immediate death, by thirst, of all the inhabitants, of the Canal zone, as there would still be enough water in the part of the Sweet Water Canal which lies within the Canal zone to keep the population going for several days. But there is no certainty that the Canal would be restored in time, and it would be the bounden duty of the British Government to provide alternative means of water supply. These alternative means might take two forms. Water might be brought from the Jordan—this would involve a pipe line of about 300 miles long over very difficult country—or large condensers might be constructed in the Canal zone. These operations would be extremely costly and probably unsatisfactory.

Coming to the defence of the Canal itself, the Canal zone is an unpleasant and unhealthy place and very undesirable as a permanent quarter for British troops. It has been suggested that a British garrison might be maintained in Palestine and brought down to the Canal in case of emergency. There are two objections to this course. The first is that the only communication between the Canal zone and Palestine lies over a single line of railway crossing 150 miles of desert. In the event of war this railway would be very liable to be broken, either by attacks on the ground or attacks from the air. If we relied on the garrison being able to arrive on the Canal bank in time, it is probable that we should be deceived and that the enemy would get to the Canal before we did. The other objection to basing our Canal defence force in Palestine is the fact that we hold Palestine under a Mandate which, theoretically at any rate, can be revoked at any moment.

Last year I ventured to ask the late Government whether they considered that the military occupation of Palestine was advantageous to the British. The noble Duke, the Duke of Devonshire, who was then Secretary of State, used these words in reply:— I am bound to say that there is no question of strategy, but that we are there because we are carrying out a certain definite obligation, placed upon us before the world by the League of Nations. That, to a certain extent, begs the question because it is obvious that any armed force wherever it might be, and for whatever purpose it might be there, must have some strategic importance and must be taken into consideration in framing a scheme of Imperial Defence. It clearly indicates that the late Government, at any rate, did not base their scheme for the defence of the Suez Canal upon the presence of a British force in Palestine. It is my firm conviction, which is shared by many people who are much better qualified to express an opinion than I am, that whoever holds Cairo holds Egypt and whoever holds Egypt holds the Suez Canal.

I pass now to the protection of foreign interests in Cairo. Many of your Lordships have visited Cairo and Alexandria and are aware that practically the whole of the commerce of those towns is in the hands of foreigners. You have only to walk through the principal streets either of Cairo or Alexandria, and look at the names over the shops and offices, in order to see Italian, French, Greek, British, Maltese, Indian and Syrian names; in fact, the names of almost every nationality except Egyptian. If we evacuate Cairo and Alexandria, who is to be responsible for the protection of these people and of the vast financial, commercial and industrial interests which they represent? What their fate would be we can only infer from what has happened in the past.

In May, 1921, there were very serious anti-foreign riots in Alexandria in which about one hundred people lost their lives and there was a considerable destruction of property. The riots were eventually quelled by British troops, and after everything had become peaceful a British Commission was set up to inquire into the cause of these riots. I propose to read to your Lordships an extract from the Report of that Commission. What they said was this:— This outburst in Alexandria happened because the people thought that the hand of the Government was relaxing and that the authorities dare not act against them. They took two days for preparation and then the long pent hatred of Europeans burst out. If this is not the correct view, it is difficult to understand why the police should have joined in, or why the soldiers of the Third Battalion Egyptian Army, who had arrived from Cairo only the day before, should have forgotten their discipline and used their arms to shoot down Europeans in the streets. Given similar circumstances, this feeling will always manifest itself in the future, as it has done in the past, and a very long period of time must elapse before that feeling can be eradicated. The Italian. French and Greek Consuls gave evidence before the Court of Inquiry. They solemnly protested against the treatment of their nationals, and state that they can never consent to their being protected by a force composed exclusively of Egyptians. That is a very important point because there is every reason to believe that this opinion of the Consuls was then shared, and is now shared, by the Governments which they represent.

M. de Witasse, the French Consul, added this further statement— I would draw the attention of this Court to the events of a like nature which happened on the 11th June, 1882 … Under the pretence of a quarrel between a Maltese and a native of Ramleh, natives commenced an attack on all Europeans. The Europeans went to the carcols for protection and were met with bayonet thrusts. They complained to the Governor; but he pretended to be ill, and took no action. Finally, owing to the numerous complaints, some gens d'armes were sent, who instead of protecting the Europeans, fired upon them and the Europeans, in self-defence, returned the fire from the windows of the houses. Exactly the same thing that happened on the 11th June. 1882, has happened on the 22nd May, 1921. It does not require the gift of prophecy to foresee that what happened on May 22, 1921, will be repeated when the British garrison is withdrawn.

One other thing happened at Alexandria in 1921 which is not referred to in the Report of the Committee. During the riots an Italian man-of-war arrived at Alexandria with troops on board, and there is no doubt that those troops would have been landed had not the British military authorities taken control of the situation and suppressed the riots. If the same thing happens again after the British garrison has been removed and the troops of Italy, France, Greece or any other Power having important interests in Alexandria are landed in that town and have taken possession and assumed military control over it, what will be the attitude of the British Government? The only thing they can say, so far as I can see, is: "We are not going to protect your nationals, and we are not going to allow you to protect your nationals." I venture to suggest that the Government of France, Italy, Greece, or whoever it may be, are not likely to consider that a very satisfactory statement and are extremely unlikely to act upon it.

If the people at Alexandria have this in their favour, that being on the sea they can, in the event of riots, rely on the help of such warships as may be in the harbour, the people of Cairo are very much worse placed. Not only are they liable to anti-foreign riots which have frequently occurred in Egypt but they are also liable to Bedouin raids from the desert. The desert round Cairo holds large numbers of Bedouin. The Bedouin have a contempt for and snap their fingers at the authorities at Cairo. It is only the presence of British troops in Cairo which has prevented such raids from taking place. If the British garrison is withdrawn the position of those Europeans who are very numerous and who live in the suburbs of Cairo, will become intolerable. In conclusion, I would add that it is my firm belief that if the British troops evacuate Cairo we shall either have to wade back there through a sea of blood or give place to some other European Power. I beg to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Paper.

LORD WESTER WEMYSS

My Lords, I should like to emphasise with as much force as experience can give all the words that have fallen from the noble Lord, Lord Raglan. It seems to me that so far as England is concerned Egypt is the Canal and the Canal is Egypt. Whatever sentimental reasons we may have for thoughts about Egypt and its natives, to us the practical value of Egypt is the Canal. The noble Lord has very rightly said that it is the main artery of the Empire, and that if it is cut the artery will bleed to death. The recent experience we have had in the war is so close that there is no necessity for me to bring to your Lordships' notice all the dangers that would ensue from such a happening. We very nearly saw it, and we trembled to think what might have happened if it had materialised en the part of the enemy.

There is also, it seems to me, another question which may be considered, and which makes our position in Egypt so extraordinarily difficult, and that is a moral one. There can be no doubt what ever that since the Treaty of Lausanne our prestige in the East has suffered a considerable diminution. That is a factor which I think must be taken into consideration when we regard this question, for, whatever happens, it is the Canal that we have got to safeguard, and the safety of the Canal rests on law and order in Egypt. If we have no moral authority and no force at our back, as the noble Lord so aptly put it, our future generations will, unless they are to see the Empire fall to pieces, have to wade through more, and probably much worse, wars than we have had even since the year 1882. Not only I but thousands of people in this country sincerely hope that they may hear to-day from the Government something which will reassure them as to the future of the country. Not only in private affairs but in public affairs a policy of putting off is one of the greatest dangers. As soon as the peoples of Egypt and of the East are aware that we do look upon this subject as one of Imperial importance I am sure the danger and the difficulties will be lessened.

LORD PARMOOR

My Lords, I appreciate the important matters raised in the speech of the noble Lord who put the Question, and in the speech of the noble and gallant Lord who spoke last. I am aware of the special experience which both those noble Lords have had of the matters to which they have referred. The noble Lord, Lord Raglan, referred to the Suez Canal, the question of the water supply, and Cairo and Alexandria. I have no doubt whatever that all Imperial or British interests will be carefully safeguarded. I think everyone may take that for granted. I am sorry to say that it is quite impossible for me to go into these questions at the present moment, for a reason which I will state, and which, I think, your Lordships will appreciate.

These very matters are coming up for consideration when the projected meeting with the Egyptian Prime Minister takes place. It is expected and hoped that that meeting will take place in a very short time. Then all these will be matters of friendly discussion, and I think both noble Lords will realise that it would be very unfortunate at the present time for me to make any general statement on matters which are intended to be questions for friendly discussion between the Prime Minister of Egypt and the Prime Minister of this country. One must necessarily only speak in a guarded manner. I cannot, I am afraid, give any information beyond that at the present moment, except that I think your Lordships may be quite certain that what are called Imperial interests will be properly safeguarded in any negotiations of that character.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

My Lords, I quite recognise, and, if I may respectfully say so, approve of the reticence which the noble Lord, the Lord President of the Council, has shown in answer to my noble friend's Question. If I say that he was, I think, fully justified in his reticence, that conveys no reproach to my noble friend behind me—he will understand that—who is in a position of complete independence in putting the Question, which I think was a reasonable one to put. I do not desire to place the Government in any difficulty in this matter. They have a negotiation in front of them, and they are entitled to keep their own counsels, but I think it right to say, on behalf of myself and those with whom I act, that we could not favour any want of care in safeguarding the Imperial interests which are involved in Egypt. We take an absolute view on this subject.

I think, sometimes, that the question of national independence is liable to be much misunderstood. We have, of course, no desire to go back upon the arrangement which has been made recognising the self-government of Egypt, but no country is really independent in the sense that it may do exactly as it likes without reference to the interests of other countries. That is true of all countries, even of the greatest. It is true in an increasing degree of other countries as they go down in the scale of importance, and Egyptian independence must be recognised only upon condition that British interests are entirely safeguarded in that country. The Canal is vital to the Empire, and whatever is necessary to protect the Canal we must, of course, insist upon. I do not think there is any advantage in mincing one's words upon that.

So long as that safeguard is amply provided for, other matters are of minor importance, but I do recognise that what has been said by my noble friend behind me, and by the noble and gallant Lord on the Cross Benches, is also true. There are other subjects which have to be considered, and one of the principal subjects is the welfare and safety of the European population in Egypt. Regard must be paid to that, and we have certain obligations to other countries in these matters which must not be forgotten. Those are the principal matters. There may be others of which, of course, having so recently served upon the Committee of Imperial Defence I am well aware that it would probably not be appropriate for me to refer to at this moment, but I thought I ought to say so much in order that there should be no misunderstanding as to the attitude we on this side of the House take.