Lords Sitting of 14 July 1924

Preamble
The House met at a quarter past four of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
MARRIAGES VALIDITY (PROVISIONAL ORDERS) BILL. [H.L.]
Returned from the Commons, agreed to.
MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDER CONFIRMATION (STRATFORD - UPON - AVON EXTENSION) BILL. [H.L.]
Returned from the Commons, agreed to.
PREVENTION OF EVICTION BILL.
Returned from the Commons, with the Amendments insisted upon by the Lords, agreed to.
PACIFIC CABLE BOARD BILL.
Returned from the Commons, with the Amendment made by the Lords, agreed to.

COUNTY COURTS BILL.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT HALDANE): My Lords, I beg to move the Motion which stands in my name.
Moved, That Standing Order No. XXI be considered in order to its being suspended for this day's sitting; and that the Order for the Third Reading of the County Courts Bill have precedence of the other Notices and Orders of the Day.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Motion agreed to, and ordered accordingly.
Bill read 3a (according to Order), and passed.

SAINT ENOCH'S CHURCH AND PARISH QUOAD SACRA ORDER CONFIRMATION BILL.
Read 3a (according to Order), and passed.
CLYDEBANK AND DISTRICT WATER ORDER CONFIRMATION BILL.
Read 3a (according to Order), and passed.

COUNCIL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.
EARL BEAUCHAMP: My Lords, I beg to ask the Lord President of the Council if he can give to the House any information relating to the last meeting of the League of Nations.
THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (LORD PARMOOR): My Lords, I shall have to reply at some length to the Question of the noble Earl because I think there is need of publicity concerning what takes place at the meetings of the Council of the League of Nations. The noble Earl, I am sure, refers not to the meeting of the League of Nations, but to the meeting of the Council of the League of Nations, from which I have recently returned, and your Lordships are aware that last Friday or Saturday a miscellaneous Paper was issued containing my Report of what passed at the meeting. It will be unnecessary, therefore, for me to go into any questions of detail; they are all contained in the Report of the British representative.
The meeting, in some respects, was not so important as the March meeting; that is to say, the questions involved were not of such wide interest. On the other hand, it was a very important meeting as it was an evidence of the growing friendly spirit which, most fortunately, dominates the whole position at Geneva. Let me call your attention to the very important character of the representation. France was represented by the veteran upholder of the principle of the League of Nations, M. Leon Bourgeois, and M. de Jouvenel, who held a prominent place in M. Poincaré's Cabinet. M. Hymans represented Belgium. He has taken a prominent part in the foreign affairs of Belgium for a long time. In addition our President was M. Benes, Foreign Minister of Czecho-Slovakia.
I want to make one or two statements to your Lordships and then to refer to several matters which took place at the last meeting of the Council. The principal members who will represent Great Britain at the coming Assembly in

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September have now been designated by the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister. Your Lordships will recollect that the Prime Minister himself, I am sure at great sacrifice considering all the work he has to undertake, will be the leading British representative. I noted that the noble Viscount, Lord Cecil of Chelwood, expressed the hope the other day that the Prime Minister would not only be present at the commencement but would remain at Geneva during the whole month of September. That is a counsel of perfection, but it is too much to ask of any Prime Minister, having regard to the enormous claims that are made upon his time and strength. The present British representative will be the second member of the representation, the Home Secretary will be the third—there are many important matters specially within the cognisance of the Home Secretary—and the fourth representative, who will be the alternative to the Prime Minister and will take the place of the Prime Minister when the latter has to go away, will be Professor Gilbert Murray, the very eminent professor of Oxford University, who is Chairman of the Executive Council of the League of Nations Union and who is known to have taken a very active part in all questions of League principles and League detail. He is a Liberal in politics, but politics do not enter into a question of this kind.
There is another matter about which I have been asked, and should like, to say a word. I have been asked questions on several occasions concerning the views of the Government on the Treaty of Mutual Assistance. These views have now been sent in a considered Report to the Secretariat at Geneva, and no doubt they will be immediately published. I am not sure whether they have actually been published yet, but the document was sent some time last week. I think that the tenor of the document will show what I may call a continuity of view on this subject between the present Government and the late Government. I hesitate to go further, but I see that the noble Viscount, Lord Cecil of Chelwood, has just entered the House, and I ought to say that when he considers that document he will not be altogether satisfied with its contents. I do not propose to comment upon the document which must speak for itself. It has the assent of all the Dominions—we all have one common
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view on this subject—and a very similar view at any rate was expressed by the United States Government, as I saw in the Press towards the end of last week. The noble Viscount will understand, therefore, that although I do not propose on the present occasion to go into the arguments in detail he cannot expect to find that the answer is favourable to his point of view.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: Will the noble Lord allow me to interrupt him for one moment? Has the document to which he has referred been published yet? I have not seen it.
LORD PARMOOR: It has been published in the sense that it has been sent to the Secretariat which, as the noble Viscount knows, is the way in which a document of this kind is published. I am in the same position as the noble Viscount in that I have not actually seen it referred to in a published paper, but it has been published by being sent as the answer of the Government to the Secretariat at Geneva. I do not propose to go into this answer in any detail, but, after seeing the document, the noble Viscount may desire to raise a question on some specific occasion. In the meantime, the answer has been published formally and technically.
If I may, I wish to say one other word on a general point before I come to the specific matters which were dealt with at the last Council meeting. Questions have been raised—I do not intend to go into them in any sense to-day—of strengthening the Council or strengthening the League, by the admission of countries which are not Members at the present time. I merely wish to make this statement as a view of my own and not from any official standpoint. I hope that if the League is strengthened by the addition of Members this will not interfere with the representation of the Council as it now exists. In other words, I hope that if the League is strengthened the Council will be proportionately increased in number, and I say that because there are so many members of the Council, known very well to the noble Viscount opposite as well as to myself, all of whom have done, and are doing, splendid work.
It is true that there must be a certain routine of representation. That is an

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essential factor of the Constitution of the League. On the other hand, I should be extremely sorry if the admission of other countries to the League lessened the opportunities of re-election of those who are now members of the Council or the election of persons in their place. I speak with gratitude of that which has been done by the representatives of Spain and of other countries. So far as the Latin Republics of America are concerned, to a great extent they decide one with another what they would desire the representation to be and I desire to say, being myself a strong advocate of making the League what has been described as "all inclusive," that I do not want this to be done by sacrificing the position of any members of the existing Council. This, of course, can be avoided within the terms of the Pact, by increasing the membership of the Council at least to a proportionate number.
I do not know whether your Lordships have before you the Report of the last session of the Council which I hold in my hand, but there are one or two matters in it to which I should like to call attention. It was published, I think, on Saturday. The first group of matters referred to comes under the head of "Financial and economic reconstruction," and I think I can claim for the League and the Council of the League that, whatever criticism they have been subjected to in some directions, their work in financial and economic reconstruction has been entirely good and entirely satisfactory. To a great extent that is due to the strong character of the Financial Committee of the League. It really represents the banking, financial and economic interests of all the leading countries. In all that it has desired to do it has always attained the confidence and support of the financial interests in the various countries concerned. Perhaps it would be invidious to mention a name, but everyone who knows his work is conscious of the great indebtedness of the League and of the Council to the representative of the British Treasury, who has done admirable work on every occasion in dealing with these matters of financial and economic reconstruction. As your Lordships will understand, matters of financial and economic reconstruction always affect this country in a
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particular manner. In other words, when financial assistance is required the first consideration is to obtain the support of the British Government.
Perhaps your Lordships will allow me to draw your attention in a word or two to that which has been done under these heads of financial and economic reconstruction. That which has been done for Austria is fairly well known, and I do not think that I need refer to it again. One or two questions were raised during the discussions of the Council in which the suggestion was very properly emphasised that further drastic economies were required if Austria were to be economically independent in the future. I think it is as well to make it clear that, although an immense amount has been done for Austria, she is still only on her way to financial stability in the wider sense of the term and that care is still necessary.
Now I come to the case of Greece. Here I think I can claim that the British Government and the British people have done good work. Mr. Morgenthau, the American head of the Committee dealing with Greek refugees, came here some time in April and it fell to my lot to be Chairman of the Sub-Committee which deals with this question of Greek refugees-This work, which it of the very greatest importance and involves the happiness or misery of hundreds of thousands of people, could not have been carried on without the assistance of the Bank of England. Mr. Norman, of the Bank of England, came forward and supplied, on proper security, £1,000,000 of English money, which has enabled this great work to be carried on. It is hoped that this amount will suffice until permanent arrangements have been made in the autumn. As adding to what I have said, I might state that the statistics of these Greek refugees show that during the period from January I to April 30, 13,000 Greek refugee families were settled in Macedonia, Thrace and old Greece. I dare say your Lordships will appreciate what that statement means—the settlement of 13,000 families who, apart from such help, would have been really in a hopeless condition. This work could not have been carried out without our assistance and except, through the financial methods familiar to those who deal with the League of Nations, and I claim that it is entirely to their credit that this assistance has been given.

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In the case of Albania, your Lordships may recollect that Lord Lamington called attention at an early date to this matter and asked whether, in the exceptional circumstances, assistance might not be given by the British Government. I was happy to be able to give a sympathetic reply. The sum promised by the British Government was found, other sums dependent upon our contribution have also been found, and again, there has been great alleviation of famine conditions. But although these conditions have been alleviated, we have found that all the difficulties have not been overcome and we appeal to other States who have not heretofore given assistance to help in this matter.
Now I come to a very important matter and a really great success—Hungary. What has happened in the case of Hungary could not have happened except through the assistance of the Financial Committee of the League of Nations. I wish to emphasise that but for the influence, authority and security which the League gives the amount of money desired to be found for Hungary could not have been found. When we met on the Council of the League the last time we were told that owing to the large amount of money promised from English sources the loan to Hungary was likely to be an assured success, and the Council gave its authority to the Financial Committee to do all they could to carry through the financial negotiations. We acted upon the advice of the Financial Committee and gave to the Reparation Commission an undertaking that it could carry through to a conclusion the reconstruction plans contained in the Protocol. This undertaking was required as a condition to the Reparation Commission releasing their claims upon Hungarian assets. That was an extremely important factor and the result is that the whole of the Hungarian loan—I think it was oversubscribed—was found, and the gratitude of the Hungarian Government has been expressed more than once. This is a great step in the direction of their financial reconstruction.
The next point on which I should like to say one word is the Saar Valley. The Saar Valley has been the topic of criticism on more than one occasion. It has been often suggested that the trusteeship of the Council of the League of Nations, as guardians of the interests of the inhabitants of the Saar Valley, has
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not been adequately carried out. I think that criticism has been unduly exaggerated. The position was a very difficult one, and I think it is being gradually straightened out. It stands in this way at the present time: that the local gendarmerie has been increased to an extent which the British Government considered satisfactory. The constitution of the Governing Commission, largely influenced by what was done by my predecessor, Lord Cecil, has been placed upon a satisfactory basis. A delegation of the inhabitants of the Saar Valley came to me at Geneva to express gratitude for what the British Government had done and to state that the existing conditions placed them in an entirely different position to that in which they were before. I think that is important because it is a case of trusteeship which ought to be carried out in as effective a manner as possible, although from the very conditions of governing a country of 700,000 mining inhabitants, it is no easy task. The only outstanding question concerns the Customs Duties which can be charged when the first five years of the occupation come to an end. That question was raised really very late before the last Council, and was sent to a Committee of Jurists. I have no doubt that, whatever the law is said to be, that law the Council will determine shall be enforced.
The next question about which I should like to say a word—and I am sorry that my noble and learned friend Lord Phillimore is not here—is with regard to the protection of minorities. Your Lordships are perfectly well aware of the prejudice aroused, even in this country, on what I may call the alien question. Even in this advanced country there are people not above prejudice when dealing with aliens, and you can hardly wonder, therefore, that in a country like Poland the difficulties are much greater. The Polish Government, with whom we have had the most friendly relationships, have, however, always expressed a desire to do the best they can in the difficult circumstances which exist, and ultimately, in order that these matters might be settled, Lord Phillimore undertook the Chairmanship of a Committee appointed to arrange terms of settlement between the Polish Government and those known as German "colonists."

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It is a very difficult question. A large number of "colonists" had been expelled, as was thought unjustly. It had, in fact, been found to be unjust by an international Conference, and the question of compensation arose. A series of compensation cases under those conditions might have taken years to settle. I am perfectly certain from my knowledge of such matters that it would have been extremely difficult to carry them through. But what really happened was this. The Polish Government met Lord Phillimore's Committee in a most fair-minded way. They suggested that an over-all sum should be settled on terms which Lord Phillimore satisfied himself were fair, and then this over-all sum, having once been settled, should be distributed among the various claimants. A system of that kind is not perfect, but Lord Phillimore's son, Captain Phillimore, kindly went to Poland, His mission there turned out a great success. He saw the various claimants, and so far as he could ascertained what would be a fair payment to meet their claims, and the figure was ultimately accepted by the Polish Government. I should like to express my gratitude to the Polish Government for the step they took towards the settlement of this difficult question.
There is a further outstanding question between Germany and Poland affecting what are called minorities of nationality—again a very difficult question. I believe that is being settled at the present time by a Committee in Vienna. Many-steps had already been taken at the last Council Meeting, but the matter was not concluded. When the Polish representative was called before the Council, he gave an undertaking that whatever the decisions of the Arbitral Tribunal should be they would be enforced by Poland and, meanwhile, the hand of Poland would be stayed in the sense that she would not push forward further evictions while matters were sub judice. I will give the words of the Polish representatives' reply when it was alleged that persons had been unfairly expelled. I am afraid I had rather to cross-examine him and the noble Viscount, Lord Cecil, will appreciate that. The Polish representatives said that in no case had any such persons been expelled from their properties or from Polish territory; that if administrative action had actually been taken it was only in cases where it was
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clear that the nationality of such an individual in no way depended on the Vienna negotiations. He promised to give further information to the Council of the League so that they might see that everything went fairly in the future, I do not for a moment doubt that, and I hope that the matter may be satisfactorily settled.
A further very important matter was the control of armaments in Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria. This has such an important bearing to my mind on the whole question of disarmament that I want to emphasise the position. At the request of the British Government the following item was placed on the Agenda of the Council:
"To consider the position of the Council of the league of Nations in regard to Articles 159 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain, 143 of the Treaty of Trianon and 104 of the Treaty of Neuilly."
Under these Articles this is the provision:
"Austria (Hungary Bulgaria) undertakes to submit to any investigation which the Council of the League of Nations, acting if need be by a majority vote, may consider necessary."
Let me explain what that means.
Up till this time there have been Inter-Allied Commissions of Control to safeguard the position of disarmament in those three countries. It was always contemplated that after a time these Inter-Allied Commissions of Control should come to an end, and that then the League should undertake the duty of seeing that no fresh armaments were made. In other words, these countries agreed under the Covenant to submit the question of disarmament to the investigation of the League after the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control came to an end. That was extremely satisfactory in itself, but the question was how to carry it out. Fortunately, the representatives of France—who, I must say, have always, in my experience at the Council, been extremely friendly—were M. Bourgeois, whom the noble Earl opposite will affectionately remember, and M. de Jouvenel, a great friend of the League of Nations. They both assented to this.
They said quite frankly—and it was afterwards stated publicly—that this is a very important point, particularly to France, because whatever is applied to Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria will

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certainly be applied in the ease of Germany. I do not say it will be applied immediately, because the question is whether Germany has now complied with the conditions of Article 203 of the Treaty of Versailles, and it is not until she has complied with those conditions that the subsequent steps can be taken under Article 213. I indicated, on behalf of the British Government, that there were two difficulties ahead of us. One was a difficulty to be settled by jurists, because it was not very obvious how the Council should be composed under the terms of the Treaty when these matters came to be considered. The second point was that we should have to be advised on technical matters as regards armaments of various kinds. M. de Jouvenel, who, on behalf of the French Delegation, accepted the general proposal, said he thought these matters might be settled in this way: that so far as concerned the jurists' question it should be sent to the Committee of Jurists. We were unanimous, and that has been done. I hope very much that this country will be again represented by my noble friend Lord Phillimore if he can possibly spare the time to go to Geneva.
Then there was the further question of expert opinion on naval, military, and are matters. That was referred to what is known as the permanent Advisory Commission—a Commission which was appointed under the terms of the Covenant in order to advise the Council on all military questions. But it was made clear—and I want to emphasise this point—by every member of the Council, I think, that these two bodies, the Committee of Jurists and the permanent Advisory Commission, were only in the position of giving advice, and that the ultimate determination and responsibility must rest with the Council itself, and with the Council only. I consider it very important to make that point quite clear. I am glad to see that the noble Earl appreciates that, because he has had such great experience in these matters. Having made it clear that the ultimate responsibility rested with the Council itself, we were unanimous as to the provision to be made.
Let us see how important that is. Supposing you have the disarmament of
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Austria, Bulgaria, and Hungary, and afterwards, we will say, of Germany, submitted to investigation by the League of Nations. There you have immediately a test of disarmament under the control of the League of Nations itself—a test of disarmament which is capable of much wider application, if it is thought desirable that such application should be made. I do not propose to go any further at present than to make the suggestion, which has always appealed to my mind, that disarmament is the way to bring about security, and that it is rather the wrong way of looking at matters to say that security must come first, and disarmament afterwards. I think we realised all these difficulties when this matter was discussed during the war in this House.
The proper interpretation of the Covenant, it seems to me, is that, given disarmament under proper conditions—and no doubt the intention is that there should be disarmament of all countries in the long run—that would bring the security which we all want; whereas, if you do not have a measure of disarmament, in whatever terms you may have it set forth, it seems to me difficult to ensure that if national passions are aroused the armaments will not be used possibly to bring about another war—a catastrophe which, in the opinion of most people, would mean the end of European civilisation.
The other points are matters of detail. There is the question of slavery. We had a very strong Committee appointed to consider it and everyone will recognise the value of our representative, Sir Frederick Lugard. One other matter which I might mention gave rise to some misunderstanding. The man who has taken the pioneer and prominent part in dealing with the Russian refugees is Dr. Nansen. Civilisation and humanity at large are enormously indebted to him for the work he has done. He wrote a Report saying that his duties would terminate next Christmas, and indicating what should be done and what his ideas were for the future. He suggested that this question of Russian refugees had left the political area, as he called it, and had come into the labour area, had become rather a question of employment than of political differences. In his very valuable Report ho made a suggestion that the

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work should be transferred from what is called the Secretariat to the International Labour Office. Any one who knows what Dr. Nansen has done will, of course, give great weight to his opinions.
But a matter of this kind should not be carried out without the International Labour Office assenting to the transfer of these duties to them. The refugee problem is not a pleasant task. I think that Dr. Nansen has acted in the most unselfish spirit in the wonderful work he has done. So we adopted his Report, leaving it of course to the International Labour Office to say whether they could undertake the duties or not. This was not a matter of organisation, and our only consideration was how these refugees could best be protected and dealt with. At the present time that matter has not been settled. Negotiations, I believe, are going on between the Secretariat and the International Labour Office. Whether they will be successful or not I do not know, but I am sure that those of us who are dealing with this question are not so much concerned with the mechanism of things except in order to obtain successful treatment. We desire wholeheartedly that everything that can be done shall be done in regard to these wretched and miserable refugees whose condition is one of the worst products of the war.
We have also a Committee on Intellectual Co-operation. Originally, the German member of it was a man of world wide reputation in science—namely, Dr. Einstein. He decided at one time to resign from the Committee, not being satisfied with the work of the League. He has now rejoined, with I think the consent of all parties, and not only with their consent but their welcome. Therefore, I hope that this Committee on Intellectual Co-operation, which was originally suggested and put into order by M. Bourgeois, may carry out its great duties of creating in intellectual life a measure of common understanding between different nations.
I have attempted, though no doubt imperfectly, to give an account of what the Council did. I feel very strongly that, whatever may be said about the Council, it is being rapidly strengthened owing to the excellent work it is doing. It is, of course, open to criticism; everybody is open to criticism. But it is gradually
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strengthening its work, in particular on the philanthropic and economic sides, and I sincerely hope that the opinion of your Lordships may be further strengthened in the direction to which you gave approval even during the war, when this House, the first of all Senates and of all Parliamentary bodies, gave its assent to the principle of the League of Nations as a principle which ought to be adopted in order to ensure us as far as possible against disastrous wars in the future.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: My Lords, I do not propose to follow the noble and learned Lord into the details of his interesting review of the work of the last Council. The work has been of great value, no doubt. Some people may think that it was concerned with rather minor matters and that it was a chronicle of "small beer." But even if that opinion be held, the beer was of excellent quality. As a matter of fact, I think that is not altogether an accurate criticism. Some of the work which was done by the Council was of the first importance. I agree with the noble and learned Lord that the work of the reconstruction of Hungary was a work of very great importance, of very great political difficulty and, perhaps, even greater financial complication. That it was accomplished successfully was due, no doubt, to the labours of the Council, but quite as much, if I may be allowed to say so, to the labours of the Secretariat, particularly of that distinguished and remarkable international servant, Sir Arthur Salter.
Now I notice that the noble and learned Lord said something about the Saar Valley and rejoiced that the foreign troops were to be diminished and replaced by gendarmerie. I agree. But the process has gone a very little way as yet. There will still be a very large body of foreign troops in the Saar Valley and I am convinced that until you get the foreign troops out of the Saar and leave order in the hands of a gerularmerie you will not really have got a satisfactory state of things in that district.
With reference to the question of the refugees, the noble and learned Lord told your Lordships that Dr. Nansen had suggested that the further dealing with this very difficult question might be handed over to the International Labour Office, and, indeed, the suggestion of Dr. Nansen seems a very reasonable one. It

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is for the most part no longer a political question. It is mainly a question of economics and how to find employment and, indeed, dwelling places for these refugees. It is a matter which I should have thought came more within the competence of the International Labour Office than that of Dr. Nansen and his Committee, and I understand that the Council were of that opinion and recommended it, though I understand also that some representatives of the Governments that voted for this proposal on the Council voted against it when it got to the International Labour Office. I do not know whether that is so.
If it is so, it indicates what I have always felt myself to be a great weakness in that part of the League organisation. I think it is, in principle, wrong to have the International Labour Office entirely independent of the League. It ought to be, no doubt, an autonomous body under the League, but it ought to be under the League. The present position is really indefensible. The money for the International Labour Office is found by the League, but the, League has no control, directly or indirectly, over its expenditure That is a position which I am sure no one could defend, and I hope some day or other, though I admit the difficulty of the problem, that a solution will be found.
In some respects I think this Report is very encouraging. There is one passage in it which I would venture to commend, if I may do so without impertinence, to my noble friend Lord Banbury. He has not always been—shall I say?—a wholehearted believer in the League of Nations, and, therefore, I am more than anxious to save such a brand from the burning. If he will look at this Report he will see that a very interesting statement is made. It is in reference to the assistance to Greece. It seems that in the course of that very magnificent work which is being done there it became necessary for the Greek Government to try to borrow another £1,000,000 from the Bank of England, and they made their application. This is what the Report states:
"At this meeting it was reported by Mr. Morgenthau and M. Diomedes that they had succeeded in reaching an agreement with the Bank of England for a further short-term loan of £1.000,000 for the continuance of the work of their Commission. The only condition attached to this agreement was,
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that the Council of the League should definitely decide to carry the work on to a conclusion."
In other words, the authorities of the Bank of England made the condition that the League should go on being responsible for this work, and then they would find the money. They evidently have a very high opinion, as, indeed, I know they have, of the integrity and efficiency of the League of Nations, and they backed their opinion to the tune of £1,000,000. I think that is a testimony which my noble friend will think is of some value.
LORD BANBURY OF SOUTHAM: What is the security?
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: I will not go into that at this moment. That was a matter for the Bank of England, and after investigating it the only condition they made was that the League should continue the work to a conclusion. The same thing applies to Hungary. There is a very remarkable circumstance in connection with this matter. There was considerable hesitation—I do not think there is any harm in saying it now—amongst the financial houses of New York in taking any part of this loan to Hungary, but ultimately one of them did so. The hesitation arose from this circumstance: that quite recently two foreign loans had been issued in New-York, one by Czecho-Slovakia and another by Holland, and in both cases there was some difficulty in finding the money. There was some fear, therefore, that still greater difficulty would be found in the case of Hungary, but, as a matter of fact, this League loan for Hungary was launched. I forget the exact sum, but if I remember rightly something like £2,000,000 of it was assigned to America. That amount was subscribed in New York by the public with great rapidity, and without any reluctance whatever. I attach some importance to that fact. You have the testimony of two great financial communities as to the efficiency of the League work that is being done at the present time.
The most important facts in the League policy of the Government necessarily find no mention in this Report. The first of them is the undertaking of the Prime Minister to attend the Assembly at Geneva. I am extremely glad to hear that he is going to do so,

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and that he will be accompanied by the Primo Ministers of France and Italy. That is a very important testimony to the growing public importance of the League. Whether or not it will turn out to be of great advantage, entirely and obviously depends on what the Prime-Ministers do when they get there. I can only say that I hope they are not going there merely for the purposes of a demonstration, merely for the purpose of making speeches. There were a good many speeches made at the Assembly of the League of Nations in the first two years, which were listened to with sympathy and sometimes with applause, but in the last two years the sentiment of the Assembly, if I did not mistake it, was that it was necessary to get to business, and that the time for fine sentiments and eloquent speeches had passed.
I trust that the Prime Minister is going to the Assembly in order to set forward the remedies for the great causes that are troubling Europe, and particularly in order to deal with the very great and difficult question of the reduction and limitation of armaments. The noble Lord made a reference to the policy of the Government in regard to armaments, and suggested that it would be probably more convenient to deal with that at a future time when we have before us the document that has been sent to Geneva. I respectfully agree with him, and I do not propose to say anything beyond this: that I trust when we do see the document it will not be of a purely negative character, and that if the Government cannot accept the suggestions that have been made in the League itself they will at any rate have some alternative policy to put forward. I cannot help feeling—and I say it with regret—a little disquieted over the policy of the Government in this connection.
The noble Lord said that he thought it was of great importance that the League had undertaken to deal with the disarmament of Bulgaria, Austria and Hungary. I did not quite understand why he thought it of great importance. As I understand it, the proposal is that when the existing international authorities have certified that those countries have been disarmed to the extent that they are bound to be disarmed by the Treaties, then the League
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will take over the duty of seeing that those armaments are not increased in an unauthorised manner in the future. I am, I admit, very nervous about the whole of that part of the duties of the League. It is a very difficult task for them to undertake, and though I would not for a moment say that it is wrong, I am not so happy about the noble Lord's account of the methods that are to be employed for creating the necessary machinery. It is apparently sent for the advice of the permanent Military Commission. I would be very sorry to say anything against that body. It has done very excellent work, but so far its work has been mainly of a critical character, and I cannot at this moment call to mind a single piece of constructive work that it has done since it came into existence. How the noble Lord proposes to extend this procedure, which must necessarily be of a very special kind, so as to cover the general question of international disarmament, as he appeared to indicate, I am altogether at a loss to know.
That is not the only thing which disquiets me about the policy of the Government in this respect. There is an incident which took place in the Council which is not recorded in the document that is before your Lordships. Last year the Assembly passed a resolution suggesting that all Governments should agree not to increase their armaments beyond what they are at the present time. That may be an impracticable suggestion. I express no opinion about it. But I find that this is what happened in the Council. The noble Lord, Lord Parmoor, is reported to have said:
"No country was more desirous of disarmament than Great Britain, and he did not wish to oppose the resolution submitted by the President. He desired, however, to make it quite clear that Great Britain would not be able to take any step in the direction which was indicated in the resolution. The resolution did not suggest any obligation on the part of any country, but suggested that the countries might be asked to take certain action. Great Britain would be unable under the terms of this resolution to make any answer which was likely to be of value, and, while he did not oppose the resolution, he thought it was only right to make these reservations."
That may have been perfectly right. I do not criticise it in substance, but it does not seem a very large step towards international limitation of armaments.

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Another matter which the noble and learned Lord did not mention is the relative failure—I say "relative" because I understand it was not an absolute failure —of the Rome Conference, the object of which was to apply the principles of the Washington Treaty to the Powers which were not represented at Washington. I do not think the Government have any definite policy with regard to that either. The only step, so far as I know, that the Government have taken, after all their professions, is one which I understand your Lordships are likely to discuss later this afternoon—the gesture of Singapore. That is not a gesture which ever appealed to me; nor is it, I think, likely to advance materially, or, indeed, at all, the question of the international limitation of armaments in Europe.
I should like, at some future time, to have further information from the noble and learned Lord with regard to the question, to which he has alluded very cryptically and mysteriously—the admission of Germany to the League of Nations. I have never had the least doubt that it was desirable Germany should be admitted to the League. I thought so even before the League came into existence, and since, and I have never had any hesitation in explaining or defending that view, whenever it requires defending.
LORD PARMOOR: May I interrupt the noble Viscount in order to prevent a misapprehension? The Prime Minister, in another place, stated that the policy of the present Government was all in favour of the admission of Germany. I did not touch that question to-day.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: I do not doubt that the noble and learned Lord is in favour of the admission of Germany That is not the question. I read in The Times this morning an account of an interview which apparently the noble and learned Lord has given. I do not know whether I am entitled to quote from it in your Lordships' House, but he seems to have said, in a phrase which is quoted by the German Chancellor, that Germany would receive both a permanent seat and vote in the Council of the League. If the noble and learned Lord did not say it then, of course, it is not worth going on with that observation.
LORD PARMOOR: I should like to make this point quite clear. What I have said more than once is that I am in favour of Germany having a permanent seat and vote in the Council of the League. That does not depend on one Government.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: Then this statement is probably an exaggeration.
LORD PARMOOR: I think it must be.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: It is a quotation from a Berlin Socialist paper to which the noble and learned Lord apparently gave an interview. At any rate, I am glad to hear that he realises that it does not depend on England alone, and that any statement of that kind—I am glad to think he did not make it—is very injudicious and indiscreet and likely to bring to disaster the very policy which he desires to pursue. I have some doubt (and I trust the noble and learned Lord will forgive me for saying so) whether it can be truly said that the Government are quite acting up to their profession and desire to make the League of Nations—I forget the exact phrase—something in the nature of the keystone of their foreign policy. Except for the promise of the Prime Minister to go to Geneva, which I admit is a considerable advance, I am not sure that any progress has been made by the present Government. And no progress means reaction. Any Government that might have been in power would have necessarily advanced the League as a growing thing, but I look in vain for any clear evidence of advance by the present Government in this respect.
Indeed, in some respects I am afraid the recent direction of foreign policy has shown a tendency to go back to some of the worst precedents. I have very little belief in those loudly and widely advertised secret meetings. If you are going to have a secret meeting of statesmen let it be really secret and take place in circumstances in which it will not be the focus and target for every public criticism; otherwise, you are certain to have this result: that those who are not anxious that your policy should succeed, whoever they may be, whether for good or bad motives, will make the most of every rumour that gets abroad. They

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will say that all sorts of things did or did not occur there, and you will spend your time, as we have seen much time recently has been spent, in the correction and contradiction of rumours of that kind. I cannot help contrasting this with the great advantage of proceeding by the League machinery. There you can have the representatives of this country and any other country meeting in a normal way. No one but an idiot believes that you can have negotiations without private conversations. Of course, there must be private conversations, but they can be really private. No question arises unless they result in something, and when they do result in something you have at your hand machinery by which the matter can be internationally announced, internationally explained and internationally discussed. It is a far better system than a reversal to the old system of private, though much advertised, meetings. When I was a child a very wise person once said to me: "A secret that is known to exist is already half divulged," and that is true. If you elaborately advertise a secret meeting you cannot complain if every kind of false impression gets about as to what is done at such a meeting.
I hope I take an unduly pessimistic view as to the achievements and purposes of the Government with reference to the League. At any rate, the Government cannot charge the Opposition with having been carping or unduly critical. We have recognised the great difficulties that anyone who deals with foreign affairs labours under at the present, but I think the time is now come when we have a right to ask the Government for practical proof of their intentions. Mere sentiments, however elevated, however admirable, are not of much value. Take the question of disarmament. It is no use saying you are in favour of disarmament and the limitation of armaments, that you regard it as an essential condition by which the peace of the world can be preserved, unless you bring before Parliament and the country a definite plan for achieving your end. To say that you believe in these things and not produce a plan is worse than saying nothing about it at all. I must conclude by expressing my agreement with Sir Peter Teazle when he said:
"… never lot me hear you utter anything like a sentiment: I have had enough of them to serve me the rest of my life."
VISCOUNT GREY OF FALLODON: My Lords, I only rise to ask a question of the Lord President of the Council. I understand a document has been prepared with regard to the limitation of armaments. Could he give us any indication when that document is likely to be available?
LORD PARMOOR: I think it ought to be available at any time. I understand that it was sent to the Secretariat at the end of last week, which amounts to publication. I have not seen that it has been published in any English source.
VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD: Is there any reason why it should not now be presented to Parliament?
LORD PARMOOR: Not the slightest. It could be laid upon the Table if there is any desire to have it, because it has been published in the only way in which documents of that kind are published; that is to say, it has been sent to the Secretariat. If the noble Viscount asks for it I will see that it is laid upon the Table.
VISCOUNT GREY OF FALLODON: I should be very glad, and I think it would be in the public interest too, if the noble Lord would have it presented to Parliament as soon as possible, because it seems to me that this question is very closely bound up with the whole question of security in Europe, and it may be very desirable before your Lordships rise, and especially after the coming Conference between the Prime Ministers, that we should, with this document before us, have a debate on the question of the future of security in Europe.
LORD PARMOOR: I will ask that this shall be done. I am not aware of any objection to that course. I did not know that this specific question was going to be asked, but, so far as I know, there is no objection, and the document shall be laid upon the Table.

SINGAPORE NAVAL BASE.
THE MARQUESS OF LINLITHGOW THE MARQUESS OF LINLITHGOW had the following Notice on the Paper:—
To ask His Majesty's Government—

1. Whether it is intended by sale or otherwise to dispose of any of the plant or materials collected for the purpose of constructing Naval Works at Singapore;

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2. Whether any orders for such plant or materials have been cancelled;

3. Whether, in view of the statement by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on 18th March, he can state when His Majesty's Government intend to reconsider the question of developing the Naval Base at Singapore;

and to move for Papers.
The noble Marquess said: My Lords, I put down the Question which appears in my name upon the Paper mainly because of an advertisement which appeared originally in the Straits Times of Singapore on May 1, and was copied in various papers in this country, announcing that certain material which, as it appears from the advertisement, had been collected in that region for the purpose of constructing naval works, was for sale. This announcement caused no little concern in the minds of many persons in this country and in the Dominions, as was evidenced by various letters that were written to the Press. I think this uneasiness was caused mainly because it had been understood that the decision of the Government not to go forward with the extension of the naval works at Singapore had not been a final decision. There was no statement, either in this House or in another place, to the effect that the scheme had been finally abandoned, but the advertisement of material, which appears to be material of a non-perishable nature, as being for sale not unnaturally gave rise to the view that His Majesty's Government no longer thought it likely that they, or their successors, might have to reconsider the decision, and that they had consequently decided to dispose of the material.
An examination of the statement made by the Prime Minister in another place shows quite plainly that in his mind, on March 18, there was no finality about the decision. Indeed, he made it perfectly plain on that occasion that there were circumstances in his mind which, if they came about, might make it essential for this country to proceed with the completion of the base as originally contemplated. If the First Lord of the Admiralty will turn to column 324 of Volume 171 of the OFFICIAL REPORT of House of Commons debates he will see that the Prime Minister, on March 18, in using figurative language in which he assumes that he is facing the representative
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of a foreign Power with which he desires to make an agreement, pictures himself as saying:—
"'I come to make an agreement with you, and if I cannot get it, I will have to begin developing my base.' "
And then, almost half-way down column 325 of the same number of the OFFICIAL REPORT, the Prime Minister says:
"… if we fail—"
that is, if we fail in the negotiations—
"then we shall fail, and this nation will. unfortunately, have to go back to other considerations."
These passages show quite plainly that the Prime Minister contemplated at least the possibility of failure, and in the circumstances, if the inference which I have drawn from the advertisement is sound, I cannot but think that the decision to sell any of the material collected for the purpose of constructing a base was a most unwise one.
I do not intend to detain the House at any length this afternoon. No one places a higher value upon the time of your Lordships' House than I, and I do not, therefore, propose to traverse at all the ground covered by the long discussion which your Lordships had, some time ago, on the general question of the advisability of constructing naval works at Singapore. It is sufficient to recall that from this side of the House it was contended, and contended, I think, with unanswerable force, that there was not the slightest reason to suppose that the cessation of work on the Singapore naval base would make the very least difference to any negotiations likely to be undertaken. But His Majesty's Government took another view. They decided to make this gesture, as it has been called, to try the experiment, and they thought it worth while to sacrifice the very corner stone of British naval policy in the Far East, in the hopes that by so doing they might make it more easy to negotiate some agreement with some foreign Power.
I put down the last part of my Question in the form in which it appears on the Paper because I wish, if I can, to persuade the noble Viscount opposite to reassure us on a very essential point. With many others, I deplore the decision to delay the completion of the naval base at Singapore, but I recognise that the decision has been taken. That decision

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has been taken, I understand, subject to the condition that if the agreement which it is sought to attain is not attained then the decision will be reversed, and the base completed; but we have never been told—this is really the important point—what agreement it is which it is sought to make. We have never been told whether the negotiations have been commenced with a view to obtaining such an agreement, and we have never been told whether there has been the slightest response from any other Power in the Orient, to indicate that this immense sacrifice has been made to any good purpose whatever.
I desire, without another word of comment, to ask the First Lord of the Admiralty to tell the House and the country just what agreement it is that it is sought to make: when he hopes that negotiations if not already opened, may be opened; and what, in short, is to be the test of the policy of His Majesty's Government—the test by which it may be possible to say on this side of the House that we were, wrong and noble Lords opposite were right; the test, on the other hand, which may show a result which will justify those who think with me in this matter, that His Majesty's Government have by their decision not to proceed with this essential work condemned this country and this Empire to a growing impotence in a part of the world in which our interests and our duty alike make if imperative that we should be strong. I beg to ask the Questions which stand in my name, and to move for Papers.
THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (VISCOUNT CHELMSFORD): My Lords, I am extremely obliged to the noble Marquess who has put this Question for following what is a very rare practice in this House and confining his remarks to the terms of his Questions on the Paper. I will follow the terms of those Questions in my reply. I think you may take it, in the first place, that there has been no change of policy on the part of His Majesty's Government. His Majesty's Government laid down what their policy was. It is a policy with which you may agree or disagree, hut it is a policy which was quite clear and intelligible, and no change in that policy is indicated by the advertisement to which the noble Marquess referred, with regard to the sale of material.
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May I first deal with the first Question? When the Government made its decision, the question, of course, arose as to what was to be done with the plant or materials which had been collected for the purpose of constructing the naval works at Singapore. The noble Marquess would, I think, in his remarks, lead your Lordships to suppose that this plant and material are entirely of a non-perishable character, but I am informed that there is no plant or material which in the climate of Singapore suffers no deterioration if it is allowed to go untended. Of course, we could have left it there, as the noble Marquess, I presume, would suggest, but we felt that if we did leave it there it might seriously deteriorate. Let me distinguish between plant and material which are distinguished in the Question. The plant, I believe, is approximately of the value of £22,000, and to that has to be added the cost of freight, making approximately £27,000. It consists of cranes, boilers, pumps, boring gear, electrical apparatus and the like. I may say, with regard to these particular items, that the Admiralty has a large stock of similar materials in hand at home in excess of requirements, and so a discretionary power was given to the officers concerned, that they might sell locally such plant as could be disposed of at a reasonable price, and the remainder was to be stored.
The cost of returning that plant to England would have been considerable, as the noble Marquess may see from the figures I have given to him of expenditure upon freight, and had it been returned it would merely have gone to swell the surplus stock at present in our hands. I may say that there is no real market in the East for such plant and materials. I am informed that recently some big company, which was engaging presumably in mining operations, was closing down its works and attempted to sell its materials in the East. It had very little success, and had to ship them home. So we are not, as a matter of fact, likely to be able to dispose of the plant in the East at what we say we must have—namely, a reasonable price. As a matter of fact, we have disposed of items of plant to the amount of £2,500, which if required at any time could easily be replaced from the stock that we possess at home.

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Coming to materials, these consist, in the main, of water pipes and their fittings. They are of the value of about £20,000, with the addition of £4,000 for freight. We have received an offer from the Municipality of Singapore of £1,700 for some small portion, and that offer is now under consideration. Perhaps I have been able to satisfy the noble Marquess that the arrangement we have entered into is a businesslike arrangement. Stock is likely to deteriorate in that damp climate. It can be replaced in a very few weeks from home if it be necessary to replace it, and when one comes to compare a period of a few weeks, for shipping any additional plant out to Singapore, with the nine years which it was contemplated it would take to complete the Singapore development, I think it is not an unreasonable procedure which we, have adopted with regard to the plant and materials. With regard to the noble Marquess's second Question, in which he asks whether any orders for the plant and materials have been cancelled, I am informed that no orders have been cancelled.
Coming now to the third Question, the noble Marquess has given the House an accurate representation of what the Prime Minister said in another place with regard to our policy. I will adopt his quotation. I have not verified it, but I presume the noble Marquess was careful in verifying his quotations—
"… if we fail, we shall fail, and we shall have to go hack to other considerations."
That policy still holds. If the policy of appeasement, which the Prime Minister adumbrated in another place, were to fail, we shall then have to go back to the consideration of the Singapore base. There has been no change of policy on the part of His Majesty's Government with regard to that statement, which was made in both Houses on March 18.
The noble Marquess goes on to ask whether, in view of the statement by the Prime Minister, the Government intend to reconsider the question of developing the Singapore base. With regard to that, I may say that it is a very difficult problem which we have to face, and we have been exploring the situation ever since the decision was made on March 18. I may say quite frankly that even to-day there was a meeting of those who are concerned in the matter, to consider how best the
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Prime Minister's policy might be carried into effect. In that way I hope I can satisfy the noble Marquess that we are not standing still, but that we are endeavouring to see in what manner the Prime Minister's policy can be brought to a practical conclusion. But it is certainly impossible to answer, and I think it is unreasonable to ask me now, whether I can state an exact date when His Majesty's Government intend to reconsider the question of developing the naval base at Singapore.
THE MARQUESS OF LINLITHGOW: But approximately?
VISCOUNT CHELMSFORD: I do not think I can even give an approximate date. I am afraid I must state that quite definitely. We are exploring the situation, and, as soon as we have been able to make up our mind as to the method of approach with regard to this difficult question, we shall make the approaches which the Prime Minister indicated in his statement on March 18. This cannot be an approach to one party alone. The Washington Pact must, of itself, make any Conference that may take place necessarily a Conference of more than two Powers. At the Washington Conference, at which the noble Earl (Lord Balfour) was present, there were, I fancy, as many as five Powers represented. That, in itself, shows that it would be necessary to approach more than one Power with regard to the policy adumbrated by the Prime Minister.
I think that is all the reply I have to make, but I must say frankly that it is impossible at the present moment to indicate the time when His Majesty's Government intend to reconsider the question of developing the naval base at Singapore. That must depend upon conditions which are beyond the control of His Majesty's Government at the present moment. I can only add that the Government are proceeding in the matter, and that as soon as it is possible to lay any policy before Parliament I am sure they will do so.
VISCOUNT LONG OF WRAXALL: My Lords, when I was at the Admiralty, not very long ago, this matter was considered in the gravest and most anxious manner, and before I went to the Admiralty it was considered—as, I submit, it should have

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been considered in this case—not only by His Majesty's Government here, but in actual council with the Governments of the Dominions overseas. It was considered in the way it ought to be, because it is an Empire question, not a question which alone concerns the British Navy, or British interests here. I concur with What the noble Marquess, Lord Linlithgow, has said. The impression left on the minds of the majority of us after the debate in another place, and after the decision of the Government had been announced, was that the matter was not finally decided, and that the mere fact that it was not proposed to remove some of the necessary plant which had been taken to Singapore showed that it was intended to reconsider the matter at no distant date. The noble Viscount has now put the finishing touch to the whole question.
He says he cannot tell us even when the date will approach for reconsideration of the matter. All of us who are familiar with the way in which these things are treated by Governments know perfectly well that, so far as this Government are concerned, they have put the thing entirely from them, and we must regard it as a res acta, a thing settled definitely by this Government—that they are not going to proceed with this new base at Singapore. From what I have heard, ever since the so-called decision was announced in the other place, and from what I know of the proceedings which took place when I was at the Colonial Office and at the Admiralty, this will be a very severe blow to our Dominions in the East. Both Australia and New Zealand will regard it as a definite declaration by the Government here that they are not going to accept that part of their Imperial responsibility which consists in taking care that adequate arrangements are made for our defence and protection in the event of trouble arising in the Near East.
I have no means of knowing what the present state of things is in those waters. I know what it was when I was at the Colonial Office. The Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand brought us information which was not at that time, so far as I am aware, known to the Admiralty, and which certainly was not known to the Colonial Office—information as to the condition of things obtaining
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in some of these islands in the Mid-Pacific, and it showed us that it was necessary that we should take definite steps, and before very long. So far as I know—no statement has been made to the contrary—the decision at which you definitely arrive now, the final decision, has been made without consultation with the Governments chiefly concerned.
VISCOUNT CHELMSFORD: May I correct the noble Viscount at once? Before the debate took place on March 18 the Governments of the Dominions had been consulted, and they were told. A White Paper was published giving the correspondence that had passed between His Majesty's Government and the Dominion Governments.
VISCOUNT LONG OF WRAXALL: I am well aware of that. The Governments were consulted—in other words, they were informed that it was the intention of His Majesty's Government to make this change, and they were asked if they would like to express their views. What were their views? Did the Governments in the Far East concur in the action of His Majesty's Government at that time? Did they believe, as we believed here, that the decision was one which would not be regarded as final but that it was taken in existing circumstances and would be reconsidered at no distant date? Do they agree with the decision of His Majesty's Government here that this base is to be abandoned practically for all time?
VISCOUNT CHELMSFORD: That is not the policy of His Majesty's Government. I said quite distinctly that the policy is exactly the same, but that that particular condition on which the Prime Minister said that the policy would be reconsidered has not arisen, because we have not yet been able to get into such touch with other foreign Governments as would enable us to say that our policy has been a failure. We are exploring the whole situation at the present moment, and, of course, as soon as we have got into touch and have had our policy either accepted or rejected, then we shall be in a position to state to the House what our policy is.
VISCOUNT LONG OF WRAXALL: I can only say that anything more unsatisfactory I never heard in my life. If His Majesty's

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Government, and the noble Viscount, the First Lord of the Admiralty, in particular, are able to derive any satisfaction or comfort from the extraordinarily vague announcement he has made to us, all I can say is that they are possessed of a very sanguine temperament. At all events, I am unable, and those who agree with me are unable, to share their views. The proposals that the late Government made were deliberately so arranged as to extend over a period of ten years, as the noble Viscount knows very well. It was not proposed to do all this work at once. He said, in the course of his remarks just now, that it was calculated that it would take ten years to complete these works. Yet we are told now, after one of those years has gone, that the Government of to-day do not even know when it is likely that they will be in a position to reconsider this matter.
The noble Viscount tells us that is not a definite turning down of the whole question. I should like very much to know what view is taken by the Governments of New Zealand and Australia upon this particular question, and whether they regard the decision of the Government as one which is likely to give them any comfort. From all I hear they take a precisely opposite view. When I talk about the Governments of the Empire being consulted I do not mean the process which has been adopted by the Government on this occasion. I do not mean telling them that it was likely to adopt a particular policy and asking them whether they had anything to say about it. I mean consulting them well in advance and listening and paying full attention to their opinions and anxieties. That is what I call consulting the other Governments of the Dominions, and I should like very much to know whether His Majesty's Government could tell us anything about the replies received from the Oversea Governments, particularly from the two Governments specially concerned in these Pacific questions, and whether His Majesty's Government have had any reply which looks as though those Governments were prepared to accept with patience and without grave misgiving and dissatisfaction the announcement that has been made to-day.
I shall be very much surprised if we do not find that they are entirely opposed to
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the policy of His Majesty's Government and that they will regard the announcement to-day, when they read it, as making it clear that all the hopes they had (and they had some faint hopes) must now be abandoned. We may be confident that at all events for years to come this policy is to be a thing of the past, which means drifting for years. That is what my noble friend and the Government call keeping a policy still alive. It may be alive, but it is the sort of life I should not care to live.
THE EARL OF BALFOUR: My Lords, I am sorry that I could not be here—I was kept away by a public engagement—during the speech of my noble friend the Marquess of Linlithgow, and I certainly should not have intervened at the tail end of the debate except for some observations that fell from the noble Viscount, the First Lord of the Admiralty, in the course of that part of his speech which I was fortunate enough to hear. I do not pronounce upon the full interpretation of that speech. My noble friend who has just sat down is clear that to all intents and purposes it meant a negation of the policy which we on this side of the House have consistently recommended, and which is undoubtedly in conformity with the earnest views of all our Dominions and all our interests in that part of the world, including, I suspect, the great Dependancy which the noble Viscount knows so well—our Indian Empire.
I do not rise to try to form an estimate of what is probably quite inestimable—namely, the intentions of His Majesty's Government upon this point. I rise rather to ask what is meant by a phrase that fell more than once. I think, from the noble Viscount, the First Lord of the Admiralty. He more than once talked about the, necessity of consulting certain foreign Powers in connection with this. I was, I suppose, more closely connected than any living man with all the transactions that have a bearing upon the Singapore question that took place at Washington, and I am unable to put the smallest significant meaning upon the statement as to the foreign nations that have to be consulted. Is it one, of the great naval Powers in the Pacific? Does the noble Lord refer to the great naval Powers in the Pacific?
VISCOCNT CHELMSFORD: I do not know whether the noble Earl would prefer that I should answer that at once. When the Washington Pact was entered into, I understand that the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France and Italy were all represented at the Conference which resulted in that Pact. If anything of a similar nature were to be regarded as the means of proceeding with the Prime Minister's policy it would almost necessarily be the case that those same Powers should be brought into conference again. Whether that is going to be the case or not I do not say at the moment; but I think it must almost necessarily be the case that those same Powers who were parties to that Washington Pact would again come into conference if there was any extension of that Washington Pact.
THE EARL OF BALFOUR: The noble Viscount really seems to suppose that the fortification or the turning into a naval base of Singapore has something to do with the other Powers who were parties to the Washington Pact. I can assure him that it has nothing whatever to do with them. You might as well consult the foreign Powers concerned as to any change you made in the fortifications of Plymouth or Portsmouth. Singapore was deliberately left outside—
VISCOUNT CHELMSFORD: Yes.
THE EARL OF BALFOUR: —and knowingly left outside that sphere of the Pacific Ocean in which, I quite agree, all the Powers the noble Viscount named are more or less concerned. Primarily, of course, it is the United States of America and Japan which are concerned with the Pacific area. The noble Viscount is right in saying that Italy and France have also quite distinctive rights, claims and interests, and I would not exclude Holland, with whom, although not a party to the Pact, we kept in touch in regard to her interests within that sphere. But all that relates to the Pacific Ocean, and the Pacific Ocean alone. I agree that if somebody looks at the map he could draw the boundaries of the Pacific Ocean along many lines differing from each other and yet all plausibly defining the area which can properly be described as the Pacific Ocean. This was not left to stray definitions. This was not a matter which was to be decided by somebody taking down a large map of
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the Pacific Ocean and saying: "Where shall I draw the boundary on its western side?" The boundary was drawn with the utmost precision. It was drawn in a manner about which no mistake is possible. It was drawn in a manner about which every sailor—American, Japanese, French, Italian—would be absolutely agreed. The line of longitude was unmistakably drawn cm the map to exclude, and was meant to exclude, Singapore.
If that be true, why are we to bring in other nations with regard to our own private affairs more in the case of Singapore than in the case of any other of the naval bases in which, from our very position, we are so profoundly interested? It is not as if Singapore, do what you will, could be a threat to any of these nations. I am sure none of these nations has every cherished the idea for an instant that anything we could do at Singapore either was intended to be a menace, or could be an effective menace, against any of their interests. On the contrary, they know perfectly well, as your Lordships know, as the Government know, as the country know, as all our Allies and friends know, the British Fleet is one of the great securities for the peace of the world. The British Fleet can only be a security for the peace of the world if you give it the means of operating effectively. It cannot operate effectively in the Pacific unless you make Singapore a naval base, and if you exclude the Pacific from the area in which the British Fleet is effective you exclude one of the greatest instruments we possess for maintaining world peace.
I am sorry that the Government have entered upon this policy. I should almost guess that they had perhaps committed themselves to an anti-Singapore policy before they knew all the facts, and before they were in a position really to estimate what place in our system of defence Singapore possessed, and the effect the policy would produce upon our great Dependencies and self-governing communities, to whom you have not been very kind in the course of your administration. Having, unfortunately, committed themselves in ignorance to this most unhappy policy, the Government are now seeking for some method of extricating themselves from a difficulty which need never have arisen. I do not wish harshly to criticise anything that

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they have done. I admit that they came in under difficult circumstances. I admit that perhaps anybody, merely considering with insufficient knowledge the expenditure of £11,000,000, or whatever the sum may be, on a fortified base, might be allowed to hesitate. I do not wish to make the part of the Government more difficult if there is the least hope of their doing anything to retrace the unfortunate step they have taken, and annul the unhappy impression which unquestionably has been produced on Australia and New Zealand.
If they will do that, they will not find in me at least a harsh critic, but if they are going to wait until four or five other Powers who have nothing whatever to do with the matter are consulted—well, it is a new Conference, I suppose, and Conferences are an unhappy necessity, but I should think that they were such an unhappy necessity that no Government would be anxious unnecessarily to multiply them. If that be so—and I think there is probably no one on the Bench opposite who will deny that it will be so—they are surely committing a great error when they drag into a subject which in no way concerns them our nearest Allies and our dearest friends. It is a matter solely between us and our great Dominions. I trust that what has fallen from my noble friend behind me may be unduly pessimistic, that his interpretation of the Government action may be unnecessarily harsh, and I can assure them, for my part, that if I see the smallest sign of their taking what I conceive to be the right way they shall have every assistance that I am in a position to give them.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, the noble Earl who has just sat down is a master of dialetical skill, and he has succeeded in diverting the discussion to a variety of points. I will make him the fullest present of this—that Singapore is wholly outside the boundary line fixed at the Washington Conference. It was carefully expressed to be outside. I think the noble Earl himself has told us that that decision was come to not only with the assent of the American representatives at the Conference but also with that of the representative of Japan itself. I make the noble Earl the fullest present of that. The boundary line laid down at the Washington Conference has nothing to do
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with the decision to which the Government came. Nor is it our case that Australia and New Zealand are pleased with the decision to which His Majesty's Government have come. We know they are not pleased with it. We have their declarations in the correspondence which was laid before Parliament some time ago. The decision is one which affects the Empire as a whole, and one which deeply concerns the future of the Empire as a whole. If we could do so we should be only too glad to fall in with the wishes of Australia and New Zealand. But this is a vital matter to the whole Empire. It is not one to be determined merely by whether a certain place is outside the boundary line or not. It is a very much greater question than that.
It is, first: What would be the effect, upon the broad, general foreign policy of His Majesty's Government of establishing a new base in the East, which would be a base of offence, whether we wished it or not, just as much as it would be a base (or even more so) for defence? The noble Earl knows something of Singapore, He has studied it, and I have studied it closely also. What would be the result of a naval base at Singapore? We should have to keep a Fleet there. If you are merely considering what is in the interests of the British Navy and what would be the best step to make the British Navy the most effective instrument possible in the Pacific, by all means have a great naval base in the East, and I think probably Singapore is the most convenient place for it.
But we can buy that instrument at too great a price. I said just now that you could not have a naval base at Singapore which was merely defensive. It is essential that it should be a great instrument of offensive possibility. It would be something which would dominate the whole Pacific, and which would make an alteration in the strategical balance of the world. There is no getting out of that. I have worked it out on paper. You would have a base from which you could conduct the most far-reaching operations. From one point of view that may be very desirable. It would afford a complete defence to Australia and New Zealand. But it would do that and it would do other things. It would do them at a cost, and the cost would be that you could not reconcile this new position which it is suggested you should take up

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with the broad principle of foreign policy which the King's Government is endeavouring at present to pursue. We may fail, but we are trying to make the world rather better than it is at present. A notable advance in this direction was made in the Conference at Washington, in which the noble Earl took so distinguished a part. It may never be a question of the six Powers in the Pacific; such a question may never arise. But it is a question whether you can get such international relations as will enable Singapore to be much less important than it appears to be in the minds of some people at the moment and make all these things of less account.
Let me give an illustration? A Conservative Government was in office in the year 1903, and they removed garrisons from Canada. It was a systematic policy. It was not thought necessary for us to make provision for defending Canada against the United States, or against any other enemy, and one very good reason was that there was a frontier line of four thousand miles which you could not defend in the least. The course of events has shown that that policy was wise. It was not a question as to whether it would be at any time necessary for us to take offensive measures, and whether we should take them was another question. The point was that the Conservative Government took the better way: they removed these garrisons from the frontier line, with the result that there has ever since been the best of feeling on the point between the United States and this country. That is only an illustration of the kind of thing we are dealing with here. I know it does not appeal to the noble Viscount (Lord Long). He has other ideas about foreign policy: and a different idea as to how to avert war.
Our policy is to keep up the Fleet, to make the Navy efficient. Whatever we may decide to have in our military and naval organisations they must be efficient and we shall endeavour to keep them efficient. But the proposition to develop the Singapore base is a proposition which goes far beyond keeping up efficiency. You add a new weapon which we never had before and which we may never need to have, and by which this nation may be able to impose its will in the Pacific Ocean. Our policy may fail. I know it does not commend itself to some of your Lordships, but it is the policy of the
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Government and one which we mean to carry forward. We are trying our best to bring about peace all over the world. That does not mean that we do not intend to keep the Navy efficient, but it does mean that we do not intend to put a new weapon into our hand which may be looked upon with suspicion by others.
The noble Earl said that nobody regards the British Fleet as other than an instrument which exists for the peace of the world: it is the police of the world. That is perfectly true, but are we so destitute of imagination as to think that if we made the Fleet, in the very position and place in which it was, a powerful weapon of offence and able to dominate the whole Pacific, it would be still regarded in the same way? That is not our notion of foreign policy, and I think a complete misconception of the situation is involved in the question of the noble Marquess. How can we give any indication as to when our policy is going to succeed, or fail; or how soon it will succeed, or fail? The Question on the Paper is one which does not admit of any answer. It may be that our policy will not succeed, but we shall know sometime beforehand whether it is likely to succeed or not, and therefore be in a position to take what steps may be necessary to reverse decisions at Singapore and other parts of the world. At present we hope it will not be necessary to reverse any such decision, but an already complex and difficult situation would be accentuated if the Government at this, time gave any indication such as is suggested by the Question.
VISCOUNT PEEL: My Lords, I have listened with great interest to the discussion and also to the interpretation that has been put upon the observations made by the noble Viscount the First Lord of the Admiralty. I notice that the attitude of the noble Viscount opposite is entirely thrown over by the Lord Chancellor. In a few rather caustic sentences ho pushed aside entirely the idea that this was a matter to be dealt with by the Powers represented at the Conference at Washington; and I am not surprised that he did so. I was astonished to hear the observations of the noble Viscount, having myself listened to a statement by his own Prime Minister, in which the Prime Minister stated that it was perfectly clear that this matter was entirely outside the Conference at Washington.

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The noble Viscount opposite has not properly studied the statement of his own Prime Minister. But after listening to the Lord Chancellor I have come to the conclusion that the prognostications of my noble friend, Viscount Long of Wraxall, were right.
What is the defence put forward? What does the Lord Chancellor say about this base at Singapore? He entirely threw over the idea that in the time to come something might be done to develop a base at Singapore. He attacked the proposal on principle. According to him it was a most monstrous thing to suggest that we should have what is called an offensive base from which we could threaten the Pacific. It is clear that whatever may be the result of the Conference, which we are told is going to take place, the Lord Chancellor himself is opposed to the principle of the base at Singapore. I dare say that the noble Marquess could tell your Lordships better than I can what is the precise difference between an offensive and a defensive base, because I suppose that every base that is defensive could be used for offensive purposes. But I do not quite understand what we were going to threaten. Reference has been made over and over again to the distance between the base at Singapore and Japan, and I wish to know, if the noble Viscount fears the dangers that might arise from an offensive base at Singapore, what are the Powers that are threatened. I am afraid that on the whole the noble Viscount, Lord Long, is right, and that the noble and learned Viscount and the Government are entirely opposed to any base at all.
What is the position, as suggested by the noble Earl behind me, of India and our different Possessions in the Pacific? The question—and it has been debated over and over again—was not that of having an offensive or defensive base, a base which might threaten other Powers; the question was that, if you were going to have a Navy and if that Navy was to be effective, you ought at least to make that Navy mobile and not paralyse those ships which you did keep and make it impossible to retain your position in the future, both in Indian waters and in Eastern waters. I am afraid that the Government have made their position only too plain. The speech that we have
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heard from the noble and learned Viscount was one of pure pacificism, and, if it were followed out logically, you would have no defensive forces at all to maintain the strength and position of our Empire.
EARL STANHOPE: My Lords, may I make two quotations from speeches made by the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack? This is not a new policy; it is a policy of waiting to see what other nations are going to do, and we have had it all before. The noble and learned Viscount made a speech almost identical in phraseology with that which he has made this evening. It was made in this House in April, 1911, and I should like to quote from it. The noble and learned Viscount said on that occasion:—
"So far as the rest of the world is concerned the peoples of all lands are beginning to show signs of a desire that this tremendous burden of armaments should, if possible, be diminished rather than increased. Is this, then, the time when, if you take the standard of the reasonably probable, it is desirable to take the step that we are asked to take? And if you take the standard of the logically possible what an example we should be setting to other nations at a time when, as we all hope, we are seeing a real beginning in a new movement for the world's peace."
That was in 1911. What is the result of the policy of the Government of that day? I was on military duty outside your Lordships' House on November 11, 1914, the occasion of the opening of Parliament by the King. The troops that were lining the streets on that occasion had to hurry back to barracks in order to hand over their rifles and equipment to the draft which left for France that night and which I rejoined in France the next morning.
I would tell your Lordships another result. I came and made a speech in this House early in 1915 in which I drew your Lordships' attention to the terrible lack of ammunition for our Forces at the front. I did not tell your Lordships on that occasion—I could not—that one of the reasons that impelled me to make that speech was that I had recently read a memorandum signed by the Chief of the General Staff in France, just at the conclusion of the second battle of Ypres, in which he stated that it was well-known to all ranks how great was the shortage of ammunition at the beginning of the war, how ammunition was being made in a hurry to be used at the front, and that

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ammunition made in a hurry was often defective: and the troops were asked to withstand the casualties inflicted by our own defective ammunition with the same fortitude as they withstood the casualties inflicted by the enemy.
I have not risen in order to attack the noble and learned Viscount in this matter. The noble and learned Viscount did a great deal in the reorganisation of the Army, and the nation has every right to be grateful to him for his services. But I do rise to point out that the Government of that day may very possibly, for all I know, have refused the repeated and urgent requests of the noble and learned Viscount for adequate ammunition, and that the result of the Government of that day refusing to provide that necessary equipment may have been the loss of valuable lives at the front.
I have one further quotation from a speech of the noble and learned Viscount which I should like to give your Lordships. It is from a speech which he made after the war, when the noble and learned Viscount, like many of us, had learned something from that great struggle, and it was made in the course of a debate in your Lordships' House in which the question of the Committee of Imperial Defence was being discussed. The noble and learned Viscount said this:—
"I may be asked, however, why, in a time of profound peace, it is necessary to ask your Lordships to entertain such a subject. … We have only to look at the newspapers every morning to see that the world is still full of explosive material. Where it may explode, and how, no one can tell. We hope that it will not explode; but if ever there was a time when the work of the Staff mind was necessary, when it was essential that there should he continuous and anxious observation of what is going on in new quarters, and study of the new problems— more difficult because they are more vague and more contingent—it is to-day. The sky is, relatively speaking, very clear at this moment. We have had experience of that before. Who can tell when the sky may become clouded? I am not asking your Lordships to contemplate making expenditure upon new naval or military forces; what I am asking you to do is at least to see that the requisite study is devoted to these contingencies lest they should possibly mature and we should find ourselves unprepared in the face of what we have not thought out."
Singapore is not an increase of naval and military forces. It is because we know, from that which has been said by the noble Viscount, the First Lord of the
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Admiralty, and from other sources, that all the experts of the Government have agreed that Singapore is necessary for the defence of our far-flung Dominions and for our trade, that we ask the Government not to allow this matter to go into a policy of drift, as the Government allowed the defences of this country to go into a policy of drift before the war, but, if they cannot get—I was going to say an immediate, but at any rate a definite—agreement with other Powers, to push, on with this very necessary provision for the defence of the Empire.
THE MARQUESS OF LINLITHGOW: My Lords, I do not propose to detain your Lordships for more than another moment or two, but some of the observations that have fallen from the First Lord of the Admiralty and from the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack have been so astonishing as to justify me in attempting some reply. I understand that the position of the Admiralty and of the Government in the matter of the disposal of the material collected may be shortly put thus: Nothing is being done which would in any substantial degree delay the completion of the works at Singapore if the policy of His Majesty's Government comes at any time to be reversed. That, I think, is a fair statement of the position.
VISCOUNT CHELMSFORD: We believe so.
THE MARQUESS OF LINLITHGOW: The noble Viscount answers that the Government believe that to be the position. I hope it is. The noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack appears to regard this matter in rather a different light from that in which, according to his speech in the House of Commons on March 18, the Prime Minister sees it. Apparently, the Prime Minister is conscious that the soundness or otherwise of the decision to delay the completion of the base ought to be tested soon, because in his speech I notice that he said
"this country has a short time, and I am afraid it is only going to be a short time, during which it can rest absolutely sure that there will be no war that will overtake it within a certain limited number of years."
That is his view, and with the knowledge that the base cannot be completed, say, within ten years, I am astonished that the Prime Minister himself is able to accept

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responsibility for a policy which, if words mean anything, has been explained to us in this House to-day as the shelving of this question for an indefinite period.
But when the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack tells us that what we are asking for in regard to the naval works at Singapore is a new weapon with which we may dominate the Pacific, it is hardly in accordance with the facts. In the first place it is not a new weapon. He knows well that, in the period before the concentration of the Fleet in the North Sea against the German menace, there was something called a Pacific squadron, and he knows that Hong Kong in those days was capable of docking our largest ships. Hong Kong is no longer capable of docking our largest ships, and all we ask for in pressing the urgency of the completion of this base, is something at Singapore which can do for modern capital ships that which Hong Kong could do for capital ships at the time of which the noble Viscount was speaking.
There is nothing new asked for, and when we are told that the base at Singapore is going to put in this country's hands a weapon capable of dominating the Pacific, I retort that the distance from Singapore to Japan is some three thousand miles, about the same as the distance of the shores of this country from those of America; and if we are to be told that the construction of naval works at this or that point on the coast of Great Britain is going to enable us to dominate the Atlantic and America, I answer that such a view takes no cognisance whatever of the limits imposed by the steaming radius of modern ships. I do not propose, having regard; to the business which still remains on the Paper, to detain you for more than a moment. I would only say this, that the result of the discussion this evening has been to make this much perfectly plain: no definite agreement is in contemplation by His Majesty's Government, as the prize to be won by the sacrifice which has been made; no negotiations have been opened, and we are not to be told when those negotiations are to be started.
I would wish to follow a good example in these matters, and say nothing about foreign policy, or about the conduct of foreign affairs by the Secretary of State,
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the Prime Minister, which could be in any way regarded as an unfair attack upon that Minister or his policy. I have, however, in this matter of the Singapore base, an uncomfortable feeling that the country has not been treated fairly. I may be wrong, but the impression left on my mind is that this gesture is far more a gesture to the extreme supporters of the Labour party in this country than it is a gesture to this or that foreign Power. For my part I cannot understand why the Labour Government, above all Governments, should view with dislike and alarm the prospect of a powerful British Navy in the Far East. It used to be the fashion to hold out the British Empire to ridicule before the mob, as doing little more than offer comfortable jobs to statesmen in this country who went abroad and, in the enjoyment of large salaries and great positions, found the reward for services in this country.
That idea has been exploded. The people for whom His Majesty's Government claim particularly to speak—the simple folk who want to live in peace and quietness with the whole world—are the people who, above all, wish to see the British Navy able to protect them against all the world, to protect them against famine, and against those upheavals which render wretched the lives of the poorest. I believe that when the time comes it will be found that in the simplest homes in this land are the men who are the quickest to appreciate that the British Navy is an instrument of peace and good government throughout the world. I do not propose to put your Lordships to the trouble of a Division, and I am very much obliged to your Lordships for the way in which you have listened to my remarks.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

BRITISH MUSEUM (No. 2) BILL.
Order of the Day for the Second Beading read.
LORD MUIR MACKENZIE: My Lords, this Bill is so short and, I think, so plainly drafted, that no detailed explanation or epexegesis is required, and I propose to read the clause to the House:—
"1.—(i) The Trustees of the British Museum shall have power at their discretion,

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and under such regulations as they may think fit from time to time to prescribe, to lend, for public exhibition in any gallery or museum under the control of a public authority or university in Great Britain, any duplicates of printed books, prints, medals, coins or of other objects comprised in the collections of the Museum, or any object, not being a duplicate, which in their opinion can be temporarily removed from the Museum without injury to the interests of students or of the public visiting the exhibition galleries of the Museum.
(ii) Before making any such loan the Trustees shall be satisfied that due provision is made for the safety and insurance of the specimens lent and for payment of all expenses in connection with the removal and return of the said specimens or otherwise in connection with such loan."
This Bill passed the House of Commons with general assent. It was introduced by the Conservative Attorney-General, it was backed by the Minister of Education of the late Liberal Government, and it had the consent of the Government itself and also of the Speaker, who is himself one of the Trustees. I have reason to believe that the Bill is also approved by those Trustees who sit in this House. I do not know whether the most rev. Primate or the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack will say anything upon that subject, but, so far as I know, there is no difficulty, or objection to the Bill, except from one person. I noticed on Saturday that there was a letter in The Times on the subject of the British Museum Bill, but I think that the writer must have got hold of some other Bill, because every one of his criticisms is expressly covered by the Bill as it stands. I ask your Lordships to give the Bill a Second Reading.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a — (Lord Muir Mackenzie.)
THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY: My Lords, there are many of your Lordships who are Trustees of the British Museum. I think there are ten or twelve who are Trustees, and seven, I think, are members of the Standing Committee. Therefore I stand in the presence of several who are able to speak with knowledge, I will not say equal to mine in length, for my experience as a Trustee extends now over forty-one years, and I have been pretty regular in my attendance at the Museum during the whole of that period. I have a right therefore to say something about it, but I do not want to claim to be
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speaking on behalf of the Trustees, further than this, that the matter was before a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Trustees and then before the Trustees as a whole, and it has undoubtedly our general support.
The reason why I rise is this. It is of supreme importance that this Bill should not be allowed to raise expectations on the part of the public which would prove to be unrealised in fact, with the result that disappointment might ensue. So far, at least, as I am able to speak from any knowledge of the Museum and its management, the important part of the Bill will be the Regulations which the Trustees are empowered to make, and, indeed, are required to make, as to the conditions under which alone they will allow articles to be taken outside the Museum on loan. I regard it as a virtuous act, an act of self-sacrifice, on the part of the Trustees, to accept this Bill at all, because at present when the applications, not infrequent, are made for the loan of objects in the Museum's custody, we are able to answer that we have no power to lend them, and, with that perfectly simple answer, no difficulty arises. We now have the duty thrown upon us to make Regulations, under which we are to have power to make the kind of loans that may be asked for. I venture to say, though I am afraid the utterance may be a disappointing one to some outside, that I believe the Regulations that we shall make will be of a very restrictive kind, and that we shall be extremely cautious as to what we render possible by our Regulations, as regards the scattering of objects which are in the custody of the Museum authorities.
There are, of course, certain objects, say, some Egyptian antiquities and certain things of that kind, of which we have a very large number of practically identical examples, and there I hope that other museums may profit by loans. But, if it be supposed that this measure, because it gives us the power, will make it probable that there will be scattered up and down England all kinds of articles now to be found in the British Museum alone, and that this will be done in a way to meet the sort of demand which certain museums are sure to make, I desire now to issue a word of warning. I believe—at all events, I hope—that the

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Trustees will be exceedingly careful how they act. Your Lordships will see that we are empowered not only to lend duplicates—and that must be interpreted with very great strictness—but also other objects which can be lent without detriment to the interests either of students or of the public. Now, half the interest of the student who comes to the British Museum to examine old books, or mediæval books, or manuscripts, or very many other articles of beauty and of art, is in comparison. It is in order to look at the successive editions of a particular book so as to see what were the variations—to an amateur, looking absolutely trifling between one article and another, but to an expert making all the difference —that the student comes. That is the kind of thing which we have, with the greatest care, to safeguard in the interests of students.
I am anxious to make it clear from the outset that, so far, at least, as some of the Trustees are concerned, we shall do our best, while serving the interests of the public in the way the Bill suggests, to safeguard also the interests of students, who come from all parts of the world to the Museum, knowing for certain that they will find there, not only a particular article of which they are in search, but other corresponding articles, with which they, as students, desire to compare it. That I believe to be true, though in the Natural History Department of the Museum the details are less under my eye than they are in other Departments. But undoubtedly with regard to antiquities, literary and artistic, we shall, I hope, be exceedingly careful in the Regulations we make, and, though I hope and believe that we shall be able, to lend for exhibition, to many local museums, articles which they could not otherwise obtain, it must not he supposed that there will suddenly be a perfect readiness on the part of the Trustees to lend anything that is asked for. The refusal may, in the public eye, seem to be unnecessary, though we know that in the eyes of students a very large number of things which the public might think could easily be lent must be in the Museum, if the Museum is to do its work.
The popular idea that the visits of the public to the Museum are its sole purpose is, of course, a complete fallacy. I do not wish to estimate the relative
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importance of what is done for the public visiting the Museum, and what is done for the care and satisfaction of students, who come as scientific men to look into things at first hand. I am not prepared to say that that second purpose of the Museum is in any sense inferior to the first, and it is with due care to safeguard the interests of those students to the uttermost that I hope we shall now draw up the Regulations which we are bidden to draw up. For these reasons, while gladly supporting the Bill, I want to utter that word of warning at the outset as to the way in which we shall be able to give effect to it.
On Question, Bill read 2a and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

THE LATE SIR HUGH LANES PICTURES.
LORD CARSON LORD CARSON rose to ask His Majesty's Government whether they are now in a position to make a statement as to their intentions of restoring the French pictures of the late Sir Hugh Lane to Dublin in accordance with the wishes expressed in a codicil to his will, which he signed shortly before he was drowned in the "Lusitania," but which was unfortunately not witnessed; and whether if legislation for that purpose is necessary the Government propose to bring in a Bill to enable this to be carried out.
The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, may I say that this Question has no political significance whatsoever, which is not always the case in business relating to Ireland. In point of fact, the question embodies the views of every Party, and there are many even at the present date, in Ireland. I have been associated with the matter from long before the Treaty which created the present system of government in Ireland. In truth, the facts which I have to place very briefly before the House bring back to recollection one of the great tragedies of the war—the sinking of the "Lusitania" in May, 1915. Sir Hugh Lane was a passenger in that vessel and lost his life. It is really out of that calamity that the whole of this matter has arisen.
Sir Hugh Lane was an Irishman who had devoted himself to art. He became a great art expert and from the earliest time that ho was able to spend money upon pictures (amongst which, I may say,

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he lived) he began to endow in Ireland a gallery of art to which he added from time to time. He became possessed of one of the most valuable collections of more or less modern French pictures, sixty-two in all, I think. I am not quite sure whether they were all French, but they are at the present moment in the custody of the National Gallery in London and can be seen at any time. What happened was this, and this was the origin of the Question I have placed upon the Paper. Sir Hugh Lane was very anxious that a proper building should be erected on a suitable site in Dublin for housing the pictures he had already presented to Ireland and these pictures which were on loan at the time to the National Gallery in London. Unfortunately, there was at the time a Corporation in Dublin whose hearts were not altogether set upon art. That Corporation refused to give any assistance, and when Sir Hugh Lane procured a most beautiful design which was to cross the Liffey as a foundation in the Florentine fashion it was immediately turned down by the Dublin Corporation.
Sir Hugh Lane, being an enthusiast in art and most enthusiastic about this particular design, made a will shortly afterwards, on October 11, 1913, in which he left a number of pictures to the Dublin Gallery, the gallery which he had founded, but excepted from the gifts to it—
"the group of pictures lent by me to the Loudon National Gallery, which I bequeath to found a collection of modern Continental art in London."
Later on, in 1914, Sir Hugh Lane became a director of the National Gallery of Ireland and once more returned to, if he had ever departed from, his great desire to encourage art in his own native country. The result was that on February 3, 1915, he executed a codicil to his will, in which he said:
"This is a codicil to my last will to the effect that the group of pictures now at the National Gallery which I have bequeathed to that institution I now bequeath to the City of Dublin provided that a suitable building is provided for them within five years of my death."
He left as sole trustee his aunt, Lady Gregory, to whose enthusiasm in trying to have the wishes of her nephew carried out I can bear testimony, as well as to the great work she has done in trying to get these pictures back for Ireland.
The whole matter that raises the difficulty is that Sir Hugh was drowned in the "Lusitania" without ever having had the codicil witnessed. He had signed the codicil; indeed, it was in his own handwriting. He had put it in an envelope addressed to his sister and placed it in his drawer in the most appropriate of all places, the National Gallery of Ireland, lilt he was either unaware of, or had forgotten, the necessity of having the codicil signed by witnesses. There is not only this codicil in his own handwriting and signed by him, as I have stated, but there is overwhelming testimony not only to his having expressed the desire that the pictures should go to Dublin but to the fact that he had made this codicil leaving them to his aunt for the purpose.
I have here a quotation from a statement made by the noble Lord, Lord Glenavy, a member of your Lordships' House who was Lord Chancellor for Ireland and who went into the whole of this matter. The noble and learned Lord said that he had had before him the documents referred to and they established an overwhelming case in favour of the proposition that the late Sir Hugh Lane not only intended to leave these pictures to Dublin and the Irish people, but he believed he had effectually done so. I could quote, though I will not trouble your Lordships with it, what seems to me to be overwhelming testimony as to the intentions of Sir Hugh Lane.
The circumstances have been put before one Government after another, who from time to time have made half promises in the matter. At one time a Bill had been actually prepared, or at all events bad been largely gone into, when Mr. Macpherson was the very excellent Chief Secretary for Ireland. But in one way and another, and one can well conceive why, the matter has been deferred by successive Governments. Of course, the war was going on. In 1916, the next year, there unfortunately came about a rebellion in Ireland, particularly in Dublin. Then there was the ending of the war and the outbreak of a fresh and more extensive rebellion in Ireland and those terrible burnings of all the beautiful places and beautiful things in Ireland. Then, of course, nobody would have thought of building a gallery for the purpose of housing these pictures as was required in

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the codicil, unless they had some assurance that some Government would set right what was, after all, only the misfortune that happened to this distinguished gentleman, and would make an effort to have his last wishes carried out.
Meanwhile, the pictures remain with the National Gallery. So far as the National Gallery is concerned it had, and it has now, no other course than to insist upon retaining the pictures. The Trustees have them under a will properly attested. Dublin claims them under a codicil unattested, and, therefore, the National Gallery, as public trustees of property entrusted to them, have no option but to keep the pictures in their custody until some action is taken by His Majesty's Government, or some other Government. From time to time members of the National Gallery have been approached, and have taken up a perfectly fair and proper attitude. I have an extract from a letter written by the late Lord Plymouth, in March, 1920, in which he states:—
"I do not think it fair to approach the National Gallery Trustees individually asking them to act upon their own personal opinions in a matter where their duty is to act as trustees for the nation. Their action as trustees cannot he governed by sentiment but by motives of generosity, or, if you prefer the expression, ' moral right.' Legal authorities, having settled what the position of the trustees is, it becomes the duty of the Government to carry the matter further if they think it desirable and fair, and by a deliberate Act of Parliament they should restore that to which they think Dublin has a good moral claim. The responsibility for that decision should not be placed upon the National Gallery Trustees. I hope I have made my meaning clear. The Government must take full responsibility, and I should acquiesce at once in their decision."
The late Lord Brownlow wrote at the same time:
"The National Gallery have no power to relinquish property which is legally theirs, but of course Parliament can do so, and I can assure you that any Bill introduced for that purpose will not meet with any opposition from me."
I have said enough, I think, to show that the position of the National Gallery is a perfectly accurate one, and that no move can be made in the matter unless the Government agree to some legislation to settle this question.
There have been many petitions to His Majesty's Government, there have been meetings of all shades of opinion in politics of Irishmen both in Ireland and
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here, and there have been petitions from a large number of artists—not all Irishmen—asking that the will of this gentleman, who had devoted his life to art, should be carried out by the nation, and the pictures returned to Dublin. I hope I may receive some encouragement from the present advisers of His Majesty's Government. May I say, as an Irishman who hates the whole system of government that has been set up in Southern Ireland, that I have received more encouragement, in trying to help some of my fellow-countrymen over there who were abandoned in the hour of stress, from this Government than I received from either of the two Governments which preceded them. I say that frankly, because I think it is due to a Government, however you may disagree with it in politics, to acknowledge the efforts it makes to relieve those who are in distress and grave difficulties.
I admit that an Act of Parliament must be passed to deal with these pictures. I do not know whether the noble Lord who will answer me is prepared to say that the Government will pass such an Act of Parliament. I should welcome the fullest enquiry into this matter with a view to ascertaining the facts of the will of Sir Hugh Lane in order that, having ascertained them, justice could be done to his memory and to his wishes by taking such steps in the nature of legislation as would give back to Dublin, as he undoubtedly intended, these pictures which would be a valuable memorial to a great Irishman.
THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (LORD ARNOLD): My Lords, the Question of the noble and learned Lord furnishes an opportunity which His Majesty's Government welcome to make a statement about this matter. The circumstances relating to it have been broadly put before your Lordships by the noble and learned Lord with his accustomed clarity. My reply, therefore, can be a brief one, but I hope it may be a satisfactory one. On October 11, 1913, Sir Hugh Lane made a will by which the thirty-nine pictures—I am advised that the number is thirty-nine—to which the noble and learned Lord refers were bequeathed to the National Gallery in London. As your Lordships have been told, Sir Hugh Lane lost his life in the "Lusitania" disaster on May 17, 1915,

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and there was subsequently found in his desk at the National Gallery of Ireland, of which he was director, a codicil, to which the noble and learned Lord has referred, in the handwriting of Sir Hugh Lane, altering his previous disposition as to these pictures and bequeathing them to the City of Dublin.
As Sir Hugh Lane's signature to this codicil was no witnessed, it had no effect in law, and there is conflict of evidence on the question of fact whether Sir Hugh Lane intended this codicil to be legally valid and thought that it was so. His Majesty's Government consider that this question of fact ought to be settled by an impartial tribunal, and have, therefore, decided to appoint a Committee, consisting of three competent and impartial persons to report whether in their opinion Sir Hugh Lane, when he signed the codicil, thought that he was making a legal disposition, and, if so, whether it is proper that, in view of the international character of the matter at issue, the legal defect in the codicil should be remedied by legislation. His Majesty's Government hope shortly to be in a position to communicate the names of the three persons to be appointed to serve on the Committee.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: My Lords, as an old Trustee of the National Gallery I feel compelled to say a few words on this subject; it has on more than one occasion called for my attention. So far as I am able to speak for my colleagues, not one of them would shrink from a full inquiry into the circumstances which have been mentiond to your Lordships to-night. I will go further and say that I hope we may usefully co-operate with the Committee, in bringing evidence before them, in considering question of procedure, and in other ways. I rather stress that, because when I called at the National Gallery this afternoon to inquire whether the authorities there had been approached on the subject of this Question I found that not a word had been said to them about it. That is rather an unusual proceeding where a great public Department is having its conduct impugned in Parliament.
I was much comforted by the noble and learned Lord's explicit statement that the action of the Trustees of the National Gallery was the only action they could possibly have taken in the
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circumstances. I am strongly of that opinion. We had before us these two instruments—Sir Hugh Lane's will, written in the year 1913, in which he bequeathed this group of pictures to the National Gallery here, and the later un-witnessed codicil, in which he changed his mind and desired that the same pictures should go back to Dublin. It was contended that the codicil represented Sir Hugh Lane's real mind and that it should be allowed to prevail over the will. I need not say that it was impossible for the Trustees to listen to a proposal of that kind. It would have meant that the incomplete and ineffectual instrument should be preferred to the properly executed and complete will; that the destination of the pictures should follow not the properly executed will but the incompletely executed codicil. No Trustees could possibly listen to such a proposal, and the advice we received was very strongly indeed in that direction, I think it would have been a very grave decision to allow the codicil to prevail even if we had been perfectly sure that it represented Sir Hugh Lane's mind. We took a considerable amount of evidence on that point, and the effect of it was to lead many of us to suppose that it was not the case that the codicil did by any means represent the last views aid wishes of Sir Hugh.
The fact is that Sir Hugh Lane had several minds upon this subject. At one time undoubtedly he wished these French pictures to go with his other pictures to the Dublin Corporation. The noble and learned Lord has very humorously told us how it came to pass that Sir Hugh Lane fell foul of the Corporation. He was deeply incensed by their treatment of him. They turned down his design, objected to his architect, and altogether refused to help him in carrying out what was undoubtedly the wish nearest to his heart—namely, to found an important collection of pictures in the City with which he had been so honourably connected. I think I may add that, just as he had quarrelled with the Dublin Corporation, he possibly might have quarrelled or been dissatisfied with the authorities of the National Gallery here.
What was constantly present to his mind was a desire somehow or other, either in Dublin or in London, to set up a good exhibition of modern art, and it is

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most important to remember that in his last days and subsequently to the date of the codicil ho had good reason for believing that, largely in consequence of the munificence of Mr. Duveen, his wish would be realised and that his pictures would, as I hope they will, find a home in an adequate collection of foreign pictures. I cannot, therefore, quite accept the noble and learned Lord's contention that there is before us anything that can be described as "overwhelming evidence" (those are his words) to show that Sir Hush changed his mind and wished the pictures to go to Dublin instead of London. That is a matter which can be looked into. Nor can I accept his statement that so far as the National Gallery is concerned Sir Hugh Lane, or his friends, or anybody else, ever received what he called a half promise that the pictures should so to Dublin.
LORD CARSON: The noble Marquess has misunderstood me a little. I said he had received a half promise from the Government.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: I am glad to have that correction; I accept it. There remains to be discussed and examined what can be done in this case. As at present advised it would surprise me to find that the incomplete codicil is to be preferred to the complete will. There are other ways by which it would be possible to give effect to Sir Hugh Lane's wish that this collection of pictures, which he so greatly prized, should be exhibited in Dublin.
There is the question of lending pictures, which is very important, and I am sure that, if it was merely a question of lending, and if the status of the Irish Free State renders it qualified under the Act of Parliament to receive loans from the National Gallery, that is a proposal that would be regarded by most people as eminently reasonable. But you will remember that Parliament, and this House in particular, looks with rather a jealous eye on proposals of this kind, and I recall a Bill introduced in this House by Lord D'Abernon for encouraging the exchange and loan of pictures in the National Gallery. It was passed, not without considerable criticism, through your Lordships' House, but it never got any further in its way through Parliament. Those are the kind
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of obstacles which might possibly be in our way. I need say no more except this, that if the Inquiry is set up with reasonable terms of reference, and is not an Inquiry which prejudges the issue—I am glad to see my noble friend. Lord Parmoor, signifying his assent—I, for one, should certainly not raise any objection to it, and should wish that it may possibly bring about a generally acceptable solution of a question which unfortunately has created a good deal of resentment and ill feeling in the past.
THE EARL OF MAYO: My Lords. I welcome the answer that the noble Lord who speaks for the Government has given in reply to this Question. At last we have something definite concerning these pictures, upon which there has been much contention, much talk and much sentiment expressed in the country from which I come, and I shall feel it my duty when I go back to Dublin, which will be very shortly, to inform my friends of this result. May I say that Sir Hugh Lane was one of my oldest friends? I was associated with him in starting the Municipal Art Gallery in Dublin that still exists. Both my noble and learned friend. Lord Carson, and my noble friend. Lord Lansdowne, are quite right in saying that the will stands, and that there is a codicil in existence but not witnessed. Therefore I welcome this Inquiry, which is the first sympathetic reference we have had from any Government concerning these pictures. At last we have something definite, and I put myself and my friends on the other side entirely in the hands of that Committee. We shall, I am certain, abide by its findings and be satisfied with the way—and I am sure it will be a just way—in which those findings are brought about.
THE EARL OF CRAWFORD: My Lords, I should like, if I may, to say one word upon this matter, because I am one of those who are quite convinced that the terms of the codicil in question do not represent the final opinions of Sir Hugh Lane. The codicil, in the words of this Question, was signed "shortly before he was drowned in the 'Lusitania'" disaster. I take the word "shortly" from the terms of the Question, but, in point of fact, it was fourteen or fifteen weeks before his death. The codicil is not the last recorded document of Sir Hugh Lane's desires. The noble Lord

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who addressed us just now has no doubt seen the sworn affidavits of responsible and public officials in this country, dated long after February 5, which was the date of the codicil.
LORD CARSON: There have been a great number the other way also.
THE EARL OF CRAWFORD: I think the noble and learned Lord did not indicate that there had been any adverse expressions of opinion after the date of the codicil, and I merely say this in order to let people know that which apparently is not generally known, and which, but for what I say, would not be recorded in your Lordships' debates—that there are subsequent documents, precise and explicit. The reason for this was that Sir Hugh Lane was not merely interested in his canvases, but was concerned, in a way, even more with their unity, that they should be exhibited as a great block of art, representing different phases of European painting; and they were chosen for their relation one with another. For his purpose it was all essential that a proper gallery should be provided, and, throughout the controversies, "Who will provide me with a gallery?" was really the basic question which Sir Hugh Lane kept on putting before himself.
In Dublin he was in positive despair. They could not, perhaps, afford to provide a gallery—a costly thing, no doubt—but the contumely and neglect with which his offers were received disheartened him and tiling him into despair. As everybody knows, he was domiciled for years in this country, and after the codicil was signed he again entered into negotiations, as I say, with responsible and public officials in this country, about providing a building. He wanted an assurance, and he received an assurance. It is quite true that the gallery was not there and then built.
LORD CARSON: Or since.
THE EARL OF CRAWFORD: The crisis of the war came, and, for very good reasons, money could not be thrown into bricks and mortar during that period. But the gallery was promised and, as all of your Lordships know who are interested in these affairs, the gallery is actually approaching completion to-day. I merely say this in order to justify the
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Trustees of the National Gallery, who are not merely relying upon some technicality of an unsigned document. Something really very much more than that is involved. Sir Hugh Lane, as we know, was greatly attached to Ireland and to Dublin. The bequest in question is a mere fraction of the public bequests which he made, and for every pound's worth left to England under the will I should imagine that two or three or four pounds' worth have already been left to Ireland under other clauses of the will. Ireland has not come out badly.
I have no doubt that the noble Marquess, Lord Lansdowne, correctly expressed the view of the Trustees of the National Gallery, that they would contribute all that they can to the elucidation of a very difficult problem. I did not quite catch the terms of reference of this Committee, but I would make this one observation about it. It is to be composed of competent and impartial gentlemen—one is always glad to hear that—but I hope that the Government is not going to consider this question quite in isolation. It is not merely a matter of whether there is a greater balance of opinion in favour of an unsigned codicil than in favour of sworn affidavits by people who believe that Sir Hugh Lane wanted his pictures ultimately to end here. A very much bigger question than that is involved, and I hope that the competent and impartial gentlemen will remember that any judgment they give will have a strong bearing upon the attitude of benefactors to the State in future. That is really very important. I know case after case where people have refrained from leaving gifts or money—but particularly gifts—in their wills until positively satisfied by the authorities that the terms of the will cannot in any circumstances be abrogated. It is a very serious thing to abrogate wills. We have done that, I believe, occasionally in the ease of our great collections and galleries, but it is a very dangerous thing to do, and I hope that in settling the personnel of this Committee the noble Lord and his colleagues will bear in mind that the question is far wider in its bearings than is involved in the actual destiny of these forty or fifty pictures.
LORD CARSON: My Lords, with the permission of the House I should like to

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say one word to thank the Government for the offer which they have made, and which I most gratefully accept. I did not go into the controversial matters raised by the noble Earl who has just addressed us. Had I done so I would have taken the whole evening and late into the night, because I know that there have been a great many conflicting statements upon this matter. I have some of them in my hand, made the very day before Sir Hugh Lane, left for America, which must have been the very last he saw of anybody in this country. These are matters which, if they are investigated, ought to be investigated impartially, and with no preconceptions of any kind on one side or the other

LOCAL TAXATION IN SCOTLAND.
VISCOUNT NOVAR: My Lords, I beg to ask whether His Majesty's Government propose to take action on the Report or the Dunedin Committee dealing with local taxation in Scotland?
LORD MUIR MACKENZIE: My Lords, I am desired by my right hon. friend, the Secretary for Scotland, to say that this subject is now under consideration, but that he is not in a position to say what action the Government may be able to take.

ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE LAW OF LUNACY.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR had the following Notice on the Paper:
To move, in order to bring the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act, 1921, into operation, to resolve, That it is expedient that a tribunal be established for inquiring into a matter of urgent public importance, that is to say—

1. The existing law and administrative machinery in England and Wales in connection with the certification, detention and care of persons who are or are alleged to be of unsound mind.

2. The extent to which provision is or should be made in England and Wales for the treatment without certification of persons suffering from mental disorder.

The noble and learned Viscount said: My Lords, I should tell you that this Motion does not involve any question of policy. The question is whether there should be an Inquiry into this subject, and it will be done by a Royal Commission. The only purport of the Motion is that the Royal Commission, when set up, shall be given those powers which the Statute mentioned, the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act, 1921, confers, so that the Commission shall have power to call witnesses and take evidence on oath. The other House has passed a similar Motion, and I now ask your Lordships to pass it.
THE EARL OF ONSLOW: My Lords, the noble and learned Viscount has told us that this Motion is simply to enable the Royal Commission to examine witnesses on oath, but he has not explained to us why it is suggested that a Royal Commission should be set up to go into this matter. You will, perhaps, recollect that last year I had the honour to submit a Bill dealing with the subject connected with the matter to be investigated by the Royal Commission. That Bill was accepted by your Lordships, and passed through all its stages. Since then the Government has changed, and the present Government is proposing to set up a Royal Commission. I think the names of the members of the Commission have been announced in another place. I do not know whether it is convenient to ask the noble and learned Viscount for a little more information as to the reasons which have led the Government to take the course proposed.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Your Lordships will remember that since the events which the noble Earl has mentioned we have had the trouble arising in the Harnett case, in which the Court of Appeal took a different view from that taken in the Court of First Instance. The Judges of the Court of Appeal thought that there were matters which required investigation, and it has been thought right to appoint a Royal Commission for the purpose.
THE EARL OF ONSLOW: I thought that might be the explanation.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

CENTRAL LONDON AND METRO POLITAN DISTRICT RAILWAY COMPANIES BILL.
Returned from the Commons, with the Amendments, agreed to.
SOUTHERN RAILWAY (DOCK CHARGES) BILL. [H.L.]
Returned from the Commons, agreed to, with an Amendment: The said Amendment considered, and agreed to.
HOUSING BILL. [H.L.]
Amendments reported (according to Order).

HOUSING (SCOTLAND) BILL. [H.L.]
Amendments reported (according to Order).
House adjourned during pleasure.
House resumed.

ROYAL COMMISSION.
The following Bills, and Measures passed according to the provisions of Section four of the Church of England Assembly (Powers) Act, 1919, received the Royal Assent: —

County Courts.

Prevention of Eviction.

Marriages Validity (Provisional Orders).

Pacific Cable Board.

Ministry of Health Provisional Order Confirmation (Stratford-upon-Avon Extension).

Saint Enoch's Church and Parish Quoad Sacra Order Confirmation.

Clydebank and District Water Order Confirmation.

Central London and Metropolitan District Railway Companies.

Southern Railway (Dock Charges).

West Indian Islands (Telegraph).

Small Debt (Scotland).

Auxiliary Air Force and Air Force Reserve.

Ministry of Health Provisional Orders (No. 1).

Ministry of Health Provisional Orders (No. 2).

Ministry of Health Provisional Order (Watford Extension).

Greenock Improvement (Extension of Time) Order Confirmation.

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Coatbridge Burgh Extension Order Confirmation.

Kilmarnock Corporation Order Confirmation.

London and North Eastern Railway (Dock Charges, Scotland) Order Confirmation.

Ministry of Health Provisional Orders (No. 4).

Ministry of Health Provisional Orders (No. 3).

Glasgow University (Barbour Scholarship) Order Confirmation.

Burntisland Water Order Confirmation.

Board of Education Scheme (Female Orphan Asylum, etc.) Confirmation.

Ministry of Health Provisional Orders (No. 5).

Ministry of Health Provisional Orders (Water).

Stroud Water.

Southampton Harbour.

Sunderland Corporation.

Harrogate Corporation.

King's Lynn Docks and Railway.

Aberdare Canal.

Malvern Hills.

City of London (Various Powers).

Staffordshire and Worcestershire Canal.

Wandsworth Borough Council (Superannuation).

Great Western Railway (Dock Charges)

London County Council (Tramways and Improvements).

London Midland and Scottish Railway (Dock Charges).

Hackney and New College.

London and North Eastern Railway (Dock Charges).

Aire and Calder Navigation.

Haslingden Corporation.

Lancashire Asylums Board.

Spencer Settled Chattels.

Benefices Act, 1898 (Amendment) Measure, 1923.

Union of Benefices Measure, 1923.

Ecclesiastical Dilapidations Measure, 1923.

Bishopric of Blackburn Measure, 1923.

Diocese of Southwell (Division) Measure, 1923.

House adjourned during pleasure.
House resumed.
House adjourned at five minutes before eight o'clock.