Lords Sitting of 9 July 1924

Preamble
The House met at a quarter before four of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
VISCOUNT WILLINGDON.
Freeman, Baron Willingdon, G.C.S.I., G.G.I.E., G.B.E., having been created Viscount Willingdon of Batton, in the County of Sussex—was (in the usual manner) introduced.
LORD STEVENSON.
Sir James Stevenson, Bart., G.C.M.G., having been created Baron Stevenson of Holmbury, in the County of Surrey—was (in the usual manner) introduced.

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES (MEASURING INSTRUMENTS) BILL. [H.L.]
THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (LORD PARMOOR): My Lords, I beg leave to introduce a Bill to amend the law with respect to measuring instruments, and to move that it be road a first time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 1a.—(Lord Parmoor.)
On Question, Bill read 1a; and to be printed.

LONDON MIDLAND AND SCOTTISH RAILWAY (SUPERANNUATION FUND) BILL.
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE): My Lords, I beg to move the Motion which appears on the Paper in my name.
Moved, That the order made on the 10th day of April last, "That no Private Bill brought from the House of Commons shall be read a second time after Tuesday, the 17th of June next," be dispensed with, and that the
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Bills be now read 2a.—(The Earl of Donoughmore.)
On Question, Motion agreed to, and Bills read 2a accordingly.

GREAT WESTERN RAILWAY (ADDITIONAL POWERS) BILL.
The King's consent signified: Bill read 3a (according to Order) with the Amendments: Further Amendments made, Bill passed, and returned to the Commons.
BOARD OF EDUCATION SCHEME (FEMALE ORPHAN ASYLUM, ETC.) CONFIRMATION BILL.
House in Committee (according to Order) on re-commitment of the Bill: Bill reported without amendment.
MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDERS (No. 5) BILL.
House in Committee (according to Order) on re-commitment of the Bill: Bill reported without amendment.
MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDERS (WATER) BILL.
House in Committee (according to Order) on re-commitment of the Bill: Bill reported without amendment.

DIOCESE OF SOUTHWELL (DIVISION) MEASURE, 1923.
THE LORD BISHOP OF SOUTHWELL: My Lords, I beg to move, That in accordance with the Church of England Assembly Powers Act, 1919, thi3 House do direct that the Diocese of Southwell (Division) Measure, 1923, be presented to His Majesty for Royal Assent. A very natural question that might arise in the minds of some of those present is why it is that after only forty years of life a Motion should be made to divide this diocese. It is but, forty years since the diocese of Southwell was formed out of the diocese of Lichfield, taking the County of Derby, and out of the diocese of Lincoln, taking the County of Nottingham. The answer to that question is twofold.

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First, I am quite confident that the diocese would never have been formed if there had been a Church Assembly, or a body who could scrutinise the proposal, at that time. It was a hurried measure and resulted in this extraordinary position: that instead of creating a small diocese, one of the largest dioceses in England was created—the whole County of Derby and the whole County of Nottingham, with a tremendous area including five hundred parishes—and the attempt to fuse those two Counties has, from the time of the inception of this diocese, to a great extent failed. The only corporate body, in addition to the Church, which has tried to unite the two Counties is the celebrated regiment, the Sherwood Foresters, but from the ecclesiastical point of view it has been found from the time of Dr. Ridding to be almost impossible. It is not necessary for me, perhaps, to enlarge on the fact—because I think everyone here will understand what it means—but it is the case that in my diocese I take in some of the great suburbs of Manchester, I take in the great suburbs of Sheffield, I go right under the eaves of Lincoln Cathedral and down to Melton Mowbray. We have a population now of 1,450,000.
The second reason is that the growth of the diocese and of the population has been immense and is now becoming still greater. The great South Yorkshire coalfield and the Derbyshire coalfield is sweeping across Nottinghamshire and is gradually taking in that famous spot, the Dukeries, and now eight pit villages are rising in that one County with all the problems which surround an incoming population of from fifty to sixty thousand. That is the problem which I am having to face at the present moment. A few years ago I determined to visit every parish thoroughly, to invite into the Church the clergy, the congregation and the wardens, and to address them, ask them questions, and to go thoroughly into the whole life of the parish. It took me exactly four years to go from parish to parish to do all the work, and, by the time I had got half way through, those I had seen first were grumbling that they never saw their Bishop. Our proposal, therefore, is to create two dioceses exactly conterminous with the Counties of Nottingham and Derby, thus preserving all the County feeling in each area. Fortunately, the problem is simple,
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because in each County there are 250 benefices, and while in Derby there is a population of 750,000, in Nottingham there is a population of 700,000, rapidly increasing.
I will not go into further details, but there is one word which needs to be added at the present juncture. A great and significant change is taking place in the Church of England. From these Benches, a few nights ago, some words were uttered somewhat belittling the weight to be given to the Church Assembly and all the councils which have been created under the Church of England Assembly Powers Act. But you cannot uproot tradition and prejudice in a day, or expect all the results of the Act to burst into life immediately. We have too long spoon-fed the Church of England members, and taught them to leave everything to the parson, the wardens and the squire. We have made a great beginning, and already brought reforms into the Church, whilst in many parishes there is new life coming in through the parochial councils and the new councils formed in the diocese. You may say that 140,000 signatures on the electoral roll in my diocese is not the ideal, but it is a good beginning, and to have, after three years' work, 9,000 councils is a tremendous advance on the whole question of Church life and Church administration.
Why do I say this? I say this because, whether we like it or not, administrative work is increasing at every turn. As with the county councils, so with ecclesiastical work. Our administrative work in dioceses is twenty times what it was a few years ago. Dilapidation measures, patronage boards, Union of Benefices Act and various things, besides the great work of the Central Board of Finance, mean that a Bishop, though he cannot, of course, himself carry out the details, ought to be in the "know" of all these great administrative works. And if so, then two counties is a ridiculous size of a diocese to ask the Bishop to administer and to oversee. I trust I have said enough to show that we are not unwise in asking for consent to this Resolution. I would only add that from the beginning, through the two Diocesan Conferences and the other conferences which have been held, there has been perfect unanimity. Even that arch-critic, the Bishop of Durham, said he could not oppose this proposal. Therefore, I trust

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that, without any likely criticism of a hostile kind, we may come to a unanimous decision upon this Resolution.
Moved, That in accordance with the Church of England Assembly Powers Act, 1919, this House do direct that the Diocese of Southwell (Division) Measure, 1923, be presented to His Majesty for Royal Assent.—(The, Lord Bishop of Southwell.)
THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF YORK: My Lords, I do not rise to offer any opposition to this Measure, but to give expression to an opinion with which, if your Lordships will give me one or two moments of your patience, I think I shall have your sympathy. The division of the diocese is, I believe, entirely right. The proposed Measure seems to me to meet the case admirably, but it has one most serious defect. Concealed within the apparently innocent Clause 4 of the Measure is a provision that the Bishopric of Derby, the diocese about to be created, shall be under the jurisdiction of the Archbishop of Canterbury. I raise no sort of objection to that statement, but it ought to be followed by the statement that the Bishop of Southwell shall return to the jurisdiction of the Archbishop of York. I beg you to believe that this is not a revival of the secular controversies between the two Archbishops which would lead your Lordships to exclaim: "A plague on both your houses." It is a matter of real importance just in so far as the Church of England ought in some measure to carry on history and reflect in its present life the historical associations out of which it comes.
For centuries the association between this diocese of Southwell, as it will now be with Derby removed from it, and not only the Province but the diocese and Archbishops of York, has been close and continuous. Indeed, it was only interrupted something like eighty years ago. It so happened that the archdeaconry of Nottingham, which was then an archdeaconry of the diocese of York, was transferred to the diocese of Lincoln. At that time the state of things in the Church of England was such that nobody much cared—I doubt whether a great many people care very much now—to what Province they belonged. Convocation had been suspended and, by an act of oversight which I greatly deplore, my predecessor at that time raised no difficulty
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about the loss of his archdeaconry to the Province of Canterbury. It therefore happened that when, a little over thirty years ago, Nottinghamshire was added to Derbyshire to make the diocese of Southwell, the archdeaconry of Nottingham, which is really the County of Nottingham, then technically in the Province of Canterbury, remained there. But there was every hope that when Nottinghamshire was set free from its entangling alliance with Derbyshire it would return to the allegiance to which it belonged by the ties of centuries.
The connection between Southwell, its Minster and its diocese and the Province of York is, as I have said, singularly close and continuous, and the case for the restoration of Southwell to its proper Province is, historically speaking, overwhelming—there is no other phrase that should be used. Not only was Nottingham an archdeaconry in the diocese of York but, more than that, my predecessors largely built Southwell Minster, endowed its prebends, and took the greatest-possible interest in it. The house in which my right rev. brother is now living was built, or at least its foundations were built, by one of my predecessors. Three of them, I think, are buried there. And with the exception, possibly, of York Minster, there is no church in this country that is more associated with the Archbishop of York than the Minster of Southwell.
There are other reasons which make it difficult for me to understand why this return has not taken place when the new diocese was able to make it. There may have been affinities acquired of recent years with the Midlands, but I venture to say that there are still equally strong and effective affinities with the North of England. I will go further and say that, in my judgment, the character, the language, the type of the people of Nottinghamshire are much more akin to Yorkshire than they are to the Midlands. I have failed to understand for what reason this provision has not been made in this Measure. There are vague hopes extended that possibly, later on, some further subdivision might result in the addition of Southwell, with one of two other dioceses, to the Province of York, but meanwhile the hiatus remains, and the wrong done to historical association is grievous.

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You may be surprised that, having said all this, I should not at once proceed to move that this House do not request His Majesty to give his Assent to this Measure. But I am reluctant, for this one reason, to prevent, or even delay, the formation of a diocese which is urgently needed and in regard to which, as I have said, I am in most hearty sympathy with those who promoted it. Our procedure does not admit of any Amendment. Moreover, I must accept the consequences of my own misdeeds. I ought to have called the attention of your Lordships' Ecclesiastical Committee to this defect in the Measure, as I have done in the Church Assembly, but, in the pressure of other business, the time passed, and I neglected to do so. But, in any case, I doubt very much whether asking the King not to give His Assent to this Measure would be the best way of bringing home to the diocese of Southwell the wrong which it has committed. If a mother opens the door of her own home to a daughter to return, and the daughter is unwilling to do so, I do not think that much gain results from the mother attempting to exercise any compulsion.
But in view of the future and in view of the past, I should like to put it on record that the Archbishop of York of this present time, when this Measure was submitted to the King, did in his place in Parliament, as he has done in the Church Assembly, record his protest against what, I think, is a very great wrong to the principle of historical continuity. I make my protest more in sorrow than in anger, but I cannot but add that my sorrow is deep and real, and I think I owe it to a long line of predecessors to give expression to it in your Lordships' House.
THE LORD BISHOP OF NORWICH: My Lords, in supporting this Measure I think, perhaps, I owe it to the House rather than to my own consistency to call attention to the difference between the erection of this new Bishopric and the division of the diocese of Winchester, which I criticised only a few days ago. I have jotted down some half-dozen points in which this Measure appears to me totally different from the Measure for the division of the diocese of Winchester. The view I explained to your Lordships the other day was that we need as few
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Bishops as possible. To-day, there are 98 archdeacons in England, I believe, and 38 Bishops—an interesting comparison. That view of mine does not for a moment rule out every increase of the Episcopate where it has made good, and this scheme will, so far as I can judge, certainly do no injury to the Church of England. I put the whole interest of the Church of England above the question of issues which relate only to one diocese. Secondly, this proposed new Bishopric does not spoil, it even consolidates, County feeling. Thirdly, it gives the new Bishop and the old a fine area of work and does not offend Archbishop Benson's dictum on the strong centre that every Bishopric should represent in the life of the whole Church.
In the next place, my right rev. brother the Bishop of Southwell said nothing at all corresponding to such words as were heard from the Bishop of Winchester the other evening when he said that he proceeded on foot from village to village, but was only able to go through a comparatively small part of the great diocese of Peterborough. We have heard no arguments to-night about discarding the ordinary methods of transit. Whereas the division of the diocese of Winchester was properly criticised in the Church Assembly and a very considerable and very representative minority was opposed to that division, in this case—I have just looked it up—few words were said, and the Church Assembly immediately endorsed the views expressed just now to your Lordships' House by the Bishop of Southwell. Your Lordships will discriminate between ill-digested schemes on the one hand and this scheme, so admirable, on the other hand. Here is no case of a scheme being commended to the House because good men have been working industriously for many years and can provide nothing better. That, of course, is a testimony to their goodness and to their industry; all honour to them. This is a scheme which commends itself on its own merits. It is well drawn as a scheme, and no one finds any fault with it.
I confess that I do not sympathise with all that my right rev. brother has said about the electoral rolls, because I cannot yet believe that they represent the deliberate mind of the Church. It is, of

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course, most unfortunate, as the words of the most rev. Prelate, the Archibishop of York, would lead some of us to reflect, that in this House there are no means of amending any Measure, however glaring may be some of the faults in it. But setting those points aside, I very much hope that your Lordships will approve of the Measure that is now before you, and will see that I am not inconsistent and that there is a clear-cut distinction between this Measure and the one that I ventured to question before your Lordships' House last week.
VISCOUNT CAVE: My Lords, I am struck by the ingenuity with which the right rev. Prelate the Bishop of Norwich, having made one speech against the Winchester Measure, has taken this opportunity to make another speech in opposition to the same Measure and that at a time when the sponsors of the Winchester Measure are not present in the House and have no means of coming here to meet the indirect arguments of the right rev. Prelate. I will not follow his bad example because on the next occasion when the Winchester Measure comes up for discussion I hope to be allowed to say a few words to your Lordships on that point. I will only say that I do not think the right rev. Prelate is justified in the comparison which he has thought fit to make between the two Measures much to the disadvantage of the other.
My main purpose in rising is to say a word about what was said by the most rev. Prelate, the Archbishop of York. I am not so unwise as to intervene in a dispute between the Province of York and the Province of Canterbury. He would, indeed, be a bold man who set himself between the croziers of the two Archbishop; I only want to say this. As something has been said, I think most unfairly, in another debate against the Ecclesiastical Committee of the two Houses, of which I am Chairman, I want to make it perfectly clear that the point which the most rev. Prelate has raised to-day was in no way raised before that Committee. Not a whisper of any such question reached the ears of the Committee, nor was the matter even mentioned. That being so—I can see that the most rev. Prelate assents to that statement—I need say no more than this, that I am sure it is still open to him, if this Measure receives the Royal Assent,
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to raise the point by means of another Measure which he might bring before the Church Assembly.
THE LOUD CHANCELLOR VISCOUNT HALDNE: My Lords, I listened with much sympathy to what was said by the most rev. Prelate. No doubt in this Measure historical considerations have been largely disregarded and a great change has been made. But five years ago your Lordships thought fit (and I then, unlike the most rev. Prelate, urged your Lordships as much against it as I could) to pass a Bill which deprived you of all effective power of controlling questions of policy that were concerned with the kind of Measure to which the most rev. Prelate referred. Your Lordships abdicated your functions and transferred them to a body called the National Assembly of the Church of England, and on such a footing that if that Assembly sent up Measures for your assent you could not amend them; you could do nothing but assent to or reject them.
The effect of that was this. No doubt there may be questions arising of such a character as to move the House to reject a Measure, but if the matter is purely domestic then, by the legislation of 1919, it has passed out of our hands. The Enabling Act was given a very wide scope. It enabled the National Assembly to disregard Statutes and everything else. The question as to whether this Bishopric belongs to the Province of York or the Province of Canterbury is essentially one of those matters with which your Lordships allowed the National Assembly to deal. It has done so. We cannot amend the Measure. We can only affect it in this way, that if the most rev. Prelate brings a Measure forward to re-transfer the Bishopric to the Province of York we can agree to it. But, as I say, we cannot amend the Measure. So it is that your Lordships find yourselves in a position of powerlessness.
I am not going to repeat the observations that I made last week, nor am I going to repeat the observations of the right rev. Prelate the Bishop of Norwich on the somewhat exiguous extent to which the voters represent the Church. Your Lordships have made the situation and there is only one way in which we can treat it, and that is to regard it as a domestic matter to be decided by the

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Church. The National Assembly has, after all, decided it and the Ecclesiastical Committee of Parliament has not dissented from it. Therefore, I cannot see that your Lordships can do anything else but assent to it.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, after the observations that have fallen from the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack it is only right that one should call attention in a sentence to another side of the case. The noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack, and, I must say, one or two right rev. Prelates, seem to take every opportunity which comes before your Lordships' House for carrying out what is, after all, the express decision of Parliament—namely, the Enabling Act—in order to do their best to undermine the confidence of the country in that Act. That indirect method of attacking what Parliament has already decided upon is a very unfortunate course to pursue, and it makes it absolutely necessary for those of us who voted for the Enabling Act to point out, in one sentence, that what confronted the country and the Church before that Act was passed was a natural paralysis of all reformative legislation for the Church of England.
For years many, of whom I am one, watched with growing dismay year after year pass, admitted abuse after abuse brought before Parliament, and nothing done. Everything failed. The Church was absolutely paralysed, and, then, after a great effort by a great public act—and, I may say, an act of faith—Parliament passed the Enabling Act, and under that Act great reforms have already been carried out, and many more will be carried out. I deplore the practice of trying to undermine the confidence of the country before that Act has been thoroughly tried, and I would respectfully suggest not only to the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack, for whom I have the greatest possible respect, but also to certain right rev. Prelates who sit opposite, that they might do their utmost not to undermine the Act but to make it work.
LORD PARMOOR: My Lords, I should like to say one word in reference to what the noble Marquess has said. As he knows, I was associated from the start with the movement which eventuated in the Enabling Act, and even in the old
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days there was some difference between the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack and myself as to whether that Measure should be enacted or not. But that stage has gone by. The Act has come into operation, and has operated in a most beneficent manner. It has given a vitalising force to the Church which she could not have under the old conditions. I remember—and of this the noble Marquess will be cognisant—when we were in the other House together, how often we tried to get measures of Church reform considered, and never succeeded. It was in order to give the Church a power of passing Measures necessary for its life and organisation that the Enabling Act was passed. I think that it is lamentable that right rev. Prelates, knowing what the Church has done and what the Church's wants were, should, under these conditions, come here not in the ordinary way to deal with what the Assembly has done but to attempt to undermine the Act itself. I hope that process will not be continued when future Measures come forward.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

GUARDIANSHIP OF INFANTS BILL. [H.L.]
Order of the Day for the House to be put into Committee read.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly:
(The EARL OF DONOUGHMORE in the Chair.]
Clause 1:
Principle on which questions relating to custody, upbringing, etc. of infants are to be decided.
1. Where in any proceeding before any Court (whether or not a Court within the meaning of the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1836) the custody or upbringing of an infant, or the administration of any property belonging to or held on trust for an infant, or the application of the income thereof, is in question, the Court, in deciding that question shall have regard solely to the welfare of the infant, and shall not take into consideration whether from any other point of view the claim of the father, or any right at common law possessed by the father, in respect of such

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custody, upbringing, administration or application is superior to that of the mother, or the claim of the mother is superior to that of the father.
VISCOUNT CAVE VISCOUNT CAVE moved to leave out "have regard solely to the welfare of the infant" and insert "regard the welfare of the infant as the first and paramount consideration." The noble and learned Viscount said: I put down this Amendment in the hope of persuading your Lordships to remedy what I think an oversight, or at all events a defect. It is proposed by Clause 1 of the Bill to enact that in considering the question of custody and matters of that kind the Court shall have regard solely to the welfare of the infant. I am sure that the right course is to make the welfare of the infant the paramount consideration, and it was my duly, in a recent case which came before this House judicially, to lay that down as the rule of our Courts, but I think it is a mistake to say that the Court shall shut its eyes to every other consideration.
The Act of 1886 provides that the Court shall consider the conduct of the parents, and the wishes as well of the mother as of the father. I do not sec why those considerations should be excluded, as they would be excluded I think by this Bill. The conduct of the parents is surely material in considering what is to become of their children. The wishes of the parents, who may possibly agree, ought also to be considered, and may very likely be of more value than the opinions of the Judge himself not guided by those wishes. There are other matters which also ought to be considered, such as the responsibility of the father for his children, the special suitability of a mother to have charge of young children, questions of religion, and matters of that kind; indeed, all the facts ought to be before the Judge, and he ought to be entitled to take them into his mind in coming to a decision. I, therefore, propose, instead of saying that the sole consideration shall be the welfare of the infant, that the welfare of the infant shall be the first and paramount consideration, and that we should leave the Judge at liberty to consider the other matters also. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, lines 18 and 19, leave out ("have regard solely to the welfare of the infant") and insert ("regard the welfare of the infant as the first and paramount consideration"),—(Viscount Cave.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I have listened to the speech of the noble and learned Viscount, and I think that he has made out his case, the more so because his Amendment covers the substance of what is dealt with in an Amendment which comes later, and I think that the words, as he proposes to insert them, are better than the words as they appear in the Bill. It is true, as he says, that we ought not to look solely at the welfare of the infant, because there may be other considerations which affect the welfare of the infant which should be taken into account. After all, the infant is a member of a social unit, the family. I need not say more than that I am prepared to accept the Amendment.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
VISCOUNT FITZALAN OF DERWENT VISCOUNT FITZALAN OF DERWENT moved to add the following proviso to the clause:—
"Provided always that, where the religious education of an infant is in question, the Court, in deciding that question, "shall take into consideration the wishes of the parents so far as they shall have been ascertained concerning such education, and where it appears that the wishes of the parents differ, or during their joint lifetime have differed, the Court shall take into consideration any agreement at any time entered into between the parents touching the matter in question."
The noble Viscount said: I understand that this Amendment is considered in some quarters unnecessary, and I admit that after the Amendment of my noble and learned friend below me, which has been carried, it may be argued that my Amendment is still more unnecessary. At the same time, I hope your Lordships will be kind enough to accept it. The noble and learned Viscount who moved the last Amendment alluded to the question of religion, but the word religion does not appear in the Bill, and I venture to think, and others agree with me, that in a Bill of this character affecting children questions of religion should not be altogether ignored. That being so, I hope your Lordships will agree to this Amendment. Further, so far as my co-religionists are concerned, it is the rule that in the case of a mixed marriage there shall be an agreement respecting the religion of the children. That agreement has no legal force, and is not binding in any way, nor does the allusion made to it in this Amendment give it any legal force whatever.

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Still, I think there may be cases of difficulty and dispute as to the religion of children, and if such cases do arise the Judge might well take into consideration any such agreement that has been previously come to, and it should be left to his decision as to whether he will act upon it or not. I understand that when a similar measure was before the Committee presided over by my noble friend Lord Banbury of Southam, an Amendment of this character was brought forward and it was intended by the Committee that it should be incorporated in the Bill. Therefore, if that Bill had matured we should have it now in the Bill.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 25, after ("father") insert the said new proviso.—(Viscount FitzAlan of Derwent.)
LORD CARSON: Personally, I doubt whether this Amendment is germane to the clause at all. The clause merely fixes the principle relating to the custody and upbringing of children, and says that there should be no more preference to the father than to the mother, or to the mother than to the father. I cannot see how the question of religion is germane. Assuming that it is, I suggest to the Lord Chancellor that it is entirely out of order, having regard to the Amendment that has just been passed. It would not fit in with that Amendment, which I think rightly enacts that the one consideration in deciding the question of guardianship is that the Court shall have regard to "the welfare of the infant as the first and paramount consideration." If that is to be the first and paramount consideration, how are you to bring up, in the determination of that question, agreements which may have, been entered into under entirely different circumstances, and where it would be impossible to carry out those agreements without in many cases disturbing the settled views and settled religious principles which have been inculcated in the upbringing of the child?
An agreement may have been entered into at the time of marriage, but events may have happened which have led to the children being brought up, some in one religion and some in another, contrary to that agreement. Some of the children may have been brought up in one way and some in another, and the Court may
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be called upon to separate the guardianship of those children, although they are of one family, in consequence of an agreement which is entirely out-of-date at the time when the matter has to be settled. So long as you leave it to the Court to determine, and determine as the "first and paramount consideration," the welfare of the child, all such questions as these would be carefully considered, but to bind the Court down by an agreement, which may be entirely out-of-date, would really take away all the force of the Amendment you have just passed.
VISCOUNT FITZALAN OF DERWENT: May I point out to the noble and learned Lord that the Amendment does not bind the Court? It only calls attention to this matter.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: The noble and learned Lord has, I think, put his finger on the crucial difficulty in this Amendment. The purpose of the Bill is to provide the principle on which questions relating to the custody and upbringing of children are to be determined, and it lays down this principle, now that Lord Cave's Amendment has been passed, that what is to be looked at is the welfare of the child, not as the only consideration but as the principal consideration in the matter. The Amendment, the sincerity of which one appreciates and recognises, provides something that is concerned only with religious education. If you are going to specify, you must specify a great deal more than that. You specify the well-being of the child as the paramount consideration, but if, after that, you are going into a variety of subjects, you are undoing the advantage you have in laying down the general principle in the Bill. If you introduce one subject by itself—religion—the Judge who is to deal with the matter naturally asks why it has been put in. And if there is an agreement that the child is to be brought up, let us say, as a Mahomedan—an agreement entered into before marriage—the learned Judge will feel that he has to look at that agreement in a special way.
No doubt, you are to look at the well-being of the child, but if you are specially told to take into consideration the wishes of the parents so far as they have been

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ascertained in regard to religious education, that is something which any Judge would look at as cutting down to some extent the general principle of the Bill. I see nothing but endless difficulty if this Amendment is put in. It is surely the best course to take the general principle as laid down in the words of the noble and learned Viscount's Amendment and make the well-being of the child the first consideration. It is then possible to look at all the circumstances of the case, take into consideration any such agreement as was mentioned by the noble Viscount, so far as it affects the well-being of the child, and leave the Judge perfectly free. I hope the noble Viscount will not press the Amendment.
On Question, Amendment negatived.
LORD RAGLAN LORD RAGLAN moved to add the following proviso:—
"provided that when the Court is in doubt as to the direction in which the welfare of the infant lies it shall in the case of a boy incline to the opinion of the father and in that of a girl to the opinion of the mother.''
The noble Lord said: This Amendment differs from that which your Lordships have just rejected in that it makes no attempt to fetter the discretion of the Court. It is merely intended to give them assistance in questions of difficulty. I listened very carefully to the Second Reading debate, and it appeared from the speeches of several noble Lords that the Court might find itself in considerable difficulty in certain cases. They might have to decide whether it would conduce to the welfare of the child that lie should be educated at Oxford or Cambridge, or whether he should be brought up as a Baptist or a Primitive Methodist. In these cases I think it would be much better to have recourse to what I may describe as the old established principle, that in questions affecting boys the father is the best judge and in questions affecting girls the mother is the best judge.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 25, after ("father") insert the said new proviso.—(Lord Raglan.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: If the last Amendment was a difficult one this is much more difficult. Conceive the position of a County Court Judge. He asks in the first place: "Am I in doubt?" If you put a question like that you always find that there is some element of
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doubt. Then he says: "What am I to do.' Am I to look at the father?" He may not be a good person to look at, but the learned Judge says: "If it is a boy I am to incline to the opinion of the father about the disputed question, and, if it is a girl, I am to incline to the opinion of the mother." Really Judges are sensible people, and I think one may leave them alone without any such statutory direction as that they are to incline in one way or another if they find themselves in doubt, as they unquestionably will if they are encouraged to he in doubt. I would respectfully suggest, to the noble Lord that this is not a good Amendment to press.
LORD RAGLAN: I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause I, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 2 agreed to.
Clause 3:
Amendment of 49 & 50 Vict. c. 27. s. 5 with respect to the custody and maintenance of infants.
3.—(1) The power of the Court under Section five of the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1886, to make an order as to the custody of an infant and the right of access thereto may be exercised notwithstanding that the mother of the infant is then residing with the father of the infant.
(2) Where the Court under the said section as so amended makes an order giving the custody of the infant to the mother, then, whether or not the mother is then residing with the father, the Court may further order that the father shall pay to the mother toward" the maintenance of the infant such weekly or other periodical sum as the Court, having regard to the means of the father, may think reasonable.
(3) Where at the time when any such order whether for custody or maintenance is made the mother is residing with the father of the infant, the order shall not be enforceable whilst she so continues to reside with him.
(4) Any order so made may, on the application either of the father or the mother of the infant, be varied or discharged by a subsequent order.
VISCOUNT CAVE VISCOUNT CAVE moved to leave out Clause 3. The noble Viscount said: I have put down upon the Paper, purely on my own behalf, a proposal to reject this clause, because I thought it desirable to give those in charge of the Bill notice that we should desire some explanation of its meaning and purpose. It is, to me,

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rather a difficult and perplexing clause. What the clause proposes, as I understand it, is that while husband and wife are still living together in one house it shall be open to the wife to apply to the Court for directions as to the custody of the child and, further, to ask the Court to order the father to pay a weekly sum to the wife for the maintenance of that child. If the section stopped there it would create a somewhat absurd position, for you would have a household in which, in fact, the custody of the child was in the father but, under the order of the Court, some other arrangement was made, and the whole thing would be absurd.
But the clause does not stop there, for it provides that such an order shall have no effect so long as the parents continue to live together. I admit that this improves the proposal, but I still see grave difficulties in the way. In the first place, this kind of question would arise only where there were differences between husband and wife, and the wife who, while continuing to live with her husband, makes this kind of application and obtains an order for him to pay money, for disobedience to which order he may perhaps in time be sent to prison, does incur a somewhat serious risk. This is not an imaginary suggestion for, at the time when the previous Bill was before the Select Committee, it was strongly urged on the part of the Home Office that we were putting upon a mother too great a risk by inviting her to make this kind of application to the Court while she was still living in the same house with her husband.
In the next place, this kind of order would surely create a very strange position in a household. It would be a cause of friction, and you would have put into the hands of a wife who is still part of the household a weapon which she could use, and I dare say from time to time would use, against her husband in a somewhat novel way. She would tell him: "I have got this order which compels you to give up your child and to pay me so much a week out of your earnings and which I can enforce by a strict process of the Court, and, if you do not do what I say in this way or that, I shall enforce the order." I do not think that this is quite a fair position in which to put a father.
The third point which I wish to make is that you are putting a premium on separation.
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If you are going to give a wife an order contingent on her leaving her husband I think you will put an inducement before her to separate from her husband. Instead of doing that which, in my experience, all the Courts try to do and keeping husband and wife together, you are really taking a step which may force them apart. Those are, I think, serious considerations, and I should like to know what is the answer to them. I was told a little time ago that this clause was a compromise. I am always rather afraid of compromises, especially in matters affecting children, but I do not think that it is much of a compromise, because I read only yesterday, I think, a report of a meeting of a very important association connected with what is called the women's movement in which an important speaker said that this Bill was of no use at all and that they certainly did not accept it as any answer to their demands. If, therefore, this is a compromise, it is a compromise on one side only, and is not accepted by both sides.
I am not at all obstinate in this matter, and if I can be persuaded that there is some good reason for this clause, and that it will work, I do not, of course, want to press my own views against the views of other people; but as matters stand to-day I do see great danger in the clause. I will add this: I am thinking of the child and of the harmony in the house; I am not thinking so much about this equality between two persons who never could be exactly alike which people are always pursuing. I read with some regret the Preamble to the Bill, because I am sorry that the question of children's welfare should be used as a means for following cut this theory of equality. I am all for fair treatment of both sexes, but I think, in this matter, that it is the child that we must think of, and not any theory which one association or another may hold.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, lines 4 to 24, leave out Clause 3.—(Viscount Cave.)
THE EARL OF WEMYSS: I wish to express an earnest hope that the noble and learned Viscount will not press this Amendment. I am sure that if he had devoted as many hours as I have to the Committees which prepared the way for this Bill he would share my sentiments

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and do nothing to destroy the compromise at which we arrived. To eliminate Clause 3 is not only to take away a very important clause but to take away that which, in my opinion, is the one real justification for the introduction of this Bill. It is only fair to confess that many of us who were on the Committees fell that many of the grievances that were brought forward to justify the introduction of a Guardianship of Infants Bill were illusory, that they were more sentimental than practical, and were really brought forward as part of the policy of equal citizenship and a desire for the impossible ideal of absolute equality between the sexes. But I think we wore all agreed that it had been proved to us that the laws of maintenance and custody were unfair upon women at the present time, and I think that every single member of both Committees—I do not even except the noble Earl, Lord Onslow, who may have wished to see the proposal amended—felt that something ought to be done. I will go further and say that even men like Sir Chartres Biron and Sir Paul Lawrence, who objected in toto to the principle of equal guardianship, admitted, so far as I remember, that some improvement should be made in the laws of maintenance.
The noble and learned Viscount drew a picture of one side of the medal, and it is quite true that anything of this kind might be open to the objections that he put. But these objections have been pointed out to women, and they are prepared to accept the risk. There is another side of the medal. Take a woman who is married to a brute who neglects her, illtreats her and half starves her. She has no money, and has no other home to which to go. What is she to do? She has to choose between semi-starvation with her husband or complete starvation without him. The noble Viscount said he did not like this Bill because it was a compromise and had not been accepted by women as a whole. I venture to say to the noble Viscount that I do not think he is quite acquainted with the facts. It is true that women who belong to the extreme societies do not accept it, but these are only one or two groups, and as a whole I think women responsible for the organisation of women have accepted the Bill as a compromise, which certainly falls short of what they had hoped for but by which they are willing to abide. People outside them may be
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almost neglected, and if your Lordships pass the Bill without amendment it will remove a difficult question from practical politics. Therefore, I hope that the noble Viscount will see his way not to press his Amendment.
EARL BEAUCHAMP: My Lords, I should like to reinforce what has been said by the noble Earl. I do not speak from the point of view of sex equality, but I venture to hope that in this case the noble Viscount in charge of the Bill will adhere to the Bill as it stands. We are dealing with imperfect people in an imperfect world, and it is extraordinarily difficult, I think, to lay down in the clauses of a Bill the exact phrase which will suit each case which comes before the Courts. As I understand it, the object of this clause is really to keep the home together. I am sure that the noble Viscount does not look forward to the exercise of this power by an unfortunate woman, but it is a power in reserve so that a man who is behaving badly shall know that the woman has this power and is able to go to the Court and obtain an order. If he amends his ways and behaves better then the order under Clause 3 is not put into active operation, because the husband and wife are continuing to reside together and the man, presumably, is behaving better. As I say, there are two stages in the matter and the man has two chances of behaving better. Therefore, being an old-fashioned person and thinking it better for the children to have a father as well as a mother in the house, I think it is more likely to prevent the, evil father from continuing in his bad ways, and I hope the noble Viscount in charge of the Bill will adhere to the clause.
THE EARL OF ONSLOW: As my name has been mentioned perhaps I may be allowed to explain what I think was the view taken by other members of the two Committees which sat to consider the Bill during last Session and the Session before. With the first Committee I need not deal. The second Committee heard all the evidence on the subject and then Lord Wemyss drafted a very able Report with which I find myself in agreement on general principles. There were, however, one or two provisions to which I had ventured to put down Amendments. I thought that if provision was made for orders of the courts of summary jurisdiction

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for payment by the man to his wife of a weekly sum while she was still living with him it might lead to domestic trouble and perhaps violence. I therefore put down an Amendment, and the Committee, for the reasons which I gave, hesitated to propose a change in the law in that direction. When, however, we had considered as far as Clause 9 or 10 an Amendment was moved which changed the main principle of the Report to a considerable extent, and the result was that further consideration of the draft Report was proposed. Then, owing to the General Election, we never considered the Report further, and the Bill lapsed with Parliament, and my Amendment was never considered by the Committee.
I based that Amendment on the views very strongly expressed by Sir Ernley Blackwell of the Home Office, who told us that out of ninety-nine cases of wife murder during the years 1901 to 1922, eighteen were connected with the question of obtaining separation orders. He also said there were many cases in which juries have found verdicts of manslaughter and others of causing serious bodily harm to women. A Bill was before the House of Commons last Session, and I think it has now passed the other House, and has reached this House, dealing with an amendment of the Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act of 1895. As Lord Wemyss says, under the Common Law, before a woman can make an application for a separation order, she must have left her husband. This has prevented a large number of women from making applications, because they have no other place to go to, and I think everybody is agreed that on this question of separation a woman should be allowed to remain in her husband's house until she has made application. That is what this Bill will make possible. This question of maintenance, however, is a separate one. Not having heard what the noble and learned Viscount will say in reply. I agree with what has been said by my noble and learned friend behind me, and if he were to press the matter I think I should support him in going to a Division.
LORD ASKWITH: Having had charge of the two Bills previously before the House I should like to endorse what was said by the Chairman of the Committee. This is a compromise really between those
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who considered that maintenance should be given to the wife while living with her husband under the same roof, and those who thought that that would create difficulty, but that a wife, before the separation, should know what maintenance she was likely to have. There are instances of difficulty arising owing to a woman who has had a cruel husband being unable to get an order unless she has first separated from her husband. She is then without means, perhaps, to go to another home, if she could get one. She is without her children, and the man will not receive her back, and the home is broken up even if she fails to get an order. Therefore, she has been put in an exceptional position, in which she suffers very great hardship.
It is the last part of Clause 3 to which I think Lord Cave has alluded in his remarks. But supposing that Clause 4 is passed, under subsection (4) of that clause after the woman's death an order may be made for payment to the guardian towards a child's maintenance, although, while the woman is alive, she is precluded from having any maintenance without first separating from her husband. Lord Onslow alluded to a Bill which has passed through the House of Commons without any amendment on this particular matter. Clause (3) says that where any order is made it will not be enforced while a married woman continues to reside with her husband. The House of Commons in that Bill endorsed the principle that such orders for maintenance might be obtained while a woman still resides with her husband, which would give her an opportunity of getting justice without first breaking up her home.
LORD BANBURY OF SOUTHAM: My Lords, I earnestly hope that my noble and learned friend will adhere to his Amendment. I do not understand the point of view of the noble Lord who has just sat down. So far as my experience goes, the position at present is a very simple one. If a woman is ill-treated by her husband, and her husband is, in her opinion, unfit to have the custody of the children, all that is necessary is for her to go before a court of summary jurisdiction and ask for a separation order, coupled with the custody of the children. Only a fortnight ago I was chairman of a bench of magistrates before which a woman came and asked for a separation order because her

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husband had cruelly treated her. We listened to the case and came to the conclusion that she had been badly treated by her husband. We asked her whether she was quite determined not to go back to her husband. The bench of magistrates with which I am connected nearly always, before coming to a decision, tries to see if it cannot reconcile the parties and keep the home together. This woman, in a very determined voice, told me that she was not prepared to go back to her husband. We therefore gave her a separation order and the custody of the two children, and, having ascertained the means of the father, we made an order for what we thought to be a proper amount for the father to pay.
In these circumstances why alter the law? Why say that, though a woman is living with her husband, she may go before a Court? She will have to prove that he has treated her badly, that he is not fit for the custody of his own children, and she will demand that a payment be made by him to her, and then she has to go back and live with her husband. I suppose the majority of your Lordships are married men. Picture to yourselves what would happen if such a thing were to occur in your own households. At once a bone of discord would be introduced between husband and wife, and the probability, if not the certainty, would be that a separation would at once ensue.
I listened with great attention to the speech made by the noble Earl, Lord Wemyss. I understood him to say that when he was acting as Chairman of a Committee a certain number of women connected with various women's institutions gave evidence before him, that they had very many illusions, that their chief desire was to have equality of the sexes, and that something must be done. I believe that he was absolutely right in giving the reason for the introduction of this Bill. It is not because the Bill is wanted, it is not because this clause is a good one; it is because a lot of women, having formed themselves into a society, must have something to do to justify the existence of the society, and the payment of a secretary. Therefore they say: "We must have equality of the sexes," and they bring forward ideas which probably some female friend of theirs has put into their heads, some other female friend having first imparted it to her, and that
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idea has probably been transmogrified during its passage from one woman to another. Having formed the society and having come to the conclusion that something must be done, they bring forward a Bill in Parliament.
Your Lordships will remember that only a few days ago the noble Earl, Lord Birkenhead, in describing a speech made by the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack, said that what he gathered that the Lord Chancellor desired was that something must be done, and he characterised the frame of mind of those people who said that "something must be done" by saying that they did not in the least know what ought to be done, or what they wanted to be done, but they felt that something must be done, and therefore they brought forward a Bill, which we rejected by a large majority only yesterday afternoon.
LORD BUCKMASTER: My Lords, whatever may be the reasons against this clause, surely those advanced by the noble Lord who has just sat down can hardly be regarded as cogent or convincing. My reason for saying that is this. He starts by comparing the position of a woman if this Bill were passed with the position which she holds to-day, and he seems to have overlooked the fact that at the present moment separation orders cannot be granted by a court of summary jurisdiction, except for persistent cruelty and, I think the words are, "wilful neglect." But this Bill contemplates that a woman may be prepared to live with her husband notwithstanding that causes exist which might entitle her either to a separation or to a divorce, and noble Lords who have from time to time opposed the provision contained in my Bill for divorce on more extended grounds can hardly support the noble Lord when he suggests that the right course for a woman to take in order to obtain her rights is to separate herself from her husband, and then apply to the magistrates for relief. It seems an extraordinary argument to be advanced by any one who says that the real desire of the bench of magistrates over which he presides is to maintain the unity of the family, and to prevent the husband and wife from separating. The noble Lord talked of these associations of women, of whom I know nothing at all—
LORD BANBURY OF SOUTHAM: Neither do I.
LORD BUCKMASTER: Then, if you know nothing whatever about them, why do you suggest that they are responsible for this Bill? And why do you suggest that in the introduction and support of this Bill people are being influenced by a variety of uninfluential opinion, formed by women who meet together for the purpose of doing nothing except discuss abstract laws. Behind this Bill, as I read it, there is a real feeling that a woman who is living with her husband may frequently find that his conduct, owing to drunkenness, violence, or other gross excess, renders him wholly unfit to have the custody of the children, to which by law he is entitled, and this Bill, enables her to ask the Court to decide the circumstances so that that custody should be hers or his. What is there that is contrary to any principle of reason or justice in such a provision as that? Further, the woman cannot get maintenance excepting under this Bill, and she cannot get maintenance if at the time when she applies, she is resident with her husband. She can only get maintenance at the time she is separated from him. I sincerely hope that your Lordships will not cut out of this Bill what appears to me to be one of its most valuable provisions
VISCOUNT ASTOR: My Lords, I should like to support what has just been said. I understood from the noble Viscount, Lord Cave, that his desire, as I am sure it is the desire of all your Lordships, is to keep the home together. I venture to suggest that we are far more likely to keep the home together, and not to break it up, if the wife is not compelled to leave the home before she can make her application for maintenance. What happens now is that the woman has to leave the home before making her application for maintenance. If she fails, she has neither maintenance nor home. In addition to that, in many cases I understand that the lawyers of the husband bring a charge of desertion against the woman for having left her homo. I venture to suggest that we are far more likely to keep the home together if this Amendment is not pressed. The noble Lord, Lord Banbury of Southam, referred to the support which the Bill with Clause 3 in it was receiving from women's
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organisations. He said that he did not know the personnel of these organisations. I can assure him that most of them have plenty to do without taking up your Lordships' time where there is no justification for legislation. They are very able women in touch with many of the human tragedies of life, and in their opinion the home is far more likely to be maintained if Clause 3 remains in the Bill. I venture to hope, therefore, that the noble and learned Viscount will not press his Amendment.
LORD BANBURY OF SOUTHAM: The noble and learned Lord, Lord Buckmaster, is apparently also of opinion that women's associations are at the bottom of the Bill—which is of interest.
LORD TERRINGTON: As a member of the Committee which sat on this subject, I should like to assure the noble Lord, Lord Banbury of Southam, that, apart from the earnest body of women whose evidence we took, there was strong evidence from other people. I entirely endorse what the noble Earl. Lord Wemyss, has said about the Committee, and I consider Clause 3 is absolutely vital to the Bill.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: We have listened to an important and interesting debate—important because of the contributions made by various noble Lords, and interesting in the way in which the discussion has developed. It began with a most reasonable speech from the noble and learned Viscount opposite, in which he said: "I want to know what this means." He made a speech which, perhaps, would have been more appropriate on Second Reading, but certainly was not out of place in Committee. It was, however, a speech which went to a principle which was essentially a Second Reading principle of this Bill. Then, as the debate went on, the noble Lord, Lord Banbury of Southam, entered upon the scene, and with him an objection to a desire to do something in general (a very reasonable form of criticism) developed, on this as on former occasions, to an insistence that we should do nothing. He wants to get rid of the principle altogether by doing nothing. I am glad that I have not misinterpreted him; but that is a very different attitude to that adopted by the noble and learned

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Viscount opposite, and is a very remarkable development of the noble and learned Viscount's attitude.
When you tome to the Bill the real difficulty was well illustrated by the noble Earl, Lord Wemyss. Your Lordships may not know the amount of work which it fell to Lord Wemyss to put into the Committee which sat on this subject. He performed herculean labours which, in the end, led to a Report with which nobody agreed. At the same time, it was ii Report which contained the root upon which they were all converging, and it has been a very valuable piece of information in the preparation of this Bill.
I will tell your Lordships exactly why this Bill assumes its present form. First of all, let us see what the Bill is. It is a Bill to amend the law relating to the guardianship of infants. It is not a Bill which deals with separation orders. It is not a Bill which deals with questions of the direct kind between husband and wife. It is a Bill in the interests of the infant, and the principle is the principle which is embodied in the Amendment of Lord Cave which we accepted, that the interest of the infant is to be not necessarily the exclusive consideration, but the paramount consideration. When yon come to the question with which Clause 3 deals, it was well put by my noble and learned friend Lord Buck-master. A husband and wife may he on a very unsatisfactory footing so far as the conduct of the husband is concerned, and yet the wife may be devotedly-attached to him and may not wish to leave him. She may feel that if she leaves him he will break up the home. Yet his conduct may be such that she cannot get out of him maintenance for her child.
This Bill enables her in such a case to go to a court of summary jurisdiction or any other Court to get an order that he is to contribute so much for the maintenance of the child. The custody of the child may, in the interests of the child, be given to her, and it may fall to her to apply the money so obtained. But the Bill provides that the intervention of the. Court shall be an intervention which is to be in the interests of the child so far as the custody of the child is to be with the mother, and is to have only moral weight so long as the husband and wife continue to live together. If the wife
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continues to remain with her husband and to hold to him she is not to enforce the order. If she did it is very likely that the family might be broken up. But she will have the order saying what, in the opinion of the Court, she ought to spend on the infant and what should be furnished by the father. She will know that if things get so bad that she can bear it no longer she may go. She will have got this order and the custody of the child.
That is a proposition that cannot be easily combated. It is true that associations of vigorously-minded ladies complain of this Bill that it is a miserable compromise. They say that they do not want it, that they want something better, something which would astonish the noble Lord, Lord Banbury of Southam, if ho could not prevent them from obtaining it. They put their objection to it on the ground that the Bill does not do nearly enough. Then there are others who have objections to this clause. But it was seen, as Lord Ask with pointed out to your Lordships, that it was necessary to come to some adjustment between those two views. I do not like to call it a compromise because it is really an adjustment. The adjustment reached was that which is seen in Cause 3. The matter was negotiated in the House of Commons by representatives not of one party but of various parties. This agreement was come to and unanimously accepted by the House of Commons, and the view taken by the Government was that, although the matter was delicate in the extreme, t his was a very useful clause and one which would probably lead to an improvement in the position of the child in such unhappy family circumstances as those to which I referred.
It is for that reason that the clause assumes its present form. It is really vital to the Bill. If it was knocked out, I am afraid that it would really kill the Bill because there would no longer be anything in it on which there was convergence of opinion as there is at the present time. We are now in the happy position of having something definite which has been agreed, and I hope that the noble and learned Viscount will not press his Amendment.
VISCOUNT CAVE: I am glad that your Lordships have had this discussion. I

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am still in doubt about this clause, but in view of what has been said from all parts of your Lordships' House I will not press my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 3 agreed to.
Clause 4:
Power of father and mother to appoint testamentary guardians.
4.—(1) The father of an infant may by deed or will appoint any person to be guardian of the infant after his death.
(2) The mother of an infant may by deed or will appoint any person to be guardian of the infant after her death.
(3) Any guardian so appointed shall act jointly with the mother or father, as the case may be, of the infant so long as the mother or father remains alive unless the mother or father objects to his so acting.
(4) If the mother or father so objects, or if the guardian so appointed as aforesaid considers that the mother or father is unfit to have the custody of the infant, the guardian may apply to the Court, and the Court may either refuse to make any order (in which case the mother or father shall remain sole guardian) or make an order that the guardian so appointed shall act jointly with the mother or father, or that he shall be sole guardian of the infant, and in the latter case may make such order regarding the custody of the infant and the right of access thereto of its mother or father as, having regard to the welfare of the infant, the Court may think fit, and may further order that the mother or father shall pay to the guardian towards the maintenance of the infant such weekly or other periodical sum as, having regard to the means of the mother or father, the Court may consider reasonable.
(5) Where guardians are appointed by both parents, the guardians so appointed shall after the death of the surviving parent act jointly, and in the event of the joint guardians being unable to agree on any question affecting the welfare of the infant, either of them may apply to the Court for its direction, and the Court may make such order regarding the matters in difference as it may think proper.
(6) Section three of the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1886, is hereby repealed.
LORD BANBURY OF SOUTHAM LORD BANBURY OF SOUTHAM moved to leave out Clause 4. The noble Lord said: This clause provides that the father of an infant may by deed or will appoint any person to be guardian of the infant after his death. The mother may do the same. Then the clause provides that
"Any guardian so appointed shall act jointly with the mother or father, as the case may be, of the infant so long as the mother or father remains alive unless the mother or father objects to his so acting.
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"(4) If the mother or father so objects, or if the guardian so appointed as aforesaid considers that the mother or father is unfit to have the custody of the infant, the guardian may apply to the court, and the court may either refuse to make any order (in which case the mother or father shall remain sole guardians or make an order that the guardian so appointed shall act jointly with the mother or father, or that he shall be the sole guardian of the infant, and in the latter case may make such order regarding the custody of the infant and the right of access thereto of its mother or father as, having regard to the welfare of the infant, the court may think fit, and may further order that the mother or father shall pay to the guardian towards the maintenance of the infant such weekly other periodical sum as, having regard to the means of the mother or father, the court may consider reasonable."
Where guardians are appointed by both parents that does not so much matter.
The effect of this clause, as I understand it, is this. You may have a mother who is, perhaps, a foolish woman. With all due deference to Lord Buckmaster, I think there are many foolish men, but there are quite as many foolish women. You may have a mother who is a foolish woman, who is spiteful, as many women are (much more so than men), and she may decide that, having had some difference with her husband about the education or about the career of her children, she will appoint a guardian. This guardian, after the mother's death, may haul the father before a Court. The guardian may have been another foolish woman—for I do not see that there is anything in the Bill to prevent that—and this woman may take the father before the Court, and the father may have to prove before that Court that he is a fit person to manage his own child or children. I really must say that if there was anything that was calculated to make the relations between husband and wife unhappy, it is a Bill with clauses of this sort.
The whole basis of the Bill is nothing more nor less than an absurd idea that for the future men and women must be equal. They are not equal, they never will be equal, they were not made equal, and you cannot make them equal. A Bill with clauses of this sort is only likely to cause friction between husband and wife, and to do everything which it is not supposed that it will do. I ask your Lordships to remember this. From time immemorial the father ha" been the head

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of the family, and I earnestly hope that for all time to come the father will remain the head of the family. That he does wrong sometimes is absolutely certain. Men are human, and they do wrong perhaps very often, but the general principle has been acted upon that the father should be head of the family. In any business or undertaking you must have a head.
If you are going to manage things by committees you will never do that well, and you cannot manage by a committee of two, because if they do not agree what is going to happen? If you are going to have committees you must have a committee of three, so that a majority may decide. I shall certainly go to a Division on this if I can get a Teller. I earnestly hope your Lordships may not be led away by sentimental desires on the part of any women, however excellent. I do not for a moment deny what Lord Astor said, that there are very clever women who have bound themselves together to improve this wicked world by taking all those rights which they have never had before, and by putting themselves on an equality with men. If we allow this kind of Bill to become law all we shall do is to east dissention between husband and wife and make families unhappy.
Amendment moved—
Pages 2 and 3, leave out Clause, 4.—(Lord Banbury of Southam.)
LORD ASKWITH: I sincerely trust that the noble Lord who has just spoken will not have a Teller. When we were discussing the last Amendment he uttered strictures against women's societies of which he confessed he knew nothing. On this clause he has dealt with guardianship at will without, I think, having read the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1886. The effect of his Amendment is this, that by not allowing this clause you revive Section 3 of the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1886, which it is proposed to repeal. What does this clause do? The first part of it is the present law. The second part of it is that: the mother should have the same right as the father now has to appoint a guardian on her death. According to the law as laid down in 1886, she has a right, to appoint a guardian to act after her death, but only provisionally, and that appointment has to come before the Court, and the Court, if it finds that the
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father is an unfit person, may make an order as to the guardianship. The mother has, therefore, to intimate that she considers the father an unfit person, and so to brand the father in the eyes of her children, instead of having the opportunity, which the father has now, of appointing a guardian without having to bring that kind of stricture against her husband.
This clause gives the Court absolute power, for the welfare of the child, to decide what is the proper line on which guardianship should proceed, whether it should rest with the father alone, or the father and the guardian, or the guardian alone. That is the principle of the Bill. It also raises woman to the same position as man in natters of this kind. That is a principle to which my noble friend entirely objects. He denounced it on the Second Heading of the Bill, and he is pursuing it in his next two Amendments, with his consequential Amendment, which are intended to cut the whole of the Bill to pieces, and, in fact, to devitalise it in such a manner that it will not be a Bill at all.
LORD DARLING: I rise merely to ask a question of the noble and learned Viscount in charge of this Bill. So far as I can see there is nothing in the Bill which prevents the case that I feel might arise. This is what might happen. A woman may have separated from her husband on the ground of adultery, or upon any other ground, and she may make a will appointing a guardian to act with the father of the child. When she died the provisions of that will would come into operation. The person she appointed would probably be another woman. If she was living separate from her husband on the ground of adultery, or under a judicial separation order, she would, it appears to me, probably appoint a woman who would be thoroughly hostile to the husband, because she would dislike her husband. Is if contemplated that such a wife should be able to impose upon the husband, during the minority of the child, a woman guardian who would be absolutely hostile to that husband? I need hardly say that the converse of that might, arise, and it might be the man who would appoint a guardian who would be hostile to the mother. I only desire to be informed by the noble and learned Viscount how this matter stands, because

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it seems to me that, if that is possible under this clause, it is a most objectionable clause.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: The answer to the noble and learned Lord is that subsection (4) provides for this case. It enables the Court to exercise discretion to get rid of the appointment of any such guardian, and gives the Court complete control over the circumstances. In such a case the appointment of a guardian would not be allowed for a moment to stand. As regards the main question raised by Lord Banbury of Southam, he made a thoroughly masculine with and speech and he concluded thoroughly masculine
Resolved in the affirmative, and Amendment disagreed to accordingly.
Clause 4 agreed to.
Clause 5 (On death of either parent without appointing guardian surviving parent to be guardian alone or jointly with others):
LORD BANBURY OF SOUTHAM: The Amendment which stands next upon the Paper in my name, to leave out subsections (2) and (3), is consequential upon that which has just been defeated, and consequently I do not move it.
Amendment. It was an Amendment all in the interest of the father paramount, but, unfortunately, that is a principle which the Second Reading of this Bill negatived. This is a Bill to provide for the guardianship of infants, and to allow that purpose to be cut down by such an Amendment as the omission of Clause 4 would be to stultify the Bill. I hope your Lordships will not accept the Amendment.
On Question: Whether Clause 4 shall stand part of the Bill?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 70; Not-Contents, 6.

CONTENTS.

Haldane, V. (L. Chancellor.)

Yarborough, E.

Hawke, L.

Jessel, L.

Parmoor, L. (L. President.)

Astor, V.

Mendip, L. (V. Clifden.)

Bertie of Thame, V.

Mildmay of Flete, L.

Argyll, D.

Burnham, V.

Mostyn, L.

Falmouth, V.

Muir Mackenzie, L. [Teller.]

Bristol, M.

Hutchinson, V. (E. Donoughmore.)

Olivier, L.

Dufferin and Ava, M.

Oxenfoord. L. (E. Stair.)

Lansdowne, M.

Novar, V.

Playfair, L.

Peel, V.

Ponsonby, L. (E. Bessborough.)

Ancaster, E.

Younger of Leckie, V.

Beauchamp, E.

Rathcreedan, L.

Buxton, E.

Southwark, L. Bp.

Riddell, L.

Chesterfield, E.

Ritchie of Dundee, L.

Clarendon, E.

Arnold, L.

Rowallan, L.

De La Warr, E. [Teller.]

Askwith, L.

St. Levan, L.

Denbigh, E.

Balfour of Burleigh, L.

Shandon, L.

Doncaster, E. (D. Buccleuch and Queensberry.)

Biddulph, L.

Stanmore, L.

Buckmaster, L.

Strachie, L.

Eldon, E.

Cawley, L.

Stuart of Wortley, L.

Lindsey, E.

Clinton, L.

Terrington. L.

Liverpool, E.

Crawshaw, L.

Thomson, L.

Lucan, E.

Darling, L.

Treowen, L.

Malmesbury, E.

Erskine, L.

Wemyss, L. (E. Wemyss.)

Morton, E.

Faringdon, L.

Wharton, L.

Mount Edgcumbe, E.

Harris, L.

Wyfold, L.

Strafford, E.

Hastings, L.

NOT-CONTENTS.

Ullswater, V.

Lawrence, L.

Raglan, L. [Teller.]

Banbury of Southam, L. [Teller.]

Mowbray, L.

Templemore, L.

Clause 5 agreed to.
Clause 6:
Extension of jurisdiction to Courts of summary jurisdiction.
6.—(1) For the purposes of the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1886, as amended by this Act, the expression "the Court" shall include a Court of summary jurisdiction:
Provided that a Court of summary jurisdiction shall not be competent—

(a) to entertain any application under the Guardianship of infants Act, 1886, as so amended, relating to an infant who has attained the age of sixteen years, unless the infant is physically or mentally incapable of self support; or

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(b) to entertain any application involving the administration or application of any property belonging to or held in trust for an infant, or the income thereof: or

(c) to award the payment of sums towards the maintenance of any infant exceeding twenty shillings a week.

(2) The Lord Chancellor may make rules regulating the procedure in Courts of summary jurisdiction under this section, and may by those rides make provision for enabling of applications to be heard and determined otherwise than in open Court
(3) Where on an application to a Court of summary jurisdiction under the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1886, as amended by this Act, the Court makes or refuses to make an order, an appeal shall, in accordance with rules of Court, lie to the High Court.
Provided that where any such application is made to a Court of summary jurisdiction, and the Court considers that the matter is one which would more conveniently be dealt with by the High Court, the Court of summary jurisdiction may refuse to make an order, and in such case no appeal shall lie to the High Court
(4) An order of a Court of summary jurisdiction for the payment of money under the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1886, as amended by this Act, shall be enforceable in like manner as an order for the payment of a civil debt recoverable summarily.
(5) This section shall not extend to Scotland.
LORD BANBURY OF SOUTHAM LORD BANBURY OF SOUTHAM moved to leave out Clause G. The noble Lord said: This clause allows a court of summary jurisdiction to act instead of the High Court. It seemed to me that the magistrates were not always the best court to which cases of this sort should be submitted, and I thought it best to put down an Amendment in order that I might hear from the Lord Chancellor his opinion upon the matter.
Amendment moved—
Pages 3 and 4, leave out Clause 6.—(Lord Banbury of Southam.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I have a high opinion of the bench of magistrates, which has been heightened by listening to the noble Lord's description of the exactitude with which he presides over it when ho is there. I think the very essence of this Bill is to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts of summary jurisdiction, and it would really be to destroy the scheme of the Bill to exclude the magistrates from the working of it.
On Question, Amendment negatived.
Clause 6 agreed to.
Clause 7 agreed to.
Clause 8:
Consents required to marriage of infants.
(3) For the purposes of this section "the Court" has the same meaning as in the Guardianship of Infants Act, 138(5, as amended by this Act, and rules of Court may be made for enabling applications under this section—

(a) if made to tie High Court to be heard in chambers;

(b) if made to the County Court to be heard and determined by the Registrar subject to appeal to the judge;

(c) if made to a Court of summary jurisdiction to be heard and determined otherwise than in open Court;

and shall provide that where an application is made in consequence of a refusal to give consent, notice of the application shall be served on the person who has so refused consent.
LORD BANBURY OF SOUTHAM LORD BANBURY OF SOUTHAM moved to leave out paragraph (c) of subsection (3). The noble Lord said: I had put down an Amendment to leave out both paragraph (b) and paragraph (c), but I will confine it to paragraph (c), which says that rules may be made for enabling applications—
"if made to a Court of summary jurisdiction to be heard and determined otherwise than in open Court."
I do not believe that it is a good thing to have all these cases heard in camera. If they are heard in camera there are a certain number of people who will come forward on the chance of getting a verdict, but if they are heard in open court these people are less likely to come forward, inasmuch as they do not wish to have their private affairs exposed. I hope that the Lord Chancellor will accept this Amendment which, at any rate, is not vital to the Bill, and has nothing to do with the equality of the sexes, but is merely a matter of procedure.
Amendment moved—
Page 6, lines 20 to 22, leave out paragraph (e).—(Lord Banbury of Southam.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: If we were to accept this Amendment we should be putting a court of summary jurisdiction in a different position from that of every other Court. There are cases, though not very many, which come before the Courts in which it is highly inexpedient, for various reasons, that the details should be discussed in public. The

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Court is left a discretion which is very carefully guarded, and I think it is necessary to preserve that discretion—which is preserved to the High Court and the County Court—to the court of summary jurisdiction also.
On Question, Amendment negatived.
Clause 8 agreed to.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved, after Clause 8, to insert the following new clause:
". In Scotland a father or mother acting as tutor of a pupil child by virtue of the common law or of the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1886, as amended by this Act, shall be deemed to be and always to have been a trustee within the meaning of the Trusts (Scotland) Act, 1921."
The noble Viscount said: I move this Amendment at the request of the Lord Advocate. It is a technical Amendment but an important one. Under the law of Scotland a tutor, that is to say, a person who is guardian of an infant, is in the position of a trustee and treated as being in a fiduciary position, and that is the result of Statute. But the Statute will not cover the new cases of tutors under this Bill, and consequently I move this Amendment, to put them all upon the same footing and to declare that they are in a fiduciary position as regards the exercise of their powers. I think that this is obviously a reasonable' addition.
Amendment moved—
Page 6, line 32, at end insert the said new clause.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 9 agreed to.
Schedule:

SCHEDULE.
Contents required to the Marriage of an Infant.
1. Where the. Infant is Legitimate

Circumstances.

Person or Persons whose consent is required.

1. Where both parents are living:

(a) if parents living together;

Both parents.

(b) if parents are divorced or separated by order of court or by agreement;

The parent to whom the custody of the infant is committed by the decree or order of the court or by the agreement, or if the custody of the infant is so committed to one parent during part of the year and to the other parent during the rest of the year, both parents;

THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved, in the second column, to leave out "the decree or." The noble Viscount said: This and the Amendment which follows are really drafting Amendments which it is desired to insert to meet a criticism made by my noble friend Lord Buckmaster on the Second Reading. The second Amendment is consequential upon the first. I think they introduce an improvement, and I am obliged to my noble and learned friend for having suggested them.
Amendment moved—
Page 7, lines 11 and 12, leave out ("the decree or ").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Amendment moved—
Page 7, line 12, leave out ("the") ["the Court"] and insert ("any").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Schedule, as amended, agreed to.

EXPENSES OF COUNTY AGRICULTURAL COMMITTEES.
LORD STRACHIE LORD STRACHIE had the following Notice on the Paper:—
To draw attention to the letter of the Minister of Agriculture stating that the Ministry will pay the travelling expenses and subsistence allowances to any representative of agricultural labour in respect of attendances at meetings of county agricultural committees, and to move for Papers.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I desire to call the attention of the House to a letter sent by the Ministry of Agriculture on May 30 this year to all county councils. I will quote one or two sentences from that letter:—
"The Ministry realises that the discontinuance of the payment of expenses has made it difficult for representatives of agricultural labour to attend the meetings of the agricultural committee and its sub-committees, and that to that extent the committees have lost something of their representative character."
It will be within the recollection of your Lordships that up to 1921 members attending agricultural committees of county councils were, without any restriction whatever, if they liked to apply, repaid by the Ministry of Agriculture their expenses both for sustenance and for travelling, either by rail or motor

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car. The Government of that day thought fit to cut off this allowance on the ground that it was extravagant and uneconomical. I draw your Lordships' attention to this circular, because I want to know why the Government, if they think it desirable to have larger attendances at the agricultural committees and to make it easy for members to attend, should simply set up a class distinction. They state the matter as follows:—
"The agricultural committee may, on application being made, pay as part of the expenses of the committee travelling expenses and subsistence allowance of members of the committee, or any subcommittee of the committee, appointed to represent the interests of agricultural labour thereon on such a scale, and in accordance with such conditions, as may be determined by the county council with the approval of the Minister.''
That is to say, you are to set up a special class upon these agricultural committees representing smallholders and agricultural labour. It seems to me that it is rather late in the day, and the last thing that I should have thought a Labour Government would do, to draw such distinctions.
When payment of Members was discussed in another place it was never suggested that only those Members who represented Labour, or who represented a particular class, should have their £400 a year, but any member of the House of Commons who liked to apply for it could get that £400 a year. As a matter of fact, although this was denounced by one of the Parties in the House—I think I am right in saying that the Chief Whip of one of the great Parties said that whenever his Party came back into office they would simply abolish that £400 a year—nothing took place, and it was generally accepted by all Parties in the House of Commons that they would apply for the £400. I happen to know this because at one time I was His Majesty's Paymaster-General, and it was my duty to pay members of the House of Commons, and during that Parliament there were only nine members of the House of Commons who did not apply. Therefore the principle was generally accepted, and it was taken entirely out of the range of Party politics.
But now we have a new system, apparently, set up on these councils, and only one class is to be paid. I think it is within the knowledge of this House that there are many farmers who ought to
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have their expenses paid quite as much as any of the smallholders or agricultural labourers, and, so far as I know, it has not been the farm labourer who has been prevented by expense from attending the meetings. The trade organisations take very good care that the farm labourers shall be represented At the same time, I think it will be desirable, when once you have admitted the principle of the payment of these expenses, that there should be power to pay the travelling expenses of all members of the county councils out of local rates. Of course, in this particular case the payment is to be made out of the Imperial Exchequer, a fact which makes it all the worse, it seems to me, to set up a privileged class.
I am told that the Labour Party do not approve of it, and think that it casts a sort of stigma upon them. Therefore, it will be very interesting to hear from the Labour Government on what ground they propose to pay the travelling expenses of the farm labourer but do not propose to pay the travelling expenses of the small farmer and perhaps, in some cases, even of the small squire, especially when attending the sub-committees; because I take it from another letter of the Ministry of Agriculture that they are very anxious that these sub-committees should undertake a great deal of work. If they wish that, it is all the more reason why they should not make this class distinction. I think it is very wrong indeed to make such a distinction at the present day, and I shall be glad to hear from the Ministry what is their reason for making it. I beg to move for Papers.
THE EARL OF ANCASTER: My Lords, I confess I rather regret that the Ministry of Agriculture should have thought fit to issue this letter, and I think the speech to which we have just listened will strengthen the argument which I wish to put forward, as to why I think it is a pity that the payment of a particular class who attend these agricultural committees should be legalised. I feel that once you pay one lot of people who attend these agricultural committees it is perfectly certain there will be demands for similar payment from other members who attend these committees. You cannot confine it to representatives of the labourers' unions. Naturally, the farmers' unions will ask for their representatives to be paid, and, so far as I know, the representatives

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of the Central Landowners' Association will follow suit. I am one of those—perhaps I am a reactionary—who hoped as long as possible that so far as the administration of county affairs was concerned it would still be an honourable duty which men would be willing to do for nothing.
There are a very large number of people, not only rich people, but people who are quite poor, who have in the past attended to county business and carried it out very well, and I think it is a very serious thing that you should begin with the thin edge of the wedge of paying everybody—because that is what I am certain it will gradually lead to—who takes any part in county business. The reason I say that is that if you once lay down the law that expenses shall be paid to certain persons who attend agricultural committees—which in many cases have practically nothing to do—it seems absolutely impossible that you should stop there, and not have to pay every single member of your education committees. I expect a great many noble Lords in this House are members of county councils, and they will know full well that the work of the education committees of county councils is about twenty times as great as, and a good deal more important than, the work of the agricultural committees. To begin by saying that certain members of these agricultural committees are to be paid their expenses is a sure way of ending by paying the members of other committees. You are, in fact, starting by the payment of certain members of the least important of any of the committees of the county councils.
I take a rather strong view about these committees because I think they are hardly wanted. In the old days the whole work connected with agriculture, so far as the county councils were concerned, was done by the smallholdings committers and the diseases of animals committees, and they are practically subcommittees of these agricultural committees. What the use is of having sub-committees and increasing the number of committees and of meetings I really cannot make out. I think that the only fresh work which has been thrown upon these agricultural committees is the eradication of weeds and the decision in particular cases whether a tenant can be turned out for bad cultivation. We all
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know that whenever such a case occurs, which is very seldom, it invariably means that the agent of the county council, and probably one or two farmers on the county council, go and inspect the farm and report whether the farm is in a bad state of cultivation and whether it would be fair to turn the tenant out for bad cultivation. Therefore, in my opinion these agricultural committees serve very little purpose, and really it would not very much matter if the labour representatives attended them or not. As the noble Lord has just pointed out, if the representatives of the agricultural labourers wish to attend it is open to the unions to pay them their fares, just as is done by other unions now.
This all arises out of the Act, I think of 1919, which set up with a great blowing of trumpets the agricultural council, which was to be a parliament for agriculture. The moment a question of policy has to be decided—I speak somewhat feelingly about this—you cannot decide it in the agricultural council but it has to be decided by the Ministry. Instead of starting to pay people to go and sit on them, I think the sooner the agricultural councils and the agricultural committees, their offshoots in the counties, are done away with, the better, for it would be a great saving of time and money to the country, and to individuals. Unfortunately, in the humble capacity in which I was at the Ministry I was never able to put my opinions into force. It is on these grounds—first, that the agricultural committees do exceedingly little and that they are not required; and secondly, that I am very much opposed to the payment, if it can be avoided, of people who are engaged in county work, people who, in this instance, are members of one of the least hard worked committees of the councils—that I regret that this letter has been sent. I may be a reactionary, but I should be sorry to see the day when people in the country refused to do county work without being paid for it.
LORD PARMOOR: My Lords, I am entirely in agreement—and I do not think the Government will take any other view—with the main principle which has been referred to by the noble Earl—namely, that a va6t amount of voluntary work is done on our local government bodies. The other point to which he

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referred, whether these agricultural committees are of value or not, is, I think, rather outside the terms of this Question. He will excuse me for not following him into that matter. The reason for these particular payments is a very simple one. Since the present law has been in force it has been found that, in practice, you cannot get the attendances of the agricultural labourer unless his expense" are paid. What is desired to be done here is to relieve the local authorities, who were making payments at one time for this attendance, and the amount has been placed upon the national Exchequer. What has been done has been approved by the local authorities, and approved, I think, in a special way by the county council authority in Somersetshire, which is the County of the noble Lord, Lord Strachie.
I must say one or two words now to show how exactly this matter arise. The noble Earl was right in going back to the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries Act, 1910—an Act still in force.
THE EARL OF ANCASTER: I thought it was the Agricultural Councils Bill, but it docs not matter.
LORD PARMOOE: It does not matter. I think I have the right name, but the date at any rate is 1919. Under that Act is was a requirement, a duty, that the county councils, other than the London County Council, which was excepted, should establish agricultural committees, and that every scheme constituting such a committee should provide for the payment by the Ministry of Agriculture of not more than one-third of the members of the Committee, and of any subcommittee to which the powers of the agricultural committee were delegated. The noble Earl may be opposed to it, but he had his opportunity when he was connected with the Department. Whatever his views may be, however, that is the existing obligation. When the present Government came into office the Minister found that in a large number of counties vacancies existed on the agricultural committees and the sub-committees. The numbers had not been kept up. He also learned that on every committee and subcommittee the labour representatives were inadequate in number. In the majority of counties the labour representatives still do not exceed one in
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twelve, and in some cases they number considerably less. For instance, in Somerset, out of a total of 45 members, only two are labour representatives. The Minister, therefore, gave instructions that, whenever vacancies arose, the possibility of filling them by nominating additional representatives of labour should be explored. That is to say, he intended and hoped that the representation of agricultural labour should be made a real and effective one.
When he desired to carry out this policy the Minister found that the cost of attending meetings was a serious obstacle in the way of securing the services of the most suitable men to act as representatives of the agricultural labourers on these county council committees. The 1919 Act authorised county councils to provide, in their schemes for constituting the agricultural committees, for the payment of travelling expenses and subsistence allowances of members of the committees or of any sub-committee of the agricultural committees. Between the passing of the Act and December, 1921, the majority of county councils made provision for the payment of travelling expenses and subsistence allowances, the cost being, for the most part, repaid to the counties from the Vote for the Ministry of Agriculture. As a result, however, of the recommendation of the Geddes Committee this arrangement came to an end at the beginning of 1922, and since that date about one half of the county councils have deleted from their constitutional schemes the clauses authorising payment of expenses. Even in the remaining counties it is understood that practically no expenditure is incurred in this way. Thus, since the Geddes Committee cut down the support given from headquarters, one half of the counties make no provision, and the other half make no expenditure.
In these circumstances the Minister was faced with the difficulty that, in order to secure that agricultural labour should be represented on county committees, the cost incurred by such representation must be repaid to them. In other words, it was a necessity, if we were to have the representation at all, and I do not think the noble Earl would desire to exclude this representation from the agricultural committees. At the same time, experience

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had shown that it was no use looking to the county councils to meet the cost out of the rates—that had been tried. The only way open to the Minister therefore was to obtain a grant from the Treasury for this purpose, and this he did. That is what is explained in the letter. In the conditions which I have explained the expenses could no longer be met from the county fund—which, I think, is right—and therefore provision was made out of the national Exchequer.
The reason why the Government has restricted the repayment from the Ministry's Vote to the expenses of representatives of agricultural labour only are these. First, that the interests of landowners and farmers have always been fully represented on the county councils and county council committees, without any provision for repayment of expenses—that is the knowledge and experience of everyone who has taken any part in county life; apart from the agricultural labourer there has never been any difficulty in the attendance of representatives—and, secondly, to have extended repayment by the Ministry would have very greatly increased the cost, with, in their view, no corresponding advantage. The cost of the limited repayment—and this is the question which the noble Earl asked me—is not expected to exceed £1,000 at the outside during the current financial year.
It is satisfactory to know: that, while in some counties the Minister's suggestion has been criticised, in other counties it has been very warmly welcomed. It is a great mistake to suppose that the noble Lord is representing the views of county councils generally. This proposal has been very warmly welcomed by county councils from the standpoint that they desire this representation and they know it cannot be obtained in any other way. Perhaps it is rather hard to give again the example of Somerset, but that is the one which has been supplied to me. In Somerset members of the agricultural committee, representing both landowners and farmers, spoke strongly in favour of the Minister's proposal, which was adopted unanimously by the committee. This is a practical question. I think the labourers ought to have representation. They cannot have it without the expenditure of this £1,000. I do not think there is in that the slightest trace of an idea of what is
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called class distinction. It is n simple fact that they cannot afford to attend unless their expenses are provided for. I hope your Lordships will consider that is the explanation. It is a practical one and, as I am told, a very large number of county councils welcome the suggestion. They want the representation and they see that it can be obtained in this way.
LORD HASTINGS: My Lords, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Parmoor, I think, would hardly expect that his answer to the noble Lord's Question will give satisfaction. It appears to me, if I may say so, to deal somewhat inadequately with the point that my noble friend Lord Strachie made—namely, that there is a very definite class distinction in the provision contained in the letter sent out by the Ministry of Agriculture. The noble and learned Lord quoted the County of Somerset as being one of the counties which have welcomed and approved this letter of the Ministry. But there are other counties in which the letter has been treated in a very different spirit and in which the labouring population themselves regard it as something of an insult. Labourers in the county with which I am particularly familiar have declined to accept the terms offered to them by the Minister on the ground that they see no reason whatever why they should be distinguished and earmarked, so to speak, from others serving on these committees. I agree very much with my noble friend Lord Ancaster, who said he hoped that service would continue to be given in the counties gratuitously, and I regret very deeply that any suggestion should be made from which will spring the payment of members of county councils for the many duties which they perform. If it has to come it is, surely, indefensible to give this payment to one class of the community only instead of offering it to the whole. Far from having met with the general approval that the noble Lord, Lord Parmoor, seems to think it has received, I can assure him that there are parts of England in which the letter is very deeply resented.
LORD STRACHIE: My Lords. I do not think it is necessary for me to press the Motion which I have placed on the Paper, but before I ask the leave of your Lordships to withdraw it, I should like to state that the noble and learned Lord is

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mistaken in thinking that there is no difficulty in getting very suitable men to stand for election to county councils or, after they have been elected, to continue serving on the ground of expense. In my own county members of the county council have often said that they have not been able to continue serving because of the expense of attending committees, and so on. I do not want the noble and learned Lord to think that expense has nothing to do with attendance at meetings of county councils. When he says that the letter has been welcomed by many county councils, I think he might have told us what those councils were. He mentioned the County Council of Somerset as approving the letter. They did not approve it wholeheartedly, because I hold in my hand a recommendation from the county agricultural committee that they may on application being made pay as part of the expenses of the committee, repayable by the Ministry of Agriculture, travelling expenses and subsistence allowance to members of the committee or any sub-committee of the committee being bona fide agricultural labourers or cultivators of not more than fifty acres of Land who attend such meetings as those to which reference has been made. The noble, and learned Lord would hardly view that as a satisfactory resolution to pass.
We know it is impossible for agricultural labourers in a large county like mine to travel forty or fifty miles. I cannot understand why he quoted with approval a resolution passed, not by the county council but by the agricultural committee. It has still to be confirmed by the county council. I should very much doubt whether it would be adopted unanimously. If I am present I shall oppose the proposal. It would probably affect the employment of agricultural labourers if they had to tell their employers in harvest time that they had to be constantly absent in order to attend meetings of the county council committees. I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

OTTOMAN PUBLIC DEBT: BONDHOLDERS' RIGHTS.
LORD BANBURY OF SOUTHAM LORD BANBURY OF SOUTHAM had given Notice to ask His Majesty's Government—
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1. Whether the revenues in Palestine assigned to the holders of Turkish bonds under the Decree of Muharrem, and collected by His Majesty's Government from the middle of 1918 until the end of 1920, were placed to a special account separate from the Government's other revenues; whether interest was credited on the amount deposited; and whether at that time His Majesty's Government did not regard the said revenues as belonging to the bondholders.

2. Whether the statement made by Lord Arnold in this House, on May 21, that the, revenues collected by His Majesty's Government were not remitted to the Debt Council at Constantinople because the. Debt Council was composed of enemy members is correct, seeing that all enemy representatives on the Council left Constantinople at the end of 1918;

and to move for Papers.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I hold in my hand the Report of the Iraq Administration from October, 1920, to March, 1922. On page 37 of that Report I find under "Receipts and Expenditure by main heads," and included among the receipts: Ottoman Debt Revenues, 24,09,558 rupees, which I venture to say is evidence that at that moment those revenues were collected as being revenues assigned to the Ottoman Debt Redemption. Therefore, at that time the Government was aware of the claims of the Ottoman Debt bondholders to these revenues, and they actually set them aside in a separate account for the credit of the bondholders. I see that the noble Lord, Lord Arnold, on Wednesday, July 2, in reply to a question by my noble friend Lord Raglan, stated that from March, 1920, certain payments were going to be made under the Treaty of Lausanne to the bondholders. That has nothing whatever to do with the Question I am asking His Majesty's Government, because the Question I am asking is not whether the Treaty entered into at Lausanne is going to be observed, but whether or not before a certain date the Palestine Government did not appropriate certain moneys which belonged to other people, and which they knew belonged to other people, because they put them into a separate account, and whether they will not make restitution for the wrong that they have done.
THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (LORD ARNOLD): My Lords, in reply to the first part of the noble Lord's Question, the assigned revenues collected by the military authorities in Palestine were placed to a special account, separate from the other revenues, and for some time interest was credited on this account. The object of placing these revenues to a special account was statistical—that is to say, the object was to keep a record of the amount collected. It was not intended that the authorities in Palestine should be debarred from using the proceeds of these revenues to meet expenditure. His Majesty's Government did not at that time, or at any later time, regard these revenues as belonging to the bondholders, but their view was that the question whether an amount equivalent to the, proceeds of these revenues would have to be reimbursed to the Ottoman Debt Council after the war was one which it was impossible to decide until the Treaty of Peace had been settled.
As I explained in my reply on May 21, the Treaty of Lausanne fixed March 1, 1920, as the date from which Palestine has to assume responsibility for a portion of the pre-war Ottoman Public Debt, but does not place upon Palestine, or upon His Majesty's Government, any liability to reimburse to the Ottoman Debt Council the amount of the assigned revenues collected after the occupation of Palestine by British military forces. His Majesty's Government are advised that apart from the Treaty no such liability exists.
In reply to the second part of the noble Lord's Question, what I said in my statement on May 21 was this:—
"The British military authorities when they occupied … Palestine kept separate accounts of the proceeds of the assigned revenues. There was, of course, no question of actually paying over these revenues to the Ottoman Debt Council at Constantinople which then consisted of enemy nationals."
It will be seen that I was referring to the period of British military occupation during the war, and not to the subsequent period after the Armistice. During the war there was, for the reason which I have explained, no necessity to consider the question whether the proceeds of the, assigned revenues collected should be paid to the. Ottoman Debt Council. After the
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cessation of active hostilities by the Armistice of October 30, 1918, the German and Austro-Hungarian representatives on the Ottoman Debt Council left Constantinople, as the noble Lord correctly states in his Question. The question then arose as to the reimbursement of the proceeds of these revenues, and the view taken was, as I have already stated, that the matter could not be settled until the terms of the Treaty of Peace had been decided upon, and the view taken later on, when those terms had been decided upon, was that there is no liability to reimburse the proceeds of these revenues. I would, in conclusion, remind your Lordships that, as I stated when the noble Lord raised this subject on May 21, the position of the present Government is that it adheres to what was done and arranged by their predecessors in regard to these matters.
LORD BANBURY OF SOUTHAM: My Lords, I am much obliged to the noble Lord for his reply. I am sorry that it does not give me very much satisfaction, because, as I understand it, the noble Lord adheres to the taking of money which belonged to somebody else—which he does not deny belonged to somebody else, and which he admits was put to? separate account—and devoting it for purposes for which it was not intended, because a Treaty subsequent to the taking of the money did not say the money should be handed over to the rightful owner. Whatever Government supported that. I am sure that on reflection the vast majority of people will say that it is a proceeding which ought not to have taken place.
LORD RAGLAN: My Lords, may I point out in addition, that Palestine was, and I believe technically still is, occupied enemy territory, because the Treaty of Lausanne has not been ratified? Therefore, the Government has no power to allocate the revenues of the country.

RE-ORGANISATION OF OFFICES (SCOT LAND) BILL. [H.L.]
Order of the Day for the House to be put into Committee read.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Muir Mackenzie.)
LORD DUNEDIN: My Lords, at the time of the Second Heading of this Bill, as your Lordships know, I made a certain request, and since then I have been in communication with the Government. Although I cannot say they have done everything that I wanted, they have made most material concessions. By one of the Amendments which is going to be moved by the noble Lord opposite they have taken away one of the objections to the Bill. In those circumstances I should not think it right to proceed in my opposition, although I do not get everything that I wanted. I would like to say that I wish to recall very forcibly to the noble and learned Lord Chancellor's memory the words of the promise he gave as to doing something for the state of the Scottish Records. Those words of promise I confess, as an answer to my speech, were rather gratifying than relevant, because it is certain that what he promised to do could equally have been done without passing this Bill. But the Government have really much bettered the position to the gentleman who is to be the Keeper of the Records, and I therefore hope that tin-promise of the Lord Chancellor will be fulfilled.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: With the assent of my right hon, friend the Secretary for Scotland, I gave the noble and learned Lord the promise to which he has referred, and which I can assure him will be carried out.
On Question. Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly:
[The EARL OF DONOUGHMORE in the Chair.]
Clauses 1 to 4 agreed to
Clause 5:
Office of Keeper of the. Records.
5.—(1) The person holding the office of Deputy Keeper of the Records at the date of the passing of this Act shall become the officer in charge of the Record Department, and such officer shall hare after that date the designation of Keeper of the Records of Scotland. Section eight of the Lord Clerk Register (Scotland) Act, 1879, shall be construed as applying to the office of Keeper of the Records of Scotland in the same manner as it has hitherto applied to the office of Deputy Keeper of the Records.
LORD MUIR MACKENZIE LORD MUIR MACKENZIE moved, at the end of subsection (1), to insert:
"and the powers and duties vested in the Deputy Clerk Register by virtue of any Act
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shall, subject as hereinafter in this Act provided, be vested in the Keeper of Die Records, but nothing in this subsection shall he construed as transferring to the said Keeper any power to give directions in regard to the registration of any deed in the registers mentioned in the two immediately succeeding sections of this Act or any power of supervision or control in regard to the keepers or other officers thereof."
The noble Lord said: After the interchange of compliments between my noble friend opposite and the noble and learned Viscount, there really seems nothing for me to do except to move the Amendments which have been practically agreed upon. I should like to take the opportunity of saying how very much obliged the Government are to my noble and learned friend opposite for the manner in which he entered into the discussions and arrived at conclusions which are satisfactory to the Government, and which, I am glad to say, though not entirely acceptable to him, yet are such as he is willing to agree to. I do not see present the noble Duke, the Duke of Buccleuch, but I think the Amendments that are put down are calculated to remove the difficulty which he seemed to feel of supposing that the tendency of the Bill was to remove the centre of gravity from Edinburgh to London. I hope that it is quire clear on the face of the Hill that for the future the business will be carried on as it has been hitherto in Edinburgh. Having said so much generally as to these Amendments, which all stand together, I will move them, of course, separately. I beg to move the first Amendment standing in my name.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 41, at end insert the said words.—(Lord Muir Mackenzie.)
LORD DUNEDIN: I agree that the Amendments to this Bill hang together. This is a rather long addendum to the clause, and I think it has been made necessary by a case which was decided in the Court of Session soon after I left it. In itself, the decision in that case was right, but there were many observations with which I do not concur. I thought it might even have been necessary to have had another addendum. It was never my wish that there should be an appeal from the Keeper of the Sasines to the Keeper of the Records. The proper appeal when a subject feels that he has not been treated fairly is to the

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Court of Session. I have come to the conclusion, however, that Clause 13 is sufficient, and I acquiesce in the Amendments proposed.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 5, as amended, agreed to.
Clauses 6 to 8 agreed to.
Clause 9:
Secretary for Scotland may make orders relating to Register of Deeds, etc.
9.—(1) It shall be lawful for the Secretary for Scotland, after consultation with the Lord President of the Court of Session, the Lord Advocate and the Lord Justice Clerk, by order to direct that the office of Keeper of the General Register of Sasines, the office of Keeper of the Records, and the office of Keeper of the Register of Deeds, or any two of such offices shall he united to the effect that the offices shall be held and the duties thereof discharged by one and the same person.
LORD DUNEDIN LORD DUNEDIN had on the Paper an Amendment, in subsection (1), to leave out after "consultation with" and insert "with the approval of." The noble and learned Lord said: As it stood there was a most cumbrous provision in this clause. It had to do with the amalgamation of two offices, which I think it will be well to amalgamate. But as it stood it provided that the Secretary for Scotland should consult with three people and be bound by the opinion of none of them. I do not think that is a good plan, and therefore my Amendment, which I should like to amend by substituting the word "consent" for "approval," provides that he shall not make this change without the approval of the Lord President of the Court of Sessions.
Amendment moved—
Page 3, line 25, leave out ("after consultation with") and insert ("with the consent of").—(Lord Dunedin.)
LORD MUIR MACKENZIE: The Government gladly accept the Amendment which they think is an improvement on the Bill.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD DUNEDIN LORD DUNEDIN moved, in subsection 1), to leave out "the Lord Advocate and the Lord Justice Clerk." The noble and learned Lord said: This is consequential.
Amendment moved—
Page 3, lines 26 and 27, leave out ("the Lord Advocate and the Lord Justice Clerk").—(Lord Dunedin.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD MUIR MACKENZIE: The Amendment to this clause standing in my name is consequential.
Amendment moved—
Page 3, lines 28 to 30, leave out from ("Sasines") to ("shall") in line 30, and insert ("and the office of Keeper of the Register of Deeds").—(Lord Muir Mackenzie.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 9, as amended, agreed to.
Clauses 10 and 11 agreed to.
Clause 12:
Powers of Secretary for Scotland as to Registers, &c.
12. From and after the passing of this Act the Secretary for Scotland shall have and may exercise all the powers and duties in regard to the control of the public registers, records and rolls of Scotland and the keepers and other officers thereof heretofore vested in the Deputy Clerk Register.
LORD MUIR MACKENZIE: I beg formally to move the omission of this clause.
Amendment moved—
Page 4, lines 18 to 23, leave out Clause 12.—(Lord Muir Mackenzie.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Remaining Clauses agreed to.
The Schedule:

RE-ORGANISATION OF OFFICES (SCOT LAND) BILL. [H.L.]

  SCHEDULE.
  Consequential and Minor Amendment of existing enactments.

  Enactment to be Amended

  Nature of Amendment.

  The lands Valuation (Scotland) Act, 1854. (17 & 18 Vict. c.91.) Section 28

  For the reference to the Lord Clerk Register or his deputy there shall be substituted a reference to the Keeper of the Records.

  Section 35

  For the reference to the Lord Clerk Register of Scotland or his deputy where first occurring there shall be substituted a reference to the Secretary for Scotland, and for the reference to the Lord Clerk Register or his deputy where second occurring there shall be substituted a reference to the Keeper of the Records

  Enactment to be Amended.

  Nature of Amendment

  The Writs Registration (Scotland) Act, 1868. (31 & 32 Vict. c. 34.) Section 3

  For the reference to the Lord Clerk Register there shall be substituted a reference to the Secretary for Scotland.

  The Land Registers (Scotland) Act, 1868. (31 & 32 Vict. c. 64.) Section 9

  For the references to the Lord Clerk Register there shall be substituted references to the Secretary for Scotland.

  Section 10

  For the references to the Lord Clerk Register there shall be substituted references to the Keeper of the Records.

  Section 12

  For the reference to the Lord Clerk Register or his deputies, where first occurring, and for the reference to I he Deputy Keeper of the Records, there shall be substituted references to the Keeper of the Records; and for the references to the Lord Clerk Register where subsequently occurring there shall be substituted references to the Secretary for Scotland.

  Sections 17, 19, and 24

  For the references to the Lord Clerk Register there shall be substituted references to the Secretary for Scotland.

  Schedule B.

  For the reference to the Deputy Keeper of the Records there shall be substituted a reference to the Keeper of the Records.

  The Titles to Land Consolidation (Scotland) Act, 1868. (31 & 32 Vict. c. 101.) Sections 36, 38, and 68.

  For the references to the Lord Clerk Register there shall be substituted references to the Secretary for Scotland.

  The Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act, 1876. (39 & 40 Vict. c. 70.) Section 45

  For the reference to the Lord Clerk Register there shall be substituted a reference to the Keeper of the Records.

  The Lord Clerk Register (Scotland) Act, 1879. (42 & 43 Vict. c. 41.) Section 10

  For the reference to the Deputy Clerk Register there shall be substituted a reference to the Keeper of the

  Enactment to be Amended.

  Nature of Amendment

  Records, and the following proviso shall be added to thatsection:— "Provided that when "any writ or document "is in the custody of "the Keeper of the "General Register of "Sasines, or the Keeper of the Register of "Deeds, the order may "be made on the Keeper having the "custody thereof."

  The Scottish Board of Health Act, 1919. (9 & 10 Geo. 5, c, 20.) Subsection (2) of Section 3.

  The words from "and "shall at all times" to the end of the first paragraph of the subsection shall be repealed.

  LORD MUIR MACKENZIE: The provisions in the Schedule have now become unnecessary and it is therefore necessary to move the Amendments which are on the Order Paper, to leave out the references to the Land Valuation (Scotland) Act, 1854, the Writs Registration (Scotland) Act, 1868, and the Land Registers (Scotland) Act, 1868, down to "Schedule B" in the first column, and the references to the Titles to Land Consolidation (Scotland) Act, 1868, and the Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act, 1876.
  Amendments moved—
  Page 6, line 5, leave out from the beginning of line 5 to the end of line 8 on page 7.
  Page 7, lines 13 to 26, leave out from the beginning of line 13 to the end of line 26.— (Lord Muir Mackenzie.)
  On Question, Amendments agreed to
  Schedule, as amended, agreed to.

SMALL DEBTS (SCOTLAND) BILL.
House in Committee (according to Order): Bill reported without amendment.

THE RODEO.
LORD LAMBOURNE LORD LAMBOURNE had given Notice to ask His Majesty's Government if they are aware that Mr. Cochran refused to allow the R.S.P.C.A. inspectors to examine the horses in the rodeo show when being saddled or unsaddled or to examine the saddles or girths; whether in view of the statement in the Press that the performances

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are to be repeated in the Coliseum they will use their influence to induce Mr. Cochran to allow either the police or the R.S.P.C.A. inspectors to make a proper examination.
LORD BANBURY OF SOUTHAM: My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend Lord Lambourne, I beg to ask the Question which stands in his name.
EARL DE LA WARR: My Lords, in order to answer this Question it is not necessary for me to repeat the general statement of policy in regard to this matter which the Lord President of the Council laid down on, I think, June 4. What I think is needed is a definite statement of the facts as the Government see them and how the Government intend to deal with them. The Question refers to action by the police or by the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, and your Lordships will therefore realise at once that the answer must divide itself into two heads.
The police have certain definite legal powers, but the society have none. The police have no legal powers to go on private property—that is in this case, to insist on going behind the scenes—in order to see the saddling and girthing of the horses. They have, however, very definite powers. They can, if they think fit, make an arrest without warrant, and they can also at the same time take away the animals in question and deposit them in safe keeping. They have not used these powers, but they have used others. They have issued summonses against the promoters of this performance. At the present moment the case has not been decided and the matter is therefore sub judice. The Home Secretary is, however, satisfied that the powers he possesses at present are fully sufficient to deal with the matter and he docs not feel inclined to ask a favour of Mr. Cochran against whom the police have already issued summonses.
Now with regard to the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. Those of us who have sympathy with their ideals cannot help but regret that they prejudiced their position at the beginning of this unfortunate affair. At the beginning Mr. Cochran gave them leave to send their inspectors behind the scenes, but before they had an opportunity
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of taking advantage of this concession they attacked the promoters of the performance in the public Press. Therefore. Mr. Cochran withdrew the consent—an act, if I may say so, speaking personally, even more regrettable than the action of the society in making the attack. The Home Secretary does not, however, feel that he is in a position to interfere in a matter which concerns solely these two parties, the society and the promoters. He feels very strongly, however, that the promoters would be extremely unwise were they to continue in their policy of refusing to have the society's inspectors behind the scenes, and he hopes very much that they will reconsider their policy. It is only natural that, if they do not, the public will draw their own conclusions and will feel that, after all, there is something to hide. Your Lordships will realise that the matter is further complicated because the society brought out summonses and took this matter to the Courts, where then-case was dismissed.
LORD BANBURY OF SOUTHAM: Not a case of this sort.
EARL DE LA WARR: I think the case was with regard to steer roping.
LORD BANBURY OF SOUTHAM: It was confined to that.
EARL DE LA WARR: We may all have our personal views on that matter, but your Lordships will realise, from the point of view of the Government, that they must proceed with caution, that decision having been given. The Government, however, can give an assurance that they will continue to watch this matter very closely, as they have already done at Wembley. They cannot be accused of having acted with negligence in view of the fact that the police have already taken action, and they feel that they can take no further action, at any rate, at the present moment, although they can give your Lordships an assurance that they will keep a very close watch on the matter.
LORD BUCKMASTER: My Lords, the House must, I am sure, be aware that the noble Earl has not really answered the Question that has been put. The question as to whether or not the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals

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have been well or ill-advised in taking proceedings in respect of these performances at Wembley is not the Question that has been asked at all. The Question which the noble Lord has asked is, presumably, a very definite one: Has there been a refusal on the part of Mr. Cochran to permit the inspection of horses that are saddled for the purposes of the entertainment? So far as I can understand the noble Earl's reply, the answer to that is, "Yes," and, so far as the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals is concerned, he states that a permission wan given which apparently was never exercised and has since been with drawn.
With regard to the police, I am not quite sure that I understand the position. The noble Earl says that the police are taking proceedings, and that therefore we cannot speak about that which has taken place. Am I to understand that he has taken proceedings with regard to the saddling of these horses? Is that the subject matter of the action? What are the proceedings that are being taken? At the moment I have heard of none, but the noble Earl said that proceedings have been taken and, apparently, that, in consequence, the police cannot ask a favour, and have no right to go without permission. I am bound to say that it seem to me that this result is extremely unsatisfactory. I have not the least idea whether these horses are properly saddled or ill-saddled, nor has this Question anything to do with that. The only thing the Question asks is whether there has been a refusal to permit inspection and if so, whether the Government will use its influence to secure that this inspection can be made if this exhibition is going to be extended and held elsewhere. I should have liked to hear a definite answer to that question.
EARL DE LA WARR: I think my answer was very definite. I said that the society had been refused and that they had had the concession cancelled, but that at the same time the police were taking action on their own.
LORD BUCKMASTER: For what?
EARL DE LA WARR: Against the promoters, for cruelty to animals.
LORD BANBURY OF SOUTHAM: No action has been taken by the society except in regard to steer roping.
EARL DE LA WARR: This is the police.
LORD BANBURY OF SOUTHAM: I beg your pardon.

LEGITIMACY BILL.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
LORD BUCKMASTER: My Lords, the circumstances in which I ask your Lordships to give a Second Reading to this Bill render it unnecessary that I should again explain its provisions in detail. It is, indeed, a circumstance that somewhat reflects upon the lack of co ordination of business between the two Houses that this Bill comes up for its Second Reading at all. The history of this matter is as follows. I introduced to your Lordships' notice a Bill that, in effect and purpose?—indeed, I think almost literally—was this Bill, and it received your Lordships' assent on the Motion for the Second Reading, I think I am right in saying, without a Division. In subsequent: stages two most important Amendments were introduced: one an Amendment which prevented the operation of the Act in the case where the child was born at the time when one of its parents was married to a third party; and the second a provision that required certain conditions to be satisfied before the legitimacy would operate. Those two provisions Mere obviously Committee matters, and I have not much doubt that they will be moved again in the Committee stage here. They were introduced into the Bill, and the Bill so amended received your Lordships' assent.
Had that Bill gone down to the House of Commons and been discussed there, it might have been that the two Amendments would have been rejected. If so, the matter would have come back before your Lordships on the question whether or not this House agreed with the Commons Amendments, and there the whole matter would have ended. As a matter of fact, instead of that Bill being introduced in the form in which it left your Lordships' House, a new Bill was introduced having the same effect, and that

399
is the Bill which is before your Lordships to-day. As I have said, it is in essence and principle the Bill which your Lordships finally approved, subject to two modifications which I think no member of your Lordships' House will doubt are fit and proper matters for consideration in Committee. Having regard to the fact that the Bill in its present form received your Lordships' approval, I think without dissent, and in its final form again, I think, passed without dissent. I do not expect your Lordships to require me to occupy your time at any length in stating the terms of the measure.
I may, however, tell your Lordships summarily, merely in order to refresh your memories and not because I suppose that you are, really in need of the information, that the first part of the Bill provides that legitimation should take place consequent upon the marriage of the parents of the illegitimate child; that the mere fact of legitimation shall not in itself, by virtue of that section, create rights in the child; that those rights are all carefully defined in the subsequent clauses of the Bill; that provisions for the inheritance of title are left outside the scope of the Bill; that existing dispositions are not interfered with; and that the Bill operates exactly in the same manner as the Bill which your Lordships approved some short time ago. It is because I have a great respect for the value of public time, and because I notice that the hour is late, that I do not venture to expatiate further upon the provisions of this Bill, nor do I think that your Lordships would consider it respectful in me to do so, having regard to the fact that a similar Bill has already been laid before you in this Session of Parliament. I beg to move that the Bill be now read a second time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(Lord Buckmaster.)
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I do not rise to make any comment upon the actual tenor of the Bill. The description which the noble and learned Lord has given of the circumstances in which it is presented to your Lordships is, of course, entirely accurate, and the want of co-ordination to which he refers is a very great inconvenience. It is amazing to see the waste of time that is involved in the present system, but neverthelees,
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having been a member of the House of Commons for many years, I think I can understand how it occurred. In any ease this Bill is here now, and we shall have to deal with it, and I rise only for the purpose of saying that the Second Reading has the full support of those of us who sit on these Benches. No doubt Amendments will have to be made in Committee, and I am not sure whether it would be fair to leave the noble and learned Lord under the impression that only those Amendments will be moved again which were accepted in the case of the former Bill. I cannot help suspecting there may be other Amendments moved, and it is really for the purpose of suggesting, for the noble and learned Lord's consideration, that the Bill should not be put down again for a week or so, that I have risen. If that is done proper Amendments can be arranged.
LORD BUCKMASTER: There I shall be most anxious to meet the convenience of opponents of the Bill, but really I am in rather a difficulty about this. The Paper is getting very full, and I was hoping that, as this matter had only recently-been before your Lordships, if I put the Bill down again for next Tuesday Amendments could then be raised. Even assuming all the Amendments were not put in on the Committee stage there would still remain the Report and Third Reading, and, indeed, it was on the Third Reading, on the last occasion, that the most important Amendment was introduced.
LORD BANBURY OF SOUTHAM: In answer to what the noble Lord said about what took place when a similar Bill was brought in at the beginning of the Session, I think he has forgotten that I ventured to object to the Bill on the Second Reading. Unfortunately, I had congestion of the lungs and the Report and Third Reading were passed while I was still ill in bed, and I had no opportunity of moving Amendments. I would prefer that this Bill should be thrown out.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I personally have no objection to Tuesday, except that there is a very big debate down for that day. However, I will leave it in the hands of the noble and learned Lord, who is always very anxious to meet the convenience of the House.
On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

IMPERIAL INSTITUTE BILL. [H.L.]
Read 3a (according to Order): Amendment (privilege) made: Bill passed, and sent to the Commons.
CHARTERED ASSOCIATIONS (PROTECTION OF NAMES AND UNIFORMS) BILL. [H.L.]
Read 3a (according to Order), and passed, and sent to the Commons.

TOWN PLANNING BILL. [H.L.]
Read 3a (according to Order).
LORD MUIR MACKENZIE: My Lords, there are three Amendments down in my name—one on Clause 10 and two on Clause 14—which are simply verbal corrections and ought to have appeared in the Report of the Joint Committee on Consolidation Bills. I mention that particularly because it is very undesirable that Amendments should be moved on
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these Consolidation Bills. For that reason I want to make it clear that these are not Amendments of the Bill but corrections of what was done by the Joint Committee itself.
Clause 10 (Compensation in respect of property injuriously affected by scheme, etc.):
Amendment moved—
Clause 10, page 9, line 24, leave out ("or"), and after ("adoption") insert ("or making").—(Lord Muir Mackenzie.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 14 (power of Minister to order adoption of town planning scheme):
Amendments moved—
Clause 14, page 12, line 25, leave out ("imposed") and insert ("proposed")
Clause 14, page 12, line 34, leave out ("such").—(Lord Muir Mackenzie.)
On Question, Amendments agreed to.
Bill passed, and sent to the Commons.
House adjourned at a quarter past seven o'clock.