HL Deb 10 December 1924 vol 60 cc60-78

LORD PARMOOR had given Notice to ask His Majesty's Government if they can give information to the House on the policy they intend to adopt in reference to the Geneva Protocol; and to move for Papers. The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, the Question of which I have given notice to His Majesty's Government stands upon the Order Paper, but, as I have already told the noble Marquess the Leader of the House, I do not wish in any way to press it or in any way to embarrass the considerations which are now obviously going on by His Majesty's Government. There are, however, one or two matters on which I wish to say a few words, for this reason. There has been considerable misunderstanding, and there is still obviously considerable misunderstanding, as to the action of the British Delegation at Geneva and as to the real meaning of the terms of the Protocol. I always felt at Geneva, and feel now, that the only place where one ought to give explanations upon matters of that kind is in Parliament, and especially in this House. The noble Marquess will remember the discussions which took place in this House in 1918. Of course, I do not desire to refer to them except to say that I hope the noble Marquess will re-read with care, if he has not already done so, what he said on those occasions, because every principle which he then suggested to be a right principle is similar to the principles to be found in the terms of the Protocol under discussion.

Of course, this is not in any sense a political or Party issue, but, as I have said before, there are one or two matters on which I think information should be given from the point of view of those who were at Geneva. I think also that it is of importance that such statements should be made before His Majesty's Government come to anything like a final decision, and if it is not impertinent to say so, I should like to state that any information which can only be in the hands of those very intimately acquainted with what took place at Geneva and which I could give would always be at the disposal of Hit Majesty's Government. I do not say that in any sense as desiring to give information, but in order to let them know that it is at their service should they at any time require it. The Protocol is a document directed to the stabilising of peace as the normal condition in all civilised countries. It does not purport in itself in any way to be a complete solution, and to discuss it as an isolated document cannot but bring about a large measure of misunderstanding. It is the first step, and only the first step, which may make possible the calling of an International Conference to deal with the general question of the reduction of armaments, and its intention—I think myself that the intention is carried out in terms which have not been fully appreciated—is to make aggressive war, so far as may be, quite impossible in the future.

It may be that in desiring to bring about that result and to get as absolute a security as possible we have gone too far in certain directions. I do not suggest that, but that would be the fault if a fault could be found with the terms of the Protocol itself. I do not propose to discuss in any sense, or at any rate in any detail, the terms of the Protocol. They are not sacrosanct. They are open to amendment so long as the main principles are preserved. Not only are they open to amendment but it appears to me that when the International Conference is called, if it is called, the matters cannot be discussed before that Conference apart from the terms of security contained in the Protocol itself. There is an interlinking of security and reduction of armaments and no one who has any knowledge of what goes on at Geneva can doubt for a moment that, if at the International Conference there is anything like agree- ment that amendments are required within the detailed terms of the Protocol, such amendments will certainly be adopted, so far as the Assembly of the League is concerned. To meet another objection which has been made Article 19 of the Protocol reserves in terms the provisions of the Covenant except so far as they have been expressly altered, and among the terms of the Covenant happens to be also Article 19. There is a term which allows for amendment and answers the suggestion that the Protocol can in any way stereotype these matters in the future.

There is one quotation from the speech of the late Lord Parker which I should like to make. That noble Lord made a very remarkable statement in 1918, and I refer to it because it summarises what I regard as the main proposals in the Protocol itself. I dare say your Lordships will recollect that Lord Parker summarised in a series of propositions what he regarded as the true basis upon which the League of Nations should be founded. He said—and this was his first proposition—that all members of the League should recognise that war from whatever cause is a danger to our common civilisation and that international disputes ought to be settled on the principles of right and justice and not by force of arms. The object of the Protocol is to make a principle of that kind a reality. It is not a reality in the terms of the Covenant itself, because in some directions the Covenant did not include all possible occasions on which the arbitrament of war might be resorted to. The object of the Protocol, fairly understood, is this: It is not to introduce any new principle either in the nature of obligation or of sanction, but to supply those parts of the Covenant which were not sufficiently wide-reaching in order to ensure that in all cases there should be an alternative procedure in the case of international disputes between nations.

Unfortunately, as I think, it is difficult entirely to appreciate the inter-acting effect of the Covenant and the Protocol on one another, but the first matter upon which I should like to ask the noble Marquess a question is this. He knows that under Article 1 of the Protocol there is a provision in these words: The signatory States undertake to make every effort in their power to secure the introduction into the Covenant of amendments on the lines of the provisions contained in the following Articles. In other words, it is provided that as soon as possible instead of having two documents in reference to which there are difficulties of comparison you shall have only one document—namely, the Covenant incorporating as far as necessary any terms from the Protocol.

On matters of this kind an appropriate Committee is always appointed by the President of the Council of the League and while I still had the honour of being the British Representative on the Council of the League the President sent a message to me through Sir Eric Drummond asking for the appointment upon this drafting Committee of an expert from Great Britain. Of course, I would not mention names, but I did ascertain that an expert of great authority was willing to undertake this extremely important task. When the conditions changed and the late Government went out that suggestion had not been completed. Whether it has been completed or not now, of course, I do not know, but I do say this, that if you really want people clearly to understand what the Protocol is, and, as Mr. Lloyd George said last night, to make up their minds whether the Protocol is an extension of the terms of the Covenant as regards obligations or sanctions, the easy way to answer that question is by the work of skilled draftsmen who ought to incorporate, and could incorporate, the two documents into one, making a distinction between what was derived from the Covenant and what was derived from the Protocol.

I have already said what I desired to say about the possibility of amendment. There is, however, one general view which, I hope, His Majesty's Government will have in their minds, and that is that one must have no illusions on the matters which are dealt with in the Protocol. Nothing in the nature of a scheme for general arbitration, security, and the subsequent reduction of armaments can succeed that is not promoted through the agency of the League. I imagine that there would be no doubt upon that point. Secondly, we have to consider that, if a scheme is to succeed at all, it is extremely important that it should have the unanimous support of the League, because all the countries which are Members of the League are, of course, represented at the meeting of the Assembly at Geneva. I do not want to press this matter too far, because I think the Government ought carefully to reconsider the whole position I find no fault with that at all; that was the attitude we took up from the very commencement of our discussions at Geneva.

I think that, although that ought to be done, it is a factor of the utmost importance that the terms suggested in the Protocol were, in fact, accepted by the unanimous approval of forty-nine nations represented at Geneva. Among those nations was France, which signed at the time, M. Briand being authorised to do so. At the present time, as I notice from news which has come from Rome, sixteen States have signed, including, the other day, Spain. The Protocol provides that, to go forward, it requires thirteen signatures, but three of these signatures must come from the Governments which are permanently represented on the Council, and at the present time of those only France has signed. But I think no one who knows what has gone on at Geneva, and what is the opinion of the various countries represented there, can doubt that, should Great Britain sign the Protocol—and that is a matter which the Government will have to decide—you would get the signatures both of Italy and of Japan, as well as of a very large number indeed of the smaller countries, especially the Scandinavian countries.

I have often been asked about American opinion. No one ought to attempt to dogmatise on a point of this kind, but last night I was reading an American magazine, the Bulletin of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, and I came across a very eloquent passage without knowing who had written it. It was in these words:— Yet it is through the League of Nations alone that the path to safety and salvation can be found. To sustain and aid the League of Nations is the duty of all. To reinforce it is the first aim of all who wish to spare their children torments and disasters, compared to which those which we have suffered would be but a pale preliminary. I looked back and discovered that that article was written by one of the most prominent members of His Majesty's Government—written, apparently, before he had become a member of the Government, because it was signed by him as one who had been formerly the First Lord of the British Admiralty. I only bring that forward to show the consensus of opinion upon points of this nature; although I quite agree—do not let me overstate my case—that one has to consider whether principles of that kind are, in fact, carried out in the terms of the Protocol.

One other quotation I should like to make, because it is unfortunate that some of the great speeches made by foreign statesmen at Geneva are not reported and are not read in this country. At the last meeting at Geneva, which adopted the Protocol unanimously, there were present eight Prime Ministers and rather less than twenty Foreign Ministers the number varied at different times. I only mention these facts to show what is the character of the Assembly which has considered and approved the Protocol. The quotation that I will give is from M. Briand. M. Briand made a most eloquent speech as regards the fears of France. He expressed more than once the fears he had gone through as the responsible Prime Minister of France during some of the worst periods of the war. This is what he said as regards the provisions of the Protocol, and I think it ought to be carefully regarded by everyone:— The provisions of the Protocol therefore "— of course, after discussion— are such as to reassure us"— that is, France. They are accompanied by sanctions and the combination of these two factors in a single system constitutes in our view an almost insuperable harrier to war. I hope that when His Majesty's Government, consider the terms of the Protocol they will come to the same conclusion.

It is a very notable thing that after full discussion the French Delegation headed by M. Briand should have given expression to an opinion of that kind. Is it true that the terms of the Protocol are an almost insuperable barrier to war? That was the opinion which, as I have said, was expressed by M. Briand, and by many others. I selected him as a man of exceptional position and knowledge. If that is true the minor criticisms on points of detail sink into insignificance. I do not want to press try own belief too far, but if any one believes, as I do, that M. Briand is right when he says that the terms of the Protocol are an almost insuperable barrier to war he must agree that minor criticisms become insignificant and pure matters of detail. Not only do they become pure matters of detail, but matters of detail which are open to amendment.

I am astonished at the criticism which is applied to the Protocol as though each detailed term was adamant and sacrosanct and could not be altered. I do not agree with that for one moment. If you approach the Protocol from that point of view you lose sight of the wood in the multitude of the trees; whereas if you approach it from the other point of view, if you are in favour of the main principle and consider how far that main principle may be effected in the detailed provisions, there is ample opportunity for amendment cither in the terms of the Covenant itself or at the time when the International Congress is held.

One or two special criticisms have been made, the last by Mr. Lloyd George yesterday, on which I would ask your Lordships to permit me to say a word. It has often been asked whether, as regards obligations and sanctions, the Protocol goes outside the terms of the Covenant. I have no doubt that the answer is in the negative. Further, all those engaged in the construction of the Protocol—a work, no doubt, of great difficulty and responsibility—intended at any rate (because that was the mandate entrusted to them) to keep the terms of the Protocol within the obligations and sanctions that are to be found in the Covenant. That is what the Assembly asked us to do and that is what the two Commissions had in mind; and if they have failed it is not their fault. I do not think they have failed, but if they have there is certainly ground for amendment and reconsideration.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Buckmaster, whom I see in his place this afternoon, wrote a very able analysis of this topic which appeared in The Times. He came to the conclusion that the sanctions in the Protocol in no direction went outside the sanctions which are to be found in the Covenant. I am not going into detail, but I should like to quote one or two words from the Protocol which will make the matter clear beyond all doubt. There ought not to be any doubt upon this point. The words in the Protocol are to the effect that the obligations of the said States, in regard to the sanctions of all kinds mentioned in paragraphs (1) and (2) of Article 16 of the Covenant, will immediately become operative … The Protocol does not purport to go outside the obligations and there is no word in the Protocol which suggests going outside the obligations which signatories to the Covenant are under already.

I know that various phrases were used, going even so far as an offer of the mortgage of the Navy and matters of that kind. I have stated publicly, and I should like to state it in your Lordships' House, that so far as I know there never was the slightest ground of any sort for suggestions of the kind. The noble Viscount, Lord Cecil of Chelwood, will appreciate what I say and will know very well that there have been certain differences of opinion and considerable discussion as to whether you should keep your sanctions within the limit of the Covenant or not or go in the direction of pledging specific naval or military expeditions in the future on conditions which were stated. Those were two of the matters which we had under discussion and on which we had very anxious communication with the French Delegation. It is unnecessary, of course, to go into matters of that sort, nor do I seek to do so. The result is to be found in the terms of the Protocol itself. If you look at the Protocol you will find that the British Delegation in terms inserted the words which in effect they were instructed to insert under the mandate committed to them, that so far as the Protocol was concerned, there should be no sanctions except those found in paragraphs (1) and (2) of Article 16 of the Covenant. In one way, of course, the terms of the Protocol fall short of the obligations in the Covenant. I want to give one illustration of that. It was felt that the word "aggression" in the Covenant was capable of very indefinite definition.

VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD

It is not in the Covenant at all.

LORD PARMOOR

The word "aggression" is in the Covenant. The noble Viscount says it is not. I do not want to have any controversy with him, but I think he will find that the word "aggression" is in the Covenant.

VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD

The expression is "resort to war."

LORD PARMOOR

That is another matter. As I say, I do not wish to have any controversy with the noble Viscount because he and I have had to study this document with the greatest care, but the words are to be found in Article 10 of the Covenant which is headed: "Guarantees against aggression," and it says that "the Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression," and so on. I do not want to dwell upon a point of this kind, but I want to say this, which is in accordance with what was laid down by the noble Marquess so long ago as 1918. It is impossible to deal with an offensive or aggressive war in regard to what might be called the rights and wrongs between the parties. That is a matter for subsequent history. But he suggested then—and I recollect that the noble Viscount, Lord Grey of Fallodon, suggested it also in a debate in this House—that you must regard the test of aggressor or aggression as being a noncompliance with or a breach of the Covenants with which the States have undertaken to comply on the face of the Covenant or the Protocol itself. In that respect undoubtedly there is a limitation in the terms of the Protocol which is extremely important, and which is not to be found in the terms of the Covenant itself.

I notice, too, that it is suggested there are military commitments, or naval commitments, in the Protocol which are not to be found in the Covenant. If any one will look into the documents I think ho will find that that is obviously inaccurate. It is not in accord with the terms of the Protocol as compared with the terms of the Covenant. You find the obligation in regard to possible military or naval sanction as a contingency in Articles 12, 13 and 15 of the Covenant, and there is not a single additional obligation as regards sanctions to be found in the Protocol which is not to be found, in principle, in those three Articles. I do not want to be misunderstood. In one sense the Protocol was intended to be inclusive, whereas it was thought that the Covenant was not sufficiently inclusive, but the possible differences between the two are small, though important, because, if you are to have security, you must have an alternative form of settling international disputes applicable to disputes of every kind. I do not think any one will doubt that for a moment.

Let me explain another point which has been the subject of considerable mis apprehension; that is what I will call the question of international law. The provision is this. The Protocol does accept as compulsory what is called the optional clause, or the statute prescribing the form of the International Court at The Hague, but that Article retains a power of reservation as regards any particular subject matter. There are really only four special matters of juridical importance which can be brought before the Court. At Geneva this matter was discussed, and it was made absolutely clear that we did not intend as the British Delegation to have any international law which would affect the law of sea warfare should the British Navy be engaged. In order that there should be no doubt in the future about it there is a special provision in the Protocol. The Protocol itself recognises that if this optional clause is adopted so as to be compulsory it is only so adopted with the full power of exception as regards any particular provision such as that which relates to international law. I want that to be made absolutely clear. We at any rate, whether rightly or wrongly, were determined that there should be nothing in the Protocol which would suggest or allow any interference with international law in respect to sea warfare as interpreted in the Prize Courts of this country. That was a very important matter, and it was not one which was sidetracked in any way. It was fully considered and discussed, with the result that we refused to give way in any direction so far as that is concerned, and there is a clause in the Protocol making that point quite clear.

Nay, more than that—I believe that the Navy were anxious upon this point—at the end of Article 10, where the provision is that one country may come to the succour of a distressed country—if Great Britain were acting on behalf of the League, for instance (and we could not be called upon to act unless we were prepared to do so)—any signatory State thus called upon shall "be entitled to exercise the rights of a belligerent." Those words were introduced because we were told that, there was a fear that the rights of a belligerent could not be exercised on an occasion of that kind. Any one who understands the Protocol will know that from beginning to end there was absolute provision to safeguard this matter, which was one of very great importance.

There is another point that I should like to say a word about, and it is this. A great deal has been said about American opinion. I should regret exceedingly to adopt terms which were likely to alienate American opinion from the support of the League. It is impossible to dogmatise upon a matter of this kind, but every information which has come to mo confirms the views expressed by Professor Morrison and Lord Grey that there is nothing more likely to attract. America than by the League going ahead in a matter of this kind, and nothing less likely to attract her than by lying still and doing nothing. I know that in this matter I can appeal to the knowledge of the noble Viscount opposite (Viscount Cecil of Chelwood). Everyone knows how really intense is the interest of America in the League at the present time. They know what she has done not only philanthro-pically—and a great deal of the League action has been philanthropic—but they know what she has done in two instances.

First of all, it was through Mr. Norman Davis, an American, that the Memel difficulty was settled. Secondly, and more important, at the present time, it was through Mr. Morgenthau, who originally was American Ambassador at Constantinople, that the great question of Greek refugees was settled in the cause of humanity. It was a terrible problem. He undertook it, and he settled it. He was over here last April at a time when I happened to be Chairman of the Committee dealing with this question of the Greek refugees. At that time we met Mr. Morgenthau, and £1,000,000 was subscribed for immediate necessities. What greater success has there been than the recent Greek loan—£7,500,000 required, a large sum, and applications, according to the papers, for £150,000,000. That shows the work which is being done by American citizens on behalf of the League. I should like to add that in my opinion at any rate there is nothing which is more likely to attract American opinion than the universal application of the principle of arbitration on the one hand, and the granting of further powers to the International Court on the other.

I need only say, in regard to what is stated by the Dominions and India, that we consulted them at every turn, and we had the great advantage of Lord Hardinge as head of the Indian Delegation. There was not a single point in the Protocol on which we did not consult him. I do not want to press that point too far. I quite agree that it is open to the Dominions—and properly and necessarily open to them—to reconsider these questions, just as we did, but so far as the British Delegation was concerned we could do no more. We were not only in constant communication with these Delegates from day to day, but on something like twenty occasions we had meetings, many of which lasted for a long time after midnight.

I do not desire unduly to detain your Lordships. I think I have mentioned all the principal matters in reference to which criticism has been directed against the terms of the Protocol. I have avoided, I hope entirely, matters of controversy; at any rate, I have desired to do so. When you come to close quarters with them there are certain of the Articles which, I think, might be improved in respect to the definiteness of their language. It is not easy for two concurrent Commissions, manned in two different ways, to work out a Protocol of this kind without a certain chance of overlapping. No one can deny that, and that is why it is so important that further drafting amendments should be made.

Speaking for a moment on behalf of my colleagues, as well as for myself, we do desire to press on the Government the extreme importance of the matter if, after consideration, they can find that it is right to approve this document. Great success has already been attained in the work of the League. Without being unduly optimistic, I think a more abundant success has been attained than those most in favour of the League could have anticipated in the first instance. It has settled not only political difficulties but even the greater difficulties which have arisen in connection with such questions as refugees, naturalisation and minorities. It has done a great work in re-creating society after the ruin and devastation of the great war. Look at Austria and Hungary, the Greek refugees, and Greece itself. Of course, the greatest work of all, if it can succeed, is to raise what M. Briand called the almost insuperable barrier to war in the future.

This requires two conditions, it requires complete alternative methods of procedure, which can be found in the terms of the Protocol, and these alternative methods of procedure can be safeguarded without asking for any sanctions differing in character from those already to be found in the terms of the Covenant. Of course, the terms of the Covenant are Treaty terms binding on this country. No country has held more consistently to the doctrine that Treaty obligations must be observed with scrupulous respect, and to enable the terms of the Covenant to be carried out I think the terms of the Protocol are an essential condition. There are amendments, not introducing new matter, to enable this country and other countries who have signed the Covenant to carry out the great obligations they have undertaken to further a peace settlement as the normal condition of the civilised world. I beg to move.

THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THIS COUNCIL (THE MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON)

My Lords, I am afraid that in point of length and substance the reply which I have to make to the noble and learned Lord may appear inadequate, but for reasons which I stated to him and which I will presently repeat to the House it is clearly impossible for me at this date, within at the most a few weeks after the Government have assumed office, to make any very definite statement of our policy with regard to this matter. When I mentioned this to the noble and learned Lord he was good enough to accept the validity of my reasoning, but I learnt that he desired to make the statement—and a very valuable and useful statement it has been—to which we have just listened before he proposed to exchange the detestable and almost incredible atmosphere which now surrounds us for the sunny land of Ceylon. The noble and learned Lord is going there, and I only hope that when he gets there he will find that the famous hymn writer is wrong, and that while every prospect pleases man alone is not vile.

I think the noble and learned Viscount was quite justified in making the speech he has done, for these reasons. In the first place, not only has he always been closely associated with the work of the League of Nations since its inception in this country, but he has also occupied during the last nine months the important and responsible post of British Representative at Geneva, and he himself is in large measure responsible if not for the actual terms of the Protocol at any rate for the attitude adopted towards it by himself and his colleague as representing His Majesty's Government. But, quite apart from that, I think ho may find further justification for his remarks in the desire which he expresses, and which underlay all he said, to remove certain misunderstandings of which he thought the Protocol had been the victim, to answer certain criticisms which had been made even so recently as yesterday evening in another place and to lay before the House what, in his judgment, wore the broad considerations that underlay the Protocol, and what were the misapprehensions to which in the Press and elsewhere it had been subject.

I agree with him in thinking that it must have been very difficult to evolve a document of this nature, whatever its merits or demerits, as the result of the work of two Committees sitting, if I remember aright, independently but subsequently joining together and framing this draft Protocol. I have read, no doubt some of your Lordships have also read in so far as publicity has been given to them, the Reports of these two Committees. I have read the justification of their action given by the Chairmen of the two Committees, and I have read further the explanation of their attitude given by the noble and learned Lord and Mr. Henderson who represented His Majesty's late Government. Upon one point the noble and learned Lord made remarks which may be regarded and criticised differently, according to the point of view from which you approach the matter. The gist of his argument was this—that there is nothing in the Protocol inconsistent with the principles upon which the Covenant is based, that although it may be proved that in some respects they have travelled, if not outside, at any rate beyond the Covenant, there is no essential divergence between the two, and that in all such respects the Protocol is open to amendment, and I think he indicated that in his view it may be open to improvement. No doubt that can be argued, and, indeed, I believe it is true that if you look at the case from the point of view of principles, although principle itself is a thing very difficult to define, the principles underlying both the Covenant and the Protocol are identical —they are the prevention of war and the security of peace.

The noble and learned Lord will not deny also that in some respects—he mentioned, for instance, the institution of compulsory arbitration, the definition of aggressive action, the actual provisions with regard to the economic sanctions that it is proposed to a apply, the commitments that may be entailed upon the signatory Powers, the circumstances under which sanctions, if imposed, will in the future be withdrawn, the decision, a new one, in the future by the unanimous rather than by the majority vote of the Council of the League— he will not deny that in all these respects the Protocol goes a good deal beyond the Covenant. I suppose I may put it in this way, that whereas the Covenant was, whether accidentally or designedly I am not quite clear—I rather think designedly—rather fluid and elastic in its terms and provisions, you undoubtedly have if you look at the Protocol something much more rigid, much more precise, and, I suppose it might be argued therefore by those who may be critical of it, something in a way more dangerous. That is all that I have to say upon that aspect of the case, and I do not think that the noble Lord will feel that I am putting it unfairly in saying that which I have said.

The noble Lord asks us what is the attitude of His Majesty's Government. I am not quite certain whether it was before the noble Lord and his colleagues had left office that the Protocol was referred to the Departments and to the Committee of Imperial Defence. It had not yet been done? Obviously it would have had to be done, and I happen to have read the papers about the Protocol before it assumed its final form which had been drawn up by some of the Departments of Government, notably the Admiralty, in the time of the late Government. It was obviously the duty of His Majesty's present advisers when they came into power to take the opinions of the Departments, upon this question, and the whole of the papers were sent not merely to the fighting Departments—to the War Office, the Admiralty and the Air Ministry—but also, of course, to the Treasury and the Board of Trade, which are very much concerned with the sanctions, and, naturally, to the Foreign Office, to the Colonial Office, and, indeed, to every Department concerned. They were further subjected to a very close scrutiny by the chiefs of the various staffs. These papers have been submitted to the Committee of Imperial Defence, and we have already had a meeting, over which I had the honour to preside, to commence our examination of them.

The noble Lord will follow me if I here say two things. He himself, I think, indicated that the examination must be close and prolonged, and that the greatest circumspection must be applied, and one could easily, if this were doubted, demonstrate it, I think, in two ways. No one who listened to the noble and learned Lord could have failed to see that in this Protocol are involved vast questions affecting the whole future peace of the world. I put aside for the moment the question of its bearing upon out relations with France, although the whole question of French security is wrapped up in the Protocol, and it is for that reason that M. Briand, as the noble and learned Lord told us, signed it on behalf of his Government.

There is, in the first place, that question; and then there is the question upon which the noble and learned Lord dwelt for a few moments—that of America. He spoke in terms of some confidence about the attitude that he thought might conceivably be adopted by the American Government towards the Protocol, and the illustrations that he gave of his grounds for confidence were that, in certain respects which he named, America had lent, in respect of certain inquiries, definite and valuable assistance to the League. That is true, and I am sure that everybody would be hopeful that this attitude on their part did indicate an increasing sympathy. But I am not altogether sure, from what I have seen in the newspapers, that the attitude of the new American Administration or of the President who has just been elected is likely to differ very much from that of their predecessors.

In any case it surely is quite clear that above all things we must remember American opinion and the American attitude in this matter, and endeavour, whatever we do, to secure their sympathy in any project for making the League more effective or for rendering the Covenant itself more useful. That will take time. America is a country that does not wish and, indeed, will not consent to be hustled in a matter of this sort, and I can imagine that communications with that country will be both close and prolonged. And, apart from France and America, we have to remember our relations with the whole of the other signatory States, of whom the noble Lord told us, I think, that as many as sixteen have already signed the Protocol, and as to whom he thinks that a good many more will give in their signatures if they find that Great Britain gives it her support. All these matters require to be very carefully considered.

Then comes my second point, which is quite familiar to all the members of your Lordships' House—namely, our Dominions. We know the growing sense of self-reliance that is apparent in all the actions of our Dominions, and how sensitive they are about any action being taken by the Government at home, in matters affecting foreign affairs, in which they are not minutely consulted in advance. Indeed, we are under a pledge to them that no steps shall be taken in this matter until they have been formally consulted, and I think it not impossible, although no decision has been arrived at upon the point, that they may wish to be heard upon the matter before any final conclusion is arrived at.

All these considerations surely point to the fact that a good deal of time must elapse before it will be possible to give any definite reply to the Question which the noble and learned Lord has put upon the Paper—more time, I think, than the public appears to realise. I am rather surprised to see in the Press—I think I saw it this morning, and the noble Lord alluded to it—that it has been decided at the meeting that is now taking place in Rome that the Protocol will be discussed at the next meeting in March. March is not three months from now, and I feel rather doubtful in my own mind if our investigations, covering the wide area that I have attempted to describe, can possibly be completed by then. That, however, is a matter that rests with the future. For the moment I have only to ask the forbearance of the House and their comprehension of the vast importance of the subject and of the necessity of approaching it with the utmost circumspection and deliberation; and to express my personal thanks to the noble and learned Lord for having given us the very valuable and lucid exposition of his attitude and that of his colleagues at. Geneva in September last.

LORD PARMOOR

My Lords, I should like to thank the noble Marquess for the answer that he has given. I am in entire agreement with him as to the need of all the consideration to which he has referred. Indeed, those who feel, as I do, the extreme importance of the Protocol also feel the necessity of very full consideration by the various bodies to which he has referred. I find, ii I may say so, no objection whatever to his answer in that respect. I had seen the quotation in the newspapers, to which he referred, to the effect that the further consideration of the Protocol by the Council of the League had been postponed until March. I also thank the noble Marquess for his remarks upon another point. My desire in addressing your Lordships and in any public utterance that I make is merely to make as clear as I can what, at any rate in my view and in the view of the British Delegation, the Protocol really means. This is essential in relation to public opinion upon an important matter of this kind.

For instance, the noble Lord referred to certain papers from the Service Departments — the Secretary of State for War, and so on. All I ask about that is this: If the matter comes before the Committee of Imperial Defence, of which I understand the noble Marquess is Chairman, I hope that as a representative of the British Delegation it may be possible for me, or one of my colleagues, to give detailed information on certain points which could not be given in discussion in this House. I am satisfied from what I have been told that in some vital particulars there has been what I will call misunderstanding of what the provisions really mean.

The noble Marquess has referred to a holiday which is being contemplated by me, and contemplated with much satisfaction, but at the same time, as I have said before, if it is not impertinent to say so, all such knowledge as I have of the Protocol, particularly such as is derived from personal contact at Geneva, and which cannot be very well communicated by anybody else, is entirely at the disposal of the Government, not in any controversial spirit at all, because there ought to he no controversy in a matter of this kind, but in order to assist, if I can do so, in arriving at a right conclusion. That right conclusion I ardently hope will be approval of the Protocol in such a form that the International Conference, which is the ultimate step to be taken, may be held at no very distant date. I thank the noble Marquess again for the answer which he has given, and I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.