Lords Sitting of 9 May 1923

Preamble
The House met at a quarter before four of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
METROPOLITAN RAILWAY (VARIOUS POWERS) BILL.
Read 2a.
RENT RESTRICTIONS (NOTICES OF INCREASE) BILL.
Brought from the Commons; read 1a; and to be printed.

CURRENCY POLICY.
LORD VERNON LORD VERNON had given Notice to ask His Majesty's Government—

1. Whether they intend, in the near future, to hold the further inquiry into currency policy which is suggested in the latter part of paragraphs 1 and 41 of the interim Report of the Committee on Currency and Foreign Exchanges of 1918.

2. Whether they can make any statement of their future policy towards stabilisation of the internal value of the currency, for the guidance of local authorities and others in dealing with the consolidation of war bonuses and similar temporary financial arrangements.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, the first part of the Question on the Paper refers to the Committee which was set up towards the end of the war to inquire into the policy which should be followed in regard to currency and kindred matters after the conclusion of peace. The interim Report of that Committee, issued in August, 1918, was followed by a final Report at the end of 1919, which was nothing more or less than a confirmation of the interim Report. I will, therefore, refer only to the interim Report of August, 1918.
The policy recommended by the Committee was adopted by the Government of the day. So far as I know, it has never
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been repudiated either by the late Government or the present Government, and it is therefore to be supposed that it holds the field at the present time. That policy is generally described as one of deflation and its effects have been such as to produce general approval throughout the country, but that approval has not been entirely unmixed. Many economists and others have pointed out that it has had very detrimental effects upon trade and industry. It is only necessary to look at the writings of economists and the speeches of bankers during the last three or four years to see that this is the case. Take a definite case. The Chairman of the London Joint City and Midland Bank, speaking at the annual meeting last January, stated quite definitely that this policy was largely responsible for the present unemployment and he called attention to the effect of the Government policy in funding Floating Debt as a contributory cause.
But I am not concerned to-day either with the rights or wrongs of the policy of the last four years. What I do suggest is that there is sufficient doubt with regard to what has been done and what should be done in the future to warrant a further inquiry into this subject. There are, indeed, other reasons why this course should be adopted. In the first place, the conditions to-day could not have been foreseen, and obviously were not foreseen, by that Committee. They made their Reports in 1918 and 1919 and they could not have foreseen the extent of the breakdown in Russia or the extent of the breakdown in Central Europe. Further, they could not have foreseen the breakdown of the exchanges or the speculation in foreign currency which has made that breakdown much worse, and, finally, they could not have foreseen the long-drawn-out struggle over the question of Reparations.
It is only necessary to study the Report to see from its general tenor that this was the case. It is interesting to observe in the first paragraph of the Report a statement which shows how little the Committee foresaw the events which would take place after the war. They state that—
" A sound system of currency will, as is, shown in paragraphs 4 and 5, in itself secure equilibrium in these exchanges."
The Committee must have had in mind the view that other countries would

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adopt the same strict financial policy which has been adopted by this country and the United States and would attempt to restore their currency to pre-war value. We all know that that is not the case. It is perfectly clear that it takes two to make an exchange which will remain in a state of equilibrium. However correct our currency may be, if the currency of, say, Germany is inflated to the extent it is to-day, no corrective on our part will keep the exchange in a state of equilibrium.
I suggest that the Committee foresaw quite clearly that their recommendations were very temporary indeed. In the first part of their Report, in paragraph 1, they say:
" We have had in view the conditions which are likely to prevail during the ten years immediately following the end of the war, and we think that the whole subject should he again reviewed not later than the end of that period."
Only four and a half of those ten years have elapsed, but the financial conditions of Europe have become so extraordinary that I suggest that five years should be substituted for ten years. That is not unreasonable in view of the fact that the Committee make their ten years a maximum term. In addition, it will obviously take time for any inquiry which is set up to be carried through and a Report made, and it may easily be another six or twelve months before such a Report could be issued.
The other passage to which I call attention is in paragraph 41 of the Report, where they say—
" When the exchanges are working normally on the basis of a minimum reserve of £150.000,000 the position should again be reviewed in the light of the dimensions of the fiduciary issue as it then exists."
Those conditions, of course, are not yet fulfilled, but they are not far from being fulfilled. The exchange with the United States of America is not so far from par as, and the reserve is considerably larger than, it was at the time the Report was made. It may well be that before any further inquiry and Report the conditions laid down would be fulfilled. There is another reason why I suggest that an inquiry should be held, and that is that the present level of prices in this country is more or less steady. We have been through the full cycle—a boom and rising prices followed by a slump and
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falling prices. For the last twelve months prices have been fairly steady. That is the moment when an inquiry should be held, if one is to be held; we should not wait until another large rise in prices takes place.
It may be the view of the Government that they have all the information that is necessary on this point and that therefore no further inquiry is desirable. That brings me to the second part of the Question on the Paper. If the Government hold that view, then I suggest that they ought to announce their policy. If they have decided on a policy of their own and do not intend to hold any further inquiry, they should announce their policy. The important aspect of the whole question is the effect on the level of prices in this country. Many noble Lords will remember the debate initiated by Lord D'Abernon in the autumn of 1919. That debate which lasted for some time clearly brought out the effect of currency on the question of prices, and a Return was made in accordance with the noble Lord's Motion showing the extent to which prices in all countries had followed the degree of currency inflation.
Everything that was then shown has been amply borne out in the last four years. Since then prices have continued to follow the degree of inflation or deflation in all countries. They have followed the downward course in this country and in America as faithfully as they followed the upward course of inflation during the war, and I believe it is a fact that this view is generally accepted to-day. Currency is, in fact, the primary cause determining the general level of prices in any country. But we can go further than that. I think it is also generally accepted that the one thing we need, in regard to that level of prices, is that it should be stable. Mr. McKenna, in the speech last January to which I have referred, stated this most emphatically.
In March last the present Chancellor of the Exchequer, in a speech at Liverpool, said exactly the same thing. He stated:
" By far the most important thing for any country to-day is to manage to have, if it can, stable prices."
Last week brought another ample confirmation of this view. Mr. Goodenough, the well known banker, delivered an address on "Currency and World Prices" before the Industrial Club of Chicago.

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I have not a cerbatim report of his speech, but I have the report in The Times, and I find that he stated the same thing quite clearly. He is reported to have said that—
" An abnormal rise of prices must tend to alter the conditions of life of every member of the community. It raised questions of the readjustment of wages and other labour conditions, through alterations of the cost of living, and it upset the fundamental basis of industry."
Those three authorities are, I suggest, sufficient to bear out my contention that it has become generally accepted that we should aim at getting a stable level of prices if possible. The words which I have just quoted from Mr. Goodenough's address emphasise the importance to everyone of this fact, in addition to the vital point that if affects to such a great degree wages agreements and agreements regarding salaries throughout the country.
That is the specific point which I have raised in the second part of the Question on the Paper. It is well known that the salaries and wages not only of Government employees but also of the employees of local authorities and of many private industries are regulated on a sliding scale based upon the cost of living. I do not know how long the year 1913 is to be treated as a magic year to which all figures of this kind are to be referred. I do not know how long it is expected that salaries shall vary every quarter throughout the year. But I imagine that this cannot go on indefinitely, and that the Government must have in view some definite date, or some definite period, when some form of stabilisation shall take place. It is hardly necessary to point out how disturbing it would be if we were to experience the same phenomenon as has been experienced in the United States during the last year. During the last eighteen months prices in the United States have risen by twenty-five per cent. Supposing that were to take place here. It is clear that the whole of the Government finances would be upset by the increase of salaries which would result and that the finances of the local authorities also would be upset, as well as those of private industry.
In this country, on the other hand, we have had during the last eighteen months a most remarkable stability in the level of prices. Taking wholesale prices, the maximum variation from the average is only five per cent., which is
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remarkably little. I hope that this reflects to some degree the policy of the Government—that this stability in prices is not accidental but is the definite result of policy on the part of the Government. But if that be the case it does represent to a certain extent a departure from previous practice, and I suggest that the people have a right to know what that departure is. It may be that a certain degree of co-operation will be required between this country and the United States if anything permanent is to be achieved along these lines, and I hope that His Majesty's Government may be able to state whether any arrangements either have been made or are in contemplation on this matter between this country and America.
I submit that there are three courses open to the Government in this matter. They can hold a further inquiry in the light of our experience of the last four years to re-examine the whole question; or they can decide upon their own policy and follow it, in which case I suggest that they should take the country into their confidence; or they can follow a third policy that of continuing the present uncertainty. Whatever else His Majesty's Government decide to do, I hope that this last course will not be adopted.
LORD HYLTON: My Lords, the noble Lord who has placed this Question on the Paper to-day prefaced his interesting remarks by referring to the Report that was presented in August, 1918, by the Committee on Currency and Foreign Exchanges, of which Lord Cunliffe was Chairman. The noble Lord is, of course, perfectly correct in saying that in August, 1918, before the war had come to a close, it was impossible for that Committee or for anybody else to foresee what would be the condition of affairs four and a half years after the war. But I think any of your Lordships who take the trouble to read through the interim Report of that Committee will be surprised to see, despite the great difficulty of forecasting the position of affairs three or four years after the war, how remarkably accurate in some respects were the judgments that were expressed by the members of that Committee.
In that Report the Committee stated that they had in view the conditions which were likely to prevail—naturally,

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they could not go further than that—during the ten years immediately following the end of the war, and they added—
"We think that the whole subject should be again reviewed not later than the end of that period."
Paragraph 41 of the Report, which was not, I think, quoted by the noble Lord and which deals with the amount of the gold reserve and the limit of the fiduciary issue, similarly speaks of a "review"—not necessarily a new Committee—" when the exchanges are working normally." Obviously, we have not yet reached this condition or anything resembling it. Indeed, until there is a settlement of Reparations we cannot even begin to see what the normal exchange position will be. It would be both contrary to the intention of the authors of the Cunliffe Report and in itself premature to hold a further inquiry at the present moment. Such, at least, is the opinion of His Majesty's Government.
With regard to the second part of the Question, the stabilisation of the internal value of the currency cannot be dealt with in isolation. When we return to a gold standard the external value of our currency will be bound up with the purchasing power of gold in the world's markets and the internal and external values will be mutually dependent. The problem of stablising the internal value of the £ will then merge in the larger question of stabilising the commodity value of gold. This can only be done by international co-operation among the bodies responsible for controlling credit in the countries in which a gold standard is effected; that is to say, among the central banks of issue. I may add that the policy of stabilisation cannot in any case do more than eliminate the purely monetary disturbances, and that there must always be changes in prices of particular commodities, resulting from changes in the underlying conditions of supply and demand.
Your Lordships, I am sure, will unanimously agree that production, good harvests, and world peace—all matters largely outside the Government policy—are bound to be most important elements in prices, and it is obviously impossible, to dogmatise or prophesy on such subjects. It would, of course, be possible to debate these subjects at very great length, as
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they involve many propositions on which there is acute controversy, even among the few experts who have really studied them, but I do not think that the Questions that have been put down by the noble Lord this afternoon are those that readily lend themselves to such prolonged debate. I can only recapitulate that it-is, in the view of the Government, entirely premature at present to set up a further inquiry into currency policy, and that, as regards the noble Lord's second Question, this matter is very largely governed by factors such as supply of and demand for commodities, which are outside Government control. In his concluding remarks the noble Lord made some reference, as I understood him, to the question of negotiations with the United States as regards finance. If the noble Lord will be good enough to put down a Question on that subject I will endeavour to answer him, but I am afraid that this afternoon it is out of my power to do so

VOCATIONAL TRAINING OF SOLDIERS.
LORD RAGLAN: My Lords, I wish to ask His Majesty's Government three Questions of which I have given Notice—namely,

1. Whether it is justifiable to expend Army funds in instructing soldiers in occupations which do not increase their military efficiency?

2. Whether it is possible in six months to teach a man sufficient of a skilled occupation to enable him to earn a livelihood?

3. Whether the necessity for such schemes would not be avoided if employment were guaranteed to discharged soldiers of good character in occupations calling for reliability rather than skill?

These Questions are largely based upon a statement made by the Under-Secretary for War in another place when introducing the Army Estimates.
I propose to ask leave to quote it. The Under-Secretary said:—
" We are making a start next month, at Catterick and Hounslow, with vocational training centres for instructors, who will go back to their units and pass on their instruction in bricklaying, upholstery, market gardening, and other trades which

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are useful in civil fife. Courses in the same subjects will also be given at the end of their engagements to selected men, to help them to start in industry after demobilisation, and in this way we hope to do something towards repaying the debt to the soldier, and removing the reproach of unemployment among so many who leave the Colours."
Now, I should first like to say one word as to the principle involved, which seems to me to be capable of considerable extension. I can imagine a member of a future Government getting up and saying something of this nature: "We are making a start next month in Fleet Street with vocational training centres for Cabinet Ministers, and in this way we hope to do something towards repaying the debt that we owe to Cabinet Ministers by removing the reproach of unemployment among so many who leave the Government."
As regards the general question, the Army, as your Lordships are aware, is now smaller than it has been for many years past, and is also considerably below establishment. In these circumstances it is important that it should be as highly trained as possible, and obviously if men are being trained as bricklayers and market gardeners, they cannot at the same time be instructed and trained as soldiers. I remember seeing, some years ago, a cartoon in which the British public was represented as attempting to repel invasion with the aid of footballs and cricket bats. It appears to me that a companion picture might now be drawn, in which the British Army would be depicted as attempting to repel invasion with trowels and garden rakes. But whether or not this scheme is detrimental to the efficiency of the Army, there is considerable doubt whether it, is beneficial to the individual. As your Lordships are aware, it takes many years to make a competent gardener, and even an efficient market gardener has great difficulty in making a living at the present time. It is the same with regard to bricklaying. I should like to know what attitude is adopted by the Bricklayers' Union towards these half-trained men. I understand that the Carpenters' Union refuses to admit them.
As to my third Question, it is well known that there are many industries requiring hundreds of thousands of men for which no previous special training is
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required. For some of these, ex-soldiers are peculiarly suitable; for instance policemen, omnibus conductors, ticket collectors, watchmen, and so forth, and it appears to me that this problem is to be solved by inducing employers of this class of labour to give a preference to ex-soldiers and not by this so-called "vocational training." If it is solved in this way it will not be detrimental to the efficiency of the Army, or expensive to the State.
THE EARL OF MAYO: My Lords, before the Government answers I should like to say something with regard to this subject. I think Lord Raglan has done a service to soldiers in introducing it. With regard to his first Question, I think it is quite justifiable to expend Army Funds in teaching soldiers, while in the Army, how to get a living when demobilized. When a soldier is demobilised he finds himself very often out of employment, but if he has been taught any trade whatsoever, whether that of a gardener or an omnibus driver or a carpenter, at all events he is fitted to take up some situation that may be offered to him. Therefore, with regard to Question 1, I do not agree with the noble Lord. I think it is most useful that soldiers should be educated out of Army Funds.
I come to another matter altogether in the Second Question on the Paper—namely, whether it is possible in six months to teach a man sufficient of a skilled occupation to enable him to earn his livelihood. No, it is not, and that I have proved myself with regard to a man who was absolutely disabled from shell shock, and who was in a most dreadful state. It was impossible to speak to the man without his trembling all over. Every effort was made by us in Ireland to help this man, who is an Englishman, and by degrees he got better. He was given fowls to take care of and work of that kind. Then, with great difficulty, we got him taken on as an assistant carpenter at the Duke of Leinster's place, and the whole man changed entirely. At first they would not grant the job for more than six months, but by means of pressure and exhortation he was kept on for twelve months. I have been employing the man, and he has turned out an excellent carpenter.

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Now I turn to the Question which I raised so long ago as 1917, the care of soldiers who were discharged from the Army and demobilised. I am speaking now not only of disabled soldiers, but of soldiers generally. There are several noble Lords present who took part in that debate. Lord Crawford, who was then Lord Privy Seal, addressed the House, and Lord Lansdowne and Lord Derby, both of whom are here to-day, also spoke. I cannot do better than quote what I said on that occasion. I urged the Government to do something to teach these men a trade before their discharge, and I added:
" I am sure your Lordships do not want to see these men after the war wandering about looking for work, or idling their time away as broken men at home. This is a matter of national importance, and it will come upon us all when the war is over. There are a great many disabled men in hospital, and it is no good blinking the fact that there and especially in convalescent homes they acquire habits of idleness which will be very hard to combat unless these institutions are beginning to train the men to a trade, or teach them some occupation."
What I was then emphasising was that these men should be dealt with before they were discharged from the Service. That was a long time ago, and something was done, but not much.
During the same debate, the noble Marquess, Lord Lansdowne, said this:
"I think the Pensions Department have done all that was in their power to make their scheme thoroughly attractive to the men concerned. I was given two day ago a copy of a leaflet which I have no doubt is founded upon the Warrant to which my noble friend. Lord Crawford, referred just now, in which, in the form of a catechism is given an enumeration of the terms which are now offered to disabled soldiers and sailors—
"'Q.—Who will pay the expenses of my being trained?
"'A.—All the expenses of your training will be paid by the Government.
"'Q.—How shall I manage to live without being trained?
"A.—An allowance of at least 27 s. a week during the training will be made. An additional 5s. a week for every week you have attended will be paid at the end of your training if you carry out the course.'"
Another question which was asked by Lord Lansdowne was whether the new Government scheme was being fully explained to the disabled soldiers and
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sailors while they were in hospital, and whether it was being properly carried out and by whom.
In July, 1917, I brought the matter up again, and drew the attention of His Majesty's Government to the arrangements then being made for the training of disabled soldiers, and moved for a Return of disabled soldiers, and all other soldiers who had been trained in the various areas in England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland. Lord Crawford answered me on that occasion, and I managed to get a Return of what was being done. That Return showed that, besides all the work that was being done by Lord Roberts' Memorial Workshops, and also at St. Dunstan's, there were 4,067 men in munitions. Of course, directly the war was over they found themselves in a blind alley, and the majority of the men were in munitions at that time.
As I brought the matter fully before the House so long ago I think my noble friend is entitled to a satisfactory answer to the points he has brought forward to-day. There are a great many soldiers, many of whom are disabled, who have no employment at all, and we must not forget—I do not think any of us do forget—what they went through during the war. I see many of them in Ireland, and there are, of course, a great many in this country. I certainly do not like to see soldiers, who have fought at the Front, grinding organs, singing songs, and playing bands in the streets. If these men had had the chance of being trained, as I humbly suggested nearly six years ago, they would not be wasting their time in this way; they would not have been put into munitions and left in the lurch when the war was over. I hope your Lordships will forgive me for having drawn attention to this subject again after so many years.
Old as I am the question comes very close home to me and to everybody as affecting this country. It also comes home to me with regard to our own men in Ireland, who, of course, will have to be dealt with after the troubles there are over. That is a very serious question, though I mention it by the way. Although I have said this, I hope the answer I shall receive will show- that the subject is now being well taken up and that the men are being trained, and trained while

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in the Army. That is what. I suggested long ago—that they should be trained while in the Army to fight the battle of life when they are demobilised.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (THE EARL OF DERBY): My Lords, I will answer the Questions of the noble Lord, Lord Raglan, as they stand on the Paper without dealing with those remarks of his of which I confess that I do not entirely see the point. Manual and vocational training is based on the recommendations of various Committees, the first of which considered the problem in 1877 and the others in 1883, 1895, 1906, 1914 and 1920. All were agreed that action was necessary towards the reinstatement of the ex-soldier in civil life, and that the best means of doing this was to increase his employability. It has been stated by my hon. friend the Under-Secretary in another place, that the manual and vocational training now being carried out will not only increase the employability of the soldier in civil life, but will also improve the standard of efficiency in certain technical military subjects by the co-ordination of hand and brain. It is also hoped that the scheme will provide skilled or semi-skilled tradesmen from the Reserve for the Army on mobilisation and will prove an aid to recruiting by providing better prospects for the ex-soldier after completing his service. Some of the Dominions are showing considerable interest in the scheme because they are realising that the Army in future will in this way be able to provide a, more suitable type of emigrant.
As to the second Question of the noble Lord, it is not intended to turn out a skilled man at the end of six months' training, nor is this possible except perhaps, in the case of men who have served in highly technical corps. The object is to train a man in the Army up to the "improver" standard so that he may be capable of earning a livelihood on discharge while continuing his technical education with a view to an increase of wages within a few years. The proof of a pudding is in the eating, and at Hounslow seventy per cent. of the students under instruction were on discharge found immediate employment as improvers to their trades. That in itself is, I think, a justification of the course we are pursuing.
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With regard 10 the third Question, of course if we could do as the noble Lord suggested, naturally we should like to be able to do it, but it is obviously impossible. We are doing all that we possibly can to induce employers to employ ex-soldiers and, I am glad to say, with very considerable success. But it is a thing that the War Office as a War Office cannot do. We must appeal to every individual in this country to help us in securing employment for discharged soldiers.
The Question of the noble Earl, as far as I understood it, seemed to me to have no application whatsoever to the subject now under discussion. The question of disabled discharged soldiers does not come, and I think rightly does not come, under the War Office. It is dealt with by the Ministry of Pensions, and any Question on the subject should be addressed to that Department.

LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND EDUCATION.
LORD VERNON: My Lords, I desire to ask His Majesty's Government the Question ou the Paper—namely, whether the Educational (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill will be introduced during the present Session; and whether it is intended to provide local education authorities with compulsory powers for closing schools in all cases where efficiency and economy would be increased by amalgamation.
It will be remembered that a Bill was introduced last year by the late Government which was known as the Economy (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill. That Bill contained certain clauses referring to education. In February last it was stated in another place that the educational clauses would be introduced as a separate Bill to be called the Educational (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill. What I desire to know, if the noble Marquess can tell me, is whether that Bill will be introduced during the present Session or whether it is more or less indefinitely postponed.
The latter part of my Question raises, perhaps, a rather more controversial topic because it deals with the effect of the dual system as it is at present applied in the elementary schools. This, of course, was

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a political issue before the war, but two things at least have changed since the days when it was a subject for argument. In the first place, the financial position of the country is very serious and economies are urgently required. In the second place, I think it is becoming more generally recognised everywhere that a higher standard of education throughout the country is desirable. From both points of view I hope that in the near future the Government intend to review this question. The present position is that no school with more than thirty scholars can be closed except by what amounts to local consent—consent on the part of the people of the district and of those concerned in the school.
In the first Report of what is usually known as the Geddes Committee it is stated, under the heading of the closing of small schools, that:—
" We are informed that a saving of £60,000 can be effected by closing schools below one hundred pupils in London and that an additional saving of £1412,500 in salaries might be made in urban areas outside London. The larger proportion of such schools are in rural areas and further savings should be possible there, but no attempt has been made to estimate such savings."
I do not think that any action has been taken on that recommendation of the Geddes Committee, but on those figures it would, I think, be surprising if the total saving throughout the country was less than £500,000 if a free hand was given to the local education authorities or the Ministry of Education or both to amalgamate schools where it was considered desirable.
In order to confirm these figures to a certain extent, I obtained recently from the Education Committee of the County of Derbyshire a report showing what would be the effect in that county if the compulsory amalgamation of schools was brought about. The figures are rather striking. It is stated in this report that the schools could be reduced from 373 to 339 or a reduction of 34 schools, that the departments could be reduced from 510 to 444 or a reduction of 56, and that the total estimated saving in this one county alone would be £23,000, which amounts to more than a penny rate in the county, and a corresponding saving to the Exchequer which would be in the neighbourhood of £10,000 I do not know whether Derbyshire is unique in this
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respect, though I do not suppose it is. If those figures are at all applicable to the, rest of the country, I suggest that the saving over the whole country would be a great deal larger than the £500,000 which I have mentioned, based on the Geddes figures, and might even run into seven figures. I would add that in this Report from the Derbyshire Education Commitee nothing is allowed for the saving on upkeep and repairs of school buildings which would, of course, become easier if the schools were concentrated in larger buildings.
Then there is the other aspect of the matter which is the efficiency of education. There, again, the Report is enlightening because it states that amalgamation would not be detrimental and that scholars from the smaller type of school would benefit by the better graded classes. It is well known to everybody that in a larger school with more scholars you can grade your classes better, and that each teacher is dealing with children who are more of one standard and, therefore, can teach them more efficiently. From that point of view there can be no question that it would be of advantage. Of course, the advantages are evident; and so is the objection. The objection arises almost entirely from the denominational question and the voluntary school. Local prejudice may come in to a slight extent as well, but the other is the main factor. I suggest that as the schools are being maintained to-day at an ever-increasing cost to the taxpayer and the ratepayer it is quite unreasonable for the denominations to expect the State and the ratepayer to subsidise any schools indefinitely, because they desire to keep them going on denominational grounds.
There are cases where you have two or three small schools in one village or small town doing work which should be done by one efficient school, and I submit that that is a state of affairs which ought to be brought to an end. The present system is, of course, merely a, compromise as a result of political controversy in the past. It is a very expensive compromise. It may have been justified before the war when we could well afford perhaps the small additional expense, but I suggest that if we could afford it then we certainly cannot afford it now. Whenever economy, in general, is suggested it is

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stated for the Government that you can only have economy at the expense of the efficiency of the service in question, that if you cut down the Army Vote, you will have a less efficient Army, and that if you cut down the Education Vote you will have less efficient education. But I believe that in this case you can secure considerable economy and at the same time actually improve the educational service. I contend that there is a strong case for some action by the Government.
THE MARQUESS OF BATH: My Lords, the answer to the noble Lord's Question on the Paper is that, having regard to the pressure of Parliamentary business, the Government do not propose to introduce during the present Session a general Bill containing miscellaneous provisions in regard to education. They hope, however, to introduce at an early date a Bill dealing solely with the incidence of the cost of education in public elementary schools of children in poor law and charitable institutions. I have also been asked since I came to the House to make it clear, as representing the predominant partner on this occasion, that this answer applies to education in Scotland.
This answer also, of course, really disposes of the second part of the noble Lord's Question, but in the course of his speech he has raised certain important considerations on which I should ask your Lordships' permission to make a few remarks. The noble Lord contemplates the entire repeal of the limit of numbers—practically the repeal of that portion of the Act of 1902 which relates to the voluntary schools—and also an amalgamation of schools which are not of the same denominational character. As he pointed out, if a school has fewer than thirty in attendance the Board of Education or the local authority have now the power compulsorily to close that school, provided that they think the school unnecessary having regard to the interests of secular instruction, to the wishes of the parents, and to the economy of the rates. I need not point out to your Lordships, with your experience, that economy of the rates points to the desirability of the closing of schools, the wishes of the parents are invariably against it, and the interests of secular instruction are frequently—I
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will not say invariably—served by the closing of small schools, but the noble Lord will bear in mind that by the Act of 1918 schools of the same denominational character in the same locality can be grouped together for the purposes both of efficiency and of economy, and since that Act was passed local authorities all over the country have, I believe, availed themselves very largely of its provisions. This grouping can be carried out without any regard to the limit of thirty which applies to the case of the closing of schools. If economy were the only consideration I certainly would not deny that as the matter now stands the position does constitute a certain impediment to economy. There are a number of existing schools with an average attendance of thirty which could be closed, and the children sent to some other school in the neighbourhood. It would save money, but it would be a cause of considerable inconvenience and annoyance. It is also true, I think, that a practice of this kind does load to the promotion of secular efficiency in education.
It is not very easy, as the noble Lord knows, to organise and carry on in a satisfactory way a school of very small dimensions. In large towns, as he also pointed out, even the limit of thirty is very small, and a school with that small attendance may be a cause of quite unnecessary expense, but in the country the position is different. There are many places where you could not carry on the education without the very small schools. The children would have to go long distances to school. There are obvious advantages in closing small schools, but I would point out that economy is not the only question. As the law now stands you can group schools belonging to the same denomination, and no alteration in the law would have much effect unless it provided that children of the Church of England schools could be compelled to go to a council school, or vice versa, or even children of the Roman Catholic persuasion compelled to attend a school with the principles of which they did not agree, and leave the school which has almost invariably been built at considerable sacrifice by members of their community. I think the change of children being taken from a council school and compelled to go to a

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denominational school would probably be as unsatisfactory to the champions of undenominational education as the reverse is to the advocates of denominational education. This question of the single school areas has long been recognised as one of the main grievances felt by many under the Act of 1902, and the effect of legislation such as the noble Lord has suggested would be to multiply very largely the number of these single school areas and intensify the grievance.
The system established by the Education Act must be regarded as a whole, in which the respective rights of the voluntary schools and the council schools were delicately adjusted. It is very difficult to embark on a readjustment of these rights without reopening the whole settlement, and the present is not a ripe moment for doing so. The case does not depend solely on the question of religious belief. Such an amendment as the noble Lord suggests would press very hardly on rural districts. In those districts the village school is very often the centre of the village life and the experience of the Board of Education has been that a village resents very bitterly being deprived of its school. In many cases an endowment has been given for the express object of providing a school in a particular place, thereby preventing the children of that district being compelled to go a long distance for their education. In those circumstances, naturally, people feel that if the school is closed they are deprived of something which is peculiarly their own.
This grievance is not entirely a sentimental one. Labourers are unwilling to go to places where there is no school, and farmers themselves complain that they are unable to secure labour for this reason. I suggest that any action which reduces the amenities of village life is greatly to be deplored. There is the question that the remoteness of the school to which children may be sent involves a real hardship. It is true that under present conditions they may be compelled to go three miles to school, but a daily walk of six and five miles, or even four miles, to and from school is not to be undertaken lightly by children of a tender age, and even when you are able to provide for their carriage to and from school their home life is affected because they are unable to return home at
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mid-day. The remarks I have ventured to make on behalf of the Board of Education are not intended to imply that no change in the law is desirable. I do suggest, however, that they point to the conclusion that the matter is one which is likely to arouse a good deal of controversy and that it cannot be settled except by general good will and all parties agreeing to a solution.
VISCOUNT HALDANE: My Lords, the remarks which the noble Marquess has just made prove one thing very conclusively, and that is that the Government would be very rash to imagine that it could pass such a Bill in the short time of the Session which now remains. It bristles with controversial questions. The noble Lord who has introduced the subject has certainly shown that there is a good deal to be done still; and the noble Marquess has not questioned it. As to the multiplicity of small schools it often amounts to an abuse. There are many cases in which you cannot get rid of the small school, but it is possible to convey children to school much more than is done in some parts of the country. In the part of the country where I live the children are regularly conveyed by motor when there is a distance to go to school, and that is much cheaper than having separate schools.
The real difficulty is not that there are many cases in which the small schools could be amalgamated, but that the problem is complicated by the question of denominationalism, and the noble Marquess has not given any indication that the Government intend to deal with it in this Parliament. I am not one of those who think that people will be content with Cowper-Temple religion in all the schools. Whether we agree or not, they have strong views on the point that you cannot compel them to send their children to be educated in a school where they do not like the religious atmosphere. On the other hand, it is equally absurd to think that we should have the division of schools into two grades, denominational and undenominational. In Scotland, as the noble Lord opposite knows, the question has been solved brevi manu by the people. We have taken the whole of the schools, whether Roman Catholic, Episcopalian or Presbyterian, and they are not allowed to educate or get any grants

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either from the taxes or the rates unless they submit to State inspection. That being done and the standards of the school being kept up and carefully watched, then they are free to teach anything they like in the way of religion. There are certain safeguards and qualifications, but they do not interfere with the liberty of having the denominational atmosphere that you like in the school. That is in what is supposed to be the most theological part of the United, Kingdom. It has worked very well and there has been no formidable objection to it.
It is for the Government to consider whether we are not working towards a stage when the whole policy might be taken up. No compromise on the religious question is possible. You must leave people the liberty to teach the religion which the parents wish in the schools. It may be absurd to think that it should be carried to the lengths it is, but it is equally absurd to think that Cowper-Temple religion should be treated as sufficient by people who hold strong views. The Scottish model may be a precedent, or it may be that some other way may be found, but until the Government does that I do not see how it is going to deal effectively with the question, and the noble Lord has done very well to bring it to the attention of Parliament.
THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY: My Lords, the discussion on this subject has taken a somewhat unexpected turn and I think I ought to say a few words. A great mistake would be made by anyone who supposed that the difficulties which attend any drastic policy with regard to the closing of very small schools are mainly due to denominational difficulties at this moment being acute. They are not. That is not the question which raises the principal difficulty now. At this moment the degree of divergence of opinion between those who have been the maintainers of the non-provided school system for years past and those who have objected to that system has much diminished, and the consultations constantly taking place between those for whom I may be regarded as the spokesman and those who represent other interests in our educational and religious life, show that the acuteness of the denominational difficulty, which undoubtedly loomed so large, is capable of
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being adjusted in a way that seemed improbable a little while ago. I am by no means prepared to admit that the difficulties in this matter are due to a narrow denominational view standing across the path of educational progress.
Other considerations have been pointed out to-night which have to be weighed in this matter, and which certainly have at least as much to do with it as any question of denominational views. Those of us who are familiar and are in touch day by day with the life of very rural parts of the country are aware that, however undesirable on purely educational grounds may be the maintenance of a very small school, it is often, in a hamlet, worth almost any effort to preserve something of the kind. It is the one influence, apart from very elementary material influences, which has some place in the life of the hamlet and its surroundings, and the man or woman—often it is an admirable woman—who is teaching in that school fills an exceedingly valuable place among the villagers to the general advantage of the community. There are quite other considerations than those mentioned to-night which should lead to a wise caution being shown in taking away schools from very small and isolated hamlets, where they have a place of their own and are doing work of their own of a very definite sort.
No one can realise better than I the educational disadvantages of a very small school. That goes without saying, and I need not enter into it now. No one teacher can take children from the ages of three to fourteen without immense difficulties arising in doing justice to all classes of pupils. The difficulties are immense, but they are capable of being overcome and I think that to a considerable degree they are being overcome. I am myself entirely in favour of a very considerable increase in the amalgamation of small schools, either by the process of transport which has been referred to, or in other ways. In this, as in many other matters, Scotland has set an admirable example, and if England were prepared to follow the course there suggested on the lines to which the noble and learned Viscount has just referred, a great many of the present acerbities and difficulties would be non-existent. The point which I rise to emphasise is that I should be very sorry indeed if this were regarded

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simply as a denominational question. I am quite certain that at this moment the difficulties which loomed large in this particular aspect of our educational system a few years ago are day by day diminishing, and are likely to diminish steadily in the coming months.
THE MARQUESS OF HUNTLY: My Lords, as I have been Chairman of an Education Committee in a strictly rural county for twenty years I should like to say a few words on this question. I fully endorse what has fallen from the most rev. Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury as to there being no denominational feeling or any obstacle of that kind to doing away with the small rural school. The opposition comes from every sect in the parish, particularly on the ground that they do not wish to lose facilities for the education of the children of the agricultural labourer. You cannot attempt to close a school for economical reasons or to amalgamate it with another without encountering the strongest opposition from everyone in the parish, chiefly on the ground that the one thing which the agricultural labourer asks before he hires out his services is whether there are adequate facilities in the neighbourhood for the education of his children. If you close these schools in the small rural parishes you absolutely exclude the children of the agricultural labourer from these facilities, and he does not come into the parish.
This question is not, however, a very difficult one, and I rather rejoice at the answer which the noble Marquess has given on behalf of the Government and at his indication of the lines upon which the Government are proceeding. We have found that there is not very much difficulty in dealing with the problem. Where we have found schools of thirty or forty children in a small parish, we have applied to the Board of Education to place such schools under the control of a non-certificated mistress and to send the younger children of the parish to such a school. It is possible to obtain such a teacher at a much smaller salary than we should have to give to a fully certificated teacher. We allow the younger children to be taught in that school by a non-certificated teacher, and we arrange for the conveyance of the older children to the nearest school which
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is fitted to receive them and to give them a higher type of education. We have done this in several instances, and we find that the cost of conveyance is much less than the higher salary that is paid to a certificated teacher, so that there is a great saving. If that plan is carefully thought out by local education committees I think a great deal can be done.
The noble Lord who opened this debate touched upon the question of towns, and asked why there should not be an amalgamation of schools in areas which have two or three schools where one would suffice. May I remind him of the obstacle to that process? It is the cost of building. You have at once to erect a larger school for the accommodation of the children attending the schools thus amalgamated, and the difficulty is prohibitive. That is why the Act of 1918 is practically a dead letter so far as continuation schools are concerned. It is due to the enormous cost of the building which would be entailed by carrying out that Act. I assure your Lordships that, as the most rev. Primate has said, it is not denominational feeling that is preventing the abolition of the small schools, but the feeling in agricultural districts that we should maintain facilities for the education of the labourers' children and give them the best teaching that can be, obtained. I hops that we shall never see a movement to do away with the small parish school, which is really the one educational influence to which every inhabitant of the parish looks.
LORD VERNON: My Lords, I desire to thank the noble Marquess for his very full statement in reply to my Question. I would only like to add that I never suggested, and I do not think anyone would suggest, that schools should be done away with in villages where they are really necessary and are the centre of the village life, or where this would necessitate children walking a long way in order to obtain their education. That was never my suggestion, but there are cases in which you have a parish with three schools where one school would suffice with a very slight alteration, and without re-building or building an entirely new school. It is in that kind of case that I suggest that gross wastage is going on. The noble Lord who spoke last stated that amalgamation would not save money in the towns, but that certainly was not the opinion of the

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Gaddes Committee, whom I quoted, and who estimated that the saving on salaries alone would be £142,000 in areas outside London.

AIR POLICY.
THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD had placed the following Notice on the Order Paper:—
To ask His Majesty's Government what information they have as to the construction of aircraft in Germany—

1. For military and naval purposes;

2. For commercial purposes;

and to ask what is the policy of the Government in relation to the standard of air strength which the security of this country requires.
The noble Earl said: My Lords, some weeks ago I introduced the topic which is the general subject-matter of my present Question to the attention of your Lordships, and in the course of the discussion which then took place some reference was made to the rate of aircraft construction in Europe generally, and more particularly in Germany. I was at that time unprovided with any very definite information upon that subject—with none, indeed, that was definite enough to entitle me to make any statements of fact to your Lordships—and I indicated in the course of that discussion that I should accordingly take an opportunity of asking the Air Ministry, and the Government, whether they were in a position to give us authoritative information as to the ratio of that construction in Germany. I have put down that Question to-day in the terms which appear on the Paper.
I propose, if I may, to deal quite shortly with the two branches of my Question, and I wish, in the first place, to make it clear to-day, as I attempted to make it clear a month or two months ago, that this is not a question of delinquency or alleged delinquency of any kind on the part of the Government. If any Government was to blame for this matter it was the Government of which I myself was a member, because unquestionably the four critical years were the years which followed upon the Armistice. On the day that the Armistice was adopted we had in this country
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an Air Force which was not surpassed by any Air Force in the world, whether you examined its technical equipment or the heroic qualities of those who were its pilots and its observers, and in material strength and resource it challenged comparison with the Air Force of any country of those which either for or against us had taken part in that stupendous struggle.
In every field of military preparation it has been the habit of this country, inveterate, incorrigible, to refuse always to anticipate those crises which experience and the study of history have, none the lees, taught us over long periods to be inevitably recurrent. It has never been possible, and I do not, for one, think it ever will be possible, to persuade the people of this country to prepare beforehand for great struggles and great military disturbances. They do not believe they are going to happen. They disbelieve every one who tells them that such a thing is going to happen. They disbelieved, in the five fatal years which immediately preceded the crisis of 1914, every one who predicted that a world struggle was going to arise, and, disbelieving, they naturally declined to make great military preparations. It is equally true of this people, and true throughout its whole history, that when the outbreak of these world convulsions has involved us in stupendous preparations of every sort, the moment the crisis is over they immediately resolve that no other is likely to arise. Therefore all our past military preparations were, at the earliest possible moment, abandoned.
I think, because I was a responsible member of the Government, that they were rightly and necessarily abandoned, having regard to all the circumstances in which we at that time were involved, and all the anxieties which beset the nation, economical, political, and a hundred others. But the one fact emerges at once, that, with a swiftness only comparable to the swiftness with which we had assembled those great armaments, we dispersed and dissipated them. The American nation, under the stimulus of somewhat different but still comparable motives, took the same course, and the American armaments disappeared not quite but almost as rapidly as our own did. Now this may have been necessary, or it may not, but do not let us delude ourselves for one moment as

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to the gravity of the circumstance. The circumstance was that our power, and indeed the power of the American nation, had they still been adhering to the settlement at Versailles, would not have been comparable to the power of the other great nations whose political conditions made it possible for them to contemplate with composure the maintenance of those great armaments over the important years in which the decisions reached in Paris were to be made effective.
With the disappearance of our military forces, the complete dissipation of those Armies of millions which had contributed so much to win the war, came the disappearance of our Air Force. In many ways that was far more serious than the disappearance of our military strength, because we had, after all, faced hundreds of years of insular life with the security of our Navy, and only protecting ourselves upon the military side by a small but extraordinarily competent professional Army. Therefore there was nothing specially alarming about the reversion to those precautional standards which our ancestors had thought adequate, and which experience had, on the whole, proved to be not incommensurate with our national necessities; but, of course, there had emerged in the last twelve or fourteen years, what had been most vividly illustrated in the events of the war, the fact that an immense and incalculable permanent change had taken place in those conditions which are vital and fundamental, and upon which the security and very existence of this country depends: in other words, it had become clear, beyond a doubt, that it was no longer possible to estimate the security of this country in military or naval terms, but that there had arrived a third term—namely, that of an aerial security.
Involved in that question there is involved everything which for so many years was rightly treated as fundamental by successive Governments in discussions about the Navy. We were content for all those years with an Army which scarcely counted in comparison with the vast professional Armies of Europe. We were content with that because the moment you brought the matter back to the vital point of security, we were always able to
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comfort ourselves with the reflection that we had a Navy, which in those happy and secure days we used to speak of as a Navy which was of the two-Power standard; in other words, we were content with the security that our Navy was equal to the Navies of any other two Powers in the world. The air menace at that time had not arisen. We could afford to be indifferent to military inferiority, because in regard to that which was vital to our existence and to our successful defence we were in a position so strong.
There has emerged this new danger, and I do not think that the nation has even yet accustomed itself to the new standards which are imposed on us unless we are prepared to be content with a standard of security which would have been swept away with national derision and contempt because of its gross inadequacy in days when we measured our security in terms of navies. And yet cannot we afford to adopt any different standard? Can we justify ourselves before the nation if we are compelled to say to them that there exists a Power—however friendly to us that Power may be—against which we are in a position of inferiority so striking that defence would almost be impossible.
These matters require to be treated, and they must be treated, with the greatest possible delicacy, and with a sense of great responsibility. I desire to approach the consideration of this question in that spirit. The maintenance of the maximum degree of friendship with the French nation, by whose side we suffered so much, with whose aid we asserted consequences and decisions so vital to civilisation, is dear to the heart of every Englishman. There is hardly any sacrifice consistent with our elementary conception of our duty to our own nationals which we would not make in order to maintain that friendship. But this observation must be made, and may be made without violating the conditions which I have laid down, that history has shown that enmities are not unappeasable, and that friendships are-not unestrangeable. And it has been the policy of our ancestors now for hundreds of years that we should claim to ourselves, with the utmost courtesy of language, with the most constant avoidance of anything in speech or in act that is

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provocative, the right to undertake the duty, which we owe to our own citizens, against any conceivable contingency, however unlikely politically that contingency may seem at the moment, of guaranteeing to the citizens of this country the most complete and absolute security.
How do we stand? I have before me the answer which the noble Duke, who so well represents the Air Ministry in this House, gave me on March 21, 1923. I asked the noble Duke what were the relative air strengths of this country and of France, and your Lordships will forgive me if I remind you of the figures. The noble Duke said that my figures for British machines were quite correct; that is to say, that we have 34 squadrons and 395 machines; while the French figures were 140 squadrons and 1,260 machines. I do not here examine the exact distribution of these squadrons, because, though an important topic, it is a secondary one. Nor will that examination, I think, give great comfort to those who are concerned with the security of these Islands against all foreseeable and unforeseeable contingencies, because, owing to circumstances which are well within the knowledge of your Lordships, a great number of the British squadrons have been diverted from what would in normal circumstances be their primary duty, namely, the protection of the shores of this country. It must be plain that that disproportion in the air strengths of two neighbouring countries, however friendly the relationship between those countries, is so alarming that no Government can allow it to continue.
The subject is, as I am aware, at the present moment under the consideration of a Committee over which, I understand, the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, presides, and it is no part of my purpose to-night, even if I were successful—which I should be unlikely to be—to ask him to anticipate in any way the very important deliberations, discussions, and decisions which, for all I know, may be taking place even at the present moment. And if the noble Marquess, when he speaks on behalf of the Government, informs me that it is premature at this moment to ask for a statement of the policy of the Government in relation to the standard of air strength I, for one, should be the last man in the world to make any complaint
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of such an answer. My purpose is by every means in my power to persuade your Lordships and to persuade our fellow countrymen, through such publicity as this debate gains, that this problem of air defence is, in the years that lie in front of us and for which we are responsible as trustees and custodians of the safety of this country, to be as vital a question as the strength of the Navy was to those who preceded us in Parliament in the last thirty years.
I have been trying, in the course of the last two months, to retrace the important days in which this matter was discussed when I was in office in the late Government. I have referred to such small records as I kept in a busy Ministerial career of my part in them, and I discover that I sat as a member of a Cabinet Committee—I am not going to involve myself, I hope, in any violation of old or new rules—a Cabinet Committee which was appointed to intermediate (if I may use the expression) between the Geddes Report and the different combatant Services. I did something, as others of my colleagues who sat with me did something, to mitigate the effect of the Geddes recommendations in relation to the Air Force. Looking back upon those days it is only fair to say—as, indeed, it is fair to the present Government to say—that we were in an extremely difficult situation in relation to the general finance of the country. The cry for economy was universal, the weight behind the Geddes Committee was overwhelming and irresistible; and it is also true that at that moment it had not been sufficiently realised—nor do I think it had, in fact, clearly emerged—how great was the force that was being built up in a neighbouring country, and how tenacious, as far as we can judge, is the intention of maintaining and preserving that as a great and permanent force. All those things were, perhaps, not fully realised. But I still clearly recall that we did mitigate the recommendations of the Geddes Committee. I think that if we had been more fully informed, and if I had been more fully informed at the time, I should have been disposed to go even further. But this I clearly recollect, that the full publication of the relative contemporary air strength of the two Powers was not made to the Cabinet for some weeks after this discussion took place.
I am not going into this comparatively ancient history in order to attempt any particular justification either of myself or of my colleagues, but if I were putting this matter forward in a combative spirit I should certainly prepare myself much more fully to reply to the kind of attack which might reasonably be invited by such an attitude. My intention is a very different one. My intention is not to make it harder, but to make it easier, for the Government to take the steps which I am certain to-day are insistently expected and in a year will be most vehemently demanded by the country. I read with the deepest interest a speech which the Air Minister made a few days ago in which he stated plainly that the air strength of this country was not great enough for its protection and for its security. That statement made it evident that the matter was being considered by the Government and that the Government had already formed the interlocutory conclusion that some reinforcement of that strength was desirable. The purpose of my remarks to-night is to make it plain, so far as I can, that having reached the conclusion that we are not strong enough, you must reach some standard. It was always necessary in the old naval days to reach a standard. That standard varied, and reasonably varied, with the contemporary position of international politics. But unless there is a standard no construction upon principle can take place, and no Government and no Department knows where it stands, and no technical adviser knows where he stands.
Now, I presumed to say when I raised this Question on March 21 in the present year, that only one standard would ultimately and on mature deliberation be found acceptable to the people of this country, and I am still bold enough to re-state that conclusion very confidently. I do not believe that the people of this country can be content, or ought to be content, with any strength in the air which is less than that of a one-Power standard. I most deeply hope that economic reflections arising in other bosoms will lead to the conclusion in other countries that nothing is to be gained but everything is to be lost by involving us again in competition through the decades that lie in front of us with the air strengths of nations who find it necessary to maintain immense offensive
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and defensive armaments in the air. I profoundly hope that wiser counsels will prevail and that saner conclusions will be adopted.
But if they are not, what course do we intend to adopt? Upon what principle can it be said that we can or ought to be content with less than a one-Power standard? Throughout the ages we have been protected by the fact that we are an island. That insularity is destroyed in face of the air menace, and we can protect ourselves, and can protect ourselves only on the most modest margin of security if we are able to say to those for whose safety and protection we are responsible that we are as strong in the air as any other country. I am not blind—how could I be?—to the economic considerations that are involved. I know perfectly well of the need of sustained and even of added economies; but it is not, and it cannot be, an economy that this country should at any moment be insecure, and the premium of insurance, grave as it may be, inconvenient as it may be at the moment of its incidence, is small indeed in relation to the treasured wealth which even after the war is represented by the possessions and the material possessions of this country.
I asked the special Question about Germany because I desired to have it made plain whether there was any such formidable menace in the centre of Europe as an alarmist section of the Press has attempted at intervals to convey. I have read statements which have appeared in certain papers to the effect that there was an immense, an almost feverish construction of aircraft taking place both in Germany and in Russia under the guidance of German artificers. All the information available to me as a private member of your Lordships' House was in the other direction. I had some sources of information open to me which, though not, of course, official, seemed to me to be reliable, and it was with the object of eliciting the views of the Government that I placed this Question on the Paper. Its significance and its relevance must neither be mistaken nor under-rated. If it be the fact that the German nation has studiously complied with its obligations and limitations under the Treaty of Versailles, if it be the fact that there is to-day proceeding in Europe no great programme of aerial construction, then once again one must re-examine the existing

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European situation, and the result of that re-examination with that added knowledge cannot, I think, be such as to lead us to be more content with the figures which I have already explained to your Lordships.
I have taken the responsibility of introducing this subject again because I feel deeply about it. I have done it, I hope, without offending any legitimate susceptibility, and my object will have been attained if I have directed some degree of further public attention to a matter which I regard as so grave. I have already made if, plain that I shall entertain no grievance at all if I am told by the noble Marquess who replies to this Question that the matters under discussion are at this moment being considered by the Cabinet and that at some future date a statement of policy may be made.
VISCOUNT HALDANE: My Lords, I am in substantial agreement with what has been said by the noble and learned Earl, but before the noble Marquess the Deputy Leader of the House makes his reply there are one or two sentences which I should like to add. I wish to say to your Lordships that it is not enough to take the gross numbers that foreign Powers have in measuring what you require for security against invasion by the air. Aeroplanes in their numbers are, after all, what the mathematicians call functions of the infantry forces of the country, and if a country has very large infantry forces they may have more aeroplanes than countries which have smaller infantry forces. But there is also what the mathematicians call a constant, and that is a force which any foreign Power has available for a hostile expedition in the air against this country, and that, I entirely agree, requires a premium of insurance to be paid. You must be in a position to cope with any attempt on your security. If you are not, even although war may not be likely you will find it very expensive to have failed, and for this reason. Foreign Chancellories will know your weak spot and you will find your difficulty, in diplomatic negotiations. It will put you to expense, to embarrassment, and to inconvenience. For that reason I agree that it is right that we should have a proper home defence force against air attack.
I do not think the noble Earl had much occasion to apologise, if he did apologise, for the action of the
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late Government in pulling down the Air Force that was. Nor do I blame the present Government for slowness in bringing up the Air Force to a proper standard. Both situations gave rise to very great difficulty. Our Air Force is a matter in regard to which we were behind, and that was partly the blame of the Government to which I belonged at a still earlier stage. Our Air Force was only slightly brought into existence, and in the course of the war we improvised, as the noble and learned Earl has said, with wonderful national energy and skill, but we improvised the Force for the purpose for which it was required—that is, we improvised it for dealing with an invasion from Germany by air, and also for dealing with the military situations on the Continent and elsewhere. These improvisations were admirable for the specific purposes for which they were demanded, but they did not afford a basis on which the Air Force in time of peace, in a permanent form, could rest.
That is the problem with which the present Government have to deal. It is a very difficult problem. It is a problem that takes time to solve, and, above all, one which requires—what is always the foundation of any permanent service of this kind—mind in the preparation of the Force; in other words, it requires a first-rate staff. What I should like to hear is that the Government are concentrating, in the first place, on building up an able first-rate Air Staff—the best Air Staff that the country can produce. I know that seems difficult when so few officers, comparatively, have been trained for the Air Service, but a great deal of the foundation for staff work in the Air is the foundation which is equally familiar in the Army and in the Navy. There are admirable officers in both of those Services who could be brought into the service of the Air Ministry, making it as completely a separate Ministry as you like, and added to the Air Staff. I do not want to say anything dogmatic on this matter. I know there are considerations which have to be entertained before an answer can be given about it, but if it can be done I am pretty sure that when you have got your staff you will be in a position to know the kind of Expeditionary Force that can be brought against you from any foreign country. When that is done you

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know what is the best line on which to build the strictly limited and not very large Air Force required to counteract any invading force. The question of expense has been referred to, but I think this is a vital expenditure, and if it is not met we shall lose by it and not save money.
I wish, in conclusion, to say this. I read in the newspapers and in the proceedings of Parliament of a proposal to spend £9,000,000 on naval works at Singapore. I am not going to discuss that. It may be a most desirable thing to do. You may require it because of the new naval distribution, but to begin such an expenditure and pass by the much more pressing expenditure required for a small Air Force for the defence of the country seems to me insanity. It is looking at things only partially and from a particular point of view. There is far more urgency in putting the Air Force right than there is in spending large sums in the East. We have to spend large sums in the East—I am not making any question about that at the present moment—but what I wish to say is that the Air Force comes first. I should be glad to hear, if it is in contemplation to spend vast sums in Singapore or anywhere else, that that expenditure will not be allowed to progress far before the prior and necessary claim of the defence of this country from attacks by air is taken in hand. That is what I wish to urge, and I hope that the noble Marquess will, if possible, reassure us on that point.
THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY): My Lords, I feel some reluctance in rising, in place of my noble friend, the Duke of Sutherland, who is the responsible Minister for the Air Department in your Lordships' House, to answer the Question of the noble and learned Earl. I can only say that in the technical matters with which I desire to deal in a very few words I have been very much beholden to my noble friend for his assistance in preparing my observations. I stand in his place because, as the noble and learned Earl has reminded your Lordships, I happen to be at this moment Chairman of a very important Committee that is inquiring into the subject which your Lordships are now discussing, and, therefore, it was thought more appropriate that I should reply.
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I should like, in the first place, to recognise the tone in which the noble and learned Earl has addressed himself to this subject. He has deprecated anything like recrimination as to responsibility for the situation of the Air Force, and I shall certainly imitate him in that respect, but it is necessary to say that whatever may have been the reason, good, bad or indifferent, which led the late Government to their decision in regard to the Air Force at the moment of demobilisation to which the noble and learned Earl has referred, the difficulty for us remains the same. We have found a situation where, as he has described it, the country has been deprived of the wonderful Air Force which it had at the close of the war, and we have been obliged to apply ourselves to a situation which requires very extensive remedying. The House therefore will realise that it is not our fault that the situation exists, and will give us all the consideration that is due in our efforts.
If I may I will deal at the outset with the noble Earl's specific Question about Germany, and I will read to him a few words containing the information necessary to answer that part of his speech. Germany is forbidden by Article 198 of the Treaty of Versailles from possessing any naval or military Air Force, and by the Nine Rules that were drawn up by the Commission Militaire Alliée from constructing any machine, civil or military, that have a substantial value for military purposes. From the information at the disposal of His Majesty's Government, there is no reason to suppose that the German Government is contravening either Article 198 of the Treaty or the Nine Rules. It seems, however, to be the case that the German aircraft industry is being to some extent developed outside Germany.
As to the second part of the Question, there are at present in use in Germany 111 commercial machines of 30 different types, 84 of these being old type military machines. These 111 machines are being used on the following lines:—The Aero Lloyd and the Junkers. The commercial machines in course of construction all comply with the Nine Rules, with the exception of the airship which is being built in Germany for the Government of the U.S.A.

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That is the specific answer as to Germany, but, of course, the more important part of the noble and learned Earl's Question has to do with the provision of aircraft in this country. His Question as printed on the Paper speaks of a standard, and he recognised that it-was quite possible that in my reply I should say that to make a statement about any standard was premature at the moment. That is so. It is premature, and I ask your Lordships not to press me to make it now. I hope on that point, and on other points as well, that I, or someone on behalf of His Majesty's Government, shall be able at no distant day, either here or in another place, to go a great deal further, but at this moment we have hardly arrived at a stage in our deliberations in the Committee which enables me to go that length. I will bear in mind the observations of the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Haldane, especially on the necessity of an adequate Air Staff, with which, of course. I entirely agree.
The noble and learned Earl's remarks were directed to a comparison between our strength and the strength of another friendly Power, and undoubtedly the air strength of any Power, friendly or otherwise, must react upon ourselves. We must have regard to that strength by whatever Power it is wielded. I should be very sorry indeed if there was any idea that we were creating our Air Force because of any threat of aggression from that great friendly Power. We remain, of course, friends with France. As I ventured to tell your Lordships on the last occasion when this question was under discussion, your Lordships will realise that it is not quite fair to criticise the French for the creation of their Air Force. After all, the condition of Europe is still one of great tension and unrest, and no one has a right to complain when a Power placed as France is placed thinks it right to create what appears to be day by day the kind of force which is of increasing importance in the defence of any country. Having regard to her very natural desire to exercise every precaution which a country is called upon to exercise, it would be quite wrong to criticise France for having created so important an Air Force.
We must avoid, if we can, any reversal to that terrible competition in armaments
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which the noble and learned Earl himself deprecated in his speech. We must, of course, do what is necessary; but let us hope that the good sense of European statesmen will find some way of avoiding that suicidal competition in armaments, which is pure waste from the point of view of the prosperity of a people, and which only leads, ultimately, to a temptation to war with all the horrors with which we are, unfortunately, so well acquainted.
So far as the present Government are concerned we have lost no time. My right hon. friend, the Air Minister, devoted his attention to the necessary increase in our Air Force within a very few days of taking office. It was, as it naturally would be, his first task. And let me also point this out. We are very anxious in whatever we do to carry public opinion with us. It would have been very easy for the Government to have said as little as possible about the subject. They were not called upon to make that spontaneous declaration which my right hon. friend made when ho introduced the Air Estimates a few weeks ago, but after very careful consideration with his colleagues he came to the conclusion that it was necessary to take the country entirely into the confidence of the Government so that the country might know exactly what was in front of it. I am sure your Lordships and public opinion will do us justice in this matter. It is an earnest that we are not going to neglect a matter which we could have concealed, but which we made no attempt to conceal, because we wanted public opinion behind us.
The Air Estimates provide, as it is, for a certain increase. Eighteen squadrons are provided for in the Estimates now before Parliament, and they will be pushed on with all due despatch. Broadly speaking, no greater haste could have been made in the provision of air strength, working to the ordinary normal rules which prevail in time of peace. No doubt you can make tremendous increases when working as noble Lords did during the war, but that is quite unnecessary in peace, and working to the ordinary normal rules which prevail in peace time no more could have been done than has been done. As I have explained, my right hon. friend has provided in his Estimates, at any rate for this beginning of an increase in the Air Force.

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At the same time the Government appointed the Committee which has been so often mentioned in the discussion this afternoon. Since I last had the honour of addressing your Lordships that Committee has sat continuously. It is divided into two branches, but taking both branches together we have had sixteen sittings since the subject was last discussed in your Lordships' House, any number of memoranda have been prepared and witnesses have been heard. The matter has not been neglected. We have dealt with every part of the subject—the development of aircraft, the range of aircraft, and the personnel, what the relations should be with the Navy, and last of all, and most important of all, what the total strength of the Air Force ought to be. That is what we have done. A final conclusion has not been come to;
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that would be premature. But the Cabinet has come to this conclusion: that they think a considerable increase in the Air Force will be necessary. I can assure your Lordships that whatever is necessary the Government will do their best to supply. We shall come frankly to Parliament and frankly to the country and tell them what are the results of our deliberations, which we have done our utmost to make fruitful with all the talent and experience which the permanent Service of this country affords us. When we have come to our conclusions we shall come to Parliament and ask Parliament to support us in whatever may be necessary.
House adjourned at ten minutes past six o'clock.