THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER.

HL Deb 03 May 1923 vol 53 cc1091-112

LORD MONTAGU OF BEAULIEU had given Notice to call attention to the recent policy of the Government of India on the North-West frontier of India, and to ask if any information can be given in reference to the recent construction of roads parallel to the frontier; and to move for Papers.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, at this late hour I do not propose to detain the House very long, although this is a subject which is certainly very important both to this country and to India. About two years ago we had a debate in this House on very much the same lines as those indicated in the Motion which I have put down, but much has happened since that time. The policy of road making on the frontier has progressed considerably, and already part of the programme for which I appealed in May, 1921, has been carried out. In addition there have been several changes in the institutions of representative government in India, and there has also been a considerable alteration in the military forces on the frontier.

I should be the last person to deny that there has been, generally speaking, an improvement in the military situation. Raids have not been so numerous as they used to be, and already I think I see welcome signs of an improvement, due largely to this policy of road making and of thereby increasing the mobility of our troops. But we must never forget that the frontier embraces a vast tract of country, and that the frontier is still inhabited in a great part by wild and lawless tribes, many of them extremely well armed—in fact, a large proportion of them are armed with modern rifles. Since the last war a large proportion of these tribes have obtained large quantities of ammunition as well. In the old days when we had to resist tribal attacks, the proportion of accurate rifles in the hands of the tribesmen was comparatively small, and their ammunition was to a large extent made in the locality, instead of being stolen from us, as it is to-day, or brought from outside by illicit methods.

Consequently, whatever we do on the frontier, I think the Secretary of State for India will agree with me that this region still presents a problem which has to be dealt with year by year, and that we cannot afford to relax our efforts either to maintain our own position there or to improve our mobility. In fact, our position might become very serious if, as might easily happen in the future, the tribes were at any time to combine with a power like Afganistan, and to take the opportunity of a quarrel between our selves and Afghanistan to fall upon us and to interfere with our troops on the frontier. It must never be forgotten that, although these tribes on the frontier have very often taken up a hostile attitude towards Afghanistan, they are always likely, at any rate in the neighbourhood of Kabul, to side with the forces of Afghanistan rather than with ourselves.

Besides the actual strength of our forces on the frontier there is another point to be considered. Prestige counts for a great deal on the frontier, and if we weaken our forces too far, even in the good cause of economy, as has been suggested by Lord Incheape in his very able Report, it may only result in a critical position arising which will require more troops eventually. I understand that so far the tendency is not so much towards economising troops as towards cutting down the expenditure connected with those troops, such as expenditure on mechanical transport, about which I shall have something to say later. It is no use having these new lateral roads on the frontier unless you have sufficient mechanical transport to convey your troops along them from the base depots.

In former days we had transport and no roads; to-day, it looks as if we are going to have roads and no transport, and I appeal to the Secretary of State for India to hold his hand, or at any rate to consider very carefully before he reduces mechanical transport too far, and to remember that without mechanical transport on the frontier our mobility will be very seriously affected. I fully admit—in fact, I have said so on more than one occasion in this House and out of it—that there may be a case for economising very seriously in the matter of animal transport., and I agree that, where you have mechanical transport it, is not necessary to have the same amount of animal transport. In other words, you can cut down your mules, camels and, to a certain extent, ponies, and so on, if you replace them with motor vehicles.

We have along this frontier five great salients which reach up into enemy country, and which were until quite lately without any inter-connecting roads, and I remember that in the days of Lord Hardinge and Lord Chelmsford—to both of whom I am indebted for the very great interest which they took in this subject when I was an officer of the Government in India—the lack of lateral roads was always being brought to our notice. These five great salients are the Malakand, the Khyber, the Kurram Valley and road to Parachinar, the Tochi Valley and the Valley of the Zam to Jandoia, and the Gomal into the Mahsud country. All these salients are extremely vulnerable, for the tribes keep on the hilltops, while our roads and bases are in the valleys.

Hitherto, when an attack has been made on a convoy or body of troops on a road running up these valleys, it has been very difficult to relieve them except by sending up more troops from the base. Further, when raids have occurred the raiders have been able to escape into the wild country between these valleys, and we have never had a chance of cutting them off. I am delighted to see that, so far as I can gather from documents which have been sent to me and from general information which I gathered in India last year, the lateral roads already made are answering their purpose well. The lateral road which has been made or is under construction from Thal in the North by Spinwan to Edak, and thence by Razmak to Jandola and back by Khirghi to Tank and Dera Ismail Khan, will, when it is completed as a first-class road, be extremely valuable in dealing with raids.

There is another point which I would urge upon the Secretary of State. I am quite sure that he agrees that one of the great drawbacks of the frontier has hitherto been that, with the exception of two small and very inadequate hill stations, Sheik Budin and the Samana Range, there, have been no healthy places to which we could send officers or men or civilians during the hot summer weather. Consequently, both officers and men and their wives and families have either had the expense of going to one of the regular hill stations, at a great distance from the frontier, or have had to hear the heat of the summer. That heat is not to be thought of lightly. During the war the temperatures which our officers and men had to bear in Mesopotamia were a revelation to the people of this country, but they are no worse than those of the North-West frontier, and I may say that the night temperatures in Mesopotamia are decidedly more bearable than those of the frontier, where day temperatures of 125 degrees to 130 degrees are not uncommon, with night temperatures of 100 degrees to 105 degrees. Anyone who has gone through that, as I did in the summer of 1915, will realise that after a year or two the strain of bearing such temperatures becomes almost too great. The result is that we have a very large number of oases of sickness, heat stroke, and so on, among our forces there; and, as the Secretary of State well knows, every case of sickness involves expense to the Government of India, apart from the fact that it weakens your fighting forces. Sickness, indeed, involves a very expensive form of military expenditure, and brings no return.

Now the only lateral road which is in active use to-day is the base road which starts at Peshawar and goes on to Kohat, Bannu and D.I.K. That road is in a more or less good state, but when I was there last year I noticed places where it needed improvement. Generally speaking, it is a good lateral road. Lately we have heard a good deal about Kohat in connection with the outrage committed upon poor Mrs. Ellis, and the abduction of her daughter. Those isolated murders and outrages have always occurred in the country near the frontier, from time to time, but this was more serious than usual, inasmuch as the tribal marauders on this occasion did something which they have hardly ever done before, because they attacked a white woman, murdered her, and abducted her daughter. I am not going to suggest that this outrage was the result of any particular policy, or that the Government of India were in any way to blame for it, but I say that it is the indirect result of having in the Kohat Pass tribal territory over which we have no control, and in which these blackguards congregate.

The time has now arrived when we should take over this small tribal enclave. On more than one occasion in the years 1917, 1918, and 1919, those of us who were working on the frontier had very serious apprehensions whether we were not going to have tribal trouble on this road. The tribesmen were getting exceedingly bold; they knelt down on the road and presented their rifles at the passing traffic. That happened to us on more than one occasion. They got so insolent that at last they had to be warned, on more than one occasion, and to be told that if they did not behave themselves we should take over their villages. Beyond that, there are two rifle factories in the Pass, where rifles are manufactured, which are used against our troops, and it is a question whether we should not take them over. With British territory running all round it is absurd that this should be still tribal territory, when the main lateral base road runs through it.

To leave the northern end of the frontier for a moment, I should like to know whether there is any intention, on the part of the Government of India, of improving the inter-communication between the 1st Division at Peshawar, and the three frontier forces based at Kohat, Bannu, and D.I.K., and also between the 4th Division at Quetta and the Derajat (D.T.K.) forces. Road and railway communication between Quetta and D.I.K. is very advisable; it would prevent serious raids and promote peace. From the figures shown to me I think I am justified in saying that the saving would be something like thirty to forty lakhs a year in the cost of supplying the troops, if we had a better road or better communication between those two points.

Looking back at the debate which we had sometime since I noticed that Lord Lytton, who replied, agreed with me as to the repairs necessary to the road through the Bolan Pass, and that he said it would be put into order, and metalled to twelve inches. I suppose that meant twelve feet of metalling in width. I came down that Pass last year. It was barely possible to get down even in a small motor car, and I should think it is probable that a portion of the road has now been washed away. In my judgment, having regard to the gradient of the present railway via the Sukkur Bridge, Quetta, should not be left entirely to railway communication. Road communication should also be kept in operation, because if the railway were interfered with by the forces of man or the forces of nature the troops which constitute our only defence on the southern part of the frontier could be entirely cut off from India and probably before long would be without food. I think, therefore, that the Bolan Pass road should have the early attention of the Government of India.

There has been, I am aware, a certain amount of criticism of the railway up the Khyber Pass, but I think that it was a very wise decision that the Government of India came to when they decided to make it. It was very expensive to make, because the country was difficult, the gradients severe, and you had to punch tunnels through heavy rock formations. The result will be that when finished it will not justify the cost on anything but military grounds. In that respect, I believe, it has been said that it will probably postpone the next Afghan war indefinitely, or considerably diminish its importance, and it was therefore the proper step to take as an insurance.

I hope also the noble Viscount will not forget that, although the Air Force on the frontier up to now has not achieved all that some enthusiasts thought it might achieve, it might be made more use of than is the case at present. I believe the Government of India have decided to strengthen the Air Force on the frontier, and it is one of the means whereby we can withdraw troops on the ground of economy, yet show ourselves in the country and maintain somewhat of a hold there.

We all know the excellent work which the noble Lord, Lord Inchcape, has done in suggesting reforms to the Government of India and the cutting down of expenditure. Sometimes the critics of military expenditure point to the fact that 57 per cent. of the total expenditure of India is on the Army. That may appear to be excessive, but if you consider the responsibility of the Government of India on that frontier and the forces opposed to you, I do not think that the expenditure on the Army in India is really anything to be wondered at. After all, you have taken up the duty of defending the frontier of India against all who attack it, and you cannot do that lightly or without expense. I am sure that the House will agree with me when I say that if we once begin to show weakness in frontier defence that will reflect itself all over India. Many educated and quite friendly Indians have said to me: "If your own British troops, or our troops organised by you, cannot defend our frontier successfully, what is your Army in India for?" I find it difficult to answer that question. Of course, the justification for all our troops in the Northern and North-Western part of India is that they are kept there, trained there, and used, for the defence of the frontier.

Having lived for some time on the frontier I wish to take an opportunity of paying a tribute to the splendid military tradition existing among officers and men there, as well as among civilians. I do not believe there are any finer troops, or any better led, and with a more magnificent spirit than the frontier forces. These officers and men, who endure frightful heat in summer and considerable cold in winter, who bear great hardships and carry their lives in their hands nearly the whole time they are there, deserve the warmest thanks, not only of India but of the Empire. I am sure, from what I have heard, that it would be highly discouraging to this force if the idea became prevalent—as I am afraid it was likely to do, at any rate some time ago—that the strength of the frontier forces was going to be seriously reduced.

In conclusion, I would like to ask the noble Viscount if he could see his way, in view of the importance of this question, to let the House have a Blue-book or a White. Paper, or a Return of some kind, to include the more recent memoranda of the General Staff in India on the frontier question, together with a summary of the road work already done and to be done. I am sure that if we had those Papers it would add a great deal to our knowledge of these questions, and it might be of assistance also in removing impressions which, I am sure, have no foundation in fact, as to the weakening of our forces there.

VISCOUNT CHELMSFORD

My Lords, I am sure that those of your Lordships who are interested in this question of frontier administration feel indebted to my noble friend for having put this Question on the Paper. It is true, as he says, that roads are, in a large measure, the key of the situation on the North-West frontier, and I can only say that a considerable sum was spent on frontier communications while I was Viceroy. My noble friend is an expert on this matter, and anything that comes from him on the question of transport and communications deserves the most serious consideration. But I shall not follow him this evening on the road question. It is almost impossible to make a road policy intelligible in this House without maps, and, even with maps, I know from personal experience that it very often happens that a policy which has been drawn up on map knowledge is found to be erroneous and unsound when knowledge and experience on the spot have been brought to bear upon it. I think my noble friend must be satisfied on the whole with what is going on at the present moment. You are going to have this great road of 180 miles, I believe, linking up the Tochi and the Gumal, and you are also going to have what my noble friend has pleaded for so often in this House, this road giving a hundred miles of lateral communication in the Dera Ismail Khan district.

I will pass on to the question of frontier policy which he has raised. This really, in the main, resolves itself into a question where the frontier line of an administrative territory is going to be, and, if the House will bear with me, I will in a very broad fashion indicate the salient features of the problem. There are two possible frontier lines which can be advocated or defended on geographical, military, or strategic grounds. There is the line of the Indus, and there is the Durand Line. As regard the Indus, there are those who say we ought never to have gone beyond the Indus and that if we had not gone beyond the Indus we should have been spared much expenditure, both in men and in money. But the logic of events has proved too strong for us in this matter, and we have now incurred commitments and responsibilities which would make a retirement back to the Indus line both unthinkable and impossible. I pass over the military and strategic reasons which actuated us in an advance beyond the Indus, because those are not germane to my present point. The point that I wish to make emphatically with regard to that particular matter is that. I regard the commitments that we have entered into as a conclusive answer to those who would advocate any retirement to the Indus line.

Then we come to the Durand Line. Noble Lords may remember that that was negotiated by Sir Mortimer Durand as long ago as 1893, between Afghanistan and ourselves, and that marks the frontier between the two countries. But it is not completely demarcated throughout its whole length. It was based in the main on tribal lines, so that so far as possible there should be no tribal division along that line, but that the tribes or sects of tribes should find themselves on one side or the other of that line. I think I shall not be incorrect when I say that as soon as that Treaty was made the Amir Abdur-Rahman brought the tribes on his side of the line immediately under control and subjection. We, however, took no steps, and except at certain points mentioned by my noble friend in his speech just now—the Khyber, the Kurram, and Baluchistan—our frontier does not touch the Durand Line, and does not run up to that line.

There are, of course, those who say that we ought to carry our administered territory up to that line, to disarm and control the tribes. But I think it is sufficient answer, for the present purpose, to those who advance that view that for thirty years no Viceroy has ever found himself able to face such a policy. The expenditure in men and money which would be involved in such a policy is, I think, a reasonable explanation why every Viceroy for the past thirty years has shrunk from attempting to go forward with such a policy. There are two clear possible frontier lines, then, from which noble Lords can realise the position. There is the backward frontier line geographically, the Indus, and there is the possible frontier line under the Durand Treaty that present line, except at points which I named just now, runs somewhere between those two lines. But the present line of frontier is based on no geographical, no military, and no strategic ground. It is largely the result of historical accident.

Sometimes, as your Lordships are aware, the Close Border policy is mentioned. If by that is meant that we should maintain our position on the frontier and that we should not penetrate tribal area, it is a policy I think to which all would subscribe. No one would willingly push further into that terrible welter of hills which forms the frontier unless absolutely forced to do so. If it means that the line which has existed until quite recently should remain without readjustment although circumstances arise which suggest a better line, then I cannot subscribe to what is called the Close Border line, because that line has no military or strategic reasons to support it. May I give your Lordships a concrete example from my own experience during my time in India? In 1917, during the war, when we were most anxious to avoid any frontier commitments which would involve our troops, the Mahsuds proceeded to make a series of unprovoked and wanton attacks upon our territory. We endeavoured, as I say because we were most anxious to avoid anything like commitments, to make defensive military dispositions on the frontier; but they were quite useless. Posts were cut up, untoward incidents occurred, and we incurred the cost in men and money of a campaign without any prospect of a favourable issue. We were driven then into an expedition, although a possible blaze on the frontier might be the result. Our expedition was short, it was sharp, and it was successful, but to avoid any further complications on the frontier and, I may say, after very friendly discussions with the Amir of the time, we withdrew our farces.

In 1919 and 1920 there was a recurrence of these troubles. We had then to consider whether any steps should be taken to prevent this standing menace on our frontier. Let me remind your Lordships very briefly of what the history of this region has been. Since 1852, in this particular area, we have had as many as seventeen expeditions, sometimes called expeditions and sometimes called blockades. Since 1911 we have had four expeditions, and this at a time when our policy was one strictly of non-interference and when, beyond the subsidies we gave to the tribes in order that they might have something to live on, we had as little as possible to do with them. We were driven, then, in my time to a reconsideration of this policy, and we advocated a policy of road making such as the noble Lord has indicated to-day, and a readjustment of the points of occupation, taking up a central position in lieu of those which were more remote. I may say that my successor, Lord Reading, has accepted that policy and, with certain modifications which have been made as the fruit of experience, is carrying it out.

Now, if, by the Forward policy, is meant an advance towards the Durand Line, it is not a forward policy at all. Since 1894, broadly speaking, two places to which my noble friend referred—Datia Khel in the north of this district, and Wana in the south—have been almost continuously occupied by troops, whether regulars or irregulars. And Razmak which is now going to be the principal point of occupation in that country, is further from the Durand Line than either of those places. The policy is not to be a forward one, but one of readjustment in the light of experience, and I believe it is the policy that should be followed in these matters. There should be no hard-and-fast line, because you cannot draw a hard-and-fast line which can be shown to have military or geographical advantages, and, if possible, there should be no invasion of, or interference with, tribal territory. But there should be an occupation of such posts as experience suggests may bring about peace and quiet.

There are two points which I should like to make in conclusion. The first one is this. I do not believe that we shall ever have peace upon our frontier until we can find work for the turbulent young men in that area. Dr. Watts is right every time— Satan finds some mischief still For idle hands to do. The problem as regards the frontier has been aggravated in this manner. During the war, owing to the misbehaviour of the transborder Pathans in our regiments in France and elsewhere, Army Headquarters refused to continue recruitment from the transborder Pathans. The consequence is that a large number of young men in that tribal area, who in old days would have found vent for their activity in our Forces, now have nothing to do and make mischief. The position really is not dis-similar to that in Ireland. For many years now emigration from Ireland has been stopped, and there are a lot of young men growing up there who have aboslutely nothing to do.

Take a concrete instance. My noble friend alluded just now to the work that is going on in the Khyber Pass. The Afridis have remained absolutely quiet during the past few years largely because they have all been at work on the Khyber Railway which is to proceed up to Lundi Kotal. In 1920 when our troops were moving up into Waziristan, I asked Army Commanders to find out whether more could not be done in the way of irrigation so as to increase the food produced in the frontier area. But I am afraid they replied that there was not much that we could teach the frontier tribes in regard to the irrigation of the frontier country. I pressed Army Headquarters as to whether they could not commence recruitment amongst the transborder Pathans for units that might be overseas. I do not think that in that matter we can really wash our hands of responsibility. These people are within our sphere of influence. They are within the Durand Line. I do not think we can say that we can do nothing for them. We have a responsibility for them, and I feel that we ought to try to do something for them.

I shall allude to another matter only very briefly because I should like to make a suggestion for the consideration of my noble friend the Secretary of State for India in reference to that lamentable affair at Kohat. We would all join, I think, in paying a tribute to that gallant woman Mrs. Starr and that equally gallant native officer who accompanied her into the territory. I also think that a tribute should be paid to the Chief Commissioner, Sir John Maffey, for what he has done in this matter. It was, of course, his duty to take charge and he, took charge; but I think the fact that he was so quickly able to follow up what was happening on the other side of the frontier and to put Mrs. Starr and the Rissaldar Major in the right direction to find Miss Ellis, is proof of the grip that he has upon his work there.

But the matter that I should like to mention to my noble friend is this. There has always been great chivalry on the border with regard to women, and the first occasion on which there was an outrage against a white woman on the frontier took place just at the end of my time. I asked a frontier officer of great experience about this and he said: "There has always been great chivalry on the part of tribesmen towards women, but you must remember this. In all frontier expeditions up to now the women and children were able to withdraw from their homes and their villages before the invading forces ever came near them. That has been wiped out. The purda has been lifted. In a moment you have an aeroplane over a village, and women and children get killed. Can you wonder that their attitude will change and that they will think of reprisals."

As regards this particular outrage, we know that there is a history which is well accounted for, and I throw out the suggestion to the noble Lord that if women and children are killed on the frontier there is a very great chance of reprisals on the part of the tribes. I do not for a moment say that this is going to happen, but I only say that this was said to me by a man of great experience on the frontier. I think it is well that in this matter sonic attention should be paid to it. We know the horror we ourselves felt over the air raids here when our women and children were killed. I do not think it can be wondered at that the same thing will prevail among the tribes. I am afraid I have kept your Lordships an undue time, but I hope that the fact that I have had some responsibility in this matter will excuse me.

THE EARL OF MAYO

My Lords, I have never before ventured to address you on a question relating to India, but I have often wished to say something when Indian debates were taking place in this House. Lord Montagu, two years ago, dealt with this subject very fully, and asked the Government what steps, military and civil, were being taken to provide for the efficient defence of the North-West frontier of India. I listened to every word of his speech and of the answer which was made on that occasion. Lord Chelmsford gave Lord Montagu great praise and credit for the work that he had done in urging the Government to make roads to the frontier.

I am not going to say anything about the military policy. Lord Chelmsford dealt with that two years ago, and he has dealt with it again to-day, but I desire to say something about a road to our frontier. Lord Chelmsford, to-day, said that the most troublesome young men of these tribes, when they were engaged making the railway in the Khyber Pass, were quiet, and I am certain that if to-day a road was made parallel to the frontier most of the blackguards and scoundrels, and most of the murderers and thieves, would be engaged working on that road instead of taking part in raids on our frontier. The Northern frontier of India has always been the weak point in the Indian Empire. All invasions have come from the north from the days of Alexander down to the days of Akbar. Then followed the Dutch, the French, and the English occupation, crowned by that great man, Lord Clive, who established our Empire.

Your Lordships all know that during the great war, as Lord Chelmsford has said, aeroplanes made very serious raids, but we were so much engaged in thinking of our relations and friends out at the Front that we heard very little about those raids, and about the gallant officers and men killed in them,. I know the difficulties of making a great road along the Indian frontier. It is impossible that the road should be made even along the foothills. You mast go down into the plain. But if you made such a road trade would be improved, men would be put to work, and the efforts of traders to come down by these roads running, as all roads do in mountainous countries, along the lines of streams, would be greatly helped. The traders would get on to the great road, and pass easily to the fairs they wished to attend.

The noble Viscount, Lord Chelmsford, alluded to my country. It is true that when there is nothing to do people are apt to get into mischief. In contrasting a good road with the railway it will be realised that a railway is easily and quickly destroyed. The rails are tossed into the air by means of dynamite. My experience in Ireland—and I have had much unpleasant experience since 1916—is that a well made road is one of the most difficult things to break up permanently. You can make trenches across it, fell trees, and break up bridges, but in a very few hours those trenches can be filled, the trees can be cut up and taken away, and the road made practicable for lorries and troops. My dream of a road is a big broad highway which will allow three lorries to pass abreast. That, for the present, is sufficient. Along such a road your troops can pass quickly. We had experience of that in the great war when an army was rushed out of Paris in taxicabs. You have aeroplanes to watch what is going on upon the road, and you have motor cars also to use upon it.

One of the greatest maxims that has been written on this subject is this: "Nothing economises military force more effectually than possession of means quickly to concentrate all available resources upon any point which the enemy may select for attack." That has been brought home to us over and over again. It has been brought home to me in Ireland very often. I should like to say a great deal more on this matter, but. I do not wish to detain your Lordships. Lord Montagu ought to be thanked for bringing forward this subject. I hope I shall live to see a policy of road-making carried out. I remember India very well as a boy, and I have been there since. I should like to go again. The troops and men who keep the frontier in India deserve the greatest praise and respect.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (VISCOUNT PEEL)

My Lords, this discussion on the North-West frontier of India and our policy there is, I think, highly satisfactory to His Majesty's Government. It has received encomiums from Lord Montagu of Beaulieu, who has an expert knowledge of the roads and transport, and from Lord Chelmsford, who gave a most admirable sketch of the general policy on the border. Lord Chelmsford regarded the policy as being nothing but a continuation, with some slight modifications, of his own, and no higher praise could be given by anybody than that. The chorus was carried on by the noble Earl behind me. I envy the noble Lord who raised this Question because he has been able to be out on the frontier quite recently and comes back with fresh knowledge and personal experience of the subject. I need not remind your Lordships that during the war he rendered very great services to the Headquarters Staff in India and gave valuable expert reports on transport and roads on the frontier. He speaks with considerable authority and knowledge. My task to-night has been lightened by the speeches of both noble Lords who have dealt thoroughly and in such an informed manner with the subject.

Before I say a word on general policy, I ought to deal briefly with one or two of the definite points which have been addressed to me. My noble friend in opening the debate criticised, no doubt partly in connection with recent unfortunate events, the fact that the road to Kohat went through tribal territory, and he suggested that this stretch of country should be brought under direct administration. He knows that this has been frequently discussed with the Government of India. I only say, by way of caution, that it would be no inconsiderable task, and in the presence of Lord Inchcape I should hesitate to suggest that the Government should undertake any considerable work on the frontier. May I allude, as my noble friend Lord Chelmsford did, to the most unfortunate case of Mrs. Ellis and Miss Ellis? My noble friend suggested that there might be some connection between the bombing in the Mahsud country and such a change from the ordinary habits of the frontier as outrages and attacks on women. I was rather glad that my noble friend guarded himself by saying that he did not think there was any connection in this case. All the evidence we have goes to show the contrary; that this particular raid was a reprisal for a very active seizure of men and rifles made by an officer at Kohat, and that any connection between this outrage and any bombing which took place is non-existent.

Another suggestion was made by Lord Montagu of Beaulieu. He actually dared to raise his hand against the Report of Lord Inchcape and suggested that he had been advising too great a cutting down of mechanical transport. A good many persons interested in different subjects in India have made considerable criticism of the work of Lord Inchcape. Before I say a word on the question of transport I should like to express publicly what my noble friend knows has been expressed on many occasions before, the very great debt we owe for the magnificent and monumental Report which was produced in such a brief time on so complicated a subject as the whole administrative area of India. Those who are familiar with Commissions and Reports of that kind will not withhold the greatest credit for the great labour and devotion shown by the noble Lord in producing that Report. Lord Inchcape not only showed great ability but great tact, because although he sheared, almost with brutality, most of the Services in India, yet in some odd way they look upon him as a benefactor. No greater tribute could be paid to an economist than that.

As to a reduction of mechanical transport if my noble friend has examined the figures he is aware that a great deal of is rather of an ancient order, and that what the Government of India have to consider is not how much they ought to have but how much is necessary for transport purposes and how much they can afford to keep in full maintenance. To keep the transport in full maintenance is far better than to have a larger amount of transport which could not be so maintained. The question of the exact amount of transport is being carefully considered.

My noble friend said a few words about the Khyber railway and he dwelt upon the great advantages it had in providing work for the Afridis. The point that it gave work to these active young men was also touched upon by Lord Chelmsford. I understand that by the end of this year the tunnel will be forced and the railway available for carrying materials. From the point of giving work to the Afridis and keeping them quiet I wish that work on the railway could go on for ever and that some skilful person might undo during the night what was done during the day. As at present carried on the railway will soon be completed. I need not dwell upon its strategic value or the saving of expenditure which will be secured.

The next point raised was the question of the connection between the troops at Peshawar, Bannu and Kohat. My noble friend is familiar with the broad gauge railway which runs from Peshawar, and no doubt with the narrow gauge line running to Kohat. He took us over the narrow gauge line which runs to Bannu and up to Khirghi. Railway communication is a very familiar subject to all of us. I want to say a word, partly from the economic and partly from the strategic point of view on the question of roads. Both noble Lords have described clearly the roads running down from Thal to Spinwan and Edak and the great semicircular frontier parallel road behind the tribal frontier running from Razmak down to Jandola and back by Khirghi to Tank and D.I.K., thus making a communication road up and down the frontier.

My noble friend urged, I think, in the course of his speech, that it would be a great misfortune if the Government were to reduce the troops on the frontier. I have not heard about any reduction of troops. On the contrary, so far from reducing the troops on the frontier I think the noble Lord will agree that the Government are doing everything possible to multiply them, for he knows very well that if you double the mobility of your troops you practically double your forces, and that is really what this scheme is doing.

Besides this road and the road mentioned by Lord Chelmsford there is a further road from Jandola to Sara Rogha The object of that road is to enable the scouts to support the Khassadars, and also to make it more difficult for raids to be conducted. The general system was described by the noble Lord. First you have a sort of tribal guard consisting of Khassadars, then there are the Scouts, and behind them the Regulars. The Khassadars, as those familiar with India will know, are a sort of tribal levy or tribal police, officered by their own officers and keeping order within their own limits. This is an old principle on the frontier, and I think a very good one, because it gives the tribes themselves some stake in the maintenance of order in their own districts, and keeps alive and vivifies the system of tribal responsibility, giving them perhaps an enlarged idea of the possibilities of self-government.

But, of course, troops like that cannot be left in the air. They must have support if their activities and power of resistance to disturbance are to be maintained. Consequently, we have behind them a sort of trained trans-frontier policemen, as t may call them, namely, the Scouts, who aro formed of irregulars officered by British officers, their clothing and rifles being supplied by the British Government. This is a very inexpensive force. It stands behind the Khassadars and is ready to support them if they are attacked. In this area of the frontier there are about 5,000 of them in two battalions of three wings each—the organisation is rather a peculiar one—and normally they will be under the orders of the Chief Commissioner for the North-West Frontier Province. They will be posted chiefly at two places, of which one is Sara Rogha, and they are recruited, as to one-third of them, in the trans-border areas, and as to two-thirds of them in the cis-border areas, so they are to that extent a mixed force.

The noble Lord has spoken about the withdrawal of Regulars. No doubt he will not confuse the alteration of the position of Regulars with withdrawals, because while these roads are being made—and this particular road is to be com- pleted by the end of the year—the regular forces will not be withdrawn. When they are withdrawn, or rather moved, they will occupy two stations, one at Razmak, which is six or seven thousand feet above sea level, and the other at Jandola. Both these positions are outside the actual tribal areas of the Mahsuds. One is in the Battanis country, and the other in Waziristan. I should add that we have come to Razmak and occupied it at the actual invitation of the Wazirs themselves, and that they are very gratified that we should be there. It will be seen, therefore, that though they are outside the territory, they are on the edge of the territory, and in case of trouble they are able to support either the Scouts or the Khassadars. They can be moved up very rapidly along the road and will be extremely effective—none the less effective, indeed, because they are not in the middle of the country, and none the less effective because the Mahsuds know something of tactics, and are fairly well aware of what may happen in the case of disturbance.

Several advantages are to be obtained by this distribution of troops. The noble Lord dwelt a good deal upon the health of the troops. Everybody familiar with soldiering in India knows the enormous loss of efficiency caused through sickness to the troops in these hot plains, and the enormous advantage, from the point of view of general efficiency, in their being at a place like Razmak, which is 7,000 feet above the sea. I have already dwelt upon the great rapidity with which they can be carried to the support of other troops along this road, and one noble lord has borne testimony to the fact that a road is far more durable and more difficult to destroy than a railway or a- bridge. But, more than anything, I think, so far as the Mahsuds are concerned, what this road achieves is the removal of the inaccessibility of these tribes. It is this inaccessibility which breeds a certain frowardness in people who know that they can come down into the fatter countries and loot, and yet cannot be attacked in their own country except al the cost of an elaborately constructed expedition. I think those familiar with the early history of Scotland will realise thoroughly that if the moss troopers raid- ing across the Border had known that there was a road running parallel with the Border, and that they would be cut off as they returned from their raids into Northumberland, then the farmers of Northumberland would have had less cause to lament the loss of their herds.

As raids are becoming more formidable than they were in the past, partly because the rifles with which the tribes are equipped are more effective, as the noble Lord has told us, and also because of the ammunition they were able to secure during the war, and the numbers in which these raids are conducted, it is of enormous importance that people who try to raid over the frontier should know that there is a good chance of meeting with a very unpleasant reception when they go back, and of losing all the loot which they have brought with them. Further, the roads themselves, as the noble Lord knows, have a civilising effect, and apart from the fact that these men require some occupation, even Ruskin, I believe, showed many years ago at Oxford that nothing can have a more helpful effect on the youthful mind than the making of roads. The plain truth about these hills is, of course, that they breed more people than they can feed, and until that problem is dealt with, whether by recruitment, or by occupation, or by the making of roads, or in some other way, so long will there be this frontier problem, and the question will remain alive. I have explained perhaps in some detail the present policy regarding the frontier, and I should like to say that there is peace on the frontier at present, and that on March 22 all sections of the Mahsuds accepted the British terms, so that now we can go ahead with the construction of these roads.

The only other point with which I need deal before I sit down is the reference of Lord Chelmsford to the different opinions regarding the frontier, to the "Forward" school and the "Close Border" school. He described very clearly the different principles which animated those two schools. Personally, I do not wish to belong to either school. I think that we have to deal with these particular frontier cases as they arise, and as the situation dictates. You can- not lay down one general rule for the whole of this immense frontier; there are historic, geographical, tactical and strategic reasons to be considered on each portion of the frontier with which you are dealing. The one thing clear about this frontier policy is that when you have decided upon your policy you should carry it out with vigour and determination, and there should be no turning back. That principle obtains, no doubt, and carries respect with it, in countries in the West, but it applies far more to those Eastern countries with which we are now dealing. I am very much obliged to my noble friend for having raised this subject, and I hope that I have, to the best of my ability, answered the questions he put to me.

LORD MONTAGU OF BEAULIEU

I beg to thank the noble Viscount for his reply.