HL Deb 01 March 1923 vol 53 cc226-35

LORD SYDENHAM had the following Notice on the Parer:—

To draw attention to the pledges given to the Arab peoples, and to ask His Majesty's Government whether they will lay on the Table the correspondence in 1915 between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sherif of Mecca, now King Hussein, on which their predecessors based the claim that Palestine is geographically excluded from those pledges.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, His Majesty's late Government always refused to publish this important correspondence, because on it depends the whole of our pledges to the Arab peoples which were made in the year 1915. Ever since then the Arabs have consistently maintained that we have not fulfilled our solemn pledges made to them at, that time. Surely it is only right and just that we should know exactly how our national obligations stand in this respect. As so often happens in cases of this kind, a version of this correspondence, containing the crucial parts relating to the pledges, has been made public. I am informed that this version is correct, and I hope that His Majesty's Government will say whether the portions which I quote are correct or not. I will quote only such portions as are relevant to the case which I wish to lay before the House.

On July 14, 1915, the Sherif of Mecca wrote to Sir Henry McMahon defining the boundaries within which, as he said, "Great Britain will acknowledge the independence of the Arab countries." On August 30 Sir Henry McMahon demurred, quite naturally, to any discussion of the boundaries until the war came to an end. But the Sherif stuck to his guns, and His Majesty's Government, which was at the time in very great need of his assistance, gave way.

On October 25 Sir Henry McMahon accepted the Sherif's boundaries, but with the following reservations:— The district of Mersina and Alexandretta, and portions of Syria, lying to the west of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should therefore be excluded from the desired boundaries, With these modifications. … we accept these boundaries, and, as regards those portions of the territories in which Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her Ally France, I am empowered, in the name of the Government of Great Britain, to enter into the following covenant. Then follow the words which I consider constitute the pledges:— Subject to the above modifications. Great Britain is prepared to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs within the territories included in the limits and boundaries proposed by the Sherif of Mecca. And Sir Henry McMahon went on to say— On the other hand, it is understood that the Arabs have decided to seek the advice and guidance of Great Britain only, and that such European advisers and officials as may be required for the formation of a sound administration will be British. If only the Rent Restrictions Act had been as clear as that seems to me to be, what an immense amount of trouble and valuable Parliamentary time would have been saved!

On November 5 the Sherif held out for the inclusion of the provinces of Beirut and Aleppo, which, he said at the time, were purely Arab, but on December 14 Sir Henry McMahon was unable to agree as regards these territories, because, as he said most reasonably, "the interests of our Ally France are involved." The Sherif on January 1, 1916, accepted these conditions, with the proviso that he might raise the question of the territories in which France had an interest when the war came to an end. Sir Henry McMahon now decided to clinch the bargain, and there the bargain stands, I think, at the present time.

But this is not all. Early in 1918 the Sherif reported to His Majesty's Government that the Turks were offering to make a Treaty with the Arabs, and very significantly informed them that this Treaty would be guaranteed by the Kaiser as the Protector of Islam. When this was reported to the Foreign Office, the Secretary of State at once informed the Sherif that His Britannic Majesty's Government, in agreement with the Allied Powers, confirms its previous pledges respecting the recognition of the independence of the Arab countries. If the extracts which I have quoted can be relied upon as authentic then it is perfectly clear that Palestine is included among those countries which are to be independent and subject to the advice and guidance of this country.

The excluded territory is defined, as I have stated, as the portions of Syria lying to the west of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo. Palestine is, of course, a country in which France has no special interest whatever. Damascus is well north of Palestine, and the other towns mentioned lie almost on a bee line further north of Damascus. Mr. Churchill, therefore, had to invent a theory of the existence of a vilayet of Damascus which contained in its ambit the province of Trans-Jordania. Unfortunately, there was no vilayet of Damascus, and Trans-Jordania had never had any administrative connection with Damascus. I understand, therefore, that this distinct "terminological inexactitude" has now been officially abandoned, though I am afraid it served its purpose for a time.

Your Lordships will, I think, see that the pledge to Palestine to be an independent country, subject only to British advice, is really 8.s clear as daylight. This same pledge was almost textually repeated by General Allenby in a formal Proclamation to the people of Palestine, which he made on November 14, 1918. That pledge was further implicitly con- firmed by the late Prime Minister himself in September, 1919. He then said— The Arab forces have redeemed the pledges given to Great Britain, and we should redeem our pledges. In spite of that, I contend that these pledges were violated by His Majesty's late Government. Nearly two years after this formal bargain was sealed and signed there was what I am afraid I must call a disastrous declaration which was made, as your Lordships will remember, in a private letter to Lord Rothschild. That declaration created astonishment and consternation in Palestine and throughout the whole Arab world; but the Palestinians were reassured a year afterwards by General Allenby's very strong Proclamation.

They found themselves a short time afterwards, however, under what I can only describe as a Zionist autocracy, while at the same time a strong stream of Zionists, including a good many undesirables and some Bolsheviks, was steadily setting towards the Holy Land under the protection of British bayonets. Your Lordships have emphatically expressed your opinion upon those proceedings so I will say nothing about them to-day except that they have involved great hardships upon many of the immigrants who are totally unfitted by the climatic conditions for the work they have to carry on in Palestine. As a matter of fact, fourteen of these poor people committed suicide in the course of two months.

My case, which I hope I have made clear, is this. By violating our solemn pledges we have brought upon us a host of unnecessary troubles and we have been involved in quite unnecessary expenditure. That, it seems to me, is the just nemesis of our wrong doing in the Near East. The same nemesis is pursuing us because of the shameful Treaty we made in reference to Ireland, where we abandoned all our friends to murder or to ruin. All over India, in Egypt, in Mesopotamia, in Palestine and throughout Arabia, Turkish propaganda is at the present time hard at work, and the Turks are entitled to say to the Arabs: "We are your real friends. The British people have only deceived you." That is what they are, in fact, saying at the present time. In Palestine, I am ashamed to say, most of the Arabs would now prefer the return of Turkish rule to living under the Zionist administration under which they now find themselves. It must be, and I know that it is the case, that the distrust engendered in Palestine extends itself to Mesopotamia, and that our prestige in the Near East and far beyond it has undergone a very dark eclipse.

The position of King Hussein who was our Ally during the Great War has become exceedingly difficult. The Arabs can fairly say to him: "You negotiated with the British. Why did you not make a Treaty with the Turks, who might probably have kept it?" Then, again, owing to a series of what I can only describe as gross blunders, the Turks are now able to pose as triumphant conquerors, which in no sense can they really be said to be. The Arabs, like everybody else, have suffered from some mental disturbance as the result of the war. They cherish dreams of a closer union which might enable them in future to carry on a part which was worthy of the best of their past, and I feel that it should be the primary object of British policy to guide and befriend them in their -wish for onward progress.

We need, it seems to me, an Arab bloc to counterpoise to some extent the vaulting ambitions at Angora, and that was our policy in 1915. That has lately been described, by one of Mr. Lloyd George's late private secretaries, as having teen our policy at that time. If that was the right policy in 1915, why is it not the right policy at the present time?

I hope that the Government will say whether the version of this important and crucial correspondence, of which I have given specimens, is correct or not. If it is correct, then are we not hound in honour to fulfil the pledges which I hope I have succeeded in proving do actually exist? If it is not correct, then I really think that we should have the true version of this correspondence so that we may see exactly how we now stand and be able to judge of the facts for ourselves. The smallest and the most gallant of our Allies to the War, Montenegro, received specific promises of her independence from President Wilson, from Mr. Asquith, from Mr Lloyd George, from M. Poincaré and from M. Pichon, and yet we have allowed Montenegro to be horribly oppressed and practically to be wiped out of the map of Europe. And the Arabs, under the inspiration of the Sherif, now King Hussein, rendered us very great services during the war at a very critical time, and they certainly believed that the pledge to which I have referred was a real pledge that we should honour. I maintain that our pledge has been distinctly broken. Before the Armistice I believe that we were universally regarded as a straight-dealing people whose word was their bond, and if His Majesty's Government can restore our tarnished reputation for good faith and can rebuild in the. East the prestige that we have lost since the Armistice, I believe that many of their inherited troubles will melt away in the future. I beg to ask the Question which stands in my name.

LORD LAMINGTON

My Lords, I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Sydenham, has once again raised this Question for the reasons that he gave at the conclusion of his speech. He quite rightly interpreted the meaning of the now famous Beirut and Aleppo line. It is almost inconceivable to me that when that line was suggested its prolongation was intended southward and not merely northward to Aleppo. Such carelessness as the non-mention of the names of the points which were to form the line of demarcation between Trans-Jordania and those western districts which were to be excluded from any idea of Arab independence, is inconceivable. It would have been quite inconsistent with the whole policy of the Government at that time, or the policy of the Allies, to have treated Syria and Palestine as a single entity. The one claim which has always been made by the Arabs is that there is no racial or geographical division between Syria and Palestine. That contention has always been ignored by His Majesty's Government and by the Allies, particularly France. They have never recognised that what is usually termed Syria is one country. Therefore, if they had intended to differentiate as between Syria and those districts of Syria that lay to the west of that Beirut and Aleppo line and Palestine generally, surely Palestine would have been particularly specified as included in that demarcated area.

It would be a most valuable thing if we could get this correspondence succinctly and fully brought out, because then we should know where we were. It may be remembered that these negotiations were all secret, and that they were only brought to light when a new Government got into power in Russia and revealed the nature of these secret Treaties. Whatever may have been the intention of those who negotiated with King Hussein, undoubtedly in 1919 the general understanding was that Palestine should be included in Arab independence. That was the one theme of conversation at the time. It is difficult to reconcile the promises so recklessly made during the war to the Zionists and to the Arabs. It was understood by everyone at the time that Arab independence was naturally supposed to include the whole area of Palestine and also Syria. The Arabs do not know exactly why reservations have been made by His Majesty's Government.

This Question has been raised so often that I agree with my noble friend that every effort should be made to bring to light the exact circumstances and also the precise wording in which these terms or pledges were given to the Arabs. If they were faithful Allies they were to reap a certain reward, and to have complete freedom and independence. Unhappily, we are accused now of having violated those pledges. I therefore associate myself warmly with the request that the Government should publish the whole of the Papers.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE)

My Lords, as your Lordships are well aware this is no new controversy. It has, in fact, been raised on many occasions. I am afraid that I am not in a position to satisfy the demands of my noble friends. The correspondence is long and it is inconclusive. I admit that those are not reasons why it should not be published, but there are very strong reasons indeed which show that the publication of the correspondence would be detrimental to the public interest. It is impossible to clear the correspondence of references to a number of subjects which are quite apart from the controversy that we are discussing this afternoon, and the publication of those references to other subjects would, I am confident—and this is also the opinion of my advisers—be detrimental to the public interest.

The reasons for the non-publication of these documents have, I think, been clearly stated on two separate occasions by my predecessors. In the White Paper issued last June a clear statement was made which, with your Lordships' permission, I will read. It is this: It is not the case, as has been represented by the Arab Delegation, that during, the war His Majesty's Government gave an undertaking that an independent national Government should be at once established in Palestine. This representation mainly rests upon a letter dated the 24th October, 1915, from Sir Henry McMahon, then His Majesty's High Commissioner in Egypt, to the Sherif of Mecca, now King Hussein of the kingdom of the Hejaz. That letter is quoted as convoying the promise to the Sherif of Mecca to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs within the territories proposed by him. But this promise was given subject to a reservation made in the same letter, which excluded from its scope among other territories, the portions of Syria lying to the west of the district of Damascus. This reservation has always been regarded by His Majesty's Government as covering the vilayet of Beirut and the independent Sanjak of Jerusalem. The whole of Palestine west of the Jordan was thus excluded from Sir H. McMahon's pledge. Your Lordships will also be familiar with the published reply given in the House of Commons by the late Colonial Secretary, in which he dealt on similar lines with statements that have been made in the White Paper.

I have not been content merely to accept those statements as they appeared, bat since I have been at the Colonial Office I have, to the best of my ability and power, most carefully investigated the subject for myself', and I certainly see no reason, on broad grounds, to dissent from the interpretation which the late Government has placed upon the promises. Whether they were expressed in the best terms or not, it is perhaps not for me to say, but undoubtedly there never was any intention, when the pledge was given, to recognise the independence of the Arabs so as to include Palestine. I think that is perfectly clear, and in my own mind I am certain of it. Although the terms may not have been expressed in the clearest possible language, I think it was the intention of both Sir H. McMahon and the Government, at the time, when those pledges were given, that Palestine should not be included. I am afraid, therefore, for those reasons, that it is impossible for me, much as I regret it, to accede to the request of my noble friend and allow publication of the correspondence.

LORD RAGLAN

My Lords, there is only one point to which I wish to draw your Lordships' attention. Certain areas east of the Jordan, which were formerly not included either in the vilayet of Beirut or in the Sanjak of Jerusalem, have now been included in Palestine. These areas are not very large, but it is believed locally that they have been so included solely for the convenience of Mr. Eaten-berg, and that has given rise to a great deal of feeling.

LORD SYDENHAM

My Lords, I beg to thank the noble Duke for his reply, though I cannot say it satisfies me in any way. Would it not be possible to separate in the correspondence those parts that deal with the pledges from the rest, and exclude any which might deal with military movements at the time? It would be very undesirable that they should be made public. But it is really very difficult to understand why those parts in which our promise is stated by the Arabs to reside should not be made public. There is one other point. General Allenby's Proclamation was made in every village in Palestine, and I ask the noble Duke whether he does not consider that that promise, made in the most formal way just after the conquest of Palestine, does not include the independence of Palestine?

THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE

My Lords, so far as publishing any portion of the correspondence is concerned, my noble friend is fully aware of what I believe is a Standing Order of the House, or which certainly is a well recognised Parliamentary custom, that no portion of a correspondence can be published unless the whole is published. I do not wish to shelter myself under any technicalities, and, as it has been impossible for me to publish the whole, I will consider whether it would be in accordance with the traditions and with the Orders of the House that any portion of the correspondence should be published. I certainly should not like to give an answer upon that now, but I will consider the point.

LORD SYDENHAM

I thank the noble Duke.

[From Minutes of February 28.]