HL Deb 19 June 1923 vol 54 cc534-45

EARL STANHOPE had given Notice to ask His Majesty's Government whether they will publish figures showing the minimum percentage of the different varieties of food-stuffs it is considered necessary for strategic reasons should be grown (a) in Great Britain; and (b) within the Empire overseas; and to move for Papers.

The noble Earl said: My Lords, prior to the war questions bearing on national defence were not infrequently debated in your Lordships' House. In these days such questions not unnaturally appear less often upon the Order Paper, but I plead guilty, if guilt there be, to bringing one aspect of national defence to your Lordships' attention this afternoon. I confess that I am somewhat appalled at my temerity in initiating a debate on a subject so wide as that which I have raised in my Question, but at any rate I can promise one thing: I have no intention whatever of delivering a dissertation on strategy. It was at one time my lot to have to consider strategical questions, but I arrived only at the point at which I discovered how little I knew about that vast subject. All that I propose to do this afternoon is to remind your Lordships of one or two of our experiences in the late war; to suggest the lines upon which an inquiry into the amount of foodstuffs we could grow within these islands and within the Empire might be conducted; and, finally, to give the reasons why I think that such an inquiry should be held, and, if held, should be held at an early date.

Although fighting stopped little more than four-and-a-half years ago I think many of us are inclined to forget even the main incidents in that stupendous struggle; the amazement of foreign statesmen at the way in which the people of this country accepted very severe restrictions on the consumption of food; the anxiety with which those who were in a position to know watched the continued activity of enemy submarines; and the grave words of warning that were issued from time to time by Cabinet Ministers in regard to the question of our food supplies. May I read to your Lordships a paragraph from the Report of the Agricultural Policy Sub-Committee of the Reconstruction Committee which was presided over by the noble Earl, Lord Selborne? They reported as follows: The experience of the war has shown that the dependence of the United Kingdom on imported food has already involved the country in special difficulties, and in the future may become a source of real danger. We have found that it has increased the cost of the war; aggravated the difficult problem of regulating foreign exchange; and absorbed an undue proportion of the tonnage of the mercantile marine at a time when its services have been so sorely needed for other purposes. We are conscious also of the possibility of a development in the construction of submarines which in a future war might make impossible a continuous supply of food to the people of the United Kingdom from overseas. That Report was first published in January, 1917, and might, I think, be regarded as prophetic.

I have been told by one who, I believe, was in a position to know, that grave as were our anxieties in regard to the depredations by submarines in 1916 and 1917, had the war lasted a few months longer our anxieties would have been even greater. By the summer of 1918 we had to a large extent neutralised the activities of the smaller hostile submarines, partly by the splendidly executed blocking operations conducted by the Navy at Ostend and Zeebrugge, partly by the extensive minefields which were laid off the coast of Belgium, and, above all, by our nets and other counter-measures in the English Channel. The smaller submarines had not the fuel capacity to enable them to round the north of Scotland and get into the Atlantic, to attack ships in that ocean and then to return to their bases.

By the summer of 1918, however, we became aware that the enemy were building larger submarines of oceangoing capacity: What measures was it possible for this country to take against that danger? Obviously, no mine-field across the North Sea could be wide enough to prevent big submarines from crossing it during the hours of darkness, or, perhaps more accurately, during the periods of bad visibility which are very much longer in the North Sea during the winter months. Consider the fact that a submarine was capable of crossing a minefield so long as it could cross without having to submerge. All that a submarine had to do was to approach a minefield, to lie at the bottom of the North Sea until darkness fell and then to come to the surface, cross the mine-field and, when it had reached the far side, continue its journey below the surface. It was thought that it would be necessary to divert the big aeroplanes which were then being built in this country to operate with the Independent Air Force for the bombing of Germany, in order to patrol the mine-fields in conjunction with our Fleet, so that any submaries lying on the bottom could be successfully bombed. So serious was that danger thought to be that it was decided to use every available ship for rushing American troops over to the war area during the period when submarines were most easily dealt with, namely, during the summer months, and then switch over all ships to the carrying of food supplies when visibility became bad. It was obviously better if you had to lose a ship at all to lose a ship with her crew and cargo of wheat, than to lose a ship which carried her full complement of American troops. I think your Lordships will agree that the decision was a right one. but it entailed that the food supply of the country would fall to a reserve of less than three weeks.

Therefore, at the very moment when our Fleets were supreme upon the seas, and our Armies were at last sweeping forward to victory, this country was in danger of being starved into submission. Not without reason did Lord Selborne's Committee say: We can well imagine that in some future struggle the comparative independence of the United Kingdom of a supply of food from overseas might be a determining factor of victory. The war fortunately ended a few months too soon for us to be able to realise the full effect of the larger submarines at sea. In the same way, it ended too soon for us to realise the full effect of attacks with tanks upon land. But that the submarine of large capacity is considered a great weapon in time of war is, I think, proved by the paragraph which we read in the Press yesterday morning that we ourselves have recently launched the biggest submarine by far that we have ever possessed. What we in this country are doing other countries will probably do, if they have not already done it, and we may in future look forward to far larger submarines than any we have ever seen in the past. We may find that large oceangoing submarines, based at a great distance from our shores, may be an even greater danger than small submarines, based no further distant than they were in the last war.

The lines on which I venture to suggest an inquiry into the amount of foodstuffs it is necessary for our safety that we should produce should be conducted, are as follows: In the first place the officials of the late Ministry of Food should be asked, before they are lost sigh" of, by what percentage we can reduce the normal consumption of food in this country by rationing, and by that I mean that they should lay down the minimum percentages of various kinds of food, namely, wheat and flour, potatoes, sugar, meat, vegetables, fruit, milk, butter and margarine respectively. Secondly, the Foreign Office should be asked from what countries we can be certain of getting food in time of war. That would be less ambiguous than saying from which countries we should be unable to get food. Thirdly, the Treasury should be asked from what countries it would be inadvisable, for financial reasons, for us to buy food. For instance, the Treasury may perfectly well say that in view of the heavy debt we now owe to America it would be unwise for us to buy food from the United States, however friendly she may be, because the effect upon exchange would be disastrous. I imagine that the Department of Overseas Trade is in a position to say what exportable surplus of food products each country would have available in normal circumstances. Fourthly, I would suggest that the War Staff at the Admiralty should be asked to say what tonnage of freight they could guarantee in all circumstances could be landed on these shores. Lastly, the Committee of Imperial Defence should allocate the tonnage so worked out by the War Staff at the Admiralty to the different varieties of foodstuffs and raw products, and other articles, which we must continue to import into this country even under the most severe conditions of submarine attacks by sea.

It is perfectly obvious that much of the information collected in the course of such an inquiry would be of an extremely confidential nature. Therefore, if the Government decide to hold such an inquiry, I, for one, should certainly not ask them by what methods they arrived at their figures, but I submit that if only final figures are published no possibly dangerous results can ensue, nor can the publication have any possible effect upon our friendly relations with other Powers. As your Lordships will observe, I have suggested that the figures should be produced in the form of percentages. Such a form has one grave disadvantage, namely, that as the population increases so also must your normal consumption of food, and therefore, other things being equal, the percentage of food which the Navy can guarantee to bring to this country would be automatically reduced. The percentage would therefore have to be periodically revised, but I submit that as conditions obviously would not remain unchanged, a percentage so important to the future of this country as this would in any case require to come under review at fairly constant intervals. Therefore, that is no very serious disadvantage. On the other hand, I think your Lordships will agree that a percentage is far more easily understood by the man in the street than are masses of figures showing either the sterling value of the different kinds of food products, or thousands of bushels, thousands of cwts. and carcases, gallons of milk, and so on.

Until figures are produced showing how much food we must produce in this country and in the Empire for reasons of safety—and although figures have appeared in the Press and elsewhere I cannot see how those figures can have been arrived at, except by guesswork—until reliable figures have been produced by an authorised inquiry I cannot see how any Government can formulate an agricultural policy. A Government may say, and it is a very strong argument, that for reasons of health it is necessary to have a larger proportion of our people country bred. According to an extremely interesting book written by the late Director-General of Food Production, entitled "Food," a German Commission, which sat in 1906, showed that the proportion of physically fit men in Germany was, for large cities, 65, for small country towns, 83, and for country districts 114; and further, that less than 2 per cent. of the parents of fit men came from the large towns. As the same book states that the proportion of our population engaged in agriculture was only three per cent. as against the 17 per cent. of Germany and the 20 per cent. of France, it would perhaps account for our being described as a 03 nation. I do not believe, however, that that argument will be very effective in this country. After all, even if we are, perhaps, a C3 nation, we defeated Germany in the war, and that despite her vast Army and extensive military preparations.

I submit that if the Government can show, on the opinion of experts totally unconnected with agriculture, that it is essential for our safety to produce a given percentage of food in this country and in the Dominions, they then have arguments with which they can approach the townsman—arguments that it would be extremely difficult to meet. No one has yet forgotten rationing, and if it is shown that anything less than a given percentage of food products in this country and in the Dominions would, in the event of war, either mean far more severe rationing or possibly that most painful of all deaths, death by starvation, then I believe the townsman would realise the importance of agriculture; but not till then. It even gives the foundation on which you can argue Imperial Preference, and an argument that it would be difficult to controvert, if your experts were to say it was essential for our safety that certain food products should be produced within the Dominions if they cannot be produced here.

It may be that these experts would say that a sufficient supply of food can be landed in this country at all times and under all conditions. In that case I can see no reason whatever, except the reasons of health to which I have referred, why the Government should be justified in making agriculture a key industry, or in bolstering it up any more than any other industry. But, if it is found that we must produce more food within the Empire, then I submit that you have a very strong argument to give to those who otherwise do not see that agriculture affects them in any degree whatever. The reasons why I hope the Government will hold such an inquiry without delay are these. In the first place, when war begins your experts, particularly your naval experts, are engaged in matters of more immediate concern, and they have no time to give to the detailed study of a question such as this. Secondly, as we know from experience, you cannot improvise a home grown food supply—certainly not in a matter of weeks or even months—and thirdly, whether the inquiry turns out in favour of the farmer or against him, it is only fair that he should know his fate at the earliest possible moment. I am not-one of those who believe that another great war is imminent. On the other hand, I have still less sympathy with those who believe that when we won the last great war it was a war which ended all wars. I think that recent facts have convinced all but fanatics that that idea must be due to Celtic imagination, or something of that kind.

My views are better and more clearly put than I can put them in the Report of Lord Selborne's Committee, although they are put far more strongly than I should put them, and probably far more strongly than the Committee would put them if they were to write the Report again now. They say: We hope and pray that the greater sanity of nations and their increased obedience to the Divine law may save our country from any repetition of the hideous catastrophe which has to-day overwhelmed Europe, but we can feel no positive assurance that this will be the case, and we do not think that we should be faithful to our trust for our dependants if we omitted to take any practicable measures to increase the national safety in a future time of need. It is because I believe it is our duty to peer into the future, and to take such measures for our safety and for that of our descendants as may be found necessary that I have ventured to ask the Question which stands in my name. I beg to move.

THE EARL OF CLARENDON

My Lords, I am afraid that in answering the Question which has been addressed to the Government by my noble friend it will be impossible to lay down with any precision, or even approximately, the limits to which the noble Earl refers. In the first place, any solution of the problem would necessarily vary with the changing conditions of defence and sea-transport, and must therefore be hypothetical; and the problem is further complicated in some of its aspects by the great distances which lie between the United Kingdom and many of the overseas parts of the Empire. Further, as I am sure my noble friend would agree, publicity should not be given to the results of any deliberations by the Government on this question, intimately concerned as they must be with the provisions for defence. But the noble Earl may rest assured that His Majesty's Government, which is responsible for the safety of the Empire, is not unmindful of this aspect of security. At the same time, I may say that in the present position there do not appear to be any serious grounds for apprehension.

It may be well to give briefly the leading facts as to the position, both in the Empire and in Great Britain, with regard to the principal articles of food. With regard to wheat, to-day the Empire is more than capable of supplying all its own needs. If we convert imported flour into terms of wheat, then out of Great Britain's total requirements of wheat for flour and seed about 20 per cent. comes from native crops, about 36 per cent. is imported from Empire countries, and about 44 per cent. from foreign countries. These figures neglect wheat produced in Great Britain and exported or used as poultry corn—about 15 per cent. of the crop. With regard to barley, the Empire is not self-supporting, but of the supply required for Great Britain, two-thirds is home-grown and about 18 per cent. comes from the Empire. As for oats, the Empire is not self-supporting, but Great Britain grows 84 per cent. of its supply and imports about half the remainder from the Empire, chiefly from Canada. With regard to maize, within the Empire only South Africa is a large producer, and that only in quite recent times, and the United States and the Argentine are the main suppliers for the world. With regard to rice, virtually India and British Malaya supply the Empire and have a large surplus for other countries. Great Britain is more concerned as a trader in rice than as a consumer.

Taking butter and cheese, within the Empire, Great Britain is the chief importer of butter; other countries in the Empire meeting their own needs. Including the supplies from the Irish Free State, about one-third of the needs of Great Britain are met at home, about 35 per cent. is imported from the Empire, and about 32 per cent from foreign countries. Except for special varieties of cheese, the Empire is very nearly self-supporting. As to the supplies required for Great Britain, 27 per cent. are produced at home, 65 per cent. come from Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and about 8 per cent. from foreign countries. With regard to sugar, to-day about four times as much is imported into the Empire as is exported from the sugar-producing countries of the Empire. The largest producer, India, has a net import balance, and the total production of the West Indies is only one-fifth of Great Britain's requirements in raw and refined sugar.

In respect of meat the Dominions are not only self-supporting but large exporters. England, Wales and Scotland produce to-day only 43 per cent. of the beef, 37 per cent. of the mutton, and 42 per cent. of the pork and bacon consumed within these countries. Including the Irish Free State and Northern Ireland, however, these proportions rise to 57 per cent. for beef, 43 per cent. for mutton, and 47 per cent. for pork and bacon. Of the supplies imported into Great Britain, about one-fifth of the beef, about 70 per cent. of the mutton, and about 11 per cent. of the pork and bacon come from Empire countries. I rather gathered from the remarks that fell from my noble friend that he suggested that a Committee, of which he gave an outline should be set up to deal with this whole question. In responding for the Board of Trade, I cannot give any pledge on behalf of the Government, but I may assure my noble friend that his suggestion will be most sympathetically considered.

VISCOUNT LONG OF WRAXALL

My Lords, before this subject is allowed to drop I desire, with great respect, to make a recommendation or a suggestion to His Majesty's Government and to the noble Duke the Secretary of State for the Colonies. If I may be permitted to say so, I think that my noble friend Earl Stanhope served a very great public purpose by introducing this subject to-day. I am one of those—there are others among your Lordships who went through the same experience—who, in the very early days of the war and during the time of pressure, were connected with various branches of the food supplies of this country, and I agree with my noble friend Lord Stanhope that very little is remembered to-day either of the difficulties which we endured or of the sufferings of our people as a result of those difficulties. As I listened to the reply of the noble Earl, Lord Clarendon, on behalf of the Board of Trade, it seemed to me to be a strange comment upon our curious system of Government that it should fall to the lot of the Board of Trade to reply to a question of this kind.

The issue raised by the noble Earl, Lord Stanhope, is a two-fold one. In the first place, it is connected with our defence, and, indeed, with Imperial defence, because it will never again be possible to separate those great Imperial questions into parts as was the case in olden days before the war. In the second place, it is connected with the supply of foodstuffs for this country in time of war. I would go a step further than my noble friend Lord Stanhope and beg the Government to consider this Question quite apart from the necessity which arises in case of war. The figures given by the noble Earl, Lord Clarendon, must have given anybody who listened to them cause to think, and to think furiously. Take, for instance, what he said about wheat. I ventured to say in your Lordships' House the other day that we could not only grow enough wheat to feed the whole of this country, but that if we encouraged the introduction here of wheat from the oversea territories of the Empire there would be plenty not only to feed us but to enable us to export to other countries if it became necessary. I have not the figures in my head at the moment, but I believe that the same is true in regard to meat. Of this, however, I am certain, because I have been through the figures repeatedly—that, with the exception of a very few articles, consisting mainly, I think, of rare minerals, the Empire contains within itself everything we need in the way of food or clothes or any other necessity. Therefore, I support the noble Earl, Lord Stanhope, in his contention that there ought to be a further examination of this subject from the point of view of Imperial Defence.

May I remind your Lordships of that which I am sure you all recollect quite well and which seems to be germane to the reply to which we have just listened—how, constantly in days before the war, we were told by Ministers and officials of all kinds, irrespective of Party, that we were safe. You will remember the immortal saying of Lord Fisher that we could sleep in our beds because all was well. But the time came when we did not sleep at all and went to our beds with grave anxiety not knowing what the morrow would bring forth. I agree with my noble friend Lord Stanhope that that experience ought not to be forgotten, though there is, I think, a strong tendency to forget those days.

I rose, however, to make this suggestion to the Government and to the noble Duke. It seems to me that this is not a question for any Committee except, it may be, the Committee of Imperial Defence to consider as a branch of the question of our defence. So far as that inquiry goes, it is obvious, of course, that it must be of a strictly confidential character. But in October there is going to be a great Imperial Conference which will be attended, I hope and believe, by the Prime Ministers of all our great Dominions and by other Ministers as well. I submit to His Majesty's Government that that will be an eminently suitable occasion on which to raise the Question which has been asked by the noble Earl, Lord Stanhope, to-day.

I suggest that the discussions at the Imperial Conference should not be confined to the question of defence and food supply in time of war alone, but that a real attempt should be made at last to formulate a policy of availing ourselves of those limitless resources which the devotion and courage of our forefathers and the bounty of nature have placed at our disposal throughout the whole Empire. If we can devise a plan for their efficient use, it will make us absolutely secure against any fear of starvation whether in peace or war. In that way we shall supply our needs from our own Empire and those who will stand by us when the time of difficulty comes, instead of encouraging those to make use of our markets who, the moment war begins, turn upon us and, either as useless neutrals or active enemies, attempt to endanger our very existence. I hope that the noble Duke will be able to agree that this whole question, both in its basic aspect and in its Imperial form, may be fully discussed at the Imperial Conference because I am sure that such discussion can be productive of nothing but good results.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE)

My Lords, I can assure my noble friend Lord Long, in one word, that this subject is already actively engaging the attention of those who are making preparations for the Conference which is to be held. I was not aware that my noble friend was going to raise the point and I can only now give him the assurance that those subjects are amongst those which will be considered.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.