Lords Sitting of 5 June 1923

Preamble
The House met at a quarter past four of the clock, The EARL OF DONOUGHMORE on the Woolsack.

SOUTHERN RAILWAY BILL. [H.L.]
Order of the Day for the Third Reading read.
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE): My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a third time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 3a.—(The Earl of Donoughmore.)
VISCOUNT YOUNGER OF LECKIE: My Lords, on behalf of the Southern Railway I have been asked to make a very short statement with regard to a point in this Bill. When the Bill was first introduced into your Lordships' House it contained clauses authorising the company to abandon the Basingstoke and Alton Light Railway. That railway began, I think, to be worked in 1910. It was closed down in 1916, at which time the rails were taken up and sent to France by order of the Government. The rails have not been restored, or at any rate have not been relaid, and power was asked in this Bill by the company to abandon the line and to realise the site. Considerable opposition was made to that proposal by landowners and others in the district which the railway had served, and petitions were lodged against it on behalf of many local authorities and others.
When the Bill came before the Committee of this House, presided over by Lord Kintore, evidence was given on behalf of the opponents by Colonel Nicholson, M.P., and others to the effect that the railway was promoted by the railway company at the time when a somewhat similar railway was projected by Colonel Nicholson and others to serve the same district, and that upon the understanding that Colonel Nicholson and those associated with him abandoned their own scheme the company agreed to go forward with their proposal and provide
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and construct the railway. That was done for a considerable period, during the whole of which the line was worked at a heavy loss. After hearing the evidence, the decision of the Committee was given in the following words:—
"The Committee are of opinion that the clauses for abandonment must be struck out. Although we do not see our way to impose on the Southern Railway Company an obligation to relay and work, yet we hope the company will understand that having regard to the conditions under which this light railway was originally authorised and that the responsibility rests upon railway companies to provide public facilities, not necessarily at a direct profit, it is the opinion of the Committee that the railway company should re-examine the situation in the light of the Committee's view."
In view of the decision, and the remarks of the Chairman, the matter has been carefully considered by the directors of the company.
While they are not prepared to accept the proposition that a responsibility rests upon railway companies to provide public facilities not necessarily at a direct profit, they will, in all the circumstances of the case, restore the line and work it as a light railway for some limited period, at any rate, in order to test the result. It is proposed that the line should again be worked for a period of ten years, and if at the end of this time it is found that the line, is still being worked at a loss it is considered that it would be only just and reasonable that the company should then be entitled to reconsider the whole position. I trust that that undertaking will be satisfactory to the Committee and to your Lordships' House.
LORD ASKWITH: My Lords, my noble friend has answered a question which I was going to put to him as to whether this railway really is going to be relaid and worked. I should be very glad if he could supplement that information by some statement as to when the railway will be relaid and worked.
VISCOUNT YOUNGER OF LECKIE: I am sorry to tell the noble Lord that I am not directly informed on that point, but I understand that the work will be proceeded with forth with, and in any case the line will certainly be worked for a period of ten years.
THE EARL OF KINTORE: My Lords, this Bill is an important omnibus

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measure of the London and South Western section of the Southern Railway Company, and as it was one of a group of Bills which your Lordships referred for consideration on merits to a Select Committee of which I had the honour to be Chairman, I should like to say a word to supplement what has just fallen from my noble friend. When this Bill came before us all petitions in opposition to a number of its many clauses had been withdrawn, with the single exception of the petition of public bodies, traders, farmers, occupiers and landowners in the hilly district formerly served on the twelve-mile course of the Basingstoke and Alton Light Railway against a clause authorising its abandonment. As my noble friend has said, the service of trains was discontinued during the war in order to comply with the urgent request of the Government that all rails not vitally necessary to the service might be lifted and shipped to the theatre of war, and accordingly the rails of this railway were taken up and so shipped.
This Basingstoke and Alton Railway was the first light railway built after the late Lord Jersey's Commission had reported. When it was projected it was recognised that it would have to be worked for some years without any prospect of direct profit, so that from a purely railway point of view the proposal to abandon was not an unnatural one. The case for and against abandonment was ably argued before the Committee by eminent counsel, and in the result, after a careful hearing, we were unanimous in the finding that my noble friend read to your Lordships. I now understand that the board of the Southern Railway lost no time in considering that finding. Although with no surprise, it is with very great satisfaction that I have heard from my noble friend that the board has determined to follow the strong hint we gave them in refusing to sanction abandonment. In deciding to relay and work this light, railway forthwith, the board, in my judgment, have adopted, and with very good grace, a wise, straightforward, and honourable course. I warmly congratulate them, as I do all those who will benefit by their action, on the happy decision to which they have come. Of course I am entirely in sympathy with the contention of my noble friend that after ten years of working the railway company
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would be entitled to come to Parliament again if, in their opinion, the circumstances warrant that course. It would be only fair and reasonable. I cordially support the Third Reading.
VISCOUNT YOUNGER OF LECKIE: May I say that I have ascertained since I spoke that the work is being proceeded with promptly.
On Question, Bill read 3a, and sent to the Commons.

SPECIAL CONSTABLES BILL.
Order of the Day for the Third Reading read.
THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION (THE EARL OF ONSLOW): My Lords, in moving that you do read this Bill a third time, perhaps I may remind you that on the Committee Stage of the Bill my noble friend Lord Beauchamp moved an Amendment providing that no constable called out during an industrial dispute should be, called upon to perform any work in connection with the industry in which the dispute was proceeding. I ventured to deprecate the acceptance of that Amendment, on the ground that the Act of 1831 covered the point, but Lord Salisbury undertook to look into the matter again, and see whether it would be possible to meet the point which the noble Earl raised, and also a point raised by the noble Earl, Lord Buxton, that possibly in the working of the special constabulary the provisions of the Act of 1831 might be overlooked.
My right hon. friend the Secretary of State does not feel that it would be good draftsmanship, or convenient, to accept an Amendment on the lines suggested by the noble Earl, but in order to meet the point he is willing to insert in the Regulations a provision to the effect that a constable shall not be authorised, or required, to be employed otherwise than in the preservation of the peace and the protection of persons and property, as laid down in the Act of 1831. I think your Lordships will agree that words to this effect will remind the people in charge that the special constabulary are confined to those duties specifically laid down in the Act of 1831, and that they are not required to perform any other duties. In these circumstances it is impossible,

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I think, that there should be any doubt as to whether a constable called out for duty during a trade dispute can be required to take the place of any industrial worker on strike.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 3a.—(The Earl of Onslow.)
EARL BEAUCHAMP: My Lords, I am much obliged to the noble Earl for meeting the point raised in Committee. It would be indeed churlish on my part if I did anything except express my thanks to him for having met our views in this way. I should naturally have preferred that the Amendment should be inserted in the Bill, but I recognise the difficulties which are involved in that course. It would, of course, necessitate the Bill being sent back to another place, with Lords Amendments. Perhaps that alone is sufficient reason; but on the Spur of the moment I am not able to express a considered opinion as to whether the words suggested by the noble Earl entirely meet the case. He will, I think, forgive me if I say I think that they do not go quite so far as we pressed the Government to go on the Committee stage. Take, for instance, the ease of a strike at electric power works. It is possible that this Regulation suggested by the noble Earl might prove a source of some difficulty and confusion. I am, however, unwilling to waste time by expressing an opinion without further consideration.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: If the noble Earl would like time for further consideration we are willing to put off the Third Reading of the Bill till to-morrow.
EARL BEAUCHAMP: There is no reason for putting the Bill off, because what goes into the Regulations is different from what goes into the Bill. If, however, the Government will let me have a copy of the Regulations, then, if necessary, I may raise the matter later on in the Session.
THE EARL OF ONSLOW: Of course, I shall be glad to give my noble friend an opportunity of discussing the matter in the way which he suggests.
On Question, Bill read 3a.
THE EARL OF LINDSAY THE EARL OF LINDSAY had given Notice of two Amendments, namely:

(1) After "stations" in the Title to insert ("to provide for calling up police pensioners
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in Scotland for police duty when special constables are appointed and called out for duty").

(2) After Clause 3, insert the following new clause:

("4. Every member of a police force in Scotland who retires on pension after the passing of this Act shall, as a condition of the receipt of pension, be liable (until he has Attained the age of fifty-five years or unless ho is certified by a medical certificate under the Police Pensions Act, 1921, to be incapacitated for the performance of duty) to be called up for duty in accordance with regulations which, in virtue of this section, there shall be power to make under the Special Constables Act, 1914, with the police force of which he was a member, during any period in which special constables are appointed and called out for duty within the county or burgh maintaining such police force.")
The noble Earl said: My Lords, the Amendments which stand in my name are due to the fact that the standing joint committee of Life have had this Bill under their consideration, and they have requested me to raise the points dealt with in my Amendments. They called recently upon the chief constable of the County to make a report on the Bill. In the course of his remarks he stated that he did not consider that special constables, judging from past experience, would be effective in dealing with cases of unusual emergency, or that the present haphazard methods of relying upon outside help by requisitioning police from other counties was conducive to the security of property and the preservation of law and order. It has been the habit in the past, so far as Fife is concerned, to requisition police from outside the County, say, from Perth and Aberdeen.
The standing joint committee considered this and they considered whether it would not be possible to insert in this Bill some sort of provision making it incumbent upon members of "the police force in Scotland, on retirement, to be available in case of special emergency, of course within a certain limit of years. I find that the sergeants and constables now retire at sixty and inspectors and superintendents at sixty-five, or on full pension on completion of thirty years' service, and half pension after twenty-five years' service. I do not suppose that a man having five more years to serve would miss losing the full pension, so it is not likely that there will be many eases of that kind. Having regard to the fact that the local authorities constantly

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discuss these pensions it might interest your Lordships if I gave you the rates of pensions on retirement. I find that in Scotland the constable retires on full pension of £164 13s. 4d.; the sergeant, £195; the inspector, £233 6s. 8d.; and the superintendent, £306 13s. 4d. The local authorities consider these pensions are, if anything, on the generous side, and therefore they do not think it unreasonable that on retirement a man should be liable to be called on in times of emergency for a further five years.
The present system is not altogether satisfactory. During the disturbance in 1920 the County of Aberdeen was called upon to supply extra police, and these had only been a few days in the county when they were withdrawn, probably for very good reasons, but, at all events, that was not a satisfactory position. There is no large industrial population, and no large town adjoining. In the case of Lanarkshire they have Glasgow to draw upon, and do draw upon it. Midlothian has Edinburgh: but Fife is entirely dependent on outside counties. Owing to shortness of time, this Bill has not been discussed by the County Councils' Association, and I do not know how other counties regard these proposals. But, having regard to the fact that my Amendments entail only some very slight modification of existing conditions, I think something of this kind might be accepted. I fully realise that it is a late stage in the proceedings to press such a matter, but, having regard to what I have said, and also to the fact that a proposal of this kind would mean a great saving of expense, I hope the noble Viscount in charge of the Bill will give the Amendments favourable consideration I may mention that on the last occasion when police were drafted into Fife the extra cost was over £3,000, and the full cost over £8,000.
Amendment moved—
In the title, after ("stations") in line 5 of the title insert ("to provide for calling up police pensioners in Scotland for police duty when special constables are appointed and called out for duty").—(The, Earl of Lindsay.)
THE SECRETARY FOR SCOTLAND (VISCOUNT NOVAR): I sympathise with much that the noble Earl has said in support of his Amendment. I understand that his object is to secure the services of police pensioners when it is found
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necessary to call out special constables for duty. I fully appreciate the advantage at such times of having retired men with long experience of police work. Whether the method of obtaining their services which is proposed by the Amendments would be a satisfactory one requires consideration. In any event, effect could only be given to it after the matter had been considered by police authorities generally, and I need scarcely say there would be an additional difficulty in accepting such proposals for Scotland alone. The proposal would also import a new condition into the terms on which pensions were awarded by the Act of 1921. It would only be right that the interests affected should have an opportunity of expressing their opinion. For example, it might be regarded as onerous that a retired constable residing at a distance in another district should be bound to come up for duty. Generally speaking, I think police pensioners would be prepared to offer their services when necessity arose. My own experience is that ex-constables are prepared to come forward. In present circumstances I believe that the situation would be largely met by voluntary offers of this kind, and I think it would be inexpedient, at this stage of the Bill, to attempt to deal with the matter on the lines suggested. I trust that, in view of this explanation, the noble Earl will not press his Amendment.
THE EARL OF LINDSAY: I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
THE EARL OF LINDSAY: I do not, of course, propose now to move the second Amendment in my name.
Bill passed.

HONOURS (PREVENTION OF ABUSES) BILL. [H.L.]
Order of the Day for the Second Beading read.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (VISCOUNT PEEL): My Lords, owing to causes which, I am sure, all your Lordships will regret, the Lord Chancellor is not able to be present here this afternoon to move the Second Reading of this Bill. It is the Lord Chancellor's own Bill, and I regret that he is not here to do justice to it. Your Lordships will

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remember that during the past few months there have been several discussions in your Lordships' House on this question of transactions connected with the granting of honours. There was one on March 7 last which will be fresh in your Lordships' recollection. On that occasion the subject was discussed under two heads. The first was the question of appointing a Committee of three well-known members of the Privy Council, in order to assist and advise the Prime Minister in nominating persons for political honours. That Committee had already been set up by the late Prime Minister, and therefore I need say nothing upon that portion of the business. But upon that occasion the Leader of the House, the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, stated that the Government intended to bring in a Bill founded upon another proposal of the Report of the Royal Commission to deal with certain transactions connected with honours with regard to the obtaining, or promising, or giving a consideration to try to obtain, honours for certain persons.
This Bill, entitled the Honours (Prevention of Abuses) Bill, is intended to carry out certain recommendation contained in Paragraphs 31, 32, 34 and 35 of the Report of the Royal Commission. Those recommendations were to the effect that a short Act should be passed, which would impose penalties on any person offering to become instrumental in the securing of an honour for another in return for a money payment or valuable consideration, or on any person promising payment or consideration in order to receive an honour. The honours which this Bill is intended to cover and to which it refers are personal distinctions winch are conferred by His Majesty as the fountain of honour, and the proper description of these distinctions is "dignities" and "titles of honour." The dignity means the honour conferred and the title of honour is the description of the person who bears it. Those dignities and titles of honour include the various degrees of nobility, baronetcies, knighthoods of the various Orders of Knighthood, and Knights Bachelor. The drafting of the Bill follows to some extent the precedent of the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1906. That Act deals with wrongful transactions on the part of agents which might have been the subject
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previously of civil action, and brings them for the first time within the criminal law.
The present Bill deals with transactions which, however reprehensible, are not criminal and probably could not be the subject of civil proceedings. As to the name which ought to be given to this particular class of transactions, it seems that the subject of the present Bill could hardly be described as corrupt so as to justify the expression "corruptible" or "corruption," either in the body or the title of the Bill since the term suggests a definite breach of public or private duty. Therefore, your Lordships will see that the short title of the Bill is the Honours (Prevention of Abuses) Bill, and that the long title is "An Act for the prevention of abuses in connection with the grant of honours."
Following again the precedent of the Act of 1906, offences against the Bill are made misdemeanours and are punishable either on conviction on indictment or on summary conviction. The maximum penalty in the former case is imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine not exceeding £500 or both, and in the latter case imprisonment for a term not exceeding four months or a fine not exceeding £50, or both. Now under the Act of 1906 a prosecution could not be instituted without the consent of the Attorney-General, but it was thought that it would not be either necessary or advisable to include such a provision in this Bill. If your Lordships will turn to the Report of the Royal Commission on Honours you will see that in paragraph 19—and it is very satisfactory, I think, to read their words—the Commissioners say—
"We put the question "—
that is, the question about payments being received or money being offered for honours—
"to each Prime Minister in turn, whether he had ever been cognisant of any bargain or promise to the effect that an honour would he contingent on a contribution to Party funds. We received the answer that we expected, that they had not."
That question was also put to Patronage Secretaries and Party managers and the answer was of exactly the same kind as that given by the Prime Ministers.
It is clear therefore that, whatever may or may not have gone on in connection with these transactions, the Prime

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Ministers, the Patronage Secretaries and the Party managers were entirely ignorant of all this underworld of management and of brokerage to which reference is made in a later paragraph of the Report, where the Commissioners go on to say:—
"Nevertheless, there is no doubt that there, have been for some time, and recently in increasing numbers, persons who, fur want of a better name, we may stigmatise as touts, who have been going about asserting that they were in a position to secure honours in return for specified payments."
It is against that class of person who is denounced as a "tout" in the Report of the Royal Commission and referred to also under the same name in this Bill that the penalties in the Bill are directed.
Your Lordships may say, possibly, that a Bill of this kind will not put a stop entirely to these transactions and that the one thing that can stop them and this sort of brokerage is a vigorous and healthy public opinion. That, no doubt, is true. At the same time I think your Lordships will also agree that the severity of the penalties which under this Bill are to be laid upon persons who either promise to obtain honours or are ready to pay sums to those who will attempt to procure honours for them will probably have a very salutary effect in putting a stop to this disreputable and discreditable trade. I beg, therefore, to move that the Bill be now read a second time, and I trust that your Lordships will pass it into law.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(Viscount Peel.)
VISCOUNT HALDANE: My Lords, there is no possible objection to this Bill, and there may be a rare case in which it will have some operation. For myself I expect to see it operate as did the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1906 on which it is founded, and that is very seldom indeed. Those who are interested in this subject are not fighting against cases of corruption. There are very few cases in which the tout comes and says: " Give me so much and I will get you a particular honour, "though that has happened. I have had first hand evidence of that from persons to whom a tout has gone and made an offer. When you can catch him by all means convict him. But that is a very small class of case. Nor do you deal with the evil by the appointment
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of the Committee suggested by the Report.
We discussed all this on the last occasion on which the matter was before your Lordships' House, and I am not going into it again, but it was then pointed out that the Committee on behalf of the Prime Minister would look out and take notice of such things as could be regarded as public scandal against the person in question or matters which could be taken hold of on the ground of their amounting to something more than mere gossip. What you want to do is to raise the standard on which judgment is passed in regard to the question of whose name the Prime Minister should submit for an honour. Some Prime Ministers have been very particular, but other Prime Ministers I am afraid have not always been so particular, and names have been sent up which were sent up for no reason which right-judging men would account sufficient.
When we discussed this question on the last occasion it was suggested that until one got quite away from the idea that mere legislation such as this Bill contemplates, or mere reference to some Committee of Privy Councillors, will be sufficient, you will make no progress. What is wanted is a higher standard applied in considering the recommendations which the Prime Minister will make to the Sovereign. The Prerogative of the Sovereign certainly exists to this extent, that when the Prime Minister makes a recommendation to him the Sovereign can ask, and can insist upon knowing, what are the reasons why this name has been brought up and whether there are or are not certain objections to it which are suggested, it may be, by the breath of rumour or, it may be, on more tangible grounds. That, I think, requires that both in the case of the Prime Minister and of the Sovereign there should be a somewhat close consideration of these matters. It is not to be taken as of course that the Sovereign will assent to the recommendation that the Minister makes to him in a matter so delicate as that of an honour. The Sovereign is within his constitutional rights in demanding to know what the reasons are for which the recommendation is put forward, and I for my part trust that in the future the Sovereign will inquire very closely into those things.

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I am certain of this: that it is only through a higher standard of opinion about these things that you can be safe—opinion of the kind I have spoken of, opinion which does not go upon the existence or non-existence of criminal conviction, opinion that does not go merely upon public scandals associated with a name or things of which a Committee of Privy Councillors could properly take hold, but a public opinion that demands that no name shall be sent up for an honour unless that name is beyond reproach, and unless the recommendation is founded upon some service rendered or some quality which makes it desirable that that person shall be distinguished beyond his fellows. If that is done, and the standard is high, then you need not trouble even about this Bill, or even about the Committee, or about anything else. But until you get to that stage and standard of opinion you cannot be safe, or any better off, in substance, than you are to-day.
Therefore, while I offer not the smallest objection to this Bill. I desire to say that I attach just the same importance to it as was attached to the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1906. Everybody said about that Bill: "What a splendid thing"; yet everybody knows that to-day, notwithstanding that Act, corruption goes on very much as it did before the Act was passed. So it will be after this Bill is passed, unless the higher and stronger step which I have suggested becomes one which is adopted by the insistence of public opinion.
On Question, Bill read 2a and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

RENT RESTRICTIONS (NOTICES OF INCREASE) BILL.
Amendment reported (according to Order).

NEW NAVAL BASE AT SINGAPORE.
VISCOUNT WIMBORNE VISCOUNT WIMBORNE rose to ask His Majesty's Government whether, having regard to the finances of the country, expenditure upon the Air Service should come before expenditure upon the proposed new naval base at Singapore. The noble Viscount said: My Lords, the Question which stands in my name on the
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Paper raises several points which have been already separately discussed in your Lordships' House this Session, but I thought the matters of sufficient importance to justify me in bringing them into direct relation so as to emphasise, if I can, their interdependence. Moreover, since this matter was discussed we have a new Government, and it will be very interesting and important to know whether the present Government hold the same views upon these subjects as their predecessors did. The noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, told us on two occasions—in March and last month—that a Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, of which, I think, he is the Chairman, was in existence——
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: The acting Chairman.
VISCOUNT WIMBORNE: —and that it was considering these allied questions very closely with a view of coming to a definite decision. The noble Marquess told us last month that no conclusion had then been reached. I hope that since then the labours of the Committee may have advanced, and I shall invite him, if he is courteous enough to reply to my Question, to give us, if he can, further information on the subject. We seem to be confronted with, the extraordinary and disquieting paradox that in times of straitened resources—and I do not think anybody can dispute that these are such times—when admittedly we have lost our position of insular security, and when London is exposed to aerial attack and admittedly unable to cope with a one-Power menace of that kind, we are going to engage upon the creation of a great naval base at Singapore which, if cost be any criterion, is to exceed in importance and magnitude the great sheet anchor of our sea supremacy in the North Sea, the naval base at Rosyth.
If I may briefly allude to the several issues that are involved I would like first to turn the attention of the House to the question of the financial position of the country. Nobody can, I think, deny that the country is very much impoverished, in common with all other European countries. We have not yet by any means recovered from that serious impoverishment, although we may be doing better than our neighbours in some ways. But it is at a very heavy cost. The taxation

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of this country is extremely injurious to trade. It hinders the prospect of an early revival of trade. Nobody can doubt that the present scale of taxation hits trade and business very hard indeed. Although, as a result of the sacrifices we have made, the pound sterling has been restored to something like its pre-war position, and London still maintains its lead in the money markets of the world, that achievement has been purchased at a very heavy sacrifice in the hindrance of the trade revival which we might otherwise have expected.
There are official figures on the subject. I believe your Lordships will find that it is asserted by our Treasury that, taking taxation per head of the population, we contribute three times as much in the way of taxation as either France or the United States of America. This Government has, we understand, obtained the prospective services of a new Chancellor of the Exchequer, who will shortly take up his duties. Nobody is more conscious than Mr. McKenna of the evil which this heavy taxation means to business. Nobody has emphasised the hindrance that it is to the revival of trade more than he, and nobody, I think, is more deeply pledged than he is to retrenchment with a view to a reduction in taxation.
I wonder what he will feel about this proposal in regard to Singapore? Let me remind your Lordships what the proposal is. The First Lord of the Admiralty, in making his statement in another place, indicated that the naval base at Singapore would cost the country some £10,000,000 of which £200,000 was put down in this year's Estimates. But is £10,000,000 really the figure that we shall have to face? Singapore enjoys a very unenviable reputation among engineers for exceeding the estimates for work done there. Owing to some geological formation, or to "some alluvial deposit, it seems that the estimates of public works in Singapore harbour are always grossly exceeded. There is a Member of the House of Commons, Mr. Darbishire, who has the advantage of having been a resident in Singapore for some twenty years, during which time he was brought into official connection with many of the public works undertaken in Singapore, and, making a speech m another place on the subject, he said that we should be lucky if the estimate did
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not come nearer to £20,000,000 than £10,000,000. But supposing that were a pessimistic view, £10,000,000 is itself an immense sum of money even in these rather prodigal post-war days, and one which we ought to consider seriously before dashing into expenditure.
I want to ask: What is the objective of this naval base at Singapore? What is its purpose? And against what danger is it designed? It is a new proposal on the part of the Admiralty. We have the testimony of Mr. Asquith in another place that during all the years he presided over the Committee of Imperial Defence the subject, although discussed, was never entertained by the Committee. It is quite a new, or comparatively new, thing. Against what prospective enemy, against what danger in particular, is this new work designed? The First Lord of the Admiralty, in the speech to which I have referred, said that there is in this course no suggestion of any difficulties in our relations with Japan. If Japan is excluded it is difficult to see what particular peril threatens our interests in the Pacific. In that connection it is well to remember that the Washington Treaty was signed only last year, and that Treaty implies guarantees for the status quo in the Pacific. Article XIX of the Treaty is to this effect:
"The maintenance of the status quo under the foregoing provisions implies that no new fortifications or naval bases shall be established in the territories and possessions specified."
The specification is east of the meridian of 110° East longitude. East of longitude 110° is a sort of sanctuary for the status quo and all competitive militarism in that area is ruled out of court.
What is the position of Singapore? Singapore is longtitude 105 East, or only five degrees outside the prohibited area. The First Lord of the Admiralty says that we are precluded from strengthening or improving the naval resources at Hong Kong. Hong Kong is a kind of Tom Tiddler's ground, and he says: "I will get over the border to Singapore. There I am all right." He proposes to do at Singapore what he is precluded from doing at Hong Kong. To step only just over the border, over the fringe of the prohibited area, and embark on the creation of a formidable naval base seems to

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me to be an infringement of the spirit of the Washington Treaty and lays us open to the age-long calumny against "perfidious Albion." It is difficult to see low you can build this naval station so close to the prohibited area without incurring the risk of being spoken of as having infringed the spirit of that Agreement. This House cannot view that aspect of the question without grave misgivings.
Then there is the League of Nations in existence, and Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations says that "The Members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval and air programmes." So far as I know no Government spokesman has claimed that this provision has been complied with. I shall be corrected if I am wrong, but no Government spokesman has claimed that Japan has ever been advised as to what we propose to do at Singapore and I shall be much interested to know what Lord Robert Cecil, a new member of the Government, will say about an omission of that kind.
There is another point, and it is this. Are we sure that in embarking on this grandiose scheme we may not be creating something in the nature of an obsolete device for the security of this Empire? I know that the Admiralty still claim complete and absolute confidence in the battleship, but what is the view of the Committee of Imperial Defence on that subject? Experiments have been carried out between aerial craft and ships. The results of those experiments have been concealed from the public, but enough has leaked out to shake the confidence of some first-rate experts on the subject. The Admiralty may be right in saying that, to-day, the battleship can be protected against aerial attack. It may be that it is the unit of Imperial power abroad now, but can the Admiralty say that with the same confidence of the future? Aerial war is still in its infancy. There are great possibilities of expansion and development, and it seems to me that to embark upon a policy, which admittedly is to take ten years to complete, when the primacy of the battleship may have been surrendered to this new military weapon, is a point which we ought not to pass over without some information being given upon it.
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This brings me to my last point is it a fact that we have been thinking in terms of sea-power and have neglected to consider the new weapon which, perhaps, may ultimately become the most important of all weapons of attack and defence? I mean air power. There was a debate in your Lordships' House last month and the noble Duke who represents the Air Force gave your Lordships figures as to how we stand in comparison with other countries, and especially with France, in air power. The figures are too recent to make it worth my while to recapitulate them, but they amount to this, that we only have a quarter of the Air Force which France possesses, and, unless we do more the disproportion will ho greater still as time goes on. I do not say, and your Lordships do not feel, that the French Air Force is aimed at us. We know enough of their prevailing obsession and we have sufficient confidence in the friendship which has existed between us since the Entente Cordiale to know that they have no such intention at all. The French Air Force is designed for an entirely different purpose. But there it is, and if things should turn out that we were not such good friends as we are to-day we have only one-quarter of the Air Force that is at the disposal of France. It is easy to build aeroplanes rapidly. It is not at all easy, however, to improvise rapidly the personnel which those aeroplanes require and the esprit de corps which is only the product of very long work and effort.
That briefly is the Question which I put to the Government. It amount to this:—Can we afford to indulge in this rather dubious act of Imperialism when at home the overburdened taxpayers—I was going to say the " sweated " taxpayers—have to sustain a million unemployed men in the making of roads in a country which cannot be said to be free from serious danger?
THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY): My Lords, I certainly cannot complain of the noble Viscount's speech or of his calling your Lordships' attention to this matter of great importance. Let me say in the first place that I thank him especially for the attention which he devoted to the subject of economy. It is a vital subject, and I should not like this

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occasion to pass without endorsing and emphasising what he has said as to the grave necessity which vests upon us, whether we be in the Government or in the Opposition, of co-operating together in the interests of public economy. That is essential. But at the same time no one who is responsible for affairs can allow even the motive of economy, important as it is, to overshadow other Imperial obligations which are east upon us.
I can say this with all the more confidence because the noble Viscount, in touching upon the debates on the Air Service which have recently taken place in your Lordships' House, referred, as I understand, with full approval on his own part, to the general attitude which was adopted towards this matter by your Lordships. That attitude, as I need not remind your Lordships, was expressed by a plea delivered from every quarter of the House in favour not of cheeseparing economy but of legitimate extension of the Air Service, notwithstanding that it must necessarily throw a very heavy burden upon the country. That is because your Lordships, if I may say so with respect, as men of the world and men of common sense, recognised that there is a limit to economy, that certain obligations are thrown upon us by our Imperial position, if I may so call it, which we must fulfil and which we cannot ignore. However much we may desire economy, we must be equal to that responsibility.
May I say, as I mentioned the question of the Air Force, that I am afraid that I cannot respond to the noble Viscount's invitation to enter into that subject again in detail on the present occasion? I do not think it was very long ago that we discussed the matter at some length, and since then certain events have taken place, trifles like a Ministerial crisis, which, though very important in themselves, have certainly delayed matters a little as far as the consideration in Cabinet Committees of these very necessary questions is concerned. I can add nothing really useful in respect of the Air Service to that which I said upon the last occasion. All that I promised your Lordships is being fulfilled. Investigations are proceeding, and of course they have reached a further development. Every meeting of the Committee involves that, but I do not think there is anything that I can usefully say in public.
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I will turn then to the other part of the noble Viscount's Question, the question of Singapore. Your Lordships should be made aware that the establishment of this base at Singapore was carefully considered not merely by the present Government, but by the late Government, and I believe I am accurate in saying that they were as decided as we are that this matter must be faced. I cannot, of course, speak with any confidence of the views of the late Government, and I may be in error, but I think that is the fact. The Conservative Government took the matter into consideration at a very early period after taking office, and it was referred to the Committee of Imperial Defence, as all such questions are. I can testify that in that Committee it received the most careful consideration both from the point of view of Imperial strategy and from the point of view of economy. We were obliged to come to the conclusion that the establishment of a fortified base at Singapore is necessary.
The noble Viscount asked us if we were sure that we are not building upon a false foundation. He seemed to ask whether the days of battleships were not over, whether they were not superseded by aircraft, so that the whole of our provision will be thrown away. It is, of course, impossible to say what future developments are going to be, and I should be very rash to prophesy. All I can say to your Lordships is that none of the evidence I have seen would justify such a conclusion if the noble Viscount put it forward. There is no reason whatever to think that aircraft are going to supersede battleships. Supposing a foreign battleship were to attack a base such as Singapore may be, unless it were properly defended otherwise than by aircraft it could not be defended at all. I make that observation only to show the noble Viscount how far we are from having come to that conclusion.
What is the case for Singapore? I think I shall not exaggerate when I say that unless a naval base is established at Singapore the action of our Navy in the Far East will be absolutely paralysed. The noble Viscount may think that this does not matter. I will say a word upon that in a moment, but the broad fact remains that without a fortified base at Singapore you could not have the use of your Navy in the Far East at all. That

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is the deliberate conclusion at which the Committee of Imperial Defence arrived. Just consider what it means. We are not only responsible for this country, for the British Isles, but we are responsible for far-flung Dominions in every quarter of the world and certainly not least in the Far East. We have the great Dominions of Australia and New Zealand and we have numberless other Colonies and Dependencies in those regions. They cannot be defended by aircraft because, as the noble Viscount knows, the effective area of aircraft is strictly limited. They can act only within a very limited range, and unless therefore you can have efficient naval support you would really be abandoning the responsibility which rests upon you in the Far East. That was an eventuality which we could not face.
I should like to say one more word. The strategy upon which these things depend must be treated as a whole. You cannot take the strategy of the British Empire as a whole, cut a great hunk out of it and suppose that it will be just as efficient as if was before. The whole thing is made to interlock and dovetail, and to come to Parliament and to say" We want to remove your naval base at, Singapore," and so deprive the Navy of any possibility of action in those regions, would be to injure the whole structure of 1he strategy upon which the country has entered.
The noble Viscount said, in effect: "Surely this is very nearly a breach of faith. If you are not allowed to have increased fortifications in a particular area, you ought not to have increased fortifications anywhere near that area.'' That is an astounding doctrine. How far would the noble Viscount carry it? He might say that, because you must not have a naval fortification east of line 110 you must not have a naval fortification at line 105. Why 105? Why not 95, or even 90? Argument of that kind is, on the face of it, absurd. A certain line is drawn and good faith demands that you shall abide by your obligations up to that line, but outside that line you are at liberty to carry out your own requirements, just as anybody else would be; and I am certain that the great friendly Powers with whom we have made this Treaty would interpret it in exactly the same way as we have,
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and that if it were necessary, not in the area which is sacrosanct but outside it they would not consider themselves to be in any degree directly or indirectly guilty of breach of faith in carrying out operations which they thought necessary.
I have spoken of great and friendly Powers, and that is the fact; but we are not looking to the present in respect of the new base at Singapore. There is no question of the present. We must look into the future. The noble Viscount himself said that: this base is going to take a great many years to build. That is true, but does ho not see that the conclusion from his own argument is that the situation which we have to contemplate is not the present situation, but the situation as it may be ten or twenty years hence, and that however friendly we may be with our neighbours in those regions at the present time, it would be quite unacceptable that the Government, which is a trustee for the safety of the Empire, should draw the inference that because we are on perfectly friendly terms with everybody now we shall always continue to be on equally friendly terms with everybody. It is perfectly evident that what you must do is not to provide against what might happen in the present but what might possibly happen in the future—what we may reasonably call the distant future—of our Empire.
All these matters are matters of insurance. Because you insure yourself it does not mean that you think you are necessarily going to meet with an accident directly. The whole nature of insurance is that you insure yourself against possible accident, and what is true in the case of the individual is equally true in the case of a nation. You must spend money to insure yourself against the possibility of great disaster in the future. I almost apologise to your Lordships for having repeated anything which is so obvious, but when the noble Viscount challenges us, and asks us to abandon—which, in effect, he did do—the establishment of this great naval base, all we can reply is that as the responsible Government of the country we dare not incur the responsibility of delaying entering upon the establishment of this base, without which our Navy, as I have said, would be altogether powerless in the Far East.

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I do not think that the present Government, or the late Government, can be accused of undue extravagance in these matters. After all, we have watched a process of cutting down, almost to the quick, in our fighting Services. The noble Viscount is well aware of what has happened to the Army in the last few years, and what has happened to the Navy under the Washington Agreement, he is also aware of the condition of the Air Service, and I think we may with some confidence appeal to your Lordships, and to the country, to trust us, who are not only professors of economy but engaged in those processes which our predecessors started, if we tell the country, with a due sense of responsibility, that certain expenditure, even though a large expenditure, in the matter of Singapore is necessary.
The noble Viscount, or any noble Lord who follows me in the debate, may ask: What do you want with this great naval base? We want two things in the main. We want a graving dock sufficiently large to take modern ships. There is no such thing in the Far East at present. As the House is aware, owing to the change in the form of construction of modern ships they require larger docks than any we have had heretofore. The additional width, which is a necessity for the purpose of protection, has changed all the dimensions which are required, and it is absolutely essential to have some dock which shall be capable of taking these large ships. Then, we want all the ancillary workshops which are necessary with a dock, and besides that there is the necessary provision for oil. As the House is aware, we are watching a process by which coal fuel is gradually being superseded in the Royal Navy by oil fuel. I am not capable of speaking in the presence of the noble Marquess behind me who represents the Admiralty and who is far more capable of explaining to your Lordships the reasons for this change, but I think you may take it from me that that is what is going on.
If that is to be so, you require provision so that oil may be available to make good what is required for the ships in every part of the world where His Majesty's ships are to go, and not least, of course, in the Far East. One of the principal things which will be required in Singapore will be the erection of these oil
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tanks without which this motive power is impossible. The noble Viscount said something about the difficulties of the site, and he pessimistically prophesied that our enterprise would cost at least double what we expect. I hope that is not so. There was no evidence laid before the Committee over which I presided which would lead me to that conclusion, although I know there was very careful consideration as to where the dock ought to be. The site was very carefully explained to us; and I entertain the hope that his pessimism may be unfounded, but I would not, of course, like to prophesy.
The noble Viscount said so little about the relation between the Air Service and the Singapore base that I hardly need trouble your Lordships about it. But it is quite evident that it is no argument that because an Air Service is necessary and must be provided therefore you can dispense with the Singapore dock, which is also necessary and must be provided. That would be a very illogical form of reasoning. If we, indeed, reached such a point that we could not possibly afford the two, then, no doubt, the argument would be sound. But I can assure the noble Viscount that we are not so badly off as that. Short of that, it is evident that the fact that the Air Service is necessary is no reason why we should dispense with what is also necessary in the shape of a dock. But I will say this, at any rate, to comfort the noble Viscount. During the first year or two it is not proposed to spend very much at Singapore, and for the very obvious reason that there are preliminaries which have to be carried out before you get to the very heavy expenditure. We do not expect to spend in the next financial year more than £200,000, and even in the financial year which succeeds it very little more will be necessary. That is, at any rate, two years during which there will be no heavy expenditure at Singapore. In those two years I hope a great deal will be done towards rehabilitating the Air Service. So that the two will not be, as it were, in direct competition during those two years.
When those two years come to an end your Lordships and another place will have an opportunity of considering the situation as it then presents itself. You will have to consider, in the circumstances of that time, which seems to be the more

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important of the two—which should be hurried on the faster, and which may be delayed a little. At any rate, nothing will be prejudiced. Parliament will still have a completely free hand. The only thing which will be decided will be that ultimately there will be a great fortified base at Singapore, and utimately there will be an adequate Air Force in this country. For my part, I need not tell your Lordships, after what I have said already in this House, that I earnestly hope that no time will be lost in providing us with a sufficient Air Force. I do not think that that brooks any delay whatever. But I cannot conclude, because I have said that, that therefore the Singapore base is unnecessary. On the contrary, both are necessary and, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, both must be carried out.
Viscount HALDANE: My Lords, no one, I think, on this side of the House, will complain of the noble Marquess be cause ho has not gone in any detail into the question of the Air Force. He has told us that the Committee of Imperial Defence is considering the subject connectedly, and we know that Sir Samuel Hoare and Sir Hugh Trenchard are also active on their parts. We are very willing to wait until they can tell us more. That does not mean that we are not anxious. The situation as regards the air in this country is a very serious one, for reasons which I will not repeat, because they were fully discussed the other day. That brings me to a second point, on which I find myself in agreement with the noble Marquess. Although economy is a most important consideration, there may be a situation of national peril so great that you can only look at economy in the second place, and I think, with one phase of the Air Service, that is so at the present time. Therefore I have no quarrel with him upon that point.
But my doubts come in when I consider the reasoning by which the noble Marquess put the establishment of the new naval base at Singapore on something like a parallel line with that of the Air Service. They are both to go on, and for the Air Service he properly says there is great urgency. I am not so sure that for Singapore there is equal urgency. The British Navy has managed very well in the Far East hitherto. It managed very well in the Pacific during the war;
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no doubt there were difficulties, but those difficulties were got over But is the matter one of so great an urgency as to break down, or force to yield, the principle which we have laid down for ourselves as regards economy?
I would remind your Lordships that fifteen years ago a new principle was laid down. Before that the Admiralty and the War Office, for which I was responsible, used to borrow merrily when they wanted to set up permanent works of the kind we are discussing now. Those works were paid off with very long sinking funds, and nobody minded much in those days, with a very small National Debt, which was steadily decreasing. But fifteen years ago the Government of the day—I think it was Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's Government—laid down the doctrine that oven permanent works were for the future to be paid off out of Revenue. That certainly applied stringently to the War Office, and I think it applied equally to the Navy in those days. Note the result. All the money that is wanted for this Singapore dock must come out of Revenue. That is to say, it must come out of the taxes. And, as there will be difficulty in raising a much larger Revenue than at present, it will have to come out of the pockets of people like my noble friend opposite, Lord Novar, who represents Scotland, and other Ministers who are concerned with other Services of great national importance, which will have to suffer, because these commitments are fixed commitments. It is all very well to say you begin with spending only £200,000 upon the naval base at Singapore. Yes, and for the second year you may go slowly, but then comes the third year, and there is a demand for something like £3,000,000, and we are told the contracts are out, and we cannot break faith. It is then that the pinch comes, and the matter gets serious.
It is for that reason that there arises in my mind a rather different question from that which the noble Marquess presented. I am not disputing that it is a very good thing to have a naval base in the Far East. So far as I know Singapore is geographically a very suitable place for it. I am not questioning that that is a thing which we ought in time to have. What I am questioning is whether we are not proceeding towards it rather precipitately. For my part,

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although prima facie I think a case is made, there are other matters which the Navy has to consider. Two years ago there was a proposition put before the public by the Admiralty that £100,000,000 should be spent upon replacing the ships which had become worn out, or been lost, or got obsolete during the war. That was before the Washington Conference. It looked very much like going through, because the Board of Admiralty is a very powerful body and very good at making its case heard by the public.
Then there came an outcry from a few people who were anxious about these things. What they asked for was that there might be a closer investigation than appeared to have been made of the kind of war in which the ships were expected to be used, and, that bring settled, the kind of ships that were wanted for that kind of war; the arrangements for working those ships, together with the military forces which might be required; and, finally, what would be the types of ships. It turned out that these things had not been so closely considered as they should have been. The Committee of Imperial Defence finally took the matter up and a Committee was appointed, with a result of which we know nothing except that the proposal died away under investigation. I have no doubt that the investigation was a close and searching one. I took it to mean that the propositions of the Admiralty, good in themselves, had been put alongside other questions which arose, and that, as the result of a more general and searching investigation, the £100,000.000 proposition disappeared.
When we come to Singapore I should like to feel certain that there had been an investigation of that thorough kind. I am aware—I, too, have sat on the Committee of Imperial Defence, and for a long time—that these questions are brought up with great ability by the Departments concerned, and certainly nobody is more able than the Admiralty in putting a case before the public or before the Committee of Imperial Defence. But it does not follow that everything is got at first presentation that you can get by taking time. To my mind one of the most important subjects the Admiralty has to consider from the point of view of war is the protection of
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our trade routes. That is a matter which has been very inadequately gone into in the past and I am not sure that it is adequately studied to-day. What bearing the protection of our trade routes would have upon the Singapore base I cannot tell. Perhaps it would be a very favourable one and perhaps it would be otherwise. But I should like to feel that the question had been surveyed from that large point of view, military as well as naval and commercial as well as naval, which would enable us to have the feeling that if we are called upon to establish this new naval base at Singapore we shall be setting it up for reasons of that paramount kind which we are called upon to face in connection with the Air Force.
I am not at this moment satisfied that that is so, not because I have any scientific grounds on which to raise doubts, but because I have my misgivings as to the extent of the investigation which has taken place. These misgivings are based upon my past experience. Therefore, speaking for myself and, I doubt not, speaking for other noble Lords on this side of the Table, what I should like to see is a good deal of delay over this business. You have to pay your £10,000,000 out of Revenue. That, as I pointed out, will very much embarrass the provision in the Civil Estimates in years to come. I should like to see very thorough and very critical examination of this proposition. It may be that a graving dock is wanted, and I think that very likely it is. It may well be that you cannot take the modern battleship into the existing graving docks. But I should like to know what battleships we are likely to have to send there and for what purpose they would have to go there. It may be that you would find that your scheme might become a more gradual one and not quite so grandiose as I suspect it is, according to the Admiralty plans, at the present time. There might well be, I think, a very considerable spreading of it over, because at present at all events there is no indication of a calamity to be faced in the Far East.
I agree with the noble Marquess that it is the most idle thing to predict beforehand that you are never going to have a war. You may have, to fight. But that does not prevent you from considering where it is that you are most likely to have to do so, and at the present time

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I greatly doubt whether the Far East is the place in which we are most likely to have trouble. We are getting along very well in the Far East at present and I know of no reason why we should not manage to get along in the future. I have no doubt of the ability of the Admiralty to deal with any circumstances that may arise there. Therefore, without prejudice to the desirability of the new scheme, I cannot convince myself that it is urgent in the sense that the other thing is urgent, nor can I convince myself that at a time of great financial stringency we should be called upon to face such an expenditure in addition to that which is required for the maintenance of labour and social improvements, a policy to which we are all committed.
That is really all that I wanted to say. I agree with the noble Lord who sits near me in thinking that the case of the Air Force is much more urgent, and I have tried to show that I have reason to doubt that the Singapore scheme is of such an urgency that it might be allowed to jeopardise the progress of the Air Force scheme, as it will if it eats up a great deal of money. I do not believe you will finish your expenditure upon your necessary Air Force within the next two years, and after the next two years——
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I am sorry to interrupt the noble and learned Viscount, but I did not say that.
VISCOUNT HALDANE: —it may go on, and so much the worse.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I am very sorry if the noble Viscount interpreted me as meaning that, and I should be misleading your Lordships if I did not explain it now. I only said that we should have made great progress in the next two years.
VISCOUNT HALDANE: The noble Marquess had a vista of more things to be done when we have taken that £3,000,000 of the Navy for the graving docks at Singapore and that is why I interposed. Our true policy is to go very deliberately in regard to this Singapore business, to investigate it very carefully and very closely and to see how much is neceessary and how much can be dispensed with. I think we are a little bit inclined in these questions to leave things too much to the
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Government. There is a good deal to be said in favour of trusting a Government, because they have sources of information which nobody else can have, but still it is necessary to be watchful, and I think that we shall be neglecting our duty here if we do not scrutinise very closely such propositions as that which we nave before us.

PROPERTY ASSESSMENT.
LORD PARMOOR LORD PARMOOR had given Notice to ask His Majesty's Government whether they can state what stops (if any) are being taken to provide that there shall be only one assessment of property as a basis of valuation both for local rates and national taxes; and to move for Papers.
The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, my Question is not intended, as I told the representative of the Government, to raise any difficult question of valuation or to bring again to your Lordships' notice the questions that were discussed in a recent debate concerning the valuations under Schedule A. In the course of that debate I put before your Lordships the question of the necessity, the immediate necessity as I thought, of having one assessment of property as a basis for valuations both for local rates and national taxes. I pointed out, and I do not intend to go over the ground again, the extreme inconvenience and unnecessary expense involved in the present multiple system, if I may use that expression, when, on these questions of valuation, you may have a large number of bodies to deal with and a multiplication of appeals before you can get all the matters settled, whereas if you had one basis of valuation you could get them settled once for all.
I also pointed out—and I referred to the Reports of a good many Committees—that there should be no difficulty in extending throughout the country the principles and machinery of the Valuation (Metropolis) Act. Your Lordships are aware that under that Act there is only one basis of assessment for local rates and national taxes. I think every Committee which has considered this extremely important point as a matter of practical financial business has confirmed the view that the machinery of that Act might properly be applied over the country at large and that the difficulty

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of these multiple assessments could be got rid of in that way. The object of my Question to-day is not to re-open those matters to which I called your Lordships' attention on a former occasion, but to ask His Majesty's Government whether they can state what steps, if any, are being taken to provide for this single assessment.
I am encouraged to ask that Question because on the last occasion there was no opposition offered to the view that I put forward. On the contrary, the representative of His Majesty's Government recognised the value of a single assessment, expressed the view that public opinion was rapidly ripening in that direction and indicated, I do not think I am wrong in saying, that they were considering the matter in order to bring it forward as soon as possible. I should have hoped it might have been brought forward in time to deal with some of the difficulties that will arise under the multiple assessment for valuation under the existing conditions, but I recognise that that may not be possible. There may not be time for that, but I will ask the noble Earl, Lord Onslow, who I understand is going to reply to this Question on behalf of His Majesty's Government, whether he can tell us what steps, if any, are being taken in order to carry out this desirable reform? I do not think it is necessary to move for Papers, because I understand the noble Earl is in a position to answer my Question.
THE EARL OF ONSLOW: My Lords, I hope that I shall be able to carry out the noble and learned Lord's wish, and give you an answer to the Question he has put. Perhaps I may begin my observations by quoting a sentence in the gracious Speech from the Throne at the opening of Parliament, which referred to the matter that has been raised by the noble and learned Lord. The words were:
"The anomalies and inequalities of the present system of local taxation have long called for reform and My Ministers are examining the whole question."
When those words were used that examination had just been commenced, and it has now been proceeding for several months. As your Lordships will, I think, understand, the more one goes into a difficult and complex question of this kind, the more one finds details and difficulties
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appearing, but I am glad to say that this examination has been carried to such a point that we are able to come to some preliminary conclusion.
My right hon. friend the Minister of Health yesterday stated in another place, on the occasion of the Second Reading of the Agricultural Pates Bill, that we have progressed so far in this examination that we hope very shortly to be able to circulate to local authorities the draft of a Bill on valuation and rating reform. When we do that we shall ask for their observations upon the draft Bill with a view, if possible, to introducing a measure next Session. The draft Bill to which I have referred is not yet quite ready for circulation, but is in course of preparation. As, however, it is not yet ready I think your Lordships will agree that it would be premature to discuss matters of detail, and, indeed, it would scarcely be proper to do so until we are in a position to produce the draft Bill; but, in answer to the specific Question which has been put to me, I think I may go so far as to say that one of the ends which the Government have in view is to substitute one valuation for the three valuations which are at present required. As your Lordships are aware, those three valuations are for the purposes of the parochial rate, the county rate and Income Tax (Schedule A) and the Inhabited House Duty.
LORD PARMOOR: You may have a borough rate, too.
THE EARL OF ONSLOW: That comes, I think, under the second category. At the present moment the rates and taxes raised on these valuations are based on three different values, and one of the objects of the Bill, it is hoped, will be to substitute for these three valuations one single valuation. It is impossible at the present stage to indicate the precise nature of the provisions necessary to secure this amalgamation but, generally, I think I may say that the intention is that the gross valuations shown in the valuation list shall be subsequently adopted as the gross value for taxation purposes, subject, of course, to such conditions as Parliament may impose when the Bill is passing through the two Houses. As the noble and learned Lord reminded us, the amalgamation of valuations has already taken place in

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London. The principles which govern the valuation in the Metropolis have for a long time been in operation, and perhaps I can best and most concisely explain the intentions of the Government by saying that, broadly speaking, what we contemplate is the extension of the metropolitan system to the country generally. I hope that I have been able to give the noble and learned Lord a little information on the point and to answer his Question.
LOUD PARMOOR: I should like to thank the noble Earl for the information he has given. Personally, I am very gratified to hear that the lines on which any Bill is likely to proceed are those which he has indicated.
LORD RAGLAN: May I ask the noble Earl whether he anticipates that the
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single valuation will include valuation for Estate Duty?
THE EARL OF ONSLOW: I am afraid I must ask for notice of that Question.

MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDERS (No. 5)BILL.
Brought from the Commons; read 1a; to be printed; and referred to the Examiners.

LONDON ELECTRIC RAILWAY BILL.
Brought from the Commons; read 1a; and referred to the Examiners.
House adjourned at five minutes before six o'clock.