§ VISCOUNT GREY OF FALLODONMy Lords, we understand that a statement is to be made by the noble Marquess the Leader of the House, and therefore I formally ask him whether he is prepared to make the statement which the House has been told to anticipate.
§ THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (THE MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON)Yes, my Lords. I will make to the House the statement which has been foreshadowed in public and in the Press. It cannot be made too clear, in the interests alike of the Powers concerned and of any who may hope to profit by exploiting differences between them, that the sole ground of possible divergence is as to the most effective means of reaching the ends which are vital to all and upon which all are in agreement. These ends are, as they have remained throughout, the payment of Reparations and the recovered security of Europe. To ensure them the Allies have grudged nothing in the past nor will they grudge anything in the future. This responsibility is acknowledged and is shared in equal measure by France, by Italy, by Belgium and by ourselves. Perhaps it may be held to devolve in a more special measure upon the French and British nations, by virtue of the great sacrifices which they made side by side in the years of trial, by the intimacy of fact and memory which unites them to-day and not least by the experiences which these two ancient civilisations have shared throughout the centuries.
A similar community of thought and action binds us in the present emergency to our other Allies, whose interests are in no respect divergent from our own. In the common desire for settlement and pacification, and still more for no further or unreasonable delay, we can speak together frankly and with the full comprehension 993 of partners bound by an equal destiny to the same task. The whispers of interested parties cannot be allowed on either side of the Channel or in any part of Europe to deflect us from that duty by any reservations, or by carefully fostered misunderstandings.
In all that we are about to say or to do His Majesty's Government are moved, as we know the heart of France to be moved—and the same applies equally to our other Allies—by the single desire that good will between the nations who have endured together shall be maintained and that each shall obtain what is her due. We are as determined as any of our Allies that Germany shall make reparation for the damage done in the Great War up to the fullest extent of her capacity. We have never wavered on this point; I do not believe that our people ever will. Indeed, we go further, and we are ready, as we have said on many occasions and as was repeated at Paris in January last, to use every measure to compel Germany to pay up to the amount of her capacity. We are conscious, however, as a business nation, that if we ask Germany to pay in excess of her capacity we shall not succeed. We and our Allies will be the main sufferers, and we are firmly convinced that methods which can only result in the ruin of Germany will be fatal to this country, to our Allies and to the whole of Europe.
From the beginning we have made it clear that in our opinion the occupation of the Ruhr was not calculated to produce the maximum amount of Reparation payment for the Allies. In January we made in Paris an offer which we regarded as a very generous settlement in order to avoid what seemed to us to be an economic disaster. That offer was rejected by our Allies, and since then we have stood aside animated by a spirit of sincere loyalty to the Alliance which has been, and continues to be in our opinion, the main security for European Peace. Many of the consequences which were then anticipated are in course of fulfilment. The Allies are obtaining less Reparation than they did before the occupation. What Reparation they are receiving is being exacted at the price of the growing dislocation of the German economic system and, as seems probable, of the future total collapse of that system itself.
994 The French and Belgian Governments assure us that their sole object in occupying the Ruhr is to secure the payment of Reparations. If that be so the difference between us is one of method rather than of aim, but we are convinced that an indefinite continuation of this state of affairs is fraught with grave peril. Germany herself appears to be moving fast towards economic chaos, which may itself be succeeded by social and industrial ruin. The local populations are in many cases suffering severely, and there are genuine apprehensions of a shortage of food. Nor is this a situation that concerns Germany alone. In proportion as the productive power of that country is exhausted, so does the recovery of her credit and the payment of her debts recede into a dimmer distance. Every country in Europe is paying the price for this condition of affairs. One country pays it in a steadily falling exchange, another in diminished trade, a third in increasing unemployment. If we were called upon to state or to defend the case of our own country alone, we could without difficulty demonstrate the serious effect that has already been produced upon British trade.
In spite of very great expenditure by the State—the figure is some £400,000,000 sterling since the Armistice—we still have unemployment on a large scale in this country. Not only does our devastation continue instead of being repaired, but it continues increasingly as the moral effects spread among our people.
Public opinion throughout Europe, and not least in Great Britain, is becoming more and more sensitive to these conditions and alarmed at their continuance. It is not too much to say that the recovery of the world is in danger, and that peace, for which so many sacrifices were borne, is at stake. It is in these circumstances that the necessity for action has been increasingly impressed upon His Majesty's Government. The exchange of friendly conversations, useful as they are, does not appear to lead in all cases to positive results. It is becoming evident that the attitude of the principal parties concerned must be more clearly defined.
If the situation has been at all correctly described in the preceding paragraphs, it cannot be left to right itself. There will, I believe, be general agreement to these propositions—that the period of conflict should as soon as possible be 995 terminated; that the indefinite occupation by one country of the territory of another in time of peace is a phenomenon, rare and regrettable in itself to which an honourable end should as soon as possible be found; that the debtor should not merely be called upon to pay his debts, but should be placed in a position where he can do so; that his capacity, where it is in doubt, should be tested and determined, and that united efforts should be made to accomplish these ends.
Peace will not finally be obtained and recovery will not be ensured until a solution has been found to three great questions. They are:—(1) The payment of Reparations; (2) the settlement of inter-Allied Debts; and (3) the security of a pacified Europe. It is to these questions that the attention of the world should be turned. In the pursuit of these aims His Majesty's Government are so far from desiring to deprive France and Belgium of their legal claims that they wish to assist them in their realisation. Our desire is for advance, if it can be made, and for finality, if it can be attained. And in these aspirations as well as in our view of the general situation, we are hopeful of obtaining the concurrence of France and Belgium, no less than that of Italy. Indeed, we have every reason to believe that the views of the Italian Government are in substantial agreement with our own.
What then are the steps which we think ought to be taken? The German note of June 7, in reply to a definite suggestion which had been addressed to the German Government, proposed an investigation of Germany's capacity to pay by an impartial body, coupled with an engagement to pay the amounts determined in the manner that might be proposed. It further contained the offer of a series of concrete guarantees. We do not think that these suggestions, whether they be adequate or not, should be ignored. We are unable to agree that a correspondence of this nature upon matters affecting the interests of all would be wholly one-sided, or that proposals, which may be found to contain in them the germs of a possible settlement, should be treated with indifference.
We hold that they should be examined and explored in order that we may discover whether there lies within them the possibility of progress. Understanding 996 that the French and Belgian Governments are not disposed to take the initiative in suggesting a reply—although we would gladly have welcomed any such action on their part—we have informed those Governments, as also the Italian Government, that we are willing to assume the responsibility of preparing a draft reply ourselves. Adhering, however, as we do, to the view which we expressed on the last occasion that united action is better than separate or isolated action, we shall submit the reply with the least possible delay to our Allies, for their consideration and remarks, and we indulge in the hope that we may be able to arrive at an agreement with them as to the terms. What the exact nature of the reply should be it will be premature to discuss at the present stage.
In formulating these views, His Majesty's Government are not without hope that they may be expressing Allied sentiments as well as their own. We do not believe that in principle we are widely separated, if at all, from them. Divergence of method should not be incapable of resolution. So far as united action is possible, we shall continue to pursue it, as we have endeavoured to do all along, and we shall confidently invite the. sympathetic consideration of the whole of our Allies and of all interested States to proposals which will have no other aim than the pacification of Europe and the recovery of an exhausted world.
§ VISCOUNT GREY OF FALLODONMy Lords, it would be rash, as well as unusual for me, to offer any criticisms on the statement which the noble Marquess has just made, and I do not propose to make any criticisms whatever. Indeed, so far as I followed and understood it, there are no criticisms that occur to me to make. I think from what I heard of it that even when I have had time to reflect upon and to consider it at leisure, I shall still have no desire except to further the policy which the noble Marquess has disclosed in that statement. I am glad to recognise that it is most friendly in tone to our Allies, especially to France; but I cannot conceal from myself the fact that, though most friendly in tone, it is also grave in substance. I do not pretend to be at all confident that anything that I can say will help the situation; but I feel that there are some things which I 997 should like to say on the general situation, and I would ask the leave of your Lordships, unusual though it may be, to say them now, because I would like to say them.
My fear is that the situation is so developing that if it continues to develop unfavourably, in a little time it might be demonstrably useless, perhaps even irrelevant, for me to say then what I should like to say now. I want to say it because it is the case, especially to those who have been most friendly towards and most closely associated with France, that the drift of events in the last few months has been acutely and peculiarly distressing. My association and friendship with Franco has been so close that to me the idea of a British Government ever engaging in separate negotiations with another Power at the expense of France is inconceivable.
I inherited at the Foreign Office, nine years before the war, the Entente with France which had been negotiated through Lord Lansdowne. It contained no obligation to give France military assistance. We never added to its obligations. Indeed, we expressly stated in writing that, however intimate and friendly our relations, each country was to remain as free to take its own course should war come as if there were no Entente. It is all the more remarkable that for those nine years preceding the war, in spite of efforts from quarters which were very active in opposition to the Entente—efforts made in this country and in France to sow distrust or suspicion between the two Governments—though there was no binding engagement between them, the relations were so open, frank and trustful, that never did a shadow of suspicion come between us in those nine years. The memory of that will always be with me as a close bond between our two countries. It did demonstrate how loyal and frank two Governments, without any binding tie, could be when each was perfectly loyal to the other.
Then there came a comradeship in arms, of which the whole country is just as conscious as any individual like myself. And besides that, there are the hard facts of the situation—the hard and solid facts that unless there be co-operation between the two Governments, the reconstruction and recovery of Europe is impossible, and that if the two Governments, the British 998 and French Governments, drift apart the recovery of Europe is doomed for an indefinite time, perhaps altogether. It is from that point of view that I make my observations. Our aims are the same. We wish as much as France does that Germany should pay all that she can. We know that France's need for Reparations, with her devastated districts, is even more urgent than ours. But we, too, have need of all that can be obtained, though we recognise the greater needs, and, as far as devastated regions are concerned, the priority of the French claim. We, too, wish for security for the future, as France naturally wishes for security for the future. I do not believe that the security of one country can be obtained without the security of the other.
Therefore, so far as obtaining the maximum amount from Germany that can be obtained and so far as ensuring security for the future, permanent security, are concerned, we are as genuinely and as whole-heartedly in favour of those aims as France is, and we are in favour of them without any further thought for ourselves as apart from the French interest in Reparations and security, too. Then how is it that we are not together? It is because His Majesty's Government believed, and public opinion generally in this country believed, that the particular method of securing this by the occupation of the Ruhr was calculated to defeat rather than to obtain that result. That was our honest belief.
The last German offer as regards the financial and economic aspect of Reparations is a great advance both in tone and in substance on anything that the German Government have offered before. So far as the financial and economic side of Reparations is concerned it is in effect a capitulation. Germany is like a debtor who says: " I cannot pay all that you ask. I admit my liability to pay all that I can. If you say I can pay more than I say I can, examine my books with the best experts, examine all my resources, examine all the securities I have to offer, and come to a settlement of what you will take. Examine every resource, every power to pay, every security, all will be disclosed." That, roughly, is what I take the last German offer to be.
I think His Majesty's Government is quite right, in saying that that 999 ought not be be dismissed as unworthy of being the basis of discussion. If Reparations are to materialise in the form of cash payments, or even payments in kind—and they give all guarantees and securities—how are you ever to make any progress if you put aside an offer such as that as being unworthy of discussion? I understand very well the French position, believing as they do in their own policy with regard to the Ruhr, that before they will discuss the offer the German Government should withdraw its orders for passive resistance. I understand that from the French point of view, but the last statement I saw—perhaps it was not accurately reported—attributed to their Prime Minister, contained a statement that the German offer now made—which is referred to in the statement by the noble Marquess opposite—was not worthy of discussion. It is putting the German Government in an impossible position if you say that she must withdraw her instructions for passive resistance before you will discuss anything, and also at the same time say that the offer which she has made is not worth discussing. I think it impossible to make progress on that position.
I would like to make it clear that we do wish to get the utmost in Reparations from Germany not only for the sake of France but for ourselves, and that our sole objection to French policy is that we believe it is calculated to defeat that object, and that we see not merely our-own prospects but the French prospect of getting Reparations being prejudiced as well. If the French say, as perhaps they may, that the improvement in tone and substance of the last German offer is due to their policy in the Ruhr, no one can take exception to their saying so. All we can say is if it is due to that, if there is a real improvement due to the French policy in the Ruhr, then it may be that we were not far-seeing enough in saying there would be no results from that policy, but it merely strengthens our belief that if that be a result already of the French occupation, it should be something which the French themselves should be prepared to take into consideration.
One word more on the question of security. I cannot believe that this question of future security is not in French minds as it is in ours. Of course, it is possible to discuss Reparations apart from 1000 the question of future security, but it is not really possible to think of the occupation of the Ruhr and of Reparations without also thinking of what is to be the position in the future when France has withdrawn from the Ruhr. I do not believe that the French policy in the Ruhr, whatever other results it may have, even if they be favourable results on Reparations, can, in the long run, secure French security, or, indeed, add anything to it, but in the long run will make it certain that that security will not be.
I take the lesson of history. For generations there have been these wars between France and Germany. Each has been trying after those wars to make itself secure against the other. I will take the last instance—German policy after the war of 1870. Bismarck, after the war of 1870, with France crushed and defeated, was apprehensive of French recovery in future. He made the Triple Alliance to make Germany secure. He also went further, and made a reinsurance Treaty with Russia, and for a generation Germany was secured by his arrangements. But in the long run what was the result? The result was a tremendous increase of armaments all over Europe, and, finally, militarism, in the form of Prussian militarism, which came to the conclusion that the only solution of the situation which had been created was another war. Even if a German does not agree with that way of stating it, the facts are there. For a generation Germany did get security by making a separate group of Alliances from which France was excluded, and from which she was intended to be excluded; it did lead to the result that there was a great increase of armaments; and, finally, to a most disastrous and devastating war, and Germany is where she is to-day.
We fought this war to preserve our own liberties in the first instance with our Allies, also to preserve their liberties, but we fought it in the hope that we might put an end to militarism, to that sort of militarism which Prussian militarism was, and which made war certain. I have only taken the instance of what happened after 1870, but you may go back in history and get other examples. The lesson of the past is that militarism is not going to make any nation or any group of nations secure against future war. That 1001 is, I believe, the lesson of history, and the lesson of the last war. It comes to this, that whatever may be done, France can make herself secure by a policy like the Ruhr policy perhaps for several years, but the lesson of history is for all of us, that no one nation, no group of nations, can in the long run make themselves secure by a security intended for themselves which is to be obtained at the expense of other nations of whom they are apprehensive.
The only security for any one nation in the future is some security which the other nations with whom it is regarded as possible there should be war have an equal interest in seeing maintained. That is, I believe, the lesson of history. All the old methods have been tried again and again, and they have always failed, with the most remarkable and disastrous failure of the last war. When those methods were tried after the Franco-German war they failed. It is only by the newer methods that there is any prospect of permanent security.
I wish the British and French Governments could show that they have grasped this lesson of history; that they realise the failure, in the long run, of the old methods; that they have grasped the conception of something wider, a security which will, indeed, be a security for France and Great Britain, a security from which other nations will not be excluded and which they will have an equal interest in maintaining. If the British and French Governments, strong as they would be in co-operation, firmly grasped that conception they would be able to give it practical form, make it real, and living, and applicable to international politics. If they wore united in a wide policy with regard to security of that kind it would lay the foundations of friendship between the two countries firmer than they have ever been. It would do more. There is not, I am sure, a civilised democracy in the world but what would feel its instinct so appealed to that it would sooner or later join in that policy and use all its resources, opportunities and strength to make the policy permanent and secure.
I believe that is still a possibility. If things go on drifting unfavourably it may cease to be a possibility. If France and Great Britain can come together—I am not asking more than that at the beginning co-operation should be on the lines 1002 the noble Marquess has laid before us today—they can save Europe and secure its reconstruction and recovery. If they fall apart, if the British and French Governments find it impossible to co-operate, then I see nothing in the future except the growth of distrust; one nation, or a group of nations, trying to make itself secure against another nation, or group of nations, more armaments, and, finally, another war which must be more terrible and devastating than the last war.
That is all I ask leave to say to your Lordships this afternoon. I say it in the belief that I am doing no harm by saying it, and in the hope that the policy which the noble Marquess has put forward on behalf of His Majesty's Government today will be so received in France, that they will see in it a reasonableness which does make it possible for the two Governments to begin to work together again; that they will realise how vital it is that that should be the result of the announcement of policy made on behalf of His Majesty's Government. We have come to that point when, if the two Governments cannot begin to co-operate, they must drift further and further apart, and the consequences must be disastrous to Europe, fatal to that security in the future about which France is so rightly anxious, and certainly a danger to our own security as well.
§ THE EARL OF BIRKENHEADMy Lords, I hardly think your Lordships have given permission for a general debate, but inasmuch as on two occasions I have had Questions on the Paper on this topic I may perhaps be allowed, without attempting to embark on any such debate, to make a brief observation. It must, in the first place, be plain that some formal discussion must take place upon these matters in this House. As I understand, Parliament is to rise on or about August 3. From the statement made by the noble Marquess the Leader of the House I understood that the separate representation to the Government of Germany, with the propriety of which I entirely agree, is to be addressed in the first place to our Allies, France, Italy and Belgium. No one will quarrel with that decision. But what I would like to know is whether Parliament is to have an opportunity at all of considering the terms of the answer to the German offer. When we were in power—the noble 1003 Marquess was my colleague at the Foreign Office—Parliament at those recurring crises was justly impatient of any claim on behalf of the Executive to commit this country on deeply important international affairs without any opportunity being afforded Parliament for discussion. I cannot doubt but that a day will be found in another place for a debate upon the deeply interesting and important announcement which the noble Marquess has made to-night, and it seems to me inevitable that if that matter is debated in another place, as it will be, it will equally form the subject of discussion in your Lordships' House. I shall take an opportunity, so far as it lies in my power, to afford an opportunity for such a debate.
Many points urgently require a fuller exposition than it was in the power of the noble Marquess to make to-night. I make no complaint that he limited himself to a general statement; no doubt, he was forced so to limit himself. But we have been given to understand in the Press that so long ago as four weeks a detailed series of interrogations was addressed by His Majesty's Government to the French Government. It is generally described in the Press by the somewhat unattractive word questionnaire. It would not seem to mo to be altogether unreasonable that if one old Ally thought proper, diplomatically, to address a written request for explanations as to what were the objects which the other Ally had in mind in carrying on the occupation of the Ruhr, we should have been afforded some reply. The statement of the noble Marquess to-day has left me in complete doubt as to whether at this moment any written reply of any kind has been afforded to what I understand was a most formal and courteous request for a written reply addressed to the French Government by our own Government. If no written reply has been vouchsafed, we are in the position that we have asked, with the utmost formality, that there should be a reply in writing to certain specified questions, and we are left in that verbal and unsatisfactory atmosphere in which conversations take place in Paris and in London, and it is almost impossible to attain any precision in the matter at all.
I hope that before Parliament adjourns, until, perhaps, the month of November, 1004 the matter may be pushed a little further, and I hope that it will not be regarded as in any way embarrassing to the Government or prejudicial to the Alliance if I indicate the methods to which my mind is working, and to which I shall venture to call the attention of the Government if and when a debate takes place. Supposing that this separate reply which we are to make to the German Government is not accepted by the French Government; what is to happen then? The short answer to the very noble aspirations made by the noble Viscount who has just spoken as to what might happen if only there should be established this ideal co-operation between France and England, must surely be that, in the light of the experience of the last six weeks, we must be cautious in expecting too much. I do not detect in anything that is said or in anything that is written in France any patient disposition to listen to any admonitions of any kind which come from this side of the Channel unless those admonitions fit in with the scheme of unilateral action upon which France is evidently inflexibly determined, and from which this Government has with the utmost formality dissented. Consequently, I shall be very content to be judged by what I am saying now when the event is made plain: when, in other words, the answer of the French Government is given to our separate communication to the German Government I shall be well content to be judged as to my quality as a political prophet by that answer.
Supposing then, if I may found myself for a moment upon the prediction which I am bold enough to make, they say, as, believe me, they most assuredly will say: " This policy is inconsistent with our Ruhr policy and we entirely object to your attempting to make any separate arrangement of any kind at all with Germany." No one who is listening to me will, I suppose, impute it as being any unfriendly reflection upon the French Government if I make this prediction. It could not be so treated, because not one politician, not one Minister in the present French Government, and not one publicist of reputation in France, has said or written one word which does not involve the logical conclusion which I have ventured to indicate to your Lordships. 1005 Surely, we should be mad if we allowed Parliament to break up without forming any anticipation of that which may happen, without receiving from the Government the slightest indication of what their policy would prove to be should that happen which every one knows will happen.
Let me indicate how vital are the problems which require decision both in this House and elsewhere. Supposing that the answer of the French Government is as I indicate. What is to happen then to the Army of Occupation? Are we to keep the Army of Occupation in Germany for months? What useful purpose is that Army, in existing circumstances or in foreseeable circumstances, likely to serve? I should like to ask another question. Where do our claims to Separations stand? Everybody is agreed that the existing French occupation of the Ruhr is day by day and week by week dissipating and destroying all prospects of any kind that we in this country have of obtaining Reparations. Side by side with that is a question which equally requires the consideration of the Government and the decision of Parliament, the question to which the noble Viscount has just referred, that of what is to happen to the inter-Allied Debts. We have had to pay our Debts to the United States. No one wall pretend that it is easy for us to pay them, or that it is agreeable to us to pay them, but we are paying them, though the major part of the liability was not ours taut attached to others. Side by side with that payment there exists the immense liability to us and there exists an almost indefinite capacity of competing in armaments and of erecting new and alarming additions to our expenditure upon the Air.
I welcome both that which the noble Marquess said and that which the noble Viscount said, that there was one proposal contained in the last German Note which was worth the whole of every previous Note that Germany has delivered since the signing of the Armistice—I refer to the clause which undertook to submit the whole financial situation in Germany to the decision of an international board of independent experts. That proposal, in itself, had great merits, and it had additional merits from this circumstance, that it had been made independently by the Secretary for 1006 Foreign Affairs of the United States, Mr. Secretary Hughes, who almost, though not quite, by his advocacy of that proposal, committed the United States Government to participation in such a committee if such a committee were constituted. Think how you would immediately substitute for the shifting uncertainty of the atmosphere in which at this moment we all live a business certainty to which the statesmen of all nations could give recognition, if you had set up an authoritative tribunal which would say plainly that Germany could pay so much in discharge of all claims. If such a declaration were authoritatively made, and if it were accepted by the Allies, the only task that would remain—difficult enough, but not insoluble—would be that of allocating to the different Allies the shares to which each of them may be respectively entitled.
I have made it my object, as the noble Viscount made it his object, not to say-one single word which might be justly or fairly impeached as being unfriendly to an Ally by whose side we have suffered so much and sustained so many perils, but I am nevertheless of the opinion, as I think, from the statement that the noble Marquess has made to-day, it must be assumed that the Government is of the opinion, that the best prospect of maintaining that Alliance, that relationship, even that good feeling in their integrity is by the fullest candour and frankness in speech which is consistent with the methods of international courtesy. I am persuaded that we shall not attain to complete understanding with France by encouraging or permitting them to ignore the considerations which are moving our minds and influencing opinion in this country, though an opinion at this moment largely inarticulate. No, my Lords, the true method of maintaining in its integrity that good feeling of which the noble Viscount made himself so eloquent an advocate—and for the maintenance of which I do not yield even to him in my desire—is that there should be made with the most complete frankness an explanation of what each country expects, what each country thinks fair, and what each country proposes to require.
§ THE MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTONMy Lords, I have no desire or intention to prolong a discussion which, 1007 valuable as it has been in certain of its aspects, is, if regarded from the point of view of procedure, a little irregular. It is, I believe, an uncommon and, I dare say, an almost unprecedented thing that a debate of first class importance should arise out of a Question asked by private Notice, and although I readily concede that this situation is exceptional in its importance and in its gravity, I should not like by any action of my own to extend the precedent which has been set this evening. On the other hand, as regards the speech of the noble Viscount who leads the Opposition, I have nothing but thanks to offer him for the terms which he employed; and here I am not alluding so much to the attitude which he adopted towards the statement which it was my duty to make as to the advice, as it seemed to me the sound, experienced and statesmanlike advice, which he extended equally to His Majesty's advisers, to public opinion in this country, to France, and to our Allies on the Continent.
As regards the speech of the noble and learned Earl who has just resumed his seat, he put what seemed to me a perfectly legitimate question. He said: " Here is an issue of capital importance: a statement has been made to-night of considerable gravity; the Session of Parliament is drawing to an end at no distant date; shall we not have an opportunity of discussing it? " Most certainly yes. But I would submit this further proposition to your Lordships. The test of the moment that we choose for holding that discussion is the effect which it will have upon the success or the reverse of the negotiations. I indicated to the House what are our ideas as to the course of procedure. We shall shortly be engaged in drawing up this draft reply to the German Note. That in itself will be a task of some delicacy and some difficulty, but it is one that it is our duty to endeavour to surmount. The next stage, as I pointed out, will be to endeavour to secure for it the consent of our Allies. No doubt, it will be quite clear to the House that while that process is going on nothing could be more unfortunate, or more unwise, than that we should be pressed here as to what we put into the Note, or what is the attitude, in the preliminary stages, of our Allies towards it.
1008 Your Lordships will remember that I indicated in my opening statement that it would further be our duty to place before our Allies our reasoned views upon the question of Reparations and the question of the inter-Allied Debts in its widest aspect. That is, again, a matter requiring very great caution in approaching and handling, and there again, I should be very reluctant to have a discussion here until we have communicated our views to our Allies and have some idea what their view with regard to them may be. Therefore, I ask your Lordships' permission to hold the discussion, which will certainly take place before the Session ends, in suspense for the time being, and to trust me, in consultation with noble Lords opposite, to inform them when the most favourable moment will arrive, when, having ascertained the views of the Allies whom we are about to consult, we may come to this House for that support or advice which your Lordships have never failed to give us.