§ THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD rose to ask for information upon the negotiations relating to the Ruhr occupation; and to move for Papers. The noble and learned Earl said: My Lords, the Motion which I have upon the Paper no longer corresponds with the needs of the moment, or no longer completely corresponds with them, inasmuch as the noble Marquess has made a statement which covers part but not the whole of the matters to which I desire to direct the attention of the House. But before I proceed to those matters I must make it quite plain, though I have already made an observation upon this point, that I do not and cannot assent to the view that because an international affair is grave it is a matter to which no useful contribution can be made by your Lordships' House. I would point out in that respect, first of all, that that is not the view which at this moment is being taken in another place, where the matter is being discussed in a debate to which, as I understand, the Leaders of all Parties are likely to contribute, and, in the second place, that it is not the view which is taken in any other country in Europe, where these matters are being made the subject of recurrent Parliamentary debate.
§ I should be sorry, indeed, if at a moment like this your Lordships were to adjourn without some discussion of the extraordinarily grave situation in which this country and Europe now find themselves. It is extremely important to observe that we are about to separate for three and a half months. Who can tell what will have happened in three, and a half months? Who can tell in what situation Germany will be, and what the situation in the Ruhr will be? To part without a single observation being made 1541 which may tend, if not to influence the Government, at least to inform the Government how your Lordships' minds are working, would, I think, be a disaster of the first magnitude.
§ It is a little important to observe the history of this matter. Let me summarise a few of its leading stages before I attempt an analysis of the extraordinary position in which we now find ourselves. The policy of the late Government was a clear policy. It was skilfully and tenaciously pursued by the noble Marquess, expressing as he did the views and the wishes of his colleagues It was the policy of carrying out the Treaty of Peace, while at the same time, in the later days of the Government when that possibility had become doubtful, of persuading the French that the steps which have since been taken would be prudently avoided. Whatever else may be said of the policy of that Government, at least we produced this result. We did not reach any open breach with our French Allies, and we succeeded in persuading them not to occupy the Ruhr. That was the situation when the late Government fell.
§ The next stage which requires consideration arose with the advent to power of Mr. Bonar Law. Mr. Bonar Law shared the views and expressed the policy of his predecessors—namely, that the occupation of the Ruhr would be an economic and political misfortune. He expressed that view with his usual clearness and lucidity. We had been criticised, not by the noble Marquess but by some of his colleagues to-day, for our failure to maintain relations as friendly with our French Allies as our critics thought to be desirable and possible. We were conscious that that criticism was an unfair and unjust one, and the sequence of events since we laid aside office has abundantly justified the claim which we put forward, that nothing had been neglected by us which could, consistently with the objects of the policy which we conceived to be fundamental, attain the maximum of good relationship between ourselves and the French.
§ But when once the decision was taken to go into the Ruhr, Mr. Bonar Law, with his usual sagacity, adopted a very clear conclusion. He expressed it in the speech which he made in the House of Commons. In the course of that speech he indicated a belief, indeed, that the Ruhr policy 1542 would not succeed, but almost hoped that it might, because he saw how disastrous to the Entente and the general cause of Europe would be a failure in a step so definite and so serious taken by one of our Allies. Then he used some remarkable words. It may be said, he stated, that to have no policy—and we hardly have a policy on the matter—is bad, but to take a step, perhaps disastrous, would be not only bad, but would be worse. Therefore, Mr. Bonar Law's policy was a clear one. It was, in effect: "We disapprove of the policy of the whole occupation of the Ruhr. Politically and economically we believe that occupation to be disastrous, but at the same time it is a course which has been decided upon by our Allies, and I propose to say or do nothing which in any way may increase their difficulties. "In other words, Mr. Bonar Law went into entrenchment when the French decision and French action was taken.
§ A wholly different policy has been adopted with the disappearance from the scene of the experience and sagacity of Mr. Bonar Law, and whatever else is in doubt this at least is clear, that the policy which has been acted upon is not a policy for which Mr. Bonar Law ever made himself responsible, and I very much doubt whether it is a policy for which he would ever have made himself responsible. What is it that has been done? The Government, making every arrangement by which publicity and notoriety should be given to its intentions, announced that the time had now come when this country could no longer remain inactive in the situation which had arisen in the Ruhr. Two Ministers, Mr. Neville Chamberlain and Mr. Amery, during the week-end before the noble Marquess made his statement in this House, announced in most positive and explicit terms that the time had now arrived when this country proposed to take a part in the discussions, when we could no longer disinterest ourselves alike from intervention and, it may be, from action.
§ Thereupon a Note was framed, and this Note was duly despatched to the French Government. The noble Marquess acquainted this House with the terms of that Note some two or three weeks ago. In the short and informal debate which followed I alone of your Lordships expressed the opinion, and made the clear 1543 prediction that there was not the slightest chance of that Note being accepted by the French Government. That prediction was unfavourably received by members of His Majesty's Government, and yet it seemed to me to be absolutely elementary to any one who had studied the psychology of the French nation or the present political situation in which M. Poincaré finds himself.
§ What was the Note? It was a Note which proposed a number of definite steps to the French Government. The noble Marquess will not quarrel if I say that by far the most definite of the proposals made to the French Government was that the Allies should join in a Note to be presented on behalf of them all in answer to the German Government. We have actually received to-day from the noble Marquess the information that after all these weeks of discussion and consideration the French Government have not even made the slightest reference to what was the main and fundamental proposal in the communication addressed by us to them.
§ THE MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTONThat is not so. I think the noble and learned Earl has not quite correctly represented what I said. I do not blame him for he has not seen the Notes. What I said was that we had sent to the Allied Governments a draft of the proposed identic reply to the German Government with a covering Note elaborating and explaining the suggestions contained therein. The French and Belgian replies, which we have received, comment at great length upon our exposition of the case in the covering Note. What I said was that they did not allude to the draft identic reply we submitted.
§ THE EARL OF BIRKENHEADI am much obliged to the noble Marquess for his statement. The addition he has now made clears the matter somewhat, but even in the form in which he now makes the statement it is a surprising circumstance that the sending of this joint identic Note should not be referred to in the formal answer. When I ventured to warn your Lordships two or three weeks ago that there was not the slightest prospect of these proposals being agreed to by the French Government and asked what the policy of the Government was, I was led to a conclusion which seemed 1544 to be elementary by certain considerations which, I think, cannot have escaped the attention of His Majesty's Government.
In the first place, from the moment that the French nation went into the Ruhr, it was obvious that the honour, prestige and determination of the whole nation was involved in that attempt. It was most desirable to persuade them, if you could, not to go to the Ruhr, but no one who has studied what has been said by French statesmen and by French journalists, and what has been said in the debates in the Chamber, can have any excuse for the delusion that the whole French nation were not behind M. Poincaré in his Ruhr policy. I observe that Mr. Bonar Law, in the speech to which I have already referred, plainly pointed this out. He said that we must apply ourselves to the Ruhr situation and the consequent European difficulty with the knowledge that the whole French nation is behind the French Government in their occupation of the Ruhr. It is necessary to add that every week that has passed, so far from weakening, has in my judgment strengthened this attitude, and if at this moment a decision of the French people was taken, or a decision of the French Chamber, an overwhelming majority would be disclosed in favour of the policy of M. Poincaré.
I shall be asked: To what do these arguments tend? And it is my purpose to attempt to make that plain. When, a week or two ago, I pointed out that it was certain that the French Government would not accept the proposals of His Majesty's Government, I asked what His Majesty's Government intended to do. Even then it seemed clear that it was madness to revive the question at all before the whole world unless a clear policy underlay its revival; and not only a clear policy but a useful policy. In other words, nothing at all could be urged on behalf of the course of indicating to the whole world that the moment had now arrived at which we must take some independent step, when we should assert the rights of this country, unless upon a rebuff, which could have been foreseen and which ought to have been foreseen, we had a clear policy which was better that the Bonar Law policy of accepting under protest that which was done.
1545 Nothing would seem to me to have been at once more undesirable and less fruitful than to have taken a step which has indicated to the whole world not merely that we are not content with the Ruhr situation but that we intend to do something which we have not done in the past. Either positively or negatively there is to be a reversal of the policy of this country. If you do not mean that, it was the height of futility to have still further exasperated France and puzzled French opinion by sending to them proposals which everybody knew would be unpalatable to them. Therefore I drew this inference, that when this Note was sent to France—quite obviously a new direction in our policy—the intention had already been formed of dealing with the situation upon two alternative hypotheses. The Government must have contemplated the situation upon the hypothesis that the policy would succeed. Had it succeeded no difficulty would have arisen; but it is equally clear that they must have addressed their mind to the contingency that that policy might fail. And the question which I asked a fortnight ago and which I propose with great respect to ask again to-day is, now that it has failed, what is the course which is to be adopted?
France has declined to assent to the numerous proposals which were made by His Majesty's Government. What does the Government now propose to do? Parliament is to separate for three and a half months. The most vital consequences may depend, and must depend, upon the decisions which are to be taken. Ministers have told us that England is no longer to be disregarded, that steps are to be taken. What are those steps? Are they to be taken without the knowledge of Parliament in these three and a half months? Are we to have no indication as to what effect is to be given to this step which I have shown must in logic be in the mind of the Government? They could not possibly have addressed this admonition or this recommendation to the French Government without having some scheme in their minds in the event of that recommendation not being adopted. It has not been adopted. What is the scheme of the Government?
Pressure in a grave international matter is not the custom of this House or, in the main, of another place, and 1546 there is a universal and a most reasonable desire in such difficult circumstances not to embarrass he Government. But although that feeling must receive its due weight, it was not we who forced this situation. It was not your Lordships, it was the Government who took the view that, as a development of their policy in dealing with France, it was necessary to make this proposal to the French nation. If nothing is to be done upon its failure, it would have been far better that private conversations should have taken place between the distinguished member of this House who represents us in Paris and the French Government, or between the noble Marquess and the French Ambassador in London, and that they should have attempted to discover by means of those private discussions whether or not an accommodation upon these lines were within reach. In such a case there need have been no advertisement to the world of a new orientation of British policy, there need have been no speeches upon provincial platforms by Cabinet Ministers announcing that the time had now come when Great Britain no longer intended to be ignored in the discussions of Europe. Discreet and private conversations should have taken place in Paris or in London, and we need not have advertised to the whole world the further lamentable stage which has been reached in the disagreement upon vital policy between this country and our Allies.
It is not for me, it is not for any of your Lordships who are not officially concerned, to offer advice or to indicate a policy. I notice, however, in the statement made by the noble Marquess, to which I listened with the deepest attention, that the only operative part of it was the concluding paragraph. All the rest was narrative; it dealt either with the earlier stages of the controversy or with the contents of the French and Allied replies. The last paragraph and the last paragraph alone was operative. And what did it say? It said simply this, that as the result of all that had happened His Majesty's Government had reached the decision to attempt to obtain consent to the publication of the Papers. Of expression of intention, of indication to the country of policy at a moment when we are to lose sight of the Government 1547 for three and a half months, there was not one word. All we know is that the Government are going to try—but are not at all sure whether they will succeed—to obtain the consent of the international correspondents to the publication of the letters which have been exchanged between them. We know nothing else, and we are to go away for three and a half months with no other suggestion or indication of what further steps the Government may intend to take.
It is extremely difficult for anyone who has not had the responsibility of carrying on these discussions, as has the noble Marquess, for the last nine months to make any suggestion at all, but inasmuch as no one has a right to criticise upon such matters unless there are some respects at least in which he thinks that certain things ought to be done or that certain things ought to be omitted, I ask leave very shortly to indicate my own general view upon the grave situation in which Germany, France, Europe and ourselves are found at this moment. My view is, and was, that, first of all, every attempt should have been made, consistently with maintaining friendly relations between the Allies, to prevent the Ruhr policy in limine, to prevent the French from going into the Ruhr at all. But that policy failed, and the moment it failed a wholly new situation arose. I will venture to tell your Lordships what I think the attitude of this country should have been in relation to that situation. We ought to have realised that whatever happened the step so taken was irrevocable until it brought its own lesson or its own vindication. Had the noble Marquess who represents this country in Paris been consulted at any single moment—I mean, of course, consulted upon this specific point; naturally he was consulted generally—I cannot doubt but that there has not been one day since the French occupation of the Ruhr became an established fact on which he would not have informed His Majesty's Government that the whole tenacity of the French nation was committed to the maintenance of that policy and the carrying out of that experiment either to success or failure.
Assuming, as I have assumed, that such would have been and must have been the advice given by all who understood the psychology of the French nation, what inference ought to have been drawn from 1548 it? Surely, the inference was that this occupation had created a wholly new situation, that it had revolutionised the facts. The argument of diplomacy had been exhausted in the attempt to prevent France from occupying the Ruhr. The moment the argument of diplomacy had failed there was nothing left to be done. No one in this country could be mad enough to suggest that we should attempt by any application, in any shape or form, of force to prevent that policy of occupation proceeding to its ultimate consequence, be that consequence good or bad. No one has suggested it; no one could suggest it. But the moment you exclude that suggestion—and common sense must exclude it—you are left with no other course to explore except the diplomatic one. The diplomatic argument failed on the day when Mr. Bonar Law left Paris, on the day when M. Poincaré definitively rejected the British proposal. From the moment of that failure the policy of this country must have been plain and, I think, ought to have been consistently pursued, and that was a policy based on the realisation that the French were committed to this attitude and that nothing but the logic of events would bring, on the one hand, instruction to them, or, on the other hand, instruction to us.
We have not adopted this course. What remains at this moment? Are we to keep in Germany, in the months that are in front of us, our Army of Occupation? I said at a very early stage in these discussions that our Army was to-day placed in a most humiliating situation. I do not choose to multiply, because I think no useful public purpose can be rendered by multiplying, the evidences of that humiliating situation, but they are known to many of your Lordships who have relatives or friends with that Army. In the second place, we still have a representative on the Reparation Commission. What useful function is he performing? Is he performing any function at all? What is the purpose of our retaining a member upon the Reparation Commission? I myself have not the slightest doubt that the true policy of this country at this moment is not to address representations to the French nation which we have no means at all of enforcing, and which they most evidently have not the slightest intention of accepting at our hands. M. Poincaré said 1549 recently: "We will accept in this matter interference from no nation. "Their attitude is plain. When you are confronted with an absolutely unyielding attitude of that kind, and when you are powerless to interfere, surely your right policy is to say: "Well, you have chosen to do this. You believe it will bring you economic and political salvation. Pursue it, and it is the determination of the event, and of the event alone, which can prove whether you are right or we are right."
That is a matter in which in one particular very considerable injustice has been done to the French people. At the time the Treaty of Peace was made, when I, too, was a member of the Government, it was known to all of us that the French had in mind two objects. The first was financial reparation, and the second was security. The agreement made between President Wilson, the representatives of this country, and the representatives of the French Government, gave the French what they believed to be security; in other words, the Anglo-American pact to come to the aid of France in case of further aggression at the hands of Germany, undoubtedly tranquillised and soothed real French apprehensions. That pact ceased to have, in the French opinion, effective value the moment it became evident that the American nation was not prepared to follow Mr. Wilson's guidance in this matter. Thereafter, the French were left with inadequate prospect, as they thought, in the matter of Reparations, and with no protection at all in the matter of security.
Now, my Lords, there is much ground for the view that the intervention, and the continued intervention, of the French in the Ruhr is based at least as strongly upon a desire for security as upon a desire for money. Whether they are right or wrong, who can tell? I have always doubted, and I doubt now, the usefulness of the course that the French have adopted, but I am far too experienced in such matters to be dogmatic upon it. I observe that all schools of thought in France take that view. While I think that events will prove they are wrong, I am not sure. Who can be sure? What is the calculation upon which it is based? It is, if you choose, harsh, cold and calculating. Some critics have even said it is worse. But our purpose is not to 1550 describe, but to understand it, and it is clear what the purpose is. It is this: If you cannot obtain Reparations from the German Government at least you shall render the German nation helpless for a considerable period of years—at least you shall, by perhaps the disruption of the German nation, make it certain that France will have nothing to dread from Germany in the years which lie before it.
To understand this attitude one must at least realise what France suffered in the late war at the hands of Germany, and one must appreciate that she has completely lost the security given to her by the Treaty of Peace—namely, the joint pact of America and this country to protect her in case of aggression. I have ventured to enter upon this consideration of the question for one object and one object only, and it is to make it plain to your Lordships that France is not going to deviate in any degree from the position which she has taken up. I knew that perfectly well two or three weeks ago, when the noble Marquess read to your Lordships the terms of the British declaration, and it was that knowledge which led me to say that there was not the slightest chance of her accepting the British proposals. I was right.
§ THE MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTONWhy do you say that?
§ THE EARL OF BIRKENHEADI assume that if there was any point in the French reply to which the noble Marquess thought it worth while to direct attention, as being an acceptance of the British proposals—
§ THE MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTONObviously I cannot refer to Papers which I have not yet had permission to lay before Parliament.
§ THE EARL OF BIRKENHEADNot only did the noble Marquess refer to them but on several points he indicated the tenor of them.
§ THE MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTONThe Papers to which I referred were Papers for which I and His Majesty's Government are responsible, and which we, in the exercise of our authority, have the right to lay before Parliament.
§ THE EARL OF BIRKENHEADThe noble Marquess will really have to forgive me for saying that that is not quite right. He could not possibly have derived from any Papers which His Majesty's Government had addressed to the French Government the general statement which he made, that the French and Belgian Governments had not, in fact, accepted the suggestions that this country had made to them. That can only have come from the French and Belgian communications. I cannot recall the exact language, but I think your Lordships will bear me out, and we shall sec when we read a report of the statement to-morrow whether I am right or wrong. I derived from the noble Marquess's speech the clear impression that the reply of the French nation to the document presented on behalf of His Majesty's Government was an unfavourable reply. The noble Marquess naturally would not go into details, but he certainly left upon my mind, and I believe upon the minds of your Lordships, the clear impression that the French reply was not an acceptance of the proposals addressed to them by His Majesty's Government.
In these circumstances the course which in my judgment this country ought to adopt is a plain one. We ought to give the French every chance for their policy, inasmuch as we have no means of effective interference. We ought no longer to address Notes which increase their difficulties and may involve us in the lamentable responsibility of its being supposed that we are encouraging Germany. I was, I confess, a little astonished to hear for the first time from the noble Marquess that in our proposed Note to Germany we had taken the responsibility of advising that country to desist from passive resistance. It seems to me a difficult responsibility to propose to assume. If you thought the occupation was wrong, as I understand His Majesty's Government thought, it is somewhat difficult to see how, logically, one can advise the German Government in such a matter, and one rather wonders whether the assumption of the task of giving advice in such a matter would be wholly wise.
Be that as it may, I think the conclusion must be plain, first, that henceforth we should recognise that the French occupation is an accomplished fact, an I 1552 that the whole European situation changed the day they went there; secondly, we ought to recognise that we have no power to alter the situation; and, thirdly, we should recognise that the French nation is unquestionably determined to carry that occupation out to its logical conclusion. Our course then is clear. We ought to do nothing more in the matter at all, except that I think that we ought to withdraw our Army of Occupation and our representative from the Separation Commission. In that way we shall escape all responsibility for what is going on, and make it possible for the French Government to make their own experiment with the certain knowledge that if they succeed the success is theirs, and if they fail the failure is theirs.
I have made these observations to-day because I myself feel, as every member of the House must feel, the alarming circumstances under which to-day Parliament disappears for three and a half months. Decisions of the utmost importance not only may be taken, but must be taken, within the next weeks, even possibly within the next days. By a singular series of unfortunate accidents, not even to-day, the last day before we part, have we available for discussion and consideration the documents which have been exchanged between this country and France. I have avoided every single word of criticism of the noble Marquess, greatly as I differed from some parts of the policy which has been adopted, but I have always realised the devotion and the care and the skill which the noble Marquess himself has brought to bear upon these negotiations, and I know from some experience the difficulties which he has had to encounter. But I do most earnestly hope that the decision has now at last been adopted that this experiment, be it wise or unwise, has been undertaken definitely, that it will not be abandoned, and that its results are clear; and I hope it will be realised that it is not in our power to control or to deflect it.
THE LORD SPEAKERThe noble and learned Earl has given notice of a Motion for Papers. Does he wish to persist in that Motion?
§ THE EARL OF BIRKENHEADNo, I do not intend to press that.
§ VISCOUNT GREY OF FALLODONMy Lords in two things I agree with what the noble and learned Earl has said. The first is that it is inevitable, in a situation so grave, that there should be a desire, both in this House and in another place, not to separate without discussion on the situation. In fact, both this House and another place might even feel that, as deliberative Assemblies, in a situation so grave as this, they were almost stultifying themselves and abdicating their functions if they separated without any discussion. But, on the other hand, though that is a perfectly natural feeling, it is exceedingly difficult to embark upon discussion of the situation, precisely because it is so important and so grave, without having full documents before us.
There are really being placed before the world two alternative policies—the policy of His Majesty's Government, set out, I gather, in the communication to the Allied Governments; and the policy which is being pursued by France and Belgium, and which, I presume, is more or less the subject of their replies. But we cannot pronounce upon those two alternative policies, the world cannot judge upon them, without having them fully before us. I understand, of course, that His Majesty's Government cannot publish the documents without the consent of those with whom they are engaged in confidential discussion. And therefore we are in this position: Parliament is on the eve of separating. It is naturally anxious to discuss this very important question. It has not at this moment the material before it which enables it to have a really fruitful discussion. So far as I am concerned I feel that the difficulty of taking part in this debate at all is that one has no desire except to say what may influence the situation favourably, and that, without fuller knowledge, it is impossible to know what the effect of comments upon the situation may be.
I agree with the noble and learned Earl on another point which he raised, when he spoke of the French point of view of future security, after they found themselves deprived of the security which undoubtedly would have been given them had the Franco-American and Franco-British Treaties remained in force. I have more than once elaborated that point as strongly as the noble and learned 1554 Earl has done this afternoon, and I do not wish to go over it again. I would only sum it up by saying that, looking at the thing from a French point of view, undoubtedly the disappearance of those two Treaties must have knocked the bottom out of the Peace, and that it is very natural that France should be feeling anxiety and apprehension with regard to the future. With those two Treaties gone and the Treaty of Versailles left, which she herself at the Peace, I understand, considered to be insufficient unless the Franco-American and Franco-British Treaties also held, I quite agree with the noble and learned Earl that in any criticism of French policy, and in all the discussions, we ought to give the fullest weight to that great disappointment of French expectations over the Peace.
But there, I think, I part company with the noble and learned Earl. I do not wish to use this occasion to repeat criticisms of the Coalition Government, but I must put it on record that I cannot accept his claim for the Coalition Government that its policy was always clear and consistent I have criticised it so often outside that it is not necessary for me to repeat those criticism" now. I would, however, observe that I believe the head of that Government did, at one time, indicate that there were conditions under which that Coalition Government might consent to the occupation of the Ruhr. And I would observe further that if we are really anxious to preserve good relations with France, to reconcile the two points of view, the speeches and writings of distinguished members of the Coalition Government since they left office have surely not been calculated to preserve that accord and common policy which is really essential to the interests of Europe. I do not want to elaborate that point, because my object is not to attack a Government which docs not exist, or, indeed, to raise any controversial matters.
With regard to the noble and learned Earl's criticisms of the policy of the Government, it is of course for the noble Marquess opposite to deal with them. I was not listening to the noble and learned Earl in any controversial spirit; I was listening with great anxiety to get any light thrown upon the situation which might be helpful for the future. I do not know that I can throw much light upon it. I regard the statement we have had 1555 to-day from the noble Marquess as very grave, very disappointing, though perhaps many of us were prepared for disappointment. It looks as if it were becoming more and more difficult to reconcile the policies of the British and French Governments and of the Belgian Government, too, or to keep those Governments together. Public opinion is going to take a hand in this matter. Things cannot go on as they are without public opinion being deeply stirred, and I think it is very desirable that, just as some of us here try to understand the French point of view, so in France they should try to understand the point of view of British opinion.
We have before us a very grave prospect of unemployment for the winter. We have arranged to pay our Debt to the United States. That is a business transaction into which we have entered with the good will of people who wish to carry out their obligations. Very large sums of money are owed us by our Allies. We know the financial position of our Allies to be difficult, and we are not pressing for those sums of money. But our own financial situation is one to cause us anxiety. We are in need of German Reparations if such Reparations can be obtained. We admit the prior claim of France for the devastated regions; but we do wish to see the maximum of Reparations obtained from Germany because we have an interest in receiving what payments may be available to us. And the difference between us and France is, in my opinion, this. It is that we believe that the policy they have embarked upon is going to destroy the hope of Reparations both for themselves and for us. Then, it is further postponing, to put it optimistically, the recovery of Europe upon which foreign trade depends.
Just think of what is the world situation in trade, on which we depend so much. China is in chaos. Russia has ceased to be an economic unit of any value to the world for commercial purposes. If Germany follows suit, a glance at the map of Europe and Asia will show the enormous area which will drop out of commercial operations. And we shall not be the only sufferer, though we shall undoubtedly be one of the greatest sufferers from that condition of things. We are suffering from it now At this 1556 moment, looking at it purely from the material point of view, we are paying our Debts; we are not asking for Debts to be paid to us; we are seeing our hope of Reparations from Germany destroyed, as we think; and we see the prospect of increasing injury to and shrinkage in world trade. With bad times before us public opinion here may become very restive. But it is not even that on which I would lay the most stress. What I feel so strongly is that if the French have future security in view, as I think they must have, this particular policy in which the Allies cannot be united, which really resembles the old policies which were pursued after victorious wars, is one as to which all the lessons of history go to prove that it will certainly not make for security in the long run and will produce future wars. That is the situation, as I believe, from the point of view of British public opinion.
It is, therefore, not only disappointing, it is indeed a very grave prospect that the answers to His Majesty's Government, so far as we can gather from the statement of the noble Marquess opposite, hold out so little hope of agreement and no hope at all, I gather, of speedy agreement. Things are so shaping that the question in our minds, or in the minds of some of us, is this: Is not Europe, instead of recovering from the great catastrophe of the great war, drifting towards another catastrophe which may be still more searching, still more far reaching, more deep, more sweeping and more lasting in its consequences even than the great war itself? There are forces at work in the world which are working for disorder, for disruption, for the breaking up of society. The present condition of international affairs is playing into the hands of those forces. It is not possible for His Majesty's Government alone to retrieve the situation. It cannot be done by disunion; it can only be done by union. So far as I am concerned, I recognise, especially in that statement of His Majesty's Government that they have counselled the Germans to abandon passive resistance that His Majesty's Government have gone a very long way to try to meet French views.
I listened to the speech of the noble and learned Earl in the hope of finding out any policy by which the situation might be saved. It cannot be saved by 1557 a sort of duel between the British and French policies. I agree that we cannot secure union by participating with France in a policy which we believe is bound to lead to disaster. I agree that we cannot do that, and that union can only be secured by the French making every possible effort to meet the views which His Majesty's Government have put forward. But let us remember that the catastrophe is not going to be averted simply by saying that the French are wrong and we are right. If that is the only outcome that there can be of the situation, then the prospect is really very grave.
In regard to the concrete steps of withdrawing our Army of Occupation and our representative from the Reparation Commission, I have nothing to say against those steps if they are taken to mark that we cannot agree with the policy of the French Government. But I think it would be a pity to take those steps so long as there was any hope of agreement, because it would be really almost washing our hands of any further attempt to secure agreement. But supposing those steps were taken as the noble and learned Earl suggests, are they going to help us to avert a catastrophe? So far as I could gather from the noble and learned Earl, the policy which he thought we ought to adopt besides taking those concrete steps was simply to sit still, to make no attempt to modify or alter French policy, and await the result. We could do that with equanimity if it were not that the collapse of Germany and the collapse of trade, the collapse of Europe almost, might be the result of that particular policy, and that is what we are trying to avert. That is why I think it is essential that we should put forward an alternative policy in the way in which it may be most easy for the French Government to meet us. How far that has been done we can judge only when the Papers are put before us.
Then it may be said: If you have put an alternative policy forward and the French have put forward their policy and all that His Majesty's Government have been able to do has been to state those two policies and to say: "There is the difference"; how are you better off? Well, the chance may be but a slender one, but I think the situation is becoming 1558 so grave not merely for France, Belgium, Great Britain and Germany, but for every neutral country in Europe, that these alternative policies ought to be put before the world. Events may happen which may so impress the public not merely in this country but in other countries that it may be felt that the public opinion of the world must for its own sake, for the sake of every country at any rate in Europe, take a hand in bringing about a settlement of this situation.
I cannot exaggerate what I feel about the gravity of things after the statement of the noble Marques". I feel that it is impossible to deal with it adequately without the meeting of Parliament. Grave events may happen before the three and a half months' adjournment is over, and I ask at once, and I should like a reply upon the point from the noble Marquess opposite, that His Majesty's Government, if they find that the crisis develops rapidly and that important decisions of policy are necessary, will take the steps which I understand are within their power to summon Parliament at an early date.
THE MARQUESS QUEZON OF KEDLESTONMy Lords, the concluding question of the noble Viscount is one to which I give an immediate reply. Under the powers which exist by Act of Parliament it is possible to summon Parliament after its adjournment with little or no delay, and I need hardly assure the noble Viscount, or the House, that should matters take a grave turn, which I do not myself anticipate, those powers will be utilised in order to give both Houses of Parliament an opportunity of expressing their views upon the matter. With a good deal, and indeed with the greater part, of what fell from the noble Viscount who leads the Opposition I was in entire agreement, and with no statement of his more than this, that the House is placed in a position of extreme, though inevitable, difficulty by being called upon to-day, on the Motion of the noble and learned Earl. Lord Birkenhead, to discuss a situation of undoubted gravity without the Papers which alone can acquaint the House with what has passed. I carry this sentiment so far as to say that the greater part of the speech of the noble and learned Earl, Lord Birkenhead, would not have been delivered had he been in a position to read the Papers which I hope will be laid.
1559 I shall personally indicate in one or two particulars how far from the mark in these respects his speech, perhaps for no fault of his own, was. There is another respect in which I should like to express my sincere regrets, and it is this. Certainly owing to no action or inaction on our part, matters have reached the present point at the very moment when Parliament is separating for the Recess. As will be shown when the Papers are laid, during the past six weeks or two months, and, indeed, during the whole of the summer, every effort has been made by His Majesty's Government to expedite the solution of affairs, and when the dates are seen of our Notes or our Despatches it will be recognised that any delay that there has been has certainly not been due to any failure upon our part.
I said just now that had the Papers been in the possession of your Lordships a considerable part of Lord Birkenhead's speech would not have been delivered, and I may allude to one point in particular in which—although he did not state it—he rather assumed that there had been some reluctance or some inability on our part to take up with France the question of her security. That point was not developed at length by the noble Viscount, Lord Grey of Fallodon, because, as he said, he has on more than one previous occasion explained his views on the matter to your Lordships. But so far from any such charge, if a charge were made, being tenable against the Government, the very reverse is the case, and at every stage in these proceedings not merely I personally, in my conversations with the Ambassador, but His Majesty's Government, in their statement which will be published, and which you will see, have indicated their willingness at this stage, or at any future stage that may suit the French Government, to take up the question of security with the latter. And if it has not been taken up, it has not been due to any action on our part; it has been due to the express view of the French Government that it has nothing to do with the present question, and that they do not wish it to be taken up now. Therefore on that point our shield is unsullied, as the Papers will show. No difference of opinion between us, in so far as there is difference, has either arisen or been in the smallest degree aggravated by any discussion of, or failure to discuss, the question of security.
1560 I find some difficulty in ascertaining what is the precise object of the speech of the noble and learned Earl, nor do I accept, nor will the Papers corroborate, the history of events during the past six months as imagined by him. He defended the action of the late Government of which he and I were members, and to that extent, of course, I am not concerned to dispute him. He also approved and defended the action of Mr. Bonar Law in the line that he took at Paris, and in the exposition of it that he afterwards gave in Parliament here. He then seems to have assumed that, having followed that policy for a certain period, there ensued a sharp revulsion in which we absolutely turned away from the course we had hitherto pursued, and adopted a line that, in the opinion of the noble and learned Earl, was certain to lead to irretrievable disaster. That is not in the smallest degree a true description of what passed. The policy of Mr. Bonar Law is one which, being in cordial agreement with it, we have consistently followed.
But, my Lords, there came a time when the pursuit of that policy was confronted with conditions to which no sensible man could shut his eyes. Those conditions have been summed up, if I may say so, with great power by the noble Viscount who has just spoken. He drew us a picture of Europe as it has been developing before our eyes during the past six months. What did we see? We were told that France was going into the Ruhr to obtain Reparations. We saw no Reparations being paid. We saw the chance of any Reparations being forthcoming whittled away and destroyed before our eyes. We said: That is a question that concerns not France or Belgium alone: other people have Reparations. We have Reparations, and the whole basis of our policy has been and continues to be, that this being a question that affects us is not to be determined by the action of one isolated country, or two countries alone: It is a question that affects the whole of the Allies. It is a European question. It is an international question. It is a question in which, with due regard to the interests of our own country, we cannot stand on one side and leave France or Belgium to carry out whatever military policy they may desire. I speak not merely of our right to interfere—and that right to interfere rests not only upon our share of 1561 Reparations, but also upon the rights that we possess in respect of the payment of inter-Allied Debts, to which the noble Viscount referred, and which is a matter of supreme importance and cannot be set on one side as if it did not exist. Not only do we possess this inherent and indefeasible right, but what did we see going on?
We saw a situation in the Ruhr not clarifying but deepening in obscurity and gloom from week to week. We saw Germany—not because we looked at it through German spectacles in the smallest degree—falling to pieces, rotting to ruin, lapsing into irreparable decay, and carrying with it all prospects of economic recovery not merely for Germany but for Europe. And when we looked at our own position at home—I could, if it were necessary, elaborate this at great length—we saw that which is passing in the Ruhr telling upon almost every industry in this country, and, after a few brief moments or weeks of activity, due to the purchase of coal from this country when the situation in the Ruhr first began, we saw the dark hand of this tragedy clutching at the throat of almost every industry in this country; and if we do not see it now we shall see it in the course of the winter. As the months pass we shall know exactly what the continued occupation of the Ruhr by France and Belgium has meant. It is an occupation the effect of which will be felt in almost every cottage in this country.
That was the situation, and because we took note of these circumstances, because we felt it our duty in these supreme interests to take action and intervene, we are taunted by the noble and learned Earl with having reversed our policy and adopted an action which, in one of the most extravagant moments of his oration, he described as one of madness. In what did this madness consist? The mad action was to make one more effort, one amongst scores for which I have been responsible, to bring to bear on this terrible situation the united action of the Powers of Europe. Is there anything mad in that? Is there anything wrong in that? The noble and learned Earl spoke as if we knew that the course of action we were proposing was unpalatable, and as if we were entirely wrong to exasperate France. I wish he would wait to see the terms of our Note and the terms of the 1562 draft reply. I think he would be much astonished. He accused us of encouraging Germany, and then the noble Viscount, who spoke later, so far from saying that we have encouraged Germany, said that we have actually given her good advice (which I have constantly given), to desist from passive resistance. That the noble Earl describes as encouraging Germany.
Our idea was, and we thought there was a good chance of success—I am not certain that that chance has altogether disappeared—that we ought to take the chance, if it were possible, to deliver a reply to the German Note, assuming that that Note was deserving of reply, as everybody agreed that it was. When I made that suggestion to the Ambassadors it was not turned down as impracticable; it was welcomed by them. They said: "By all means let us see if we cannot return a conjoint answer"; and, as they were unwilling, or felt themselves precluded by their previous policy from taking action themselves, they were only too glad that the responsibility should be assumed by us. We thereupon drew up this reply, and, so far from expecting that it would not be noticed or that it would be rejected, I had myself very sanguine anticipations that it would be seriously regarded, that it might perhaps be amended, but that in some form or another it would go. The House must wait to see the reception it has met with. Since I came into the House I have heard that the reply from Italy, which I mentioned in my previous speech as not having arrived, has come in and is now awaiting me at the Foreign Office. The noble and learned Earl assumes, because the replies of France and Belgium are not encouraging, that, therefore, the policy has failed. I do not draw that deduction for one moment. I cannot tell what may happen in the next month or so, but the suggestion that we have done something provocative to France, exasperated her, and brought failure upon her own shoulders, has not a shadow of foundation.
Now we come to the present position. Here the noble and learned Earl gives us his own policy which, I think, was fairly summarised by the noble Viscount in his concluding remarks. The noble and learned Earl would have us recognise that we have made a deplorable failure; that 1563 France does not mean to be deflected from her course, and that all we have to do is to sit still and do nothing and withdraw such evidences of interest in and responsibility for the continental position as we have hitherto displayed. Is that a feasible or a wise proposition? The noble and learned Earl says: Take your representative away from the Reparation Commission. I wonder if he really has studied the matter.
§ THE EARL OF BIRKENHEADYes.
§ THE MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTONVery well, he will know that twelve months' notice has to be given of such retirement, and does he contend that any perceptible difference in the situation will be made by giving that notice now? In his desire that we should do nothing provocative has he reflected, if we announced the withdrawal of our representative to-morrow, upon the effect that that would produce upon the French? Does he remember that the Reparation Commission is charged not only with Reparations in respect of Germany but in respect of Austria and Hungary and other countries? Are we to desist altogether from participation in the regulation of these affairs because in certain respects France cannot agree with us? I say this definitely, that to withdraw, or give notice of the withdrawal of our member from the Reparation Commission would in my judgment be an unwise step. It would be attended by no good result and it might possibly do a great deal of harm.
The second suggestion of the noble and learned Earl was that we should withdraw our Army of Occupation from the Rhineland. Here again, if he will look at the Treaty which no doubt he has in mind, he will see that we are there under the Treaty, and that the occupation of the Rhineland by the Allied Forces is the one and only guarantee under the Treaty which we possess, and in which we share, for the fulfilment by Germany of her obligations. We who have signed the Treaty cannot possibly run away from the implications which it carries. It would be an abnegation of our duty and render it impossible for us to exercise that influence in carrying out the terms of the Treaty which we now possess. I could argue the matter on many other grounds. I could successfully show, if it were 1564 necessary, that the presence of our Forces there, so ably commanded as they have been, has had a most quietening effect on the situation on the border and in Germany itself. I could show that our presence there has been warmly welcomed and appreciated by all the parties concerned, and I believe if we were to follow the advice of the noble and learned Earl and announce on behalf of His Majesty's Government that we were going to withdraw our Forces tomorrow, that that decision would be received not only with regret but almost with dismay in every international quarter. It is not a policy—it may be the rival policy of the noble and learned Earl—which we are at all disposed at the present to adopt.
I will make only one other observation. The noble and learned Earl rather reproached us with failure to conduct these very difficult matters by means of friendly conversations in the Foreign Office and elsewhere. I ask him to believe that there has been no failure in that respect. If he were aware of the hours that have been devoted to these conversations, recorded most faithfully afterwards, he would certainly not bring any charge against His Majesty's Government of having failed to adopt that particular instrument of conciliation. But difficult matters cannot be unravelled or conciliated by conversation alone. No one knows better than he that when we reach a certain stage matters have to be put down in print, and this brings me to a point which to my mind is of supreme importance.
The noble Viscount, Lord Grey of Fallodon, said just now with great truth that public opinion is going to take a hand. How true that was! And not only is public opinion going to take a hand, but public opinion has a right to take a hand. What has been the position in this country as regards public opinion? Owing to the extreme reserve which we have adopted here, owing to the secrecy which has overhung the conversations to which I have referred, public opinion in this country is most imperfectly informed as to what either the actions, or the attitudes, or the policy of His Majesty's Government are or have been. I think the reverse is the case in France. We all know that the Press methods that prevail in Paris are rather different from those in 1565 England, and that with the Prime Minister in France making constant speeches, with a well-informed Press giving every day full accounts of every idea that floats over the Quai d'Orsay, we know very well that the French side of the case and the French policy have a thousand opportunities of being heard from day to day and from week to week, while owing to the greater reserve that we practise in this country the same opportunities have not been presented here.
What, then, is the first stage The first stage is the laying of these Papers, and they will be as complete as the willingness of our Allies to publish can make them, in order that the country may know exactly where we stand, where the difference lies between us and them, and what are the forces or influences ranged upon the opposite side, and that public opinion may then assist us in dealing with this exceedingly grave and difficult situation. It is unfair, before the Papers have been laid, and before we have had the advantage of that assistance, to ask us what we are going to do next week or next month. If that question be put now, I do not know, I cannot answer. I myself have made, and His Majesty's Government have made, many struggles to preserve united action. That is the policy in which I have firmly and consistently believed and from which I hesitate to depart, and I should not like to admit even for one moment, although that policy has not so far been successful, that all chances of its being more successful in the future have disappeared. Your Lordships will, I think, understand that I have had to speak under great reserve this afternoon and that I would gladly have taken the House, had I had a right to do so, into even greater confidence than I have done.