AIR POLICY. (Hansard, 2 August 1923)

§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

My Lords, the reference to the Committee which was appointed to consider national and Imperial defence included, among other things, the question of establishing some co-ordination authority for the Navy, Army and Air Force, whether by a Ministry of Defence or otherwise, as well as the relations of the Navy and Air Force and the standard of strength of the Air Force for Home Defence. The final Report dealing with the whole reference will be presented in the autumn, but in the meantime the finding of the Committee upon the strength of the Air Force for Home Defence has already been adopted by the Government and submitted to Parliament, and the Government are now able to lay before the House the Committee's recommendations which they have also adopted upon the relations of the Navy and Air Force and upon the co-ordination of the Defence Forces.

First, the relations of the Navy and the Air Force. This particular branch of the subject was referred to a special Sub-Committee consisting of the Earl of Balfour, a former First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Weir, a former Air Minister, both of them being specially conversant with the difficulties of inter-Departmental relations, and Viscount Peel, a member of the present Cabinet. Sixteen witnesses were heard before the Sub-Committee and nineteen memoranda were submitted to it. The consideration by the Sub-Committee of the evidence, like the consideration by other authorities on previous occasions, have led them to a conclusion, a unanimous conclusion, in favour of the principle, of a single Air Service.

The Admiralty were rightly concerned to maintain the absolute control over all the fighting equipment in the Fleet which is essential to its efficiency. They also urged that reconnaissance at sea requires 1524 the technical training of a naval officer. The special Sub-Committee, while unable to meet the views of the Admiralty to the extent of destroying the principle of a single Air Service, consider that they have dealt by suitable provisions with these detailed objections and in particular have secured for them the absolute control afloat and the professional reconnaissance to which I have referred.

The reasons in favour of a single Air Service which have had weight with the Government may be summarised as follows:—In the first place, the Air Service, though it must have intimate relations with the other Armed Forces at sea and on land and must be familiar with their requirements, differs in its conditions essentially from both. On the other hand, aircraft whether they are flying above the sea or elsewhere are, broadly speaking, governed according to the same main principle's. In the second place, the whole science of air power is in a condition of rapid development. The application therefore of experience both as to personnel and as to matériel, wherever that experience can be obtained, whether at sea or on shore, is vital to success in either case. We cannot afford to break up the lessons of this experience. In the third place, it is clear that in certain contingencies the shore-based Air Forces and the Air Forces of the Fleet may be called upon to act together. Such common action may be very difficult without a unity of method in both Services. Efficiency therefore prescribes common knowledge, common training, common material provision and a common service. Economy points in the same direction. From this last point of view the conclusion against the duplication of training schools and aerodromes and building plant is evident. For these reasons the conclusion of the Sub-Committee and of the Main Committee that there should be a single Air Service must in the opinion of the Government be accepted, subject to the conditions which are necessary to meet the detailed objections urged by the Admiralty.

The recommendations of the Sub-Committee for this purpose are contained under thirteen heads dealing with liaison between the two Services, provision of material, inclusion in Naval Estimates of the charge for the Fleet Air Arm, integrity of the strength of the Fleet Air Arm, discipline and status of Air officers 1525 and men when afloat, number and position of attached naval officers, and special reservation of Air reconnaissance and spotting to the Navy. To these the Main Committee have added a further recommendation permitting to attached naval officers the retention of their uniform, a point which was strongly urged on behalf of the Admiralty.

If these recommendations be examined it will be seen that by their provisions the permeation of each Service with a knowledge of the requirements of the other would be achieved, and the administrative difficulties dealt with, without destroying the unity of the Air Service. It is impossible without experience to pronounce a final judgment on these arrangements. The Government are, however, confident that both Services will do their utmost to make them successful. In respect of this division of the subject the Report of the Subcommittee, together with a covering note of the Main Committee, has been laid on the Table and will be distributed immediately.

Next, as to the co-ordination of the Defence Forces. Upon the recommendations of the Committee the Government have decided as follows:—It is undesirable and impracticable to supersede the Ministerial heads of the three fighting Services by making them subordinates of a Minister of Defence. The alternative plan for an amalgamation of the three Service Departments is equally impracticable. On the other hand, the existing system of co-ordination by the Committee of Imperial Defence is not sufficient to secure full initiative and responsibility for defence as a whole and requires to be defined and strengthened. Under the existing system the Committee of Imperial Defence, an advisory and consultative body, enquires into and makes recommendations in regard to the issues of defence policy and organization which are brought before it. The power of initiative lies with the Government Departments and with the Prime Minister. This system, though invaluable up to a point, does not make any authority, except the Prime Minister, who can only devote a small part of his time and attention to defence questions, directly responsible for the initiation of a consistent line of policy directing the common action of the three or any two of three Services.

1526 The detailed provisions founded on these conclusions for strengthening the position of the Committee of Imperial Defence and its Chairman, and for securing the joint advice of the Chiefs of the three Staffs, is also contained in the Papers now being laid on the Table.