§ LORD SYDENHAM had given Notice to ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies—
§ 1. What steps were taken by the League of Nations before ratifying the Mandate for Palestine to secure compliance with Article 22 of the Covenant, which declares that "the wishes" of the people "must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory."
§ 2. Whether a censorship is now maintained in Palestine.
§ 3. Whether a recent Ordinance, reported to restrict freedom of speech somewhat severely, can be laid on the Table.
§ The noble Lord said: My Lords, Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations specifically refers to "certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire" which "have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised." Those are the words of the Covenant, and I assume that Palestine and Mesopotamia must come within the category specified in that Article. Palestine is much more advanced than Mesopotamia, which is still really existing under tribal conditions, and the standard of education in Palestine is far higher than the standard of education in India. If this view is correct, it seems to me clear that the League of Nations was bound by its own Covenant to consult the wishes of the 86 Palestinians before ratifying the Mandate. But so far as I know—and I hope I am wrong—nothing has been done in that direction.
§ As regards the censorship, in some very interesting letters from Palestine which have been recently published, it is stated that the Latin Patriarch wished to publish the Pope's Allocution in the Press, and that he was not permitted to do so by the censorship, although some of the Zionist newspapers have published slanders upon the Pope himself. In another case a letter of mine to a Palestinian was opened. The envelope was sent back to me, and there can be no doubt whatever about it. Another letter has never been delivered, and I have heard of several important letters which have not reached their destination. Either there must be a somewhat severe censorship, or else some form of unofficial spying must be going on.
§ The third part of my Question relates to an Ordinance which I have not seen. I have heard that this Ordinance operates rather harshly as regards the Arab population. I do not know what the terms are, but if it does so, it is rather strange that, at a time when we have given much greater freedom of speech to Indians, we should be restricting the liberty of speech in Palestine. In India the relaxation has gone so far that our public servants are now obliged to defend themselves by bringing libel actions against the newspapers. I hope, therefore, that this Ordinance will be laid upon the Table.
§ LORD PARMOORMy Lords, before the noble Duke answers this Question, I should like to add a word or two regarding the first part of it, as to "what steps were taken by the League of Nations before ratifying the Mandate for Palestine." I think I approach this Question from rather a different point of view from that of the noble Lord who has put it down, because I am a convinced believer in the principle of the League of Nations, in the power of the League for good, and especially in the extreme importance of supporting it at the present moment. Every one who takes the view that I hold recognises how important it is that all the great functions of the League should be fulfilled both judicially and impartially, and of all the functions or duties laid upon them none is of greater importance than those winch have been conferred upon them in reference to Mandates. In dealing with this 87 question of Mandates—no doubt, we shall hear what steps have been taken—there are two matters of great importance which affect very large populations. One is, of course, that in a Mandate—though this is not a matter specially referred to by the noble Lord—the minority should be safeguarded in every possible way, because unless minorities are safeguarded, and effectually safeguarded, you have a constant risk of friction and trouble over very large areas of the world.
The second point, which is really bound up with the first, is that the wishes of the people must he the principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory. It certainly has been stated more than once that this principle of selecting the Mandatory has not been adequately considered. Those who believe in nationality—perhaps believing even more than I do in the principle of nationality by itself—must desire that, in the new allocation of the so-called peace conditions, this principle should be given the fullest possible consideration. Even if you do give full consideration to that principle, you must, as I said before, at the same time regard and protect the views of minorities, which constitute one of the great difficulties all over the world. An attack, and, I think, an unjust attack, has been made on the League of Nations on the ground that they are too much inclined to represent Allied policy, and do not act in a sufficiently independent manner, when questions of this character are brought before them for determination. The answer to a general allegation of that kind is to show that adequate steps were taken to obtain impartial and judicial decisions, and it is from that point of view that I have said these few words. It is not entirely the view of the noble Lord who put the Question on the Paper, but I have spoken from a very ardent desire that the League of Nations should function in the best possible manner, because I look upon it as really the only hope of salvation in the world at the present moment.
§ THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE)My Lords, I will, if I may, deal with the first part of the noble Lord's Question, although I hope he will agree with me that am not answerable to this House for any action which the League of Nations may or may not have taken. It can scarcely be regarded as a function or duty of one 88 of His Majesty's Ministers, speaking in this House, to undertake to answer Questions of that character.
In any case the question that came before the Council of the League last July had reference not to the selection of a Mandatory but to the terms of the Mandate. Statements on this point were made to the House on several occasions by representatives of the late Government. I have no desire to weary your Lordships by going over old ground. I would merely remind you that, as was clearly stated in Article 94 of the Treaty of Sèvres, the choice of the Mandatory was vested not in the League of Nations but in the principal Allied Powers. As the House is well aware, the decision under which Great Britain accepted a Mandate for Palestine was reached at the San Remo Conference in April. 1920. The question of how far this decision was in accordance with the wishes of the people of Palestine, as postulated in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, has more than once been debated in this House. I am afraid that I have nothing material to add to what was said by my noble friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on March 14, 1921. I would only observe that while the terms of the Mandate, and the policy underlying them, have been subjected to much criticism both here and in Palestine, I am not aware that exception has ever been taken by the people concerned to the selection of this country as the Mandatory Power.
Turning to the second Question, I am informed that the cable censorship in Palestine was removed in May, 1921, and the Press censorship a few months later. I believe that the postal censorship was abolished at a still earlier date, but I am without precise information on this point. I will make inquiries and inform the noble Lord of the result.
In regard to the third Question, I am not aware to what recent Ordinance the noble Lord refers. It seems probable that what he has in mind is a notice published in September last, explaining the scope of a particular section of the penal code, dealing with the use of inflammatory language or of language calculated to promote disturbance or hostility to government. I shall be happy to furnish the noble Lord with a copy of this notice, if he so desires. I do not think it necessary to lay it on the Table of the House.
§ VISCOUNT BIRKENHEADMy Lords, I do not desire to argue the whole question, but I wish to refer to the statement of the noble Duke that the Government in this House did not consider themselves liable to give explanations for the decisions or actions taken by the League of Nations. I have myself always felt some anxiety as to the consequences of the inter-action of the activities of the League of Nations and the duties of this country where British interests were concerned, and I am unable to assent to the constitutional doctrine, if I understood him rightly, laid down by the noble Duke, that Ministers in this House are not bound to give their own view of decisions taken by the League of Nations where those decisions quite clearly and obviously affect British interests. Of course, we are entitled, both in this and the other House, to an explanation of where the 13ritish Government stands. Where the decisions of a body hitherto a little nebulous, hitherto in its constitution a little vague, are nevertheless able to affect British interests, of course Ministers, in so far as the interests involved are British interests, must be prepared to give us explanations about them.
I do not propose to-day to deal in excessive detail with the Question Lord Sydenham has asked, but there are some implications in that Question, and the answer made by the noble Duke, which it seems to me demand that they should be pushed to interrogation. When the noble Lord asks: "What steps were taken by the League of Nations before ratifying the Mandate for Palestine to secure compliance with Article 22 of the Covenant, which declares that 'the wishes' of the people 'must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory'" what, of course, tire noble Lord, if I am not wrong, means is that we had no business to accept, and the League of Nations had no business to confer upon us, that Mandate in Palestine, unless the wishes of the people—and I suppose the noble Lord had principally in his mind the ease of the Arab population—had been enlisted in support of the Mandate conferred upon us pursuant to the decision taken by the Powers principally affected. I am not able to go quite so far as the noble Lord who put the Question, because I take a broader view, although I can quite see his point of view, and it is a very intelligible point of view.
I have previously explained that, being absent from the country, I was not con- 90 suited, nor had I any claim to be consulted, in this matter, because I was not in the close governing body which decided these things. Therefore, I was not consulted as to whether it was worth while making a great effort to convert Palestine into a home for the Jews. If I had been consulted I think I should have asked a number of questions, which up to the moment have, I think, been only imperfectly answered. It seems to me that the question of converting the Jewish population of this country, and of the Ghettoes of the world, into an emigrating population for Palestine, would require a great deal of analysis, and that the financial activities usually associated with the Jewish race would appear to be less happily adapted to the nomadic conditions which, I understand, to a considerable extent prevail in Palestine. Nevertheless, that decision was taken. There were, of course, very large, broad considerations in reference to which that decision could be defended.
I do not press for an answer to-night because I realise the gravity of the issues involved, which only apply indirectly to the Question, but I intend very clearly to press at an early date for an answer to these questions, and I shall make bold to indicate the general issues which cause me some perplexity at the present moment. A great campaign has been raised, and from one point of view—the protection of the Arab population, to which the noble Lord who asked the Question has always most laudably, if I may say so, devoted himself—the question deserves support, but it has wider and more important implications. Are they or are they not going to be influenced by the Press campaign which has been carried on in very powerful newspapers, and in which the question is compendiously dismissed in the expression "bag and baggage"? What is meant by our new masters in the Press who are attempting to give us these orders is that we should immediately evacuate Palestine and Mesopotamia.
I raised this question on the Address, and I believe I asked the noble Marquess whether the Government were enquiring into the whole question on the merits. The noble Marquess who is now leading the House said that that was not so, but that they were enquiring into the extent of our commitments in Mesopotamia. I have refreshed my memory by referring to the speeches of the Prime Minister during the 91 Election, and I find the Prime Minister did most specifically state that the Government were examining into the whole question with a view of making up their minds. That meant that in the view of the Government the question was still open, and was still requiring decision, whether we are to evacuate these countries bag and baggage. The noble Marquess conveyed to me his view that that was not so, but that they were only going to examine into the extent of our commitments. Having made more inquiries I am now in a position to inform him that if he will collect together three clerks, one from the Foreign Office, one from the Colonial Office, and one from the War Office, they will in half an hour he able to supply him completely and finally, to the last farthing, with the whole extent of our commitments in Mesopotamia. I hope that at a very early date we shall be presented with the result of this very important discussion.
Whether or not the Government are going to enquire whether they should evacuate Palestine or Mesopotamia, or whether their minds are still open upon that point, I do not know; but I shall ask leave to make a very plain observation in that respect. The decision that we should accept responsibilities in Palestine and Mesopotamia was taken at a time when I and all other Ministers, except the very favoured few who were members of the War Cabinet, were repelled from that inner circle which, and which alone, was responsible for the decisions taken at that date. And when I accepted office as Lord Chancellor, after the Armistice Election, I was most explicitly told that the only responsibility that I took in that novel and, I think, undesirable arrangement was responsibility for my own Department. The Department for which I was responsible is an exacting one. It covers a wide field, and I was able to exhaust such activities as I possess without tedium in addressing myself to the duties of that Department. But there are other men more favoured and more responsible, to whom these high decisions and the responsibility for these decisions, was committed.
Let me give your Lordships the names of two of these. The present Prime Minister was most closely responsible. The present Leader of this House, the chief of the noble Marquess opposite (Lord Salisbury), was most directly and closely responsible; he 92 was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. I need not, of course, mention the name of the late Prime Minister, who was primarily responsible. I therefore had this great advantage, that, as a Departmental Minister responsible for my Department, I was constantly sustained and comforted by the knowledge that these great minds were being applied to these decisions, and were able not only to advise the country but to accept the whole responsibility of involving the country in these decisions.
And what follows from that? We went into Mesopotamia; we went into Palestine. What I shall desire to know from the Government—not now, but at some moment convenient to themselves—is this: If the decision is, indeed, to be taken that we are to leave either Palestine or Mesopotamia, why did we ever go there, and what was the justification for the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Leader of this House, and the present Prime Minister ever involving this country in the hundreds of millions of expenditure which has already been incurred in those countries, if, indeed, the decision was wrong? I will not do these distinguished men such injustice. I cannot believe that the present Prime Minister was so wrong. In theDaily Mail, which is slightly committed to one side of the controversial proposition, I read, under the heading of the Prime Minister, "I wish we had never gone there." Of course, it is a little late in the day to wish that. Quite a lot of money has been spent there. And I am not in a position to say whether the Prime Minister is right or wrong in relation to Mesopotamia. But as for myself, the country having spent hundreds of millions of pounds, having accepted before the whole world the responsibility for going into Mesopotamia, being involved in deep commitments for the preservation of peace in those regions, I will most carefully examine and criticise the grounds, if grounds are put forward, for evacuating that country in the face of those sacrifices, small as was the responsibility I had for them.
But wholly different considerations arise when we come to the case of Palestine, so opportunely raised by the noble Lord, Lord Sydenham. In the case of Palestine the considerations are not commercial. I do not in my heart believe that the considerations which influenced the late Government, the present Prime Minister and the present Secretary of State for 93 Foreign Affairs, were commercial when they were dealing with the case of Mesopotamia. They were quite obviously not commercial when they were dealing with the case of Palestine. If we are to be told to-day or hereafter—for I do not ask for an answer to-day; the issues are, I think, too great to permit of an extempore opinion—if we are to be told that we are to evacuate Palestine, after the commitments to which the present Prime Minister and the present Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs have made themselves parties, after the commitments in which they and they alone have involved the country and have involved Parliament, then I shall presume to ask some questions as to what is the strategical importance of Palestine in relation to Egypt.
We are told by that Press which appears to-day to be our masters that we are to evacuate Palestine bag and baggage. We have held Egypt now for forty years. We have held Egypt in loose tutelage, and immensely to the advantage of that, country for the whole of that period. Our former leaders, and particularly the late Mr. Gladstone, occasionally refreshed the world with assurances that it was our intention one day, and probably at an early date, to evacuate that country. I have sometimes thought that the saintly character of the late Mr. Gladstone invested these comforting assurances to the rest of the world with somewhat more persuasiveness than they would perhaps have possessed if they had been put forward by the noble Marquess who is now leading the House, or even by his distinguished father. Mr. Gladstone has always seemed to me, by the union of what the late Mr. George Brodrick called a very simple mind and a very sophisticated understanding, to have been able to persuade his contemporaries in Europe of the intentions of this country in a manner more conformable to the interests of this country than perhaps his Conservative contemporaries could completely have attained.
However that may be, and in spite of those repeated assurances, we stayed in Egypt. We have been there for forty years, immensely to the advantage of that country. To-day Egypt has become a vital link in the chain of Empire communications, and it is at least as true to-day to say that Palestine, strategically, is indispensably necessary to the protection of Egypt. We have gone to the last limit 94 to which the late Government was prepared to go in the concession of autonomous, or semi-autonomous, institutions to Egypt. It is very unlikely, believe me, who have examined and re-examined all these problems, that our successors, when they have time to apply their minds to them, will go further. And they would, indeed, in my judgment, be unwise if, rashly or hurriedly, they decided to decline the Mandate imposed by the League of Nations, or submitted by the League of Nations for the acceptance of this country, and accepted by the present Prime Minister, the late Prime Minister, and the present Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Question asked by the noble Lord deals with a more limited subject, namely, the acquiescence of the Arab population, which, I agree with the noble Lord, it is of vital importance that you should conciliate if you are to maintain this Mandate. It is ludicrous to suppose that you could ignore this great, virile population, which, if you left them to themselves to adjust their own differences by the weapons which to-day are so fashionable in the world, would sweep the other side away. And, of course, you cannot impose upon them artificial conditions and expect that they will proceed with complete tranquillity, and with the philosophical quiet in which discussions take place at debating societies. Nothing of the kind will take place. But while that is so, while statecraft will address itself to conciliating the susceptibilities of the Arabs, to reconciling them as far as we can, not so much to any Jewish domination of Palestine, to which I am not so much committed, but to the Mandate to which, I believe, the Arabs subscribe—while all that is true, I most earnestly hope, without asking for an answer to-day, that His Majesty's Government will not prematurely reach a decision about the immensely grave and irreparable step which would be involved in the evacuating of our responsibilities either in Palestine or in Mesopotamia.
§ THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY)My Lords, I can assure the noble and learned Viscount that we shall not take any decisions, either on this matter or on any other grave matters, without the very careful consideration which he would have given to it had he been still responsible for affairs. I am obliged to the noble and learned Viscount that he refrained from pressing us to give any answer to his 95 Question at the present time. At the same time I think, perhaps, I might offer just a word of criticism of the sort of hypothetical attack which he made upon the Government in anticipation that we are going to make a decision which he deprecates. Surely, it would have been almost wiser to have waited until the adverse decision had been arrived at before delivering a philippic against what might have been.
§ VISCOUNT BIRKENHEADIt would be too late.
§ TILE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYThe noble and learned Viscount gave us some very interesting details as to the interior arrangements of the late Government. Until I beard him speak I was not aware of what were the limits of his responsibility. They appear to have been very narrow, so far as I can make out.
§ VISCOUNT BIRKENHEADThey were publicly announced at the time.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYThen I must plead ignorance; I am afraid I do not read everything that is published. It is interesting to know that the noble and learned Viscount is intent upon criticising very severely a great many of the acts of the late Government.
§ VISCOUNT BIRKENHEADI agree that the noble Marquess misunderstood me. So far as I understand the present position I find myself in entire agreement with the decisions taken by the late War Cabinet in relation both to Palestine and Mesopotamia. I am only a little puzzled as to how those decisions can he called into question to-day.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYI thought there was a wealth of sarcasm which the noble and learned Viscount delivered at the heads of my noble friend the Leader of the House and the Prime Minister for the decisions which had been arrived at when he was a member of the Government.
§ VISCOUNT BIRKENHEADNo, no.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYThen I misunderstood the noble and learned Viscount. I have always admired his power of sarcasm, but I thought it was 96 misdirected, because, unless the Lord Chancellor can be responsible for the Government, I do not know where the limits of Cabinet responsibility can be placed.
On the question of the League of Nations, I think the answer is quite simple. My noble friend the noble Duke said, and said truly, that he cannot be responsible for the acts of the League of Nations. That is true. All that the Government are responsible for are the deeds of representatives of His Majesty's Government upon the League of Nations, and to that extent, of course, they are fully responsible. For everything the representative of His Majesty's Government says or does upon the League of Nations we accept full responsibility, and are willing and anxious to give such explanations to your Lordships' House or to Members of Parliament in another place as may be demanded of us. But it is quite clear that we cannot be responsible for the acts of a whole of which we only form part. I think that is the simple answer to the noble and learned Viscount.
§ VISCOUNT BIRKENHEADI quite agree with that.
§ Loan SYDENHAMMy Lords. I should like to thank the noble Duke for the answer he has given me. He made it perfectly clear to us that nothing was done to ascertain the wishes of the Palestinians. What was more important, he also made it clear that it was not necessary to ascertain their wishes, because the Treaty of Sevres practically made Article 22 a dead letter. As that also applies, I presume, to Mesopotamia that Article should, I think, be removed from the Covenant at once, because it no longer has any meaning whatever. There are no countries whatever left to which it can apply. May I add that if the wishes of the people had been ascertained this year I am quite certain that they would not have voted for Great Britain as a Mandatory Power?
The one point in the League of Nations which attracted me very much was that it was going to be, for all time, the protector of small nations. There is the case of two small nations which it has flagrantly neglected to protect. I allude to the poor Montenegrin people and the Palestinians. In neither of those cases has the League of Nations stood up for the rights of small and unprotected people.