GENOA CONFERENCE.

HL Deb 27 June 1922 vol 51 cc2-46

THE EARL OF MIDLETON rose to move, That there be laid before the House any correspondence which took place between the British Government and the Governments of the United States, France, Italy, Germany, and Russia, with reference to the Genoa Conference, between the adjournment of the Supreme Council at Cannes and the meeting of the Genoa Conference, and any formal Notes which passed between the British and other representatives at the Genoa Conference not hitherto laid before Parliament.

The noble Earl said: My Lords, I hardly think your Lordships will expect any apology from me for the introduction of the Motion which I have ventured to put down. Four weeks ago, Lord Crawford, in reply to Lord Salisbury, told the House that the Government did not propose to lay any further Papers with regard to the Genoa Conference. This is a very serious decision, and I ask leave to challenge it. The objects of the Genoa Conference, as stated, were the establishment of European peace on a sound basis, and the consideration of the essential conditions for reestablishing confidence without injury to existing Treaties. Its objects, therefore, were political as well as economic, and practically the whole of the Papers, not very voluminous, which have been laid before Parliament have to do with the economic and not with the political side of the Conference. There is, indeed, but one Paper which I think could be described as trenching upon the political side, and that Paper is a Memorandum which has been practically ruled out of consideration by the Powers.

We have had much reason in the past to complain of the absence of information with regard to foreign and other affairs. In the debate on the Address to the Crown at the beginning of this session, the Government were asked what Papers they proposed to lay on a number of subjects. There had been great trouble in India, and foreign affairs of great magnitude, since Parliament adjourned. I take, as an instance of our treatment, what occurred with regard to India. The noble Marquess who leads the House at once promised Papers from the Viceroy on co-operative movements. We did not get those Papers for over three months, I think, and when we got them they bore on the face of them evidence that the Viceroy had been hurried into sending a telegram, fifteen to twenty pages long, a few days after Parliament met, from which it certainly would appear that there had been no intention of laying Papers until it was pressed upon the Government.

I speak on this subject with no fear of contradiction on the part of the noble Earl who is to reply to-night. I had the honour of serving under him, like many on this side of the House, for a considerable number of years. I should not describe my noble friend as having been, in matters of Parliamentary practice, a martinet or even a precisian, but if there was one subject on which he would brook no laxity on the part of his subordinates, it was on being prepared with Papers before Parliament was asked to discuss any question of foreign affairs or other subject on which Papers had to be laid. There are those around us who can remember that he always acceded to a demand from the Opposition for the postponement of a debate unless the Papers were laid.

Have we not a right to ask why the Government will not take Parliament into its confidence on a matter which so deeply affects the future peace of Europe as the Conference at Genoa? If it be said that the actual results of that Conference have not been great, then we may ask to know why there was not a happier result. I cannot help feeling myself that the Conference met under an unfortunate star. In the first place, the United States were not represented. We know nothing, I think I am right in saying, as to the reason of that omission. We have nothing to guide us, but the title of the Papers laid on the Table is "International Economic Conference, Genoa."

Is it not a paradox, in the distracted condition of the trade of Europe, to seek to find a remedy for an almost insoluble question without the aid of the United States? I do not know whether your Lordships recollect that the United States have a trade with Europe, according to the last statistics available, of close upon £1,000,000,000 a year. It would not, I think, be too much to say that the United States has almost a deciding voice in the resuscitation of the trade of Europe. Quite, apart from the moral effect of the absence of the United States, I claim that Parliament has a right to know in what circumstances the invitation was addressed, and under what conditions the invitation was refused: whether or not anything which was still pressing with regard to the Washington Conference came into the question; that at all events we should be seised of the reason for the hiatus valde deflendus in this matter.

That is not the only matter. For the first time an invitation was addressed to Russia. Everybody knew that the inclusion of Russia was a thorny question. Possibly, it turned out to be even thornier than was expected. It might have been perfectly well known to His Majesty's Government that our position in France was delicate with regard to Russia, because we were prepared to make concessions which France was not prepared to make. We were, I believe, the greatest creditors of Russia, but France was not in a position to make the offer which His Majesty's Government, I presume, had settled before they went to Genoa to make—namely, to forego something of our debts. On what grounds, surely we may ask, was a question so certain to lead to trouble left to be fought out before the very people to convince whom it was necessary we should present a common front to them, instead of being threshed out beforehand, quietly, between two friendly Allies? That is the first question with regard to the Genoa Conference on which I feel we have a right to be enlightened.

The new diplomacy, about which we hear so much, is supposed to bring principals together, to make a short cut to decision, and to abjure subtleties. It is claimed by a good many people who espouse the new diplomacy that it gives greater information to nations as to what is being done in their behalf. I am not sure that the experience of Genoa has been very favourable in that respect. It is perfectly true that tit-bits were served out, sometimes of a very controversial character, to the Press, but I do not know that this assisted the deliberations. If we are to adopt the somewhat flamboyant language of the Secretary of State for War, and speak of the economic decision of Genoa as being on the lines of the Code of Justinian, one wonders whether that Code would have been as perfect as it was if it had been hammered out amid the clangour of the printing press, and amid the strife of tongues. Again, we saw at Genoa grave warnings against the reliability of certain English newspapers. I cannot help expressing what I believe all your Lordships would feel—namely, that it would be happier for us if the Prime Minister felt that he was accountable to Parliament and to Parliament alone, and not to the Press anywhere, and that the whole object of information is to provide something for the permanent guidance of Parliament, and not headlines for the newspapers next day.

Under this system, the old system of negotiations has been altogether put aside. At the conclusion of negotiations in old days Papers were promptly laid before Parliament, and those who stood by us knew where they were—because you could not publish Papers without asking the Government to whom they referred whether they agreed to them—and they knew where we were. Apply that treatment to what has just occurred. I cannot help thinking that the most adverse influences have been at work in consequence of this new system of publication or non-publication. Almost directly after the Conference finished there was an exchange of Notes or Memoranda between this country and France, the publication of which was, I believe, almost without parallel in the history of our foreign diplomacy.

I do not want to enter into the controversy whether the Bolsheviks did or did not accept at Genoa the Resolutions which our Government believe that they accepted, although the French Government understood the position quite differently from ours, but I think that we may go as far as this. Whether the inclusion of the Russian Delegation was vital is a matter of great dispute. Statesmen may well feel justified, in the present unsettled condition of Europe, in believing that we can have no permanent and comprehensive amendment until Russia has been again included in the European family. But I believe that nine out of ten Englishmen feel that a revolutionary Government, whose only authority is derived from force, whose record is tinged with crime, and whose permanence can only be secured through terror, can be introduced into the European family usefully only if it is prepared to accept the fundamental traditions and circumstances under which civilised nations work.

It is not clear that the Russian Delegation did accept those principles, and I feel, with regard to our French Allies, that we have a right to look back and to consider what our own course has been, or rather, what the course of the Government has been on our behalf, in reference to the Russian Government, and whether that was a foundation on which we could confidently build to produce in the Russian Delegation the state of mind which was necessary for the acceptance of the fundamental conditions of the Conference. We cannot forget, or, if we forget, the Russian Government are not likely to forget (I am not complaining of it), that we first attempted to influence Russia by force, and that we went to negotiation only after force had failed. I think that when the history of this Government comes to be written it will be recorded that the greatest and most permanent failures in their policy have been when they have attempted to found negotiation on the failure of force, in this as in other cases.

But that is not all. I have referred to the speeches made by the Prime Minister with regard to the Russian Government. most remarkable speech was made more than a year ago in the House of Commons, in which the Prime Minister said:—"The economic resuscitation of Europe is impossible without Russia." …"Russia is essential to Europe; Russia is essential to the world." … "We are dependent on Russia; Russia is dependent upon us." Is it to be wondered at that, after this language, the Chief of the Russian Delegation at Genoa said: "We are here because Europe cannot get on without us." I venture to challenge the statement that we are dependent upon Russia. The exports from Russia to this country were before the war only 3½ per cent, of the total exports of Russia. All that raw material which is so valuable to the world is now obtainable here at very moderate prices. And I think I am justified in saying that Russia has far more to gain from this country than this country has to gain from Russia. And our Allies might well be surprised at the use of such language to persons who came there certainly in no spirit of submission, but who asked favours of Europe in a somewhat autocratic manner.

Again, the Prime Minister spoke of trading with Russia as the only means of counteracting the ferocity, rapine, and crudities of Bolshevism. It is not very encouraging, after the humanising influences of Genoa, and the almost cordial reception there given to the Russian Delegates, to find that this last month has been marked in Russia by some of the worst instances of religious persecution and some of the most flagrant violations of the principle of fair play and justice that have characterised the whole of this unfortunate episode. I think that every member of this House will feel that if we have to fall out openly with France on a question he would wish that the Russian question should be the last, and not the first, on which we did so.

I should like to ask the noble Earl opposite (Lord Balfour) one or two straight questions about these Despatches or Memoranda, especially the one published on June 12, when, I think, he was not in charge of the Foreign Office. They are most extraordinary in their language. I think we have a right to know from what Office they emanated. Did they emanate from the Foreign Office? Were they signed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs? If so, the whole touch is very unlike the foreign or diplomatic touch; it is very unlike the language which my noble friend, Lord Curzon, is accustomed to employ to foreign nations. It is not usual to tell your chief Ally in public that he is suffering from confusion of thought, and to enable him to say in reply that he declines to admit that he is ignorant of his subject. It is not usual, surely, to call him to account and lecture him on the rights of Sovereign States. It was pointed out on behalf of this country that it is the right of every foreign State to seize land, but that that right is subject to proper compensation. That is, perhaps, a good Parliamentary argument, but what is the use of asking its acceptance by the Government of France, who are seeking the return of a large amount of land? What is the value of a promise of compensation from a Government which had already said it would be ruined if it paid the debts which it had incurred to France?

Just as the late Lord Salisbury years ago said that some members of the public seemed to think that diplomatic action consisted in shaking your fist in your opponent's face when he happened to differ from you, and that that was not the method in which diplomacy was conducted, so, I think, it is very unusual that Memoranda published by this country should be in the nature of Parliamentary scores, and not on the lines which have always been adopted for open controversy—namely, those which are likely to lead to a settlement of the question. And I really think, if these Memoranda did not emanate from the Foreign Office, that we have a right to ask how they were drawn up.

Others of your Lordships may have seen it, but I have never seen a Memorandum sent to a foreign Power which was not sent under the seal and hand of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. There are in his House several noble Lords who have held the office of Foreign Secretary for a long time, my noble friend, Viscount Grey, and my noble friend, Lord Lansdowne, among them. There are also diplomatists who have served the Foreign Office and others who have held high posts there. My own experience of the Foreign Office is exiguous compared with theirs, but I make bold to say that there are certain points on which none of them is able to contradict me, and one is that the relation between the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister in the past was one of complete co-operation and confidence, but that the Foreign Minister was the channel of all negotiations. He saw the foreign diplomatists; he made statements to them on behalf of the Government; he kept careful and accurate note of all conversations for the benefit of his colleagues.

Let us contrast for one moment what occurred in the last two great European crises with what occurred at Genoa the other day. In 1877 Lord Salisbury went to Constantinople as a special envoy. He appears to have communicated almost daily with the Home Government and the Foreign Secretary, as regards almost every conversation of importance that he had with General Ignatieff, the Russian Government, and the Turkish Government. Twenty-eight different publications were placed before Parliament for their guidance with regard to that Conference, as shortly as possible after the Conference closed. Take, again, the Congress of Berlin in the following year, 1878. That was attended by Lord Beaconsfield, then Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury, then Foreign Minister, and Lord Odo Russell, our Ambassador at Berlin—plenipotentiaries if ever there were plenipotentiaries. Every two or three days Lord Salisbury indicted a full account of what had taken place privately and publicly to the principal Secretary of State remaining at home, the Home Secretary, for the information of the Government, and. as promptly as possible, some forty-six publications appeared in order to inform the country and Parliament of what had taken place.

Now look at Genoa. The Prime Minister was there; the Foreign Secretary, unfortunately, was not. It was specially unfortunate because only a month before, in Paris, he had cone to an agreement with the French Government on the happiest lines as regards the important question of Contantinople. The Foreign Secretary not being there, it might have been supposed that somebody of equal importance would have been invoked. My noble friend opposite had just returned from his work at Washington, for which the whole world has given him credit. He was, I believe, not far from Genoa. I know he will not thank me for suggesting that a well-earned holiday might have been broken by his being summoned there, but I am certain it would have given the country great confidence to know that he was there. But he was not. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was not there; the permanent Under-Secretary, who is the natural guardian of the work of the Foreign Office, was not there; the Ambassador was not there. The only important representative of the Foreign Office who was there, so far as I know, was the legal adviser, who deals with forms rather than with policy. Surely, in those conditions, if ever there was a case for a full report to this country, that was one.

I wonder whether I shall get any answer to the question I am going to put: Were such reports sent? Did any member of the very considerable secretariat of the Prime Minister send, every two days, for the guidance of His Majesty's principal Secretary of State or, indeed, of the Foreign Secretary, a record of what had taken place? Were notes taken of all these conversations at the daily meetings of the five Powers from which the twenty-nine were excluded, and were those notes registered for the information of the Foreign Office If they were, then we have a right to ask for those Papers; we have a right, at any rate, to ask for a selection of those Papers. If they were not, I really think I have the right to ask: Why not? Is it really the case that these records have been allowed to lapse? I ask that simply from the point of view of common sense. The Foreign Secretary had to deal with France in March. The Foreign Secretary happened to be absent in April and May when France was again being dealt with, and had to take up in June the difficult and complex question of Russia and the attitude of France in that regard. I say he cannot do that if in our foreign affairs he is simply to be a bird of passage. The tendency has been more and more, I submit, in the course of the last few years, to allow the Foreign Secretary and the Foreign Office to degenerate, in the eyes of foreign Ministers, into a sort of dull background to the picture in which the Prime Minister and his secretariat are the only prominent figures.

I should like to say one word about that secretariat before I sit down. I am not going to trouble your Lordships with the whole question of whether there should be a Cabinet Secretariat or not. But I confess I draw a great distinction between the Cabinet Secretariat in Whitehall Gardens and the Prime Minister's secretariat which has been domiciled, I believe, until recently, even if it is not now, in what is known as the "Garden City" in Downing Street. The House of Commons was told the other day that this huge secretariat and staff, numbering in all 114 persons, was merely a recording department, a transmitting department, and a communicating department. I hardly think that will be urged to-night. It is against the experience of anybody who has had anything to do on any subject with His Majesty's Government in the last few years. Everybody knows, it is common knowledge, that the secretariat of the Prime Minister, containing many very able men, has a position and an occupation quite beyond that of a transmitting and communicating department. In regard to foreign affairs, I urge that the time has come when that secretariat, its power, its scope and its influence, which has increased and is increasing, should be brought to an end, and that the work should be returned to the Departments to which it belongs.

Before I sit down I wish to state quite frankly the aim of the Motion I have made First, we wish to obtain a better knowledge of what occurred at Genoa and what led to the failure—failure in the sense that it caused considerable divergence between Great Britain and France; failure in the sense that to a certain extent it divided or began the division of Europe into two camps; failure also in the fact that other nations seem to have been somewhat shy of further conference. The second point which I urge is that we have the right to stand for the control of Parliament, for knowledge to be given to Parliament of foreign affairs, a right which has been almost entirely rejected in the course of the last few years. The third point is the one that I made just now of the return to the Foreign Secretary of the transaction of all routine business and of important affairs which may have lapsed from the hands of the Foreign Secretary into that of the Department to which he belongs.

Short cuts do not always lead us most quickly to our goal. We have been told that Europe is now a vast hospital. I doubt it. We all know that if each Power is to play the game of "beggar-my-neighbour" it may advantage itself, but the effect will be deadly to Europe generally, and the resuscitation of Europe will suffer. If we are to avoid that I contend that the Government must proceed by long strokes rather than by short ones. They must base their actions on conclusions which may be permanent, and not upon what may make a temporary triumph.

If your Lordships will allow me, I will give two instances of what I hope may be avoided. In the debate upon Genoa, a month ago, the Prime Minister spoke in the gravest manner of the existence of a Red Army of a million and a half of men with a reserve of four millions behind it, and he pointed out how dangerous it was to the peace of Europe. But in another passage I was astonished to find him making light of "the silly forgeries of military Conventions which take no one in." The Prime Minister had one Convention sprung upon him at Genoa, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer told the world next day that the Government had had no inkling of any description concerning it. It is quite true the Prime Minister may not find a military Convention sprung upon him; at the same time, is it wise, in the same speech, to point out the present danger to Europe and to assume that the still greater one, the peril from the coalition of such an Army with the power of Germany, is altogether non-existent? That is what I venture to call a crisp argument at the moment, but not a permanent conclusion.

Again, in a grave passage, the Prime Minister told us, in relation to this very question of the return of private property by the Bolshevist Government, that revolutions were accompanied by wholesale confiscation without compensation. "In fact, the Conservatism of France to-day," said the Prime Minister, "is rooted in confiscation." It is true that in the Middle Ages there was confiscation whenever a revolution occurred. It is equally true that there was confiscation in France one hundred and thirty years ago, but it met with the universal reprobation of civilised Europe and of mankind. Is it wise, at the very moment when European concert depends on all nations pulling together to prevent the widespread ruin which has followed the adoption of these nefarious doctrines in Russia, to cite lightly in that manner cases which are calculated to lead to a wholly opposite conclusion to that desired?

It is that sort of language which makes us nxious as to the language which may have been used on our behalf at Genoa. It is that which makes us feel that now, more than at any other time, it is absolutely necessary that Parliament should be given full information as to what has occurred, and as to the reason for some of the failures which took place. It is because I believe that this House is justified in insisting on what has been the immemorial practice of Parliament in this respect, that I venture to move the Motion which stands in my name.

Moved, That there be laid before the House any correspondence which took place between the British Government and the Governments of the United States, France, Italy, Germany, and Russia, with reference to the Genoa Conference, between the adjournment of the Supreme Council at Cannes and the meeting of the Genoa Conference, and any formal Notes which passed between the British and other representatives at the Genoa Conference not hitherto laid before Parliament.—(The Earl of Midleton.)

THE MARQUESS OF CREWE

My Lords, the Motion of the noble Earl behind me opens up three or four different lines of thought, and in pursuing them for a very short time—because it is late, and there are other speakers which your Lordships must wish to hear—I desire, if possible, to avoid travelling over the ground that has been covered by the noble Earl, more particularly in what he said about the recent policy of this country in relation to Russia. The noble Earl dealt with the general practice of His Majesty's Government in regard to the publication of Papers on foreign affairs; with the particular question respecting what happened in settling the preliminaries of the Conference at Genoa; with what the effect on the Genoa Conference itself may have been of the reticence of which he complained, and the apparent lack of consultation with some others of the Powers.

As the noble Earl told us, the longstanding practice of diplomacy has been for conversations on foreign affairs to be carried on and a careful record of them to be kept. The record, as your Lordships know, is kept in this way. Where a conversation takes place in this country between the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and a foreign Ambassador, the Secretary of State takes a note of the conversation, turns it into the form of a Despatch, and transmits it to the Ambassador of the country concerned. Where, on the other hand, the conversation takes place abroad, the British Ambassador similarly writes a Despatch to the Foreign Office here after the conversation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs in that country. The uniform practice has been, so far as is possible without detriment to the interests of this country——arid, of course, of the other country concerned—that those conversations and those Despatches should be published in the form of a Parliamentary Paper.

So far as Genoa is concerned, it may be said that this is a useful practice for humdrum times, but that we live in different days; that this is a question of a Conference and not of the ordinary discussions that take place between the respective Foreign Offices of different countries. My noble friend behind me dealt fully, or almost fully, with the answer to that complaint, if it were made, by calling attention to what happened in 1877 and 1878. Not only was it the case at the Berlin Congress, which the noble Earl opposite remembers well, that frequent conversations and other documents were sent home, but during the months that preceded the calling of that Congress, between March, 1878 (when the idea of the Berlin Congress was first mooted at Vienna) and June (when the Congress actually met) conversations between Lord Augustus Loftus, our Ambassador at St. Petersburg, and Prince Gortschalioff, the Russian Foreign Minister, were sent home and freely published in response to requests made for them in both Houses of Parliament. Similarly, the conversations that took place at Vienna were sent home and published. Between March and May of that year Lord Salisbury published no fewer than forty-two Papers dealing with objections raised by different countries in South East Europe to the manner in which they were to be dealt with under the San Stefano Treaty.

It is impossible not to draw, as the noble Earl drew, a comparison between the candour with which British policy was developed and displayed to Parliament and what has taken place in respect of the Genoa Conference. My noble friend also dealt with the preliminaries to the Genoa Conference itself. All that we know about those preliminaries is contained in the Parliamentary Paper describing the Resolutions which were adopted by the Supreme Council at Cannes in January as the basis for the Genoa Conference. So far as I am aware practically no other record has been presented to Parliament of what happened between those two Conferences. I have never seen any record, except what appeared in the Press, of what happened when the Prime Minister met M. Poincaré in France soon after his assumption of the French Premiership on the resignation of M. Briand. And, so far as communication with other Powers is concerned, there has been no publication of documents which enable us to know what has passed. As the noble Earl said, we have to depend upon what we have been able to glean from the Press, and it is, of course, a question as to how far a particular description of what has occurred at a meeting between distinguished statesmen is to be regarded as inspired, or how far it is to be regarded as a mere guess. It may possibly turn out to be erroneous, and conceivably may be inspired by some feeling of malice towards those taking part in the conversations.

It will not be until we come back to the simple publication of records of conversations that we can know really how we stand. I do not want to dwell at any length on conferences as the ordinary instrument, of diplomacy in substitution for the older methods to which we have been accustomed, but it is interesting at this moment to quote what the late Lord Salisbury said about conferences at the time of which I have been speaking. Lord Salisbury, writing in April, 1878, to Lord Odo Russell, the British Ambassador at Berlin, said:— Our view as to the Congress is that, though it is an admirable instrument to enable friendly Powers to come to an agreement about details, it only aggravates the divergence between those who radically differ, because it accentuates and calls public attention to the amount of difference and makes retreat on either side a loss of honour. We are not, therefore, very anxious for a meeting until we have ascertained that Russia on essential points is amenable. For "Russia" read "France" and the words seem not inapplicable to what happened at Genoa.

Speaking in more general terms, Lord Salisbury's biographer, who certainly knew the inmost thoughts of that great Foreign 'Minister, states— That an International Conference will do more harm than good if it is entered upon while vital issues remain open, was an axiom of diplomatic tactics upon which he often expatiated. In addition to the more immediate reason urged in these quotations, he used to dwell upon the atmosphere of intrigue which pervades such assemblages. The less interested Powers all have their own ends to serve and their support is inevitably competed for by the protagonists. Complex bargains, unavowed compacts, side issues and indirect notives of all kinds are intruded upon the larger controversy and, should that be of a critical character, the risk of rupture is greatly increased. Acting upon these views, he lost no time in pressing forward the preliminary negotiations which he believed to be necessary. None of us goes so far as to say that there are no circumstances in which International Conferences have to be held, but the degree of caution which was expressed by Lord Salisbury in that particular instance, and which is of general application, is surely worth remembering.

The object of the Genoa Conference was to confirm what had been done at Cannes on the need for international co-operation in the restoration of Europe; to establish European peace on a solid basis; to bring about the restoration of confidence without doing violence to existing Treaties; and to deal with questions of banking, currency, credit and transport. The Genoa Conference, as we know, owing to the attitude assumed by France, became in the main an economic Conference, and, so far as I have been able to understand, in dealing with those subjects of transport, currency and so on, the French delegates showed themselves reasonable and helpful to the utmost degree, provided, of course, that politics in the strict sense were not allowed to intrude into the discussion of those subjects. The work of the Conference was thus narrowed down. There was, however, as I understand, marked confusion between the various Commissions and Sub-commissions that were appointed to deal with specific questions at the Conference, and it was attempted to reduce that confusion by a number of private conferences and conversations held at different villas, rather than by any meetings of the Conference itself. As I understand my noble friend, Lord Midleton, to have argued, a great deal of that difficulty and confusion might have been avoided by the preliminary preparation of agenda in a more settled and concentrated form, and, presumably, by more frequent negotiations than did take place between some of the different Powers involved.

I do not think that anybody will deny that, in itself, it was a considerable feat to collect the representatives of thirty-four nations at a Conference, and any credit that is claimed by His Majesty's Government for having brought about that result will, I am sure, be cheerfully given. But there did, undoubtedly, exist the belief—and this is a point which has to be noted—among a great many who took part in that Conference that, as a matter of fact, most of the thirty-four nations had very little to do with the business at all, that practically all the decisions were made by four or five nations, and that, in fact, it was not very much more than a meeting of the Supreme Council in disguise. How far that supposition rested on a foundation of accuracy, I am, of course, in no position to know, but that the suspicion should have existed is surely unfortunate, and, if it is not true, would not the publication of many more Papers than have been issued make the facts clear? If in any sense it he true, I do not see how it can be denied that the meeting of such a Conference as this, assuming to represent almost all the nations of Europe, and its failure to achieve anything much more than the preparation of the ground for other Conferences, must in itself be a hampering fact to the League of Nations, which also includes most, though, unfortunately, not all, of the nations of Europe and to which, for the future settlement of European questions, we look forward so keenly.

I cannot help feeling that the Government have fallen into the error of ignoring, to some extent, the history of the past, and of dwelling perpetually on the unprecedented circumstances in which they find themselves dealing with the Powers of Europe. It is true that the events of the last few years have represented a crisis menacing the civilisation of Europe, and, indeed, of the world; but this is not the first time that that has happened. No crisis could be greater than those which, in the past, have menaced the civilisation of the whole world as it then existed. Historians in the future will not say that, if the Allies had been defeated and Germany had conquered in the war, even though the civilisation of Europe might have been, for the time, apparently crushed thereby, the crisis was a greater one for the future of the human race than if, say, in the sixteenth century, Spain had crushed England and the Netherlands, or to go further back in history, if, in the third century before Christ, Carthage had demolished Borne, or, in the fifth century, Persia had overwhelmed Greece.

I cannot help thinking that His Majesty's Government have been prone—I will not say to exaggerate the importance of the affairs in which they have been engaged, but that they are mistaken in thinking that entirely new principles of international communication have become desirable in the sense in which nobody would have believed them to be desirable twenty or thirty years ago. The only real hope of an entirely novel system of consolidation and co-operation between the great Powers, and also the small Powers, both of Europe and of the rest of the world, must, after all, lie in the League of Nations, and it is partly because some of us feel that the recent dealings of the Government with foreign affairs, and in particular with the Conference at Genoa, are harmful to the ideal of the League of Nations that we support the protest which has been made by my noble friend, Lord Midleton, in his demand for Papers.

THE EARL OF DERBY

My Lords, I venture to intervene for a very few minutes in this debate, and it will only be for a very few minutes, because I can so heartily endorse all that has been said by the two noble Lords who have preceded me that there is little I can add. I would however, add that little, which is an entreaty to the Government to give heed to this request—a request which is made not only in this house but is being made every day by the country at large——for more information. I do not for one moment intend to make any attack on the Government, and if in the Lobby afterwards we have to chastise the Government it will be with pain and with a hope that we shall be able to do it for their good. It is with that hope that I shall vote for this Motion. It really is, if I may say so, to the Government's advantage that they should give more information to the country than they have been prepared hitherto to give.

The new form of diplomacy—I do not quite know what that is—has been alluded to, but there is this difference from the old diplomacy, that instead of written Despatches there are personal discussions. If I may say so, the fact of there being personal discussions renders it all the more necessary that information should be given to the country, and given quickly, because as a general rule no two people agree as to what takes place at these oral discussions. It is, therefore, essential that after these discussions have taken place there should be some record of what has occurred, signed and approved by all who have taken part in them, and that some report of what took place should be given to the country at large.

I am not one of those who press for every detail. I know perfectly well that while negotiations are in progress it would be detrimental to the interests of those negotiations if everything was given to the public, but at the present moment we are told so little that we are left dependent on the newspaper reports. These reports are made up by reporters trying to do their best from information gathered from stray statements here and stray statements there, and give an account of what is taking place which very often is not only inaccurate and misleading, but at the same time extremely dangerous, because on those inaccurate reports is built up a public opinion which causes a considerable amount of misunderstanding between the countries. Therefore, while I do not press for details of the negotiations still in progress—the danger of giving such information is obvious—that surely cannot apply to letting us know what took place at the Genoa Conference, and still more what took place before the Conference. What we want to know are the terms under which France went there, the terms under which Russia went there, and the terms under which America refused to go there. Until we know that, there is no way in which we can form our opinion as to whether any one nation or the other behaved badly at that Conference. We want to know the rules of the game before we can say whether the game was played fairly by those who participated in it.

I have said, and I hope this House will agree with me, that too often this country, through lack of knowledge, comes to a decision which is not always right, and if only a statement had been made by the Government it would have made a better case for the Government than they allowed their supporters to make for them. I am going to take, if I may, a concrete case, where the withholding of information has undoubtedly led to a misunderstanding between two countries; at all events, between the people of two countries. In your Lordships' House nothing is, I believe, out of order—it may be out of order, but, luckily, there is no penalty for being out of order—and so I propose to deal, as a concrete case of a misunderstanding which might be cleared away, with the relationship that exists at the present time between England and France. It is a subject that I have very much at heart, because I earnestly believe that that good relationship is as essential to one country as to the other, and that without such close relationship, and without our going hand in hand, the reforming of Europe is practically an impossibility.

I am therefore going to take this concrete case of a so-called Pact or Alliance, or call it what you will. Here is the case. At the Conference at Cannes the Prime Minister offered a Pact or a defensive Alliance with France to the French Government. We do not know the details. We do not know whether France accepted or refused. But if you ask the man in the street in England, and the man in the street in France, I think I can tell you what both would say. The man in the street in England would say that the Pact was offered to France and refused by France. The man in the street in France would say: "The Pact was offered as a condition to our going to Genoa. We went to Genoa, we delivered the goods, and you have not delivered them in return." I believe both those replies to be absolutely inaccurate. But those are opinions which are gaining strength simply and solely because we cannot get the information as to what is the reality of the position.

Now, I have put certain questions. Answer certain questions, and the moment you have done that, you will have put the two countries in possession of information which will let them form their right judgments as to the position of the Pact. Give them that information and I believe that you will do a great deal to restore the friendly feeling between the two countries, which has been somewhat marred lately. Withhold it, and your misunderstanding will grow from day to day. I put those questions in a speech that I made some time ago. I put certain questions to the Prime Minister. They were not answered by the Prime Minister, but there was a half column in The Times, headed "Anglo-French Pact." Those things are not official, but, knowing something, as I do now, of the authorities from which such statements come, I feel that if the official view was put alongside of the non-official view you would find very little difference between them, and that the highly authorised people who generally give this information are probably the only people who can give the information to us, but who prefer to give it through the channel of a newspaper rather than to the two Houses of Parliament.

Here is the direct misunderstanding. This is what I call the English semi-official point of view:— The position as regards the proposed Anglo-French Pact, discussion on which has been revived again in the Press during the last few days, is that when the Pact was first suggested at Cannes it was stated to be contingent on an agreement being arrived at between England and France on a number of outstanding questions, principally the Eastern question and Tangier. This point of view was understood to have been accepted by the French Government. No settlement, however, has yet been reached on the outstanding questions referred to. In other words, the settlement and the signature of the Pact were dependent on all these other questions being settled. That is the English point of view.

Let us take the French point of view, which is slightly different. The French authorised statement deals with the matter rather more in extenso, but there is only one paragraph that I need read— Some mistake was perhaps made in putting forward the Pact in apparent connection with other subjects. It cannot be a bargaining instrument; it must stand on its own merits. Is not there a divergence of opinion there, which shows that the two countries, and perhaps the two Governments, have an entire misconception as to each other's idea of how this Pact stands? The English statement is that it must depend on outstanding questions being settled, and the French statement is that, on the contrary, it must not be in any way connected with those negotiations. On that matter the Government ought to have given information which would have prevented these diametrically opposite statements being made from France and England respectively.

I want to see this misunderstanding cleared away. If the noble Earl opposite answers certain questions which I will ask I believe that misunderstanding can be cleared away. I am going to put them to him to-day because I believe it would be a good precedent, if the questions are answered, for giving information on other subjects; he would find how very quickly he can do away with many of the difficulties existing between the two countries to-day. The questions I would like to ask are these:

1. (1) When the Prime Minister offered the Pact to M. Briand at Cannes, did 22 he do so in writing? Was it accompanied, either in writing or verbally, by any condition, such as that the French should send delegates to Genoa?
2. (2) Was the offer of the Pact renewed to M. Poincaré? Did he, in response, send any Despatch making conditions or suggestions? If he did, what were those conditions, what were those suggestions?
3. (3) If he sent a Despatch—as I believe I am right in saying that he did—what was the reply of the British Government, and when was it sent?

I ask for an answer to those questions, not now, but at any time when the noble Earl may think it convenient. I have asked them because I want to give a concrete case of a misunderstanding, which has arisen solely from lack of knowledge, perhaps not in the minds of the Government but in the minds of the people, and which can be cleared up by a frank statement of the state of affairs by the Government.

I am not going to deal with the Conference of Genoa in the detailed way in which the two noble Lords have dealt with it. I am one of those who, perhaps differing from the opinions of those who sit around me, think the Prime Minister did it bold thing, and on the whole a right thing, to attempt to bring about at Genoa some sort of general agreement that might give peace to the world. I think that attempt was doomed to failure, and I think the Prime Minister must have known it was doomed to failure. But, that being so, I give him more credit than other people perhaps do for having attempted to do something which he thought was doomed to failure but which he thought was right. But, while you can give !dm credit for that, you must, at the same time, ask for what reason he went there, apart from the general wish of restoring harmony to the world. We must know why France went halfheartedly; we must know why America refused to go at all; we must know the conditions under which Russia went. Then, when we know that, we shall be able to form a truer conception of the Prime Minister's policy, and it is with a view of letting this country form a proper conception of the policy of His Majesty's Government that I now heartily endorse the request that is made for Papers.

THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (THE EARL OF BALFOUR)

My Lords, in the latter part of the noble Earl's speech he reverted to what, I take it, was the principal subject on which we are now engaged, but in the main part of his address he concerned himself with another matter—a very important matter, but one which had, so far as I could see, little reference either to the speech or the Motion of the noble Earl who opened the debate. And indeed, I think my noble friend who has just sat down had himself sonic suspicion that perhaps in an Assembly where order was more narrowly enforced he might, not have been in a position to bring forward the subject on which he made such an interesting statement.

On that subject, and before I return to the main subject of the debate, let me say briefly how, as I understand it, the question of the Pact has stood and now stands. It was at Cannes that in conversation the Prime Minister and M. Briand discussed this subject, and they were agreed. The Prime Minister outlined the sort of Pact which he desired to see carried out, which was, of course, a mere repetition of what the House, the country and the world was fully acquainted with—the original abortive Treaty in which. America was to take a part. There was nothing new in the substance of it. It came to this, that the British Empire would guarantee France against aggression and invasion by Germany and would confirm the London Reparation Agreement. In addition to that, not as touching the substance of the Pact but as touching the time at which it would be useful to discuss it and, if necessary, to carry it out, the Prime Minister and M. Briand were agreed that there were three or four questions, outstanding questions, between the two countries which it would be desirable to settle. And surely they were right? It would not have been either a wise or a prudent course in the middle of controversial negotiations to ask either this country or France to enter into this Pact. M. Briand, as I understand the matter, is entirely of that opinion, and the substance of what I have just explained to the House, which was in the first instance the result of a conversation between the two Prime Ministers, was subsequently communicated in writing to M. Briand.

Then, my noble friend asks me what happened when M. Briand left office and was succeeded by M. Poincaré. M. Poincaré desired, I believe, to take up the negotiations exactly where they had been left. He also agreed with his predecessor, M. Briand, and with the British Government that this Pact should only follow a general liquidation of outstanding questions and I believe that be communicated that opinion not merely to the British Government but to the Press in an interview with a correspondent of the Daily Mail on January 17. Broadly speaking, that is where the matter rests now. These subjects of discussion between the two Governments are still subjects of discussion, and until they have reached, or have nearly reached, a complete settlement it will surely not be worth while to enter into further and minute details upon this most important and interesting subject. I do not know whether that answer satisfies my noble friend, but I think it is complete, though there is probably nothing in it which is not already known generally both in England and in France.

Having dealt briefly, but I hope not inadequately, with that point, let me go back to the speeches of the noble Earl, my noble friend who initiated this discussion, and of the noble Marquess who leads the Opposition. I do not say, and I think I should be doing great injustice to the speech of my noble friend who opened the debate if I suggested, that it was confined to the discussion of whether we had or had not given adequate information to the House about the Genoa Conference, and whether we had or had not followed the good example set us by our predecessors. That, no doubt, was the main theme of the noble Earl's discourse. But in the intervals, the interstices of that main argument, be introduced a good many other subjects of great importance which had not, as far as I could judge, any very strict relevance to the Motion before the House.

He made a brief but comprehensive attack upon the policy of His Majesty's Government with regard to Russia. He said that we had first tried force and failed, and then tried diplomacy, and he implied, I think not obscurely, that diplomacy also was likely to fail. When you are dealing with a Government like the Soviet Government of Russia—which came into existence, remember, as, if not the formal Ally, the practical associate of Germany in the great war and with whom there has never been or at all events there was not a formal peace—and when my noble friend talks of force, what else should be used but force when you are dealing with a Government which was in alliance with your most formidable enemy? There has been no precise division between the position in 1917, let us say, and the position in 1921 or 1922, although that position has completely altered. But the difficulty, of course, of all this changing cinematograph is that you cannot precisely say at what time relations were formally altered; you cannot say at what time force was clearly necessary, at what other time the use of force became a very doubtful advantage, and at what further period it became clearly pernicious; because when you are dealing with a situation like that which we had to face in Russia those sharply marked distinctions do not occur. All you can say is that, by common consent, there was a moment when Soviet Russia was in alliance with our enemies and was, therefore, our enemy; that there is now a moment at which it would be a great advantage to the world at large if normal trade relations could be established again between Western Europe and the great community in the East.

I do not know that more can be said or that more need be said upon that aspect of the subject. I leave that which was, after all, but a parenthesis in my noble friend's speech, and I will come to what was his main contention and the main contention of the noble Marquess who followed him. Both those noble Lords appeared to be under the impression that in everything connected with this Genoa Conference we were keeping back information which was at our disposal, that there were piles of Papers of the kind which it is usual for the British Foreign Office to publish, which we had refused to publish; that there were embryo Blue-books galore which had never been permitted to see the light, and that if your Lordships had only got these documents in your possession you could form not only a more adequate, but a completely different, judgment of recent events than you have formed at the present moment. It is a dream; it is a fantastic dream. I can assure my noble friend that he is under a complete delusion in this matter.

He says, for example, that my noble friend Lord Lansdowne and I, who were colleagues in office when the Entente Cordiale was arranged with France, pursued quite a different course from that which the present Government are pursuing. I admit I have not refreshed my recollection in the matter, but I asked my noble friend the noble Marquess whether he remembered exactly what occurred, and I do not suppose he would fake the responsibility of giving any minute account of our procedure in that matter, but it is quite certain that many conversations took place, that much correspondence occurred, which of course was never published, and never ought to be published, on that subject. It is in the main true, I believe, that we only published the Protocols and a general Despatch covering them, in which an account was given of how matters had been arranged. I do not think my noble friend dwelt much upon that particular case.

The particular cases which appeared most to appeal to noble Lords opposite are, to my great surprise, the Conservative precedents of 1877 and 1878. I do not believe private conversations were then published. I have not refreshed my memory with any minute study of these things, but, so far as my recollection goes, Protocols were published, conclusions were published, but the discussions which took place every day, and which were the sort of discussions that were referred to among others by the noble Marquess opposite, were not published. They could not be published, they ought not to have been published, and they were not published. But, after all, a great deal was published with regard to the Conference at Berlin of 1878, and there was a good deal published with regard to the transactions in which my noble friend and I were concerned in making the great arrangement with France which marked the early years of this century.

But there are later precedents than that, and I was very much surprised that they were not referred to by either the mover of the Motion or the noble Marquess opposite, who must have them very fresh in his mind, for the Government of which he was a member was concerned, if my memory serves me right, in three great Conferences. There was the Conference of Algeciras, the Conference at London on maritime warfare, and the Conference of 1913 connected with the Balkan wars. Those were three great. International Conferences of the utmost importance. They were the most important diplomatic transactions that took place, so far as my knowledge goes, during the term of office of my noble friends opposite. Those were the precedents to which I should have thought they would have referred. We heard much from my noble friend of the good old times. Those were the good old times. What occurred then? As regards the Declaration of London, nothing was published but a final Protocol. As everybody knows, the Declaration, though not, unfortunately, wholly inoperative, never was ratified, but that does not touch the point. The point is what was published, and nothing was published except the final Protocol. I ought to have begun by mentioning, first, the Conference to which I shall now refer—the Conference of Algeciras. That was in 1906, and all that was then published was the general Act, and two or three selected and quite unimportant Papers with regard to the Jews, the slavery, and the alcohol in Morocco. No procés-verbaux were published; no Papers, and no correspondence were published. Still, something was published.

When I come to the third of these great cases nothing was published. The third of these great eases, as I have already suggested, was the Conference of London on Balkan affairs which took place in 1913. That arose out of great transactions in Central and Eastern Europe. It was the parent of important events which have since followed, and of that, so far as I am able to discover, nothing was published at all. The Powers sat here round the table; they discussed these difficult matters; they came to certain conclusions, but nothing was laid before Parliament, and I am astounded, I confess, when I look back upon these twenty years of precedents of which the greater part were occupied by the term of office of the noble Lord opposite, I am amazed to find how little they published, and how they can have the courage to come forward and attack us for not publishing more than we have done. The inconsistency is patent and obvious. I do not remember my noble friend who initiated this debate, and who was certainly a very ardent member of the then Opposition, coming forward and directing the thunders of his eloquence against the noble Marquess who now joins him in attacking the present Government.

The truth is that. I do not believe any Conference has ever taken place with regard to which completer information has been given. Certain particular questions have been put to me. Noble Lords want to know more about America, in particular. There are no Papers to be read about America. Remember what the circumstances were. The American Ambassador was at Cannes when the whole of this Genoa Conference was being discussed between British and French Prime Ministers. The American Ambassador was asked verbally to convey to his Government our great desire that they should take part in the Conference, and a reply was given by the American Government, but it was published. There were no documents from our side. It was done orally. There was a document on the American side, and that has been published. I can give the world no more information. I suspect they knew all this before, but the American Government, for reasons which they set forth as fully as they thought desirable, did not wish to take part in the Conference, and we felt, that being so, there was nothing more to be said in the matter.

Where is there undue reticence? Where is there culpable concealment in a transaction like that I am unable to find it. Remember, there has not been in this particular case anything corresponding to that covering Despatch of which my noble friend behind reminded me, which gave an account to the world of the general motives and course of the negotiations which led up to the Entente Cordiale, but, though no such covering Despatch has been given to the public, have the public been kept unaware of the general views of the Government upon this subject? I should have thought that the speech that the Prime Minister made before going to Genoa, and the speech he made after returning from Genoa, carried just the kind of information which a covering Despatch would carry, and conveyed it more fully, with greater amplitude, and certainly with greater eloquence.

The fact is that so far as my inquiries have gone there is really nothing more that is worth publishing, and nothing more that could be published, so far as I know, except two trifling Despatches which were sent by the British Foreign Office in answer to a French Despatch. The French Despatch has been published by the French Government. There is nothing of the least interest or importance in regard to general policy on this question in the two British Despatches, but if my noble friends think they will give them enlightenment, in spite of my assurance, I have no objection to lay them on the Table of the House. Provided always that the French Government agree—I must consult them, of course—we have no objection to laying these Despatches, though I do not think, honestly, any public service will be served by so doing or any material information conveyed to any noble Lord. However, it may give my noble friend who spoke last a sufficient excuse for not administering that punishment to the Government which he threatened, and which he said would only give the utmost personal pain to himself—a. personal pain which, I hope, I shall spare him by giving him this adequate excuse for not voting against his late colleagues.

There is one more important point to which I must refer. I am not sure that I fully understood it, but the noble Earl who initiated the debate accused us of having gone into conference without having first come to an agreement with the French. He said: "How foolish not to have thrashed out all the subjects of difference with the French Government before you went into a conference with the French Government where all the European nations were assembled." That is a most unfounded charge. I know of no difference—I do not remember any at this moment—between us and the French Government at Genoa, except that which was connected with compensation, or purchase, or restoration of property in Russia. On that point it is quite true that the Belgians took a line different from our own, and that the French joined with the Belgians in that. difference. But it was the French who changed their course, not the British. The matter is in all these Papers. Before we went into conference the French and ourselves were agreed upon the broad policy, and the actual Resolution that was drawn up was drawn up by a French expert, a British expert, and, oddly enough, a Belgian expert. It was the Resolution thus drawn up that occasioned such difference as there was.

We had not the slightest reason to believe before going into conference that the French would differ from us, nor did they differ until the Belgians declared that they could not adhere. They had agreed to the Resolution. I should like to know what opening for criticism there is in a course like that? We are charged with not settling our differences in private, unreported conversations I presume, before going into conference. The only difference was that which was connected with the treatment of private property in Russia. On that point we had agreed with the French, the French had agreed with us, and the difference only arose out of an incident which we never foresaw, which we could not have foreseen—namely, that the Belgians did not wholly accept the principle upon which the Resolution was founded, to which we and the French had previously both agreed.

I do not know t hat there is any other charge I have to meet except the one that the Prime Minister and his secretariat did not keep the Foreign Office adequately informed. It is true, unfortunately, that the. Foreign Office was not represented at Genoa by the head of the Department.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

By nobody.

THE EARL OF BALFOUR

It is true that it was not represented by the head of the Department, and the whole House knows why. It was not represented because, unfortunately, Lord Curzon's health did not permit him to go. The noble Marquess says it was represented by nobody. It could be represented by nobody of equal authority to the Secretary of State, and the suggestion is that the Under-Secretary of State should have gone. Noble Lords know very little about the personal difficulties under which the Foreign Office labours, and has laboured for the last few weeks, if they lightly make a charge like that. Not only was the Secretary of State ill but the Under-Secretary of State was away on a most needed holiday, from which he was dragged back prematurely by the illness of his second in command, and it would have been impossible to carry on the business of the Foreign Office with all its chiefs either disabled by illness or overwhelmed with work.

But to say that the Foreign Office was not represented at Genoa is wholly inaccurate. Neither the Secretary nor the Under-Secretary of State could go, for the reasons I have mentioned, and which are sufficient reasons, but there were other persons who went, other very able officials who went, whose services were in constant request, whose information was entirely at the disposal of the British Delegation, and whose information was largely drawn upon.

There is also the suggestion that no sufficient information was given by the Delegation at Genoa to the Foreign Office, in London. These are the facts. Every day a telegram was sent; usually, information was telegraphed two or three times a day. These telegrams were sent by the Foreign Office representative, and they were sent to the Foreign Office. In addition, under the Prime Minister's direct instructions, full private letters were sent to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Leader of the House of Commons in duplicate every day.

Further, we have heard that the disadvantage of Conferences, as distinct from diplomacy of the older type, is that, in diplomacy of the older type, the Foreign Minister had conversations with Ambassadors, that he recorded those conversations, that they were then transmitted to our representatives abroad, and, if needful or desirable, they could, by common consent, be communicated to the public. I can assure the House that if the difference between the old diplomacy and the new is the question of record, all the advantage is with the new. Every conversation was recorded, every conversation was minutely kept. It would be in our power or our successors' power—under, of course, the ordinary precautions, the ordinary seals of secrecy which bind us, not merely to our own interests, but to those of our Allies—it would be possible at any future time to find out exactly what was said on every occasion by every man of importance.

Now, compare that with what happened at the Balkan Conference in London in 1913. I am told that there were no records kept at all of those conversations. They were frequent, they were important., they led to great results, but no record remains, so far as we know, of anything that then passed; and I should have thought that the last charge that could be made against the present Government is that, under the machinery which they used and which they have to a large extent brought into being, records are inadequately or imperfectly kept. And let me say that these confidential records were communicated, as of course, day by day, to the Prime Ministers in the great self-governing Dominions, and I have myself seen a letter from South Africa explaining how grateful the South African Government was for being kept au fait with all that was done, day by day, in the Genoa Conference.

I cannot end this subject without saving something about an attack, which I deeply regretted, made by my noble friend, Lord Midleton, upon the secretariat. In the first place, I think—I may be doing him an injustice—that he confuses the Prime Minister's private secretaries with the Cabinet Secretariat. They are quite different. There has been a succession of most able men acting as the Prime Minister's private secretaries. Is it suggested that he should not have private secretaries Is it suggested that, in times when more and more difficult questions have poured in upon the Government than at any time in recorded history, he should be deprived of the number of private secretaries—and very hard-worked private secretaries they are—carrying on the tremendous and responsible businesses which he has to transact? They are different from, and have nothing whatever to do with, the Cabinet Secretariat, which has itself grown out of the war, a Secretariat of which, I am proud to think, I was one of the original progenitors.

What has been the result? The result has been that you have a machinery for record—a most difficult art, let me tell my noble friends—which has never been equalled. I have seen a great deal of it. I saw a great deal of it at Washington, and I saw a great deal of it at Paris, and both at Paris and at Washington I was able to say that the British Secretariat was trustworthy, and was trusted, that it was almost as useful to those with whom we were negotiating as it was to ourselves. I am sure the attacks made upon the Secretariat are attacks made in pure ignorance. I believe that no greater service has been done to the machinery of this country, at any rate for times like these, than the development of the Secretariat. It began, as I say, with the Committee of Defence. It still includes the Committee of Defence. I believe some people have gone the length of suggesting that Sir Maurice Hankey, who is the head of that Secretariat, is overpaid for his services. He receives just the same payment, now that all the work of the Defence Committee, in addition to all the work of the Cabinet Secretariat, is put under his charge, as lie did under noble Lords opposite, when he was made the permanent secretary of the Defence Committee.

I never like to hear the Civil Service of this country attacked, but never, in all my experience—longer than that of any noble Lord sitting in this House—of public affairs, have I heard an attack which, in my judgment, has less foundation or did more injustice to most hardworking and most competent experts in the business they have to transact, than the suggestions made in another place, and by my noble friend opposite in the debate to which we have listened to-day. I do not feel that I have really done justice to this branch of my subject, but it is one on which I feel extremely strongly. I have, if I may say so without arrogance, an unequalled experience on this point, because I was, from the nature of the case, through all the early and critical period of the Versailles negotiations, for three months dependent upon them for all the reports they sent home, for all the conversations they recorded, and also for all the work they did in Washington. I have seen them on countless other occasions, and there is no set of public servants from whom the public gets more value for its money.

I hope I have answered all the charges brought against the Government. The charge of secrecy is really a fantastic charge, but, if it gives noble Lords any consolation, I will at once inquire of the French Government whether they will permit the publication of their own Despatch, which they have themselves made public, and the two replies which it called forth from us. They are, as I think, quite valueless for forming any just estimate of what has gone on, or is going on, in connection with the Genoa and Hague Conferences, but at least they will enable the Foreign Office to say that every Paper that could conceivably be of any use to anybody, even to the most curious, has been laid before the public.

VISCOUNT GREY OF FALLODON

My Lords, as I was not present in your Lord ships' House when the noble Earl who has just sat down made what is, I believe, his first appearance a few days ago, I hope you will allow me to take this opportunity of saying how much pleasure it gives me to find myself in the same House with the noble Earl again. For more than thirty years I sat opposite to him in the House of Commons, except for a short period when we were colleagues, a period which would have been to me, at any rate, exceedingly pleasant, if it had not been that for the whole of that time we were engaged in the war, which left neither me nor, I should think, the noble Earl time or inclination to think of things that were pleasant. To find myself sitting opposite to him again gives me a sense of something familiar, almost homelike, which is very agreeable and pleasant, and I am sure that feeling of pleasure would be shared by anyone who has been long associated with the noble Earl in public life, whether he has been associated with him as a colleague or associated with him as a member of an Opposition.

The noble Earl has made a most interesting speech, in which he has given us some interesting information. Especially did he give interesting information in reply to the questions of the noble Earl, Lord Derby, about the Pact with France—information for which we are all the more grateful because it was in a sense not so strictly relevant to the debate as some other matters. I do not propose to follow on that point, and I do not propose to go in detail into what the noble Earl has said in defence of the Cabinet Secretariat, and some other matters. If I had a criticism to make of his speech, it would be not that it was irrelevant, but that it was almost too strictly relevant to the actual words of the Motion, because the speech of the noble Earl who moved the Motion, I thought, in the most important part of it, did impugn not merely the lack of information but the whole policy of the Genoa Conference. That was the part of his speech which seemed to me particularly interesting, and that is the part of his speech to which Lord Balfour has not replied.

I will not spend any time over the criticism or the reply to the attack on the policy of the Government towards the Bolsheviks, except to say this, that the noble Earl really missed the point of the criticism with regard to the policy pursued towards Russia in attacking the Bolsheviks by force. He missed the point when he spoke as if that policy of force had been pursued only while the Bolsheviks were the associates of Germany. Our real criticism is that after the Armistice, when Germany was out of the war and was beaten, an enormous number of millions spent, and an enormous number of words spoken and written, were devoted by the Government to denouncing the Bolsheviks, and then when that policy had resulted in failure, and the policy of force had com- pletely failed, the Government swung round to the policy of negotiation. Our criticism is that they were in an exceptionally weak position to negotiate because of the millions spent and the language used, and the failure which they had incurred in the policy of force against Russia after the Armistice.

However, I will not spend time on that. Nor do I want to spend time in defending the old methods as compared with the new. We are all of us wiser, at least I hope so, in the last few years than we were before the war, and I am quite prepared to admit that the older methods, although they had nothing to do with bringing about the war, are capable of improvement. It does not follow, however, that because they are capable of improvement, therefore the new methods adopted are better than the old ones. I listened to, and there was considerable force in, the noble Earl's point that as regards the amount of Papers published the old methods on certain occasions, such as the Algeciras Conference, and so forth, had a lot more to say for themselves than the present methods. He said there must always be private conversations, and private conversations could not be published. Yes, my Lords, but what I feel is this, that under the new methods private conversations are not private. Things are constantly coming out in the Press in a way that they used not to do before the war.

I heard the noble Earl's comment that they got too much information, but it is not the amount of information. I will take this instance. The noble Earl spoke on the point of how far there was agreement with France throughout the Genoa Conference, and he made light of any difference. Well, those of us who are anxious about the future suffered great anxiety during the Genoa Conference. From time to time it seemed to us that the Entente with France was being strained almost to breaking point. Was it so, or not? Nobody who listened to the noble Earl could have supposed that there was any strain upon the Entente during the Genoa Conference; Are we mistaken in supposing that there was a strain? Was our anxiety all misplaced? It was not only the newspapers which attack the Prime Minister which gave that impression. The newspapers which support him spoke at times of the Entente as almost at an end. Where did that information come from? I cannot say that it came from the Prime Minister's entourage; but if it be the case, as the noble Earl has given us to infer from his speech, that there was no serious strain on the relations with France during the Conference, I think it was a great pity that the Prime Minister's entourage, which is supposed to be so often active with the Press, did not pass word to the Press of the nature which the noble Earl has given us this evening. It is an enormous relief, if it be true, that our anxiety is exaggerated as regards the strain put upon our relations with France during the Conference.

My object in taking part in the debate is not especially to attack the policy of the Government, but to make what contribution 1 can, for what it is worth. It may not be worth much, but the situation is growing increasingly serious. Years have passed since the Armistice, and we are really making no progress towards the reconstruction of Europe. I cannot think that Genoa has really made any substantial progress at all, and if it has not, it is a very serious matter. It has been so much time wasted, and my complaint of the Government would be this—and I admit it applies not only to this Government, but to other Governments—that they all agree that the reconstruction of Europe, the recovery of Europe, is a most important and urgent problem, but they do not seem to have settled down to any clear perspective of the methods by which that progress can be brought about.

The first thing which seems to me essential to the reconstruction of Europe is the co-operation of the Government and the resources of the United States. I ventured to say, when the project of the Genoa Conference was first launched, that it seemed to me a pity that the League of Nations was put aside, because 1 thought that everything practicable could be better done through the League of Nations than through the Conference. The reply given by the Prime Minister, and the one reason which seemed to me at the time to be important, was that the Government of the United States would not co-operate with anything under the League of Nations, from which we inferred that it would co-operate in a Conference at Genoa. One very disappointing part in the speech of the noble Earl to-night was that he has told us there are no more Papers about the communications with the United States. My feeling is that there ought to have been.

I am prepared to say—I was prepared to say openly if the United States had gone to Genoa—that if previous communications had passed with them under which it had been made clear that they would not co-operate with anything under the League of Nations, but they would co-operate in the Genoa Conference, that would have been a complete justification for putting the League of Nations on one side on that occasion and holding the Genoa Conference. But when the United States did not go to the Genoa Conference, and when we were told, as the noble Earl told us to-night, that there are no more Papers to be published on this subject, then I understand why the heart really was taken out of the Genoa Conference. What I think ought to have been done was to sound the Government of the United States as to the method in which it would participate in the discussion of the reconstruction of Europe. If that was not done I think it was a grave and fatal mistake, and it appears not to have been done.

I would point out further, though I feel rather reassured after the noble Earl's speech to-night, that it must be a prime condition of getting the co-operation of the United States that France and ourselves are in cordial co-operation. As long as we differ the United States will not look at European questions. If we are agreed I believe they would help, ft cannot be said now, as perhaps it might have been said some months ago, that the United States will not co-operate. Their reply giving a refusal to go to The Hague was a reasoned statement not only of the reasons why they would not go to The Hague, but of the conditions on which they would co-operate in the objects of Genoa. Mr. Hoover, a member of their Government—a man, by the way, not only with perfect impartiality, but with immense knowledge of European economic conditions—has made several speeches all pointing in the same direction; and the participation of Mr. Pierpont Morgan on behalf of the United States— not on behalf of the United States Government, but on behalf of United States bankers, but of course he would not have gone without the good will of the United States Government—in the Bankers Committee at Paris has made it clear that the United States are willing to co-operate.

The first condition of making progress, it seems to me, is not to arrange methods like Genoa or The Hague, and then invite the United States after that and say you will be very glad if they will come, but, in concert with France, to make sure beforehand of the methods you are going to adopt with the United States in order that you may secure their co-operation. And it seems to me now that the most favourable possible outcome of the Hague Conference would be that it should lead to that result. Till then, we make no progress. Without a good understanding with France I do not believe we can make a beginning to secure the aims of the Genoa Conference; without the co-operation of the United States we can make no progress.

As I am dealing with this point of how the progress which we failed to make at Genoa can be made, I do not want to ignore any point which I really feel to be important, however difficult it is. My first point was that the co-operation of the United States is essential. I come now to my second point, which is a very difficult and delicate one for an Englishman to touch. It is the question of German reparations. It was excluded from the Genoa Conference because, I understand, the French Government demanded that it should be excluded. I think they were perfectly right to demand that, and 1 think the Prime Minister was perfectly right to concede that demand, because the Genoa Conference was not a suitable place at which reparations could be discussed. But as long as German reparations remain unsettled I do not believe progress is possible, and I believe that any methods, by Genoa Conference or otherwise, which are devoted to the very laudable end of securing peace and economic and financial reconstruction will really not make any progress so long as this question of reparations remains hanging like a cloud over the political and economic situation in Europe. So long as it remains unsettled, it is really, I think, a menace to peace and a bar to financial and economic progress. I am not going to press the Government on this point, because it is a very delicate one for any of us to deal with, and particularly for the Government.

During the period immediately after the Armistice; a great wave of opinion swept over this country—which was. to say the least, not discouraged by the Prime Minister at the time, in a speech he made at Bristol, I think—that Germany was to be made to pay the whole; cost of the war. Now, reparations are much less important to us and always were less important to us than they were to France—much less important. But in the beginning, just after the Armistice, we really forced the pace about reparations, and, after having forced the pace then, it does not come very well from us now at a time when reparations are not so very vital to us, but are very vital to France, to talk about altering the Treaty of Versailles or scaling reparations down.

The reason why I am introducing this point is this. I am sure this question of reparations will have to be dealt with, and the facts will have to be faced, but I think a great deal is spoken and written in this country which does not take account of the feeling and position in France. I find it continually in private conversation, as well as in things which are written in some of the newspapers. Of all the countries which signed the peace, certainly of all the Allies, France must feel more disappointed and more anxious at the course which events have taken since the peace was signed than any other country. After the peace was signed I believe her first anxiety was security. She thought she had obtained it, not by the Treaty of Versailles, but by something much more important—by the Franco-American and the Franco-British Treaties, which gave her to understand that if Germany should attack her again aggressively the whole of the military, naval, and air forces of the British Empire and of the United States would be behind her. That enormous security has gone. It does not exist to-day. Both these Treaties are no longer in existence.

France was to get her finances restored by reparation, from Germany. The language used on behalf of the Government must have encouraged her. I do not believe she has got anything appreciable towards the cost of repairing the devastated regions in France even, which I gather she is repairing out of her own pocket. And one question I would ask, though not to be answered immediately—Is it possible to tell us what is the amount which Germany has so far paid in reparations, not only to ourselves but in reparations altogether?

I put what seems to me the French case because I do not believe you can approach the discussion of this question of reparations with any good effect in France unless you approach it with a full knowledge of what the French position must be. Reparations will have to be settled not by senti- ment but by facing the facts. I do not believe you will get cash in any large I quantities from Germany without an international loan, and I do not believe you can; get that international loan without the co-operation of the United States. That co-operation can be obtained, and though the Bankers' Committee in Paris has not led to any direct result, I hope that it has advanced the question of reparations by bringing those who were most concerned more closely in contact with the facts which, sooner or later, have got to be faced if any considerable sum is to be realised from Germany. That may not be strictly I relevant to the Motion. In a sense it is relevant, because I think all these methods, such as Genoa and so forth, are really foredoomed to failure while reparations remain unsettled, and, believing, as I do— I may be wrong—that that question really is an obstacle to progress in Europe, I did not think it fair to make what I hoped was a contribution as to how I thought that progress should be made without facing that very difficult and awkward question.

Now, I come to the third point, which will bring me up to the real criticism I have to make of the Government. It is this. Genoa seems to have been devoted to securing an Agreement with the Bolshevist Government. As far as we can judge from the newspapers—I have not had time to read yet the Papers which have been published by the Government about Genoa-—and as far as I can gather, the securing of an agreement with the Bolsheviks was the great object pursued during the Genoa Conference. There were other objects, but more and more that question became important, as if it was the one great object of the Conference. I think that was a mistake. I do not believe that an agreement with a Bolshevist Government is of the first practical importance to the reconstruction of Europe. It is of very great importance and very desirable; it is of very great importance theoretically if Russia could be restored, but practically I do not believe it is.

I have nothing whatever to say against humanitarian measures for the relief of suffering people in Russia; that is another matter upon which I do not touch. I am dealing now with the economic and financial reconstruction of Europe. I believe that the destruction wrought in Russia has been very great, and that it is a mistake to think that by pursuing an agreement with the Bolsheviks, whatever good we may do to them, we are really taking a step towards the financial and economic reconstruction of Europe and a step which is of any present value. I believe the recovery of Russia must be infinitesimally slow after all the destruction which has been wrought. And I should like to ask the noble Earl whether he has any reports, whether the Foreign Office has any reports, as to what is the actual state of things in Russia, which he could publish and which would enable us to form an impression of how much chance there is of any rapid recovery of Russian trade and prosperity. Has he reports, for instance, about the amount of internal trade which is left in Russia, and how long it would take before even the internal trade of Russia is re-established, let alone before she can become an exporting country?

The United States Government are prepared to co-operate in this matter, but I understand they will only co-operate by an expert Committee, first of all, inquiring into the facts. In that I believe they are perfectly right. I believe that one of the great mistakes of Genoa was that it pursued this agreement with Russia without having first inquired into the facts. The United States Government insist on facing the facts first. They show good will in the matter, and I think they are both willing and wise, and that the conditions they lay down for co-operation are perfectly sound.

Then I come to one other question—Is it the case that Government credits or loans to the Bolshevist Government are out of the question? The United States Government say they are out of the question. I have some recollection that the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in the House of Commons, said they were out of the question. If they are out of the question, has the Bolshevist Government been informed that there is no chance of their getting Government credits or loans? If they have not been informed, will they be informed when they arrive at The Hague? If discussions such as there were at Genoa are to have any real result, it is essential that there should be no misunderstanding on a point like that; otherwise, if there has been a misunderstanding, when the point really becomes critical it means that all the time spent upon the discussion is thrown away.

My criticism of the policy pursued by the Government at Genoa and elsewhere really can be put very shortly. I have been told by Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Bonar Law that I am wanting in gratitude if I criticise the Government's foreign policy at all, because they supported the foreign policy pursued when I was at the Foreign Office. I have constantly expressed my gratitude for the support which the Conservative Opposition gave to the policy pursued in those years before the war. It was a policy in continuation of the policy which had been pursued by the Conservative Government before we came into office. I do not claim that it was perfect. I am quite prepared, if occasion arises, as it may some day, to defend that policy which I think is sometimes very unfairly criticised. But all I claim for it now is that it was steady and consistent, and it was the same right through. I have supported the policy of the Government with regard to the Washington Conference, especially the part taken by the noble Earl, Lord Balfour, of which I have spoken elsewhere and of which I am prepared to speak again and again in the most unqualified terms of approval, shall I say? "Approval" sounds a patronising word and I would say, of support.

I have been old-fashioned enough—and the noble Earl is probably old-fashioned enough to appreciate the fact—in supporting Ids personal part, of which I think it is impossible to say too much in gratitude for what he did, to assume that it was the policy of his Government, and have said that the Government of which he is a member must also have their share of the credit. The policy of the League of Nations I cordially supported, and always support it. The difficulty is that the Prime Minister, who was at one time a supporter of the League of Nations, for some time has not said a word, as far as I have seen, in favour of it, and appears to have left it in the cold. That, I think, is most unfortunate, but I am not so much concerned about that because I am sure the time will come when he will support it again.

Then, I supported the Prime Minister's policy when he was discussing the Pact with France. I did it in somewhat guarded terms, I admit, and in terms to which I adhered, but it was support. Now, my difficulty is that if I support the policy pursued under the present methods one month, I must either attack the Government or support an entirely different policy another month. Whether criticism of the foreign policy of the Government is due to the new methods, or to the personality of the Prime Minister, or to the inherent perversity of things, I will not for one moment discuss, but it is really a number of inconsistent policies, one following the other, and it is impossible to give steady and consistent support to something the like of which I do not think we have ever had an instance of in this country before.

The policy of Lord Beaconsfield was attacked very strongly by Mr. Gladstone, not on the ground that it was inconsistent but on the ground that he thought it wrong. It was consistent, it was a clearly defined policy, so clearly defined that it was open to enthusiastic support on one side and bitter attack on the other. The foreign policy of Mr. Gladstone, I remember, was attacked in 1885 on the ground that foreign affairs were neglected, and that there was not sufficient foreign policy. For the first time our complaint now is that we have too much foreign policy; that it is not one policy, but many policies. It makes it impossible to give the Government the support which an Opposition has sometimes given on foreign affairs.

I feel that we are drifting, and Europe is drifting, in the most perilous way. Think what the condition of things has been since the Armistice. We have not succeeded in getting any firm ground. If Genoa had given us firmer ground I would have supported Genoa, whatever I might have thought of the policy at the beginning. We get no firm ground. Look at the years since the Armistice, and it seems to me that the ground between nations in Europe has been getting more and more shaky. The League of Nations was a most excellent start, and it has done excellent work. I believe that if the Government had stuck to the League of Nations policy—I entirely except the noble Earl, who has done admirable work for the League of Nations, and has lost no opportunity of doing everything he can to encourage and support it —and if the League of Nations had been encouraged instead of leaving everything to the Supreme Council or inventing Genoa Conferences, and so forth, we should be better off than we are now. But we have had no firm ground, and some of the ground which we thought was firm, such as the Entente with France, has from time to time been shaken. Time goes on, and if nothing is done, if Europe continues to drift as it does now, of course it will drift to disaster.

I venture to press on the noble Earl opposite that until the Government really fix in their mind what are the essential points, and pursue those points unremittingly—and I put co-operation with the United States first in the matter—until they really pursue a settled policy, we shall make no further progress, and the condition will remain, as I fear it is to-day, one in which the relations between Governments are not getting better. The relations between the British and French Governments certainly, I think, have been impaired since the Armistice instead of improved; and largely what the Government has been doing in the Genoa Conference is to begin at the wrong end—at the Bolshevist end— instead of the United States end. His supporters claimed—and I think claimed rightly—that the Prime Minister did his best at the Genoa Conference, but it would be better to do your second best at the right end, than to do your best at the wrong end. I think the Genoa Conference was beginning at the wrong end, and you will have to reverse that policy and begin at the right end. I support the Motion which the noble Earl has moved.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

My Lords, it would ill become me to ask your Lordships to listen to me for more than a, few moments in order that I should indicate the course which it is proposed to pursue in reference to this debate. I think we may congratulate ourselves upon this: that we have heard from my noble friend, the noble Earl opposite, and from the noble Viscount who has just sat down, two of the most important speeches on foreign affairs to which it has ever been the good fortune of your Lordships to listen in this House. I shall, of course, not attempt to deal with the substantial points which they raised; indeed, I shall trouble your Lordships for a very few moments only.

The question is this. Does the new diplomacy furnish the country with an opportunity of judging the course of foreign policy as well as the old diplomacy did? In order to elucidate that question my noble friend, Lord Midleton, put down a Motion asking that all the relevant Papers should be laid before Parliament. To that my noble friend, the noble Earl opposite, with the dexterity with which in another I place I was familiar, and which I have always admired, said: "Well, but there are no Papers." That is an answer, I admit, which is rather difficult to get over. Having said that there were no Papers, he added that the Government were not to blame for there being no Papers because the noble Viscount who sits besides me, and his friends, formed part of a Government which, in their turn, when they had Congresses and Conferences, never had any Papers.

Neither my noble friend, Lord Midleton, nor I have anything to do, except in the way of personal friendship, with the noble Viscount and his friends who sit upon this Bench. We are not here to defend for one moment the proceedings which they may have thought it their duty to take when they were responsible for the foreign affairs of this country, and as a matter of fact we, probably attacked their method, as certainly the noble Earl opposite did. Therefore, he can hardly appeal to them for support. No, we fall back upon Conservative precedents, the precedents which, although the Party of the noble Earl opposite was responsible for them, he swept away. The astonishing thing is that whereas, in respect to the foreign affairs which led up to the Conference at Constantinople, there were twenty-six separate Parliamentary Papers published, and whereas in the ease of the Congress of Berlin—which was, of course, a far more important Assembly—there were forty-eight sets of publications, so far as I know, with the exception of that small number of notes which were exchanged—I think two, one on each side, or perhaps three— at Genoa, nothing has been published. No Papers have been laid before Parliament, and my noble friend says there are none. That is a most astonishing confession.

Were there no negotiations? He says that there were a few verbal discussions with the American Ambassador, and that there, was a written reply which has been published. I do not think that written reply has been laid before Parliament. I suppose we had to gather it from the newspapers. Surely, it is an astonishing thing that the British Government, to whom it was vital, as I should have thought, that the American Government should have joined them at Genoa, did not place upon paper the arguments upon which they relied to bring that about. I should have thought that there would have been a long succession of telegrams and Despatches illustrating how strongly the British Government had urged this necessary policy upon the Government at Washing- ton, and the concessions that they were prepared to make in order to secure American co-operation. I should have thought that all these things would have been done rather than accept that which was fatal to the Genoa Conference from the beginning, the absence of America from it. We know practically nothing as to why America would not join. We do not really know why France was reluctant to join. I am sure any one who has listened to the speech of the noble Earl opposite must have been convinced that the rosy picture he painted of the condition of the Entente during the Genoa Conference was altogether an illusion. It was very severely strained, and we know little about the exact circumstances in which that strain took place. The truth is that the British people have no means of judging the foreign policy of the Government.

I come back lo the point at which I began. If there are no Papers it seems useless to ask your Lordships to divide in order to force the Government to produce them. You cannot get blood out of a stone. There are no Despatches, and in these circumstances, I believe I have my noble friend's authority for saying that we shall not trouble your Lordships to go to a Division. I hope in the future that the Government may adopt other methods, and by creating the necessary Papers also create the opportunity of taking the country into their confidence and enable it to form a judgment on their policy.

THE EARL OF MIDLETON

My Lords, after what has fallen from the last three speakers I shall be meeting the wishes of your Lordships it I adopt the suggestion that has been made. May I correct the noble Earl opposite in one respect? I do not think he quite appreciated what I said with regard to the secretariat. I carefully guarded myself from in any way impugning the action of the Cabinet Secretariat. I am fully conscious of the great merits of Sir Maurice Hankey, but I feel that there is a great deal to be said about the large staff which centres around Downing Street. The Parliamentary skill of the noble Earl cannot conceal the fact that it has made a considerable change, and I think a regrettable change, in the relations between Ministers and No. 10 Downing Street. I want to explain that I am fully conscious of the great merits of the Cabinet Secretariat.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.