§ LORD SYDENHAM rose to draw attention to the position in Mesopotamia, and to ask His Majesty's Government how the Mandate, the Treaty with King Feisul and the "Independent Arab State," which the Secretary of State for the Colonies said on the 10th instant that "we are creating," can be reconciled.
§
The noble Lord said: My Lords, the control of Mesopotamia was one of the great objects of pan-Germanism, and the concession which was obtained by the Deutsche Bank for the construction of a railway in 1888 was the first important step towards the realisation of that object. The idea was to establish colonies all along the line, and the effect would have been, in time, to obtain the political and military control of the whole of Mesopotamia, with a strong grip upon Asiatic Turkey, and a very long arm stretched out far towards the East. Before the war the pan-German publicist Karl Radek made this explanation of the military importance of the Bagdad Railway:—
The strengthening of German Imperialism, the first success of which, attained with so much effort, is the Bagdad railway, the victory of the Revolutionary Party in Russia, the prospects of a modern revolutionary movement in India, the movement towards nationalism in Egypt, the beginning of reform in Persia—all this has raised to an extraordinary degree the political significance of the Badgad Railway.
Now, we know from Prince Lichnowski's revelations that just before the war the Government was engaged in negotiating a Treaty with Germany, the effect of which would have been to give Germany complete control in Mesopotamia, together with other advantages.
§ Why the Germans did not close at once with this fine bargain, and put off their war, I do not know, but the fact that they did not do so is one of the strongest proofs that they were determined at that time to fight. Their great and very carefully designed schemes have all been shattered by the great war, and it has cone to pass, by the force of circumstances not entirely within our control, that we now find ourselves in power in Mesopotamia. We arrived there, of course, to protect the oil fields along the Karun river, which would otherwise have been destroyed by the Turks. We then made the very grave mistake of the premature advance on Bagdad, which led to disaster, and the terrible suffering of the troops which is 698 described in the Report of the Royal Commission. Then came General Maude's brilliant campaign, and we were led irresistibly onwards until now the whole country, about 600 miles long by 160 miles broad, has fallen into t lie hollow of our hands. I think that the immense increase of our territory since the war is a great drawback, in view of our present impoverished financial position. The Empire was large enough before, and we were not developing it as we ought to have been developing it. There is the further disadvantage that we are viewed by other nations as insatiable land-grabbers, and that we are regarded with special suspicion in America and in France, because we are thought to be seeking control of the oil fields which are believed to exist in Mesopotamia. I need hardly say that suspicions of that kind are totally undeserved, but we have to reckon with them, because they happen to exist.
§ Since the Armistice we have spent fully a hundred millions sterling upon Mesopotamia, and some of that amount, I am quite certain, has been wasted. The Secretary of State for the Colonies has recently said that he has reduced the expenditure to about £11,000,000 this year, and he promised further reductions if all goes well, but he did say that he was not without some feeling of anxiety. There have been no troubles recently, except in Kurdistan, where four British officers have been killed. The Kurds were originally intended to have self-government, but that intention was never carried out, and their present position is peculiar and uncertain. Mr. Churchill said that Southern Kurdistan was at liberty to take part in the impending General Elections if it chose. To my mind the association of Kurds with a General Election suggests comic opera. But the point is that the situation in the very mountainous regions of Mosul, where we have no frontier, is far from satisfactory at the present time, and until peace is concluded with Turkey there must be danger of risings in this region.
§
We have three military forces in Mesopotamia at the present time. The first is the Regular Army of 2,210 British troops, and 5,556 Indian troops, with 7,107 followers. Secondly, there are the native levies, which are under the control and the orders of the High Commissioner, and for which we pay the sum of about £600,000 a year. Thirdly, there are the
699
Arab forces, paid entirely out of the revenues of Mesopotamia. As the Secretary of State said on July 11—
The presence of three armies co-existing together in the service of one State, differently paid and variously controlled and commanded, does lend itself to humour.
That also, I think, has a touch of comic opera about it. The Air Force appears to be in general control of all the Imperial forces, and it is proposed that it should operate from a fortified loop somewhere on the Tigris. Whether it could really deal effectively with a rising on a large scale in the north I will not attempt to discuss. I must point out that it has already absorbed a number of aircraft which are urgently needed for the service of the Navy.
§ Politically, the position seems extraordinarily complicated at the present moment. We have fulfilled in Mesopotamia the pledge we violated in Palestine, and we, have set up a native State under King Feisul. We are now making a Treaty with him, and on the top of the Treaty is the Mandate of the League of Nations, though Mr. Churchill did say distinctly that we were creating "an independent State" in Mesopotamia. An independent State is quite incompatible with the Mandate, which, I believe, is most unpopular among the people of Mesopotamia. The Treaty and the Mandate might be exceedingly difficult to reconcile because neither a Mandatory Power nor a mandated State has any freedom of action. The draft Mandate for Mesopotamia contains seventeen Articles, some of which would never be strictly carried out by any Arab State. But if any failure occurred it would be open to Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, or the Hejaz, all being original members of the League of Nations, to bring railing accusations against King Feisul's Government, or our own Government, or against both, before the League of Nations.
§ I assume that the Treaty, the terms of which I do not know, will embody the obligations contained in the Mandate. But who will be responsible? And what are we to do if the independent Arab State fails to conform to the meticulous provisions of the Mandate? I suggest that this is not a workable arrangement. It may land us in difficulties of all kinds, which we cannot now entirely foresee. I hope the noble Duke will tell us plainly what the policy really is in regard to Mesopotamia.
700§ Viewing the economic possibilities I see no certainty whatever of profitable oil production, but I believe that the agricultural possibilities of the country are enormous. If they are to be developed we shall require great irrigation works, more railways, improved navigation on the great rivers, a sufficient settled population of agriculturists, a strong and stable Government, and a huge influx of capital. Is there any chance of those conditions being fulfilled at the moment? Under the auspices of a Lord Cromer, acting with a perfectly free hand, I can imagine Mesopotamia becoming a very rich and prosperous State, but we must remember that Lord Cromer's great work in Egypt is already beginning to crumble away, as is that vast and splendid work which generations of Britons have accomplished in India. You cannot repeat in Mesopotamia either the experience in Egypt, or the experience in India, without Western economic control, which seems now out of the question, and we can only hope that the people of Mesopotamia will be happy and contented if they muddle along in the good old Eastern fashion.
§ Meanwhile, we shall continue to spend something like £11,000,000, which we cannot afford now that we cannot find money to provide aircraft to make our Navy secure on the seas, or our great towns safe from bombardment on land. Our military strength is not sufficient for the needs which may any day arise, and I see a suggestion is made that it should be reduced to 90,000 men, being 30,000 less than the numbers which have been allowed to Poland. I hope there is no possibility of any such suggestion being looked at for a moment.
§ I was strongly opposed to the abandonment of Mesopotamia, and I said something on that point in this House. But I can now only come to the conclusion that we should abandon the whole country except Basra and the line of the river to Kurna. We cannot do this at the present moment, but it should be our fixed policy as soon as the independent State which we are creating has shown that it can maintain order and protect life and property. That will not be till we have concluded peace with Turkey. I note that King Feisul has been already informed that we reserve the right to throw up the Mandate. I find no provision in the Covenant for throwing up the Mandate, and I hope the opinion of the Law Officers of the 701 Crown was taken before this important communication was made to King Feisul.
§ I have reached the conclusion that we ought to abandon Mesopotamia as soon as we can, with the greatest reluctance, and only because I put the financial restoration of this country in the forefront of my wishes. We cannot afford the constant drain which Mesopotamia will create, or the large amount of unknown liabilities which are certainly involved. Incidentally, by abandoning all Mesopotamia except the narrow strip of territority to which I have referred, we should prove to all the Powers that we have no dark designs upon the oil fields of Mesopotamia; and that, in itself, would be something to the good.
THE DUKE OF SUTHERLANDMy Lords, I assume that the statement to which the noble Lord refers is that made by the Secretary of State in the course of a debate in another place on July 11. My right honourable friend's words were—
We are not entitled to disclaim the Mandate, but we are acknowledging an Arab State. We are creating an independent Arab State, and making a Treaty with that State.I do not quite understand the difficulty that the noble Lord finds in reconciling the policy of the Mandate with that of a Treaty with the State of Iraq. The Mandate defines the responsibility of His Majesty's Government as Mandatory Power towards the League of Nations. It does not define, or purport to define, our relations with the Iraq State, which will be regulated by the proposed Treaty as soon as it has been signed.The position is this. His Majesty's Government in accepting a Mandate for Iraq accepted the obligation to advise and assist a country, whose existence as an independent nation had been provisionally recognised, until such time as it was able to stand alone. That is the language of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Mandate, when its terms have been approved, will explain and define the extent of the liabilities that we have incurred towards the League of Nations under this arrangement. Our acceptance of it constitutes the sanction under which we are empowered to enter into special relations with the Iraq State, and the special relations into which we propose to enter are those that will be set forth in the Treaty. If it were not for the Mandate we should 702 have no legal basis whatever for claiming a special position in Iraq, or for seeking to enter into Treaty relations with the Iraq State.
As it is, the authority of the Mandate gives us the necessary locus standi, and enables us to proceed as rapidly as possible with the process of converting the "provisional independence" of Iraq—which has been acknowledged by the League of Nations—into a definite and permanent reality. That is exactly what we are doing. It may perhaps be said that we are proceeding with the process more rapidly than was contemplated when the mandatory principle was first formulated. I do not resent that kind of criticism in the least. On the contrary, I welcome it as a tribute to the success which His Majesty's Government have achieved in the difficult task that was entrusted to them.
We informed the Council of the League of Nations in November last, before the negotiations for a Treaty with Iraq had made any progress, of the lines on which we intended to proceed. We have received no protest or criticism of any kind from them. We are, consequently, justified in assuming that they see no objection to the course on which we have embarked, and that they, at any rate, do not regard our action as in any way inconsistent with the obligations undertaken under the Mandate. I think, when noble Lords see the text of the Treaty, that they will realise that our whole policy is in strict accordance both with the spirit of the Covenant of the League of Nations and with the general conceptions underlying the mandatory system.
§ LORD SYDENHAMMy Lords, I think there must have been a little terminological inexactitude when Mr. Churchill used the words "independent Arab State." I think that was not, perhaps, exactly what he meant, because I cannot see, and I do not think the noble Duke has explained, how any independent State could exist in a state of independence under the Mandate. May I understand from the noble Duke that it is intended, when Mesopotamia can stand alone, to throw up the Mandate, and that such will be the policy of the Government as regards the future?
THE DUKE OF SUTHERLANDThat depends on how the independent Arab State turns out. If it turns out well, that might be possible.
§ LORD CARSONMay I ask the noble Duke whether it is true that this is costing us £11,000,000 a year?
THE DUKE OF SUTHERLANDI have not the exact figures here at the moment, but, if I may have notice of that question, I shall be very glad to give the noble Lord the information at any time.
§ LORD SYDENHAMI think the figure of £10,500,000 was admitted in another place, but there were some other charges, which could not be brought in. It is somewhere about £11,000,000.