CAPITAL SHIPS. (Hansard, 11 July 1922)

§ THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (LORD LEE OF FAREHAM)

My Lords, I do not in the least complain of the Questions which the noble Marquess has placed upon the Paper, and I have, of course, been aware of the remarks in the Press to which he refers, that the Government either had executed, or were about to execute, what he calls a volte face with regard to the building of these capital ships. I think I can reassure him at once with regard to the main facts by stating that the Government have not reconsidered their decision, nor do they intend to do so.

Having stated that, I prefer, on the whole, not to go in any detail into the technical question of what aircraft are, or are not, capable of in attacks upon surface vessels. After all, that matter was considered fairly exhaustively in a previous debate in your Lordships' House, in the course of which it was my duty to expound the technical views of my naval advisers and experts; and to that statement I really have nothing new to add at the present time. I think that statement and the arguments then adduced still hold, and it would be merely a repetition if I recurred to them this afternoon. I am particularly anxious not to say anything which would suggest in any way—because it would be entirely false—any hostility or lack of sympathy on the part of the Admiralty towards the Air Force or to its continued development. Indeed, for obvious reasons, there is no portion of the fighting Services which is more interested in the development of aircraft than the Royal Navy.

It has become an essential and vital weapon of the Fleet and must be developed and made use of to the utmost possible extent. But I will say this in answer to the noble Marquess: that, quite apart from other and higher considerations—international questions, and considerations affecting our security and prestige throughout the world— there have been no new developments in connection with either aerial or under-water attack which could necessitate any reversal of the decision of the Government to proceed with these capital ships, or, indeed, any modification in the constructional designs which have been already approved. That, I think, is a sufficient 348 answer to the first Question of the noble Marquess.

With regard to his second Question, I can say categorically that in the view of the Admiralty and its naval advisers, fortified by and based upon the experiences of the late war and by prolonged practical experiments which have taken place since, it is feasible both constructionally and financially to build capital ships which shall be reasonably proof against any known and, so far as one can see, any likely methods of attack. More than that, the necessary designs for this purpose have, as I have said, been worked out already and approved, and are ready for the use of the builders.

The third Question of the noble Marquess—"What is the estimated total cost of these two new ships, including any necessary accessories afloat or ashore"—is prompted, I assume, by the fact that there have been some very remarkable allegations made in the Press and elsewhere to the effect that if this policy of building capital ships is pursued the taxpayer will be let in for an expenditure in connection with these two ships and their accessories of anything from £30,000,000 to £50,000,000—I am not sure that some estimates have not been even higher. If that were so, it would be a very formidable expenditure for us to contemplate in these times, and, whilst the decision to proceed with these ships stands, I think it is only fair to relieve the anxiety of the taxpayer by telling him, as nearly as we can estimate it, what the actual cost will be as against the fanciful figures which have been used to buttress up interested arguments in the other direction. It is estimated by the Admiralty that the two ships, taking into account present-day prices for material and labour, both of which we hope are likely to go down, are calculated to cost approximately £6,500,000 apiece, or, including all accessories, reserves, stores, etc., both afloat and ashore, something like £8,000,000 apiece, making a total, which varies according to whether you take merely the cost of the ship or of all known accessories afloat or ashore, of between £13,500,000 and £16,000,000, which is a very different figure from that of £30,000,000 to £50,000,000, or even higher, with which we have been regaled.

In that connection, on a financial point only, I may, perhaps, point out to your Lordships that when these two new ships 349 are completed four of our existing capital ships will have to be scrapped under the Washington Agreement. The annual cost and upkeep of these two ships must, therefore, be subtracted from the annual cost and upkeep of the four ships which we shall retain up to that time, and will, as a matter of fact, be considerably less. I have had the figures worked out, and so far as can be ascertained the actual saving in personnel by building these two ships as compared with retaining the four ships which they are to replace will be 1,100 men, and the animal saving in upkeep, etc., will be about a quarter of a million sterling. That is something to put on the other side.

The last Question of the noble Marquess is: "What is the present relative position of the British Navy as compared with the navies of foreign Powers in the matter of post-Jutland capital ships?" The position is this. The United States of America has three of these post-Jutland capital ships practically complete; Japan has two actually complete; Great Britain has but one and that only a hybrid—the battle cruiser "Hood"—which was partially constructed before Jutland and only partially embodies the lessons of that battle; and other countries have none. So that we arrive at this position, that unless the two capital ships, which were sanctioned at Washington and have already been approved by Parliament, as I would remind the noble Marquess, during the present session, were proceeded with, we should definitely have to abandon the one-power standard which we have lately adopted and should have to permit the British Navy to fall to the third place in the most essential fighting spear-head of the Fleet. I venture to say that that is a course which would not only be fatal to our prestige throughout the Empire and the world, but would be quite incompatible with the pledges which the Government have given to Parliament and to the country in the course of the present session, and certainly one which the Board of Admiralty could not possibly accept.

I hope I have now answered in sufficient detail the actual Questions which the noble Marquess has placed upon the Paper. I do not think it is necessary for me to add anything on this occasion beyond expressing some surprise that this campaign against capital ships should be pursued in any responsible or instructed quarter; because the whole question of the value of the 350 capital ship was gone into very thoroughly and exhaustively only last year by a special Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, presided over by Mr. Bonar Law. That Committee reported that they heard no evidence adequate to the support of the contention that the capital ship was obsolete, and, further, that in the naval warfare of the future such ships would play the same vital part as they have done in the past. That was their finding, and may I say that it coincided with a similar finding in practically every country in the world that maintains a Navy. This question was investigated quite independently by those countries, and they all came independently to the same conclusion.

I can assure your Lordships that was not a hole and corner Inquiry on our part, and all the critics and those who attacked the capital ship were invited to state their views before the Committee. Some did so. Perhaps the most vocal and persistent of them, Admiral Percy Scott, who is now leading the agitation against these ships, declined to attend or to state his views to the Committee, or to give them any assistance whatsoever, preferring, apparently, to conduct his campaign in the Press outside. This, coupled with the fact that he has not had the advantage of serving in a capital ship for more than thirty years, somewhat diminishes, in my judgment, the force and responsibility of his argument, and, on the whole, I prefer to lean on the advice of the great sailors, headed by Lord Beatty, who actually commanded our Fleets throughout the late war, and who are unanimous in the advice which they give to the Admiralty and the Government that these capital ships continue to be an absolutely essential and vital factor in the Navy of the future.

In any event, it is difficult for me—and it is here only that I wish to touch at all upon the arguments that have been used by the noble Marquess—to understand why, if this development of the air menace has reached the stage that is claimed for it by some, it is this particular class of ship, the capital ship, which is to be abandoned. The capital ship is the embodiment of the maximum power of defence and offence, and it is, therefore, obviously best equipped against the new menace of either aerial or under-water attack. I cannot understand therefore why this type should be the special one which the critics are seeking to abolish. Is the argument this: that the British 351 Navy and all surface fighting ships should be abolished altogether? If that be so, then there would be no means, so far as one can see, of protecting our ocean routes, or maintaining our food supply. I am sure the noble Marquess did not refer seriously to feeding this country by air. I believe at one period the Israelites were nourished by that means, but it is not a method of supply upon which it would be prudent to rely in the future. Unless, then, the real argument is that the Navy should be abolished altogether, surely the most essential class of ship to maintain is the capital ship, which is, of all types, the strongest and best qualified to resist this new menace.

352 In conclusion, I would only reiterate what I think I have said on a previous occasion, that in the considered judgment of the Admiralty and its advisers the capital ship is the supreme embodiment, up-to-date, of offensive and defensive qualities for sea-fighting, and, as such, it always has been, is, and so far as can be foreseen always will be, the essential basis of sea power. For that reason, if for no other, the Government have no intention whatsoever of abandoning, or of reconsidering, their decision to proceed with the construction of these ships.