Lords Sitting of 23 February 1922

Preamble
The House met at a quarter past four of the clock. The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.

RIOT (DAMAGES) BILL. [H.L.]
LORD ST. JOHN of BLETSO: My Lords, I beg leave to introduce a Bill to amend and extend the provisions of the not (Damages) Act, 1886.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 1ª.—(Lord St. John of Bletso.)
On Question, Bill read 1ª and to be printed.

ELECTRICITY (SUPPLY) BILL. [H.L.]
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE DUCHY OF LANCASTER (VISCOUNT PEEL): My Lords, I beg leave to introduce a Bill to amend the law relating to the supply of electricity.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 1ª.—(Viscount Peel.)
On Question, Bill read 1ª, and to be printed.

SITUATION IN IRELAND.
EARL BUXTON: My Lords, I beg to ask the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack the Question of which I have given him private notice—namely, whether he has any statement to make to the House in regard to Ireland.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT BIRKENHEAD): My Lords, I am obliged to the noble Earl for having asked me the Question of which he has been good enough to give me private notice. The events which took place yesterday at the meeting of the Sinn Fein body in Dublin will have been noted by your Lordships. The implications of the decision there taken are a little difficult to appreciate clearly in this country, and I should be unwilling to commit myself prematurely to an expression of opinion as to what the result is. But the Irish Ministers representing the Provisional Government have been invited to come to this country during
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the week end in order that discussions may take place between them and the representatives of His Majesty's Government as to the effect of the decision reached yesterday in the Sinn Fem body.
So far as the Government are concerned, and subject always to those discussions our position is, of course, precisely the same—that we stand by the Treaty, and we do not at present understand that the decision which has been taken is adverse to that view. If either the noble Earl or any other noble Lord, would be good enough to put down a Question next week, when the discussions I have indicated have taken place, I shall, no doubt, be in a position to give full information.

MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDER (CARDIFF EXTENSION) BILL.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY OF THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH (THE EARL OF ONSLOW): My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill he now read a second time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2ª.—(The Earl of Onslow.)
On Question, Bill read 2ª, and committed. The Committee to be proposed by the Committee of Selection.

VOLUNTARY ARMIES IN BULGARIA AND HUNGARY.
LORD NEWTON LORD NEWTON had given Notice to ask if the Supreme Council are still insisting upon the formation of voluntary Armies in Bulgaria and Hungary in spite of the excessive additional expenditure involved and the difficulty of obtaining recruits.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, in putting the Question which stands in my name, it is hardly necessary for me to remind the House that in all the Treaties signed at Paris there is provision that each of the former enemy States shall institute what is known as a voluntary military system in their respective countries. The voluntary military system is an essentially Anglo-American institution which nobody approves of except themselves, and I never heard it more strongly denounced than by my noble friend, Lord Curzon, who, I understand, will reply to me this afternoon.
But notwithstanding its difficulties, this system has been adopted, apparently with some success, in Germany. There they seem to have had no difficulty in getting the number of men required, but it is sufficiently obvious that with a population of over sixty millions, most of whom are accustomed to a military life, the difficulties were not insuperable, and it has also to be borne in mind that in an industrial country like. Germany there must be a certain amount of unemployment. It has also been possible to introduce the voluntary system in Austria. Austria, owing to the action of the statesmen at Paris, consists merely of a huge overgrown city with a barren country around it, and presents every facility for the formation of a voluntary Army, because there must be thousands of men out of work, and only too glad to embrace any opportunity of earning money. I understand, however, that in Austria the expense has been found extremely onerous, and that the Austrian Government is applying for some modification of the Treaty.
When you come to the two countries mentioned in the Question Bulgaria and Hungary—the circumstances are entirely different. These countries are now small agricultural countries, and anyone who has the most elementary knowledge of the European continent knows that there is nothing so difficult as to induce the peasant to serve in the Army; in fact, it is impossible to offer him sufficient inducements to enlist as a volunteer. Bulgaria is a small agricultural country with a population, I think, of something like four millions. It. was at war practically from 1912 till 1918, with few intervals, and it has lost a large portion of its territory, and a large portion of its population. The Government is very heavily in debt. All kinds of demands are made upon it, and, in spite of its obvious bankruptcy, I understand it is expected to pay reparations to the amount of £90,000,000 or £100,000,000 sterling.
I do not think anyone will dispute the fact that Bulgaria needs an Army. I will not elaborate the reasons, for they are obvious. The conditions in a country like Bulgaria are totally different from those in Western Europe. If a country like that does not possess an adequate military force, it is quite plain that the whole political edifice may crumble, and that, at all events, the State would be
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quite incapable of fulfilling the demands made upon it in connection with the Treaty. Nobody would dispute, I think, the principle that there should be a reduction of the military strength of the Bulgarian Army, which was fixed at Paris at 20,000 men, with the addition of frontier guards, gendarmes and others, making a total allowed of 33,000 men. In spite of the inducement of high pay and other advantages, I understand that up to now of the 33,000 men required only 6,530 have come forward, and that, with the exercise of the greatest economy, this force under the voluntary system will cost 807,000,000 francs, whereas if Bulgaria were allowed to raise the men in her own way it would cost only something like 280,000,000 francs.
The Bulgarian Government is, therefore, placed in this dilemma: either it must contrive to exist without an Army at all. or it must reconcile itself to being plunged more rapidly into bankruptcy than would otherwise be the case. What makes the matter worse is the method by which this provision of the Treaty is being carried out. Bulgaria was disarmed long ago. There is practically nothing in the shape of warlike material left in the country. I can quite understand that during the process of disarmament, and for the purpose of fixing the frontiers of a new country, Military Missions are required, but when once the process of disarmament has been accomplished, I am utterly unable to conceive why it is necessary to send a large number of high military officers, belonging to the different nationalities, accompanied by large retinues.
These Commissions represent a very heavy charge upon these more or less bankrupt countries. In this particular country, for instance, there is a number of inter-Allied Commissions on which England, France, Italy, and, for all I know, other Powers, are represented, and the expenses are, for a poor country like Bulgaria, extremely heavy. I am unable to give the precise figure, but the House will get some impression of the relative cost of Missions of this kind when I explain that whereas it Bulgarian Minister of the highest rank draws only 4,000 francs a month, a typist attached to a Mission of this kind and the typist, I suppose, is the lowest paid of all actually draws 10,000 francs a month, or two and a half times as much as the most highly paid

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officials in the Government. In these circumstances it is not surprising that the Bulgarian Government have appealed to the Supreme Council at Paris for some modification, but I understand that their claim has been rejected.
I pass from Bulgaria to the other country mentioned in the Question, Hungary. I do not want to say too much about. Hungary. I have enlarged on the subject so frequently in this House that it is unnecessary for me to repeat former arguments, but I may say, quite shortly, that, if anything, Hungary was treated more harshly than Bulgaria in the Peace Treaty. The presence of a disciplined Army in Hungary is, if possible, even more essential for the safety of the country than is the case in Bulgaria. Hungary, as we all know, is not only surrounded by unfriendly Powers, but it is also a prey to internal dissensions. What I have been assured is that if the voluntary principle is insisted upon, not to mention other disadvantages, it will have the effect of attracting all the undesirable elements in the country. In other words, Hungary, which stands in considerable danger of Bolshevism, will, if this particular. Treaty is insisted upon, be liable to become the prey of an Army which might be little better than a Communist machine, and might be utilised for the complete upsetting of all existing institutions. The result might be civil war, and that, of course, would eventually result in war with foreign countries.
The figure of the Hungarian Army is fixed at 35,000 men, and, if my information is correct, up to a short time ago hardly any recruits had been found. Circumstances may possibly have altered since; I have heard a rumour that a number of men have been obtained, but if that is so they can only have been got on very onerous terms. I understand that in order to obtain recruits for this Army you have to offer them the pay of first-class civilian officials. The cost of this Army is estimated at 830,000,000 kronen, whereas, if they were allowed to raise it in their own way, the cost would have been only 130,000,000 kronen. It seems to me that 700,000,000 kronen is an excessive price to pay in order to conform to the crochets of Mr. Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George. I say so advisedly, because I am convinced that it is the British Government which is responsible for this particular demand. No other nation believes in the voluntary principle.
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When I was in Hungary last autumn I found that all the military representatives of the other Powers were strongly in favour of the Hungarian contention and of their being allowed to recruit their men in their own way. The only obstacle was the British representative, who was tied down by express instructions from his own Government.
Hungary is treated in the same way as Bulgaria with regard to expensive Missions. I am unable to give the exact cost of the Mission which is dealing with this particular question in Hungary, but I know that it is very considerable. As an instance of that let me quote from an experience of my own. I visited one of these Military Missions in the autumn, and I found that the British representative—a Colonel—was drawing no less than sixty times as much as his Hungarian colleague who was doing precisely the same work. And if the British representative was drawing sixty times as much as the Hungarian representative, the Japanese, French, and Italian representatives were being paid in the same proportions. Therefore, Hungary is in very much the same position as Bulgaria, so far as I can ascertain. They also have made application to Paris to be relieved from this extremely onerous obligation, and the only answer they have received is that the Treaty must be carried out in every detail.
It is easy to understand why this answer is made. It is obvious that the Supreme Council are under the impression that if they make any concession to these two small countries they will be obliged to make some concession to Germany. I do not see that the cases are at all analogous. The Germans have had no difficulty in raising the men. I observed a paragraph in the Press this morning to the effect that the Military Mission in Bulgaria is about to terminate its labours. I hope it is true, because it is time that this absolutely unjustifiable expense was ended.
Before I conclude, I desire to point out that what strikes me about this particular insistence on the part of the Supreme Council is the arrogant and gross hypocrisy of the whole proceeding. In each Treaty, at the head of the Military, Naval and Air clauses, you will find a pompous declaration in the following words:—
"In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations "—

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the voluntary system is introduced. If the object of the Treaty is to introduce a general limitation of armaments throughout Europe, why in the name of commonsense is it enforced only in the case of these small enemy nations?
I do not think it is realised—I did not realise it myself until a few days ago—that in spite of all these declarations about the necessity of disarmament and so forth, at the present moment, after three and a half years of so-called peace, there are far more min actually under arms in Europe than there were before the war. The French are maintaining an Army of between 800,000 and 900,000 men; there are about 200,000 more men in the French Army than there were in the German Army before the war. Belgium is maintaining a larger Army; Poland an enormous Army; and Greece is also maintaining a larger Army and is engaged in a war of annexation. The Succession States have been encouraged to build up huge Armies, and in the process have been actually assisted by France, and possibly by other nations. It is the literal truth to say that the only Allies who have disarmed have been ourselves, and, to a certain extent, the Italians.
In that connection I should like to draw attention to an extraordinarily interesting book which is published by Signor Nitti, the late Italian Prime Minister. Not only is the book interesting in itself, but it contains a most illuminating and remarkable Memorandum by Mr. Lloyd George, dated March 25, 1919. This Memorandum is so admirably drawn up, its sentiments are so clear, that it amounts almost to an inspired document. It is a thousand pities that, owing to French opposition, the admirable principles in the Memorandum have not been brought into effect. I quote from it a passage which is peculiarly applicable to the subject I am raising to-day. Mr. Lloyd George wrote:—
"If the small nations are permitted to organis3 and maintain conscript Armies running each to hundreds of thousands, boundary walls will be inevitable and all Europe wi11 be drawn in. Unless we secure this universal limitation we shall achieve neither lasting peace nor the permanent observance of the limitation of German armaments which we now seek to impose."
I do not think anything truer has been written since the war came to an end. As a matter of fact, you can only justify the procedure of the Supreme Council upon the assumption that all the Allies
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are angels and all who fought against them are the exact opposite.
If the Supreme Council is really in earnest in its desire to limit, armaments it is impossible to understand why they do not enforce the so-called voluntary principle upon the Succession States. It is simply ridiculous to pretend that small States like Bulgaria, Austria and Hungary, can be a danger to anyone. They are small and isolated, surrounded by nations unfriendly to them, with a population, in most cases, two or three times larger than themselves and possessing Armies twenty times as large. The Army of one small State do not care which you take, whether it be JugoSlavia, Czecho-Slovakia or any other you please—is actually very much larger than all the Armies that, ex-enemy States have been authorised to maintain. Germany is allowed 100,000 men, Austria, 30,000, Hungary, 35,000, and Bulgaria, 33,000. The sum total is less than 200,000 and yet, as I say, these States, which ought to have been made models for a world which is supposed to be anxious for peace, are each allowed to maintain an Army infinitely greater than the totals which I have just enumerated.
All these considerations have, no doubt, been placed before the Supreme Council in Paris, and without any success. Where the Bulgarian and Hungarian Governments have failed, I can hardly hope to succeed myself. Nevertheless, I would make an appeal to His Majesty's Government, because I consider that they are primarily responsible, and I would say, in conclusion, that to my mind it is a most deplorable thing that by our action we should create a totally mistaken impression—I am convinced that it is mistaken—that this country desires to act in a vindictive manner towards the small countries who sided against us during the war.
LORD SYDENHAM: My Lords, we live in clays when propaganda may direct public opinion, and even, in some cases, public action, and anyone who studies the propaganda that is going on at the present moment must discern certain perfectly definite tendencies. At the present moment it is clear that the main currents are divided in three particular directions. In the first place, they are directed to the abolition, or the drastic reduction, of the German reparations; in the second, to the

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spread of Communism throughout the world, and the recognition of the assassins who have reduced Russia to ruin; and, in the third place, it is quite evident that this propaganda embraces attempts to create ill feeling between ourselves and our late gallant Allies, the French.
As the result of this propaganda too many of the working classes have been led to believe that their prosperity and employment in the future depend on letting down the Germans as easily as possible, and on recognising the Marxian tyrants of Russia. Both of these objects are expected to be promoted at the Conference at Genoa, and the revolutionaries everywhere are consequently doing their utmost to secure that that Conference shall be held.
Besides these main currents of propaganda, there are minor streams which can be turned Oil when they are required, or may perhaps he quiescent for a time. We have seen vicious attacks on Poland, on Hungary, and on Montenegro, and as the result of them, the first two countries have been held up to public dislike and suspicion, while unfortunate Montenegro has been shamefully wiped off the map of Europe. The sources of this propaganda are evident, and Radek, whose real name, of course, is Sobelsohn, is one of the ablest directors of this conspiracy to corrupt public opinion throughout Europe. He has many very capable colleagues who are performing the same task in respect of India. Egypt and other countries.
All this may seem to be absolutely irrelevant, but it hits a direct bearing upon the Question which has been raised by ennoble friend, and on his many previous efforts to draw attention to the cruel position in which Hungary has been placed under the Treaty of Trianon. The influences that were brought to bear to effect the dismemberment of Hungary can clearly be traced in the propaganda to which I have referred. Hungary has had a bad Press wherever this propaganda has been able to penetrate. On the other hand, Jugo-Slavia, Czecho-Slovakia and Rumania are in comparative favour. Hungary has not only been dismembered, but is to be disunited as far as possible. It was only the other day that Hungary was threatened with invasion merely because it was believed that she contemplated the restoration of her ancient Monarchy. If she is denied the power of compulsion, she will,
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my noble friend has so well explained, be put to expenses which she is quite unable to bear. Why should Hungary be deprived of the means of defending the little country and the few rights which have been left to her? Why should this be, when she is surrounded by aggressive neighbours, some of whom are misgoverning her own nationals, and when she has had the shocking experience of a period of Communist revolution?
Bulgaria is in a somewhat different position. Unfortunately, she lost the sympathies of our country by her action in 1915 but it should always be remembered that that was not the fault of the Bulgarian people, and that the Army showed the greatest reluctance when it was forced to move. Some regiments mutinied when they were ordered to the frontier, and the late King proclaimed Martial Law and, I believe, shot 3,000 men. The Bulgarians are mainly an agricultural people—80 per cent. at least—and they are nearly all peasant proprietors. These are just the conditions in which it is almost impossible to raise an effective voluntary Army.
My noble friend has told you that the forces allotted to Bulgaria under Article 68 of the Treaty amount, in all, to 33,000. The Government, with great difficulty I believe, has been able to raise only 6,350, and of these many are totally unfitted for the purpose for which they are intended, because the work of frontier guards requires special qualities which these enlisted men do not possess. The result will be that smuggling by armed bands across the frontier of Bulgaria will before long become general. We have been told that the cost of these 33,000 enlisted men would be 807,000,000 francs, which is far beyond the resources of Bulgaria. Like Hungary, Bulgaria has aggressive neighbours. JugoSlavia I have not the slightest idea why—maintains a very large Army, which is compulsorily recruited. The Greeks also are very heavily armed, though it is possible that their unfortunate experience in Asia Minor 'nay have tended to cool their military ardour. It is natural that great uneasiness should prevail in Bulgaria at the present time.
As we have been told, there is a large amount of disarmament in the air, and I believe the League of Nations is working as hard as it can in that direction. But hardly anything has been accomplished.

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We alone are busy in disarming ourselves, and von will have noted that the Commander-in-Chief in India last week gave warning of the danger to which I ventured to draw the attention of the House some time ago. I see no sign of disarmament in many quarters where, quite superfluously large Armies are still being maintained.
The Supreme Conned has regulated the Armies in the ease of ex-enemy countries, and we must assume that they fixed the numbers at the very minimum necessary for the security of those States. Surely it might be permitted to Bulgaria and to Hungary to raise the very limited forces which have been allowed to them in the cheapest and most effective manner. It is this disregard of the special racial and economic conditions of certain countries which has made so much of the work of the Supreme Council dangerous, in my opinion, to the future peace of Europe. It is really a monstrous thing to inflict impossible military expenditure on a country like Hungary, which we have deprived of two-thirds of its original resoures. For these reasons I most strongly support the appeal of my noble friend, and I earnestly hope that His Majesty's Government will give careful and sympathetic attention to these grave matters.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (THE MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON): My Lords, in one respect the noble Lord who sits behind me, Lord Newton, was absolutely wrong. This is not a, matter, either as affects Bulgaria or as affects Hungary, in which His Majesty's Government is principally or primarily concerned. My noble friend seems to have got it into his head, in his usual amiable way of speaking, that we art intro carrying out some special crotchet of the late President of the United States or the present Prime Minister of this country, and he spoke as though our representatives at Supreme Councils, or meetings of the Ambassadors' Conference at Paris, act under special instructions, differing from those which are given by the other Powers to their delegates. That is not the case.
The question of carrying out the Treaties—and I will come in a moment to the nature of those Treaties—is, for the time being, in the hands not of the Supreme Council, which has of her, and perhaps in
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some respects more important, work to do, but in the hands of the Conference of Ambassadors at Paris, which is charged with the task of carrying out the Treaties already signed and ratified, in minor particulars. They act upon their own authority and judgment, and I believe in this matter with absolute unanimity. My noble friend, Lord Newton, accuses them of gross hypocrisy. I was waiting for that phrase. I have never heard any speech from my noble friend in Which he did not accuse those who had the misfortune to disagree with him, and whom he was satirising, of being either hypocrites or humbugs, and I am entirely familiar with the spectacle of my noble friend its the one and only Aristides. But even though he may have a monopoly of the many noble qualities which he is by no means averse front exhibiting to the House, I object to his assumption that those who have the misfortune to disagree with him are stained with the darkest moral attributes. That really is not the case, and in the present instance the Conference of Ambassadors at Paris, and the Foreign Offices in Europe, are carrying out the policy decided upon since the war and expressed in the Treaties, which there is no alternative, unless the Treaties themselves are broken, but to carry out.
Now what was the object of those Treaties? There was no idea of treating with special vindictiveness Bulgaria or Hungary. The object of the Powers was to get rid of the danger of large standing Armies in Europe, and to put a stop to the spirit of militarism, which was the fons et origo of the recent war. In order to carry out that object the first policy was to substitute voluntary enlistment for compulsory service in the future. It was applied not here and there, with an invidious and discriminating hand, but all round. It has been applied to the countries we have been discussing to-day, and it will be applied to Turkey when the fortunes of that country come under discussion a little later on. In the case of those two countries, the policy of which I speak was provided for in the case of Bulgaria by the Treaty of Neuilly, and in the case of Hungary by the Treaty of Trianon. Under both Treaties compulsory service disappeared and voluntary enlistment was substituted in the terms of the Treaty.
Before I come to the actual terms, may I say a word upon the Treaty position.

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My noble friend seems to think it does not matter at all if a Treaty has been concluded—that you can evade it or alter it, or treat it as of no effect. That is not the, case. These Treaties are part of the International Law of Europe, not only signed but ratified, anti if you ratify a Treaty the only thing you have to do is to carry it out, or, if you do not mean to do that, to declare your intention to abrogate and destroy it and create some new Treaty in its place. When he went on to talk about the special circumstances of Bulgaria and Hungary—and from his expressions of sympathy for those countries I do not desire to dissent he did not pause to remember that those countries are surrounded by other States with populations much larger and with feelings aggravated by long historical and other disputes—feelings by no means alleviated by the circumstances of the war. For instance, the neighbours of Hungary, with populations of forty-two millions, and the neighbours of Bulgaria, with thirty-two millions, would absolutely refuse to accept any modification of the Treaties on the lines suggested by my noble friend. Does he suggest that we are to over-ride those objections and expose the centre of Europe to another conflagration, by giving justification for intervention by the surrounding States to which I refer?
Take the case of Bulgaria by itself. I said I would refer to the Treaty position. It is as follows: By Article 65 of the Treaty of Neuilly compulsory service is abolished in Bulgaria. By Article 66 of the same Treaty Bulgaria is allowed to raise a voluntary Army of 20,000 men. By Article 72 the period of such service is fixed at 12 years. Under Article 69 Bulgaria was allowed 10,000 gendarmes and 3,000 frontier guards. No definite period of enlistment is laid down in the case of these subsidiary forces. It is quite true that in the course of last autumn the Bulgarian Government complained to the Powers that they were unable to raise a volunteer force without raising the scale of pay to a figure out of all proportion to their assets, and that they feared they would be left with a force which was insufficient for the maintenance of order. The Powers at once took this protest, in which they saw some substance, into consideration, and they made a concession in order to meet it. They agreed to allow the Bulgarian Government to enlist on a short time basis a number of gendarmes
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and frontier guards over and above the number fixed in the Treaty.
The Bulgarian Government wisely recognised that it is no good kicking against the pricks in this matter and at the present moment they are contemplating measures by which both the financial difficulty and the difficulty of securing volunteers may he met. It is proposed to impose a tax upon men of military age who do not volunteer for service, which shows that the Bulgarian Government realise that the Powers are intent upon enforcing the Treaty of Neuilly, and that they cannot expect, and I can assure my noble friend that they will not receive, any modification of the main principles and spirit of the Treaty such as he prayed for this afternoon.
Then we take the case of Hungary. By Article 103 of the Treaty of Trianon compulsory service was equally abolished in Hungary, but there, too, protests have been received, and in some respects a case for more lenient consideration has been made out, and similarly in the case of Hungary concessions have been made by the Conference of Ambassadors sitting at Paris. The Army was to have been placed on a voluntary basis by October 26 last. Hungary has been granted a considerable extension of time beyond that date, so that the transition can be made gradual. An increase in the numbers of police and gendarmes has also been allowed to her.
The noble Lord spoke as if there had been either no recruits or very few recruits—as I think he said—enlisted under this system. The figures are, I admit, small, though they are larger, I think, than my noble friend has any idea of. By the end of January, 8,500 had been recruited, but my information is that they were the result of a not very whole-hearted recruiting campaign. This force, existing under the conditions which I have described, which is being allowed to Hungary, will really be amply sufficient for the maintenance of order in that country. There is no reason why Hungary should now, in her straitened circumstances, require a large regular Army, nor is there any reason why the Powers should allow her to possess it. A conscript Army with a short term of service is a luxury which many of these Powers enjoyed in the past, which they used to the public detriment, and eventually to their own destruction, and which constitutes a menace that they cannot be allowed to exert again in the future.

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I hope my noble friends, who have more than once asked me to speak about Hungary and Bulgaria, will believe me when I say that my attitude is never animated by a desire to under-rate the difficulties of those countries; still less have I any feelings of revenge for the misguided course which they pursued in the war. This is not a matter of personal feeling; it is a matter of the Treaty policy of Europe, laid down by a combination of the whole Powers, now being faithfully carried out, and from which, in this case or in that case, it is impossible to allow a deviation.

FAMINE IN RUSSIA.
THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY rose to call attention to the reported facts respecting the gravity of the famine in Russia; and to ask whether His Majesty's Government is now able to make any statement as to possibilities in the matter.
His Grace said: My Lords, I desire to call attention for a few minutes to the facts now in our possession—I think we may call them faets—with regard to the famine in Russia, and to ascertain whether ally action in connection with those facts is likely now to be taken by His Majesty's Government, or whether they can give us some anticipation of what is likely to be the outcome of the reports which are in our hands. For many months we have all been aware that we were living in the presence of one of the most appalling calamities—if calamity is a word to be used for a thing so long drawn out—that the world has ever known. Day by day, while we were about our ordinary work, the people of Russia have been literally dying by thousands, and the ghastliness of the facts of the famine area is simply beyond words.
I do not propose to-night—there is no object in doing so—to dwell upon the horrors which have been depicted to us. Whether we take the detailed reports, now in our hands, by experts whose words cannot possibly be disputed, or whether we take the newspaper pictures, which many thought to be exaggerated, but which are now, I think, proving to have been practically fair pictures of what was taking place, the unspeakable horrors that are prevailing over a vast area of country are almost impossible to put into
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words—people living upon pounded grass, and the bark of trees, and refuse of every kind, and even unnameable horrors much worse than that, I am afraid, taking place beyond question! The picture is so awful a one that—as is always so in extreme eases—we are almost tempted to regard it as fiction rather than fact, or as though it referred to some other age or period than our own.
And we may add that for a long time past to many of us—to me at least—the horror of it all has been even enhanced by a kind of mystery and uncertainty and cloud Which has overhung it all, and the extraordinary difficulty of obtaining accurate facts upon which we could rely—a difficulty, I suppose, due, first, to the fact that the sources from which reports came were not on either side unprejudiced; and, secondly, to the very important fact that those who were endeavouring to give reports had no real skill or aptitude for generalisation on a great scale, but were apt, from what had just been before their eyes, to picture what they thought must be true elsewhere.
Now a change has come, the veil has been to a large extent lifted, the facts have been put before us by those who were not only anxious to give us a true picture, but who were also competent to judge about it and to generalise with thoughtfulness, and on a basis of wide experience. There have been several noteworthy men, foremost among them two, Dr. Nansen and Sir Benjamin Robertson. Dr. Nansen, who, of course, is a man of heroic adventures, of noble and eager philanthropy, and of considerable scientific knowledge, is not a man who has, or claims, any expert knowledge of famine administration or famine problems, which have their own character and their own history, but a man whose word can always be listened to, not merely with respect, but with confidence that what he says is what is true.
Now we have, in addition to that, the evidence before us in detail given by Sir Benjamin Robertson, who, I imagine, is the very best man in the world to give us that evidence, who has visited, as Dr. Nansen did, a great part of the areas affected, and who has brought to bear upon his visits an experience which, I imagine, is almost unrivalled in the world, of the administration of famine areas at times of extreme distress and difficulty. His experience has, of course, been of India.

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But anyone who has read with care what he has said, or who has seen him and conversed with him, will know how he has been constantly on his guard lest he should interpret Russian facts by Indian experience, and has compared the two with a skill which is very effective in its result.
These fearless men have done an enormous service to us at this time. They are fearless, because we have always to remember that this is not merely a very difficult and trying, and almost terrible, journey to take, but that the difficulties at the present moment, with typhus raging, are enhanced by the imminent peril of death almost any day. We have already lost some of our noblest men and women by the ravages of typhus. I would note that remarkable man, Dr. Reginald Farrar, who, after perfectly splendid service in Africa and Canada and on the Continent during the war, laid down his life the other day owing to typhus when trying to grapple with the famine problem. There are many more. These men therefore, who have done this work for us, have done it not merely in the face of unexampled difficulty, but of the most constant personal peril.
These reports now in our hands, as it seems to me, make a difference to the whole situation. Hitherto some of us (at least, I speak for myself) have felt this difficulty in dealing with the Russian famine problem its sheer vastness which was so bewildering, its complexity which was very great, indeed, and the lack of a practical objective of something which we saw could really be effectively done was constantly hindering what might otherwise have been an enthusiastic desire to give help. There has been a lack of the sense of hope in anything we could try to do, because it all seemed so futile and feckless and poor, like throwing a pail of water a great conflagration. It might for a moment affect a few yards of it and the rest be left to go on as before. And though many of us have been doing our very best to meet the difficulty and to let the real facts stand out before the world, we have found wherein the difficulty of doing so necessarily lay.
Now, it seems to me, the position is changed. We have set before us—I speak specially of Sir Benjamin Robertson's report—a fairly clear objective as to what could be clone, with a definite plan for doing it more or less worked out, with the prospect of a real possibility of practical
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business-like relief-giving, and a definite estimate based on knowledge and experience as to the kind of sum of money that is required for doing it. All that, as it seems to me, puts the situation in a different light from that in which it has been before, and there is upon us, as I think, a somewhat increased responsibility.
If I understand the question aright—and I will be brief in indicating what I understand about it—it is roughly this. The Volga basin, a huge area of an oval shape, putting it in the roughest way, with an area of at least 1,000 miles from north to south, is the region wherein the acute famine conditions have subsisted for a long time. The southern part at least of that area has been. I suppose, about the finest wheat-producing area in the world, a region front which great supplies were exported for ourselves and for others, and which is still capable of producing crops of wheat of almost unexampled value. Within that great area some millions of people are living, of whom it is calculated that about fifteen millions or sixteen millions are literally starving to death.
I do not go into the causes of that condition of things. The causes of the famine are differently described by different people, and I do not want to dwell upon them now. It seems perfectly clear, front the concurrent testimony of various competent people, that, except in one very small portion of the area, the famine is not due, as has so often been stated, to time ravages of war. That region was not overrun by the Armies fighting against the Bolsheviks, and was not, save as to a very small port ion of it, destroyed by them. It is due, year after year, to the system of requisition adopted by the Soviet Government, which took half the produce of the fields for public services, or supposed public services, for which they intended to use it. Of 4,000 pools, or whatever the quantity was, grown by a farmer or peasant in the area, they requisitioned 2,000 poods, leaving a similar quantity to the grower.
The consequence was that the farmer or peasant determined that the following year he would only grow half as much, and he did that, expecting to be left with it, but the half was again requisitioned. Then he determined to reduce the quantity by half the next year, and the same thing happened. It was found that the position became intolerable, and the amount of work the people were able to do for 1921 was

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extremely small. Then came the awful drought, and the crops went to nothing at all. If we are to find a cause for it. I suppose it would be mainly in the requisitions of which I have spoken.
A more pathetic picture can hardly be imagined than that which is drawn by Sir Benjamin Robertson in one or other of his reports. I forget whether it is in the report of the journey or in what he calls the "Travel Notes." It is a picture of huge cranes and gigantic elevators covering the region, and towering over a barren land. There are all these things for the moving, the raising, and the carrying of the corn, of which there is not a vestige to be seen, and the presence of those gigantic implements emphasises the rather ghastly picture.
In the area of relief, the American society have taken over and made themselves fairly responsible, and are carrying out their responsibility, for something like seven-eighths of the necessitous, leaving one-eighth to the British relief forces. I shall not go into details about the others. Sweden and other countries are giving minor aid. But we might say, roughly, that for seven-eighths of that area America has made herself responsible, leaving one-eighth to others. The authorities of the United States have voted, not. as a loan but as a gift, more than £4,000,000—not dollars, but pounds—for the carrying out of the American society's work, and it is being carried out.
The Americans are not touching the one-eighth which is left to us, because we have undertaken to do, and are doing, our best for it. In that area there are about 1,250,000 people, including adults, and it is upon that area that we are now urged to concentrate all our attention. For the most part we have helped children only. The Americans, who helped children only at first, are now finding that that is a mistaken policy, and are adopting the policy which Sir Benjamin Robertson so eloquently advocates—that, even if it means taking a smaller area, you should take care of the adults as well as of the children. To my mind, nothing is more pathetic than the picture he draws of tens of thousands of little children crowding into the relief agencies and collecting places, unable to say whence they came, sometimes knowing nothing more than their names, sometimes ignorant alike of names and parentage, brought up, from our point of
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view, under the utterly unsuitable arrangements of the Soviet Government and under conditions utterly different from anything that would correspond to home life anywhere else.
For these and other reasons. Sir Benjamin Robertson urges, in unanswerable terms, as it seems to me, that even if we have to limit the area with which we are dealing, we should take care that we do not confine ourselves to that particular bit of work to keeping the children alive while their parents are lying, dying or dead, around the mom in which the children are being fed—but that we take the adults as well its tire children and do what we tall for both. If any of your Lordships who have not gone into the matter will read what Sir Benjamin Robertson says in his report on that subject you will find it is not merely a striking description but an unanswerable bit of evidence as to what ought to be the nature of our policy.
The whole of it is a ghastly and terrible picture. Relief is going into the area which is served by the Americans and the smaller one served by ourselves, and I think we may say that there are a few facts which are, I will not say cheering—that is a word one can rail use in such a connection—but alleviating to some extent the horror of the situation, and which stand out slightly on the other side. There is, first, the fact, now I think unchallengeably proved, that there is no kind of pilfering or distraction to other objects of the food or the money that is being sent for that relief. What leaves this country or America to go to the famine-stricken area, gets there. It gets to the distributors, so far as the transport makes it possible. There may be delay before the transport is able to bring it to its destination, but it does get there, anti is not pilfered. It is therefore not being diverted from the purpose for which it is sent, and I think it is important that that fact should be known.
The second point is the way in which the efficiency of the distributing agencies has impressed itself upon the skilled observers, and especially that of the agency being worked on behalf of the Society of Friends by Mr. Watts and that worked for the Saving of the Children Fund by Mr. Webster. Both these gentlemen seem to be of quite singular capacity for their task, in the view of one so experienced in supervising work of this kind as Sir

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Benjamin Robertson. He says that we could not have found two men more capable of overcoming the enormous difficulties which have to be met with in the areas to which the money goes. Moreover, there is the fact that the Soviet Government is co-operating to the best of its power in bringing the relief in an appropriate way by contributing the vitally important element of seed corn, which is not to be eaten but is to be put in the ground for next year.
The American system, as some of your Lordships who have followed the facts know, is this. Maize in great quantities is given for food, and one train carrying great loads of maize goes into a particular area, and is followed there by another train carrying the seed corn. To my mind, it is a very striking fact, noted by all these observers, that these unhappy peasants, reduced as they are to the verge of starvation, even if they have nothing to eat at all, are ready to sow the corn rather than eat it, so well do they realise the needs of the coming year. I should have expected to have heard that the case would be otherwise, in view of the desperate condition to which they are reduced. I have cross-examined the two men of whom I have spoken as to what they have to say about it, and their reply is that it is amazing to see the self-restraint that the people show in being ready to use for seed what is given for seed instead of using it for the purpose of satisfying their desperate hunger. That point has been carefully considered, and is admitted by those who are giving the relief.
What is needed, in order that Great Britain may do that part which has been taken over more or less by Great Britain? According to Sir Benjamin Robertson, £500,000 would not do everything that is desired, but its expenditure would produce an incalculable improvement upon what will be the condition of affairs in the absence of the expenditure of such a sum. Apparently, we have at present in every area a certain amount of stores, some given by His Majesty's Government. Whether it was the best kind of stores for the purpose or not I cannot say, but stores were given of different kinds, and they are there with a good deal else in addition. It is fortunate that they are there, because, within about three weeks from now begins the period of five weeks during which there is a thaw. In that period
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no transport at all is possible. The position was described by someone in these words: "Railway sleepers are floating in treacle." The railways, therefore, are in a hopeless condition during that period, and transport is impossible. Therefore, as quickly as possible, within the next week or two, we have to get stores for the people. The great object is to get into the American area the stores required to keep the people going till the middle of April. As regards our area, after the middle of April we shall have to take over new responsibilities for maintaining the people until the harvest, which will not be till the middle of August.
From April to August, therefore, we shall have to take over the responsibility of looking after the people to the best of our power. But according to this most wise and expert observer we can, with the help that I have indicated, or something like it, prolong the feeding of the children. We are now feeding about 320,000 children, and also as many adults as possible, say 500,000 or 600,000. If we had the necessary money we could get the work for future relief organised, and the administrators on the spot. This, of course, only means doing the best we can towards meeting the need, which is far greater than we can properly cope with, but it does mean meeting the need to a very considerable extent. A very large number, unhappily, must die, but by concentration at one particular area, and by wise management according to the scheme which is now put on paper for us, we can attain an enormous result of good for that great area in the preservation of life.
I desire to know whether His Majesty's Government can tell us whether they can see their way to adopt any practical steps in leadership or whether they have any suggestion to make of a substantial grant to supplement voluntary aid and so help us to do what we feel can be done. I cannot but think that the moment is one that I ought not to let pass without at least asking that question, and learning that it has been fully considered, as I have no doubt is the case. This is not the moment or the occasion for making an appeal. Every one of your Lordships feels as strongly as I do what our obligations are in these matters—our obligation for the sake of this unhappy people, and our obligation for the sake of the health of Europe, for famine breeds pestilences which go far beyond the famine area. There are also to be considered the possibilities of future commer-

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cial relations and trade, but I feel far more deeply and strongly what is due on the ground of the elementary principles of common humanity and of Christendom, for which we care. I desire to ask the Question in my name.
THE MARQUESS OF ABERDEEN AND TEMAIR: My Lords, I wish, in a very few words, to supplement something that was said by the most rev. Primate when he alluded to the mystery or uncertainty which has surrounded this subject. I am afraid the uncertainty is not all yet cleared away. For example, a short time ago a statement appeared in the Press headed, I am sorry to say, in some papers, with the line:"Doctor Nansen's Reward." The statement went on to say that Dr. Nansen had become an honorary member of the Soviet. That statement was evidently accepted by a number of people, including Mr. Nabokoff, who wrote to point out that Dr. Nansen had been entrusted by the League of Nations with the mission of taking to their homes a large number of Russian refugees. The inference was that he was disqualified in a sense for carrying out this work because he had become member of the Soviet. What were the facts I They were given in a letter written by Dr. Nansen to The Times on February 14, in which he states that he never heard a word about becoming an honorary member of the Soviet, and that if he had received any such invitation he would have at once felt it necessary to decline it, because in his work he must be dissociated from the politics of any country.
I should add that Mr. Nabokoff did not allude to a fact, which perhaps he did not know but which I shall now state to your Lordships, and I think an apology from him would be appropriate in regard to it. The facts are that Dr. Nansen has transferred 385,000 Russian refugees to their homes at a cost of about £400,000. I have no doubt that these facts are known to the Department of the noble Marquess who leads the House. Clothing was much needed, and 60,000 suits of clothing were sent to the most needy of these refugees. That was a great work, accomplished, I am told, without a single failure; and it is an example of the capacity and reliability that Dr. Nansen has shown throughout. It is a monstrous thing that his work should have been defamed and misrepresented. Perhaps defamed is too strong a word; I will say discredited.
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After what the most rev. Primate has said I will not dilate upon that aspect of the matter, except to say that in The Times to-day there is a further and most important supplementary statement in support of what has been done by the various societies. There is a pregnant sentence at the end of that statement where allusion is made to the economic aspect. We are told that Europe cannot afford to help these starving people; I say that Europe cannot afford to neglect them. The credit of this country is really at stake. It is monstrous that the people should be misled by such statements. They emanate, not within the borders of our own country, but elsewhere, from people who are so determined to discredit the present affairs in Russia that they say: "Let the people die in order to bring discredit on the Soviet Government."
I think this frightful devastation of human life makes a claim upon the whole human race, and more especially upon those who are expected to take the lead. We have the example of the United States with its £5,000,000 worth of food sent. Our own Prime Minister sent a sympathetic message in support of the Famine Relief Fund and alluded to the fact that something had been done already. I think that was a reference to about £100,000 worth of stores. That is something, but when we have been told of the urgency of relief I hope the Government will consider—especially as the Prime Minister has expressed his sympathy, and given his imprimatur to the need for relief—that this further movement should be carried out quickly and on an ample scale. Surely £2,000,000 is not too much. That sum would at any rate do a great deal of good on the spot and clear the character of our country in regard to the accusation of lack of concern, and of neglect, in this matter.
LORD EMMOTT: My Lords, I need not add anything to what has been so well said by the most rev. Primate as to the terrible character of the calamity in the Volga area in Russia at the present time. I want rather to deal with one or two practical matters from my own standpoint as Chairman of one of the funds specially interested in the relief of the victims of the famine. I am not without hope, let me say, that the three funds specially interested in this work may practically pool their efforts and so get away from a feeling of competition between them which is undesirable and un-

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satisfactory. What we want to do is to carry out, as adequately as possible, in the two districts where British relief organisations are now working, the relief of children and adults. One would be only too glad to extend that work, but I am afraid that is all we can do at the moment if we are to carry it out adequately. Hitherto, the relief given has been almost entirely to children, until the last few weeks. In a famine of this intensity it is as essential to feed adults—it is really almost more necessary—as to feed children, if you wish to keep alive the population that can till the ground next year. That is a practically obvious point.
With £400,000 from public and private sources we can keep the children alive who have been fed, and keep a good many of the adults alive in those two districts. With £600,000 we could do the work pretty adequately. That is a comparatively small matter—£600,000—when put in relation to the great American effort. America is giving £6,000,000; about £2,000,000 privately, and £4,000,000 as a Government grant. We could get a considerable portion of the money we want by means of private charity, but the springs of private charity would flow touch more freely if the Government could, and would, assist us in the matter. Therefore, I join in the appeal which the most rev. Primate said he did not make, but which he did make inferentially, for Government assistance, Sir Benjamin Robertson is, willing to give his services in controlling the relief, provided we can get adequate assistance.
I will not deal with some of the objections raised. There can be no question now that the supplies are reaching the victims of the famine. Again, these people whom we are helping are the victims of the famine, and are not responsible for the famine. These peasants, and their fellows, have been opponents of the Communistic régime which has been the governing factor in Russia during the last four or five years. It is they who have brought it practically to an end, because all the tenets of Bolshevism are now given up in practice by the Soviet Government itself. As the most rev. Primate, and also the Marquess of Aberdeen, pointed out, it is to our interest to help these people. We have a direct British interest in keeping the peasants of the Volga region alive until they can grow the harvests they used to grow in the past, and which were one of the most
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important sources of food supply to this country and other European countries.
If the peasants are to be allowed to die on an immense scale—and millions must die in any case—the reconstruction of Europe is pro tanto delayed, and there is no question more vital to the cure of Unemployment here than keeping as many as possible of these poor people alive in order that the country may not become a desert. Therefore, on the ground of humanity and self-interest I say that we ought to assist in this work. I really cannot understand the idea which seems to be held that this country, and Europe at huge, can dissociate itself from a direct interest in the matter. Behind this famine lurks the appalling danger of a famine next year on an immensely more widespread and terrible scale, and also the danger of the awful pestilences which are raging in Russia at the present moment.
I said, however, that. I rose rather for a severely practical purpose. As the Chairman of the Russian Famine Relief Fund, responsible for the proper disposal of the stores given by the Government to the British Red Cross and then handed by them to us, I do not want to take too much the attitude of looking a gift horse in the mouth, but there are seine facts that I think I ought to make known to your Lordships. A good many of these stores were useless from the point of view of famine relief. We received about £30,000 worth of foodstuffs; we were to have received, I think. £31,000 or £35,000 worth but we have not been able to get some £4,000 worth of them. We have to collect them at terrible expense from Army damps, and pay all the freight charges to send them out to Russia. Among those stores were 200 tons of lime juice, valued at £2,100; and lime juice, after all, cannot bring great physical relief or moral comfort to people who are dying from starvation. Pork and beans and tinned beef were less useful than grain, but still they had their value front the point of view of feeding adults.
With regard to the balance of what was said by the Disposals Board to be worth £100,000, we collected £21,000 worth of stores in Egypt and brought to Constantinople, and they consisted of moth-eaten clothing and second-hand things, with some medical comforts. We found that it was really so little use sending them to Russia that we arranged to divert them for

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the purpose of the refugees in the Constantinople district—of course, with the consent of His Majesty's Government. Those stores, which were said to be worth £21,000, were valued by Lloyds at £8,500. The remainder—£41,000 worth, according to the Disposals Board valuation—were handed over to us and consisted of medical drugs, hospital equipment and so on. It is impossible for us to value these stores, but I am credibly informed that many of the drags are what is known as "time-expired." They were handed over to us only yesterday, I think, after two and a half months' delay. There are some 300 tons; I suppose it will cost at least £1,000 to send them to Russia, and we have had two or three of the staff waiting to receive them for two or three months. One feels that, from the point of view of famine relief something more digestible is required than operating tables, of which there are a good many in this medical equipment.
I am afraid I am looking a gift horse in the mouth, but I must say quite frankly that £40,000 or £50,000 in cash would have been infinitely more useful than this nominal gift of £100,000 worth of goods, which even on the Disposals Boards' valuation have never reached that sum. I am sure I have only to mention this to the noble Marquess, the Leader of the House, to ensure that his Department, the officials of which I have to thank for the most valuable help in regard to this matter, will do its best to induce the Disposals Board to bring up the value of the gift made to us to something really like £100,000. I say £100,000, although the figure of £200,000 was once mentioned. I venture to urge that, if His Majesty's Government ever in the future offer us further stores, they will consult the Famine Relief Organisation or the British Red Cross as to the stores in their possession which are most suitable for the purpose of famine relief. What we really want are grain, beans, rice, and commodities of that kind. They are infinitely more useful for our purpose than anything else.
LORD WEARDALE: My Lords, before the noble Marquess answers the Question put to him I may perhaps supplement what my noble friend has said from the point of view of the Save the Children Fund. This Fund was the first in the field to take up this question of famine relief in Russia, and I think we may claim that
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it has worked with remarkable efficiency, because we chose highly competent agents—Sir Benjamin Robertson has borne testimony to their competency—men who spoke Russian, which was an all-important accomplishment, and under their charge we despatched to Russia, before the navigation closed, enough food to carry on our operations in the Saratov district until the end of April or the beginning of May. We have made a great effort in accomplishing that, and I am glad to know that Sir Benjamin Robertson, who did not go out on our behalf but whose immense authority we quite recognise, has borne distinct testimony to the way in which our work has been accomplished.
I should like to ask the noble Marquess this question. We, by voluntary effort—and voluntary effort is a great strain and trouble in these days—have been enabled to find food for some 250,000 children in the Saratov district. We found food sufficient until possibly the middle of May, but after that period we really do not know whether we shall be able to carry on, and I should like now to ask His Majesty's Government directly whether they would like to see our work entirely lost, as it would be by these unfortunate children sinking back into starvation from the want of the very few hundred thousand pounds which might very readily be given for this purpose. I agree that the State is not at present in a very flourishing condition. It is difficult—almost impossible—to expect Parliament to devote large sums of money for any purpose whatever. We have the "Geddes axe," and many things of that kind, and I agree that it must be repugnant to the Government to make any demand upon Parliament for funds. But I regard this as a very exceptional case. You have before you the noble example of America, which has granted £4,000,000 sterling for this purpose, which is conducting relief operations on an immense scale and, as I am given to understand, conducting them very efficiently. All that we ask is that the British Government should supplement the efforts of voluntary societies in order to, carry us through the famine period.
I agree with my noble friend that we shall not see the end of the evil even then, because we are faced with famine conditions in Russia next year. I have known Russia well for forty years, and I naturally speak with some knowledge. I say most dis-

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tinctly that the Russian peasants are worthy of all praise for the splendid patience that they have shown under unexampled sufferings. I think it would well become the British Parliament to make a grant of a moderate amount—I do not ask for a large amount—to enable us to continue, in the area which has been assigned to us, the work which is being very ably carried on at the present time.
THE MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON: My Lords, I hope that the extent of the interest which is felt in this subject both by Parliament and the public at large will not be measured by the rather scanty audience that happens to be here this afternoon. I am convinced that that is not the case, because even were we not personally familiar with the details that have been put before us by the various speakers there is a general sense in the community at large that this is a terrible, devastating, almost unprecedented crisis in the history of the populations of Eastern Europe, and there is a very wide fountain of sympathy always springing in this country, not merely for distress in general, but for the victims of this particular catastrophe.
With almost everything that has fallen from the previous speakers I am personally in agreement, and I was very glad to hear the case stated with so much amplitude and precision by the most rev. Primate. A good many people will not have the opportunity of coming across the report of Sir Benjamin Robertson, which I believe was only issued to-day, but a full summary of all that is contained in that document, with a good deal of most interesting matter, is contained in the speech of the most rev. Primate, and those who read our proceedings—I wish they were more in number than I believe them to be—can find in the report of his speech, and the speeches of those who followed him, a very full account of the situation as it now is. So full have been these accounts that I do not think I need say anything, in the few observations which I have to make, about the area over which the suffering extends, nor about the intensity of the visitation, which is very great and lamentable, nor about the activities of the various agencies, other than our own, which have been endeavouring to cope with it. All honour to the generosity of the American Government, who have given this large sum—20,000,000 dollars I have been told it is—whose
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agency, working under the inspiration of Mr. Hoover at home and of Colonel Haskill out in Russia itself, has accomplished, and is accomplishing, work of enormous magnitude, and on the whole of remarkable and conspicuous success.
I pass that by for the moment, because what we are concerned with here are the activities of our own people and of the various British organisations which are devoting themselves to the same task. We have heard to-night from the spokesmen of more than one of these bodies. Lord Emmott, for instance, spoke as Chairman of the Russian Famine Relief Fund, and if he is dissatisfied with the nature of the material with which he has had to deal, and I am afraid he has some reason for being so, at any rate no one is dissatisfied with the way in which his fund, and more particularly he himself, have devoted themselves to the management of the task which they have undertaken. Now about these stores. It always seems that in our country the administration of charity is accompanied and disfigured by stupidity of the grossest description, and so it has been in this case, and although the matter of the lime juice is a small matter—I think only £2,000 in value—still it is a very stupid mistake to have made. I gather also that in some respects the same may be said of other stores, which came from Egypt or Constantinople, and which were either inferior in character or useless. I imagine that the Disposals Board is the body responsible for these errors, if indeed they have been, as I am afraid they have been, committed, and I can only say that I will act as suggested by the noble Lord, and put myself in communication with those persons and endeavour to see whether there are not more serviceable stores available; and anything that it is in my power to effect to implement the contributions that have already been made in a better fashion I will gladly undertake.
Next we have Lord Weardale, who spoke on behalf of the Save the Children Fund, a fund which has been a good deal, and as I think most unfairly, attacked and traduced in the newspapers, but which I have endeavoured to back up to the best of my ability and which has done conspicuous service in the Saratov province in giving food to children numbering, I think, between 200,000 and 300,000.
LORD WEARDALE: 250,000.
THE MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON: Then I do not think anybody has mentioned by name, although it has been referred to, the good work done by the Society of Friends in the Buzuluk district of the Samara province. They have found food for 100,000 persons, of whom 70,000 are children. These are the principal British agencies that have been at work. Lord Emmott's Committee was responsible for sending out Sir Benjamin Robertson, and here let me say with what pleasure I have heard the tributes paid to that very eminent and successful administrator, this afternoon. It gives particular pleasure to me, because shortly after I went to India as head of the Government, I had to administer the greatest famine which had occurred there during the last fifty years. It was during the course of that famine that I first came across Sir Benjamin Robertson, and it was in dealing with that famine that he acquired the great knowledge and experience which, when he became head of the Central Provinces later on, allowed him to cope successfully with minor visitations of the same character. It is certainly true that a more painstaking and sincere representative of the Relief Fund could not possibly have been sent out than Sir Benjamin Robertson. I am also glad that particular mention was made by the most rev. Primate of the name of the son of an old friend of ours, Dean Farrar. Could the father have lived to see the work of his son, and to know of his self-sacrificing and noble death in the course of this famine, he would have rejoiced that his name was borne by one so worthy, and those who recall the father are not in the least surprised at the heroic career of the son.
Knowing Sir Benjamin Robertson, I asked him to come and see me and give me his advice in the matter. He says, and no doubt with truth, that it is no good for us to attempt anything in the large area that is so successfully covered by the American organisations to which I have referred—that supposing you tried to send out seed there, or foodstuff, or anything else, you would merely add to the already terrible congestion of the railways. As your Lordships know, transport has almost completely broken down. It would complicate the work done by the Americans, and for the most part would be good purpose wasted. He says: "Concentrate yourselves upon those two little
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islets" to which I have referred—the islet which is administered by the Save the Children Fund and the islet looked after by the Society of Friends. Concentrate your attention upon those, and try and find the money to keep the people going in the interval between now and mid-August, and, if you can get it, of course buy the grain for sowing for future use. I was interested to hear Lord Emmett say, and I think the Archbishop said also, that it really was mistaken policy to concentrate exclusively upon the children, and that while the children constitute the next generation and are worth keeping, the adult is the person useful for the moment; and I was glad to hear Lord Emmott say that the scope of the work ought to embrace the grown-up as well as the young.
The question is from what source the money is to be procured. The most rev. Primate put his Question upon the Paper in a form so ambiguous that it suggested the ecclesiastical language of an earlier epoch. For instance, he asked whether His Majesty's Government is now able to make any statement as to possibilities in the matter. I had a shrewd suspicion as to what he meant, and towards the end of his speech it came out. I might have inferred from the Question that he desired me to make a statement as to the possibilities of the extension of the famine, or of dealing with the famine. But what he really wanted to know was whether His Majesty's Government would be able to find the money, and the same question has been more directly put by the speakers who have followed.
I recognise the humanitarian appeal. I recognise that no very large sums of money are asked for in the present case. But when I go to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, as I have done over this, he repeats, in language infinitely more lugubrious and severe, the remarks that fell from the noble Lord, Lord Weardale. He reminds me that there are nearly 2,000,000 unemployed in this country. He talks also about the "Geddes axe." He informs me that several most important Departments of State, with one of which I am personally connected, are to be condemned root and branch, and are to disappear. He tells me that if any money were given it could only be as a gift, because, of course, no restitution is possible. He tells me that, if he went to the House of Commons and

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put a sum of money upon the Votes he could not get it, that public opinion, as there represented, would not return him a favourable reply, and I think it is the case that we are almost always disposed to be more generous in your Lordships' House than they are over the way, for reasons into which I need not enter.
I can only say, therefore, upon this point, that, glad as I should be to help, I have not persuaded my colleague who is mainly responsible to endorse my feelings in this respect, and I think, if noble Lords feel, as they do, so deeply and so earnestly about the matter, the way to proceed is to organise public opinion, to bring pressure to bear through members of the House of Commons upon the Government. Supposing you have a round robin or appeal signed by 200 or 300 Members of Parliament, Governments become much more acquiescent in the situation than they would he of themselves. I wish I could give a more consolatory reply to the speeches which we have heard, to which we have all listened with the utmost sympathy, and for which, personally, I am very grateful to the noble Lords who delivered them.

PAPERS ON INDIA AND EGYPT.
THE EARL OF MIDLETON: My Lords, I desire to ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs when the Papers relating to India, promised in the debate on the Address, will be laid on the Table; and whether it is proposed to lay any Papers with regard to Egypt. The noble Marquess will realise that the war has made a complete change and a fresh departure in regard to the information laid before Parliament on all questions connected with foreign affairs and the Dependencies. But I rather hope that, having regard to his old experiences in another place when we were companions, he will revert to the better practice of giving Parliament the opportunity of judging to some extent of what the Government are doing and proposing.
In the case of India the noble Marquess certainly held out a hope to us, in his speech on the Address, that Lord Reading's Despatch would be laid on the Table, and we hoped that it might be accompanied by other Papers. May I press upon him also that the very grave events that have been taking place in Egypt, and also the
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recent visit of Lord Allenby and the Councils which, we know, have gone on during that period, make it highly desirable that some Papers should be laid before Parliament as speedily as may be with regard to the position of affairs in Egypt.
THE MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON: My Lords, the noble Earl is quite correct in saying that in the debate on the Address I mentioned that a Despatch, or communication, was shortly expected from the Viceroy of India, giving the views of the Government of India upon the existing situation. That communication has now arrived, and it is being prepared in the India Office for submission to Parliament, as promised by me on that occasion. It will be accompanied by other Papers, I believe, as well, which are being selected and arranged in the India Office for the purpose. I hope that these Papers will be in the hands of Parliament on Wednesday of next week; at any rate, in the course of next week.
As regards the Egyptian Papers, we did, I think in December last, lay Papers, i.e. Papers up to the point at which we had failed to come to an agreement with the Adly Mission in England in the course of last year; and the views of His Majesty's Government, contained in a Despatch, had then been communicated by Lord Allenby to the Sultan. Since that date there have been, of course, communications between the High Commissioner and ourselves, culminating in the agreement which has just been arrived at. Upon that point, too, Papers are being prepared, and they will be laid also in the course of next week, I hope on Tuesday next, so that Parliament will be in a position, whether it discusses the matter then or a little later, to know at any rate the final stage which the negotiations have reached.

TREATY WITH AFGHANISTAN.
LORD LAMINGTON: My Lords, I beg to ask His Majesty's Government the Question of which I have given Notice—namely, when the full text of the Treaty with Afghanistan will be laid on the Table.
THE MARQUESS CURZON OF KEDLESTON: My Lords, the actual text of the Treaty itself, as signed at Kabul, was in Persian, but a translation has been pre-

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pared and will be laid shortly as a Treaty Series Paper. Meanwhile, I will make arrangements for two copies to be placed in the Library for the convenience of the noble Lord or of any others who wish to see it.
[From Minutes of February 22.]

RHONDDA (PETITION FOR WRIT OF SUMMONS).
Committee for Privileges to meet on Thursday, March 2.
BARONY OF CROMWELL.
Committee for Privileges to meet on Thursday, March 2.
BOLINGBROKE PEERAGE.
Committee for Privileges to meet on Friday, March 3.
BARONY OF LE POWER AND COROGHMORE.
Committee for Privileges to meet on Monday, March 6.
MADRAS RAILWAY ANNUITIES BILL. [H.L.]
  STOKE-ON-TRENT CORPORATION (GAS CONSOLIDATION) BILL. [H.L.]

    TEES CONSERVANCY BILL. [H.L.]
    Committees to meet on Tuesday next.
    House adjourned at ten minutes past six o'clock.