§ THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD had given Notice to ask His Majesty's Government whether the correspondence published in the last issue of theSunday Express and purporting to be between M. Gounaris and the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston is authentic; and to move for Papers.
§ The noble Earl said: My Lords, I rise to ask the Government a Question which I have put on the Paper as to whether or not the correspondence purporting to have taken place between the noble Marquess who leads the House, Lord Curzon, and M. Gounaris, which was published theSunday Express of last Sunday, is an authentic correspondence or not. I assume it to be so—not that I have to my knowledge, in spite of my being at the time a 338 member of the Government, ever seen any of the letters before—because it would appear to be evident that no paper of responsibility, as theSunday Express undoubtedly is, would have published such correspondence if it had not satisfied itself fully of the fact that the letters were authentic. I think it, would be convenient—it is a matter of the highest possible importance, and I will reserve any comments I desire to make upon them till then—if I read the letters to your Lordships because it may be that some of you have not, up to the present, been aware of their contents.
§ The first letter was written from the Greek Legation on February 15, 1922, to Lord Curzon, and was signed by M. Gounaris. It is as follows:—
§ "My Lord Marquess,
§ "On October 27, 1921, your Lordship was pleased to communicate to M. Baltazzi and myself the views of the British Government in regard to the situation in the Near East. From the consideration of the situation ill this region in connection with the general political situation, your Lordship drew the conclusion that the speedy establishment of peace was in the common interest of all parties. With a view to securing such a peace your Lordship urged us to place ourselves in the hands of three Allied Powers, whose joint mediation the British Government would try to obtain. Bearing in mind the sympathy and interest felt by the British Government for Greece, and once more manifested by your Lordship on the occasion of this interview, we decided, after careful deliberation and after consultation with our colleagues in Athens, that it was in the interest of Greece to adhere to your Lordship's proposal. Various circumstances which your Lordship is more competent to appreciate than myself have hitherto deferred a solution of the problem and more than three months have elapsed without it having proved possible to establish peace in spite of the sincere efforts of your Lordship to that end.
§ "During this interval the Greek Government did not lose sight of the fact that the surest foundation for the negotiation of peace with Turkey in the common interest of the Allies who jointly conducted the war against that Power and will jointly conclude the peace, consisted in the maintenance of the militarystatus quo in Anatolia. To this end the Greek Government has strained its energies to the utmost to keep the Greek Array in its present position. The British Government will readily understand the serious difficulties which the Greek Government had to face in this connection. The Greek Army has remained more or less constantly mobilised for the past nine years, Further, the strong patriotic feeling of the soldiers and the consciousness of their mission to liberate their brethren under the Turkish yoke and reunite them to the fatherland—these feelings. which have served to neutralise their natural war-weariness, have been adversely affected by the growing probability that the coming peace will not fully secure the realisation of the omission of which they are conscious.
339§ "The steady depletion of the financial resources of the country, moreover, unavoidably involved increasing difficulty in supplying the needs of the Army and correspondingly increasing hardships for the troops in Asia Minor. In spite of these difficulties it has hitherto proved possible for Greece to meet the situation. Her exertions to this end have, however, created a state of things to which I feel it my duty to draw your Lordship's attention in the hope that the interest which we know the British Government to feel in the matter will impel them to accord it their careful consideration with a view to facilitating the discovery of means to meet the present difficulties which must needs prove insuperable for Greece, if she be left to her own resources.
§ "2. In particular I wish to bring to your Lordship's knowledge that the financial resources of the Greek Government are completely exhausted. In anticipation of this inevitable development I repeatedly approached the British Government with a view to their granting facilities for the cent lesion of a loan in the British market. Consequent on this, an Agreement was signed on December 22, 1921, between the Chancellor of the Exchequer and myself whereby the British Government signified its consent to the conclusion of a loan not exceeding £15,000,000, and to the granting of security for such loan. In spite of this action of the British Government it has not yet proved possible to conclude the loan. Meanwhile, information from Athens represented the situation of the Treasury as growing steadily worse, and the latest telegrams state that the Government is completely unable to meet the expenditure on the upkeep of the Army for the first half of February (O.S.) in spite of the fact that in the meanwhile disbursements of public; money on any other object have practically ceased.
§ "3. Over and above this complete financial impasse, it should he recalled that the campaigning season in Asia Minor is approaching. Little inure than a month separates us from the date on which operations were resumed last year. Meanwhile, the enemy has been reinforced in men and supplies.
§ "Under these circumstances the Greek Command in Asia Minor state that they cannot undertake to give an assurance of their ability to cope with the contingency of a Turkish offensive unless they receive (1), reinforcements sufficient to raise the units under them to full strength and thus neutralise the present Turkish superiority in number; (2) supplies of fresh war material (especially aeroplanes, machine guns, and motor lorries), these being indispensable if the mobility of the Army is not to be affected; and (3), financial assistance as the present financial position of the Army is desperate.
§ "Unless these conditions are fulfilled the Command consider that the impending Turkish offensive will expose the Army to very serious dangers and urgently request that the above measures be instantly taken or, should they prove to be impracticable, that an order be instantly given to avoid the dangers foreseen through a withdrawal, while it is yet time to take the initiative of a withdrawal before being forced to it by the development of the situation. They consider further that such a withdrawal must necessarily amount to it complete evacuation of Asia Minor, since no line mere to the west would afford, in 340 the event of withdrawal from the fortified line now held, stronger defensive positions which would enable the Army to hold out without strengthening it by the measures above indicated.
§ "Finally, the Command of the Asia Minor Army add that should the enemy receive yet further reinforcements it would become necessary similarly to reinforce our own Army by calling up fresh classes to the Colours, so as to neutralise the accession of strength to the enemy.
§ "With regard to the above the Greek Government is indeed in a position to meet the call for more troops in both of the cases contemplated. Clearly, however, the Greek Government is not in a position to furnish the Asia Minor Army with the financial assistance of which it is in such need, or to supply the necessary war material, least of all in the event of the calling up of fresh classes, when considerable additional armament will be indispensable."
§ There follows some other matter which is not of the same importance, and which, as it is somewhat lengthy, I do not find it necessary to read, but I have read enough to make it plain that here was a document of the very first State importance. It was a document in which the Greek Government, through its representative, the late M. Gounaris, put before the Foreign Secretary these propositions—" We cannot maintain ourselves in Asia Minor unless we are given financial aid. We cannot maintain ourselves in Asia Minor unless we are given machine guns, ammunition, and military equipment generally," and he adds: "If you are not able to give us this assistance let us know in time in order that we may withdraw. At this moment there is still time to withdraw; in a month or two there will be no time to withdraw."
§ I was taking at that time, as many of my Cabinet colleagues were, a deep interest in the position of Greece in Asia Minor, feeling profound anxiety as to the safety of her troops and the consequences of defeat at the hands of the Turkish Army, and I am confident that I never saw that letter. I am confident that tins most grave matter was not circulated to me. Perhaps the noble Viscount, Lord Peel, who was a colleague of mine, and a Cabinet Minister, will be able to tell me whether my recollection is correct on that point so far as he is concerned.
§ VISCOUNT PEELI was not a Cabinet Minister then.
§ THE EARL OF BIRKENHEADI am much obliged. My noble friend Lord Lee of Fareham tells me that he never saw it. 341 I know that had that document been circulated the first thing I should have done would have been to have asked for a Cabinet meeting in order that the most grave question of our responsibility to the Greeks might be discussed, and that we might acquit ourselves of it. Had I seen that letter I should have said to the Greeks, as far as it fell to me to address a message to them: "If you cannot maintain yourselves there we cannot give you financial assistance. We cannot give you military equipment; and if this is really your position, clear out at once; withdraw at once. "Think of the misfortunes and horrors that would have been avoided had such advice been given. We had not the opportunity, because I never saw the letter, nor did, so far as I know, any one of my colleagues.
How is that letter answered, according to theSunday Express? I say plainly that I should not have made this document public myself—I should not have taken such a responsibility—but timeSunday Express has thought it proper to do so, and that is their business not mine. As they have been made public they require discussion and explanation. This is the answer given by the noble Marquess, Lord Curzon.
§ THE EARL OF BIRKENHEADI am obliged for the correction. As the letter to which it is an answer was published your Lordships will consider—
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYWill the noble and learned Earl tell us where he has obtained a copy of the letter he is going to read?
§ THE EARL OF BIRKENHEADI would rather not tell the noble Marquess unless he wishes to dispute its authenticity. If he does not know whether it is authentic or not, I will postpone the Question until he has had an opportunity of satisfying himself.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYI am not disputing its authenticity. If the noble and learned Earl takes the responsibility of publishing a confidential document, that is his concern.
§ THE EARL OF BIRKENHEADIt is not a question of publishing documents. 342 The document to which this is an answer has been published in the Press. A reply was sent by Lord Curzon. If the noble Marquess, in the absence of Lord Curzon—and it is a formidable circumstance—does not feel that he is able to deal with the matter, or has not the knowledge as to whether this letter was actually sent by Lord Curzon, an elementary sense of fairness would lead me to postpone further discussion of the Question until Lord Curzon is here himself. There are certainly advantages in that course.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYThe noble and learned Earl having read one document now asks me to take the responsibility of stopping him from reading another. I should have thought that the reflection would have occurred to the noble and learned Earl as to the absence of Lord Curzon before he entered upon the debate. He seems to have realised it rather late in the day and I shall not take any responsibility in guiding him.
§ THE EARL OF BIRKENHEADThe noble Marquess is entirely in error in supposing that I have realised my responsibilities rather late in the day; still more is he in error if he imagines that I shall not most fully discuss this matter, as it will be discussed elsewhere, when the noble Marquess, Lord Curzon, returns to this country. Indeed, I shall be glad to hear what the noble Marquess has to say. But does the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, really suppose that while the discussions at Lausanne continue—they may and probably will continue for weeks—documents like this can be published in the public Press and no notice taken of them in Parliament?
I accept the responsibility of quoting this answer at once. The letter to which this is an answer has appeared in the public Press, and as the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, will express no opinion of the other, of course, I take full responsibility for reading the answer to it sent by Lord Curzon. It is dated March 6, 1922:—
§ "Your Excellency,
§ "I have considered with the utmost care the Note which you addressed to me on the 15th ultimo and desire to express my appreciation of the perfect candour with which you have expounded to me a situation that is indubitably fraught with the gravest anxiety to the Greek Government and nation. I can only express a hope that, the military position in Anatolia is less immediately critical than your Note would lead 343 me to think, and that the remarkable patriotism and discipline of the Hellenic Armies, of which so many illustrations have been furnished in the campaigns of the last few years, will not fail them in any emergency that may conceivably arise.
§ "2 As regards the financial position, your Excellency has yourself detailed the inception of the negotiations by which it is hoped by your Government to raise a substantial loan in the London market. His Majesty's Government have, as you know, endeavoured, within the limits of their publicly declared neutrality and of the engagements entered into with their Allies, to lighten the difficulties by which these negotiations were attended and if, as I am informed, they have failed to produce the desired result, this would appear to have been due in the main to obstacles connected with the commercial, rather than with the political, aspects of the proposed transaction.
§ "3. In these circumstances, the wisest course is unquestionably to expedite the diplomatic solution of the anxious position ill which all are placed. I deeply regret that owing to circumstances over which His Majesty's Government have bad no control the proposed meeting of the Allied Ministers in Paris has been so long delayed. An Italian Ministry having, however, now been formed, I have hastened to propose that the Conference should meet in Paris on March 13—a date which at the moment of writing seems likely to be again postponed for a few days to meet the convenience of the new Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs. I have little doubt that the best subject that will conic under examination there will be the Anatolian question; and I earnestly hope that a solution may be found which will be acceptable to both parties and may relieve you of the more serious apprehensions by which you are assailed.
§ " 4. Your Government has already placed itself, in accordance with the advice which I ventured to tender to you last autumn, in the hands of the Allies, and I doubt not therefore that in a similar spirit of confidence and good faith, you will be prepared to listen to such counsels as may be offered to you from Paris with regard to the immediately existing situation."
§
What follows? The Greeks say: "We are ruined and lost if we maintain ourselves in Anatolia without military equipment and without financial support. If you are unable to give us either of these we beg of you to give us warning in sufficient time in order that by withdrawing we may save ourselves." What did Lord Curzon reply? He said:—
I can only express a hope that the military position in Anatolia is less immediately critical than your Note would lead me to think, and that the remarkable patriotism and discipline of the Hellenic Armies, of which so many illustrations have been furnished in the campaigns of the last few years, will not fail them in any emergency that may conceivably arise.
The advice might then have been given to the Greeks 10 go, while there was still time for withdrawal. The advice might have been given to theta to stay. What was said
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by the noble Marquess was that he had confidence that the historic martial qualities of the Greek Army would suffice to meet the needs of the next few weeks and of the campaign that was so soon to follow.
§ If that advice did not mean: "Stay, at least for the present," I do not understand the meaning of words, whether they be employed in diplomacy or for any other purpose, and I most deeply deplore that we in the Cabinet were not allowed an opportunity of examining this letter for ourselves, of giving our opinions upon it, and of seeing whether there might not have been evolved from Cabinet discussions, with the collective gravity of responsibility, an advice which might have prevented these ghastly tragedies, an advice which aright have saved the lives of these Ministers, and not have rendered necessary the tragic development which has been met by this sublime gesture of the temporary withdrawal of a Minister.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYMy Lords, I think I gathered from the attitude of noble Lords when I interrupted the noble and learned Earl just now that they shared with me the surprise I felt that the noble Earl had undertaken to ask this Question and make this Motion in the absence of my noble friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The object of the noble Earl was very evident. He wishes to attack the foreign policy of my noble friend, and he took the opportunity when my noble friend was serving his country, at great personal inconvenience, and, I hope, with success, in Lausanne. He allowed himself to be betrayed into attacking my noble friend when he was away.
The situation is certainly very remarkable; indeed, almost comical. I have no responsibility for the policy which was pursued in the early part of this year, and most of my noble friends sitting on this Bench had no responsibility. But the noble and learned Earl was responsible. He was a member of the Government, and this is not, the first occasion when we have heard him at that box trying to evade responsibility for the actions of the Government to which he belonged—not a very elegant posture, may I venture to tell the noble Earl? He says he was not aware of the particular documents in question. I have not the same privilege of a complete 345 absence of discretion in which the noble Earl himself seems to rejoice.
§ THE EARL OF BIRKENHEADYou have had it for a good many years.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYI do not think so. I do not remember ever having made a speech of the kind to which we have just listened in your Lordships' House. I cannot, of course, go into full details, but I have no reason whatever to doubt that both these documents were circulated to members of the late Government, as were other documents of the kind. Of course, I accept it from the noble Earl when he says that he did not read the document.
§ THE EARL OF BIRKENHEADThe noble Marquess must not be allowed to put that construction on what I said. I said that I was quite confident that no such document was ever sent to me. I am confident that it was never circulated, and I am confirmed in that opinion by my noble friend, Lord Lee of Fareham, who sits here beside me, and who was at that time a member of the Cabinet. I had never seen it before. I would point out that this is not the kind of document one would naturally receive and forget.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYI am afraid I cannot speak as to that, so far as the noble Earl is concerned, but I should like to say that I do not suppose that even he will suggest that the late Prime Minister did not see this document.
§ THE EARL OF BIRKENHEADI should be amazed if the late Prime Minister saw it. I have the best reasons for supposing that he did not see it.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYI am bound, in a way in which the noble Earl is not, and I cannot go further into that point. All I can say is that I am very much astonished that such a document should not have been sent to the leading members of the Government, and I think that probably the noble Earl will find that, if not in his own case, at any rate in the case of his more important colleagues, this was done.
§ THE EARL OF BIRKENHEADNo, I shall not. I have asked already.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYWe can all ask questions. We are not all able to say what the replies were.
§ THE EARL OF BIRKENHEADI wonder what the noble Marquess means by that observation. Let me tell him, if he is making reference to me—
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYI do not call in question the veracity of the noble Earl.
§ THE EARL OF BIRKENHEADhardly imagine you would.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYI certainly would not.
§ THE EARL OF BIRKENHEADAnd I should have sonic observations to make if the noble Marquess did. As to the remark which he made in that very cryptic form, let me make it perfectly plain that I can discover no reference in my papers or notes in relation to this letter. I went to the late Prime Minister and asked him, and he is quite emphatic that he had never seen it before. He further made inquiries among the Secretariat, and all of them were unanimous that the document was shown to none of them.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYI must, of course, accept what the noble Earl has said, but, the noble Earl having read out these letters—though, of course, I have no responsibility for them—I should like to make the personal observation that to read out particular documents by themselves, without describing the further negotiations which are in contemplation, is undoubtedly not a way to convey a thoroughly accurate picture of what took place.
But there is one observation which I think it is necessary to make, and it has nothing to do with confidential documents. I refer to the most significant of all the public utterances which were made in connection with this circumstance of foreign affairs, a certain speech which was made in the House of Commons by the late Prime Minister on August 4 this year. That, of course, is a speech of which there is no question at all. It was a public speech, and, if the noble and learned Earl will refresh his memory by looking at that speech, he will find that both in point of date and in point of substance it is far 347 more important, as indicating the attitude of the late Prime Minister towards the policy which the Greek Government were to pursue, than any other utterance that has been made. Beside that speech I think all these other matters shrink into insignificance.
I should like just to read the typewritten answer which I hold in my hand, which may be taken as the direct reply to the Question which the noble Earl has placed upon the Paper:—
The quotations from M. Gounaris' Note of February 15, reproduced in theSunday Express of December 3, are exact, and the summary of the Secretary of State's reply is substantially correct. Lord Birkenhead, as a member of the late Cabinet, was, no doubt, fully informed of them.—I now know that such was not the case—At the time of this correspondence the Allied Conference on the Eastern Question, originally proposed for the previous December, had been postponed as a result of Cabinet crises in Paris and Rome. It finally met at the end of March, and the result was the Allied proposals which were published at the time. The first of these proposals was an Armistice. This the Greeks accepted, while the Turks demanded Greek evacuation of Anatolia as a preliminary condition of aceptance. Negotiations developed from this demand, but the Allied proposals were never accepted. Finally, the Greeks transferred part of their Army from Anatolia to Thrace, and asked to be allowed to occupy Constantinople. This was refused. At, the end of August the Turkish attack on the remaining Greek forces in Asia Minor was opened.
§ LORD BEAVERBROOKMy Lords, I only intervene for a moment to say that I was consulted, as principal shareholder of theSunday Express, before the publication of the correspondence. I agreed to the publication of the extracts from the letter of M. Gounaris, but I declined to permit the publication of the answer of the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. In declining to consent to 348 that publication I was moved by the fact that he was at the time abroad carrying on difficult negotiations, and I considered I would be making a mistake if I allowed his reply to appear in the columns of the newspaper. That is why I intervened to-day when the noble Earl was about to quote from that letter.
§ LORD LAMINGTONMy Lords, the noble and learned Earl relies entirely upon those two letters that have been published, but he must have known perfectly well for many months what was the position. On more than one occasion I have raised the question, pointing out that the assistance or encouragement given to Greece was a breach of faith towards Turkey, and I ventured to prophesy that persistence in this dangerous and hazardous enterprise would end in disaster to Greece. It seems to me absolutely unnecessary to rely upon those two letters as betokening a lack of candour or failure to supply information to the noble and learned Earl.