Lords Sitting of 7 December 1922

Preamble
The House met at a quarter past four of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
LORD MACLAY.
The Right Hon. Sir Joseph Paton Maclay, Bart., having been created Baron MACLAY of Glasgow in the County of Lanark—Was (in the usual manner) introduced.

RELATIONS WITH GREECE.
THE DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH: My Lords, I desire to ask His -Majesty's. Government whether they are in a position to explain the circumstances in which His Majesty's Minister has been withdrawn from Athens, and in doing so I will add only a very few sentences. The only statement of policy that we have had with regard to the withdrawal of our Minister from Athens is a statement which fell from the lips of the Prime Minister the other day. In the House of Commons, in reply to a Question addressed to him, the Prime Minister said that it was contrary to the practice of civilised countries to execute Ministers who had failed in their policy. I take it, therefore, from His Majesty's Government, that the attitude of this country towards Greece was more that of a gesture of horror on the part of a civilised country at the events which had taken place, and that it was not a protest in regard to any specific British interest. If this should be the case it would appear that we acted alone, and that in acting alone our position was somewhat weakened.
What are the facts of the case? They are these. Our own Minister has been removed from Athens; so far as we can judge from the public Press, the Minister for Italy is at Athens but has been instructed by his Government to break off diplomatic relations with the Government of Greece; while the representatives of the United States and France are at Athens, and only the other day they visited the Foreign Minister of Greece to make their protest to him against the events which lave lately taken place. If these facts be true, it would seem that the policy of His Majesty's Government was in one direction, that of
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the representatives of France and of the United States was in an almost diametrically opposite direction, and that of the Italian Government was of an intermediate character. If that is so, and as far as we can judge that is the situation, no doubt His Majesty's Government have very excellent reasons for the action they have taken, and I am sure we may look forward to hearing those reasons from the lips of the noble Marquess.
We should bear in mind that grave criticisms wore made against the representatives of the late Government for pursuing a precisely similar line of action, and that when time Turks advanced on Gallipoli, and threatened to march into Europe, and His Majesty's Government announced their intention of resisting them, at once criticisms were made that it was vital for His Majesty's Government to got the co-operation of both France and Italy. Yet on the first occasion of a change of Government we perceive that His Majesty's Ministers adopt an attitude which suggests that this spirit of independence still survives. And I ask the noble Marquess this Question: If this spirit of independence still survives, is it due to the fact that we tried to get co-operation from the Government of France and the Government of Italy, and failed; or is it that we felt our-selves entitled to act alone? Independence of action brings with it its consequences, and the consequence is that at this present moment the Diplomatic Corps at Athens is complete except for the presence of the representative of Great Britain. Sooner or later he will have to return. And I ask the noble Marquess, on what terms will he return? What are the terms which His Majesty's Government will insist on the Greek Government carrying out before its representative is permitted to return to Athens and resume diplomatic relations?
THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY): My Lords, the noble Duke has amplified his Question by not very many, but a few, observations. Let me say in the first place, in reply to those supplementary observations, that there was no difference so far as I am aware in the opinions entertained by the Western European Powers as to the disapprobation of the Greek Revolutionary Government in the circumstances Which are now the, subject or inquiry. There was a general opinion, I think, throughout

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the whole of the West of Europe as to the feeling that we ought to entertain on such a subject, though it is perfectly true that the method by which that feeling was displayed differed in degree.
I do not see any analogy between the action of the British Government in Athens and the action, a few months ago, of the British Government in respect of the Turks at the Dardanelles. That latter matter was a very important warlike operation which might have led to very serious consequences, and certainly criticisms were made against His Majesty's late Government that they had not secured the co-operation of France before they entered upon that policy. But I do not think any parallel could be drawn between that very grave matter and this matter, which, however we may reprobate it, is of very minor importance.
In answer to the Question on the Paper, I have to say that the Ministers were tried and condemned by an extraordinary Court-Martial which was set up by a Decree of the Revolutionary Committee dated October 25. Repeated efforts were made by Mr. Lindley, His Majesty's Minister in Athens, to procure a trial before a Civil Court, and subsequently to prevent the carrying out of the death penalty. These efforts were made upon the general ground that it is contrary to the practice of civilised Governments to put to death outgoing Ministers by revolutionary action and upon the special ground that for historical reasons Great Britain stands in a special position of influence in Greece. We felt it, therefore, to be our duty, if our remonstrance was ignored, to show in some manner that could not be misunderstood how strong would be the disapproval of His Majesty's Government, and to withdraw His Majesty's Minister. In the event, our remonstrance was ignored, and the Minister was withdrawn accordingly. I do not doubt that in consequence the strong opinion of His Majesty's Government has been duly realised in Athens.
THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD: My Lords, I do not rise exactly to criticise the course of conduct which in difficult circumstances the Government pursued, but the result has certainly been extremely unfortunate. Still less do I intend to criticise in any way the action taken by the Greek Revolutionary Committee, not because my sentiments on the matter are
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in the least likely to be divergent from those of the noble Marquess and his Government,—because, after all, it is not a matter which primarily is advantageous when decisions have been taken and action has been followed, and when we have no principal responsibility in the matter, to reflect at all upon subjects which are not very obviously our concern—but the withdrawal of a Minister is always, of course, a very inconvenient process, and it would, I think, have been very much better if we had been guided in this matter by the advice which the Government so frequently gave to us when they were in opposition and we were in power, that they should secure common action among all the Allies.
There were several lacuncœ in the interesting statement made by the noble Marquess. He did not for instance inform us whether our Minister at Athens associated himself with the representatives of the United States of America, France and Italy at the time when he made the remonstrances which preceded the execution. It is, I suppose, evident that remonstrances and warnings proceeding from the representatives of all those Powers would be far more likely to be effective than remonstrances proceeding from the representative of this country alone. And if that were not done, it was on the whole, I think your Lordships will agree, a regrettable omission.
But what certainly is clear is this, that in withdrawing the Minister we, and we alone, have apparently felt ourselves called upon to take this step. Here I must confess I feel grave doubt as to the wisdom of the course that has been pursued. In the first place, we do not, I suppose, wish to make seriously the claim that we are a more moral nation than the French, and the Italians, and the Americans, or that we are a more sensitive nation. We should hardly be bold enough, I think, to put forward the claim that we possess a more sensitive moral character, so that we are more deeply affronted by events which we deplore than the representatives of other countries. And it would appear, therefore, to be plain that we have felt it necessary to mark our feeling in this matter in a manner which has not recommended itself to any one of our Allies.
The Government will, I venture to predict, discover that it is a very easy thing I to say: "Let us maintain complete

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accord and harmony with our Allies; let us always act with our Allies." The noble Marquess spoke a moment ago of the failure of the late Government on more than one occasion to march side by side with France iii all these post-war difficulties. I think, perhaps, that the Government will discover, and will discover at an early date, that to utter these pious admonitions of harmony, and to adhere to them in practice in all the ramifications of foreign policy at this moment, are very different things. You can march in harmony very easily with all your Allies if on every point of sincere and conscientious difference of opinion yon surrender your own point of view. There is no difficulty in that. But the difficulties of the Govermnent will arise, when, being unwilling, as they will be unwilling, to surrender their own point of view, they discover that there are divergences of opinion which are Sometimes fundamental.
The present case is hardly so grave as others that I have in my mind. But the noble Marquess did not answer a point, and one of some importance, that the noble Duke put. The question is this. We have taken away the Minister. I need not point out to your Lordships how intimate and how Various are the commercial interests that we have in Athens, and in Greece generally—certainly of the very-highest importance as far as a small country is concerned. It is the ditty of the Minister to give assistance of that kind to English national and citizens who find themselves in Greece for commercial and other purposes. Is it a wise thing to place this community, and at this moment of all others when trade in every part of Europe is showing some slight flicker of revival and when every degree of fostering protection that can be given should be given—is it a wise thing to put our citizens in Athens at an obvious and even admitted disadvantage as compared with the citizens of the United States of America, who are not less anxious than we are to add to their trade, and as compared with the citizens of France and the citizens of Italy.
If we are told, as we may be told, that although the Minister has left some representative is still in Athens able to give attention to these matters, two criticisms suggest themselves upon that point. First, that it is quite obvious that the Minister would be the man at once more responsible
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and more capable for the purposes of safeguarding English interests than one who, up to quite recently was a subordinate acting under the direction of the Minister and carrying out his policy. The second observation which falls to be made upon that point is that the dramatic force of the gesture—the removal of the British Minister—is very greatly diminished if at the same time we say to anybody who points out the grave consequences of that removal: "Oh yes, but we have left all the rest, there; it is only the Minister who has gone." I do not see where the moral gesture conies in if you say: "We remove A, but B, C and D are still there."Unoaculso, non deficit alter.
One other difficulty presents itself in this matter. How long is this gesture of moral indignation to be maintained? Is it for a week; is it for a month; is it for six months? It is always very difficult to take a decision of this kind. It is like a man who receives some affront from another man and decides to cut him. It is very easy to cut a man once; but if you happen to he thrown into association with him in business so that you have to meet him every day it is extremely inconvenient, indeed impossible, to go on cutting him. Then the awkward question presents itself: At what moment am I to cease cutting him, and once more grant him the compliment of recognition?
When you remove a Minister, you find yourself in the same difficulty as we did when, in our horror at the murder of Queen Draga and others in Serbia, we withdrew our Minister from Serbia. At that time we acted in concert, if I am not mistaken, with all the representatives of the civilized Powers. Therefore, without any particular loss of dignity we were able to take that step and to restore diplomatic relations once more. But our Minister was withdrawn with every circumstance of publicity from Athens when it was thought necessary to adopt the same course. But we shall have to make up our minds very soon, I imagine, either to send back that Minister or another, and then the question will, undoubtedly, present itself: Was it worth while for the sake of maintaining this isolated attitude of extreme indignation for the space of three, or four, or five weeks to have made ourselves responsible for the dislocation? I ask time noble Marquess—
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I have no doubt whatever that it has already done a great deal of good.
THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD: I do not know; that may be. I am not disposed to be dogmatic upon the matter; it seems to me to be very difficult indeed to be sure, or to speak dogmatically, upon such a point. But that does not affect the point I was discussing at the moment, and that was whether the noble Marquess could give us any indication at all as to bow long this interruption of our representation at Athens is to last.
I would only add that it seems to me t hat there may be an explanation, though not an altogether adequate one, of the course adopted by the Government. It occurred to me when I was trying to discover some adequate explanation of it, that in the hope of saving the lives of these men before the decision was irrevocably taken that their lives would not be spared, it may have occurred to His Majesty's Government that the threat of removing our Minister might have been, as it might have been, a decision which made for mercy; that they made the threat in that expectation which, unfortunately, the event falsified and then found themselves compelled to carry out the threat which they had previously made in those circumstances. However that may be, if the noble Marquess is in a position—he may easily not be, and of that I make no complaint—to tell your Lordships how long this interruption is going to last, I shall be very grateful to him.
LORD NEWTON: My Lords, as one who, in former years, passed some time in the diplomatic service, I confess that I feel somewhat surprised at the action taken by the two noble Lords opposite. As I understand it, they have both found fault with His Majesty's Government for not having consulted with their Allies upon this particular point. I presume, to put it roughly, that the attitude of the Government is this—that upon all questions of policy they do consult their Allies as much as they can, including not only France and Italy but other Allies. But this is not a question of policy at all. This, as I understand it, is a question of humanity anal Justice, and I altogether dissent from the views expressed by the noble Earl and by the noble Duke that, on questions of this kind, we are to consult with every one of
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our Allies as to whether their particular point of view agrees with ours.
I do not know whether the noble and learned Earl would condescend to accept me as a reputable witness, but I have some acquaintance with these Balkan countries and I am perfectly certain that the noble Marquess is correct in saying that our action has produced an excellent effect. This is not the first occasion of the sort. We suspended diplomatic relations for a long period with Mexico—I forget how long it lasted—in consequence of the action of the Mexican Government. Later on, as the noble and learned Earl reminded us, we suspended diplomatic relations with Serbia. I forget whether we withdrew only our Minister or the whole Mission, but we suspended diplomatic relations with that nation. If I am not mistaken, we did that without consulting our Allies at all. I do not wish to be egotistical—
THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD: We had not any Allies then.
LORD NEWTON: We were on just as good terms with the people as we are now.
THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD: But we had no Allies then.
LORD NEWTON: As a matter of fact, in a case of that kind you do not consult your Allies at all. You consult your colleagues and ask them what they are going to do. In the particular case of Serbia my recollection is that nobody was consulted, but that we withdrew our Minister upon our own initiative. Those are cases which have occurred and I can conceive of other cases where it might very well occur.
A short time ago I was in Sofia, and there I found in gaol, as it might be in Marlborough Street Police Station, former Prime Ministers corresponding, say, to Lord Rosebery, Lord Landsowne, Mr. Asquith and even the noble and learned Earl opposite, all in gaol and for no particular cause alleged against them. I visited these unfortunate statesmen and they assured me that no definite charge had been brought against them at all. Anyhow, these Ministers were arrested on different grounds. It was said that some of them were too warlike, and others had not made peace quickly enough. Anyhow, they were all locked up, and a short time

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ago a Referendum was taken on the subject of their trial. And I have very little doubt, from such knowledge as I have of those countries, that before long they will be condemned to death. If they are condemned to death, I sincerely hope that His Majesty's Government will repeat the action they have taken in the case of these Greek people, and that in the case of these men who, as in the case of the Greeks, are politicians and statesmen with whom we have had official relations, they will do their best, if necessary, to save their lives.
This question of whether you are to suspend diplomatic relations or not seems to me to be one which depends entirely upon circumstances. Anybody might reasonably contend that if we suspend our diplomatic relations with Greece it is rather absurd that we should not have suspended diplomatic relations with the Turks when they massacred occasionally thousands and thousands of Armenians and other Christians. So far as I recollect, there never was any question of suspending relations at all. I will not profess to analyse the motives, but I will conclude by venturing to express the opinion that each case must be judged upon its merits and that you cannot lay down any fixed rule upon the subject. So far as I am concerned, I believe the action which has been taken by His Majesty's Government will be emphatically approved by everyone who has any knowledge of the circumstances.

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND M. GOUNARIS.
THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD had given Notice to ask His Majesty's Government whether the correspondence published in the last issue of the Sunday Express and purporting to be between M. Gounaris and the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston is authentic; and to move for Papers.
The noble Earl said: My Lords, I rise to ask the Government a Question which I have put on the Paper as to whether or not the correspondence purporting to have taken place between the noble Marquess who leads the House, Lord Curzon, and M. Gounaris, which was published the Sunday Express of last Sunday, is an authentic correspondence or not. I assume it to be so—not that I have to my knowledge, in spite of my being at the time a
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member of the Government, ever seen any of the letters before—because it would appear to be evident that no paper of responsibility, as the Sunday Express undoubtedly is, would have published such correspondence if it had not satisfied itself fully of the fact that the letters were authentic. I think it, would be convenient—it is a matter of the highest possible importance, and I will reserve any comments I desire to make upon them till then—if I read the letters to your Lordships because it may be that some of you have not, up to the present, been aware of their contents.
The first letter was written from the Greek Legation on February 15, 1922, to Lord Curzon, and was signed by M. Gounaris. It is as follows:—
"My Lord Marquess,
"On October 27, 1921, your Lordship was pleased to communicate to M. Baltazzi and myself the views of the British Government in regard to the situation in the Near East. From the consideration of the situation ill this region in connection with the general political situation, your Lordship drew the conclusion that the speedy establishment of peace was in the common interest of all parties. With a view to securing such a peace your Lordship urged us to place ourselves in the hands of three Allied Powers, whose joint mediation the British Government would try to obtain. Bearing in mind the sympathy and interest felt by the British Government for Greece, and once more manifested by your Lordship on the occasion of this interview, we decided, after careful deliberation and after consultation with our colleagues in Athens, that it was in the interest of Greece to adhere to your Lordship's proposal. Various circumstances which your Lordship is more competent to appreciate than myself have hitherto deferred a solution of the problem and more than three months have elapsed without it having proved possible to establish peace in spite of the sincere efforts of your Lordship to that end.
"During this interval the Greek Government did not lose sight of the fact that the surest foundation for the negotiation of peace with Turkey in the common interest of the Allies who jointly conducted the war against that Power and will jointly conclude the peace, consisted in the maintenance of the military status quo in Anatolia. To this end the Greek Government has strained its energies to the utmost to keep the Greek Array in its present position. The British Government will readily understand the serious difficulties which the Greek Government had to face in this connection. The Greek Army has remained more or less constantly mobilised for the past nine years, Further, the strong patriotic feeling of the soldiers and the consciousness of their mission to liberate their brethren under the Turkish yoke and reunite them to the fatherland—these feelings. which have served to neutralise their natural war-weariness, have been adversely affected by the growing probability that the coming peace will not fully secure the realisation of the omission of which they are conscious.
"The steady depletion of the financial resources of the country, moreover, unavoidably involved increasing difficulty in supplying the needs of the Army and correspondingly increasing hardships for the troops in Asia Minor. In spite of these difficulties it has hitherto proved possible for Greece to meet the situation. Her exertions to this end have, however, created a state of things to which I feel it my duty to draw your Lordship's attention in the hope that the interest which we know the British Government to feel in the matter will impel them to accord it their careful consideration with a view to facilitating the discovery of means to meet the present difficulties which must needs prove insuperable for Greece, if she be left to her own resources.
"2. In particular I wish to bring to your Lordship's knowledge that the financial resources of the Greek Government are completely exhausted. In anticipation of this inevitable development I repeatedly approached the British Government with a view to their granting facilities for the cent lesion of a loan in the British market. Consequent on this, an Agreement was signed on December 22, 1921, between the Chancellor of the Exchequer and myself whereby the British Government signified its consent to the conclusion of a loan not exceeding £15,000,000, and to the granting of security for such loan. In spite of this action of the British Government it has not yet proved possible to conclude the loan. Meanwhile, information from Athens represented the situation of the Treasury as growing steadily worse, and the latest telegrams state that the Government is completely unable to meet the expenditure on the upkeep of the Army for the first half of February (O.S.) in spite of the fact that in the meanwhile disbursements of public; money on any other object have practically ceased.
"3. Over and above this complete financial impasse, it should he recalled that the campaigning season in Asia Minor is approaching. Little inure than a month separates us from the date on which operations were resumed last year. Meanwhile, the enemy has been reinforced in men and supplies.
"Under these circumstances the Greek Command in Asia Minor state that they cannot undertake to give an assurance of their ability to cope with the contingency of a Turkish offensive unless they receive (1), reinforcements sufficient to raise the units under them to full strength and thus neutralise the present Turkish superiority in number; (2) supplies of fresh war material (especially aeroplanes, machine guns, and motor lorries), these being indispensable if the mobility of the Army is not to be affected; and (3), financial assistance as the present financial position of the Army is desperate.
"Unless these conditions are fulfilled the Command consider that the impending Turkish offensive will expose the Army to very serious dangers and urgently request that the above measures be instantly taken or, should they prove to be impracticable, that an order be instantly given to avoid the dangers foreseen through a withdrawal, while it is yet time to take the initiative of a withdrawal before being forced to it by the development of the situation. They consider further that such a withdrawal must necessarily amount to it complete evacuation of Asia Minor, since no line mere to the west would afford, in
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the event of withdrawal from the fortified line now held, stronger defensive positions which would enable the Army to hold out without strengthening it by the measures above indicated.
"Finally, the Command of the Asia Minor Army add that should the enemy receive yet further reinforcements it would become necessary similarly to reinforce our own Army by calling up fresh classes to the Colours, so as to neutralise the accession of strength to the enemy.
"With regard to the above the Greek Government is indeed in a position to meet the call for more troops in both of the cases contemplated. Clearly, however, the Greek Government is not in a position to furnish the Asia Minor Army with the financial assistance of which it is in such need, or to supply the necessary war material, least of all in the event of the calling up of fresh classes, when considerable additional armament will be indispensable."
There follows some other matter which is not of the same importance, and which, as it is somewhat lengthy, I do not find it necessary to read, but I have read enough to make it plain that here was a document of the very first State importance. It was a document in which the Greek Government, through its representative, the late M. Gounaris, put before the Foreign Secretary these propositions—" We cannot maintain ourselves in Asia Minor unless we are given financial aid. We cannot maintain ourselves in Asia Minor unless we are given machine guns, ammunition, and military equipment generally," and he adds: "If you are not able to give us this assistance let us know in time in order that we may withdraw. At this moment there is still time to withdraw; in a month or two there will be no time to withdraw."
I was taking at that time, as many of my Cabinet colleagues were, a deep interest in the position of Greece in Asia Minor, feeling profound anxiety as to the safety of her troops and the consequences of defeat at the hands of the Turkish Army, and I am confident that I never saw that letter. I am confident that tins most grave matter was not circulated to me. Perhaps the noble Viscount, Lord Peel, who was a colleague of mine, and a Cabinet Minister, will be able to tell me whether my recollection is correct on that point so far as he is concerned.
VISCOUNT PEEL: I was not a Cabinet Minister then.
THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD: I am much obliged. My noble friend Lord Lee of Fareham tells me that he never saw it.

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I know that had that document been circulated the first thing I should have done would have been to have asked for a Cabinet meeting in order that the most grave question of our responsibility to the Greeks might be discussed, and that we might acquit ourselves of it. Had I seen that letter I should have said to the Greeks, as far as it fell to me to address a message to them: "If you cannot maintain yourselves there we cannot give you financial assistance. We cannot give you military equipment; and if this is really your position, clear out at once; withdraw at once. "Think of the misfortunes and horrors that would have been avoided had such advice been given. We had not the opportunity, because I never saw the letter, nor did, so far as I know, any one of my colleagues.
How is that letter answered, according to the Sunday Express? I say plainly that I should not have made this document public myself—I should not have taken such a responsibility—but time Sunday Express has thought it proper to do so, and that is their business not mine. As they have been made public they require discussion and explanation. This is the answer given by the noble Marquess, Lord Curzon.
LORD REAVERBROOK: The answer was not published in the Sunday Express.
THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD: I am obliged for the correction. As the letter to which it is an answer was published your Lordships will consider—
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Will the noble and learned Earl tell us where he has obtained a copy of the letter he is going to read?
THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD: I would rather not tell the noble Marquess unless he wishes to dispute its authenticity. If he does not know whether it is authentic or not, I will postpone the Question until he has had an opportunity of satisfying himself.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I am not disputing its authenticity. If the noble and learned Earl takes the responsibility of publishing a confidential document, that is his concern.
THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD: It is not a question of publishing documents.
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The document to which this is an answer has been published in the Press. A reply was sent by Lord Curzon. If the noble Marquess, in the absence of Lord Curzon—and it is a formidable circumstance—does not feel that he is able to deal with the matter, or has not the knowledge as to whether this letter was actually sent by Lord Curzon, an elementary sense of fairness would lead me to postpone further discussion of the Question until Lord Curzon is here himself. There are certainly advantages in that course.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: The noble and learned Earl having read one document now asks me to take the responsibility of stopping him from reading another. I should have thought that the reflection would have occurred to the noble and learned Earl as to the absence of Lord Curzon before he entered upon the debate. He seems to have realised it rather late in the day and I shall not take any responsibility in guiding him.
THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD: The noble Marquess is entirely in error in supposing that I have realised my responsibilities rather late in the day; still more is he in error if he imagines that I shall not most fully discuss this matter, as it will be discussed elsewhere, when the noble Marquess, Lord Curzon, returns to this country. Indeed, I shall be glad to hear what the noble Marquess has to say. But does the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, really suppose that while the discussions at Lausanne continue—they may and probably will continue for weeks—documents like this can be published in the public Press and no notice taken of them in Parliament?
I accept the responsibility of quoting this answer at once. The letter to which this is an answer has appeared in the public Press, and as the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, will express no opinion of the other, of course, I take full responsibility for reading the answer to it sent by Lord Curzon. It is dated March 6, 1922:—
"Your Excellency,
"I have considered with the utmost care the Note which you addressed to me on the 15th ultimo and desire to express my appreciation of the perfect candour with which you have expounded to me a situation that is indubitably fraught with the gravest anxiety to the Greek Government and nation. I can only express a hope that, the military position in Anatolia is less immediately critical than your Note would lead

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me to think, and that the remarkable patriotism and discipline of the Hellenic Armies, of which so many illustrations have been furnished in the campaigns of the last few years, will not fail them in any emergency that may conceivably arise.
"2 As regards the financial position, your Excellency has yourself detailed the inception of the negotiations by which it is hoped by your Government to raise a substantial loan in the London market. His Majesty's Government have, as you know, endeavoured, within the limits of their publicly declared neutrality and of the engagements entered into with their Allies, to lighten the difficulties by which these negotiations were attended and if, as I am informed, they have failed to produce the desired result, this would appear to have been due in the main to obstacles connected with the commercial, rather than with the political, aspects of the proposed transaction.
"3. In these circumstances, the wisest course is unquestionably to expedite the diplomatic solution of the anxious position ill which all are placed. I deeply regret that owing to circumstances over which His Majesty's Government have bad no control the proposed meeting of the Allied Ministers in Paris has been so long delayed. An Italian Ministry having, however, now been formed, I have hastened to propose that the Conference should meet in Paris on March 13—a date which at the moment of writing seems likely to be again postponed for a few days to meet the convenience of the new Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs. I have little doubt that the best subject that will conic under examination there will be the Anatolian question; and I earnestly hope that a solution may be found which will be acceptable to both parties and may relieve you of the more serious apprehensions by which you are assailed.
" 4. Your Government has already placed itself, in accordance with the advice which I ventured to tender to you last autumn, in the hands of the Allies, and I doubt not therefore that in a similar spirit of confidence and good faith, you will be prepared to listen to such counsels as may be offered to you from Paris with regard to the immediately existing situation."
What follows? The Greeks say: "We are ruined and lost if we maintain ourselves in Anatolia without military equipment and without financial support. If you are unable to give us either of these we beg of you to give us warning in sufficient time in order that by withdrawing we may save ourselves." What did Lord Curzon reply? He said:—
"I can only express a hope that the military position in Anatolia is less immediately critical than your Note would lead me to think, and that the remarkable patriotism and discipline of the Hellenic Armies, of which so many illustrations have been furnished in the campaigns of the last few years, will not fail them in any emergency that may conceivably arise."
The advice might then have been given to the Greeks 10 go, while there was still time for withdrawal. The advice might have been given to theta to stay. What was said
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by the noble Marquess was that he had confidence that the historic martial qualities of the Greek Army would suffice to meet the needs of the next few weeks and of the campaign that was so soon to follow.
If that advice did not mean: "Stay, at least for the present," I do not understand the meaning of words, whether they be employed in diplomacy or for any other purpose, and I most deeply deplore that we in the Cabinet were not allowed an opportunity of examining this letter for ourselves, of giving our opinions upon it, and of seeing whether there might not have been evolved from Cabinet discussions, with the collective gravity of responsibility, an advice which might have prevented these ghastly tragedies, an advice which aright have saved the lives of these Ministers, and not have rendered necessary the tragic development which has been met by this sublime gesture of the temporary withdrawal of a Minister.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I think I gathered from the attitude of noble Lords when I interrupted the noble and learned Earl just now that they shared with me the surprise I felt that the noble Earl had undertaken to ask this Question and make this Motion in the absence of my noble friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The object of the noble Earl was very evident. He wishes to attack the foreign policy of my noble friend, and he took the opportunity when my noble friend was serving his country, at great personal inconvenience, and, I hope, with success, in Lausanne. He allowed himself to be betrayed into attacking my noble friend when he was away.
The situation is certainly very remarkable; indeed, almost comical. I have no responsibility for the policy which was pursued in the early part of this year, and most of my noble friends sitting on this Bench had no responsibility. But the noble and learned Earl was responsible. He was a member of the Government, and this is not, the first occasion when we have heard him at that box trying to evade responsibility for the actions of the Government to which he belonged—not a very elegant posture, may I venture to tell the noble Earl? He says he was not aware of the particular documents in question. I have not the same privilege of a complete

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absence of discretion in which the noble Earl himself seems to rejoice.
THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD: You have had it for a good many years.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I do not think so. I do not remember ever having made a speech of the kind to which we have just listened in your Lordships' House. I cannot, of course, go into full details, but I have no reason whatever to doubt that both these documents were circulated to members of the late Government, as were other documents of the kind. Of course, I accept it from the noble Earl when he says that he did not read the document.
THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD: The noble Marquess must not be allowed to put that construction on what I said. I said that I was quite confident that no such document was ever sent to me. I am confident that it was never circulated, and I am confirmed in that opinion by my noble friend, Lord Lee of Fareham, who sits here beside me, and who was at that time a member of the Cabinet. I had never seen it before. I would point out that this is not the kind of document one would naturally receive and forget.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I am afraid I cannot speak as to that, so far as the noble Earl is concerned, but I should like to say that I do not suppose that even he will suggest that the late Prime Minister did not see this document.
THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD: I should be amazed if the late Prime Minister saw it. I have the best reasons for supposing that he did not see it.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I am bound, in a way in which the noble Earl is not, and I cannot go further into that point. All I can say is that I am very much astonished that such a document should not have been sent to the leading members of the Government, and I think that probably the noble Earl will find that, if not in his own case, at any rate in the case of his more important colleagues, this was done.
THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD: No, I shall not. I have asked already.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: We can all ask questions. We are not all able to say what the replies were.
THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD: I wonder what the noble Marquess means by that observation. Let me tell him, if he is making reference to me—
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I do not call in question the veracity of the noble Earl.
THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD: hardly imagine you would.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I certainly would not.
THE EARL OF BIRKENHEAD: And I should have sonic observations to make if the noble Marquess did. As to the remark which he made in that very cryptic form, let me make it perfectly plain that I can discover no reference in my papers or notes in relation to this letter. I went to the late Prime Minister and asked him, and he is quite emphatic that he had never seen it before. He further made inquiries among the Secretariat, and all of them were unanimous that the document was shown to none of them.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I must, of course, accept what the noble Earl has said, but, the noble Earl having read out these letters—though, of course, I have no responsibility for them—I should like to make the personal observation that to read out particular documents by themselves, without describing the further negotiations which are in contemplation, is undoubtedly not a way to convey a thoroughly accurate picture of what took place.
But there is one observation which I think it is necessary to make, and it has nothing to do with confidential documents. I refer to the most significant of all the public utterances which were made in connection with this circumstance of foreign affairs, a certain speech which was made in the House of Commons by the late Prime Minister on August 4 this year. That, of course, is a speech of which there is no question at all. It was a public speech, and, if the noble and learned Earl will refresh his memory by looking at that speech, he will find that both in point of date and in point of substance it is far

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more important, as indicating the attitude of the late Prime Minister towards the policy which the Greek Government were to pursue, than any other utterance that has been made. Beside that speech I think all these other matters shrink into insignificance.
I should like just to read the typewritten answer which I hold in my hand, which may be taken as the direct reply to the Question which the noble Earl has placed upon the Paper:—
"The quotations from M. Gounaris' Note of February 15, reproduced in the Sunday Express of December 3, are exact, and the summary of the Secretary of State's reply is substantially correct. Lord Birkenhead, as a member of the late Cabinet, was, no doubt, fully informed of them.—"
I now know that such was not the case—
"At the time of this correspondence the Allied Conference on the Eastern Question, originally proposed for the previous December, had been postponed as a result of Cabinet crises in Paris and Rome. It finally met at the end of March, and the result was the Allied proposals which were published at the time. The first of these proposals was an Armistice. This the Greeks accepted, while the Turks demanded Greek evacuation of Anatolia as a preliminary condition of aceptance. Negotiations developed from this demand, but the Allied proposals were never accepted. Finally, the Greeks transferred part of their Army from Anatolia to Thrace, and asked to be allowed to occupy Constantinople. This was refused. At, the end of August the Turkish attack on the remaining Greek forces in Asia Minor was opened."
LORD BEAVERBROOK: My Lords, I only intervene for a moment to say that I was consulted, as principal shareholder of the Sunday Express, before the publication of the correspondence. I agreed to the publication of the extracts from the letter of M. Gounaris, but I declined to permit the publication of the answer of the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. In declining to consent to
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that publication I was moved by the fact that he was at the time abroad carrying on difficult negotiations, and I considered I would be making a mistake if I allowed his reply to appear in the columns of the newspaper. That is why I intervened to-day when the noble Earl was about to quote from that letter.
LORD LAMINGTON: My Lords, the noble and learned Earl relies entirely upon those two letters that have been published, but he must have known perfectly well for many months what was the position. On more than one occasion I have raised the question, pointing out that the assistance or encouragement given to Greece was a breach of faith towards Turkey, and I ventured to prophesy that persistence in this dangerous and hazardous enterprise would end in disaster to Greece. It seems to me absolutely unnecessary to rely upon those two letters as betokening a lack of candour or failure to supply information to the noble and learned Earl.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I apologise to your Lordships. I find there will be a formal stage of a Bill to be got through on Monday, and therefore I beg to move that the House do adjourn till Monday.
Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.
[From Minutes of December 6.]
The Lord Ebury—Sat first in Parliament after the death of his brother.

HOUSE OF LORDS OFFICES.
First Report from the Select Committee made, to be printed, and to be considered on Tuesday next.
House adjourned at twenty five minutes past five o'clock until Monday next, a quarter past four o'clock.