DEFENCE OF NORTH-WEST FRONTIER.

HL Deb 31 May 1921 vol 45 cc381-405

LORD MONTAGU OF BEAULIEU

My Lords, I beg to move that leave be given to advance to this day the Notice (relating to "the measures taken for the defence of the North-West frontier of India) which now stands for Wednesday the 8th of June next.

THE EARL OF CRAWFORD

The Government has no objection to the Motion.

Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.

LORD MONTAGU OF BEAULIEU

My Lords, I rise now to ask His Majesty's Government what steps, military and civil, any being taken to provide for the efficient defence of the North-West frontier of India; and to move for Papers. In doing so I would like to thank your Lordships for allowing me to advance the Question to this afternoon, in order to meet the convenience of the noble Earl who represents the Government of India in this House. I need not apologise for raising the question of the North-West frontier of India. It has always been an important part of the Empire, and has increased in importance during late years owing to the fact that we have now to consider not only the question of the tribes on the frontier and a friendly or unfriendly Afghanistan, but the danger which may arise from a new kind of Russia beyond the North-West frontier more difficult to deal with than the Russia of the past.

The North-West frontier of India is the only military frontier in the whole of the Empire. It. is over a thousand miles long from Gwadar to Chitral, and represents over 1,500 miles of actual frontier. We have to face to-day not only the armed forces of Afghanistan, a more or less organised State, but something like 300,000 or 100,000 aimed tribesmen who live in the district around the frontier, and that fact alone would justify me in bringing forward the Question. These tribesmen in the past—I am speaking now of ten or twenty years ago—were only partially armed. They are now armed with modern rifles and have become a much more formidable force. They have been able to get their rifles not only from imported sources, but by theft from us, by overpowering our small guards. In addition, one rifle factory, if not two factories, may be found almost within the borders of the frontier. These rifles are not of first-class manufacture, but they can kill if held straight.

To face this always present danger we have two divisions, the 1st at Peshawar and the 4th at Quetta, and three frontier brigades at Kohat, Baum, and Dik. If we put the total of that force at 50,000 men we are not over-estimating it. Owing to the nature of the country and the fact that communication is very difficult, the force is not very easily moved about. There is a great lack of lateral communication on the frontier, and it is wonderful that so small a force has been able to hold this long line of frontier without a serious reverse. We have had outposts overpowered here and there, but, on the whole, the line has been held exceedingly well. One reason why we have never suffered very seriously is that the tribes have not combined. If there had been any Combination with Afghanistan the position would have been ',Try serious indeed. Though we have been engaged in. a. series of wars with the Mahsuds in the south and the Waziris in the centre, luckily we have never been engaged with both at the same time, and that fact has enabled us to move forces to the districts attacked with comparative ease.

We have now to meet a situation in which, from religious or political motives, agitators may go among the tribes and stir them up to a united attack. In asking the House to consider this matter I am bringing it forward in order to elicit from the Government whether, with the concurrence of the Government of India, they have in contemplation any change with regard to the frontier, or whether they think the present state of affairs, if not satisfactory, is inevitable. There has been no real peace on the North-West frontier of India for many years. During the last three or four Years the raids have grown into a continuous imams series of small wars, with the result that the casualties have been comparatively heavy. The Secretary of State published a Paper giving the details of some of these casualties, and it appears that in two years ending in February last no fewer than 5,169 officers and men have been killed or have died of wounds or disease, 3,474 wounded and 829 missing—a total of 9,172. A proportion of these casualties occurred during the Afghan War, and they cannot, therefore, all be put down to the tribal warfare which has continued; but many of them have been suffered since the Afghan War.

Another serious disadvantage with which we have to contend is the lack of good water, with the diseases arising from bad water. When I was there in 1917 and in 1919 I had an opportunity on more than one occasion of coming into contact with those responsible for medical administration, and I found that 62 per cent. of the casualties from disease came from water borne, or what may be called preventable, causes. Perhaps the noble Earl will be able to tell us whether the system of motor lorry filters, which I advocate very strongly, is being continued and whether it is being extended. Though our sense of proportion has been somewhat altered by the casualties of the great war, and though we have been rather accustomed to regard war as a normal state of things, vet we must remember that these casualties are greater than any that have occurred in previous years over this area. The North-West frontier for about two hundred miles is in a constant state of ferment, and I see no reason to anticipate that we can do anything but keep stronger forces there in order to meet the attacks made upon us.

This entails a certain expenditure upon the Government of India, who are by no means anxious to spend money in these days, as their revenue is not elastic while the expenditure is constantly increasing. I desire to suggest a policy to the Government which may save lives and also a large expenditure of money in the future. Let us consider for a moment our strategical position. It is an extraordinarily bad one. We are in possession of, or at any rate have to protect, various valleys which run up into the hinterland beyond our own country. These valleys constitute four dangerous salients running into the enemy's country. We have to protect the cultivated ground in the valleys where there is population. The enemy, on the other hand, has nothing to lose, because the troops that attack live upon or behind the frontier hills. The result of this is that we have to maintain isolated garrisons at the end of a long line of road, or road and railway, such as up to Parachinar 120 miles from the base at Kohat. We have to maintain these garrisons without any proper lateral communication, which involves going down a great many miles to the main communication road in order to get supplies or to assist the wounded. That is inherently a bad strategical position, and these four salients, which might be reckoned as the Khyber, the Kurram, the Tochi and the Gomal, are very dangerous from a military point of view.

Until quite lately we have not had sufficiently good roads up these valleys, and, as a result, our communications have been faulty. I must, however, pause for a moment to say that both the late Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, and his predecessor, Lord Hardinge, were most anxious to do all in their power during their terms of office to improve existing roads and to build additional roads, and I received the greatest assistance from them when it was my duty to have to do with such matters. But much improved as many of the roads are, we need more roads, especially lateral roads.

Then there are the disadvantages of a very bad climate. Possibly I ant the only member of this House, or at any rate the only member present to-day, who has ever had the misfortune to live in those valleys during a portion of the summer. The temperatures are just as bad as those of Mesopotamia. The day temperature ranges from 110 degrees to 120 degrees, or even 125 degrees in the shade and the nights are particularly hot. I remember nights when the temperature reached 105 degrees or 108 degrees in the shade. That is a climate and those are temperatures which the white man, as a rule, cannot stand, at any rate for ally length of time. There have been sad episodes at one or two frontier stations due to men's nerves breaking down under the strain of the climate and of the kind of warfare, with which I will not weary the House to-day. When I was there, our men had nothing like the same comforts as the troops in Mesopotamia, at Bagdad, or on the Tigris or Euphrates. The time has come when we should give to the troops on this frontier every possible comfort in the way of ice-making machines, electric fans, and, if possible, local hill stations as well. A few more hill stations on the frontier between Cherat and Quetta would be of immense service to the troops.

We have now, I think, reached a stage when the Government of India will before long have to face two alternative policies. Of course, it is possible that we may go on along the lines foreshadowed by Lord Morley in his period of office as Secretary of State for India, a policy of going as little forward as possible, remaining in the Valley of the Indus, or even (at one time) having in contemplation retirement behind the Indus, except for the Peshawar plain. Nowadays that would be a suicidal policy. We must maintain our prestige on the North-West frontier. If it once broke down, and the people of that country thought that we were weakening in any way in our power to govern, it would react on India in a very serious way, and might, indeed, be the beginning of the end so far as large portions of the population were concerned. We might stay where we are and put up with these constant wars. That, I think, is a policy which leads you nowhere.

On the other hand, I think it might be the wiser policy to take over the whole country and the tribes—the Mahsuds, the Waziris and the rest of them—and administrate them as a regular part of India. That would have many advantages. At any rate, you would probably not have to keep more troops than at present, and, in addition, you would be able to get hill stations for your troops during the summer, which would be a most desirable development from every point of view. Those who were loyally disposed and wanted to trade with British India would be able to do so without serious interruption. I feel certain that the present policy combines the two disadvantages of unsound military strategy and thoroughly bad hygienic conditions, and I am sure that before long the Government of India will have to reconsider the whole position.

I come now to another portion of the frontier, upon which I hope the noble Lord who answers this Question for the India Office will be able to give the House some information. Until about seven or eight years ago there was only one road up the Khyber Pass which was fit for the use of motor vehicles. Between 1915 and 1918 we began the construction of a second road which was nearly finished before I left India in 1919. The road was not so perfect as it might have been, but it was most valuable to our troops during the Afghan War. I might even go so far as to say that if it had not been for the second road up the Khyber it would have been almost impossible to maintain beyond that point the troops necessary to overcome the forces of the Afghans. Two years ago I was delighted to find that the Government of India carried out a recommendation which I made that there should be a wire ropeway in the Khyber Pass. This has been completed, and has lately taken over twenty tons of stores a day to the summit. That is a step in the right direction.

Quite recently a trunk railway line has been extended up the Khyber Pass and I hope the noble Lord will be able to give the House, with due consideration of public policy, any details he can as to the construction of that line, how he proposes to protect it, and where the terminus is to be. If it is only to go to the frontier at Lundi Kotal it will not be very much good in case further trouble occurs with Afghanistan. I have heard that some arrangement has been made by which we can extend the line to Dakka. No doubt the noble Lord will tell us whether that is the case. The line will be difficult to make from an engineering point of view and it will also be difficult to protect. It will be subject to sniping, and to a sudden descent of the enemy from the very steep and high hills on either side. It will, therefore, need many efficient and well placed defences to prevent the interruption of the line and to secure the protection of supplies upon which will depend the safety of our troops at the frontier.

Perhaps the noble Lord will also tell us what attitude is adopted by the Afghans towards this line, and what view is taken of this point by our Mission at Kabul. If I know anything of Oriental diplomacy it is that it delights in delay until something happens which turns to the advantage of the Power with whom we are negotiating. Unless that Mission can report definitely that it has been able to achieve something it would be more dignified for us to withdraw it or to intimate to the Government of Afghanistan that it cannot be left there indefinitely. At the present moment it has achieved but little and the danger of leaving it there must be apparent.

As regards other railways on the frontier, I suggest that the time has come when an extension of some of them should be considered. There is a railway which runs from Kohat to Thal. That was originally planned to go on to Parachinar, the nearest place from which British troops could reach Kabul. Parachinar is also suitable for the use of aeroplanes. The head of the line there would be only ninety miles distant from Kabul, and an extension I to Parachinar is very desirable. Then we have a possible extension of the railway from Bannu to Dardoni or Miranshah up the Todd valley. I have seen convoys of camels five miles in length winding up this valley. Constantly they are being attacked and the raiders get off scot-free with a great deal of loot. I suggest that there are only two ways of sending convoys up these valleys. One is by motor lorries accompanied by armoured car, and the other is by train with an armoured locomotive and armoured trucks. Otherwise, we shall go on losing lives and a great deal of property belonging to the Government, owing to the raids of the population who live a few miles away from the road.

The third railway extension which I should be pleased for the Government to consider would be an extension of the line which runs at present to Tank and has been extended a short way to Murtaza. It might be extended to the south by the Zhob Valley to Quetta. I am afraid that these names will not be familiar to all of your Lordships, but it is necessary that I should get them on the Paper so that I may get a reply. Generally speaking, my object is to ask the Government to consider whether an extension of the railways as well as the roads in a westerly direction up these valleys is not advisable and will not result, in the long run, in saving lives and money.

Another railway has been built to the south of Quetta by Nushki to Dusdap on the Persian frontier. This line is, of course, an entirely strategical line. It can never convey any quantity of produce and it runs through the most dreary and dismal country which it is possible to conceive. Is it intended that this line should stop at Dusdap or be continued on to Bandar Abbas or into Persia? The extension of this line seems wasted to a large extent unless you are prepared to keep something like 200 miles of line permanently in order for military contingencies. It seems to me that you must do something with your line and connect it with some terminus or centre of trade whereby you may get sonic return for your money.

Now I come to the question of lateral roads, and here I think I have the sympathy of the General Staff in India. The necessity for lateral roads on the frontier is very great. You have these dangerous salients running into the enemy's country, and you have to go back to the base before getting into the next valley. I suggest that this question of making lateral roads should he seriously considered now. One from Thal to Edak via Spinwan is under con- struction. That road is very important as one which links up the garrisons at Parachinar and Thal with that at Dardoni, and runs through a country which is liable to be constantly disturbed. Those lateral roads are essential from a strategical point of view. It is impossible to relieve these distant garrisons unless you have lateral means of communication.

I suggest to the Government of India that they should seriously consider also the question of the Kohat Pass road, which I should think is unique on any frontier. It is the road between two parts of British India, and passes through a country which at any time may rise against you, and which contains two rifle factories where rifles are being made for the purpose of shooting at our troops. If we consider it wise to allow the rifle factories to go on we should at least make the road through the Pass secure. Otherwise, the relief by the 1st division of any garrison at Kohat would have to be carried out from a long way round by railway. The improvement of the road through the Pass is a question which should be carefully considered by the General Staff in India, and I assume that it has not been done because of financial rather than political reasons. In connection with that road the other road from Khusalgarh to Golra on the Grand Trunk route should be made. It was the subject of my recommendation more than three years ago, and until it is made the garrison at Kohat may at any time be in serious danger.

I have heard it said that with the improved service of railways east of the Indus there is not the same necessity for roads as there was. I do not agree. Roads must be always the prime means of communication. The extension of roads also will make for peace, because the civilising effect of a road everywhere on a frontier, especially in India, is very great. Trade begins to flow down a road, people settle along it, they find that trade pays them better than warfare, and the road exercises very great influence for peace and law and order. Of course, it goes without saying that on the North-West frontier we must use all the modern methods of warfare. We must use aeroplanes. I should like to see the Government of India use airships as well. You can never obseive properly from an aeroplane. I have tried it myself and failed. You must have something that hovers and can remain still. Immediately the tribesmen hear the noise of a propeller they lie clown and look from above like rocks. I have known several hundreds of men hide in the hillside and it has not been possible to see them until you get close to the ground. You need one or two airships.

In addition, you must have armoured cars to protect convoys. I know that the Government of India thoroughly agree with that suggestion. They have recently done a great deal in adding to the motor transport, have now got things on a better basis than they have ever existed in my time, and, I think I may say, have produced almost a revolution in the methods of defence on the North-West frontier, But we want more motor transport on the frontier even now. There are cases in which camels and mules are being used where certainly motor transport should be employed, and I suggest that also to the Government of India. In that connection I might mention the interesting fact that this year is the fiftieth anniversary of the use of motor traction in India. It was in 1871 that Colonel Crompton, who is still alive, used—at the suggestion, I believe, of Lord Mayo, then Viceroy of India—a small kind of traction engine with rubber tyres, and I believe that was the first time that a mechanical vehicle was used in any country in the world to any extent. They took loads up to 20 tons.

We shall have to keep troops to a large extent on the frontier for many years. But I am convinced that if we make more roads, if we extend our railways, and if, above all, we go into these countries, which have been consistently in a state of unrest for a long titite—places like the country of the Mahsuds and the country of the Waziris—and take them over, we shall not want more troops, but fewer. But until then we have to look forward to a time of increasing unrest on that frontier and to the necessity for more troops every year.

I know that a great deal has been said in India, and here also, about the high proportion of military to civil expenditure and also to the total Revenue raised. I thoroughly admit the force of that argument. It does seem a very large proportion to spend something like 50 per cent. of the Revenue of India on military preparation. But India is in a very peculiar situation. In no other part of the Empire have you a frontier one thousand miles long, and half a million men ready to rise against you. That is really the secret of what appears to be the excessive expenditure upon military matters in India. You will never get rid of that expenditure so long as you have a frontier which is liable to be disturbed. But if you were once to have a serious reverse on your frontier, if, for example, you were to lose command of the Peshawar Plain or places of less importance, that would precipitate a very serious crisis in India for the Administration. Many of the Indian peoples would then think that you were not strong enough to go on governing India, and your prestige would fall very seriously.

Therefore in bringing forward this Motion to-day I have done so with the firm conviction that the North-West frontier of India is a subject of increasing importance. I feel certain that the noble Lord who answers for the India Office will agree with rue that the present policy is not satisfactory; it is expensive in men, and also in money. I suggest that the whole question should be reconsidered, and that some effort should be made whereby this constant loss of men and treasure might be avoided. After all, if you cannot defend your frontiers which are the keystone of power your arch will fall. I beg to move.

LORD SYDENHAM

My Lords, this Question is one of very great importance to the people of India and also to us who are responsible for their security against murder and robbery on a large part of the frontier of India. It was in 1849 that we annexed the Punjab, and then, in the words of Sir Alfred Lyall, "we carried our territorial frontier across the Indus right up to the foot of the Afghan hills." I fancy that the people who made that momentous decision very little realised at the time where it would lead us, and what it involved. But from that time onwards we have been always confronted with this great problem of the frontier tribes, and that problem has led to a very heavy total loss of life and treasure in the past.

Some years after the annexation passed before we even realised the main factors of the problem of the frontier, and at first I think it must be said that we never had any policy of any kind. There was a long period of raids and counter-raids, leading to innumerable small and great expeditions, which went no way whatever towards solving the great problem of the frontier. After that, with the greater knowledge we had gained, we avoided interference with the domestic affairs of the tribes, but we set up a system of subsidies and of levies, local and tribal, which system, as your Lordships are well aware, was very largely extended and developed by the noble Earl the Leader of this House.

It was then possible to withdraw troops to some extent from the frontier and to replace them by the new Militia forces, and it was claimed for that policy—and I think rightly claimed—that it exerted a civilising influence over the tribes. On the whole it proved remarkably successful for nearly twenty years, during which it was tried. But, of course, a great deal depended also upon the capability of the officers whom we employed there. Then there was a bad set-back when we temporarily abandoned the Khyber Pass, and that led to the desertion of a considerable number of our Militia force. But in 1919, at the time of the Afghan invasion, the desertions were on a much greater scale and a considerable part of our levies disappeared, carrying with them their rifles and their military knowledge, either to the Afghans or to the frontier tribes.

Present conditions, so far as I can understand them, do not seem to be quite favourable to a return to this policy on a large scale; because a new generation has grown up among the tribes, a generation which has forgotten the lesson we administered in 1897, and, as the noble Lord has said, the tribes now are far better armed and better trained than their predecessors were. It is always the young tribesmen who are easily accessible to the preaching of the Mullahs, and they can at any time be led either to attack their neighbours or to make a raid into British India. Lord Kitchener, with whom I once discussed this question, was, I believe, entirely in favour of occupying the whole of the tribal territory right up to the Durand line, which is, I think, what my noble friend is now advocating. That was the logical policy, because as a buffer State the tribal territory had proved a most dismal failure. But it would have been very costly, and it would not have been popular probably with the Army, because it would have led to the Army being distributed in a good many posts among the mountains in very unpleasant conditions. I am doubtful whether this policy is now possible because of the doctrine of self- determination which, as Mr. Lansing said the other day, "is loaded with dynamite," and which appears to have a good many supporters in this country. There would be a good many people who would say you must not by force impose your rule upon these unwilling and hitherto wholly independent tribes.

The constant troubles on the frontier during the last two years—and they have been worse almost than in any other period that I remember—have forced upon the Government of India, as I understand, a partial adoption of Lord Kitehener's plan. In reply to some very severe questioning in the Legislative Assembly of India, Dr. Sapru stated on behalf of the Government the other day that— His Majesty's Government in May last sanctioned the military occupation of the central portion of the Mahsud territory, together with the construction of roads, which experience has shown to be one of the most effective of pacifying influences. As I understand, that policy is to be applied to the Mahsud territory south of Tochi Pass, and I assume that it means that a really good motor road will be made up to and beyond Bannu and also from Tonk to Wano. Whether there will be a lateral road—and the lateral roads are extraordinarily important—connecting the Tochi and the Gomal routes I do not know; nor do I know whether the road is to be pushed beyond Kohat into the Orakzi territory. I understand that it is also definitely decided that the railway should be extended from Peshawar to Landi Kotal, but to extend it across country through tribal territories between the Khyber and Kurram routes seems impossible.

The objects of the Government of India, as disclosed in this answer, seem to be to occupy positions of strategic importance and to connect them with railheads by motor transport, which is far less vulnerable than the ordinary convoy, which may be said to invite attack. This policy constitutes a somewhat new departure and, perhaps, might be described as, in a sense, experimental. The Government of India have stated that it must take some time and that it would cost a considerable amount of money, but, so far as I understand this policy, it seems to be both sound and wise. Road-making is almost always a gain to any country, as the noble Lord has said, and if we are to hold posts in tribal territory they must be within easy and rapid access of the railheads of India.

This policy will bring us into closer touch with the Mahsud Waziris and it may be regarded by the other tribes as involving a menace to their independence. It certainly is a policy which, once announced—and it has been announced—must be rigorously carried through to the end without any halting or intervals of delay.

My noble friend has dealt with the aeroplane question most effectively, but I think it must be said that aeroplanes on the frontier generally have proved somewhat disappointing, though that is, of course, because certain parts of the country are eminently unfitted for their use. They will undoubtedly find many uses, and I hope that a good type will be provided in future, which, I think, has not always been the case in past.

The crux of the frontier problem in the future, I believe, lies really with our relations with Afghanistan. I am afraid at the present time, as my noble friend has said, that those relations are very far from being satisfactory. The Amir appears to have made a Treaty with the Bolsheviks and also with the Nationalist Turks, while, at the same time, he seems to have been playing with our Mission at Kabul. Then the Bolsheviks have also made a Treaty with the Kemalist Government at Angora, while we have made a commercial Treaty with the Bolsheviks. Was there ever such a tangle of Treaties as that? Who can possibly say what will come out of it all? What is certain is that an unfriendly Afghanistan, or an Afghanistan which is dominated by Bolsheviks or by Pail-Islam, would add immensely to our difficulties, which are sufficiently great already. I understand—I hope that the noble Earl will be able to say it is not true—that the Bolsheviks have already been trying to tamper with the tribes on the frontier, and, as we all know, money in that part of the world will suffice at any to bring off a raid. I can see no sign at present that the Jewish Government at Moscow has carried out an important part of its Treaty engagements with us.

I read in the Indian papers the other day that Mr. Gandhi had stated that he would not tolerate an Afghan invasion, which sonic of his allies seemed rather to desire. I am afraid that is not a very sufficient or effective defence for the Indian frontier, which must remain for a long time a source of anxiety in spite of Mr. Gandhi's wonderful oratorical powers.

For many years the responsibility for the frontier must rest wholly upon us, and cannot rest upon the new form of government which we are imposing upon India. Your Lordships may not realise that the new Legislative Council in India, which, as I have already said, is dealing, or wishes to deal, with frontier questions, rests upon the votes of 180,000 out of 215,000.000 people in British India. That is just as I if the House of Commons was returned by considerably less than 40,000 voters and yet called itself representative of the masses. The main thing, after all, will be the efficiency of the Army in India and its readiness for action at all times on the frontier. That must continue to be the chief security of the people of India, and. I must confess, as said the other day, that I am alarmed at the extent of the reductions which have been made already.

Whatever we do the frontier must continue to make heavy demands upon the Budget of the Government of India, but I should like to point out that some of the figures which are given are, to a certain extent, misleading. Those figures, as I understand them, relate only to the Revenues which are handled by the Government of India and which naturally appear very high in comparison with the corresponding figures of other countries. But if the percentage is taken upon the whole of the Revenues of India, both imperial and Provincial, I think it will be found to be very moderate, having regard to the exceptional conditions of danger which my noble friend has so ably de scribed. I am very glad that he has raised this Question to-day, because it will enable the noble Earl to clear up a great many points which, to me, as an obsolete soldier, are not yet quite clear.

VISCOUNT CHELMSFORD

My Lords, before the noble Earl replies I should like to say a word or two with regard to the very interesting speech which the noble Lord, Lord Montagu, has made with reference to the frontier of India. While I was in India the Government of India were very much indebted to the noble Lord for his expert assistance in connection with roads and motor transport. But I cannot help thinking, if he will permit me to say so, that he is rather apt to look at these things through his motor goggles. There are many other items of expenditure on which the military authorities in India spend large sums. It is quite true that motor transport and roads are most essential matters, but they must take their places with other essential things which are required for military purposes.

The noble Lord very properly pointed out that the tribesmen on the frontier are a much more formidable force at the present moment than they were a good many years ago. That is due in the main to two causes. It may be within the recollection of your Lordships that 'at the beginning of the war all the trans-border Pathans had to be disbanded from our Indian regiments as, owing to their religious proclivities, we had found that they were not to be relied upon. When those trans-border Pathans had been dispensed with throughout the Indian Army as a portion of our fighting forces they naturally went back to the tribes from which they had originally come. Similarly, under the frontier policy which had prevailed for some twenty years, as the noble Lord, Lord Sydenham, has pointed out, the whole of the Militia system on the frontier, with the exception of a certain portion of Militia and the Kurram Rifles which remained firm because they were Shiahs in the midst of Sunnies, crumbled away, and all those men returned to their tribes, taking with them, as Lord Sydenham has pointed out, not only their rifles but their military knowledge.

It is an extremely interesting fact that in the last Mahsud campaign about a year ago the Malisuds attacked us under the strictest military discipline. They advanced to the sound of the whistle and had covering fire very carefully arranged to cover their advance. In fact, they were well instructed in all the latest military devices which had been taught our Army by our officers. On that side you have a much more formidable problem to-day on the North-West frontier than you had twenty years ago. But you have also this element in the situation, that owing to the dilution of our Indian Army during the great war our Indian troops are not up to the same standard of training, especially in frontier warfare, as they were in pre-war days. I happened to proceed along the frontier at the end of the Afghan War, going up to Dakka and other places that the noble Lord mentioned. During that tour I took occasion to question the commanding officer of every Indian regiment and I was informed, that only about 20 per cent. of his regiment were trained men, that the rest were recruits who had been brought in for the purposes of the great war and were insufficiently trained, and that with all the trained officers there was only one officer besides himself who had had any experience in frontier warfare.

I well recollect that a certain Brigadier-General, who visited me at Simla in 1920, told me that he found that it was necessary during the course of the last expedition to place the pickets himself. The noble Lord, Lord. Sydenham, will realise that placing the pickets in advance on the frontier is a matter that is usually done by a subaltern, or a captain. That was the condition of the training of our troops when we had to undertake the very formidable operations the other day. You have, therefore, a combination on the one hand bf the increased efficiency of the frontier tribes, and, on the other hand, of a great decrease in efficiency on the part of our troops. The consequence was that during the Afghan campaign and the recent operations we had to use forces in numbers out of all proportion to those that have been necessary in previous campaigns. So far as the efficiency of our troops is concerned, I hope that is only a matter of time. They are learning every day, especially those who are up now in the Mahsud country. That is the concrete position with regard to the fighting on the frontier.

Taking the larger question, the noble Lord, Lord Montagu, put before us two alternative policies. One was "Stay where you are"; the other, "take over the tribes." That is putting it baldly. The noble Lord, Lord Sydenham, pointed out that for the last twenty years the policy, which is identified very largely with the noble Earl, Lord Curzon, had been eminently successful. But we have to remember that that was so largely because we had no Afghan trouble during that time. It was when Afghanistan intervened, and when the whole religious question came to the fore, that the tribes threw in their lot with their co-religionists. The whole trouble began with the incursion of the Afghan Army in 1919. With regard to the "Stay where you are" policy, we were able last year to make a real departure from that policy in connection with the Mahsuds. We obtained leave from His Majesty's Government to advance into the Mahsud country, to occupy that country, and to make a quadrilateral of roads. I am afraid that I cannot at this moment recollect the exact corners of the quadrilateral, but those roads would settle the whole position in the Mahsud country. That is a policy which is entirely in accord with what Lord Montagu put forward to-day. But it is one thing when you are dealing with a small area, and it is another thing to take over a whole country— a most difficult country where, as the noble Lord has pointed out, there are some 400,000 fighting Mien. It is a big proposition to take over the whole of that country right up to the Durand line. However, what we did may have the effect of being a salutary warning to the other tribes that if they misbehave in the same way that the Mahsuds have misbehaved the same fate would overtake them. I should be inclined to allow the Government of India ample time in which to follow the policy that they have adopted with reference to the Mahsuds.

Both noble Lords have alluded to the Afghan Mission. I think we must be patient in the matter of the Afghan Mission. If I am not incorrect, Sir Louis Dane's Mission, which went out there in Lord Curzon's time, was there over a year, and when it came down it had not accomplished very much. I have every hope, however, that we are going to accomplish something through the more recent Mission. At all events, we have accomplished this already. Except for communications with Afghanistan, letters passing between us and the Amir, we have had no thrashing out of the misunderstandings which existed between Afghanistan and ourselves from the date of the Dane Mission until the Mussoorie Conference of last year. The discussions which are now going on will, I am confident, have a very salutary' effect, inasmuch as they will make Afghanistan realise how far we are prepared to go and what we are not prepared to do. After all, if we achieve that it will be something. I am hopeful with regard to it.

We have to remember that Orientals procrastinate in their negotiations; indeed, they would not regard it as being consonant with their dignity unless they took some time over discussions of this sort. Therefore, we must be patient, but I have every hope that we may get something really valuable out of the work of the Mission which is now at Kabul. I will not say any more, because I think it will be most unfortunate if, at this time, when the Mission is still negotiating, anything were to be said here which might in any way be misunderstood, or which would prejudice those negotiations. I should, however, like to say that I think the Government of India owe a very great debt to Sir Henry Dobbs, the head of that Mission, for the admirable patience and wonderful skill with which he has conducted the conversations so far as they have gone.

Touching on one or two smaller points which the noble Lord, Lord Montagu, mentioned, I would like to point out, as regards the railway in the Khyber, that that policy has already been laid down. The railway is going to be completed, and is progressing. No doubt the noble Earl will be able to give the latest information regarding it. When I left India it was progressing very well. So far, the tribesmen had not shown any great hostility to it, and were accepting the position, in the main, in a most wonderful spirit. I should like to correct one statement that the noble Lord made with regard to the railway to Dusdap. That railway was never planned with any reference to Afghanistan. It was planned in order that we might be able to supply that little force of ours that was at Meshed. Moreover, in the early days the consideration was had in view that, supposing there was an incursion in the direction of Afghanistan, we might quickly get a force round that way. As the noble Lord knows, the railway goes to the South of Afghanistan, and then takes a turn North into Persia. As regards the railway itself I may say that I have pressed all along that it should go beyond the point which has been mentioned. I should like to see it go over that very rough and desert country as far as Neh. If that were done it would probably have some commercial value. I doubt if it is of any strategical value now, and if we are not able to develop the caravan traffic along that route it may just as well be torn up, and the rails given to the Government of India for use in India.

I do not think there is anything that I can usefully add to what the noble Lord has already told your Lordships with regard to this matter. It is undoubtedly a most important Question, and it might perhaps have been better if it had been discussed on the large side rather than in its details. The whole subject of the -frontier policy is one of immense importance. I should not quite take the gloomy view that the noble Lord has done with regard to the present situation, because I think that the forces on the frontier are ample sufficient at the present moment to control the situation, and even if there is any incursion they will be sufficient to deal with it. The House is indebted to the noble Lord for bringing up the subject, and I am glad he has done so.

THE EARL OF LYTTON

My Lords, the Question raised, as every speaker has admitted, is extremely interesting and important. There are, of course, one or two aspects of it which I am debarred from discussing by military reasons, and I. am sure the noble Lord will be the first to appreciate this. That applies also to the question of our present Mission to Afghanistan, which is not raised directly by the Question, and on which I am not able to give him at this moment any information. The immense advantage we derive from the presence of Lord Chelmsford in this House and the authoritative speech he has just made relieve me of the necessity of replying to a number of points raised in the debate. I have not the advantage of being personally acquainted with the country and can only give to the noble Lord the information I have obtained from the Department with regard to the points specifically referred to in his Motion.

The noble Lord has divided his Question into two headings, and has asked me what steps, both military and civil, are being taken to provide for the efficient defence of the North-West frontier of India. I will deal first of all with the civil measures which have been taken. The one most directly affecting the problem is that which relates to the provision of the Militia corps and levies recruited from the tribesmen to which Lord Sydenham referred. It is well known, as has been admitted by previous speakers, that when the Afghan incursion of 1919 took place some of our Militia corps, which had clone excellent work for many years, in fact ever since the settlement following the last great tribal rising in 1897, failed us, under the stress of hitherto unexampled temptation to join our enemies. Probably too great reliance was placed on these irregular corps, but, be that as it may, some of them, notably the Waziristan Militia and the Zhob levies proved unequal to the strain. The Khyber Rifles, who were given the chance of taking their discharge before they had committed themselves too far, took advantage of this offer to a large extent. The Kurram I Militia and the newly constituted Mohmund Militia, on the other hand, remained stedfast.

As the result of that experience, the policy on this matter has been largely modified. In the plans for the future the local levies and Militia have been to a great extent relieved of the responsibility of offering sufficient resistance to an enemy to allow time for the arrival of Regular Troops. In future, as I shall explain in a moment or two when I come to state the military measures, the covering force, behind which the striking force of the Army is to concentrate, will be composed of Regular Troops, supplemented only by levies and Militia as auxiliaries. The opportunity has therefore been taken to reconstitute these Militia corps, which were dissolved after the fighting of 1919, into units of a less regular nature, and, it is hoped, better adapted to fill the role of irregular auxiliaries. They will consist of a Khassadar corps in the Khyber area numbering about 900; a North Waziristan constabulary of a strength of 1,100, or rather less; a South Waziristan constabulary of a similar strength, and Zhob levies which, with the Zhob tribal scouts, will have a strength of about 1,400. Other corps, such as, for example, the Mohmund Militia, remain generally in their former shape.

Under the head of civil measures come also the steps that are being taken, and, in some cases (as with the Afridis, except the Zakka Khel), have already been taken successfully, to bring about settlements with the tribesmen along the frontier. Employment in the various levy corps and Militia, and on the works in progress, such as the roads and railways under construction, affords a valuable inducement to good behaviour, but both in the Khyber and Waziristan, it has been found necessary, as Lord Sydenham mentioned, to occupy the country of the tribesmen with military forces. How long this occupation will have to last, and in what strength, it is impossible at this moment to foretell, but the Government of India is determined not to let the present opportunity slip of concluding the best and most enduring settlement it can devise with the tribesmen.

The noble Lord asks me for some information as to the progress of the Khyber railway. The occupation of the Khyber with troops has necessitated the construction of a railway up the Pass in order that the troops may be adequately maintained with all that is necessary, both in peace and war. The railway is a continuation of the standard 5 ft. 6 in. gauge line which has hitherto terminated at Jamrud, and its completion will enable the troops and stores to be railed without trans-shipment or break from any point on the broad gauge system of India to Landi Kotal at the summit of the Khyber, where, on a wide elevated plain, there are facilities for the concentration of a considerable number of troops. The necessity for this railway was brought home to us in the operations of 1919, when, as a makeshift, an elevated wire ropeway was erected for the transportation of stores. This ropeway is still working, and will, no doubt, continue to do good service until the railway is completed. At present earth work is in hand and making good progress along most of the alignment; culverts and retaining walls are in hand and some 400 feet of tunnelling has been accomplished. In addition to this a great deal of work in connection with camps and quarters for the construction personnel has been done, but apart from construction sidings at Jan crud, the stage of laying rails has not yet been reached.

Now I come to the military measures on which the noble Lord also asks for information. The more purely military steps that are being taken to provide for the efficient defence of the North-West frontier may be summarised under two general heads— namely, (1) the provision and organisation of forces suitable for (healing with our possible enemies on the frontier, and (2) the improvement of communication along the frontier. As regards the former, the Army available for operations on the frontier consists, in the first place, of a covering force along the frontier of sufficient strength to maintain its advanced position and to hold off hostile attacks until there has been time to mobilise and concentrate in its required positions the second main portion of the Army, the striking force, composed of Air Forces and of all arms, organised into brigades, divisions and Army troops, suitable for operating in the mountainous terrain of the frontier.

For the reasons I have mentioned I cannot give any precise particulars as to the strength, composition, and. exact disposition of these forces. I may, however, mention that their relative strengths are liable to vary according to circumstances.

For instance, under favourable conditions, it might be possible to increase the striking force by releasing some of the troops which have to be locked up in the advanced positions allotted to the covering force when conditions are disturbed on the frontier; the guiding principle being that sufficient time should be afforded to the brigades and divisions of the striking force to mobilise and move into their positions undisturbed.

The composition of both the covering and striking forces has been decided upon with due regard to the character and armament of the enemy it is thought that they are most likely to have to encounter and to the nature of the country. As the noble Lord is well aware, the country on the North-West frontier imposes limitations upon the numbers of men and animals that can be employed in military operations, and, for this reason, the efforts of the military authorities in India have been directed to making the greatest possible use of modern mechanical appliances. Apart from the Air Force, with which India is now well equipped, attention has been directed to the necessity of evolving a type of tank suitable to hot countries and mountainous ground, and to the provision of armoured cars, improved artillery, and, particularly, of pack or mountain howitzers.

Perhaps one of the most important improvements, however, consists in the provision of a very large amount of mechanical transport to serve the forces taking the field. It is unnecessary to dwell on the importance of mechanical transport in increasing the efficiency of the Army, but in this case it is perhaps permissible to allude to the immense change brought about by the substitution of lorries capable of carrying heavy loads for many miles a day for slow-moving animal transport of very limited daily range, encumbered with numerous attendants, occupying miles of road space, and with a useful carrying load which diminishes rapidly with the length of the communications and the need for carrying the food of its own animals and drivers. The noble Lord wanted to he assured that this policy of an increase of motor transport was being continued. I can assure him that it is. To enable the continually increasing mechanical transport to be in a state of constant efficiency, extensive workshops have been established at Chaklala, near Rawal Pindi, and an establishment of British and Indian per- sonnel for these workshops has been sanctioned. It is hoped to complete this establishment in the course of next autumn and winter.

The subject of mechanical transport leads naturally to that of the roads, upon which my noble friend is so great an expert. I agree entirely with all he has said of the importance of the roads everywhere, but more particularly in this district, and I can assure him that their value is appreciated by the Government of India. The extent to which the roads are being developed is determined solely by financial considerations and the funds available. To begin with the Khyber, the two roads up the Pass were last year reported to he practically completed, with the exception of some of the bridges over nullah beds, so as to take mechanical transport traffic, the width of metalling being sixteen feet. I regret that I have to refer to a number of places which will be meaningless to your Lordships without reference to a map, but the noble Lord, Lord Montagu, is familiar with the district, and perhaps he will be able to follow me. The following further roads were reported at the same time to be either completed or practically completed up to a similar standard, except that in a few eases the width of metalling has been limited to twelve feet:—Nowshera-Malakand Pass-Chakdara; Peshawar-Shabkadar-Abazai; Shabkadar-Michni; PeshawarMichni; Landi Kotal-Kam Shilman; Kohat - Thall-Parachinar; and Bannu-Miranshah. All of these are either completed or practically completed. The list is not exhaustive, as work is in progress on other roads as well, ell, though some of those, in the more advanced positions, are designed to take only cart traffic.

In Waziristan work is in progress on a very important series of motor roads which are designed to form one of the roost important elements in the pacification of this country. The principal of these roads in Waziristan is the one leading from Murtaza, which is on the 2 ft. 6 in. railway line connecting the Indus at Kalabagh, past Khirgi, to which the same railway has now been extended, near the mouth of the Tank river, and Jandola to Ladha, where the main portion of our forces occupying the Mahsud country are at present cantoned. It is intended ultimately to continue this road to a point in the Tochi Valley, probably near Boya, and then down the valley to Miranshah. Further to the south a road will run from Murtaza, on the 2 ft. 6 in. railway, up the Gomal river to Kajuri Kach, with a cart road continuing to Toi Khula, some ten or twelve miles further up the valley. The completion of these roads, together with the occupation of the country, will, it is hoped, have a pacifying effect on the particularly turbulent tribesmen of this part of the frontier.

Further to the south we come to Quetta as the centre of a road and railway system. It has long been recognised that a serious deficiency in our frontier communications is the lack of either a railway or a motor road connecting the Gomal Valley with the Quetta system, through the Zhob Valley. Lack of funds, however, has hitherto prevented this defect from being remedied. A narrow gauge mineral line, however, runs from Khanai on the standard gauge railway Dr the chrome mines near Hindubagh, and so forms the germ of possible future improved communications. Also the road from Harnai, on the same standard gauge railway, as far as Loralai, a matter of some fifty miles, is being improved to fit it to take mechanical transport.

It has been considered more important to improve the road from Sibi, at the eastern end of the Bolan Pass, to Quetta, in order to afford relief to the portion of the railway on which the steepest gradients occur. This road is being made fit for the passage of motor traffic with 12 inches of metalling. Proposals arc also under consideration for the improvement of the road from Quetta to Chaman to fit it for the passage of mechanical transport throughout. Apart from the main improvements in rail and road comminications along the frontier, steps have been taken to improve the sidings and trans-shipping and unloading facilities at the various railheads, the principal of which are Dargai, at the foot of the Malakand Pass and at the head of the narrow gauge line from Nowshera; at Jamrud, at the mouth of the Khyber; at Kohat, where the change from the 5 ft. 6 in. to the 2 ft. 6 in. gauge railway occurs: at Thall, at the head of the same narrow gauge line; at Mari-Indus, where trans-shipment occurs across the Indus by steam ferry to another narrow gauge railway starting from Kalabagh on the western bank of the river; at Bannu and at Khirgi, at the head of the two branches of this line.

In connection with the subject of the roads on the frontier and of the mechanical transport whose use they are designed to facilitate, I would like to take this opportunity of acknowledging the great obligation which we are under to the noble Lord, for the invaluable work which he has done in this connection in India, and for the advice which he has given to us on the subject during the last few years. I have given the noble Lord all the information which I have been able to obtain, but I feel that I owe you some apology for having to make a statement which was necessarily very technical, and to refer to places which are unfamiliar to many of your Lordships, but I could not otherwise give to the noble Lord all the information which he required. I hope that my statement may be of more interest when it is read than it could possibly have been to those who have had to listen to it.

MONTAGU OF BEAULIEU

My Lords, I beg to thank the noble Earl for his most interesting reply to my Question, and also to join with him in thanking Lord Chelmsford for his most interesting speech, which, coming from such a source, was a matter of great gratification to us. Lord Chelmsford referred to my being apt to look at things through motor goggles. I suppose it was a perfectly legitimate comment. I will only reply by saving that when you are looking at the North-West frontier, and the equipment of armies, you have to look at those matters through very modern spectacles. It is no good thinking about bows and arrows. I am glad to hear that the Mahsud country has been taken over definitely, and I hope that it may be an augury of the taking over of other parts of the frontier later on. As regards the question of expenditure on frontier matters, I agree with the noble Lord who said you must cut your coat according to your cloth. The North-West frontier, however, is more important than any other military district in India, and it seems to me that some of the provision utilised in the rest of India might be economised, and more money spent on the frontier. I beg to thank noble Lords who have spoken, and the noble Earl who replied for the India Office for his remarks.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.