§ LORD SYDENHAMMy Lords, I desire to ask the Under-Secretary of State for India the Question which stands in my name on the Paper—namely, whether he can state the extent of, and the reasons for, the intended reductions in the Indian Army —and to move for Papers. The reduction of the Indian Army at this juncture raises what are really great Imperial questions and, I think, needs more justification than it has yet received from anybody. Decisions which may have the most serious consequences seem to have been taken without the previous knowledge of Parliament, and I am quite certain that very few people in this country realise how serious is the step that is contemplated. Before the great Mutiny, the Indian Army consisted of 311,500 native and 39,500 British troops. That Army rendered great services overseas in Ceylon, Amboyna, Egypt, Macao, Bourbon, Rodriguez, Java, Persia, Afghanistan, Burma and China. That was a great record, which is too often forgotten in these days.
After the disbandment of the revolted Bengal Army and the assumption of authority in India by the Crown, the Army was drastically reduced. It was reduced again about 1881 in consequence of the Report of the Eden Committee. But, following the Penjdeh scare in 1885, it was again greatly increased, regiments which had been broken up a few years previously were reconstituted, and a fourth squadron was added to the Cavalry regiments. In my humble opinion, the Russian menace to India was always an illusion, but it became a sort of obession of the great forward school in India and it has for years powerfully influenced the whole of our policy throughout Asia. The menace of the Bolshevik autocracy to-day has assumed a far greater danger than anything that arose from the Russia of the Czars, and I cannot understand how 181 anyone can believe that the situation is not more threatening to-day than it was in 1885 when we added largely to the Army. Since 1885 there have been further additions to the Army, more especially to the mountain artillery, and the fixed proportion of one to two and a-half has been established between the British and Native elements of that Army. That decision was arrived at after long and most careful consideration.
Briefly, that is how the Indian Army stood at the outbreak of war, when, of course, an immense increase became immediately necessary. About a million Indians served overseas, and some 60,000 of them were killed. I need not repeat what has been so often said in this House—how much the Empire owes to the gallant fighting classes of India which gave their lives freely in almost every theatre of war. The disbandment of the new levies was inevitable, but the reduction of the prewar Indian Army is quite a different matter. We have been told that eighteen fine Cavalry regiments are to be abolished. As I said the other day, the Cavalry is the flower of the whole Indian Army. It is drawn from the pick of the yeoman classes of India, of which it is the hereditary profession. I am well aware of the opinion which has arisen after the campaign in France that Cavalry has depreciated greatly in importance. I believe that theory to be quite as baseless as some of those which were drawn from the exceptional circumstances and conditions of the Boer War.
The noble Earl will probably say that aircraft, tanks, and armoured cars justify this very sweeping reduction of the Cavalry. Against that view stands the opinion of Field Marshal Lord Allenby, who states that these new elements add to the importance of Cavalry. He says:
The battle value of Cavalry increases with the breadth of vision bestowed by aircraft. The Air Service by enlarging the horizon renders possible such bold strokes by masses of horsemen as were seen in Mesopotamia, Palestine and Syria.Then he goes on to say that tanks and armoured cars can also afford great assistance to cavalry.No one can attach more importance to aircraft than I do, but it must be clear that against insurrectionary movements they are far inferior to the use of mounted men. 182 The use of aircraft has been so much restricted in India that they would be almost impotent to deal with great disturbances. In any case the aviators cannot seize and hold a position, nor can they relieve a hard-pressed garrison. In place of breaking up those eighteen splendid Cavalry regiments, would it not have been wiser to have restricted the cadres of the whole of the other Cavalry regiments to three squadrons, which could have been expanded when war made it necessary? I do not know what reduction of Infantry is proposed, or whether it is intended to retain the proportions as between British and Indian troops which for many years was regarded as inviolable. I am quite certain that the noble Earl will make all these matters and the intentions of the Government of India and the India Office perfectly clear when he replies to me.
The danger to the peace of India, internally and externally, was never so great as it is now. The Dobbs mission has been in Cabul for four months and apparently has accomplished nothing. That is a humiliating fact which must tell against our prestige throughout the whole of the East. It is admitted. It has been admitted in this House that the Afghans, while negotiating with our Mission, concluded a Treaty with the Bolsheviks.' Since then, according to the Manchester Guardian, a supplementary clause has been added to that Treaty providing for a subsidy of one million gold or silver roubles, and also the construction of a telegraph line from Kustk through Herat and Kandahar to Cabul, with any technical assistance which may be required. The object of that telegraph line is obvious. But it is also reported now that another Treaty has been made with the Nationalist Turks by the Afghans. So it seems that the Afghans are rapidly falling under the influence either of the Bolsheviks, or of Pan-Islam, or possibly of both.
Besides that, fighting is now constantly taking place on the frontier, as we read almost every day. With a hostile Afghanistan, or even an unfriendly Afghanistan, frontier warfare would be far more serious and more continuous than it was in the past. In 1897 we employed 120,000 troops on the frontier, though the Afghans at that time were quite friendly to us. In the spring of 1919 when the Afghans invaded India, we required over 200,000 troops on the frontier, or, with non- 183 combatants, about 300,000 men, though only part of the tribes rose at that time. Is the Government sure that when the Army is reduced as proposed it will be able to deal with the much greater troubles that may at any time arise on the frontier and at the same time be sufficient to preserve order in India?
The internal situation, in my opinion, was never so menacing as it is to-day. I am most anxious not to seem to exaggerate the situation, but I must say that some of the reports we receive are really most fallacious. Latterly, I have seen it said that Mr. Gandhi is rapidly losing his influence with the educated classes and that his non-cooperation movement is breaking down. That may be true to some extent, but what is forgotten is that his appeal to the ignorant and fanatical masses has aroused a feeling of race hatred which may take years before it subsides, if, indeed, it ever does subside. He has followed Mrs. Besant's earlier efforts but with much greater effect, working upon the masses and upon the boys and students, to imbue them with dislike and contempt not only of the British Government, but of all British officials in India, and the strength of that appeal lies in its religious aspects. Mr. Ghandi and his myrmidons teach that British rule is satanic, that it is the duty of all religious Indians to get. rid of it. No one who has not lived in India can quite understand how dangerous such teaching is, especially when the teacher claims, and is conceded, supernatural powers and supernatural sanction.
The Moslem extremists are even more violent in their language than Mr. Gandhi himself, and the wildest falsehoods about our treatment of the holy places of Islam have been widely circulated amongst the fanatical classes in India. During the last month we have seen two shocking outbreaks of violence, one at Malegaon in the Bombay Presidency, and the other on the Bengal coalfield. The police were easily overpowered, and loss of life and destruction occurred because troops were not available in time to deal with these disturbances. Then the forces of Bolshevism are certainly being brought to bear upon parts of India at the present time. The objects of the Bolsheviks, of course, differ from those of Mr. Gandhi and his associates, but they reinforce each other, because they both agree in the determination to turn us out of India.
184 The personal experience of a nonofficial Englishman and his young wife, who had just arrived in India, will show better than anything I could say what has been the effect of this continuous preaching of race hatred. This was written after a journey through the Punjab in March last—
At the station we found ourselves in the midst of a crowd of the most menacing and hostile Indians I have ever seen. We appeared to be the only two Europeans anywhere near, and we at once received the attention of the whole crowd. They collected round our carriage, jeered at my wife—who, as you know, only arrived in this country last week—and finally decided to enter our carriage. A policeman on duty—the only one visible—kept some of them back, whilst I myself was able to keep the door closed against the remainder. The train fortunately started, and I had hoped all was well, but at each successive station the crowd got down from their carriages and endeavoured to get on to our compartment, sometimes hem both sides, all the while shouting: Mahatma Gandhi ki Jai,' Hindu Mussalman ki Jai: The experience for my wife, who is only a girl of twenty, was most terrifying, and for myself was one of the most trying experiences I have ever had. The crowd was practically in possession of the train. None had a ticket, and they all entered whichever compartment they pleased, only being kept out of mine by force. Fortunately, though prepared for it, I was not obliged to shoot, but it was a near thing. as had they succeeded in getting into our carriage I would have done so to protect my wife.That was a crowd which had just been attending one of Mr. Gandhi's great demonstrations, and as so often happens in India now, it took possession of the train, and travelled without taking any tickets.But that is not an isolated instance. I could give several more of the same kind. It shows clearly to what a pass things have come owing to the free preaching of race hatred against us. It seems to me that it will be almost impossible for Englishmen and Englishwomen to live much longer in India if that kind of thing can go on. Speaking in the Legislative Assembly on March 8, the Commander-in-Chief gave a plain warning of danger, both external and internal, and I cannot understand how he consented to these reductions before he could have had time to make himself completely master of the situation in India. Since the Mutiny, and before the great war, Indian troops have served in Abyssinia, Afghanistan, Egypt, Sudan, Somaliland, Burma, China and Malta, but all this seems as if it were now to be changed. According to the very remarkable Resolution passed by the Legislative Assembly on 185 March 26, the Indian Army is no longer to be counted among the armed Forces of the Crown, as it has been hitherto. Henceforth it is to be employed only for defensive purposes in India, "except in very grave emergencies "—those are the words of the Resolution—" and with the consent of the Governor-General 'in Council "which might not be forthcoming in face of a hostile Assembly that might be dominated by the extreme Party. If, when we have reduced the Army, some emergency arose which needed reinforcements, we should have to supply those reinforcements, but there is no reciprocal obligation upon India at the present time, since the passing of this Resolution.
The Indian Army is a very delicate instrument which would easily break to pieces if it were mishandled. I do not think it is generally realised here that so long as we provide officers of the right type for the Indian Army we retain the affection and respect of the classes which, after all, are the most. important classes in India, and the classes which will take charge of India when Home Rule arrives. For the present, at least, we remain absolutely responsible for the defence of the Indian frontiers, and for the preservation of internal order; and latterly, I am afraid, we have not effectively discharged that second task. I cannot believe that a democratic Government, formed on Western models and controlled, as it will always be in the years to come, by a very small minority, will ever be able to create and maintain an efficient Army. Left to herself, India will be open to invasion, and India will most certainly be invaded. I cannot see how we can ever share with an Indian Parliament the control and organisation of a great Army.
I am well aware of the present financial stringency—which is due to many causes—some of which, I am afraid, will be permanent—and of the fact that we are replacing what was one of the most wonderfully cheap Governments in the world by a Government which will be far more expensive. There are reasons why there will be financial stringency in India for some years to come, but surely security comes before everything else, and I must warn His Majesty's Government that the weakening of our military forces at the present time may make it impossible for us to fulfil our grave responsibilities to the masses of India, and may very easily lead us to disaster. I beg to move for Papers 186 showing the opinion of the late and present Commanders-in-Chief in India, and that of the Imperial General Staff, if taken, upon the intended reductions in the Indian Army.
§ LORD CHELMSFORDMy Lords, before the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, replies to the speech which has just been delivered by the noble Lord, I should like to say a few words on this very important matter, because I have been responsible during the past five years for the policy in India. I accept that responsibility, and I wish to place before this House the reasons for the various Questions which the noble Lord has raised this afternoon. In the first place I should like to draw the attention of the House to the particular Question and Motion which the noble Lord has placed on the Paper. He asks the Under-Secretary of State for India whether he can state the extent of, and the reasons for, the intended reductions in the Indian Army. The greater part of the noble Lord's speech was taken up with a lurid account of the condition of India at the present moment. I quite agree that the state of India and the external menace to India from Afghanistan and the tribes are factors which have to be taken into account in any reduction of the Indian Army, but one felt, listening to the noble Lord, that these were the matters to which he, wished particularly to draw your Lordships' attention.
May I point out one interesting fact in reference to the letter which the noble Lord read to your Lordships. He gave as its date March 9. That was at least three weeks before I left India, and the occurrence to which the noble Lord has drawn your Lordships' attention was never brought to my notice during those three weeks. Between March 9 and the date of my leaving India the Governor of the Punjab, who was my guest at Delhi, and with whom I had a long discussion with regard to the state of India, never mentioned any occurrence of this sort. He told me that with the exception of the Sikh problem, which resulted in the massacre of which your Lordships have heard, the other causes of unrest have greatly diminished, and that he was not anxious about the unrest with reference to the Punjab affairs of 1919, nor was he anxious in other directions. It is interesting to find that on March 9, at least ten days before the Governor of the Punjab paid me a visit, 187 this very striking occurrence should have happened. I can only regret that it was not brought to my notice, and to the notice of the Governor of the Punjab at the time. We should certainly have taken action with regard to it.
The noble Lord asks the reasons for the intended reductions in the Indian Army. I can state them in a sentence. We in India attempted to cut our coat according to our cloth. We attempted to balance our income and expenditure. I know that is not a fashionable thing to do in these days, and it may be regarded as a somewhat insufficient reason. But in India we regarded it as a sufficient and as an imperative reason. In consequence of our very parlous financial position we cut down ruthlessly our civil expenditure far below the limits of efficiency, reducing some of our Departments almost to starvation estimates. But even then we could not balance our Budget, and so we had no alternative but to consider the position with regard to Army expenditure.
Noble Lords here will perhaps hardly realise the colossal increase which has taken place in the Army expenditure in India during the past five years. If I may, I will deal with figures which are familiar to those connected with India, though perhaps not so familiar to your Lordships. The Army in India this year is going to cost 62.20 crore of rupees, as against 26.11 crore of rupees in the last financial year before the war. That is more than double. Those are the only figures I shall mention. I doubt whether Lord Sydenham would ask me to go in detail into the figures for this year, though the financial problem is necessarily at the bottom of the situation. This increase is largely due to three causes. In the first place it is due to the very large rise in pay of the British soldier in India, which has practically trebled during the past three years; in the. second place, to the largely increased expenditure on matériel and equipment of the Army in India, which found little or no place in the expenditure in 1913–1914; and, lastly, to the necessity which we, as the Government of India, were under to make up the leeway for past years of starvation in respect to military matters for which we, as a Government, could take no responsibility whatever—for instance, hospitals, barracks, and all those things which make for the health and welfare of the British and Indian soldier.
188 The Esher Committee made strong recommendations as to improvements in that direction. But before the Esher Committee had issued its Report we had ourselves taken steps to deal with this matter; and that is another reason why our military Budget assumed the colossal proportions it did this year as compared with previous Budgets. When I remind your Lordships that these figures represent more than 50 per cent. of the whole Budget of India, no one can doubt the seriousness of the situation. If you have a military Budget which is going to sterilise all civil development of the country, it is a matter which you have to take into serious consideration and see what steps can be adopted to remedy it.
We have taken it very seriously, and more than a year ago I appointed a Special Committee, consisting of members of the Council, to go into the whole question in detail. They found that while a certain laxity had grown up in expenditure as the result of the removal of the stringent financial supervision which had existed in pre-war days, they were not able to suggest any reductions which would obviate the necessity of having to deal with the number of troops in India. I remember the care with which every possible method of effecting some reduction in our Budget was explored, and they always came back to the only possible form which would enable us as a Government to balance our income and expenditure—namely, by a reduction in the personnel of the Army.
The noble Lord has drawn a lurid picture of the possible emergencies which the Government of India, or British rule in India, may have to meet. He strongly urged that the Government of India should base its military strength on all the possibilities it may have to face. If you attempt to organise your military Forces on the basis that they should be sufficient to meet every possible emergency, I can only say that any Government which attempted to do so would head straight for bankruptcy. It is what no nation in the world attempts to do, and certainly not what His Majesty's Government at the present moment are attempting to do. If that is to be the basis on which His Majesty's Government should organise the Forces, I can only say that the present state of the Imperial Army is one of the greatest bluffs in history. It is obvious that our military Forces on the basis that they should be sufficient to meet all possible Imperial emergencies, are grossly 189 insufficient. I repeat, that India must be allowed to base her requirements on reasonable probabilities; and it is on reasonable probabilities that the Government of India is taking up the question of the redaction of the Army as necessitated by our very parlous financial position.
I should like to say one word, before I conic to the possible reduction of British troops in India, with regard to what the noble Lord said on the reduction of the Indian Cavalry. From first to last that has been an entirely military question. The late Commander-in-Chief, to whom I was talking the other day, had contemplated a reduction of the Cavalry in India. He left before the scheme by which that reduction was to be effected had been carried out. The present Commander-in-Chief took up the question where Sir Charles Monro left it, and the present scheme for reduction by the amalgamation of certain Cavalry regiments is, from first to last, a military scheme to meet the exigencies of the situation. No pressure of any sort has been put upon the Commander-in-Chief to carry out such reduction. It was first initiated by the late Commander-in-Chief, and carried through under the auspices of the present Commander-in-Chief, after very careful consideration on his part as to the best method of effecting the reduction.
The noble Lord, Lord Sydenham, has practically said that we were bringing about these reductions in India at great peril to the British raj. May I assure him that that was not our idea, and that we had examined that question before we made any suggestions with regard to reduction. I would draw a distinction between troops which are required for the external defence of India and those which are required for internal security. As regards those required for external defence on the frontier and in connection with Afghanistan, no reduction was contemplated. In the scheme that we considered it was clearly laid down that there would be no reduction of British divisions which were essential for security from external invasion or disturbance.
When one comes to the question of whether it is possible to reduce the troops required for internal security, I would remind your Lordships of what I have already pointed out in connection with the expenditure on the Army, that as regards material and equipment our Army in India now is many times stronger than 190 it was in 1913 and 1914. We have machine guns and Lewis guns to an extent which is colossal as compared with 1913 and 1914. We have a large motor transport service which did not exist at all in those years. We now have aeroplanes, and it is contemplated that we shall also have tanks. In all these respects the Indian Army has a vastly greater military strength than it had in 1913 and 1914. I think we may very fairly draw the deduction that for the purpose of internal security a single company of 1921, with its machine guns and Lewis guns and its capacity to get about the country by means of motor transport, can almost do the work of a battalion of 1913 and 1914. On that point I found that my civilian colleagues largely agreed with me.
It is natural that His Excellency Lord Rawlinson, the Commander-in-Chief, did not see altogether eye to eye with us. But no man could have worked more loyally, and with a greater desire to meet the financial side of the situation, than did Lord Rawlinson. He showed himself most reasonable and most ready in every way to try to meet our financial position. That question, however, is really immaterial, because we found, when we proposed this to His Majesty's Government, that the system of troops in India was so inextricably hound up with the British troops in England, owing to the system of linked battalions, that it was impossible for us to reduce any British troops in India without giving longer notice than had been proposed.
The whole question of the British troops has therefore been postponed for consideration at both ends—in India by a Committee of the Executive Council. Had I remained as Viceroy in India I should have myself served on that Committee, because I can conceive of no consideration which is of greater importance to the whole question of the military strength of India than the ratio of British to Indian troops. When I left India, the matter had been settled in England. The noble Earl, Lord Lytton, will doubtless inform us as regards India. It was settled that in England this matter should be taken up before a Sub-Committee of the Imperial Defence Committee. At both ends it will be very carefully considered, and I feel confident that when Lord Sydenham hears that this is what is proposed and is being done, he will feel complete confidence in the two bodies who are now carefully giving their consideration to this most important matter.
THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (THE EARL OF LYTTON)My Lords, I think I can best answer Lord Sydenham's Question by first of all stating as clearly as I can the actual facts regarding the reductions in the Indian Army which have already been approved. I have already dealt with this matter on a previous occasion, but I should like to remind your Lordships what these reductions actually are. The total establishment of fighting units in India—that is, exclusive of troops at Aden, in the Persian Gulf, and in overseas garrisons outside India and Burma—the total strength allowed for in the Budget for 1.921–1922 is less than the corresponding figures for. 1914 by about 6,000 British ranks and 7,500 Indian ranks. With regard to British troops, the reduction has come about in this way. During the war a number of British units were withdrawn from service in India for service elsewhere, with the result that the numbers now are less than those before the war by one British Cavalry regiment and six British infantry battalions. With regard to the Indian troops the reduction of eighteen Cavalry regiments—that is, from 39 to 21—has been sanctioned, as I explained on a previous occasion, the Infantry battalions remaining the same.
As Lord Chelmsford has just reminded your Lordships, these reductions were made with the unanimous approval of the Government of India and with the complete assent of the late and the present Commanders-in-Chief. The reasons for them were, I think, as follows. In consequence of the improved equipment of the Army by the introduction of Lewis guns and Hotchkiss guns, by the improved machine guns and by the addition of armoured cars, tanks and aeroplanes, it was possible, in the opinion of the military advisers of the Government of India, to make these reductions in numbers without reducing the fighting efficiency of the Army. Lord Chelmsford has told your Lordships that in his opinion the Army to-day, in spite of these reductions, is far stronger and more capable of meeting the requirements of at any rate the internal situation in India than it was, with larger numbers, in 1914.
I am anxious to dwell upon this point, because on the last occasion when we debated the subject I was asked a supplementary question by Lord Crewe, and I said then that I thought the introduction of an Air Force had largely influenced the 192 minds of those who had advised a reduction in the Army. I want to correct the impression which I then conveyed. Certainly the introduction of an Air Force was one of the factors, but it was only one factor. The better equipment of the Army, the better weapons, and, above all, the introduction of armoured cars, were matters which I think were even more important factors than the existence of an Air Force.
Those reductions, as I have said, have been made with the unanimous approval of the Government of India. They have been sanctioned by the Secretary of State, and they bring the Army of India to numbers which represent a provisional post-war strength of that Army. It is true, as Lord Chelmsford has told us, that the Government of India wished to make further reductions in the numbers of the personnel beyond a point to which the present Commander-in-Chief was prepared to agree, and possibly it is to those reductions that my noble friend has referred in his Question. The object of the Government of India in desiring to make further reductions was to reduce their present heavy military expenditure, and in this they were certainly neither alone nor peculiar. Even my noble friend himself, I think, would admit that it is desirable to reduce. expenditure upon armaments, provided it is safe to do so.
The whole question really being what it is safe to do, my noble friend has given your Lordships reasons why, in his opinion, no further reductions should be made in the Indian Army at the present moment, and why, in fact, even those reductions that have been sanctioned were possibly not consistent with considerations of safety. I would very briefly remind your Lordships of some reasons why every effort should and must be made to reduce expenditure upon armaments in India, as well as in other countries. They are reasons which, in the main, are common to all countries, reasons of which we are very conscious in this country, but many of them are reasons which weigh even more strongly in India than they do here. During the war expenditure upon armaments became so enormous that every other branch of the administration was necessarily starved, and the commercial, industrial and economic life of the nation, which 'was completely at a standstill during the war, is now anxious to expand, and for its expansion requires the expenditure of public money.
193 Two results, in particular, were caused by the war, both of which necessitate increased expenditure at the present time. They are both reflected in the figures which Lord Chelmsford has given to your Lordships of the present military expenditure in India. The first is an improved standard of comfort, and the second is the increased cost of almost every article. Money is wanted to-day for education, for houses, for rates, for every kind of development, and, above all, to meet the recent rise in wages; and I would remind your Lordships that the rise in wages applies also to the pay of the naval and military Forces. In consequence of the increased pay, of the improved equipment-, and of the increased cost of everything, Lord Chelmsford has told us that the Army in India to-day is costing three times what it cost in 1914. Those are reasons which make it imperative for the Government of India to endeavour to reduce its expenditure on this head. Lord Sydenham has told us that in his view it is not safe at the present time to contemplate making economies by further reducing the strength of the Army, and he has referred to a number of incidents which he is right in thinking are a cause of great anxiety to those responsible for maintaining public order in India to-day.
In regard to the letter from which he quoted, Lord Chelmsford has told your Lordships that that letter was not brought to his notice before he left India. I think it probable that it never would have been brought to the notice of the Government of India by the writer, and yet your Lordships, I think, will agree that if there is one person to whom the information contained in that letter is of the utmost importance it is the Viceroy, and his advisers. I can assure my noble friend, Lord Sydenham, therefore, that as soon as I became aware of the existence of that letter, and it was sent to me, we communicated by telegram with the Government of India to ask whether they were aware of the facts mentioned in it, and on learning from them that they have no knowledge of the incidents referred to, we shall send the letter to the Government of India, in order that they may make investigations regarding the occurrence, and take what steps may be necessary to prevent any possibility of its recurrence.
But, whether the picture drawn by the noble Lord is exaggerated or not, it is 194 undoubtedly true that the situation is, and has been for a long time, very anxious, and, because of the existing unrest in India, we are told that it is really not possible to contemplate further reductions in the Army. But the Government of India have to consider the cause of the existing unrest and to deal with the removal of those causes, if possible, as well as with the suppression of unrest where it is evidenced. One cause, at any rate, of unrest in India to-clay undoubted] y is the intolerable burden of taxation— a burden which we feel greatly in this country, but which is felt even more greatly in India. Consequently, the strongest possible pressure is put upon the Government, by public opinion in India, to produce economies, if possible, and naturally, after the successful issue of the war, to reduce expenditure upon armaments, if possible. It was natural, therefore, I think, that there should be some difference of opinion between the civil and military advisers of the Viceroy, or at any rate that the civil and military advisers should look at the question from slightly different points of view, one body desiring to reduce the military expenditure in order to make the country more contented, the other advising that so long as unrest existed it was not safe to make further reductions.
The proposed reductions and the opinions of the Government of India and of the Commander-in-Chief were conveyed, of course, to the Secretary of State, and he had to decide what action he should take in the matter. I need not assure your Lordships that the Secretary of State and his advisers at the India Office felt the utmost sympathy with the Government of India in their desire to effect greater economy. But on one thing we were quite determined, and that was that though the Army in India ought to be reduced to the minimum which was compatible with safety, considerations of safety, and not of economy, must ultimately be the determining factor. I feel sure that my noble friend will be glad to know that that was the view taken by the Secretary of State in Council, and that although he is entirely with the Government of India in wanting to effect such economy as can be made consistently with the military needs of the situation, he is also determined that whatever Army is necessary—and, in the opinion of the body to whom it has been referred, necessary for the external and internal defence of India,—that Army must be maintained.
195 The question, therefore, is not what Army can we afford, but what is the minimum force which the military situation in India requires? The Government have decided to submit this question to a body which, I feel sure my noble friend will agree, is the most competent body to give us advice on the subject— namely, the Committee of Imperial Defence. That Committee will, of course, hear all sides of the question, and, as Lord Chelmsford has reminded your Lordships, the Viceroy is appointing a Committee of his Executive Council to prepare material to lay before the Committee of Imperial Defence. The Secretary of State has given an assurance in the House of Commons that, until this Committee of Imperial Defence has made its report, no further reductions beyond the point to which I referred at the beginning of my remarks will be sanctioned.
I have not entered, and I do not propose to enter, into a discussion of the merits of either the reductions which have been made, or those which have been suggested for the future. I do not propose to take up the point raised by Lord Sydenham as to whether it is, or is not, safe at this moment to make further reductions, because the matter is at the moment sub judice, and it is being considered by a body far more competent to give an opinion on the subject than I am. I hope, therefore, your Lordships will agree that the Government has taken the best steps for determining what are the military requirements of the situation, and I have assured your Lordships that, when that is determined, they will not agree to reducing the Army below what is necessary in view of that military situation. They have also given an assurance that no further reductions will be made until the Committee of Imperial Defence has expressed its opinion. My noble friend will see that whilst that Committee is pursuing its labours it would not be possible for me to undertake to produce the opinion of individuals who will appear and give evidence before it, or to lay any Papers on the subject. I hope that he will be satisfied with the assurance I have given him, and that I have been able to remove some, at any rate, of his anxieties.
§ LORD SYDENHAMI beg leave to withdraw my Motion.
§ Motion, by leave, withdrawn.