§ LORD LAMINGTONrose to ask the Under-Secretary of State for India what are the reasons for not appointing a Committee of expert engineers to consider the advisability of carrying out the proposed Sukkur barrage on the I Indus. The noble Lord said: I am not at this hour of the night going to venture to give your Lordships' House any detailed information about the project proposed, vast and important though it is. I have had some correspondence with my noble friend, the Under-Secretary of State for India on the subject. Put very briefly it is in connection with a 323 proposal which has been adumbrated for a num her of years of increasing the cultivable area of central Sind by a system of canals. One of the chief canals is called the Rohri Canal. Why it has not been undertaken in the past is owing to different vicissitudes, but I think all the expert opinion agrees that it has been too long delayed. It would probably have been put into operation except for the fact that in 1912 there was a big irrigation project in the Punjaub, and it was thought that the waters then withdrawn from the Indus for this scheme would reduce the flow of the Indus to such an extent that it would be impossible to carry out successfully the Rohri Canal scheme. Events have proved that this was a false expectation.
§ Then was considered the question of building a barrage to hold up the waters to enable the Rohri Canal to be built, and also a new system of canals on the right bank of the Indus. All have to say is that the barrage enormously adds to the expense of the scheme. At the place where it was originally projected a great band of rock crosses the Indus, and that was the site selected for the dam. Even that site, though it offers all the facilities of a rock foundation, has certain difficulties. It was then considered desirable to look for other sites. However, now the engineers of Bombay have derided upon a site only 6,000 yards below this great band of rock, on the sand. But it is very much feared that if a great dam is executed there the waters of the Indus will be so held up that it will be quite possible they might break out a new route and possibly cut a channel to the west of the town of Sukkur, leaving the railway bridge perfectly useless, and also, perhaps, doing grave destruction to the systems of irrigation already working.
§ In addition, if this dam were built, it would mean an enormous increase to the cost of the work, and also —and it is to this that the point of my question is particularly directed—in building tie barrage first instead of commencing with the Rohri Canal the dam would be built at a quicker rate than the canal could be cut, and for a number of Years the capital suit]; in building the dam would practically be unproductive—perhaps for five or six years Of 'course, the extra expense incurred would also entail raising the assessments paid by the cultivators for the use of water. Those who have examined the figures maintain that the cost of this barrage or dam would 324 be greatly minimised, but it would be far in excess of the sum that has been put down to it. Those who think that this is a mistaken policy contend that the canal ought to be first commenced, because as soon as the first two sections are cut there will at once be a productive income.
§ In 1913 a Committee was appointed to inquire into the whole question and it was decided that the completion of the canal and barrage should be simultaneous. The canal would take longer than the barrage, and should be the work to be undertaken first. In the opinion of many engineers, if the Rohri Canal were cut it would be found that there would be sufficient water flowing to obviate the building, of the barrage at all. It would be better to corn-mince with the canal. Then there would be time to see what amount of water was to be obtained from the Indus and also time for an examination as to the best site for the barrage.
§ I could quote the opinions of many eminent engineers in the matter, but I will be content. with mentioning that of Sir Murdoeh Macdonald, who, having gone into the question, said that he could not understand why any one should propose to build the barrage first. During the first period the natural levels of the river were at all times high enough to supply- water over a large area. That is the opinion of an eminent engineer, and it is impossible to understand; why the authorities should determine on beginning the work on the barrage first. All I ask is that the Government of India should consider whether an inquiry is not desirable in the face of so many expert opinions. I. presided at a meeting in London the other day where there was not one person who did not agree as to the undesirability of commencing the barrage first and inquired what earthly reason there. was for the Government of India to force this costly and expensive work as the first undertaking, instead of taking the advice so often given that it was the Rohri Canal that should be commenced first.
THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (THE EARL OF LYTTON)My Lords, the Sukkur barrage scheme to which the noble Lord has referred is an immense undertaking of irrigation development which has been prepared by the Government of Bombay, and which if it can be successfully carried 325 out is expected to make the Province of sind one of the largest cotton-growing districts within the Empire. It has recently attracted some attention in London, because at a meeting of the East India Association it was adversely criticised by Dr. Summers and ether distinguished engineers who have now retired from the service of the Government in India. There are two features of the scheme, the first financial, the second technical. The noble Lord touched upon both In its financial aspect—involving such questions as how the money is to be found, whether the estimates as to cost are reliable, and whether the scheme is likely to be remunerative—it has not yet been approved. This matter has been referred back to the Government of India, by whom it is now being considered. I shall therefore say nothing about that aspect The technical aspect of it—involving the site of the barrage, design, construction, etc—has been approved by the Secretary of State and it is this approval to which my noble friend takes exception. He has supported the view taken by Dr. Summers that the building of the barrage should be postponed until after the construction of the Rohri Canal. I shall riot, of course, argue the merits of the case with my noble friend, but I can tell him that on this point the unanimous opinion of irrigation experts in India is against him. Those who have studied the question recently on the spot, consider that if the irrigated area were greatly increased without building the barrage a season of short rainfall might produce a calamity so grave that no Government could take the risk of such a possibility.
In view of the opinion recently expressed at the meeting to which I have referred the Secretary of State has been asked whether he will refer the matter to a committee of experts before giving his approval. The Secretary of State replied in the House of Commons on August 2, that he had already given his approval to the scheme, subject to a further consideration of its finance, and that he did not propose to adopt the course suggested. My noble friend now asks me to give him the reasons for this decision. They are: (1) That in the seven years which have intervened since the Committee of experts reported in 1913, the whole problem has been exhaustively re-examined by the best irrigation engineers and revenue officers in Bombay, who have recommended the present scheme; and (2) That t he Government of 326 India is satisfied that the, present scheme is free from the objections raised by the Committee of 1913 to the earlier scheme Of course, this is not a. matter on which desire to dogmatise, nor I am sure would the Secretary of State refuse to adopt the course which my noble friend suggests if there were good grounds for doing so.
I submit that there a re only two grounds which would justify the Secretary of State in referring this matter to yet another committee. They are: (1) if there were any difference of opinion amongst the expert advisers of the Government of India; and (2) if he had any reason to doubt the competence of those who have given the advice. Neither of these two conditions exists. The advice has been unanimous and it has been given, by competent engineers with the most recent experience of the problem. You cannot go on referring a matter front one set of experts to another indefinitely. This is no new question. It has been examined most exhaustively and the present scheme represents the most recent and I think I may say final judgment on the matter. In such matters there must he some finality. When the Government has obtained the best expert advice available and is prepared to take the responsibility of acting upon it, the Secretary of State is not disposed to withhold his approval.
§ LORD LAMINGTONI beg to thank the noble Earl for his reply. At, the same time I think it is eminently- unsatisfactory. We have never had the names of any of the experts who gave advice which is in flat contradiction of the opinion of the committees appointed by Lord Curzon in 1902–3 and again in 1913. There is nothing to show that the enormous expense which is going to be incurred—
§ LORD LAMINGTONI regret very ranch that the Secretary of State is so obdurate in this matter and only hope that those responsible may be surcharged any expense.