HL Deb 24 November 1920 vol 42 cc513-626

Debate on the Amendment moved by the EARL OF DUNRAVEN to the Motion that the Bill be now read 2a—namely, to leave out all the words after "that" and insert "this House declines to proceed with a Bill which meets with no support from the great majority of the Irish people, and affords no prospect of any permanent settlement"—resumed (according to Order).

VISCOUNT GREY OF FALLODON

My Lords, I have taken part only twice in discussions in this House, and then on comparatively trivial and passing matters when I was still at the Foreign Office. I have therefore never before heard an Irish debate in this House. But I have heard many Irish debates, and I have never yet heard one which was so conspicuously free from Party spirit or any attempt to make Party capital as the debate which I heard last night in your Lordships' House. I could not help feeling as I listened that, so far as this House is concerned at any rate, the atmosphere and the opportunity for the settlement of the Irish question are such as have never been before. I wish we could feel that it was so elsewhere, and particularly in Ireland.

I am afraid that your Lordships may think it a little irrelevant for me to go so far back as I want to go for a moment into political history, but it is of the very essence of the Irish question that you cannot approach the events of any day in Ireland, or any Bill, without Irish history in your mind. If, so far as our recollection on this side of St. George's Channel is concerned, the roots of the Irish difficulty are not deeply set in history, they are in Ireland. I do not know whether it is confirmed in the two volumes recently published of Lord Beaconsfield's biography—I have not been able to verify it—but I have always heard that his last word on leaving office, indicating the great political difficulty which he saw ahead of this country, was "Ireland." That was forty years ago, in 1880. What has been the history since that warning was given? Some of your Lordships have been in active political life for the whole of those forty years. I have been in active political life for thirty-five years, since I was first elected to the House of Commons. During the whole of that period, with the exception of the years when we were actually engaged in war, the Irish question has been pre-eminent as a matter of controversy between Parties, as a pre-occupation of Governments, as a question which has exhausted the House of Commons, at times has strained our Constitution, and has been directly and indirectly prejudicial to the working of our political system. The amount of effort which both Parties have devoted to the Irish question in those forty years is more ham can be estimated. And at the end of it, what do we find? The state of things as it is in Ireland to-day. It is, and must be, a tragic reflection for those who have been in political life for the last forty years, to whatever Party they have belonged.

In that spirit I would approach the consideration of this Bill—in the spirit of reflection which comes from thinking of what has passed in those forty years and the result that we have to-day. It will lead me to no Party reflection. The noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack, to whom I am grateful and, I should think, the whole House is grateful for the tone he set in the debate last night, said one bold, but, as I think, true thing. He bracketed the danger of the Irish question with the danger which we have just escaped in the Great War, and towards the end of his speech he coupled the sense of achievement that this generation might feel if they had settled the Irish question with the sense of achievement which they do feel in having passed through the struggle of the Great War successfully. That means that in the Irish question we are in the presence of a great danger, in face of which we must sink our Party feelings as much as we did during the War. It is easy for either of us to make Party capital out of the events of the last forty years. It is easy for Unionists to say that had there been no Home Rulers they would have settled the Irish question. It is equally easy for Home Rulers to say that but for the existence of Unionists they, in the course of the last forty years, would have settled the Irish question by Home Rule. It is easy for either Party to make Party capital, but it is as futile as it is easy. In what I have to say I shall try to make the reflections upon past mistakes as free from that spirit as possible.

The questions I put to myself are these—In these years of failure where have we gone wrong? What are the mistakes that we have made? What is the real cause of failure? The noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack was very frank so far as Unionism was concerned. He said, indeed, that he was still a Unionist, but that he had come to the conclusion that the maintenance of the Union was impossible; and the majority of those who founded their policy upon the maintenance of the Union have now, I believe, abandoned that as a possible policy and are looking for a solution in some other way. The position, so far as they are concerned, is perfectly frank and very emphatic. Have we who have been Home Rulers got anything to learn by reflecting on the past? I think the mistake that we as Home Rulers have made from the beginning was that we did not sufficiently realise the absolute necessity of taking into consideration the feeling of Ulster. I believe that if, at the very beginning of the Home Rule departure in 1886, it had been laid down as an axiom that though Ireland was to be united there must be within that united Ireland autonomy for the Protestant counties of Ulster, we might have made more progress than we have. I am not sure that we should have done it, because we should have had to convince the Nationalist, that autonomy for the Protestant counties of Ulster was an essential condition of any progress in Home Rule, and I do not think Nationalist opinion at that time was prepared to admit that.

The result was that we introduced Home Rule Bills which had the support of Nationalist Ireland but were bitterly opposed by the Protestant representation of Ulster, and owing to that opposition they failed to get through Parliament in this country. Now the Government are doing just the other thing. They have got the support of the Protestant representatives of Ulster. They are bringing forward a Bill that will not founder on that rock, for it is now supported by the Protestant Members of Ulster. But it is a Bill which is rejected and refused not only by extreme but by moderate opinion in the rest of Ireland. Has that really any better chance of success than our previous Home Rule Bills had? Is it not likely to be true that, though our Home Rule Bills failed in Parliament here up to quite the very end, this Bill, though it may get through Parliament here, will fail in working in Ireland?

I come from that reflection to this. What has been the real cause of failure to settle the Irish question? I believe that the real cause has been the difference of opinion in Ireland itself, and that in which British Governments have been most to blame has not been the detail of their particular proposals, but in their failure to recognise (whether they have been Unionists or Home Rulers) that until those differences between the two parts of Ireland were composed there could be no real settlement of the Irish question. That I believe is the deepest cause of failure. I think that our method of trying to settle the question has been wrong, because our method has not tended to compose the differences. The Bills which we introduced as Home Rulers positively inflamed the differences between Ulster and the rest of Ireland. This Bill, to put it mildly, has not made the differences less. On the contrary, though our Bills made Ulster exceedingly bitter, this Bill, while conciliating Ulster, has brought out a difference of opinion, a cleavage, which does not follow exactly the same line as any previous cleavage in Ireland, because it has put the moderates—even some of those who were Unionists in Ireland—besides those who have always been Nationalists, in opposition to the Ulster position.

I believe that it would have been much better—I think it would be much better even now—if, instead of the British Government producing a large and detailed Bill, they had started by laying down the broad lines of the limits in which Ireland could have complete autonomy, stating the minimum which we in this country must reserve for the safety and security not merely of ourselves but really of Ireland too. And I see three things which are absolutely essential. Foreign affairs is one. As regards Foreign affairs, I would say nothing except that I would put Ireland precisely in the same position as the great self-governing Dominions are now in, with the same right to be consulted, the same right about commercial treaties, but leaving, as now, one foreign policy in the hands of the Imperial Government.

The next thing is the Army. There can be but one Army in the modern sense of the word in these two Islands. It is impossible to have divided military authority. I should not contemplate the maintenance of any Imperial troops in Ireland after Home Rule was passed unless the Irish Government itself desired it, and I should see no danger in an Irish Government raising a local force for home defence. What is a local force for home defence is a detail which might be left to be defined later on. But when we come to the Navy I am perfectly certain, and the history of the late war shows it, that unless there be only one Navy and one naval authority neither Ireland nor Great Britain can be defended.

NOBLE LORDS

Hear, hear.

VISCOUNT GREY OF FALLODON

That must be without qualification. I would explain on that why it is that I am a little reluctant to use the phrase Dominion Home Rule. As far as the Navy is concerned, unless I am mistaken, naval arrangements with the self-governing Dominions are not quite the same now as they were before the war. I think that some of the naval bases which were under Admiralty control before the war have now been handed over to the Governments of the self-governing Dominions. Therefore when you are talking about Dominion Home Rule from the point of view of the Navy you have to ask, "Do you mean pre-war Dominion Home Rule, or post-war Dominion Home Rule for your arrangements with regard to the Navy?" I have no complaint whatever regarding what the Government may have done respecting the self-governing Dominions thousands of miles away on the other side of the oceans, and I feel with regard to Dominion Home Rule that it is a thing which may vary from day to day. It is in fact what the self-governing. Dominions say it is. It may be one thing to-day, it may be another thing a year hence. With regard to Ireland we must from the beginning have no ambiguity, and, whatever may happen thousands of miles away on the other side of the oceans, we must be perfectly clear with regard to the question of the Navy with two Islands so closely together. Under modern condi- tions of mines and submarines it is absolutely inconsistent, with the safety of either that there should be divided naval authority.

NOBLE LORDS

Hear, hear.

VISCOUNT GREY OF FALLODON

I want to make that very clear, because nothing could be worse, when we are stating a minimum and trying to make in the eyes of Ireland our concession as large as possible, than that we should leave anything ambiguous and un explained which would cause us to seem to take back afterwards something that we were thought to have given. That is the negative part of the matter, and that, I think, must be done by the British Government. I think much the better course would have been to leave to Ireland itself what I call the positive part of the matter; to leave Ireland itself to say within those limits what form of Government it really desired. That means, of course, a Convention or a Constituent Assembly.

I admit that when I advocated that some weeks ago the state of Ireland was not what it is to-day. With all that has happened in the last few weeks I do not know that one could possibly, advocate that as a practical course at the moment, but if we are not actually on the eve of a settlement of the Irish question the time may conic when the Government, this House, and the House of Commons, may have to consider that method of procedure again. It is said that such an Assembly in Ireland would never agree. The Convention, from all we hear, very nearly did agree; it was the nearest approach to a real settlement by agreement—by Irish agreement—that we have ever reached.

NOBLE LORDS

Hear, hear.

VISCOUNT GREY OF FALLODON

It failed but it failed not by much, and the fact that it did fail is not so much, I think, a reason for not trying it again, as the fact that it so nearly succeeded is an argument in favour of its being the most hopeful method.

My Lords, I feel that something more is needed from us to improve the chance of Irish agreement. I do not go the whole length that the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack went yesterday about the, difference between the two parts of Ireland being irreconcilable. It is true that the difference is very bitter, and I believe that we should do more than we have ever done hitherto to make those two parts of Ireland face their own difficulty instead of our trying to face it for them. Hitherto the Protestant part of Ulster has felt that if only it could defeat the Home Rule Bills the British Government would be left in the position of coercing the rest of Ireland. The Nationalists in their turn have not faced up to the. Ulster difficulty because they have thought either that the Ulster difficulty was not so serious as it was or else that it was the business of the British Government to get over the Ulster difficulty for them. I would have it clearly understood in Ireland that we will not go on indefinitely being manœuvred into the position either of coercing Nationalist Ireland or coercing Ulster. I believe the greatest lever we could bring to bear to induce a settlement between the two parts of Ireland would be to make it perfectly clear that they cannot rely on the British Government indefinitely continuing to govern Ireland or any part of Ireland by force.

This leads me to the statement I made some time ago, upon which the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack adverted last night. I said that the British Government should make it plain that at the end of two years it would no longer make itself responsible for the management of Irish internal affairs. The noble and learned Lord said that at the end of that two years the South of Ireland would fly at the throat of the North. He spoke of that as a certainty. He said that the differences between them were age-long and were not to be composed in two years. I do not believe that would happen. I have always felt that the comparatively rich, strong, and compact Protestant part of Ulster was perfectly able to take care of itself, and that the last thing the rest of Ireland would do would be to attempt to coerce or attack it; and I believe that still.

If the differences between the two are so irreconcilable, what becomes of all the provisions in the present Bill, the potential provisions which contemplate the two parts coming together for a United Ireland? If those differences are so irreconcilable as the Lord Chancellor said, then all those provisions in the Bill contemplating the two parts coming together to make a United Ireland are so much paper. I do not believe the differences are irreconcilable provided both sides were convinced that the responsibility for the government of Ireland and the future of Ireland really rested with them, and provided they saw the necessity as well as the opportunity of coming to some agreement with each other.

But I have a further qualification to make about that statement with regard to the two years. I agree that in human affairs no Government and no individual can say with absolute certainty that at a specified day or at the end of a specified time he will do a certain thing. Circumstances may be too strong for him. I wrote that before anything was known about reprisals. I do not wish to bring into this debate a matter which, naturally, must raise controversy and heat. But when the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack said that keeping the armed forces of the Crown in Ireland for another two years, as I proposed, exposed to murder would be so unthinkable that it would be better to withdraw them at once, I say frankly that with the present state of things in Ireland were I writing now I would never for a moment advocate that the armed forces of the Crown should necessarily be kept there for another two years or for any specified time.

We are moved with almost intolerable indignation at the murders which have taken place in Ireland. We are also moved with astonishment, almost with incredulity, also with great anxiety, about what we have heard as to the forces of the Crown getting out of hand in Ireland. I am not speaking of what appears in the newspapers so much as of what many of us hear that in military opinion the conditions under Which the Army is kept in Ireland to-day are such as are undermining and must undermine morale and discipline. I withdraw my statement about the two years in face of what is happening now unless the Government can assume direct, real, and effective control of what is being done in Ireland. I wish them to have all powers of punishing crime and preventing crime, but I wish those powers to be exercised with real direction and control which is consistent with efficiency and discipline. Unless that can be done then I will meet what the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack said last night by saying I agree it would be better that the forces of the Crown should be withdrawn.

I will say no more on that bitter subject, but I should not like it to be supposed for many reasons that I had advocated that the forces of the Crown should be retained in Behind under such conditions as are existing at the present time. I had contemplated, at the time I said that, that if the Government made a real offer which appealed to moderate opinion in Nationalist Ireland the outrages and murders would have ceased, and that for the two years that followed the armed forces of the Crown would have had a comparatively quiet and easy task. I do not say that the fact that the Government had not made such an offer is any palliation of the murders which had taken place before. Nor is the fact that they have not yet made such an offer any palliation of the murders which have taken place recently. On the contrary, if such an offer had been made it would have been the duty of the Government still to do their utmost to discover and punish those who had committed the murders which had already taken place. But I did contemplate, and I believe I was right in contemplating at the time I wrote that, that if the Government had come forward with such an offer as I have been indicating the duties and the position of the forces of the Crown in Ireland would for those two years not have been what the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack assumed they would be—that they would have been comparatively satisfactory and easy.

Now I come to the actual Bill. I have said what I think would be the best method of procedure. I have said that in the present deplorable state of Ireland I am not sure that a Constituent Assembly or a Convention is practicable at the moment. And therefore I do not urge my preference for that method of procedure as a reason for voting against the present Bill. And I have a personal explanation to make to your Lordships for which I must apologise, but which I fear is inevitable. I am engaged to-morrow to make a speech on a public matter of interest but not of party controversy—I think hardly controversial at all—at Liverpool. I fear that I am to be the chief speaker. The meeting was fixed months ago to suit my convenience, and it would be most unfair for me to cancel all that at the last moment, unless indeed my single vote in this House was of such public importance that I thought it right to put the people on the spot to such great inconvenience.

I therefore cannot be present to vote to-morrow evening, and I make that explanation for two reasons. One is that I hope your Lordships will feel that, if I am not present to-morrow evening after having obtruded a speech of my own in the debate, my absence will not arise from any discourtesy or indifference to other speakers. On the contrary, it is a matter of great regret to me that I cannot be present. But as I cannot record my vote I feel that I must ask your Lordships to let me explain a little in detail what I feel as to how I should vote.

I could not have voted for Lord Willoughby de Broke's Motion: I am not sure I should not have voted against it. I could not have voted for it for precisely the same reasons for whirl;—as he explained so frankly and honourably last night, as far as he himself is concerned —though he might vote for Lord Dunraven's Motion, he could not vote for any Motion the direct object of which was, not to defeat Home Rule, but to produce an enlarged Rome Rule Bill. Therefore I should be reluctant to give any vote which would give the Government the impression that this House was so divided in its opinion about the Irish question that it was impossible for the Government to make progress with any solution of it. I am sure that would not represent the general impression of the House. But if the Bill was defeated by people going into the Lobby for entirely opposite reasons, that would be the conclusion which the Government might justly draw.

On the other hand, what I should like to do is to vote for a Motion which would make the Government feel that it was difficult, if not impossible, to get this Bill through the House as it stands, but that a larger and a better Bill would have an easy and successful passage. That is the way I should desire to use my vote. And if it be that a Motion is before the House which will give the Government time to consider more especially the financial part, which the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack told us last night under certain conditions he would be prepared to consider, that is the Motion for which I should desire to vote.

Now, let me explain why I feel so strongly about the Bill as it stands. First of all, it scents to we to stereotype partition. I was very much struck by the word "finality" in the Duke of Abercorn's speech last night. What did he mean by "finality?" This Bill has in it no finality: it has some potentialities. What did the noble Duke mean by "finality"? Did he mean that this Bill put Ulster in a position in which she would be done with further solutions of the Irish question—a position which she would maintain definitely? If so, then the Bill is going to be used to stereotype partition. I am quite sure that in partition there is no finality.

The other point on which the Bill falls short is finance. On finance I go further, perhaps, than many noble Lords are prepared to go who think the provisions of the Bill inadequate on finance. I would take the long view with regard to Ireland. If you look back into history— not the last few years, but into history—the balance on finance with regard to Ireland is heavily against us. I believe, even as a mere matter of accountancy, it can be shown that Ireland in the years when she was poor, with her dwindling population was paying an undue share. I do not say that it was intentional on our part, but it was the fact of a poor country being linked up with a rich country that made her suffer financially. If you are going into indirect matters, such as the suppression of Irish trade, you go through a melancholy time when this country was growing in population and wealth and Ireland was diminishing in population and getting poorer, and the financial balance, if you take a real and just view of the whole of the transactions between the two Islands, is heavily against us.

To this day even moderate Irishmen believe that the reason why financial control is not given in this Bill is that we are still anxious that Ireland should not have her fair opportunities and fair scope. You have to get rid of that suspicion. In my opinion the best way of getting rid of it would be to treat Ireland as a self-governing Dominion, and to say frankly to her that we would take nothing from Ireland except what Ireland is prepared voluntarily to contribute. I know we shall be told by those who look at the last few years or at the present day that this is unheard of generosity, and entirely unjustifiable. If you take the long view of history I believe it is not generous; I believe it is not more than just. If you are to overcome all this old bitterness in Ireland, if, in the spirit of the conclusion of the speech of the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack, you are to seek for real reconciliation, I believe it will be not only financially just but essential to the spirit of the whole settlement that you should make a clean sweep of the financial question and say you will take what Ireland offers voluntarily, and that you will not make financial conditions, or anything short of absolute financial and fiscal freedom in Ireland a condition of the settlement. I would go as far as that.

The noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack dropped a very significant sentence on finance last night. I do not expect him or the Government to consider so far-reaching a financial proposition as I have put forward, but he did discuss in his speech the question of fiscal autonomy for Ireland. I understood him to be discussing the question of Customs and Excise and fiscal autonomy. He made no promise but if I remember his words correctly he said that if peace were offered the Government would examine and reexamine most carefully this financial question. If only the Government would go a little further and, instead of saying that if peace were offered they would give fiscal freedom to Ireland, would put it the other way round and give fiscal freedom to Ireland in the hope that it would produce peace, something might be made of this Bill. They must go further than they have done. The mere fact that the Lord Chancellor went so far as he did last night raises in my mind the question as to whether there is not yet time for the Government to make one or two alterations in their Bill which might just make the whole difference with regard to its reception in Nationalist Ireland.

I come now to the more serious part of the Irish question. Really if anything can be done to make the difference between this Bill proving a settlement or being a failure, the issue at stake is enormous. The Lord Chancellor spoke last night of the distrust and dislike felt towards us in some parts of the world, and he said frankly that this distrust and dislike was due to misapprehension—what he said was indefensible misapprehension, but still misapprehension—in connection with our treatment of Ireland. It is true that Ireland is a domestic question; as far as the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is concerned it is a purely domestic question. But it does differ from all other domestic questions, and it transcends them in importance as regards our international relations. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in replying to Lord Loreburn a few days ago, denied that we were unpopular in the world at all, and he said that he did not find it in the demeanour of Ambassadors and Ministers who came to see him. That is the last place in which you would expect to find it. You will not find it in the direct correspondence with other Governments, and if any foreign Government did raise the Irish question the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs would be perfectly entitled to reply that if the British Government within the boundaries of the United Kingdom was making mistakes, or was not acting satisfactorily, it was the business of the people of this country to correct those mistakes and that any other position was entirely inconsistent with our being a democracy.

But none the less it is quite title that though the Irish question is not, and I trust never will be, one with which the Foreign Office is officially concerned, it is as a matter of fact a greater obstacle as far as we are concerned to most important international good will and to that international public opinion on which good will depends than any of the questions which are dealt; with directly at the Foreign Office. The Irish race is a unit. Only a small proportion of it is in Ireland, and increasingly in the most important parts of the world as long as Ireland is irreconcilable that influence will be a sinister, malignant, and a detrimental one in our international affairs, and it will not only be in foreign countries but in. our self-governing Dominions as well.

It is quite true that at the present moment the self-governing Dominions as they read of these intolerable murders in Ireland, which make any dealing with the Irish question so difficult, are entirely in sympathy with anything the Government may do to punish criminals or any powers they may use provided they are used for the punishment of crime. But this question of murder is one which has been recurrent in Ireland and it is transitory. The abiding case of the Irish question is not in these things which are horrible symptoms of it. It lies much deeper, and more and more there has been growing in our self-governing Dominions in recent years a feeling of surprise, and they ask, Why cannot you do for Ireland something of the same sort of thing as is done for ourselves? On the settlement of the Irish question depends, I think, not merely a great deal in foreign relations but something in our relations with our self-governing Dominions.

Now how is this Bill going to work? It is accepted by Ulster, I am not sure that it is wanted by Ulster, but it is accepted by Ulster and Ulster will put it into operation. It is rejected by the rest of Ireland, and the rest of Ireland as far as we can see will not put it into operation. What will be the position? Ulster governing itself; Crown Colony government for the rest of Ireland as far as we are concerned—that is to say, governing the rest of Ireland by force. You cannot govern Ireland by force continually. You may put down a definite outbreak by force; that is the sort of thing you can do with the bayonet. But the saying attributed to Prince Bismarck remains true to-day, that you can do anything with the bayonet except sit upon it. What will happen if you have Crown Colony government for the rest of Ireland outside Ulster under this Bill? Will Ulster have a quiet time? There is a large minority in Ulster, and with the rest of Ireland seething with discontent the minority in Ulster is not likely to be very peaceable. I do not believe that either Ulster or the rest of Ireland can get a fair chance unless they both start together, and if you are to have Crown Colony government in the rest of Ireland while Ulster is working this Bill you will not only have trouble in Ulster but you will be playing into the hands of the extremists in Ulster and you will be playing into the hands of the extremists in the rest of Ireland.

I would, in conclusion, make an appeal to the Government. There are fears that if this Bill goes through as it is it will play into the hands of extremists in Ireland, and the state of things may get, I will not say worse, but will continue bad. There are also hopes that if it was a larger Bill improved in some particulars it might, instead of playing into the hands of the extremists, get the better of the extremists. Perhaps some people who know Ireland will tell me I do not know Ireland, and that any optimism of that kind is foolish. I do not base it on my own Opinion. I base it on the opinion of the Southern Unionists who do know Ireland and who live amongst the people in that part of Ireland; I take their view. They are the people who have most at stake, whose position is most precarious and most dangerous; they are the people—the Unionist minority in the South of Ireland—who cannot protect themselves, and they are the people who have most right to appeal to us to have their view considered. What is that view? As I understand it, it is that there is a vast moderate opinion in that part of Ireland which would assert itself if only there was a Bill which appealed to them. I do not believe you can get over the extremists in Ireland by force. I believe the only way in which you can overcome them is by bringing into action that moderate opinion which the Southern Unionists tell us does exist in Ireland. But you must arm that moderate opinion with the weapon of a settlement that really appeals to them. At present they are defenceless; they have nothing which enables them to assert themselves against the extremists, to bring over people to their own side. I believe the whole opportunity now is to make this Bill sufficiently large, sufficiently generous, or, as I would call it, just, to appeal to that moderate opinion, and in that way and that way alone I believe can you really overcome the extremists in Ireland who say they are irreconcilable.

I listened to the concluding appeal of the noble and learned Lord's speech from the Woolsack last night with profound feeling. His concluding words were very eloquent; they were inspired as I believe by sincere feeling; they spoke with hope and with sympathy of the Irish people. He spoke of them as a people "individual in its genius, tenacious in love or hate, captivating in its nobler moods," and his desire for reconciliation was intense. Nothing could have been better than the words he used. They moved me greatly as I heard them, and I am sure they must have moved others too. If only the Government would rise to something like the same height in their Bill and in their offer to Ireland as the Lord Chancellor did at the end of his speech! The words were worthy of a better Bill. Cannot we get a little encouragement from history? The Lord Chancellor said we had inherited a great Empire. So we have. This generation has inherited the. greatest Empire the world has ever known. That Empire has a history. It has not been without its reverses. It had one blow which at the tune was thought to be deadly—the loss of the American Colonies. What was the lesson of that loss? It came from not giving I in time and not giving enough. That was the warning.

Have we ever lost from giving too much? Of course, the Empire is a large term; you conic to native races in Africa to whom you can give no self-government, and there are degrees of fitness for self-government throughout the Empire. I am talking now of the Empire in the sense of its assembly of white communities. Have we ever lost by giving too much? I take the last instance of South Africa. One of the first things the Government of which I was a member did when it came into office was to grant complete self-governing Dominion rule to South Africa. We were blamed by many people at the time. It was thought to be too large; we were doing too much at once; the bitterness of the Boer War was too recent. We ourselves were confident that it was the right thing and the only thing to do, and that by being courageous, generous if you like to call it so, giving unqualifiedly, we were doing a thing that was safe. As we look back on it now the thing we did not only was safe, but it was done only just in time. If we had delayed, what would the effect have been? The time after all, considering the racial bitterness that there was in South Africa at the time when we gave self-government to them, was short. Before long we found ourselves involved in deadly peril, and when we were involved in that peril South Africa, owing solely to that grant of self-government, was not an anxiety to us but a help. I would say again, In all our history have we ever lost by giving too much? I would say to the Government, "I believe now you have an opportunity; it is not too late even yet. If you leave the Bill as it is I see nothing but the trouble in Ireland which I have described, and I see no prospect of reconciliation; but if you improve the Bill I do see a real prospect." In spite of what may appear to-day to some of us, I believe what Lord Dunraven said last night to be true—that there is an opportunity, and that there would be a response. I would not say to the Government, "Take warning from the history of the Empire," so much as I would say to them, "Take courage from the history of the Empire." It is not only from our failures that we need to take warning. We have had our successes, from which we may take courage; and I would say to the Government, "Do not throw away this opportunity, but make a greater effort to take advantage of it." In Irish history we have thrown away our opportunities before. Now, at this moment, the Government have the whole matter in their hands as no Government has yet had. If they like to introduce a larger Bill they can undoubtedly carry it through Parliament. They are in a position such as no other Government has ever had in the country. The need for taking advantage of the opportunity is greater than ever it wits, and my last word to the Government would be to implore them, while yet there is time, not to throw away the chance of giving to your Lordships. House an opportunity of passing a verdict upon a larger and a better Bill.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

My Lords, I feel very great. diffidence in following the magnificent speech to which you have just. listened. We may differ M. opinion as to the policy which the noble Viscount has put forward, but f do not think there will be the slightest difference of opinion in any part of the House that the loftiness of the tone, the broadness of tie outlook, and the statesmanlike character of the utterances to which we have just listened have never been surpassed, at any rate, in my time, in your Lordships' House. But we must, if I may say so to the noble Viscount, not be misled by the skill of his oratory into forgetting the essential elements of this problem. He related to your Lordships with the greatest frankness all the history of the successive failures to solve this Home Rule controversy, but does it not occur to him that it is a very wonderful thing that so many men of the highest ability—men whom he has been delighted to follow in past times—have tried their hands at solving the problem on these lines and failed. He admits that they failed. He admits that the policy they pursued was in essential principles a policy which did not succeed, and which looking back at he says ought not to have succeeded. The reason, of course, is that the essential conditions in Ireland are such that a solution on these lines is in the highest, degree difficult.

I was not quite sure, as I listened to the noble Viscount, how far he would have us go. At first he seemed to speak of limitations in the length of the concessions which he would be prepared to make, but as he warmed up towards the end of his speech there seemed to be no limit beyond which he would not be prepared to go, because he said, Have we ever made the mistake of giving too much? I would venture most respectfully to suggest to him that the reason why we have never solved the Irish problem, hitherto at any rate, upon these lines, is that the problem on these lines is insoluble. You cannot get rid of the fact that you have in Ireland two races, two religions, two sections of opinion, which stand up in sharp contrast to each other, with all the friction of history behind them, with no appearance of drawing together even now, as you may judge from the speech made last night by my noble friend the Duke of Abercorn, and which are not to be defined by the arbitrary lines of the six counties. When you have drawn your imaginary line and divided Ireland in two, you will have a Protestant minority in the South with a Catholic minority in the North. You will have the same difficulties on a smaller scale, but the same difficulties as you had before.

The other great difficulty, of course, is the geographical position of Ireland in respect of England. That, of course, the noble Viscount dealt with, and very effectively, but it makes an essential difference between the treatment of Ireland and the treatment, say, of South Africa. We cannot give to Ireland either positive or virtual independence. The thing is impossible. Our own safety forbids it. If this Bill ever becomes operative, what we must look to inevitably as the ultimate end of the Constitution of our country is something on Federal lines. There is no other issue. Once you grant self-government to Ireland you will have to grant self-government to Scotland and Wales. Therefore it is of the very essence of statesmanship riot to have conditions established in Ireland which would be wholly inapplicable to Scotland or Wales. You are bound absolutely geographically by those limits, past which you cannot go.

I will not, my Lords, dwell upon that aspect of the subject any longer, for many reasons, but for this among others—that I gather that the noble Viscount did not see his way to an immediate solution on the lines he suggested. He admitted that the condition of Ireland was such that the very able proposals which he put forward in his celebrated letter to The Times were no longer applicable. He did not think that the condition of order in Ireland made, it possible to look for a solution on the lines he suggested for the moment. Indeed, he thought that the assembly of a Convention was altogether out of the question as things stand. In those circumstances surely we must deal with the Bill which is before us. We must deal with the provisions of the Bill before us, and, though they are very attractive, not with the ultimate solutions to which the noble Viscount may look.

Looking at the Bill before us, what is the most striking feature of the debate to which we have listened hitherto Why that no one, so far as I have heard the debate, in his heart thoroughly approves of the provisions of this Bill. The speaker who came nearest to cordial approval was the Duke of Abercorn, and I think your Lordships will agree that one could perceive in his tone a certain hesitation. There were the ghosts of the old battles which we fought together for the Union. There was, perhaps, the thought of the three counties which the Ulster Party think it their duty—I do not question that they think it most convincingly—to abandon. Those considerations must make any Ulsterman at the present moment hesitate, and I am sure that the noble and learned Lord upon the Woolsack does not thoroughly approve of the provisions of this Bill. Ito protests in a most striking passage his adherence to his old Unionist faith, and it is only because he is satisfied that the condition of Parties in this country is such that his old Unionist faith is impracticable, that he reluctantly assents to the provisions of this Bill. The other speakers disapproved and they did so for this reason. This Bill can only work, if it is worked at all, through the loyal cooperation of the people of Ireland. That of course was at the back of the noble Viscount's criticisms, and it was at the back really of every speech. This Bill can only work through the loyal co-operation of the people of Ireland, and that loyal co-operation, for the moment at any rate, is entirely lacking. Those of your Lordships who spoke were convinced of that.

THE EARL OF SELBORNE

Absent in the South.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

My noble friend corrects me. May I remind your Lordships of the condition of things when last you had to consider a Govern ment Home Rule Bill? That was in 1912 and the years which succeeded it, ending in the Act of 1914. How different was the situation then. In one respect it was the same—that the House of Lords was averse from carrying Home Rule—but in all other respects how different it was! Those were the days of Mr. Redmond. Mr. Redmond led the majority of the Irish people. Mr. Redmond was a loyal subject of His Majesty. Mr. Redmond's policy was not a policy of separation. Mr. Redmond practically assented to the Bill of 1914. Be even assented, I think, practically to the separate treatment of Ulster. The only question which was left was what area was to be included in the separate treatment of Ulster.

What happened after that? I would say to your Lordships that it is impossible to ignore the history of Ireland since 1914. I know it is sometimes said in the newspapers that we are bound to pay no attention to it. I cannot think why. Why should we not pay attention to facts which have been brought before us so prominently as they have been since 1914? There was the rebellion of 1916, a most astonishing rebellion. Your Lordships will realise, I am sure, that at the time of that rebellion Home Rule was certain in Ireland. Mr. Redmond had successfully steered his ship into harbour and the fact of the cooperation of Ireland in the war, if it had taken place, would have made Home Rule perfectly certain. Yet the Irish did not co-operate. All the hopes—I do not think he had many—of the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack as to the co-operation of Ireland can be tested by their attitude in 1916. What followed? They refused to fight England's battles. Not all of them; there were some splendid Irishmen of course, but as a community they refused to subject themselves to the same obligations to fight the common enemy that we all had to assume and all were proud to assume. That was not all. It was not merely that they would not fight for England. The faction in Ireland which controlled Ireland was in league with the enemy. That cannot be doubted. I am sure that the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack and noble Lords. on the Treasury Bench will not doubt it.

We know it upon the authority of the Prime Minister, because he spoke of the conspiracy of 1918. He told us that— In 1918 there was an Army of over 150,000 men enlisted, who were engaged in a treasonable conspiracy, who were engaged in negotiations with the Germans, in correspondence with thorn, who had undertaken to attack Great Britain two months after the German offensive, This is the paradise in Ireland to which he wishes to bring us. Back— "He" was Mr. Asquith I think, but I do not wish to say anything about Mr. Asquith— Give us back the good old days of 1918! That was the time we discovered documents in the pockets of the men who at that moment— Your Lordships will mark these words— and are now the leaders of the South and West of Ireland, documents showing that there was an arrangement between theta and the Germans to attack us at the moment of our greatest peril. Are we not to pay attention to a fact of that kind, vouched to us by the Prime minister himself? What is true of the intrigues with Germany is probably true of intrigues with Bolshevist Russia. I cannot on that side quote anything so conclusive, bat your Lordships were present at a debate in this House last slimmer when my noble friend the Duke of Northumberland made a most striking speech in which he traced in detail the connection between the Irish Nationalists and the Bolshevists in Russia.

What other lessons have we been taught by Ireland since 1914? There are all the murders and outrages of the present day, culminating in an outrage so barbarous and so cruel that it has shocked the country from one end to the other. The relevance of these outrages is not in their extremity. That is not the point. There are scoundrels in every country. The point is that the people of Ireland, or a very large body of them, are accessories to the murders. They are either accessories before the fact or accessories after the fact. You cannot get them to show any public detestation of these outrages. Indeed, even the leaders of the Roman Catholic. Church in Ireland seem to hang back when called upon to denounce, as you would have thought they would have been ready to denounce these outrages. We must take note of these facts. These events have taken place since Home Rule—not the same Home Rule exactly as is contained in this Bill, but much on the lines of this Bill—was offered to the people of Ireland and practically assured to them.

THE EARL OF SELBORNE

It was on the Statute Book.

THE MARQUESS OP SALISBURY

It was on the Statute Book, and they could have had it. But they repudiated it in this positive way. They showed by their conduct that they did not want Home Rule of that kind and would not have it. It is impossible to get away from those facts. I do not believe that any member of your Lordships' House thinks at this moment that the Irish are fit for self-government. Certainly the Government do not think so, because they have inserted in their Bill a clause to deal with the case where the South of Ireland would be unwilling to work the Bill. That is an extraordinary mark of want of confidence in their own proposals. They anticipate that half the members of the House of Commons of Southern Ireland may not be elected and willing to take the oath of allegiance. I am almost inclined to say that the Government hope that will be the case, because I am quite sure they do not want to put Home Rule into force in the South of Ireland at the present moment, and that is the only thing, if this Bill passes as it stands—the reluctance of half the members of Southern Ireland to be elected and take the oath—which will stand between the Government and putting the Bill into force in Southern Ireland.

The noble and learned Lord said that he had some confidence that Sinn Fein members of Parliament would not take the oath of allegiance. I have no such confidence. I believe it to be true that every solicitor in Ireland takes the oath of allegiance, and I am sure that every borough magistrate does. I am certain, for example, that the late Lord Mayor of Cork had taken the oath of allegiance. If the noble and learned Lord relies upon that, I ant afraid he relies upon very flimsy support. But the noble and learned Lord did not altogether rely upon that. He said that if the Southern Irish members come to the Dublin Parliament and qualify, and if they use their power in order to defeat the objects of the Bill, then we must reconquer Ireland. That is a pleasant prospect, is it not, when you are asked to pass the Second Reading of a Bill! What the noble and learned Lord expects is that the oath of allegiance may stand between hint and bringing his Bill into force, but if the oath of allegiance proves to be a broken reed and the Irish refuse to work the Bill, then we must reconquer Ireland. I do not think you Lordships will be content to accept a Bill which can only be justified at such a price as that.

I have tried to give your Lordships reasons why in my humble judgment the Irish are at this moment unfit for self-government, and I should have thought no one could doubt the conclusion. But let me consider for a moment what will happen if you try to put into force a Bill the working of which depends entirely upon the loyal co-operation of the people of Ireland, and you have not got that loyal co-operation. Look not at the general statements but at the actual provisions of the Bill. Take, for example, the position of the Judges. Under the Bill—I speak with great diffidence in the presence of the noble and learned Lord, because I may have misread the provisions, for it is a difficult Bill to read—I understand that the Judges are to be appointed, even after the Bill becomes operative, by the Imperial authorities. Let us assume that is so. If not, the case is made worse. Upon the Judges will depend a great deal. Upon the Judges will depend the protection of loyal subjects who are not in sympathy with the views of the majority of Irishmen. How will they enforce their decisions? They will enforce their decisions, as Judges always must, by the agents of the law—the police. Are the police to be in the hands of the Imperial authority? Not at all The police are to be in the hands of the National Government, so that the Judges will be in this position. If they find—as they will do, being men of honour appointed by the Imperial authority—judgments in favour of the loyal subjects of the Crown, and it is not the wish and intention of the Government authority in Ireland that the Judges' judgments should be carried out, the result will be that the police will not carry them out. The Judges will be absolutely powerless, because the police will be in the hands of an antagonistic authority.

Take again the control of the Ports. Under the Bill, Customs are to be in the hands of the Imperial authority. How are the Imperial officers to enforce the revenue laws unless they have control of the ports? It is clear that they must have control of the ports, and if so they must have troops to protect them and to enforce their decrees. Is that a system which would work? It would work perfectly if there were loyal co-operation between the local and the Imperial Govern- ment, but it will not work if there is antagonism between them. It is clear that it would be impossible to enforce the revenue laws unless there were control of the ports by the Imperial authority. The friction which would arise between the Imperial authorities in the port and the national police both in the port and outside can be better imagined than described.

And what is true of the revenue is true in a much more important matter—that is, the protection of the ports in time of war. If the ports must be protected by Imperial authority in time of war then they must be in the hands of the troops. Here again we have the difficulty that we may have—and judging from the history of Ireland since 1914 we probably should have—a hostile Ireland thwarting in every way the efforts of the Imperial authority in the ports and harbours, and indeed along the coasts of Ireland. The noble Viscount who has just sat down has told your Lordships how vital it is that the control of the sea should be in the hands of the Imperial authority, and the control of the sea, of course, involves control of the coasts from which ships are fed. Therefore it appears to me that this instance will convince any candid man of the hopelessness of governing Ireland on these lines so long as Ireland is disaffected.

I will take other examples very shortly. The Bill prohibits the Irish from raising armed forces. I understand that it is also prohibited to the Irish Parliaments to pass sectarian legislation. How are you to enforce this prohibition? Who is to enforce it? On what could the Government rely l I do not know. I speak with diffidence, because I do not know what the Government may be able to say in reply, but as far as I am concerned I see no means of preventing armed forces being raised in Ireland. The noble Viscount, I believe, said just now that he did not mind them having armed forces. I am sure that all of us would strongly object, to seeing possibly hostile armed forces raised in Ireland.

NOBLE LORDS

Hear, hear.

THE MARQUESS or SALISBURY

Sectarian legislation in regard to education and marriages is prohibited. How are you going to enforce the prohibition? Is it not clear that you cannot do it without the loyal co-operation of the Irish? I do not know upon what the Government relies. I might mention that export bounties are prohibited, but how are you going to enforce that prohibition? People sometimes say, "There is the Lord Lieutenant who is an Imperial officer, who is tinder Imperial control, and he will be ordered to refuse his assent to Bills of which the Imperial Government disapprove." I do not know whether that is contended by the Government. The noble and learned Lord upon the Woolsack delivered a magnificent speech last night which I greatly admired, lucid in all its particulars and very eloquent, but I think he barely touched upon the Lord Lieutenant, if at all. I did not expect him to touch upon everything, but I did mark that omission. What is the position of the Lord Lieutenant? The noble and learned Viscount who spoke last night said that the Lord Lieutenant would act upon the advice of his local Ministers. Poor man! He would have to act upon advice of three sets of Ministers, and they might be quite inconsistent. He has to act upon the advice of the Southern Ministers, upon the advice of the Northern Ministers, and upon the advice of the Imperial Ministers, and they might none of them agree.

It is said that there will be no overlapping, but I think your Lordships will recognise that there will be overlapping. There will be all sorts of cases between the South and the North where legislation which is proposed to be passed in the Northern Parliament will affect the South, and legislation proposed to be passed in the Southern parliament will affect the North. What is the poor Lord Lieutenant to do? The Southern Ministers will come to him and say, "You must give your assent to this Bill." The Northern Ministers will come to him and say, "If you do we shall resign"—and what is he to do? What answer is there in democratic government when Ministers who have the support of a majority in constituent. Parliaments, say they will resign? There is no answer.

VISCOUNT HALDANE

There is the example of the Dominion Parliaments.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

The Dominion Parliaments are friendly Parliaments—that is the difference. What is the Lord Lieutenant to do? He cannot send for another Government because that other Government would not have the support of the majority of the particular House of Commons.

VISCOUNT HALDANE

I think the noble Marquess is under a misapprehension. In Canada, for instance, where there is a distribution of both executive and legislative powers, no Bill which is passed by a Provincial Parliament can become effective unless it is also assented to by the Governor-General. He does net normally interfere, it is true. The advice of the Provincial Minister determines the Lieutenant-Governor in giving his assent, but the Bill has to go to the Governor-General for assent, and sometimes on the advice of Dominion Ministers he has to disallow it. It is exactly the same situation.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

The British Constitution is full of these anomalies, and we are quite familiar with them. If I had time I could remind your Lordships of any number which exist in this country, all of which have this in common—that if the particular authorities choose to use their power they can make the machine unworkable. The House of Commons was broken down in Mr. Parnell's time because the Irish chose to use their powers to the fullest extent. You cannot work any of these systems, therefore, unless there is cooperation and loyal feeling between the various constituent bodies and unless there is a system of give and take. Looking at the history of Ireland since 1914 can you say that there is likely to be anything of the kind if and when this Bill becomes law and is put into force in Ireland? If you rely upon the Lord Lieutenant to stand between you and disaster he cannot do it. He must give way. Otherwise it is quite within the power of the majority in the Irish Parliaments to make the machine unworkable. As in big things by the assistance of this power of resignation, and in small things by the power of the Executive to direct the police not to carry out laws of the Imperial Parliament of which they do not approve, so the power must pass into the hands of the local authority, and nothing we can do can stop it unless we adopt the suggestion of the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack and re-conquer Ireland.

I have tried to indicate to your Lordships the reasons why it appears to me that such a Bill as this cannot 1,e brought into operation at this moment with any chance of success. Let me ask one further question, Who wants this Bill? I believe Ulster wants it, rather reluctantly; but nobody else wants it. Not a single speaker in your Lordships' House up to now has said that anybody really and cordially wants it, and it is quite certain that the Southern Irish have indicated that they do not want it In the course of his eloquent speech last night the noble and learned Lord quoted my right hon. friend Sir Edward Carson, and quoted him very effectively. The noble and learned Lord was directing himself to the argument that the decision of the representatives of Ulster must be accepted as decisive of their views, and he quoted these words of Sir Edward Carson in support — Where will you get a better method of self-determination than this? Do you think it would be a better self-determination to say to the Irish people, You go by the majority and set up something that the people of the North of Ireland loathe and detest, and then, if they do not accept it, go and shoot them down? Is that self-determination? What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. If that is true of the North of Ireland it is true of the South of Ireland; and I venture to ask the noble and learned Lord, if you go and set up something that the people of the South of Ireland loathe and detest, and then, if they do not accept it, go and shoot them down, is that self-determination? Of course, it is not self-determination; and this Bill which is put forward in the name of self-determination is not by any means a fulfilment of that great principle. That appears to me to be another important consideration.

We want to know two things. The first is whether Ireland is fit to have this Bill in operation? The second is, Does Ireland want the Bill at all? Those are the two questions which seem to me to lie at the very foundation of the controversy. Your Lordships may well ask after what I have said whether I intend to vote against the Second Reading. I do not. I am not prepared to resist the Second Reading of the Bill, and I will tell your Lordships why.

The noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack reminded your Lordships of the position in which we are left by the fact that the Act of 1911 is upon the Statute Book, and though I did not agree with all his speech I did agree with that passage in it. When the Act of 1914 passed there was practically an agreement among all parties that Ulster should not be made subject to a Dublin Parliament. But the Act of 1914 does subject it to a Dublin Parliament, and it was only the accident of the war which prevented the amending Statute being passed under which she would have achieved separate treatment. But it did fail to pass, and Ulster is left, so far as the Act on the Statute Book is concerned, under a Dublin Parliament. And supposing—I think the noble and learned Lord said so, it is true—supposing the Turkish Treaty were ratified to-morrow, then forthwith—I do not know whether immediately or within a month or two- -the Dublin Parliament would be set up, he writ would be issued, and, contrary to what amounted to, I think, a pledge given by all parties to Ulster, she would be made subject to the Dublin Parliament. I am not prepared to face that alternative. I do not think we could do that, and therefore I cannot vote against the Second Reading of the Bill.

But your Lordships will realise that I am not an enthusiastic supporter of the Bill. And when we come to Committee it seems to me that your Lordships would be well advised to see that the two conditions which I have ventured to lay down as absolutely essential should be fulfilled, namely, that there should be some means of ensuring that the South of Ireland is fit to allow the Bill to come into operation; and, in the second place, that there should be some means of finding out whether the people in the South of Ireland want the Bill to come into operation at the present time. For those two conditions it seems to me we ought to provide.

It would be perfectly possible, of course, by an amendment to take care that the actual operation of the Bill should depend upon the consent of both Houses of Parliament—the consent, that is to say, not only of the House of Commons but of your Lordships' House as well. The Bill, as it stands, is to come into force upon the appointed day. The noble and learned Lord pointed out that there is a little margin allowed one way or the other, but only a little margin. On the appointed day, or a few months earlier or a few months later, the Bill as it stands must come into operation. He hopes, of course—I trust he will forgive me for saying so, for I cannot help thinking he hopes—that there will not be sufficient members taking the oath in the Southern Parliament to fulfil the conditions of Clause 70, and so the Government may be relieved of the difficulty of bringing the Act into force. But, as I have shown, I do not think we can be satisfied with Clause 70. The noble Viscount who has just silt down has shown your Lordships what his opinion is of governing Ireland as a Crown Colony. But there are other objections to Clause 70, besides those which he has enumerated. I may just instance the fact that the operation of Clause 70 depends upon the discretion of the Government. It may not be the discretion of this Government, it may be the discretion of some future Government—a Government; perhaps drawn from a political party with which this Government are as much out of sympathy as I am. Indeed, judging from the past record of their government of Ireland and what I must call the awful mess that they have made of it I am not prepared to trust; even this Government to decide when this Bill should come into operation.

Those are difficulties in the road of Clause 70. I say that we must take care that the discretion to decide the moment when the Irish are fit to take upon themselves these responsibilities must be vested, not in the Executive Government; but in the two Houses of Parliament. And I say on the other side that we must take some, special means of seeing whether the representatives of Southern Ireland are anxious that the Bill should operate as law. It is in that sense and by that spirit that I for one shall be guided when the Division is called upon this Amendment. I need not tell you, my Lords, that I am still a convinced Unionist. I believe that it is in the Union that the safety of Ireland really lies, and not only the safety of Ireland but the safety of the Empire which I love.

THE MARQUESS OP LONDONDERRY

Lords, it, will appear a paradox that one who has always vehemently and strenuously opposed Route Rule for Ireland, and who is more or less traditionally associated with the policy of the Union, should stand before your Lordships to advocate this Bill. I need hardly say that nothing but the gravest reasons could have altered a view in my mind which at one time I certainly thought was crystallised and unalterable. But I should be wrong indeed were I not at once to say that, whereas in former years I optimistically believed that a patient and indifferent administration of the Union would eventually achieve success in Ireland, I am now compelled to realise that patience seems gone, and that the adminis tration of the Government of Ireland freed front all those influences which occupy men's minds in political life seems to me now to be an idea Utopian in its character and unworkable in practice.

But I have no intention of standing here in a white sheet, and I feel there is no need for it. Not only have I no regrets for having felt myself in opposition to Home Rule Bills in the past, but if I had to decide over again I should take up exactly the same position. For whereas those other Bills for the better government of Ireland in my opinion have never really contained the possibilities of bringing peace and contentment to Ireland, I feel that this measure does contain the germs, however small they be, of bringing about that necessary eventuality. I shall endeavour to put before your Lordships briefly the reasons which have made me come to this conclusion. But I am convinced of this, that nothing but the wholehearted support and the loyal co-operation of every one will remove the black cloud which now hovers so menacingly over Ireland.

This is no time for recrimination, and I feel that the difficulties which have occurred in Ireland are due to the fact that Irishmen have always brooded over the past, that they have always considered wrongs of centuries ago and have not given a free rein to their imagination or endeavoured to look into the future to see what they could do as Irishmen to ameliorate the condition of their country. Here is a chance which throws on Irishmen themselves the responsibilities for which they have clamoured so long, and which their record in all countries of the world except Ireland shows they are capable of shouldering successfully.

I listened with the greatest respect and interest to the speech of the noble Viscount, Lord Grey. I felt myself fully in agreement with him on many points, and I can only say that at the close of his speech I was somewhat disappointed that he did not more definitely say what were the larger and fuller provisions which would achieve that difference which be said existed between the present Government and himself in regard to the question of Ireland. He went over the past, and with his usual fairness admitted at once what he believed had been the failures in regard to the successful prosecution of a policy for the benefit of Ireland. He said that the position of Ulster had never been considered as it should have been. I believe that is one of the reasons why this Bill may achieve success. One of the difficulties in the past and one of the drawbacks to former Home Rule Bills has been the fact that the position, the ideas, and the sympathies of Ulster have never been considered. Where we have erred in the past is that we have never attached sufficient weight to the sterilisation of effort in the whole of Ireland. For many generations we have seen men capable of discharging high offices in this country and in Ireland standing aloof for some reason or other and not taking that part in the government of their own country which their abilities fully justified. It is a misunderstanding on these two points which has really been the drawback to a settlement of the Irish question.

It is not my intention to weary your Lordships with my view of how the policy of the Union could have succeeded judged by the test of peace in Ireland. After the events of the closing years of the eighteenth century there was no other policy possible. The method of the inception of that policy, judged by modern standards, may seem difficult to defend, although I believe I could do so to your Lordships' satisfaction, and if I were to dilate on the harm done by the postponement of Catholic Emancipation, advocated so strenuously by Pitt and Castlereagh as a necessary corollary but opposed and unfortunately successfully opposed by George HI, I should be raking up the past and be doing exactly what I am asking your Lordships particularly not to do. I will only say this, that I agree entirely with the Lord Chancellor in his belief that the policy of the Union is by far the best policy, but that the twenty years of administration of that policy by one Party convinced of its eventual success, is something for which in the quick changes of political life it is imposible to hope.

The situation I am endeavouring to review is Ireland in 1920. At this moment we are bound to confess that public opinion has ceased to operate in Ireland. We see in Ireland a country in which terrorism has a strangle hold; a country in which human life is of no value—in a word, a country in which the situation is the antithesis of that which humanity and civilisation seek throughout the world to establish; and events described in the newspapers in the last few days show that am taking no exaggerated view. It may be said that if the concentrated public opinion of this country, shocked beyond measure by the situation across the Irish Channel, was directed solely to the reestablishment of the due observance of the law by the drastic method of overwhelming military intervention, you might, in fact you would, re-establish that due observance and respect; you might very possibly lay the foundations of future peace and prosperity. But I feel that if any other method is possible—and I look on this Bill as another method—we should arrive at a fruition of our hopes in a far shorter space of time than by this forcible means. Whether that is the best policy or not, you will find that public opinion is not concentrated on Ireland. You will find that men's minds, here at all events, are occupied with other things. You will find their minds are occupied with all those varied problems which are the necessary and obvious concomitants of the greatest upheaval which the world in the late war has ever seen. Ireland is one of those problems, but only one. To those whose information is only drawn from the newspapers it is by no means the most important of those problems, but to us who live in Ireland, who love Ireland, this problem transcends all others in importance. I venture to go further than that, and to say that on our successful solution of this problem depends not only the future happiness of Ireland but also the very existence of the British Empire. The gaze of the Empire is directed on Ireland while those nearer home are inclined to ignore her. The Empire wonders why, when the British race have been so successful in all other quarters of the world, they should have failed, or seemed to have failed, so signally in Ireland. That is why I am prepared to discard all shibboleths, to stand as an advocate of the policy contained in this Bill. My purpose is to find some system on which the greater number can more or less agree, and devote what time and energy I have to the successful promotion of that policy.

I draw two main distinctions between this Bill and other Bills for the better Government of Ireland. The first is that there is no ulterior motive in this Bill, and by that I mean there is no question of satisfying a turbulent section in the House of Commons. There is no element of a bargain for the purpose of gaining additional support for measures supported by one and opposed by, the other of the two great political Parties which have dominated political life in this country under different names for over two hundred ears. When I say this I am not referring to one particular Party or the other; I am speaking as an Irishman, and I have felt that one of the great drawbacks to prosperity and contentment in Ireland is the fact that Ireland has been the pawn in British Party politics, and that the Irish,. vote has always been a temptation to one Party or the other to use it for their own assistance regardless of what effect that might have in Ireland, I believe that this Bill is a genuine effort to understand the underlying motives of Irish agitation and to associate all Irishmen directly with the government of I heir country. It may be said that this opportunity of associating all Irishmen with the government of their country has always existed. I agree; but advantage has not always been taken of it, and instead of a loyal, prosperous, and united country we find instead in Ireland the darkest spot at the moment in the British Empire.

We have seen litany solutions put forward apart from the perseverance in the policy of the Union. Those solutions have ranged from what has been known as "gas and water" Home Rule to a full-blown Irish Republic, but none of these solutions has ever recognised the obvious and established fact which in my humble opinion governs the whole situation, and that is the existence in Ireland of two races, the cleavage roughly following the two professions of Faith. The fear of the ascendancy of the one over the other has always been uppermost in men's minds, and this everlasting anxiety, fostered sometimes genuinely and honestly by fanatics on both sides and sometimes for political motives, has been responsible for lamentable prejudices which lately have resulted in so much bloodshed.

I have always been one of those whose belief in the Union was increased and stimulated by the theory that actual unity in Ireland might be impossible, but that the fusion of the two races in the British House of Commons for the purposes of government held out by far the best chances of success. Now we propose to establish that fusion in a Council, and to separate the North from the South by the existence of a Parliament in each centre. That, my Lords, is the second distinction which I draw between this Bill and all others which have been brought forward for the same object.

Many hard words have been uttered with regard to the action of that section belonging to the portion of Ireland with which I have the honour to be associated in cutting themselves off from the South and West, and my one desire is that nothing that I shall say to-day shall add to the bitterness which has already been generated; and I should like to say this, that nothing will give me greater pleasure and satis faction in years to come, and. the sooner the better, than the knowledge that the proposals of the Government have been but a preliminary and a stepping-stone to a united Ireland where representatives from the North and from the South, by reason of the disappearance of all prejudices and the removal of suspicion by mutual experience, may meet in one assembly to work for the common good of Ireland. Let us never lose sight, in the establishment of separate Parliaments, of this happy eventuality, although some of us here at this moment may not live to see it. Lord Sligo, in a speech to which no one could have listened without recognising the genuine sorrow with which this Bill fills his mind, criticised a remark which was made by my noble friend the Duke of Abercorn, and Lord Grey made the same reference. In the noble Lord's speech he mentioned the word "finality." I would venture to suggest to Lord Grey and to Lord Sligo that the word "finality" was in the noble Duke's mind, and it certainly is in my mind, a desire that there should be an end to prejudice and an end to suspicion. When we view it from the Ulster point of view it is with a desire that there should be an end of those uncertainties, which have kept continually alive those anxieties in the minds of all the Unionists of Ulster, and have been the means of hampering the trade and prosperity of Ulster and of bringing about so many of those difficulties which have resulted in the suspicion to which I have already alluded.

I said that amongst the solutions we have heard of, a Republic has been put forward. If there is any humour at a time when a tragedy is being enacted in Ireland, the suggestion of a republican Ireland is almost laughable. There is no population in the world whose sympathies are less republican, and I venture to say that when this period of national insanity—I can call it nothing else—is past, there will be no population more loyal to the Crown than Irishmen, certainly of the North but also of the South. This is a view which may seem to some of your Lordships difficult to understand, but I cannot bring myself to believe that this present phase is the deliberate and well-considered action of the great majority of the people in Ireland. I see one more example of the influence which a determined band of assassins can exercise over a terror-stricken community. All these crimes and outrages can have been committed, and I believe have been committed, by a comparatively small number of people, and I feel that the moment this organisation is broken up you will find that the population of Ireland will be more than ever susceptible to influences which, in the event of this Bill passing into law and given a fair trial, will be in the direction of peace and contentment.

It is not easy, I know, to ask your Lordships to take a calm and dispassionate view of the situation and to realise that there are unmistakable signs that the force of this conspiracy is slowly ebbing. There is no one here who can have anything else but feelings of resentment and disgust against the perpetrators of these outrages. But, my Lords, do not let us lose our sense of proportion. Do not let us associate the whole of Ireland with this organised band of criminals. Let us rather realise that the events of the last few years have taught men unfortunately to place a far too low value on human life, and that whereas a great international menace in the shape of German aggression has been removed, we hope for all time, still the violent upheaval has necessarily brought with it unrest and discontent in all countries in the world, and this same unrest and discontent finds expression in Ireland in the disastrous occurrences of recent times.

I am particularly anxious that your Lordships should not lose sympathy with Ireland as a whole, because we need your sympathy more than ever now. It is the custom to say that Ireland took no part in the war. This is a misstatement of the grossest kind. The noble Marquess who has just addressed the House mentioned the fact that as a nation—I do not know that he used the word; he would have been wrong if he did, because I cannot admit that there is an Irish nationality—that Ireland as a country took no part in the war. The voluntary effort of Ireland compares very favourably with that of other parts of the United Kingdom; and the number of Irishmen engaged in the war, apart from the essentially Irish divisions—and I may here incidentally remark that those Irish divisions upheld the best traditions of Irish regiments—is a number that bears the closest inspection. Those are facts to be remembered and felt. Those are facts which we should dilate on, rather than brood continually over the past and over the difficulties with which Ireland has been assailed; and whereas the forces of evil in the shape of terrorism and murder have appeared to capture the population of the country, so I am convinced that a resolute band of men, imbued with the ideas of bringing to Ireland peace and contentment, can cause the population to follow the pathway in which they should go. I believe that if only on all sides support and enthusiasm will be given to this effort of the Government to assist Ireland, to see Ireland's point of view, to place those responsibilities on the shoulders of Ireland, success will crown our efforts.

I know it will be said that this country has done everything possible for Ireland. Lord. Grey spoke of the manner in which Ireland should be treated, and he said she should be treated with generosity. My Lords, Ireland has been treated with generosity, and it has been the custom in recent years to lavish money on Ireland, but I am bound to say that the reckless handling, if I may use the expression, for political purposes, of an unduly large number of Irish representatives in the House of Commons, had completely demoralised political life in Ireland before the war. That is where the Union has failed, and the recognition of failure in this direction, and the conviction that under the political system as it exists at the present moment we can nope for nothing different, is the reason that urges me to adopt this measure as a solution of an hitherto insoluble difficulty.

The noble Earl who has moved the rejection of this Bill pleads for what he calls Dominion Home Rule. I feel that his plea is based on an entirely mistaken notion, because it is quite impossible to reproduce between England and Ireland the same loose relations as to national defence, finance, and other matters which obtain between Great Britain and the Dominions. For purposes of defence and economics the British Isles are one, and to use the words of Carlyle "Separation is not on the ground plan of creation." Moreover, to grant Dominion Home Rule to Ireland means that you propose in reality to give to Ireland the same freedom and all the political and other rights which the Dominions to-day enjoy. What are these rights? The Dominions have the right to their own Army and their own Navy, if they choose to exercise that right, and in some cases they do. They have no liability whatever for any portion of the Imperial indebtedness or War Debt. Their remoteness justifies the conferring upon them, and indeed necessitates conferring upon them, much larger powers than either could or ought to be granted to Ireland. If for example, the United States went to war with Canada, or Japan went to war with Australia, and. succeeded in the warfare, the conquest of a Dominion would certainly have serious consequences which every one 01 us would deplore, but—

THE EARL or DUN RAVEN

May I interrupt the noble Marquess for one moment. He is altogether mistaken in thinking I moved the rejection of the Bill because I desire Dominion Home Rule or Dominion status. On the contrary I moved the rejection of a Bill the other (lay to give Dominion status.

THE MRARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY

I was referring to his views on Dominion Home Rule, and I think it is important that your Lordships should realize exactly what Dominion Home Rule is. I agree that it is a rather loose phrase, but it is heard on all sides and the question is always asked, Why is not Dominion Home Rule granted to Ireland I am endeavouring with all respect to show why it cannot under any circumstances be conceded to Ireland. When the noble Earl rose I was saying that if foreign countries succeeded in a war against a Dominion it would have deplorable results, but the safety of Great Britain would not be endangered. But a conquered Ireland, or a hostile Ireland, would be fatal, and deadly menace to us in these islands. As the Prime Minister pointed out in his speech on the Third Reading of this Bill, every creek, every harbour, every port, could be utilised by a foreign foe for striking a blow at the heart of England from the direction in which she is most vulnerable. I do not need to labour this point to your Lordships. Naval and military writers of the greatest eminence have again and again emphasised how supremely important it is to the safety of Great Britain that she should have complete cent ml over the sea coast of all these islands. If there were no other reason, that alone would be more than sufficient, to condemn the proposal to give Ireland the status of and confer upon her the rights enjoyed by the Dominions.

But there is another and hardly less important aspect involved in Dominion Home Rule. It is idle to pretend that Dominion Home Rule does not mean complete fiscal independence. The noble Earl who moved the Motion for the rejection of this Bill speaks lightly of fiscal independence. He was himself a member of the Irish Convention. He will recollect, as I do, that the Nationalist demand upon this question was uncompromising, and it was the real root cause of division and failure of the Convention. The demand for complete fiscal control created a deadlock. I may remind your Lordships of the document contained in the official Convention, Report G.C.3, circulated by Lord Midleton to Southern Unionists. I quote from it one paragraph in which it was pointed out that the Nationalist repro sentatives circulated a memorandum which asserted— We regard Ireland as a nation, an economic entity. Commenting upon that statement, Lord Midleton remarked in his memorandum— This claims the right to make treaties, it suggests the probability of divergence from Great Britain on fiscal questions at an early period, and asserts the necessity for Ireland being free to play her own hand. That doctrine Lord Midleton challenged, and then asserted that the full amount realised by Customs should be retained by Great Britain as Imperial contribution, because Customs was an imperial matter.

I do not feel entitled to weary your Lordships with a dissertation on the control of Customs, although I believe some of your Lordships do not attach sufficient importance to this great question, and do not realise how closely it touches so many great questions of Irish trade. There is an immense volume of evidence to show the acute peril involved in changing this great fundamental principle, but I will only quote to your Lordships one or two opinions of public bodies condemning the proposal to interfere with commercial relations between England and Ireland. In 1912 the Dublin Chamber of Commerce, by special resolution, declared that "any attempt to interfere with commercial relations would be disastrous to the trade and commerce of the country." All the leading merchants in Leinster, Munster, and Connaught declared, "It would arrest the growing prosperity of Ireland which had been steadily increasing." Full Imperial control of Customs and Excise is imperative for five reasons which I venture to put forward—(l) Because it obviates any danger of tariff trouble between the two countries, which would be fatal to Irish industries; (2) because an absolute Free Trade arrangement between Great Britain and Ireland is impossible if two separate Customs Authorities exist; (3) because it removes any chance of tariff conflicts following commercial treaties between Ireland and foreign countries; (4) because any other arrangement than full Imperial control over Customs and Excise would prevent the inclusion of Ireland in a scheme of federation for the Kingdom; (5) because it ensures an adequate contribution from Ireland to the cost of the war. These details will no doubt be raised in Committee, and I do not propose to enter into them now.

THE MARQUESS OF CREWE

I am afraid they cannot be.

THE MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY

The noble Marquess corrects me. We cannot enter into fiscal details in your Lordships' House. I think I have said enough and have quoted certain authorities to show that the transference of Customs and Excise to an Irish authority really strikes at the whole root of the fiscal state of the United Kingdom. With regard to the federal aspect to which I have made allusion I feel this is a matter deserving of your Lordships' attention. This is not the occasion on which I should be entitled to make anything but the briefest reference to the possible result of the great changes which will be enacted if your Lordships give your assent to this Bill. But the overwhelming volume of business now being transacted in the Houses of Parliament must become an acute problem pressing for solution, and while I think that devolution on federal lines may be the ultimate solution, I know that at this moment people's minds have not envisaged this question. M only desire to-day in making this reference is to express the earnest hope that in the devolution which this Bill brings we should never lose sight of the possible federation of the British Isles and not endanger the chance of such a federation by giving away Imperial control over Customs and Excise which must be centrally held in any scheme of federation.

I would ask your Lordships whose intention it is to oppose the Bill, whether the Irish problem is to be left untreated until all Ireland agrees as to the treatment. The noble Marquess who has just sat down has told us that lie does not propose to vote against the Bill, but he did not enlighten us as to his views of what should be done at this moment. I think your Lordships will agree that something must be done. It is quite impossible to allow Ireland to sink into a morass without any hope of any kind being held out to her. Viscount Grey suggests that that hope should be a larger and a fuller measure of Home Rule. Our solution is the Bill which we venture to put before you. I feel that when the noble Marquess addresses us his policy should not be entirely destructive, that he should not tell us that Ireland is unfitted for self-government. He asked MC two question's, I think. He said, "Is Ireland fit to govern herself?" I will answer that question by asking another—When, in his opinion, will Ireland be fit to govern herself? I do not feel that any one can say that a country, which in the past has produced so many men of eminent distinction who have been successful in all parts of the world, a country that has produced so much and has given so much in so many ways, is at any time entirely unfit to govern herself. I believe if only you give Ireland this opportunity and assist Ireland by your sympathy and co-operation, and not by-your criticism or recrimination, you are taking the pathway to success, and that in that way we shall eventually prove that Great Britain is capable of bringing peace and happiness to Ireland as it has been capable of bringing peace and happiness to other quarters of the globe.

Certain noble Lords are opposed to this Bill not so much on its merits but because they are specially concerned for the interests of those who reside just outside the six counties but are part of the nine counties of geographical Ulster. I think I may say that if the Government proposal had Included the nine counties instead of the six we should have had no hostile criticism from them. I have deep sympathy with those noble Lords. I feel to the full the sentiment which operates in their minds, but it is no use being sentimental on a vital issue. I feel that this venture—and I use the word advisedly because there is no certainty of success—depends so much on the success which one Parliament, or the other, or both Parliaments, as I earnestly hope, will show from their capacity to govern the territory over which their jurisdiction is in force. In the six counties your population is chiefly homogeneous. It. is actuated by the same ideals; it springs front the same race, the majority profess the same Faith, and I am forced into the posit ion of being convinced by the logic of facts and figures that a Parliament to include the six counties holds out the possibilities and the hopes which I have endeavoured to put before your Lordships. We hope to fashion a. model Government. We hope to show what Ulstermen, left to their own resources in government, can bring about, and, moreover, I believe we are entitled to your Lordships' sympathy in this matter.

Why do you suppose the Ulsterman is evincing this passionate desire to set up a system in Ulster and in Ireland—a system to which he has been bitterly opposed for so long? The answer is simple. He feels that at least this is the end of a chapter of uncertainty; that, with the responsibility of government on his own shoulders, he need no longer be apprehensive of sudden changes, of sudden political moves, of forms of government being forced upon him by his political opponents, and lastly, of being placed—I use a phrase so often employed—under the domination of his political opponents. This eternal anxiety has brought about an infinity of harm; it has engendered disturbance; it has hampered industry and has materially interfered with that progress which a strong, healthy, industrial community cannot help otherwise, to achieve and has every right to expect. I feel that in this Bill lies the best chance of success. You cannot compel people to be friends by Act of Parliament, but you can set up a system which, by its beneficial working, can bring closer together the differing elements which now exist in Ireland. It is for this reason that I urge your Lordships to give every sort of assistance to this Bill a ml to endeavour by your co-operation awl help to bring peace and contentment to Ireland.

VISCOUNT BRYCE

My Lords, the noble Marquess who has just sat down has answered in a very admirable spirit and also in a hopeful spirit the severe strictures upon the Bill which were passed by my noble friend Lord Salisbury, who preceded him. I am not able to entertain the same anticipations regarding the effect of this Bill as are entertained by the noble Marquess, Lord Londonderry, and I shall endeavour to show him why. This is the fourth Bill for giving self-government to -Ireland that has been presented to Parliament, and it is unique in this respect, that it is the only one of those Bills which has not received any substantial support in Ireland itself. All the other Bills were brought in to meet the Irish demand, and they did meet that demand, although they did not have the good fortune, except in the case of the last, to pass into law. But in this case we find a Bill which has no support whatever from the South and West of Ireland.

Those of your Lordships who listened to the debate last night and this afternoon will have noticed that the Irish Peers from the South-West of Ireland, I think without exception, expressed their disapproval of the Bill and their belief that it is not what is wanted. The only support which it received is that which came from the Peers from Ulster; and I noted that their chief spokesman among the independent Peers of the House, the Duke of Abercorn, yesterday said that he accepted the Bill only as an alternative to the Bill of 1914. I understand that, but it is very tepid praise. We know Ulster would not have accepted the Bill, or looked at it, unless under the fear that something still more distasteful should happen. I notice also a very significant fact—an important change of opinion in another place among members of the House of Commons who are staunch Conservatives, and who up to now have been opposed to any form of Home Rule. They gave their adhesion to the Bill in speeches which showed how strong were the motives which had obliged them to change their mind. I think it is not going too far to say that this is a Bill which does not please anybody, because it is the result of a compromise. It has all the aspect of being the result of a compromise in the Cabinet between those who do not want to move at all and those who want to go very much further, and it has the usual defect of compromises. It has all the faults of both courses and the merits of neither.

I will not attempt to examine the Bill in close detail, but only to enumerate some of the points which, if your Lordships will give attention to them, will I think appear to you, looking at the matter dispassionately, fatal to the success of the Bill. One of those points is that it divides into two countries under two Governments, meant to be permanently opposed to one another—because under each of them a new frame of government is to be set up—an island which is economically one. Every part of Ireland needs every other part of Ireland. There will be placed every possible obstacle to the progress of the country if you cut it up in this unnatural way. In the next place, it wounds and it exasperates the national sentiment of the people. There is such a thing as Irish patriotism. There is such a thing as Irish nationality. Surely none of us can have lived through the last thirty or forty years without feeling what a force the spirit of nationality can be. We have spell within the last few years to what passionate extreme the sentiment of nationality can run all over Europe. I do not, say that passionate nationality is not excessive in Ireland. I believe it is. I think it has gone much too far, but it is a fact which you cannot ignore, and it is quite enough to condemn this Bill in the eyes of those who cherish a. strong national sentiment for their own Island that it cuts that Island into two in a way which since the beginning of history it never has been divided.

It is a further defect in the Bill, which has been dwelt upon by some of your Lordships already, that it gives none of those special protections to the Unionist and Protestants of the South and West of Ireland which were always promised to them in preceding Bills, and I am not surprised that they resent that omission. It also fails to give one form of that protection which was always considered previously to be a necessary form. The creation of a Second Chamber to protect the minority in the North and the minority in the South was always understood to be one of the safeguards which a Home Rule Bill ought to contain. It is now omitted, and the reasons which were given by the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack for its omission seem to me entirely insufficient. He said that it was a difficult problem, and that it had better be left to be solved by the Irish Council which it is proposed to set up. Is it not likely that the Irish Council, composed of two antagonistic bodies, will find it a great deal more difficult to set up a Second Chamber than the Government would have found to frame a Second Chamber for the Bill '? I may remind them that the Irish Convention which sat in 1917 framed a scheme for a Second Chamber, one which well deserved to be considered, and in which I think the Southern Unionists were disposed to acquiesce.

If there is to be any division at all of Ireland it ought not to be the division in this Bill. It ought to be a division which leaves the whole Province of Ulster apart. I must venture to traverse the statements made by the noble Marquess that the six counties would be homogeneous. That is very far from the fact. In the six counties there is, take them all in all, no very large majority, and in the two counties which are in question—the counties of Tyrone and Fermanagh—there is, I believe, a small majority of Roman Catholics and presumably of Home Rulers. It is therefore quite a mistake to suppose that the division that is made is likely to ensure the satisfaction of the demand. It is much more probable that we shall have a great deal of friction and irritation along the frontier line between the six counties and the rest of Ireland. You may have raids from the one into the other. You may have conflict which will keep up party spirit and ill-feeling, and which will make the maintenance of order in Tyrone and Fermanagh even more difficult than the Government find the maintenance of order anywhere in Ireland at this moment.

I submit that it would have been a very great deal better, instead of cutting Ireland into two, to have had one Ireland, and to have given inside that one Ireland all possible and conceivable guarantees for which the men of Ulster could have asked. The offer has been repeatedly made to them to say what guarantees they will take, and I am perfectly certain that the Government would have had the support of the country and this House if it had framed a system of guarantees to carry out everything the Ulster people had asked for, and which they thought necessary for, their protection. We should then have had a far better promise for the future titan is given by the setting up of two independent Governments.

I cannot believe that there is any prospect of a real and permanent settlement in the Bill. If that is so, I may reasonably be asked what alternative I have to suggest. I will ask your Lordships' permission to state a few facts which are not as well known in England as they ought to be, but which seem to me to show why this Bill will be inadequate and why it is necessary to go much further if you are to secure peace and order in Ireland. It is the experience of everyone who is called upon to govern Ireland, as I was called to do fifteen years ago, that Ireland differs from England in this respect—that in England the people are with the law, in Ireland the people are against the law.

NOBLE LORDS

Hear, hear.

VISCOUNT BRYCE

That is the deplorable result of Irish history, and if noble Lords would occupy themselves in reading the history of Ireland from the Great. Rebellion of 1641 down they would understand how it has happened that Ireland is the only country in which the Union Jack flies or the English language is spoken in which the people are against the law. What is the deplorable result of this hostility of the people to the law? It is the cause of what is called the sympathy with crime. The Irish are no more a criminal people thaw any other. There is no natural sympathy with crime in the Irish mind any more than in the English mind or the Scottish mind. What is called the Irish sympathy with crime is this. It is a long-established habit and tradition never to give anyone who is being attacked by the (4averrinaint. If the Government want to find a criminal, to get evidence against a criminal or to get a jury to try a criminal, this rooted habit stand in the way—the habit of hostility to the Government as a foreign Government, an alien Government, a Government which has been oppressing the country for two centuries. That habit stands in the way of the respect of the people of Ireland for the law, and that is the great difficulty we have to overcome. You will never have a peaceful or contented Ireland until you have the people of Ireland on the side of the law in the same way as they are in England.

The hideous outrages and crimes which have horrified us within the last few weeks and even within the last few days have never had their parallel in any previous period of Irish history. Even in the rebellion of 1798 there was nothing so awful as those murders in Dublin on Saturday night. Why are they tolerated? Why should they exist? Why do not the people of Ireland rush forward to give evidence and help the police in detecting these crimes? Because of that habit which has been formed of being always against the Government and being always unwilling to give any help to it in what is considered to be its course against the people of the country. That is a fatal and permanent evil.

In addition to that, I must say in vindication of the people of Ireland, that during the last few years in Ireland there has been a terrible system of terrorism by the secret societies. These secret societies have come down from the eighteenth century. They had been active from time to time during the nineteenth century. They were very active and terrible between 1879 and 1882. They had completely died down—that is to say, they were no longer active, there was no flame although the embers were still smouldering—until the beginning of the war. And the war lit up the minds of the people into what the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, properly called a state of temporary madness. In its original inception Sinn Fein was not a criminal association. It was hardly even a, revolutionary or a republican association. It has become so under the influence of the passions evoked by the war, which have been evoked in every part of Europe—the passion of violence accompanied by cruelty, which has never been known in European history for a hundred years. There has been a repercussion of that in Ireland also. Do not suppose, my Lords, that this terrorism is to be identified with Sinn Fein. I was very glad to hear, in the singularly temperate and instructive speech that was made last night by Lord Kilmain, unfortunately to a comparatively small house, the sharp distinction which he drew as an Irish landlord living in the South of Ireland between Sinn Fein and the murder gangs. These murder gangs are a comparatively small body, but they are quite sufficient to terrorise the neighbourhoods in which they live, and I have no doubt that the leaders of Sinn Fein itself stand in terror of them.

During the terrible days of 1881 and 1882, after the murder of Mr. Burke and Lord Frederick Cavendish, Mr. Parnell himself, who was then the leader of the Nationalist Party, went in terror of his life and was obliged to apply to Sir William Harcourt, then Home Secretary, for police protection. You must not for a moment suppose that these crimes are the deeds of the responsible leaders of Sinn Fein. I agree that they ought to denounce them. I am sorry they do not denounce them. I think it is deplorable that there have not been, not only from them but from the heads of the Church, far more emphatic denunciations of the crimes at which our blood runs cold than has yet come from them. But these are the causes.

There is another fact to be noticed about Ireland. The Irish people have never had any responsibility. The Government has always been imposed upon them from without. They have never had occasion to learn by experience how difficult a task government is, what powers it requires, how often it is obliged to do things that are unpopular and to refuse that which popular clamour demands. This has been a great misfortune to Ireland. All her leaders have been Opposition leaders who have never had the responsibility of government in their hands, and for that von must make great allowances.

Thirdly, there is this feeling of Irish nationality to which I have already referred, and I beg your Lordships to remember that it is one of the features of the case which makes this Bill unacceptable, which makes unacceptable everything which appears to come from outside and is not the work of the Irish people themselves. I am sorry to have to add another feature which is new in Ireland—the universal distrust and dislike with which the Government of Ireland is now regarded. I never remember anything like it in previous years. Even in the years between 1878 and 1885, when disorder was so bad, the days of the Duke of Marlborough, of Lord Cowper, and of Lord Spencer, there was never anything approaching the dislike and distrust which all classes in Ireland, Unionsits as well as Nationalists, feel towards the present Government. I do not venture to apportion the blame for it. I do not know how far it is their fault or the fault of what is dictated to them from England. At any rate there is the fact, and it is quite enough to pre- judice the people of Ireland against any Bill that is presented to them without their having a share in its framing.

The result of all this is that after two centuries British rule has failed in Ireland. All the world knows it, and all the world taunts us with it. As was said by my noble friend, Viscount Grey, in that singularly eloquent language of his, there is no part of the British Dominions where we have failed except Ireland, and it is the only place in which we have not succeeded in meeting the wishes of the people.

And the tragic part of it is that the English people mean well to Ireland. It is commonly supposed in other countries—I have found it in other parts of the world—that there is a bitter animosity between the English people and the Irish people. You know that nothing could be further from the truth. The English people mean well to the Irish people. They do not know all about them, but they know that they have suffered much and that they must be pardoned much. And I think they are anxious to go as far as they can possibly go, consistently with the safety of the United Kingdom, to meet the wishes of the Irish people and to be reconciled to them. That is largely because Ireland has come into the party game. It is our English party system that is very largely answerable for the troubles that have arisen in Ireland, and I would venture to say to your Lordships that if India had come into English party government, as Ireland has come, we should have lost India long ago. It has been the instability of British government that has been one of the greatest causes of our failure.

I have stated these facts in order to show, if I can, that the continuance of the present system is quite impossible. My noble friend, Lord Salisbury, who spoke with that earnestness and sincerity, as well as force, which always win respect for every opinion he expresses, stated in the clearest way all the objections that apply to giving Home Rule to a people at present in a state of disorder. But he added that we ought to wait until Ireland had ceased to be disaffected. How long shall we have to wait? It is because We have not satisfied the demands of Ireland that she is disaffected, and if we wait until Ireland is peaceable and quiet we shall be told then that there is no need for Home Rule, and the occasion will again be lost, as it has been lost before. It is more than thirty Years since the policy of "twenty years' resolute government" for Ireland was propounded, and during those thirty years we have got further than ever from resolute government. These are the reasons which lead me to believe that the present Bill will be useless.

The Lord Chancellor has admitted that the continuance of the present system is impossible, and I think everybody admits that. The noble Marquess who has just spoken has admitted that we must do something. If we are to do something let us try to do something that will be effective. Now, what does this Bill lead us to? The Lord Chancellor told us yesterday that if either of the two Parliaments in Northern and Southern Ireland do not work, if in Southern Ireland either there is not half the number of members elected or half the number of members elected failed to take the Oath, there would be Crown Colony government and we might have to attempt the reconquest of Ireland. That is the prospect which appears to the Lent Chancellor, speaking for the Government, to be a probable result of the present Bill. Is not that a sufficient condemnation? How can we possibly be asked to pass a Bill at the end of which, after another vista of trouble, there stands Crown government and all the evils which it we see accompany arbitrary government low? It is a counsel of despair. I do not think that any one will seriously contemplate leaving Ireland to herself. We cannot abandon Ireland, like a derelict ship on the ocean. We are responsible for Ireland; we cannot leave Ireland without giving her a Government under which she has some chance of prospering. And therefore I dismiss at once suggestion that we can wash our hands of responsibility for Ireland.

But, subject to that, we ought, I believe, to give the completest self-government that is possible, consistently with the safety of the United Kingdom. That means that we must retain foreign policy, that aye must retain the Army, that we must retain the Navy and the command of Irish ports. I agree that it is highly improbable that in any form Ireland would be hostile, or that our ports would be used against us, bat it is possible it might happen. And I am perfectly sure that the sentiment of the English nation would refuse to allow Ireland powers of that kind that could be used against her. Subject to those conditions the safest course to go as far as we possibly can. I admit all the objections that could be brought against giving Ireland the complete control of finance, including Customs and Excise. Those objections were stated very forcibly by the noble Earl, Lord Curzon, in a previous debate and they have been stated again to-night by the noble Marquess opposite. I see great force in he first three of them; I should not acquiesce in the last two, because I see no hope of fitting Ireland in any way into a scheme of United Kingdom federation. I look upon that as a lucre phantasm.

But I realise fully the objections to giving over the control of Customs, and personally I regret that it has to be done. I am a very late and reluctant convert to what is called fiscal autonomy for Ireland, because I do not think it is to the advantage either of Ireland or of England. But we have come to a position where we have to think of more important issues than even those of the convenience of fiscal arrangements between the two countries. There are things which have to be done, although we see their faults. And this enlarged measure of Home Rule—I will not call it Dominion Home Rule, because the term is rather vague and rather misleading—but this enlarged Home Rule, which includes fiscal autonomy, seems to be one of those things which we must now concede because Ireland will be satisfied with nothing less. The Irish people have long cherished the belief that they are unjustly dealt with financially by England, and they have long believed that if they were given the control of their own finance; they could develop Irish industries, and improve the material condition of their country, and make the most of its material resources in a way in which they are unable to do so long as Parliament controls their fortunes. They will not be satisfied till they get that chance. Whether or no you think that they will make much of it is another matter. But there, it is. It is their belief, and it is one of the things that we have to consider if we want this measure to work with satisfaction.

I was very much impressed, as I suppose we all were, by the forcible argument of the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, as to the dangers of giving Home Rule to a country a large part of whose population is evidently disaffected. I realise all that. But let pie remind you not only of what has been said by so many Irish peers these two days but also of what one hears when one goes to Ireland. I happened to be in Ireland a few months ago, and my astonishment was great to find that Irish Unionists, strong Conservatives, strong Protestants, men who ten years ago had been opposed to Home Rule in any form, had now come to consider that Home Rule was inevitable, and that it ought to go to the extent of fiscal autonomy because that alone would give it a chance of success. If I were free to give their names they would carry weight as evidence to show that they think the time has come when a much larger Bill than this will have to be given to Ireland.

There are two methods by which we may proceed. The one is by enlarging and amending the Bill in such a way as to give all proper safeguards to Ulster and the full protection to Southern Unionists which they desire—full protection for them, full protection for Ulster, and fiscal autonomy. Those are the three points in which it seems to me this Bill must be transformed if it is to work. The other plan is, instead of proceeding with this Bill, to summon an Irish Assembly to draft a Constitution for the country which will represent the wishes of the people ascertained by full and free discussion. We should have to lay down the limits within which this Constitution should be framed. We should require them not to touch those reserved subjects, control of foreign policy and the Army and Navy, but subject to these we should leave it to them to draw up the form of government which they thought would be best for the country itself.

Your Lordships will remember that the National Convention which sat in Ireland in 1917 arrived at a far larger measure of agreement than Irishmen had ever reached before, and elicited a spirit of con-promise and conciliation among all its members which was unexpected. The noble Lord, Lord Oranmore and Browne, gave us au interesting illustration of that yesterday. It shows what can be done by bringing Irishmen together, getting them to work in a practical and constructive spirit. They have been accustomed hitherto only to criticise and oppose. Set them to construct, and tell them that if they can only agree we shall do our best to carry out their wishes. I believe that to be the most hopeful course that could be pursued.

It will be said that they will demand separation. Several of your Lordships have told us that they do not believe that the bulk of the Irish people desire separation. I am convinced of it. I am amply convinced that the great body of the Irish people, the majority which would be elicited upon any fair popular vote that could be taken, is in favour of the maintenance of the connection between Britain and Ireland. It is clearly to their interests to do so. It is above all things to the interest of the Roman Catholic Church. It is impossible to suppose that the Prelates of the Roman Catholic Church could possibly desire to find themselves under a Republic separated from England. I am confirmed in that opinion by what has fallen from several Roman Catholic Prelates within the last few weeks. The Archbishop of Tuam, the Bishop of Cork, and the Bishop of Ross have all spoken in that sense. I should like particularly to quote the opinion of the Bishop of Ross, because he is one of the wisest and most temperate of all the Irish Prelates. He is one whom I know very well, and your Lordships may take it that he spoke with perfect sincerity when he said that he believed that full satisfaction would be given to Irish demands by enlarging the Bill, and that the Irish people would acquiesce in that and endeavour to work it honestly and loyally.

Although I suggest the course of a Convention, and although I believe that in many ways it would be the most promising course, I do not venture to argue that it will be better than the improvement and enlargement of this Bill. It may be that your Lordships will think it better to delay proceeding with this Bill until the Government has had the opportunity of considering all that has been said here by Irish Peers and endeavouring to meet the views they have expressed. What I do earnestly wish and press, with such knowledge as a very long experience of Irish politics has given me, is that this Bill as it stands offers no prospect whatever of the fulfilment of those hopes in which the Lord Chancellor indulged yesterday. I am sure they are hopes which we all cherish, but it is only by going further than this Bill that you can have any prospect of their attainment.

Is it too much to hope that the debates in your Lordships' House, which are con- ducted in a calmer and are far less subject to Party influences than those conducted in another place, may lead the Government, to reconsider, improve, and amend this scheme which in its present form offers so little prospect of peaceful settlement? I earnestly hope that this may be the case. We all feel the extreme urgency of the position. We feel the extreme need for vindicating in the face of the world those professions of liberty and love of liberty which we are always making, and I trust that the wider views and the temperance of spirit which have so often in the last few years corrected the mistakes that have been made elsewhere and unproved the legislation which has been placed on the Statute-book, may have their effect here, and that the Government will consent to the appeal that has been made from so many quarters to reconsider their position and let this Bill pass in the form which gives it a fair prospect of success.

THE EARL OF DESART

My Lords, even if I desired to do so it would not be fitting for me, as a humble member of your Lordships' House, to enter upon a long history of Ireland and speculate on the causes which have brought it to its present deplorable condition, its we see it, at this moment. To me falls the humble task, and the more useful on, of limiting myself strictly to an examination of the provisions of the Bill, and considering whether they form any remedy now or in the future for time ills which the Government desire to meet and to cure—a desire in which every member of this House would support them if they thought the proposals before them would achieve that object.

We have heard to-night speeches of the greatest interest front; loaders of this House from different points of view as to cause and cure, and in listening to my noble friend Lord Londonderry I was reminded of the time when I had the honour of serving on the Irish Convention with him. I remember how broad-minded were his speeches, how eloquent his language and how in the early days of the Convention he led us to hope that we should work out some unanimous result. That hope was not fulfilled, but we got very near it at one time, and there did come out in that Assembly a sense of the comradeship of Irishmen and friendship between individuals. It was a remarkable feature that during the eight months we sat I do not think there was one disagreeable incident, one personal difference which produced the smallest friction.

But things have moved since then, and we meet tinder different circumstances to consider conditions so appalling as to appear almost hopeless. Now I was a Unionist, and I believe, with several other members of this House who have spoken, that could the Union have been worked successfully and could it have been made acceptable to the Irish people it would have afforded the beet prospect of security to England and prosperity and happiness to Ireland. But—it is useless to conceal it—it has, owing to causes which have been referred to, failed, and there is hardly anybody in this Horse who could really, I think, believe that any attempt to go back to lice Union is possibly in any shape or forum. You may desire it, but noticing else remains. Already the Home Rule Bill has been massed though not put into operation, and the old Unionist leaders are now supporting the Bill that is before us. Even the old stronghold of Ulster, for reasons which I admit are special to this particular Bill, has now accepted it, and ill accepting it recognised a breach of the Union of which for so many years they were the most determined defenders.

We all wish, somehow or another, to bring the better sections of Ireland into line, in some way, to co-operate in government and to endeavour to secure reasonable and orderly government in Ireland. That those elements exist those of us who live in Ireland well know, and our principal endeavour ought to be somehow or other to induce them to come into the open, to become vocal, and to assist in the common work in which we desire to be engaged. From that point of view I have to the best of my ability considered this Bill, and—I say it with regret—I can see no hope in its provisions for any result that can possibly lift front Ireland the terrible cloud that now hangs over it. The Bill contains in the first instance a provision which is unacceptable not only to the extreme section in Ireland, not only to the most bitter politicians, but I believe to nearly every section of the Unionists and to the most violent Sinn Feiner; their feeling is that whatever form of Government is applied to Ireland it shall be a Government for the whole of Iceland, and, whatever securities we shall be prepared to grant to certain sections, thy Ireland shall be one and undivided.

Now the very centre of this Bill, the main proposition of this Bill, is two Parliaments, and that I ant afraid makes acceptance of it absolutely impossible in the South of Ireland. I do not believe that any proposal involving partition that was likely to be permanent could possibly succeed or be accepted in Southern Ireland. I personally am one of the strongest opponents of partition, and do not think under any circumstances that I could persuade myself to vote for any Partition Bill, but I go so far as to say that, if I could see in this Bill any machinery which I thought likely to produce union hereafter, my objections might be modified, and I believe the objections of others might be modified. But I cannot, if you take the whole provisions of this Bill, see any prospects of that result.. As far as the thing can be established on paper, this is as near permanent partition as anything you could imagine. Of course it may not so happen—I hope it will not happen—but I have not to regard what I hope and what I think. What I am regarding is my own knowledge of the people I have seen and spoken with, and what from my knowledge of Ireland is what other people think. Their view is that partition in this form is impossible and unacceptable, and I ant perfectly certain that in that way no foundation for settlement and no peace lie.

There is nothing new in this. It has been well known for months and months that the South of Ireland has rejected this Bill. They have proclaimed loudly to all the world that they would not have it. Sonic have gone so far as to regard it as an insult that such a Bill should be offered. In face of this the Bill has gone on; it has been introduced, it has, been passed through the House of Commons and is presented to us for acceptance in this form. Gladly would I accept any Bill in which I saw the prospect of settlement, but I have to look to what would be the consequences of imposing this Bill on Ireland at the present moment. I believe they would be evil and disastrous. It is known that apart from the question of partition, which to my mind is far the most important of all, there is also a desire for what is called fiscal autonomy. Whether it would in fact be necessary, if you advance in that direction, to go to the fullest extent I should not like to say, but that has been the demand—that some greater measure of financial control is necessary to make this Bill in any way palatable to Southern Ireland. When I ant told, as Loot Londonderry has told us with great force, the objections to Customs being assigned to Ireland I. nuts say at once that I agree with it, but, as Lord Bryce said, larger considerations must come in, and whether it is objectionable or not I can quote from the Prime Minister's action during the Convention to show it was not then regarded as impossible. It is true that the Convention, nominally at any rate, broke up, or rather failed to agree on a. question of Customs. The Prime Minister intervened to endeavour by his influence and by his eloquence to produce some settlement on the subject. That was impossible at the time, but the matter was adjourned and adjourned at the request of the Prime Minister in order that it might be reconsidered after the war. It was not turned down as an impossibility, but every one in Ireland knows that, and you cannot therefore go to them and say that the thing is impossible. It may be undesirable, but you cannot go to them and say that it is impracticable. Then there may be other powers which they would seek. I strongly object to the use of the word "Dominion" It has been a most unfortunate phrase. It has misled every one. It has misled some into claiming greater powers than can possibly be given, and it has frightened those who would otherwise have been willing to give wider powers.

We know what are the absolutely necessary limitations of any grant of self-government in Ireland, and I can hardly imagine that there is any difference in this House upon that point, but unless you can do something I am convinced myself that there would be only one fate, or possibly two forms of one fate, for this Bill. Both were referred to by the Lord Chancellor in his speech last night. One is actually provided for in Clause 70 of the Bill, and is, I believe, what would happen. Ulster, or rather the six counties, would form their Parliament and would, as I think has been suggested by others, find themselves at once in extremely rough water. They have probably within their borders a population who hold the most extreme of Nationalist views. They have, within their borders, been in conflict more than once. And they have added to those extreme Nationalist views a bitterness of religious feeling that I am thankful to say does not prevail to anything like the same extent in the South of Ireland. It might be, as has been suggested, that they would have to occupy the first years of their Parliamentary life, or at any rate the first year, in dealing with riots and revolts by coercion acts or otherwise, and it cannot be forgotten that the minority, desiring as it would to be united with the South, would in its resistance to the Government imposed upon it be assisted, and its agitation fomented, from every organised Nationalist Society in the South of Ireland.

Beside that if, as I think, Southern Ireland would not accept this Bill, you Mould have that part of the country governed by a Lord Lieutenant and I think three Privy Councillors. How long de you think that would last? How long would public opinion anywhere support it? How long could you sustain it? And where does it lead to? Is it to go on for ever, or how is it to be stopped? It will not be stopped by this Bill, because this Bill will be refused and not accepted. It can only be stopped by something farther being done, and, if that is so, why not try something further now and see if you cannot get some assent from Southern Ireland? There are plenty of decent men in the South of Ireland, if you can only make them vote. I was very pleased to hear what Lord Londonderry said about that, and about the part they played in the war. If you can move them in sufficiently large numbers I think this campaign of crime and murder would be stopped and in time disappear.

The alternative suggested by the Lord Chancellor is that the Parliament should meet awl declare a Republic, and force to take even more violent measures. That is an alternative which I, as a resident in the South of Ireland, cannot view with unconcern. What I dread, awl have always dreaded most, is that by force, by circumstances of that kind, you should so govern as to alienate almost, every friend you have in Ireland, and you have many, and to produce a state of mind in Which two-thirds of the population, many of whom wish to be with you now, will say "Whatever we have, anything is better than British rule." That I want to avert if I can.

I do not speak without some little knowledge of the feeling of the country that I know, because I have seen many people. l arm thankful to say that my own county has been very peaceful, and that there has been little serious crime. Where-ever I go people come and say "Oh, my Lord, cannot we get peace somehow." Then I have talked to them and asked them what they want, and your Lordships would be surprised at the lumber of people in all walks of life who said that this miserable Bill was an insult, and that they wanted sonic huger measure. When I inquired what that larger measure that they wanted was, "fiscal autonomy has been one thing, and" rather wider independent powers "another. When I have said "What about the Republic and separation?" they have said, "The Republic is all nonsense, we do not want that." That is always the answer. Then I have asked them about the Army and the Navy, and they have SCO lied even more, and said "Of course, you must have your Army and your Navy."

Your Lordships cannot be fully aware of the great movement of what is called moderate opinion in Ireland of late. It has been expressed in a great number of ways. It has been expressed in meetings of lieutenants and deputy-lieutenants, of chambers of commerce, of farmers, and of magistrates, and most of those men, many of them old Unionists, and nearly all of them men with substantial stakes in the country, and not revolutionists—they have not all been in complete agreement because some of them were more extreme than others, but the desire of all those movements was that the Government should be compelled to make some further offer.

I do not myself believe that the plan suggested by my noble friend, Lord Bryce, of an Assembly or Convention now would be of the smallest use. Anybody elected to anything now would be elected under the influence of terror, and what you would produce in any assembly now would be a reproduction of the Mountain in the French Revolution. I believe that if any offer of wider government had been held out earlier by the Prime Minister it would have met with a very large response. I believe it would meet with a response now, but I admit that the difficulties are now greater than they were. I took a little trouble to find out about these events in nay own county. I had asked a man, a substantial man whose business took him into all parts of Ireland, in association with every class of person from the most violent extremist to the most moderate Unionist, to tell me what he thought. After some weeks he said to me, "I cannot speak for the whole of the. West of Ireland, because I am not sure, but as to certain counties I can tell you that if there WPS any offer of that character you would find that the violence would practically disappear, and that the farmers and people would come forward to say what they thought." That is what I want to get at. If you can once rouse that opinion, it is my belief that you would be astonished at the number of people who desire earnestly to escape front this terrible net in which they are entangled, but who cannot do so until they can act together.

When I hear, as I have heard, Irishmen accused of cowardice because they do not speak or do certain things, I think a good many of us would hold our tongues if we lived in a lonely cottage by the roadside with our wives and families without any protection, without police, and knowing that there were desperate men, not necessarily in the neighbourhood, who could conic from a distance and shoot us down without interruption. I do not think any of us would be ready to talk. Whatever Bill you pass, whether this one or any other, it is obvious that you take a great risk. There cannot be any doubt about it. If you enlarge it in the directions I indicate I do not believe your risk would be greater, and you would have some chance of a result. In the present temper of South Ireland you have no chance of the Bill being accepted, and the consequence of a Parliament in Ulster, with its own difficulties, and an absolutely arbitrary Government in the South of Ireland, is a condition I cannot contemplate. It could not last, but, once started, I do not know how you would get out of it. I can see no future in that direction. We are told that if we give a Second Reading to the Bill it can be amended in Committee. I understand that in the two principal respects this cannot be done. That is as regards finance and partition. The real Amendment is that there should be no partition, which appears to me to be equivalent to the rejection of the Bill.

I hope, therefore, the Government may consider, as Lord Bryce has appealed to them to do—I do not want to dictate the extent—whether in sonic way they can enlarge the powers of this Bill so as to give it a chance of that acceptance which alone cart enable them to have any prospect of bringing peace to Ireland by producing the results for which it s introduced in Parliament. If it does not do that it does nothing. There is much that I should like to say, but nearly everything that can be said has been said, and I have no right at this hour to intrude longer on your Lordships' time. I have long hoped to see something that would bring out the good in Ireland and crush the bad. I think there are possibilities, shadowy, perhaps dangerous, in legislation, but my desire is that if we embark on that course, as I think we are right to embark, it should be legislation which mill be effective and will produce the results for which it is designed, and not throw Ireland into a chaos possibly even greater, and difficulties possibly even worse, than now afflict that unhappy country.

LORD ARM A GIIDAL

My Lords, I must apologise for rising at this late hour, but it is not my intention to address your Lordships at any length. I desire, however, to add something to that which has been already said by noble Lords from the Ulster point of view. I venture to think that my lifelong association with the North of Ireland, and the fact that for nearly twenty years I represented a division of my native county of Armagh in the House of Commohs, give me sonic title to speak on behalf of the Unionists of Ulster. I ant sure I am correctly representing their views when I say, in the first place, that this Bill was not introduced in response to any demand from them. It does not, in any sense, represent the real wishes of the people of Ulster. We would much rather not have any kind of Home Rule. Any disturbance of the Legislative Union between Ireland and Great Britain is hateful to us. It violates our deepest convictions. We are firmly convinced that upon the maintenance of the Union depend the peace and prosperity of Ireland and the security of the United Kingdom. Our opposition to Home Rule has been founded upon that belief and in this respect our convictions have undergone no change whatever.

But we recognise that there has been a change of opinion in Great Britain on this question. We are well aware of the fact that in the policy of resisting every form of Home Rule, we can no longer rely upon the support of a considerable section of the Unionist Party. Many who formerly shared our convictions that this entire policy is inconsistent with Imperial security, appear now to have collie to the conclusion that some form of Home Rule can be granted to Ireland without risk or danger. We believe they are wrong; but we cannot ignore facts; and, therefore, whilst we disclaim all responsibility for the present proposals of the Government, we do not offer any resistance to the measure either in Parliament or in Ireland. At the same time, my Lords, I feel bound to express the opinion that the time chosen by the Government for bringing these proposals before Parliament is singularly inopportune. Your Lordships will remember that less than two years ago His Majesty's Ministers declared that any attempt to settle the Irish question must be postponed until the general situation in Ireland showed improvement. It has never yet been explained to my satisfaction why, in the face of that declaration, the Government suddenly determined, last December, to introduce this Bill.

There had certainly been no improvement in the contrary of Ireland. On the contrary it had become worse. The great majority of the people in the South and West had definitely committed themselves to the policy of revolution which had been declared by Sinn Fein. I suppose the Government must have had some hope and expectation that their proposals would bring about a change for the better. But the events of the past twelve months have shown that they misjudged the situation.

It is not my purpose to refer in detail to the terrible list of murders and outrages, which has grown from month to month daring the present year, until it is now beyond question that never before in history has Ireland been in such it dangerous condition as that country is in to-day. I will only say that, in my opinion, the Government would have been better advised, if they had kept to the policy which they laid down in 1918. They have chosen, however, to bring in this Bill, and it becomes our duty to examine it and to pass judgment upon it. The first question I ask myself is this—Does it represent an honest attempt to pave the way to a settlement of the Irish question? My Lords, I believe not only that the Government desire to make this the basis of a settlement, but that they are convinced it is the only possible foundation that can be laid at the present time. The great obstacle in the way of a settlement has always been the demand for Irish independence. That is a claim which cannot possibly be conceded; and we shall never reach a settlement unless we can convince the Irish people that their dream of independence is an impossible one.

All the Home Rule Bills in the past have been framed on Separatist lines. They eneouraged and kept alive the dream of independence, which it is, above all things, necessary to dispel. Dominion Home Rule—which has been suggested as an alternative to this Bill, would being us nearer to complete independence, than any of the proposals which have preceded it. I can only express my astonishment that any statesman could be found to support it for one instant. If any of your Lordships are inclined to favour this proposal I would beg of you to consider the events of the last six years.

In 1914 the Home Rule Act was placed upon the Statute Book. That measure—so we were told at the time—would satisfy the aspirations of the Irish people, and settle this problem. But what followed The Rebellion in Dublin. Then we had the conspiracy of Sinn Fein to assist the enemies of the Empire. Next we had the declaration of an Irish Republic, and, finally, the campaign of assassination and outrage of this year—which is without parallel in the history of any civilised country. Under Dominion Home Rule the government M Ireland would be handed over to men who have either organised this criminal conspiracy or condoned its appalling crimes. They would be allowed to raise an Army and Navy, and be given full power to pursue their campaign of bitter hostility against England and the Empire.

My Lords, it is difficult to understand how any one in the position of Mr. Asquith can talk as lightly an he has done of being willing to take risks. It is not a question of taking risks. We should be faced with the certainty of disaster. Dominion Home Rule would bring in its train undoubtedly civil war in Ireland, and a new war of conquest on the part of Great Britain.

From the point of view of Ulster there is no possible alternative to the Government Bill. I am, of course, aware that some of your Lordships strongly object to the setting up of two Parliaments in Ireland. We are told it will be destructive of Irish unity. I do not see how it is possible to destroy what does not exist. Ireland has always been divided; and I think we must all admit that the events of the past few years have only accentuated the division.

We may deplore the fact; but it appears to me to be absolutely futile to propose a single Parliament for the whole of Ireland. If self-government is to be granted at all, there must be two Parliaments—one for the six counties and one for the rest of Ireland.

It has been suggested that only one Parliament should be set up, and that the six Ulster counties should be excluded front its operation, and remain in all respects a part of the United Kingdom. If that proposal had been made a year ago it might have satisfied the people of the six counties. But I am sure it would not satisfy us to-day.

We have been offered a Parliament of our own. We have not only definitely accepted the offer; but there has been a growing appreciation of the fact that the Northern Parliament will be a distinct advantage to us. We shall be able by its means to obtain reforms which we have hitherto been unable to secure. I will mention only one of these reforms—namely, education. Your Lordships may not be aware that there are twenty-five thousand children in Belfast alone who have no schools to which to go. We want to build more schools—and better schools—and to improve the standard of education generally throughout Ulster. Unless we get our own Parliament we shall probably have to wait for years before we can obtain these reforms. This Bill will also settle our position in the matter of local self-government. The uncertainty which has prevailed on this question has had a most prejudicial elect upon the commercial and industrial developments of the North of Ireland. If the six counties were simply excluded from the Irish Parliament and left under the Imperial Parliament that uncertainty would continue. We should be subjected to every kind of pressure—political and economic—to compel us to come under the Dublin Parliament, and we should be driven back to the position of 1914. We have pledged ourselves to work the Northern Parliament with the sole idea of making the Bill a success. It is too late now to propose changes which would destroy the whole structure of the Bill and necessitate the introduction of another measure, and for the reasons I have given I consider that we must stand by the Bill which is now before us.

The Amendment which has been moved by the noble Earl, Lord Dunraven, is evidently designed to wreck the Bill; and I feel bound to vote against it. I would ask your Lordships to consider for a moment what the consequences of rejecting the Government Bill would be. The Home Rule Act would be left on the Statute Book; and would have to be brought into operation when the last treaty of peace has been ratified. Is that a contingency that any one of your Lordships would regard with satisfaction? The statement that it does not meet the wishes of the majority of the Irish people, I submit, is really no argument at all. Is there any proposal which would command the support of the majority of the Irish people I There is only one and that is an independent Republic, which is obviously impossible. The fact is that not one of the many alternatives suggested by noble Lords would satisfy the majority of the Irish people. I am, therefore, unable to see any point in this argument because every one of the possible alternatives is open to the same objection.

The other statement in the Amendment, that the Government Bill does not, offer any prospect of a. permanent solution, is a mere expression of opinion. I think I am entitled to say on the other side that there is no other scheme which offers, in my opinion, the same good prospect of a permanent settlement as this one.

My Lords, in conclusion, I for one do not expect this Bill to bring about an immediate settlement of the Irish problem. The most that can be said for it is that it contains the germ of a hope of settlement and points the way which must be followed if that hope is to be fulfilled. The Bill imposes a great responsibility upon Ulster. The mission of the Northern Parliament appears to, be to give a practical demonstration to the rest of Ireland that it is possible to enjoy all the rights of local self-government while still maintaining the Union unimpaired. I am confident that Ulster will take up the task assigned to her with a full sense of responsibility and a determination to establish just and efficient government.

I can only express the hope that the people in Southern Ireland will profit by the example and will come to realise in time that national aspirations must be subordinated to the interests and security of the United Kingdom. When that day arrives, my Lords, we shall be in sight of a settlement of this question upon the basis of a United Ireland as a loyal member of a united Empire.

[The sitting was suspended at five minutes before eight o'clock and resumed at a quarter past nine.]

THE MARQUESS OF ABERDEEN AND TEMAIR

My Lords, those who have for thirty years at least been consistent advocates of the policy of self-government for Ireland are not likely to approach the consideration of a Bill designed to create any form of Home Rule for Ireland otherwise than in a favourable disposition. But I confess that if I were asked how I am going to vote to-morrow, I should be inclined to reply that that will depend largely upon the response given by His Majesty's Government to the appeals which have been made to them in the direction of a large extension in certain directions of the provisions of this Bill. I have in mind especially the appeal and the arguments of the noble Viscount whose presence and voice we have all welcomed in the House to-night—I mean Viscount Grey. His speech, we all thought, was of the most weighty character.

Before dwelling for a few minutes on the subject-matter of the Bill, I must claim the indulgence of the House while I make a request for the opportunity of submitting a personal statement and explanation. Indulgence in such a case, I think, is always accorded by the House. Unfortunately in this instance, although the statement is ostensibly of a personal character, it is also, as will be seen, quite relevant to the question before the House. On the last occasion when the subject of Ireland was discussed—namely, when a Motion was brought forward by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Loreburn—I received a direct challenge from the noble Earl, Lord Midleton, with reference to affairs during the time when I had the honour of filling the position of Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. As I had already spoken in the debate I could not reply at the moment, but I instantly said that I would take the first opportunity of doing so. The noble Earl contended that Ireland was in a peaceful state when the Government with which I was connected took office, and that when I left the country was in a state bordering on civil war. To that I reply with all possible emphasis, "It is not so." Perhaps the simplest way of proving that my declaration is true will be to state briefly certain facts which, if they have been to a large extent ignored and forgotten, stand on record and are full of significance. I am alluding to the voluntary enlistment in Ireland during the greater part of that period, and I can speak not only from records but from actual knowledge and observation.

It may interest the House if I quote a significant item or two regarding this matter. One of the approved insurance societies under the Act, which had not long been in existence, consisted of about 7,000 members. This number included men and women—young people and elderly people. It is easy to estimate roughly the proportion of men eligible for active service in this total of 7,000 individuals. I think your Lordships will agree that the number who enlisted, some 2,000, is somewhat remarkable, and there can be no doubt as to the accuracy of this as it is taken from the certificates and statements in the books of the society as to the demobilised men. I suppose we must add something for those who unhappily did not live to return.

Another example on the same point is Ennis and the surrounding district in the county of Clare, of which we have heard a good deal lately. In that case, out of a population of sonic 5,000, no fewer than 800 men between the ages of 18 and 45 enlisted. That, I think, is also a very remarkable case. I have here a pamphlet about Kilrush and the men who served in the Colours. I will give the main substance of the report, which is that out of a possible enlistment total of 591 no fewer than 414 joined the Colours. I think the House is indebted to the noble Marquess, Lord Londonderry, who alluded to the manner in which so many Irishmen came forward at this period, and his cordial and generous utterance I feel sure will do good. As he only spoke in general terms I thought it permissible to give these details.

What was it that brought about the decline in this satisfactory flow of recruiting? There was one cause which I feel bound to allude to. One is very reluctant to appear to criticise anything that has to do with military administration, but as the Prime Minister himself alluded some time ago in terms of very decided regret regarding certain features of War Office administration in regard to Ireland I suppose I need not be altogether reticent on this subject, as it has a direct bearing on the question. An illustration will perhaps indicate what I have in mind. During the first part of the war there was in Dublin a Committee organised for the purpose of promoting recruiting, composed of various prominent men in Dublin, all civilians, I think. Up to the year 1915 the number that passed into service through that agency was 13,349, but in the year 1916—for what reason I do not know—the Committee were requested to leave the matter of recruiting mainly to the military authorities, and from that time the recruiting rapidly diminished. I should add that before that handing over of the work to the military authorities the Commander-in Chief of the forces in Ireland had congratulated the Committee on the work they were doing.

There was another reason which hindered recruiting after the first year of the war, and that was the postponement of the bringing into effective operation of the Home Rule Act of 1914. This gave a handle to the extremists of the Sinn Fein Party, a party which had certainly become very small in number. I can illustrate that again by mentioning that the chief organ of the Sinn Fein Party, called the Sinn Fein, had declined from a daily paper to a weekly. That was obviously significant. But after 1915 the Sinn Fein movement began to gain fresh force. Nevertheless it is absolutely certain that when the outbreak took place in Easter week of 1916, 90 per cent. of the population of Ireland were totally ignorant of any such design, and not only so, but when they heard of the rising and of the unhappy events connected with it they entirely disapproved of what had occurred, and even some of the leading Sinn Feiners were opposed to it. It was organised by young enthusiasts, but coupled with them—and this is not often mentioned—were the remnants of the strike element which took part in the serious strike which your Lordships will remember occurred some years previously. The strikers were defeated, but that defeat left very bitter memories on the part of the strikers, and they were largely responsible for the rising of 1916.

But any allusion to this change for the worse in Ireland would be incomplete without some reference to the earlier manifestations in the opposite direction—namely, manifestations of good will. I can name not a few. It is a matter of public knowledge that His Majesty King George was exceedingly pleased with the splendid reception accorded to him during his visit to Dublin in 1914. There is no need to abstain from alluding to that, because His Majesty expressed publicly his gratification, and I was myself the recipient of a telegram to that effect from His Majesty which I greatly prize. There was another event which was certainly significant, and which happened not long afterwards, and that was the visit of the British Prime Minister. I say the British Prime Minister, because that is the important point, rather than the name of the distinguished statesman who happened to occupy the office at that time, Mr. Asquith. A great meeting was held in the Dublin Mansion House, primarily for recruiting purposes but also to welcome the Prime Minister That meeting was attended by a vast assembly of people of various classes and creeds, and I have no doubt that the majority, at any rate, were Nationalists. The Lord Mayor of Dublin, who was present, occupied the chair. The Lord Lieutenant was also there as well as many other well-known people. Anybody with a knowledge of Ireland will recognise, I think, and none more so than the noble Marquess behind me, that the holding of such a meeting in the Mansion House of Dublin was something to be noted as significant.

THE EARL OF MAYO

All parties were at the meeting.

THE MARQUESS OF ABERDEEN AND TEMAIR

Does the noble Earl say that all attended?

THE EARL OF MAYO

Yes.

THE MARQUESS OF ABERDEEN AND TEMAIR

Quite so. That is the point I wish to emphasise. I am very glad that the noble Earl has laid stress upon it. I spoke of the majority being Nationalists. That fact probably is obvious and I do not further emphasise it. It was a most representative meeting. Among the speakers were Mr. Redmond and Mr. John Dillon, who had a great reception. The proceedings were closed by the singing of "God Save the King.I have reason to know that, because I happened to start the tune, which was heartily taken up. I cannot say how many years had passed since the National Anthem had been sung in that hall, but it was a long time. It was sung again some months later, on the occasion of a great demonstration of kindness and good will when the Lord Lieutenant and his wife retired from office.

With these facts in view surely we cannot maintain that the unhappy change for the worse in regard to the attitude of the majority of the Irish people towards Britain, has taken place without any cause or responsibility on the part of this country. I am not speaking of this Government, or any Government, but of the people of this country. They ought seriously to consider this point—namely the responsibility which we, as a country, must recognise in connection with this great change. A whole nation, a whole community, does not change its attitude and temper in five years without some real reason. I hope I have made good my promise that, though I commenced with a personal allusion, I would deal with a topic of direct interest bearing on the discussion.

I will quickly dispose of what remains to be said. As to the strictures of the noble Earl, Lord Midleton, I infer that when he spoke of an undesirable responsibility being handed on by that Administration to its successors, he had particularly in view, though he did not specify it, a story which I have seen quoted from time to time in the Press and elsewhere to the effect that during the period when I had the honour of being Viceroy of Ireland the Police Force in Ireland, and especially the Crimes Special Branch, or the Secret Service Department of the Royal Irish Constabulary, did not experience that official recognition and encouragement to which they were entitled and which they had previously enjoyed. To that remark I give the most unqualified contradiction, and in case my own declaration should be considered insufficient I can produce evidence the unimpeachable character of which cannot be questioned. I hold in my hand letters from those whose testimony is entirely such as to support my distinct denial. I will not trouble the House by reading those letters in full, but I will mention the names of those from whom they come. I have first a letter from Sir Neville Chamberlain, who was Inspector-General of the Royal Irish Constabulary during the whole of the period referred to. For that reason I beg leave to read a portion of his letter. It is dated November 18, 1920, and says— During the whole period of my command of the R.I.C. there was never any suggestion from any member of the Irish Government that the activity of the Crimes Special Branch should be curtailed or interfered with. On the contrary, every encouragement was given to it by the Government. Then I have a letter from a distinguished member of this House, Lord MacDonnell, who held the very important position of Under-Secretary during the first part of that Viceroyalty. He gives his unqualified support in the same direction, and I am very grateful to him for it. The next letter is from Sir James Dougherty, who succeeded Lord MacDonnell as Under-Secretary, and who had previously been for many years Assistant Under-Secretary. All who have had dealings with Sir James Dougherty will say that he was an official who for efficiency and character could not be surpassed. Lastly I have the testimony of Mr. Birrell, formerly Chief Secretary, who is as much concerned in this matter as I am, especially as the Chief Secretary has the more immediate supervision of the Police. When I mentioned to him what I proposed to say to-night, and have now said, he gave his cordial concurrence and endorsement thereto. I shall only give one other quotation, and it is a statement from the Chairman of the Irish Prisons Board, who says— The number of prisoners committed for trial in 1914 was 32,052. The daily average in custody was 2,570. In 1915 the number committed was 19,399 compared with 32,000, and the daily average in custody was 1,566, this being the lowest on record. I have even seen it stated that Mr. Birrell and I were in some sense responsible for the troubles which have afflicted Ireland since that time; in fact, it has been a current tale in certain quarters. If it has been current, all I can say is that it is counterfeit coin and a fraud, and I nail it to the counter here and now.

I have alluded incidentally to Lord Grey's speech. He impressed upon us the need of an extensive change in the Bill. I think a great many statements in this debate have been made which indirectly strengthen and support that appeal. It is a very common thing to hear about the disloyalty of a large proportion of the Irish people, and of the great need for the protection of Ulster and the Protestants generally. People get into the way of alluding to something as a matter of course, but after all is there any great necessity for the protection of these people from Roman Catholic intolerants? It is not necessary for a Parliament to be established in order that disabilities and molestations should be imposed upon the minority, but I have yet to learn that there are any serious complaints in the South of Ireland that the Protestant minority are interfered with in their business. We have heard of boycotting, but I think it is generally done purely on political grounds. My belief is, after some opportunities of observation, that so long as Protestants abstain from anything like attempting proselytising the Roman Catholics get on very well with them. We have the testimony of many a Protestant minister in the South of Ireland that they have been able to live in complete amity and friendship with the people.

When I speak of the alarm as to the danger to Protestants I cannot help alluding to a curious piece of information that I have just obtained, though it is perhaps absolutely irrelevant to the argument. This is to the effect that the patron saint, so to speak, of the Protestant element of Ulster, William of Orange, was after all not a true blue Orangeman. He obtained the blessing of the Pope before he started on his celebrated expedition. I have that on the authority of the eminent Professor of history, Dr. Sigerson, and the late Lord Acton quoted to the same effect. That being so, I venture to make a suggestion—namely, that as King William started as the Prince of Orange and was on one occasion blessed by the Pope, also as Orange is not a Protestant principality in the Netherlands but is in the south of France and is a papal principality, would it not be worth consideration as to whether the 12th of July Festival and Celebration might not be quietly discontinued. I am sure it would be a great convenience if that could be carried out.

Before concluding I wish to say I do think we must recall the hopeful indications which have been apparent in the recent records and in the debates here. I was very much struck by what was said by Lord Oranmore and Browne about his experience at the Convention. He stated that he was surprised to find how much reasonableness he found on the part of his fellow Ulster members to meet to some extent the propositions from the other side, so to speak, but that these gentlemen were delegates and therefore they had to refer each important point to their friends in the North. That is a very different thing, to referring a matter in writing to a body who have not been brought under the influence of the friendly discussion and so forth, and. that was art obstruction and a difficulty.

I also feel that the appeal to the Government is strengthened by the fact that a very deep feeling exists not in one direction only in Ireland at the present moment. We have all been horrified by the dreadful events of last Sunday in Dublin, and we were quite sure that a vast proportion of the people in Ireland share that feeling of deep and profound distress, but unfortunately concurrently with those events something else has happened—namely, the mysterious murder of a Catholic priest in Galway, the Rev. Mr. Griffin. I am not making any comment or suggestion in explanation, but there is an investigation to be held, and it is most urgently necessary now that such should be held and carried out most vigorously, because you may be very sure that every Irish Catholic feels that not only a dreadful murder has been committed but an act of sacrilege, and I suppose Catholics in this country will have the same view.

I think also that in connection with reprisals there have been lamentable events, and I suggest it would be a very helpful thing at this time if His Majesty's Government could utter some further expressions of regret, more than language of a mere passing sort, regarding the great sufferings which have been endured by admittedly innocent people in connection with those events. There is a too common custom to speak of the Irish in a tone which indicates that the whole population are to be held as having failed in their duty. It is desirable to have a very little personal association with any Irishman to find that that is entirely erroneous. I know of parents and relations of gallant young soldiers who have made the supreme sacrifice who have felt acutely this attitude on the part of many British persons whom they have occasion to meet for business purposes. It is assumed that because they are Irish they are under the same ban. Surely we ought not to forget the achievements of the Irish regiments, especially such as Gallipoli and the fate of the 10th Division there. We surely should remem- ber the spirit in which they enlisted, believing the long controversy would be ended, that the giving of Home Rule to Ireland which they understood was certain was in sight, and that the interests of the two countries were henceforward to be united. Thousands of them died believing that England had fulfilled or was going to fulfil her plighted word in this matter. Surely we should remember such testimony as that of Major William Redmond in the House of Commons who, before he returned to the Front to die, urged that we should keep faith with those who had trusted us. I am told that this Bill is a move in that direction, but I venture to suggest that there is good reason for begging the Government to consider what has been urged upon them, and to express a great hope for success in a large sense by extensive Amendments in their measure.

LORD RIBBLESDALE

My Lords, I am sorry to hear that I shall not find myself in the same Lobby as my noble friend, although in the brave old days of Home Rule we were often associated. But I am glad to hear that William III who has always been a great hero of mine, secured the blessing of the Pope; I only hope the British taxpayer of the lay had not to pay for it.

I hope that the. House of Lords will give a Second Reading to this Bill. It is almost a commonplace to say that the differences of England and Ireland are a very old and very enduring question of controversy The other day I came across something that Mr. Disraeli said when speaking on the 9th of August, 1843, on an Arms Bill for Ireland, Ireland being the same uncomfortable relation as we find it now. He said that he hoped the time would come when a Party framed on true principles would do justice to Ireland, not by satisfying agitators nor by adopting in despair the first quack remedy, but by really penetrating into the history. of this great mismanagement: It is because I think that this Bill, no doubt with a great many imperfections, is the first real attempt, with a chance of success which no other Home Rule Bill has ever had, to pierce and penetrate this great mystification of mismanagement, that I intend to vote for it.

The other night Lord Willoughby de Broke, who has been justly praised and recognised as apparently almost the only consistent member of the House of Lords, made the same excuse, I think, as I am going to make. He said that this was an Irish question. It was a question which was very much misunderstood, and was very much better understood by Irishmen than by Englishmen. "At the same time," he said, "I assert that this is an English question and I am going to speak on it, and make my Motion. I put my Amendment down at all events as an Englishman." He says that he is going to vote against the Bill as an Englishman. I hold the exactly opposite opinion. I propose to support it as an Englishman who is impressed by the wreckage of attempts to get on with Ireland which strews the history of Ireland in its relations with this country, impressed by the failure of our attempt to please or to reconcile or to understand or to manage Ireland, impressed by the conviction that we cannot go on as we are and that circumstances have reached the point where we have to move and to move in the direction which His Majesty's responsible advisers have adopted and have advised us to move.

The noble Marquess said just now in a very interesting speech, interesting as his speeches always are, from the natural source like Perier water—the noble Marquess, after various other strictures of the Bill, summarised those strictures by saying "Show me the man who likes this Bill, who will cordially vote for it." You see one here. I am prepared to vote for it, and I only hope we have a good many more. We are all Home Rulers now. Lord Grey, in the charming persuasive and weighty speech to which we listened just now, told us that he had only been Owe or twice here —due to circumstances which we all understand and. regret and we have all missed him—on non-controversial questions connected with foreign affairs, and what struck him was the calm atmosphere of the House. I agree that it is very different now. It is very different from 1893, when I had the honour of speaking in a great debate in this House and voting on Mr. Gladstone's Home Rule Bill. I remember how feeling was acute at that time. We were sitting on this side, the remnant of the Liberal Party, and I think 43 of us voted. The scarlet benches were so full that a great many on that side had to come and sit on this, and I remember that a very old friend of mine, after he had dined, did not find room on that side. He was determined to sit somewhere. It was just before the division. This particular friend of mine came in a manner which perhaps may have been interpreted that he had dined and thrust himself upon us in a way that we thought very impolite. However he was a very good pugilist, so on the whole we did not worry anything about it. But that shows the state of affairs in those days, when a man of very good manners had worked himself up into a state of political feeling which caused him to do a thing of that sort. It was still more so in 1887 when Mr. Gladstone first committed the Liberal Party to Home Rule. Lord Selborne, who had always been Mr. Gladstone's great supporter, said that Mr. Gladstone was morally insane.

Things are very different now. The difficulty now is that so many influential persons, not I admit persons responsible for the Government and administration either of this country or of Ireland, but persons who at any time may be put into that position, are all Home Rulers. But they all want their own brand of Home Rule. They all say, "Your brand is wrong. The people of Ireland don't like your brand. If you will try our brand it will be all right and we understand it well." We have Lord Grey of Fallodon, Mr. Asquith, Lord Loreburn, Lord Hugh Cecil, to cite only a few of the more prominent. But as far as I am concerned I very much prefer to consider and to speak of the Bill which is put before us by His Majesty's Government.

And here I should like to take an opportunity of entering my protest against the plans proposed, not in a Bill before Parliament but in letters to The Times by Lord Grey and by Mr. Asquith. Mr. Asquith's proposals, I hear, are to be adopted—I suppose at a great meeting—by the Independent Liberals, with whom I have always been proud to associate myself. I have been Liberal all my life; I become more Liberal as I grow older. But I am bound to say I will have nothing to do with the proposal made by Mr. Asquith which we know all about. And I will have nothing to do with the party chest either. Napoleon said that armies marched on their stomachs, and we also know that political parties can only proceed upon their chests.

Then I come to Lord Grey's speech and Lord Grey's modifications of the plan he proposed of leaving Ireland to itself after a couple of years' time to fight matters out like a lot of Kilkenny cats. It is quite true that Lord Grey to-night introduced some modifications of that. As far as I understood he said that if he had known as much as he did now he would have written differently. And one of his proposals, also, I dissent from. I believe the financial part of the Bill has been a good deal attacked, and I believe that much of that might be susceptible of amendment. But Lord Grey became so generous that everything was to be given away, and yet everything was to be provided by this unfortunate country. When I heard that he was in favour of such sweeping generosity as that what occurred to me was that what might be generosity to Ireland might be injustice to England. It is very true that in these days the taxpayer and the shoulders of the taxpayers are not very much regarded. The unfortunate taxpayer is out of fashion. To that extent I was quite unable to follow Lord Grey in his sweeping proposals, just as I find it impossible to follow him in the notion that, if things did not answer after two years, the people of Ireland were to be left to fight it out among themselves.

Whatever the faults of this Bill may be no one can contest that it has secured—not perhaps the "genial, possibly the reluctant, but at all events the efficient and the practical support of Ulster. What a tremendous thing that is to have secured I know the South are not pleased, and imperfections in the Bill were pointed out and argued, I thought, with very great ability and to my mind with a great deal of weight by Lord Dunraven, Lord Oranmor and Browne, and Lord Clanwilliam. But, even so, I think there is something in what The Times newspaper said. I do not know whether it was in the article to-day, but in two or three articles on the Irish question, which The Times has been writing lately, it is pointed out that, even if this Bill does not do all that we desire, there is such a thing as achieving through this Bill union by processes of evolution. After all, there are such things as amending Acts. People to-night have really talked as if, supposing this Act were found not to work in some material ways, there was nothing more to be done, and that we must sit down, fold our hands, and resign ourselves to dust and ashes. Even if there are mistakes in this Bill, even if it went through as it was, if no Amendments were put into it by your Lordships' House and if no Amend- ments were accepted by the House of Commons, I do not despair. You could have amending Bills.

One word about finance. I think that the finance of this Bill is on the "pokey" side. The Government would have done well to have given rather a better start in finance than it has. That point has been argued and made out by several speakers already in the course of the Debate. A distinguished Roman, when the situation of his country was almost as disagreeable as ours, declared that if the circumstances were sufficiently emergent and sufficiently extended, si res poscat, there was no length to which a wise man with due discretion should not go, and I think the Government night have stretched a point further in the direction of finance than they have.

I hear that an Amendment is going to be moved to-morrow, associated with the name of Lord Midleton, to adjourn this Debate for a certain time—I do not know how long, I was told a fortnight—and that the ostensible reason for the fortnight is for intelligences to operate and for the Government to consider the proposals of these intelligences with a view of improving the financial position of the Bill. We are also told that if that was done the Bill would go through. I have been in your Lordships' House as a spectator more than an actor for a great many years. I do not believe in Motions of that kind. I see in that kind of Motion a net spread with meshes small enough and large enough to catch all kinds of fish. In that Amendment I see not merely a dilatory Motion—dilatory was the word used by the Lord Chancellor—though It believe the supporters of it repudiate that word. They say it is not dilatory, that it is entirely an Amendment for deliberation. I am sure Lord Midleton takes that view, and many of your Lordships who will support the Amendment also take that view. But what I see in it, and what will really result if you pass an Amendment of that kind, is in effect the defeat of this Bill and of the Government at what I conceive to be one of the most critical moments this country has seen in the history of England and Ireland.

As far as I am concerned I shall vote against that Amendment. I hope we shall have more powerful speeches than I am able to make to divorce people who may quite easily and conscientiously think that there is something in this. I hope they will recognise that the times are too critical, that delays are dangerous, and that we must not have anything to do with an Amendment which will hang the whole thing up and give the worst possible impression. Lord Dunraven, I was glad to see, dealt with the very fair argument that the present regrettable state of Ireland makes it very inopportune and. very difficult to put forward a measure of this kind. He dealt with the objections which are made by a great many people to that contention. But what he told us was that Ireland is sick and tired and ashamed and horror-struck at what is going on, and if only Ireland could sec a measure that would give some sort of promise and hope of a better state of things there was a large body of moderate opinion in Ireland prepared to accept such a scheme.

People say, "Show me the moderate man in Ireland." I know it is very difficult to point the finger at such a man, but I think Lord Dunraven and many noble Lords from Ireland will confirm the view that these violences do not represent Ireland as a whole. They are the work of a certain extreme party, and it is said that if the moderate people are given a chalice they may get together. Whether that is so or not do not know. Lord Salisbury I know holds quite an opposite view, and I am bound to admit as a fair-minded man that both these arguments are not only permissible but extremely arguable. Still I say to the Government, "Holding the strong card of Ulster in your hands, and having the state of Ireland before your eyes, go on with your Bill." The Lord Chancellor had something to say about the tactical advantages of this Bill. He said that in the passing of this Bill we would acquire merit in the eyes of the whole world. Justification, I think he spoke of. Well, I hope this may be so. It is a most desirable thing, both for individuals and countries to justify themselves or to acquire merit in places where perhaps they have rather lost caste, but Lord Curzon the other night—not in this debate—told us that anything of this sort was not the least necessary, as we stood extremely well in the eyes of foreign countries. But Lord Grey, on the other hand, an ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs, did not take that view, and said that although Ireland was outside international politics, he did find the domestic problem of Ireland was an obstacle in making international arrangements.

I do not think foreign nations concern themselves in our domestic affairs as much as we think they do, or as much as we like to think. In all the newspapers and review articles we are always meddling with other people's affairs, telling them what they ought to do, and what we would do if we were in their place. We really parade as examples for everybody else in domestic relations, but I do not think that we are accepted abroad just in that way. In my opinion this notion does not count for very much. We may recover some of that prestige by this Bill, but what we may say is that abroad we are looked upon as very great muddlers in the way we have shuffled in dealing with Ireland. However justification may be the desirable and tactical advantage of the Home Rule Bill at this moment; but what we have got to consider, and what makes me inclined to support this Bill, is the remarkable change which has taken place in public opinion both in Parliament and out of doors on Ireland, and on the relations of this country to Ireland. An extraordinary change on the part of men of influence in politics on both sides, considerations of statesmanship, which, after all, has suffered shipwreck over the last hundred years in relation to Ireland, the present state of affairs in Ireland, the present necessity to move—you may be afraid of going forward, but surely you are as much afraid of standing still—these to my mind are the dominant factors in this question, and it is on these dominant factors that I rest my vote. A good many years ago Professor Freeman, the historian of the Norman Conquest, wrote a letter to Viscount Bryce, whom I do not see in his place, in which he said— I myself have my notions about Ireland. If you cannot drown her let her go. Well, I for one cannot drown her. That is clear. And I am not prepared to do the other thing without a greater effort and a new change in our relations with Ireland than have yet been achieved, but which is contained within the four corners of the Government Bill.

THE EARL OF MAYO

My Lords, I have listened with the greatest interest to the charming speech just made by my noble friend Lord Ribblesdale. I note that he admits that there has been mis- management in Ireland in the past—I agree with him—and that the efforts to reconcile Ireland have not been successful, but he is going to vote for this Bill. I ask myself whether the Bill is going to reconcile Ireland in any way whatsoever. I will deal with that later on. But I was pleased by what he said with regard to finance. He said that the finance was not satisfactory. I forget the exact expression.

LORD RIBBLESDALE

Pokey.

THE EARL OF MAYO

That is the very word. The Bill has not been generous enough in finance, and it would receive a much better reception in Ireland if it were more generous in that respect. During this debate, especially yesterday, we heard a good deal about Ulster. Ulster was there, first, last and all the time. I should like to draw the attention of the House to the fact that there are three provinces in Ireland called Munster, Connaught and Leinster, which comprise the largest part of Ireland. The Ulster of which we have been talking has only six counties. I should like to say something, and I will in the course of my speech, with regard to the effect of this Bill on those counties. The Lord Chancellor dealt very largely with Ulster and not very much with the rest of Ireland. He explained the Bill most lucidly and I congratulate him upon the way he did it. The Bill is very difficult to read and understand. I noticed that he strengthend his arguments by reading a letter from Sir Edward Carson—I do not know why his arguments should be strengthened in any way by a letter from Sir Edward Carson—who wrote that it was said that no one in Ireland wanted this Bill, but six counties in Ulster wanted it. They could not have the Union and so they accepted the Bill, one reason being that the 1914 Act was on the Statute Book. That bogey has been held before us over and over again. Nothing will make me believe that any Government could possibly put the 1914 Act into operation at present. They would not dare to do it. Any Government that attempted it would be howled down.

I should like to say something about the speech of the noble Marquess, Lord Londonderry. He made a very fine and statesmanlike speech as he always does, and he told us that Ulster, by adopting this Parliament, was setting an example to the rest of Ireland. I do not know whether he said it, but I shall say that you cannot compel people to be friends by an Act of Parliament. In relation to that he referred to the Council which was to be a fusion of both parties. When I come to the question of the Council I shall deal with that. I do not in the least think that it will be a fusion of both parties, and therefore I do not agree with the noble Marquess when he said that Ulster was going to set an example to the rest of Ireland. I do not think the rest of Ireland will take that example at all or in any way. Before dealing with this Bill I wish to recall some events that happened in Ireland. We all know of the horrible Rebellion which broke out in 1916. The Government were warned over and over again of what was going to take place in Ireland. My noble friend below me, Lord Midleton, had warned the Government over and over again. I remember speaking to a prominent statesman upon the subject, and I was quietly told to mind my own business. Those of us who come from Ireland have never been listened to when we have warned the Government of what was going to happen. They thought, I suppose, that it was for some political reason that we were warning the Government. During the years that I have had the honour of sitting in this House as a representative Peer I have time after time (and so have many others) warned the Government, and we have not been listened to. After the Rebellion to which I have referred, a Convention sat for a great many months. I admit that the Ulster members were delegates and could not act for themselves, but my recollection of the Convention, and of their attitude there, is that they would do nothing, and that they proposed nothing, but merely sat still. It. is very hard to come to any arrangements with delegates who take up that attitude. I do not complain; I only state facts.

That Convention came to an end, and the Prime Minister wrote and said that if the Convention did not succeed in coming to a pretty unanimous conclusion Home Rule would be imposed upon Ireland. I think I am right in saying that the word "imposed" was used by the Prime Minister. We have now the Ulster Members, who were the most tremendous Unionists in the past, creating this extraordinary situation. They have a Home Rule of their own. Yet they would like to remain under the Union. Your Lordships will recollect that in the House of Commons they voted on Lord Robert Cecil's Motion that Ulster should remain part of the Union. Nevertheless, they have accepted their own Parliament of the six counties. Circumstances, I admit, were against them. They took the best that they could get.

I should like to say a word regarding the way in which the Home Rule Bill was conducted in Committee stage in the House of Commons. This is not a comment by The Times but a statement in a report in that newspaper— The debate on the Home Rule Bill was conducted by indolent groups of members in a sea of empty benches. Before dinner General Seely was the sole occupant of the Front Opposition Bench, and one could not find any Labour members. That is the way in which this Bill was pushed through the House of Commons. The Prime Minister, with the present House of Commons, can practically pass anything. In the Committee stage of the Bill Amendments were introduced in the House of Commons; they were not listened to because there was nobody in the House to listen to them. Our friends were there introducing these Amendments but they were not passed. The Members trooped in and voted against the Amendments with the Government, and that was the end of those Amendments. Our friends worked hard for those Amendments; that was the result, and that is how the Bill passed in another place.

I think we have a right in this House to criticise and say what we think about the Bill. The Bill authorises and forces partition upon Ireland in the most evil way. It is a partition which is resented all over Ireland. When Ulster talks about finality, does it mean that that finality is to consist of continual partition? That is what I want to know. The Lord Chancellor talked about finality and said that Ulster was looking for finality. Well, if that is the sort of finality, what hope is there for peace in Ireland? It is resented even in Ulster, because what about the counties of Cavan, Monaghan, and Donegal in the far corner of Ireland? They are enitrely left out of Ulster. Can you imagine, noble Lords of England, a Parliament in the West Riding of Yorkshire and another Parliament in the rest of Yorkshire. Such a thing seems to me to be most impossible. This policy of partition is understandable from the purely English point of view. There is an old maxim, Divide et Impera, Divide and govern, and Ireland perhaps will be easier to get in order when there is a Parliament at Belfast which certainly will not be in touch with the rest of Ireland. If that is the policy I consider it is a very dangerous one and a very unfair one, but that may be in the minds of some who have thought the matter over.

There has not one word been said in favour of this Bill in the whole of the South and West of Ireland; not one public body has expressed any wish to have this Bill. There have been letters in the papers, but really in what those letters stated and went for they practically tore the vitals out of the Bill; the writers were not satisfied with the Bill. There have been small bodies of the so-called moderate party and peace party, but they all want more than the Bill which is before us. This Bill is imposed upon us, and I ask myself and I ask noble Lords in this House, Who is going to work the Bill in the South and West of Ireland and who will lift a finger to work it? The Republican Party certainly will not; the scattered Unionists will not, because they will not be able to.

We all know the state that Ireland is in at present. I have just come from that country. There is terror throughout the land, and terror breeds hatred. It is a dreadful thing to say, but I have never known my life such a sulky hatred throughout Ireland for British rule; there is that sort of sulky feeling that it is very hard not to notice. I ask your Lordships whether this is the moment to press this Bill on Ireland. I say, No.

I should like to say something of the Bill itself and to discuss its merits. This, I think, is the fourth Home Rule Bill that has been before your Lordships' House, and age cannot wither nor custom stale its infinite variety. This really is a variant of other Bills that have been before us. It is "An Act to provide for the better government of Ireland." I am afraid that it will muddle up things a great deal worse than they are now. I speak only of the South and West, and that is the larger part of Ireland. Let me take first of all, Clause 2, which provides for the establishment of a council of forty, consisting of ten members from the Southern Parliament, ten members from the Northern Parliament, and ten other gentlemen who are chosen. The President is appointed by His Majesty. I should like to know why the whole of Ireland should only have ten members and the six Counties the same number? I do not think that makes very much for peace. There will be a Sinn Fein Parliament, I suppose, if there is a Parliament at all in the South, and if I was a member of a Sinn Fein Parliament in the South of Ireland I should say, "It is all very well, but you have exactly the same representation as we have, though you have only six Counties to represent and we are representing three Provinces."

THE EARL OF MIDLETON

Twenty-six counties.

THE EARL OF MAYO

I do not know why this has been put into the Bill, but I suppose it is on the ground that Ulster must not be coerced. I do not think it is commendable to the rest of Ireland. What is this Council to do? It is eventually to establish a Parliament for the whole of Ireland. There are words in this Bill which it is extraordinary to find in an Act of Parliament, I think—"for bringing about harmonious action between the Parliaments and Governments of Southern and Northern Ireland." Those are very broad and vague words. Does anyone suppose for a moment that the Northern members of the Council will meet the Sinn Fein members of the South and West? I do not think they ever will, and I do not think, therefore, that the Lord Lieutenant will call upon them to meet.

Clause 3 deals with the question of the establishment of Second Houses of Parliament for Northern and Southern Ireland. In this Second Chamber proposal lies the only chance of the minorities in Ireland being represented. I should like to say something about that and the pledge which the Government gave with regard to this question. Mr. Walter Long said this in Committee on May 18 of this year— The Government undertake between now and Report to place on the Paper a definite scheme for the constitution of the Second Chamber in both Southern and Northern Ireland.

THE EARL OF MIDLETON

Hear, hear.

THE EARL OF MAYO

He went on to say— It will be our endeavour in giving this undertaking to find a scheme really practicable and effective to secure the support of those who in all quarters in this House still think that there should be every precaution taken to avoid all oppression of minorities, which would mean that the result would be nothing but failure. That was a definite statement and a definite promise. And what are we given? We are given this Council which, it is very unlikely will sit at all, and if it sits it will most likely disagree in the most dreadful manner. I was very much struck when the Lord Chancellor—I think I am right, I stand corrected if I am wrong—spoke of the pitiable position of the Southern Unionists. What will become of these minorities in the South and West if there is no Second Chamber? The promise of the Government, I say, has not been kept. You will remember, my Lords, that the sons of these men went out to the war and fought and lost their lives. Are these the men you are going to leave to the tender mercies of a Sinn Fein Parliament? I do not think that is fair; I do not think that is right. One of the most important Amendments that I hope we shall introduce will be the formation of a Second Chamber both for the North and South of Ireland, because there are minorities in the North of Ireland that have to be protected in the same way as in the South of Ireland.

With regard to Clause 4, the two Parliaments in the North and South can establish by agreement, by an absolute majority of each Parliament, a single Parliament for Ireland consisting of His Majesty and one or two Houses. That question of the Second Chamber is left quite indefinite. If they do establish one Parliament the Council disappears and the Second Chamber may not come into existence at all, although there may be one Parliament for Ireland. As I said before, those minorities will go to the wall absolutely, and I rather think it looks as if the Government did not care very much whether the loyal people who lived in the South and West of Ireland did go to the wall. I do not wish to deal with the powers of this Parliament or even a second Parliament if it is set up. But it is very interesting to point out that by Clause 70, if less than one-half of the members of both Northern and Southern Parliaments have not been validly returned and have not taken the oath of allegiance the provision establishing these Parliaments falls through and a new form of Government is set up, which we are told is Crown Colony Government—a Committee of the Privy Council of Ireland and such persons as His Majesty may appoint for the purpose. That is the formation which is called a Legislative Assembly. I ask myself, supposing this Parliament in the South and West do not conform to this Act and are not validly elected and do not take the oath, what is the use of setting up another form of Government? Why on earth should you not fall back upon the present form of Government? I dare say it does not satisfy them, but it exists. What I want to know is this. The Order, that is to say the Order for the dissolution of these not properly elected or constituted Parliaments, may make modifications in this Act in its application to the part of Ireland affected. I want to know whether that Crown Colony Government can interfere with this Act and alter it. As I read the Bill it can. But, surely, it is for the Imperial Parliament to alter the Act, and not this Legislative Assembly. I see the noble Marquess (Lord Londonderry) here, and I hope he will ask a member of the Cabinet who is going to speak to explain exactly what are the powers, if there are, any, of this new Legislative Assembly.

What stands out in this Bill is the partition of my country fixed for ever. Ulster will never go into a single Parliament—never. They would be in a minority, and they said they never would, and I believe what they say. Minorities are not protected in any way whatsoever. That is not in the Bill; it is left to a Council, which may never function. And why? Because the whole of the rest of Ireland is to have the same number of representatives as six counties. I do not think any one would stand that. It is left to a single Parliament, which can never be brought into being, to form a Second Chamber thus the Second Chamber disappears entirely. And why? Because, of course, Ulster would have nothing to do with a single Parliament. This is a Bill which, so far as the West and South of Ireland is concerned, will set everybody by the ears.

By Clause 24 the Parliaments of Northern and Southern Ireland can impose a surtax, that is to say, an additional income tax or super-tax on all individuals resident or domiciled in Ireland in respect of their total income from all sources. "Resident or domiciled in Ireland" is a broad and comprehensive term. They can also grant relief from those taxes, also a surtax can be imposed, whether or not individuals are liable to income tax or super-tax. What would a Sinn Fein Parliament do, if it were set up in the South and West of Ireland? Sinn Fein would grant relief from this surtax to their supporters and friends, but those who have opposed them, and who are part of the loyal population in the South and West will surely feel the imposition of this tax, and feel it heavily. That is only human nature. If I were a Sinn Feiner in that Parliament I should say, "Here are a lot of gentry who have opposed Home Rule and that sort of thing in every possible way; let us get rid of them and tax them out of the country." That is quite possible; it is in the Bill, and it will most likely happen. It is not a pleasant lookout for us in Ireland, and there is no protection for minorities in this Bill, especially in the matter of taxation. And we shall have no representation either, unless there is a Second Chamber. We shall be taxed to the utmost limit.

The Lord Chancellor in his speech asked himself the following question, "What is to happen if Sinn Fein refuses to take part in this Bill?" Then we have Crown Colony government set up. As I have already said, I consider that this Legislative Assembly, or Crown Colony government, has power under this Bill to interfere with and alter this Act. The other question he asked was, Supposing that Sinn Fein should affect to become members of the Southern Parliament and take the oath, and take no notice of the oath or break it to declare a Republic?, and the answer was, "It will be brought under by the reconquest of Ireland. That is a very pleasant outlook for us; and a great deal of this is in the Bill. There are possibilities in the Bill for such a situation to arise. The noble Viscount, Lord Haldane, in a very able speech, talked about granting Ireland responsibility. For myself I think that the responsibility will take the form of Sinn Fein going as far as they can, even to declaring a Republic if they have the pluck to do so.

This is not a moment for granting responsible government to Ireland; when the country is in the state it is now. It is wrong to fix partition for ever on the country and to deny fiscal autonomy. I do not say she should have it at once but I say that it ought to come in the future; and we want more generous financial terms. The times are not propitious and the Government cannot throw off their responsibility for governing Ireland. They cannot say, "We have done this and that for Ireland; this is a most generous measure." That will not do; it will deceive no one. I shall vote for the Amendment as I think the Bill will in no way help us to bring peace to Ireland.

THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE

My Lords, I desire to establish if I can the proposition that there are really only two alternatives in schemes for the government of Ireland, and that this Bill is not one of them. In the first place, I still unrepentantly plead for the maintenance of the Union as the best scheme. The Parliament of the United K ngdom has done splendid work for Ireland, and is capable of doing a great deal more. I am, therefore, unrepentant, and unlike the Lord Chancellor, who yesterday performed a feat that has never been performed before, by declaring himself a Unionist in moving the Second Reading of a Home Rule Bill.

But no Unionist can neglect the handwriting on the wall. We must recognise the facts of the situation. Ever since we have been Unionists we have been able to base our opposition to Home Rule on what was known as the will of the predominant partner. We must recognise that the will of the predominant partner is not what it always was. I do not wish to rake up ancient history. I do not wish to try and apportion the blame for this weakness, this alteration in the opinion of the predominant partner. I have always taken it, from the vote given in your Lordships' House in the early days of July, 1914, when we voted for the Home Rule Amendment accepting the principle of the exclusion of Ulster, that you cannot vote for the exclusion of Ulster without implying that you accept something to exclude Ulster from. From that day I have always felt the ground was cut from under our feet as regards the maintenance of the Union. Although there may be disputes with regard to the day and time and method, the effect is undeniable. Our Unionist friends in the North of Ireland have been forced to accept the idea of a. Parliament, apart from the Imperial Parliament, which they have always opposed, and we in the South have been compelled to discuss our future in a system in which, as an Imperial asset, we have no belief, and involving the acceptance of a Parliament separate from the United Kingdom—an idea we have always opposed.

If our old political friends deny us a continuance of the Union, what is the alternative? There is no alternative between a real Government by a Parliament of the United Kingdom and a real Government by some other body. By a real Government I mean some complete form of self-government, without leading strings; and this Bill does not satisfy that formula. The position really is all-important. Look at the position for a moment through the eyes of people living in the South and West of Ireland. They have two alternatives before them. They have first of all the Republican alternative, for which the majority of them undoubtedly voted at the last General Election. Naturally I do not agree with that alternative, but it is there, and there is no denying it has certain attractions to the narrow-minded man who lives in Ireland and never goes out of it. But that being so, what is there in this Bill that is attractive as an alternative to the Republican policy? It is essential that you should attract public opinion to your proposals, unless there is to be, as I believe, a great disaster to the Empire as a whole.

Hitherto we have been able to neglect the majority in Ireland because we could quote against it the majority of the predominant partner, but now that you are abolishing the Union you must take account of the majority, whatever it happens to be, in the South and West of Ireland. I was sorry to think that my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor was rather indifferent on that point yesterday. I listened very carefully to all he had to say, and it seemed to me his attitude was that either this Bill will be worked in Dublin or else the country will suffer the inconvenience of Crown Colony government, and so much the worse for them. From what I remember of Crown Colony government, it is not an inefficient thing, and therefore that threat does not imply quite as many terrors to people who have lived in Ireland under the present Government for many years past. But surely we all realise that Crown Colony government is impossible. Where is your organisation for it? It could not possibly be organised in a few days and in the offhand way suggested by the speeches of members of the Government. If this Bill does not work in Ireland you will have chaos and not Crown Colony government.

The most depressing thing about this Bill surely must be that not one single speaker has been able to point to any volume of opinion in the South and West of Ireland who will make any attempt to work this Bill. It is not the extremists who are not satisfied, but every one is dissatisfied with this Bill. The reason is clear. I honestly believe that you might be able to persuade a Parliament in Dublin even now that the Navy and Army and Foreign Affairs were proper matters to reserve to the Imperial Parliament, but that is the most you will ever do. All other leading strings must be abolished. They might lead us to the Boston tea ships again. These leading strings are most galling in this Bill in the realm of finance.

The noble Viscount, Lord Grey, if I may say so, was perfectly right when he referred to this question of finance as having a sentimental side in the eyes of the Irish people. There is no doubt that the belief is widely held on the other side of St. George's Channel that in financial matters in the widest sense—the Budget, commercial policy, and so forth—the Imperial Parliament, in all cases of rival interests between England and Ireland have, to put it mildly, legislated in the interests of the stronger neighbour and to the detriment of the weaker. That belief is not a modern belief. It existed before the Union and it exists still. In the past many of us have put up with that. We could not deny the facts o history, but we have neglected them, because we have been able to argue that it was one of the disadvantages of the Union and that the Union had far greater advantages to outweigh it. But in future we shall not have that staff upon which to lean, and I believe that the whole of the South and West of Ireland will be unanimous in objecting to the position to which I have referred. After all, remember that the British Government have enjoyed this predominance in our financial affairs because of the Union and for no other reason, and they cannot expect, in common fairness, to keep that predominance if they abolish the Union.

I would like to illustrate my point rather in detail from the finance clauses of the Bill. First of all, the really powerful authority under this Bill is the Joint Exchequer Board, which is set out in Clause 31. It has to consist of two members appointed by the Treasury, one by the Treasury of Southern Ireland and one by the Treasury of Northern Ireland, and a Chairman appointed by His Majesty.

It is the duty of the Board to determine any matter which has to be determined by the Board under this Act and also any other matter in connection with Irish Revenue or Expenditure which may be referred to it. The members also have to decide the most important question whether any tax is substantially the same in character as, or has been imposed in lieu of, another tax. They decide, in fact, on the legality of taxes and their decision is final and conclusive. And they may act by a majority. How will this work? First of all, what is the constitution of the Board? There are two so-called Irish members, one from the North and one from the South. It is pretty clear that, as a general rule, these two gentlemen will disagree, not because they come from the North and South respectively, but for the obvious reason that the interests of the North will be mainly industrial and those of the South mainly agricultural. Even assuming that they do agree, Who have they got against them? They have the two members nominated by the English Treasury acting under the orders of the English Chancellor of the Exchequer and they have a Chairman who is paid out of the English Consolidated Fund and is equally anti-Irish. Therefore, even assuming the most favourable circumstances, that the two Irishmen agree, you have a permanent majority against Ireland on the most important body controlling finance. We have a nasty phrase in Ireland about juries. We called them packed sometimes. It is really not unfair to call this Exchequer Board a packed Board in the interests of England and against Ireland. Surely His Majesty's Government cannot expect that it will find the smallest confidence in Ireland in view of its constitution.

I go on to the financial powers of the subordinate Parliaments. They are given in Clause 20. The Parliaments of Southern Ireland and Northern Ireland have the power to make laws with respect to the imposing, charging, levying, and collection of taxes within their respective jurisdictions other than Customs Duties and Excise Duties on articles manufactured and produced, and Excess Profits Duty, Corporation Profits Tax, any other taxes on profits, Income Tax, or any tax substantially the same in character. This clause was explained to us by the Lord Chancellor yesterday. He said that the control of certain taxes by Parliament—in this case I mean the decision as to their rates and decisions as to their desirability and as to the method of their subsequent collection—was left to the Irish Parliaments. They are allowed to keep power over Death Duties, Stamp Duties, Licences, Entertainment Tax, and certain miscellaneous items amounting to £3,500,000. Your Lordships will notice their power to impose some other taxes if they can. I wonder what those other taxes are expected to be. One would have thought that all sources of taxation had been fully well explored by now on the present basis of taxation.

The two Parliaments are to be concerned with the policy of raising £3,500,000 of their revenue. On the other hand, the Parliament in London will retain control of the revenue of £48,500,000 collected in Ireland. Of this of course part will be given back to be spent in Ireland. But that does not affect my argument as regards Parliamentary control—that is, the control and authority over taxation and the method of collect on. These figures, of course, are for the whole of Ireland. I do not know the figure for the Dublin Parliament, but the percentage is probably approximately correct. The local Parliament will be allowed a say how little more than 6 per cent. of the revenue collected in Ireland shall be raised, and the London Parliament will decide how over 93 per cent. of the Irish revenue shall be raised. Would any self-governing part of the British Empire accept such a position for five minutes? You are even treating India in the Act of last year with far greater generosity, and unless His Majesty's Government can make up their minds to give up a very large proportion of what they have retained for themselves in the figures from which I have just quoted, and which were given yesterday by the Lord Chancellor, any chance of this Bill working is unthinkable.

But this is not all. I will refer to one or two other points very shortly. Ireland is to make a contribution to the Imperial Exchequer. It is quite right that she should, but the Irish Parliament has no voice in the amount. In my view the £18,000,000 a year is far too high. It may not even stay at £18,000,000, it may even be increased, and the authority that will decide the increase will not be the Parliament of Ireland or of the United Kingdom but your favourite packed body, the Joint Exchequer Board.

Another point in which Ireland is unfairly treated as compared to England is this. At present there is a Consolidated Fund for the United Kingdom in which Ireland has her share. In future there is to be a Consolidated Fund for the United Kingdom as there is now, and there is also to be a Consolidated Fund for the Northern part of Ireland and a Consolidated Fund for the Southern part of Ireland. The Parliament of the Southern part and the Parliament of the Northern part each have power over their own Consolidated Fund. They, of course, have no share in the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom, but the Parliament of the United Kingdom retains power to charge things on the Funds of the subordinate Parliaments. Do you think that will be considered fair?

These points that I have referred to briefly are what I call the financial leading strings. Why are they imposed? Are they imposed in the interests of Ireland? Are they imposed in the interests of the Empire? Not at all. They are imposed solely in the interest of the British Treasury. That fact will be thoroughly understood in. Ireland, and as long as it is understood in Ireland there is no chance of the acceptance of this financial scheme by any business man that you can quote outside Ulster. I was amused to notice the phrase used by the Lord Chancellor. He said, you cannot impose a Second Chamber on these two subordinate Parliaments. No, my Lords, but you have no hesitation in imposing the details of 93 per cent. of the revenue in the country that they are supposed to rule over. It is really not unfair to sum up this position in one sentence by saying that you are offering to the Parliament in Dublin less financial authority than is now enjoyed by the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man, and I wonder that any British Government can think that such a position can be accepted by any body of sensible men for five minutes.

If you had produced a generous financial scheme I really believe that you might have found a majority in Ireland who would have tried to work it, but the fact that it has not been produced I claim gives ample authority to your Lordships to reject this Bill on the Second Reading. It has been laid down by the Lord Chancellor—and I rather think the noble Marquess, Lord Crewe, agreed by an interruption I heard him make this afternoon—that your Lordships have no power over these financial clauses.

That is a matter your Lordships cannot decide, it would be decided by the Speaker, but I am not sure that the position is quite as clear as it is laid down. Are we here really dealing with the question of taxation or are we dealing with the powers of a subordinate Parliament? The latter certainly would be within your Lordships' power. It sometimes happens that when the Government really want a thing done the other House is persuaded to waive its privilege, but as far as we know at present the Government do not want any financial alteration made in this Bill. If that is so, if the Government give us full warning that they will claim that this is a matter of privilege, we have no alternative but to reject the Bill in the hope that a better financial scheme will come up in some future Bill.

Before I sit down I want to touch very briefly on two small questions. Firstly, I want to say a word about the Council of Ireland, the little infant that is to grow into the full manhood of Irish union. Seldom has an infant started with less prospect of sustenance. My noble friend Lord Mayo has dealt with the point of its task of drafting second chambers, a task which few of us believe it will ever try to perform. When you set that aside, what else is there for it to do? The noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack made great play yesterday with the Private Bill legislation which is to be transferred to it. I do not know why everybody who starts a Home Rule, or devolution, or federal scheme always drags in the poor old Private Bill legislation as one of the reasons for what he is doing. Let us see how much work that is going to give the Council of Ireland. I have been carefully through the list of Private Bills for the last seven or eight years to see how many Bills have come from Ireland and to try to obtain some light on the amount of work the British Parliament will be relieved of in future by the Council of Ireland taking over this particular task. In 1912 there were 129 Private Bills of which six were Irish; in 1913 there were 133 of which three were Irish; in 1914 there were 143, four of them for Ireland; in 1915—the first year of the war—there were 63, three of them for Ireland; in 1916 there were 37, one of them Irish; in 1917 there were 38, one of them for Ireland; in 1918 there were 67, five of them for Ireland, and in 1919 there were 81, of which five were for Ireland. The result is that in eight years we have had 28 Private Bills, an average of three in one year and four in the next. Putting it at the highest figure, are four Private Bills per annum, some of them probably unopposed, really going to justify the setting up of this elaborate Council elected by the two Parliaments and give it a busy existence during the twelve months of the year? Speaking plainly, the thing is rubbish. The last thing that remains to the Council is any legislation of the Government having to do with railways. That, as a rule, is really covered by the Private Bill figures. This Council cannot be claimed to justify the optimism of His Majesty's Government when they tell us that this is an infant which will grow into the manhood of Irish union or anything else.

My last point is this. If the ultimate effect of this Bill is failure, if it fails to give good government, if it fails to wipe out the partition of the country which is now being set up and which we all deplore, will it even do less than that? Will it do anything to restore the present unhappy state of affairs in that country? Do not let us minimise the importance of this. Do not let us shut our eyes to the fact that the restoration of law and order is the thing we want long before we want any schemes of government.

I think one must be struck in this debate with the fact that the speakers have all been merciful to their old colleagues with whom they have agreed in the past and with whom they disagree at present. But there was a speech by the Leader of the House—I am sorry he is not in his place—which I happened to come across the other day and is very valuable as illustrating the point I now desire to make. What is important in any scheme of constitutional reform is that it should start in a favourable atmosphere. And what is the atmosphere of this scheme? At this late hour I will not read Lord Curzon's quotation in full. It is in volume XV. of HANSARD and was delivered on the 12th February, 1914. In one sentence Lord Curzon said— 'The only chance for the future good Government of Ireland lies in starting the new system of Government, whatever it may be, in what" [Lord Curzon is quoting the Prime Minister] "he called an atmosphere which would give it a chance of working happily. Does not that really hold good to-day? Where is your atmosphere? What single provision in this Bill will heal the present disorders in Ireland?

The Government now are optimistic. I cannot forget a phrase used by the Prime-Minister at the Guildhall ten days ago, "We have murder by the throat." My Lords, the proceedings of the last weekend were a sad comment on that optimism. The evidence of His Majesty's Government, though, I have no doubt, given in good faith, we must remember, is bound to be coloured by their desire to restore order out of the disorder for which they are responsible. But even assuming you are breaking up the murder gang, is that the only thing that His Majesty's Government have to think of in the Imperial interest? There are districts in Ireland, which some of us know, where there have been no murders, where Sinn Fein authorities all the same are de facto governors of the country, not de jure. The meetings of local authorities are the meetings of Sinn Fein authorities, and Courts are sitting and dispensing rough and ready, but not on the whole a bad kind of justice. In some districts Sinn Fein influence is keeping order. There is no one else to do it. I had one case in particular brought to my notice the other day where some extremely valuable property of a kind that appeals to many Irishmen is being guarded by day by police patrols and by night by Sinn Fein patrols because at that hour the policemen are all shut up.

What is there in your Bill that will do away with all this and restore the authority of His Majesty? Take the life the people are leading. The transport of goods is at a standstill, passenger traffic is largely suspended. If the Irish Southern Parliament were called to-morrow morning half the members, I expect, could not get to Dublin by train. Confidence and credit have been shaken to the ground. Insurance companies are timid if not recalcitrant. How is this Bill going to restore credit and confidence? Do you think you will restore it by saying, "You will either work this Bill or we will hold the pistol of Crown Colony government at your head." I say with a full feeling of responsibility—and I say it with the very greatest regret, and knowing that I am departing from my most cherished principles—that if I thought this Bill offered any prospects of peace and orderly government I should vote for it. All that it will really do, however, is enormously to weaken the power of the British Executive—which, after all, we can assume has the sanction of British public opinion behind it—and to set up no promising power in its place based upon the necessary public opinion in Ireland. That being so, I hope that we shall have a Division, and I hope that a majority of your Lordships will vote against the Bill.

LORD KILLANIN and LORD HARRIS rose to continue the debate.

Several NOBLE LORDS: "Killanin."

LORD HARRIS

Is it not time that England had a word in the matter? I venture to suggest that this Bill is going to be decided by a vote from England. Your Lordships from Ireland have had every opportunity of attacking the Bill, and I think England has hardly had an opportunity of offering its opinion as to why it should support the Bill. I leave it to your Lordships.

LORD KILLANIN

My Lords, I am sorry that I should stand between the House and the noble Lord opposite, but it is difficult for many of us to get a hearing in this House. We are told that the debate is going to finish to-morrow, and though I fully admit that those in this House from England are intensely interested in the question, still, they must admit, I think, that they are not as intimately involved in the matter as those of us who live in Ireland. For that reason one feels justified in endeavouring to address your Lordships.

My noble friend Lord Donoughmore has just now delivered. a very useful and careful speech, and has gone into some of the most important provisions of the Bill, and I hope, if this Bill passes the Second Reading, we shall have the benefit of his very useful criticisms when we are going through the Bill in Committee. In order not to take up the time of the House I am not going to deal with a great number of important aspects of this question which immensely interest me, but I am going to confine my remarks to one view of the question, but I think it is an important one—being, in my opinion, the foundation and the body and the meaning of the whole of the Bill—and that is the partition of Ireland. The outcome of this Bill will be the permanent partition of Ireland—the permanent partition in the sense of being as permanent as anything is that we mortals can presume to call permanent. The noble Marquess (Lord Londonderry), whom I understand to dissent, will admit that it is permanent in this sense, that there is no time-limit put in the Bill, and therefore it is as enacted a permanent arrangement until some change is made.

I propose in my few remarks to show how this supposed solution of the Irish question—most disagreeable and most abhorrent, I believe, to all Irish people—has come to the fore. What does partition mean, and how is it regarded in Ireland? I will arrive at the matter by giving some expression of my own personal views about the position and about Ireland. I have always been a Unionist ever since I have taken any part in Irish politics—that is, since, 25 years ago, I first stood for Parliament, to which later I was elected Member for Galway. I have always been a Unionist on the merits. I believe in the merits of the Union, and if I may refer to the fact that I am a Catholic, that I live in the West of Ireland, that I belong to a family which during the penal times suffered both in position and in property, your Lordships will see that, in being a Unionist, it must be on the merits that I am one, and that I cannot have in my views any trace of religious or class ascendancy. All the tendencies and memories from the past would lead me in the other direction.

I am a Unionist for two main reasons. I believe that under the Union, if it had been accepted by the Irish people and properly worked, Ireland would have been a prosperous entity of the United Kingdom, and that she could prosper far more than under any Home Rule Bill I have ever seen or heard of. But I cannot help recognising that the Union has not been accepted by the Irish people and has not been properly worked. In my view the Union has never received a fair chance. Ever since modern times, during the last 30 or 40 years since democracy has been in power, the majority of the elected representatives of the Irish people have done everything in their power to prevent it working. They have deliberately said that they did not want the Union to work and intended to make the government of the country under it as difficult as possible, if not impossible. It is difficult to carry on the government of a country when you have the support of the majority of the elected representatives of she people, but to govern a country when a majority of its elected representatives are bitterly hostile and refuse to take any part in it and are determined to make it as difficult as possible, is an almost hopeless task. It does not, however, lie in the mouth of Nationalists to blame the Union. They certainly have never done anything to make it work.

The Union, then, not being accepted by the Irish people, it became necessary to examine as an alternative the proposition of Home Rule—its possibilities as a feasible policy for Ireland. There have been three Home Rule Bills introduced into Parliament, but each one was full of anomalies, absurdities, contradictions, and injustices, and was finally universally condemned by the people of Ireland, and this seems to me to demonstrate that it is impossible to devise any scheme of Home Rule that is acceptable and that would be workable.

In addition to Home Rule Bills we have had conferences; there have been endless committees; there have been conferences at Royal Palaces, and there have been Conventions in Ireland; but the members who took part in those conferences always came out by the same door as they went in. They arrived at nothing. There were no conclusions. I also read in the papers repeatedly that this is "a golden opportunity," that "the cup is at our lips," that "the ball is at our feet," that "the tide is at full flow." Why, if the ball is at our feet, does nobody ever kick a goal? Why does nobody ever quaff the bowl if it is so often at our lips? Why does the clock never strike? Why do all these golden opportunities vanish and come to nothing?

The reason is that a solution on national lines seems to me to be quite vain; and I wish to say here that in drawing attention to this view of the matter I am not for a moment suggesting that the failure of those Bills and the failure of those efforts to settle the question were due to any incompetency or dishonesty of any sort on the part of the Ministers or the Governments who brought in those measures. I believe that all the people who endeavoured in the past to settle the Irish question in these ways meant well and even produced clever Bills. Still, the fact remains, their attempts were failures, and they were failures because the conditions of the case did not apparently permit of any solution on those lines.

After examining these various proposals, I always found myself returning with redoubled confidence to my old original Unionist position. One of the facts that became clear in these efforts to settle the Irish question on Home Rule lines was that every Home Rule Bill that was proposed seemed as an inevitable result to lead either to partition or to civil war. When the last Bill was before the House in the spring of 1914—when that Bill was going to become law—we were on the verge of civil war. Now we are on the verge of the partition of Ireland. These are the only two developments which are possible out of the Home Rule policy—either civil war or partition—and I don't happen to be in favour of either of them. Therefore I am a Unionist, and cannot support a measure like this.

This Bill is a pure partition Bill. It is for the division and dismemberment of Ireland. It is going to divide up Ireland into two sections. Preparations are already being made for the cutting up of Ireland. I believe that this policy of partition is hateful to every Irishman. I believe that every Unionist, anyway in the South and West of Ireland, and a great many in the North of Ireland, look upon partition as the most deplorable and disastrous result that can come out of this national movement. Furthermore, I believe that in the eyes of every Nationalist and Sinn Feiner it is the most abhorrentsolution of the Irish question that you can produce. It is obviously in their case the complete destruction and annihilation of all their aims. It absolutely abolishes the ideals that have inspired the whole of the Nationalist movement, and for which undoubtedly many sacrifices have been made.

I said I would try and see how this proposed solution of the Irish question by partition had come about. How is it that you propose now to unravel the Hibernian knot by cutting Ireland in two? I believe this fataldénouementis the direct and culminating result of the manner in which the Nationalist movement was conducted in Ireland for the last thirty or forty years. The Nationalists of Ireland never dealt at all with any of the obstacles or difficulties that stood in the way of their policy. They preferred to ignore all the difficulties. Yet these obstacles had to be removed and settled if a National policy was to have any success. They preferred, however, to ignore and even to deny the Irish opposition to their movement. They never made any attempt to come to any understanding with Ulster in the matter. Irishmen have a great gift for denying the existence of anything they do not like. Irishmen are said to be untruthful, and I do think they have a wonderful talent for deceiving themselves. There is no one an Irishman lies to so much as he lies to himself. But the net result is that, of course, this talent comes to its day of reckoning. Facts cannot be entirely avoided. They come home in the end, and so, on account of the manner in which Nationalists for thirty or forty years made no effort to deal with obstacles and difficulties, emanating from Ireland, we find ourselves up against the disastrous and grotesque position embodied in this Bill.

Although the Nationalists of Ireland in no way attempted to meet Ulster, or to come to some understanding with her, but denied and practically ignored her existence, yet Ulster was always there. Her position was perfectly manifest. She avowed it from the beginning and has upheld it since 1886, when Lord Randolph Churchill said that Ulster would fight and Ulster would be right, and when Mr. Gladstone offered to consider the treatment of Ulster separately from the rest of. Ireland. In so far as the Nationalists did recognise the existence of Ulster they seemed to do everything to antagonise her, and also, for that matter, any other Unionist in the South and West of Ireland. They seemed to me to preach hatred and intolerance of every Irishman who did not agree with them. That was a fatal attitude to take up in the case of the growth of a National movement. It was perfectly obvious that the wisest course would have been to endeavour to meet Irish opposition and come to some form of agreement. It was impossible for the National policy to succeed unless the Irish people were practically one people. Instead of that, they pooh-poohed Ulster; said their action was all bluff and only the action of a handful of people. But all the time Ulster was an important section of the Irish community that could not be neglected in any settlement in Ireland.

As the result of all this we are brought up against the question of the partition of Ireland. We were supposed to be dealing with Home Rule and self-determination in Ireland as a whole, and as that was the National policy I never could understand why the Irish Members did not devote all their energies to converting, not England or Scotland, which did not matter comparatively speaking, but Ulster. I will quote what should have been the guiding maxim of the Nationalists, as stated by an old Fenian. He said: It would be of infinitely more service to Ireland to convert ten Ulster Orangemen to Home Rule than to convince a million Englishmen. I would ask your Lordships to consider what this partition will mean in Ireland. In the first place, it will mean a huge waste of public money. Unnecessary expenditure will have to be made in the case of every public service. Every institution in Ireland will have to be duplicated. There will be two judiciaries, two systems of local government, two systems of education, two systems of administrative Government, two systems of taxation, and of every public and civil service in the country. That means an enormous amount of unnecessary expenditure. Each of those services is at present run and controlled by one body. Talking of duplication, let me give one example. There is only one asylum for the whole of Ireland for criminal lunatics. I venture to say to my friends in Ulster that one of the first things the Northern Parliament will have to do will be to found a criminal lunatic asylum in the vicinity of Belfast.

You are duplicating Ireland. You are creating two Irelands, and I would have thought that—I say this between you and me—one Ireland was quite enough. In addition to this great public waste there will be an accentuation of every cleavage that divides Irish society at the present time. I do not think those cleavages will be healed by shutting up the two parties and religions in separate compartments. You talk of founding a Parliament for the North of Ireland and a Parliament for the South of Ireland—that is not geographically correct. What you really are doing is founding a Catholic Parliament and a Protestant Parliament. We hear that these two Parliaments will come together. If they were to do so, if we could induce them to work together it would be well. The Catholics and Protestants of Ireland can and do get on together. I have had the honour of being Chairman of a Viceregal Commission recently, dealing with primary education in Ireland. Primary education is one of the most contentious subjects in the government of a country. Every part of Ireland was represented on that Commission. I sat with a Catholic Bishop on my right and with a Protestant Bishop on my left. There was a Catholic Canon on my right and a Protestant Canon on my left. Canons to right of me and Canons to left of me. There was a Presbyterian clergyman from the North of Ireland, an Orangeman from Queen's University, Belfast, and a Fellow of Trinity College, Dublin. Others were present from various parts of Ireland, from Kerry to Tyrone, and we came to a unanimous agreement on most contentious matters in connection with primary education. Therefore I believe that when fellow countrymen come together and discuss matters, they can come to an understanding and an agreement, or at worst, we can accommodate the particular views that one of the Parties is very keen on, without any serious interference with the other.

What are you doing here? You are dividing up Ireland into two hostile camps, for that is what constituting a Catholic Parliament and a Protestant Parliament means. I am told that it does not very much matter founding two camps because both sides will have hostages. That is an extraordinary argument. It does not matter very much because there are Catholics in the Protestant part of Ireland and Protestants in the Catholic part of Ireland! I am even told the minorities are pretty equal, so that there is nothing unfair in the matter, that if a Protestant is maltreated in the South of Ireland, well, a Catholic can be maltreated in the North; if a man's ears are cut off in Kerry, you can cut a man's ears off in Portadown; if Mr. Devlin, the member for Belfast, is in any way maltreated or injured, well, my noble friend the Earl of Dunraven can be maltreated or injured, and so on.

The noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack and other noble Lords have delivered eloquent passages about the possible future unity of Ireland. I hope it will come about, but I doubt it very much. These separate Parliaments will be differently composed. There will be a big majority of Protestants in one and a big majority of Catholics in the other. If they were together they might come to an understanding, but when you deliberately put up Parliaments with large majorities of one way of thinking in each of them it is obvious that they will move more and more away from one another, so that instead of coming together in a few years we shall find that these Parliaments have gone farther and farther apart—in education, taxation, possibly marriage laws, in all sorts of ways they will have diverged.

If the Parliament in Dublin follows the example of the local government councils in Ireland and makes Irish a compulsory language, in ten years time it will not be any good these Parliaments coming together because the members will not understand one another; they will talk different languages. I recognise the earnestness with which the noble and learned Lord referred to the union of Ireland. But it sounded to me, if I may be allowed to say so, rather as though the President of the Divorce Court in pronouncing a decree of divorce between two parties were to deliver a homily to them on the advisability of their speedy re-marriage.

Now, my Lords who wants partition in Ireland? The Church of Ireland—that is the Episcopalian Protestant Church—is entirely against partition. Cardinal Logue, the head of the Catholic Church in Ireland:— It would be infinitely better to remain as we are for fifty years to come under English rule than to accept partition. Mr. Devlin said he would sooner have his head cut off than consent to partition. Nothing destroyed Mr. John Redmond and his Party more than the fact that they accepted, or acquiesced in, the idea of partition whether temporary or permanent. Nothing injured that Party more; nothing is more responsible for the rise of republican movement in Ireland. It was not in 1916, but in 1914 before the rebellion that they first agreed to it. I constantly read articles in the Press about the cause of the complete fiasco of the Nationalist movement under Mr. Redmond and his Party. It is attributed to various reasons, conscription and so forth, and I daresay they had something to do with it. But I am convinced that the original and fundamental cause of the complete breakdown of the Nationalist Party in Ireland was the fact that they acquiesced in the idea of the partition of Ireland. They never got over it. That was in the spring of 1914 when the Amendment Bill to the Home Rule Bill was introduced into this House, and in 1916 the policy of partition was further supported by them.

We hear a great deal about the enthusiasm for this Bill of the members of this House who come from Ulster. What of the elected representatives of the people of Ulster in another place? I am not certain whether Sir Edward Carson said he loathed and detested this Bill, but I think he did. However, neither he nor any of the Ulster Members voted for this Bill. They took part in Committee, they voted for Amendments, but when the principle of the Bill was before the other House on First, Second, and Third Readings, not one of them voted in favour of this Bill. That is a remarkable fact, and I confess it does not seem to coincide with the attitude of the Duke of Abercorn and other Peers living within the six-county area. They talk about a change of feeling in Ulster, but the Third Reading of the Bill took place in the House of Commons only a fortnight ago when, for the third time, all the Ulster Members walked out of the House and did not vote for the principle of the Bill. It is still more remarkable that three of those Ulster Members were also members of the Government. We are told that this is a first-class measure, that the life of the Government depends upon it, and yet those three members of the Government did not vote for it—a thing unheard of in the case of a first-class measure, dealing with the country, too, that the members come from and represent.

With reference to partition, let me give you a few short quotations showing what public representative bodies in Ireland say about it. One says, "The worst form of Castle Rule would be preferable to having the country divided." Another says, "A partition of the country is worse than no settlement of the Irish question." Another says, "Better twenty years of Martial Law, coercion, and persecution than partition." These are a few views from Ireland on this measure.

I have endeavoured briefly to show how this proposed solution of the Irish question arose, what it means, and how it is regarded in Ireland. I hope it will be voted against by every Irish Peer. I have heard, I regret to say, that certain Peers from the North of Ireland are going to vote for the Bill. I would remind them that they will be the first Irishmen to vote for this Bill. No Irishman has yet done so. What are they afraid of They are, they say, afraid of the 1914 Act. I will hazard a remark about that. The 1914 Act is so unpopular in Ireland and at the same time so unpopular is the idea of dividing Ireland that the Irish people would sooner see the Home Rule Act of 1914 repealed than this Bill become law. In saying this I believe I express the view of the Irish people as a whole. For all these reasons I cannot then support this Bill for the dismemberment of Ireland.

Some of us thought that the Nationalist movement would result in this dénouement. I foresaw what is happening, and I feared it. I believe we Irish can get on together. I hate this Bill for the deepening of the Boyne instead of the bridging of the Boyne. If this Bill has to become law, if we are up against it, if there is no way of avoiding it, if partition is to come about, then in trying to be hopeful, though it is a very faint and distant hope, I pray that the South of Ireland will face the situation, and will make the best of it. I also venture to say to those who may be in both these Houses that I hope that whatever happens, however much separated they are, they will never, never forget that they are partners of one common country.

LORD MONTEAGLE OF BRANDON

My Lords, after the entertainment, so welcome to the House, provided by my noble friend who has just sat down, I shall not detain the House long. In the few remarks that I have to make I shall not attempt to discuss the question at large. The financial defects of the Bill have been so thoroughly exposed by Lord Donoughmore and the partition defects have been so thoroughly exposed by Lord Killanin that I will not at this hour go into either of these matters, though these are my principal objections to the Bill. I had my opportunity and said my say on the 1st of July, when I introduced a Bill to confer Dominion status upon Ireland. I am not going to repeat my arguments on this occasion, or to attempt to emulate the forcible arguments which have just been offered by the noble Lords to whom I have referred. I introduced that Bill because of my objection to what I conceived to be, and still understand to be, the main principle of this Bill—the partition of Ireland, involved in setting up two coordinate Parliaments and two coordinate Governments. I also wished to emphasize the belief that I held that the only alternative to this Bill (assuming that some form of Home Rule is inevitable) which was possible of acceptance in Ireland and would keep Ireland within the Empire was to confer the widest possible measure of self-government, including financial and fiscal autonomy. That was the main principle of my Bill. As to the method in which that was to be done, I favoured the adoption of a Constituent Assembly.

When I introduced that Bill I was rather a voice crying in the wilderness. But since that time, five months ago, there have begun to appear oases in my wilderness, and these have even lately begun to spread and to increase. I need only briefly refer to the remarkable pronouncements of several Prelates of the Roman Catholic Church, the resolutions passed by Chambers of Commerce, by meetings of magistrates, Lieutenants and Deputy-Lieutenants and other county meetings, and meetings in provincial towns, the deputation of the Cork business community to the Prime Minister on August 4, the peace conference in Dublin which shortly succeeded that in response to the Prime Minister's invitation, and last, not least, the resolution passed by the Unionist Anti-Partition League.

All those bodies practically adopted something very much resembling that principle of fiscal and financial autonomy. Many of them expressly adopted it as the irreducible minimum of the great body of moderate opinion, both Unionist and Nationalist, in the South of Ireland. My noble friend, Lord Dunraven, in moving the rejection of my Bill, criticised me severely for calling my plan by the name of Dominion status. I am well aware that many of my friends from the South of Ireland have joined in that criticism, mainly, I think, on the ground that the status which I proposed, and which the Irish Dominion League had been advocating, was not genuine Dominion status, because it reserved to the Imperial Parliament the Army and Navy and the whole question of defence. I adopted that reservation not merely because I believe it to be a necessity as regarded from the British point of view, but because I believe it to be essential for Ireland itself. But whatever it may be called, the principle of the proposal rested mainly upon financial autonomy. I am not going to argue that question now.

I rise for the purpose of pointing out that in addition to the remarkable expression of opinion in Ireland there have been pronouncements from the leaders of the Labour Party in England, and following upon that a remarkable pronouncement from the Irish Labour Party. The pronouncement of the English Labour Party was duly reported in the Press, and I think it showed a very significant trend of movement of opinion in this country. Taken in connection with that the pronouncement of the Irish Labour Party which followed was of supreme significance and importance. May I revert briefly to the proposals put forward by Mr. Adamson in the House of Commons? He said this— Let arrangements be made at once for calling together a Constituent Assembly elected on the basis of proportional representation by secret vote. Let that Constituent Assembly draw up a Constitution for Ireland on the understanding that that Constitution shall be accepted subject to two conditions. The first is, that it affords protection to the minority … and the second is that the Constitution will prevent Ireland from becoming a military or naval power. It is obvious that that is a very considerable advance on what the Labour Party said previously, and it should be remarked that it expressly avoids excluding a Republic. But it very seriously qualifies the powers that the Labour Party contemplate should be permitted to be included in such a measure. The first of the conditions seems to point to arrangements being made that should be satisfactory to Ulster, and the second condition clearly points—Mr. Adamson did not give any precise definition—to provisions being made for safeguarding defence. That I think must result in reserving defence, which I believe all but the most extreme Sinn Feiner would be quite willing should be reserved. These pronouncements surely merit the grave consideration of this House and of the Government.

During the same debate in which Mr. Adamson put forward this proposal, the Prime Minister deplored Ireland being in a temper, and then used these significant words— What is wanted is an atmosphere in Ireland where you can get calm consideration of what has been proposed and what the Imperial Parliament suggests, and what further suggestions Ireland has to make. We have never ruled that out. I was delighted to hear, in the eloquent speech of the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack yesterday, that he thoroughly endorses that, and that he will still welcome expressions of opinion from Ireland from all quarters as to modifications of the present proposals. The proposals of Mr. Adamson were put forward on Friday, 11th November, and on the following Tuesday, the Irish Labour Party in Dublin unanimously adopted that resolution. Is it not a very significant fact that at a time when the Irish Labour Party were in the middle of a serious railway crisis they should have so far met the proposals of the English Labour Party? I, at any rate, regard that as a very hopeful sign. Remember that the Irish Labour Party are almost entirely Sinn Fein. Outside Ulster, I suppose, they are entirely Sinn Fein. Remember that this unanimous vote took place at a time of great crisis for Irish labour. I think I may also ask you to bear in mind that at the Irish Convention, the Labour representatives persistently pursued a moderating policy. They supported Mr. Redmond in the compromise he arrived at with the Southern Unionists. I think that in itself is a hope for the future.

I do not wish to detain the House further at this hour. I should like to have said a word about Ulster, but I have on previous occasions reverted to that position. I have never been one of those who belittled the position of Ulster or disregarded its importance. I have always held that Ulster should have been considered, and I thoroughly agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Killanin, has just said as to the folly of the Nationalist Party in disregarding it. I have always held that Ulster should be treated, as the Irish Peace Conference laid down, as an equal contracting party in the matter. But I cannot for the life of me see that there is any necessity for setting up two co-ordinated Parliaments and two co-ordinated Governments. These are likely to keep Ireland divided rather than bring her together. For the purpose of bringing the various elements together it would be a far more fruitful course to have a Constituent Assembly at which all parties would attend, and at which Ulster would have the right of a free contracting party.

In conclusion, I only wish to say that while I cannot vote for this Bill, I feel bound to support the Amendment of Lord Dunraven, I hope His Majesty's Government may still see its way to accept the suggestion which I believe is to be put forward by Lord Midleton for giving further time for moderate opinion to make itself heard and a reconsideration of the financial provisions of the Bill. In voting against the Bill I am far from wishing to place any bar in the way of any sincere attempt to settle this great question. My support of Home Rule is not a counsel of despair. I do not despair of Ireland, and may I say, I do not despair of this House giving consideration to the just claims of Ireland.

TILE MARQUESS OF LINLITHGOW

My Lords, in rising at this late hour may I say that your Lordships are safe in my hands in the matter of brevity. For the same reason the noble Lord who has just sat down will absolve me of the charge of discourtesy if I do not pursue him in the arguments he has advanced, but address myself to the considerations to which I desire to draw attention.

In surveying a measure of the nature of the Bill now before your Lordships two tests may be applied. You may ask yourself how far the proposal meets the conditions and the necessities of the moment; but you may also examine the scheme with a view to discovering whether the main principles which it contains are those to which history gives the sanction of success. And I submit this to your Lordships, that the more permanent the work upon which you are engaged, the mare weight should you attach to considerations of principle and the less to those of expediency.

My Lords, the main principle that you are asked to endorse in this Bill is that of race as the basis of nationality. This measure proposes to divide Ireland into two parts, with the people of truly Irish origin to the south of the boundary, and the people of English and Scottish descent to the north. I am well aware of the crudity of this picture, but it suffices for my purpose that every one of your Lordships recognises the distinction between a Southern Irishman and an Ulsterman. Indeed, speaker after speaker in this debate has recognised this distinction. The noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack said that— The population of Ulster resembles more closely the population of Scotland than the population of Southern Ireland. While Lord Massereene said— I have always held that in considering the question of the Government of Ireland it is no use disguising the fact that you have to deal with two races. Each of the two areas so formed is to become a political entity; each is to be blessed—if blessing it be—with all the apparatus, legislative, judicial, and executive, of nationhood; and each is doomed to live, for a period to which no man may set a term, within the deaden- ing and acrid limits of its own self-interest. And with only this faint hope of reprieve, that upon the very instrument that will divide them there is written the pious—I was going to say the cynical—aspiration that some day they may again be one.

I find myself in agreement with Lord Oranmore and Browne in attributing many of our troubles in these days to the baneful influence of the catch-word "self-determination." Blindly accepted, ruthlessly applied, it is capable of inflicting infinite mischief and anguish upon the world. Born at the White House, this phrase flew round all the continents. Its power is evident upon the map of Europe to-day. Some there are, I suppose, who see in the jumble of States which now stand where once was the great Austro-Hungarian Empire the beginning of true light and liberty in the world. But then there are others who, in contemplating this array of weak and immature States lying on the fringe of a Germany still in being, are reminded of the spectacle of a convalescent by whose bedside there has been set some of those part-digested and dessicated foods, so well calculated to nourish his impoverished frame. And Germany is still after all in being.

My Lords, there is one area in Europe where this principle of race as the basis of nationality has been given a fair trial. I refer to the Balkans, and I do not know that it has in that area been a shining light and example of peace and tranquility. Indeed, nations are strong, not because they contain but one race, but because they combine within their boundaries the good qualities of different races. The greatness of the Anglo-Saxon peoples has sprung from no single parent, but is drawn from a mixture of races. The political genius of Britain is the direct result of the clash of contending outlooks and tendencies confined within the limits of one political system. And, my Lords, when, as in Ireland, it is proposed to draw political boundaries coincident more or less with the frontiers of the two religions to which the great part of the population adheres, the danger becomes great indeed. Unhappy the land where the vicious anachronism of inter-tribal hatred is fed by the consuming passions of sectarian strife. Some there are who hold that the fruits of this Bill will be a Unified Ireland in which the people of Ulster will blend their genius with that of the more indigenous stock. Is it really in that spirit that the rank and file of the Ulstermen—those who consider themselves as the British garrison in Ireland—view this measure? I doubt it. Surely to them this measure is a security against their greatest dread, a Dublin Parliament. It is to them a call to man the old defences. It is up with the drawbridge and down with the portcullis, the beginning of a long and anxious vigil in which the price of failure will be the loss of dear and hard-won liberties.

These views are well understood and sympathised with by all your Lordships. But if it can be shown that the setting up of an independent Parliament in Ulster is, in itself, a menace to the stability of political institutions in Great Britain, then it may be supposed that your Lordships would hesitate to give legislative sanction to any such scheme. Ulster opinion is, I suppose, to be fairly described as consisting on the one hand of Belfast with its immediate neighbourhood, and on the other of the Protestant farmer group. Now, Belfast and its neighbourhood is, as every one knows, a purely commercial and industrial area, and its inhabitants bear a close resemblance to those of the Clyde Valley. The ways and outlook of those groups, in the Clyde Valley on the one hand and Belfast on the other, are largely the same. But with this distinction, that whereas the Clyde workers have had nothing to distract their minds from the absorbing polemics of industrial strife, the Belfast worker up to a few months ago had for generations been concerned more with the maintenance of the political union between Ireland and England than with anything else.

Now it may confidently be presumed that, given an independent local Parliament in Ulster, the tendency there will be to elect a Labour Government of extreme type. But matters may go further than that, and you may have in Belfast the attempt to make an experiment of a daring nature, such, for instance, as a Workmen's Commonwealth on the lines of the Soviet system. If such a thing should come to pass you cannot segregate its influence to the immediate surroundings. And when you contemplate making Ulster a separate political entity it is reasonable to test the wisdom of the step by asking yourselves whether you would be prepared to make, for instance, the Clyde Valley a like political unit. If, upon the grounds which I have ventured to set before your Lordships, I cannot support, a proposal to sever the North of Ireland from the South, I could not for like reasons countenance the severance of Ireland from the United Kingdom.

I hold that the Irish people have given to the common stock of British ideas and culture, precious values of piety, of art, and, as has been demonstrated to us tonight, of humour. I believe that the peculiar qualities of the English are equally vital to the future of Ireland. What union, public or private, has ever existed of which nothing derogatory may be advanced. Yet men are patient with the evils because the good preponderates. Even, then, if I held that the state of Ireland in 1906 was the zenith of what we might reasonably hope for under the Union, I should still vote against this Bill. As it is, it is surely reasonable to hope that under the Union Ireland may come to better things than any of which she has ever dreamed. Who can believe—I say this with great respect—in the face of evidence that is all about us, that the individual citizen of whatever Church he is a member, be his piety ever so great, will for ever submit to a system that makes possible the use of religious authority as a weapon of temporal power? The noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack, in a moment of self-revelation which smacked a little of the fashionable art of autobiography, told the House that while still a Unionist in principle he was prepared to stomach this Bill because he was apprehensive as to the staunchness of those who may succeed him in power; and held that, to use a colloquialism, the sooner Ireland is made fool-proof the better. An interesting doctrine indeed, and we are entitled to hope that the present Administration may remain long enough in power to extend the benefits of its prophylactic treatment to India and to Egypt. Nor will your Lordships be too much influenced by the bogey of the 1914 Act. It is disturbing the Lord Chancellor's mind a good deal now. Not so as late as last year, because in a discussion on local Parliaments, on the Motion of the late Lord Brassey, the noble and learned Lord said— It would, of course, be idle to come before your Lordships, as to come before any assembly of Englishmen at the present time, and say, We recommend that a Legislature, whatever it deals with, be set up for Ireland. No one would listen to it. My Lords, it is uncertainty, that poison specific to the Celtic mind, that is torturing Ireland to-day. Remove it, and you will be astonished at the rapidity of her recovery.

These are days of peculiar difficulty. Public opinion in this country, weary and worn with four long years of war, battling with all the disturbing influences of an inflated currency, borne down by high prices and enormous taxation, has been quiescent, almost neutral, as to the Irish question. Give us peace, they cry, and let us mourn our dead and rehabilitate our stricken country without having in our ears this everlasting jangle which is the Irish question. Yet who amongst your Lordships believes that human happiness, even human quietude, were ever attained in a lasting degree by a refusal to face facts and to meet them? The noble and learned Lord in charge of the Bill attempted to divide his opponents by an argument against coalition. How shocking, he finds it, that those who dislike a thing for different reasons should combine to defeat it. I cannot believe that your Lordships are likely to be influenced by a trick of words that would leave a provincial jury wholly unmoved. I for one, my Lords, am bound to vote against the Second Reading of this Bill because—

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

When the noble Marquess describes what he has ventured to say is a "trick of words" he had better take the trouble to see what I put forward. Which of these parties in the combination under consideration that might assist in defeating the Bill is able itself to put forward any alternative—even if it had no responsibility of Government—to apply to existing circumstances?

THE MARQUESS OF LINLITHGOW

In spite of what the noble and learned Lord has said I hold firmly that those who argue that this Bill goes too far and those who contend that it does not go far enough may perfectly consistently support the Amendment of Lord Dunraven. I hold with every fibre of my mind that this Bill contains principles fatal to the stability of Great Britain and incompatible with the security of the Imperial structure—a structure precious for its past but more for its promise, a thing built by the hands of our fathers and sanctified now by the bloody sacrifice and the tees of half our generations.

LORD FARNHAM

My Lords, I beg to move that the debate be now adjourned.

Moved accordingly, and, on Question, further debate adjourned until to-morrow.